Translating Cuba – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

Raúl Castro’s Most Bitter Birthday

The man who a decade ago shook hands with the US president at diplomatic ceremonies is today an old man cornered by the justice system of that same country and reviled in Washington

A few meters from the Faculty of Dentistry, a newly erected billboard interrupts the urban landscape: “Raúl is Raúl.” / 14ymedio/Capture

I walk by the corner of Carlos III and Rancho Boyeros Avenue in Havana. A few meters from the Faculty of Dentistry, a newly erected billboard interrupts the urban landscape. It doesn’t announce a campaign against Washington, nor a partisan rally, nor even any of those slogans that have survived the passage of time like old furniture that no one dares to take out of the house. It simply says: “Raúl is Raúl.”

The phrase, that purports to be a celebration of Raúl Castro’s 95th birthday on June 3rd, has a strange effect. Four stars, a dark green background, and the insignia of an Army general convert the sign into something much more like a death notice than a tribute. The message doesn’t convey vitality, but rather evokes farewell. As if those who ordered its placement knew that the end of an era was approaching.

It is difficult to look at that billboard and not think about the distance that separates the man who turns 95 today from the figure who for decades held the second most powerful position in Cuba. For much of his public life, Raúl Castro existed in the shadow of his brother Fidel. From the years of the insurrection to the consolidation of authoritarian power, his role was that of an indispensable companion, a disciplined executor, and the guarantor of the military and repressive machinery.

While Fidel Castro favored improvisation, interminable speeches, and epic campaigns, Raúl cultivated an image of a pragmatic administrator.

It was Fidel Castro who drew him into the revolutionary adventure and placed him in all the key positions of the system. But it was also Fidel who condemned him to a subordinate political existence. For half a century, Raúl was the eternal number two.

However, those who knew him well always insisted that there were important differences between the two brothers. While Fidel Castro favored improvisation, endless speeches, and epic campaigns, Raúl cultivated an image of a pragmatic administrator. While one seemed obsessed with history, the other was focused on the mechanisms of power. While one spoke to the masses, the other preferred continue reading

to control the internal workings of the military and party apparatus.

That reputation for pragmatism fueled many national and international expectations when he officially assumed the presidency in 2008, following Fidel Castro’s illness. Within and outside Cuba an optimistic narrative was established. There was talk of reforms, of modernization, and of a possible economic opening. Even of a gradual political liberalization.

Some absurd prohibitions disappeared. Cubans could stay in hotels previously reserved for foreigners, buy cell phones, buy and sell their homes and cars, and access certain consumer spaces that had been off-limits for years. Later came immigration reform and the limited expansion of self-employment.

But the illusion did not last long.

The country that spent decades asking for change received more of the same. It asked for reforms and got stagnation. It dreamed of a future and was saddled with more permanence.

The transformations never touched the core of the system: the political monopoly of the Communist Party, the lack of civil liberties, and military control over strategic sectors of the economy. What many imagined as a transition ended up resembling more of a cosmetic operation designed to preserve the existing order and make the international community believe that Cuba was embarking on a path toward openness.

The moment that best symbolized those hopes was probably Barack Obama’s visit to Havana in March 2016. Images of Raúl Castro alongside the US president traveled the world. For a few hours, it seemed possible to imagine a different future for the island. A less isolated country. Less trapped by its own ideological ghosts.

Ten years later, that scene seems to belong to another life.

Today, Obama’s former interlocutor is surrounded by a completely different context. He was recently indicted in the United States on several charges, including murder, in relation to the 1996 downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes, an incident that left four dead and profoundly strained relations between Havana and Washington.

The paradox is brutal. The man who a decade ago shook hands with the US president at diplomatic ceremonies is today an elderly man cornered by the justice system of that same country and vilified in Washington.

Nor does the political legacy he leaves behind help. Among his most unfortunate decisions was choosing Miguel Díaz-Canel as his successor. He not only appointed him, but also imposed upon him a motto that later became official doctrine: “Continuity.”

For a society exhausted by hardship, mass emigration, and economic deterioration, that slogan sounded more like a threat than a promise. The country, that had been demanding change for decades, received more of the same. It asked for reforms and got stagnation. It dreamed of a future and was saddled with more permanence. The Island-wide protests of 11 July 2021, ultimately revealed the depth of that rift between Raúl Castro’s regime and the population.

Today, as rumors multiply about his health and his disconnection from reality, it is impossible to know how much Raúl Castro knows about what’s happening beyond the walls that protect him. Perhaps he still receives daily reports, or perhaps he’s increasingly detached from the daily lives of Cubans. Perhaps he isn’t even fully informed about the legal proceedings against him in the United States.

This June, Castro turns 95 at one of the worst moments of his public career. Isolated, internationally criticized, and with a country in ruins. The only thing that seems to remain today is an old man facing the judgment of history, a tribunal far more implacable than any he has known in his lifetime.

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Raúl Castro, the Enforcer ‘Time Magazine’ Saw Born Alongside the Revolution

In January 1959, while half the world was still celebrating Batista’s downfall, Fidel’s younger brother was already appearing in the international press as an architect of terror.

The image contradicts the later narrative that sought to portray him as a pragmatic administrator, less charismatic but more rational than Fidel. / Adelante

14ymedio, Havana, June 3, 2026 — “Quarrelsome and envious” was how a Jesuit priest described the younger brother who accompanied Fidel Castro at a Catholic school in Santiago de Cuba. Time Magazine recorded it in a report published on January 26, 1959, barely three weeks after Fidel Castro’s triumphant entry into Havana.

The article, titled The Vengeful Visionary, was not yet a retrospective reading of Castroism, but rather a snapshot taken in the heat of the moment. The text portrayed, with remarkable clarity, the birth of the Revolution, its euphoric crowds, and at the same time the machinery of death that was beginning to operate in the name of revolutionary justice.

Although the explicit protagonist of the cover story was Fidel Castro, Time’s text offers an early key to understanding Raúl. He appears there less as his older brother’s shadow than as the executor of a policy already defined by revenge and by the normalization of exemplary punishment. The magazine described the first executions as the moment when the victors, who had promised democracy, justice, and honest government, “clung to the arrogant instruments of dictatorship.”

While Fidel estimated that fewer than 450 men would be executed, his younger brother boasted that “a thousand might die”

The harshest passage is the one devoted to Santiago de Cuba. According to Time, the revolutionary tribunals operated with rebels serving simultaneously as prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. Sentences were handed down in summary proceedings and carried out just as quickly. In Santiago, the magazine added, “the show was under the personal command of Raúl, Fidel’s 28-year-old brother, a slant-eyed man who had already executed 30 ‘informers’ during two years of guerrilla warfare.”

The publication portrays him with a coldness that remains striking today. The context was that of mass executions, with priests continue reading

available to hear the condemned men’s final confessions before they faced the firing squad. While Fidel estimated that fewer than 450 men would be executed, his younger brother boasted that “a thousand might die.”

The scene at Santiago’s firing range reads like a preview of the country that was to come. A trench twelve meters long, three meters wide, and three meters deep; prisoners transferred before dawn from Boniato prison; confessions heard by six priests; condemned men with their hands tied; and bodies falling into the pit. One rebel murmured: “Let it end quickly. I have pain in my soul.” By noon, according to the account, 70 prisoners had died.

In that architecture of terror, Raúl Castro does not appear as an improviser, but as an enforcer. Fidel justified the repression with fiery speeches and appeals to the suffering of Batista’s victims. Raúl, by contrast, embodied the administrative side of violence: organizing, commanding, carrying out, and sustaining the mechanism. That difference would define much of his later career within the regime. Fidel needed to present violence as exceptional justice. Raúl seemed comfortable with violence as a method of power.

“Let it end quickly. I have pain in my soul”

Time’s account does not absolve Batista. It describes with stark detail the corruption, torture, and police sadism of his regime. But that is precisely what makes the reading more disturbing. The magazine acknowledges the previous horrors and yet warns that the new government was nullifying the Constitution, holding summary trials, and turning revenge into a public spectacle. The dilemma was not whether Batista had been brutal, but whether the Revolution was prepared to establish the rule of law or a new dictatorship of terror.

Raúl Castro is placed firmly on that second path. Before becoming Minister of the Armed Forces, before formally inheriting power, before becoming the face of Castroist continuity, he was already there: in Santiago, beside the mass graves, in command of the rifles. The image contradicts the later narrative that sought to portray him as a pragmatic administrator, less charismatic but more rational than Fidel.

What Time saw in 1959 was something else: the birth of a political culture in which obedience was imposed at gunpoint and the law could be suspended “in the name of the people.” Raúl Castro was not merely an observer of that drift. He was one of its first visible enforcers, and the magazine portrayed him even then as a man who took pleasure in pulling the trigger and filling graves with corpses.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Dollar Reaches a Record 600 Cuban Pesos on the Informal Currency Market

Those who receive remittances are celebrating the rise, but prices have also increased significantly, and people on the street are noticing.

The official exchange rate stands this Wednesday at 524 pesos per dollar. “Nobody sells to the State,” says Roberto. “It’s like stealing from yourself.” / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 3, 2026 — The day Laritza had been waiting for has arrived. For weeks, this retired Havana resident has been holding on to the 100 dollars she received from relatives abroad, waiting for the informal exchange rate to reach the magic number of 600 pesos per dollar. “Although they never give you the exact amount listed, the best will change at 5 or 10 pesos below,” she admits with satisfaction.

Exactly one month ago, the U.S. currency was trading at 535 CUP, but the acceleration has been surprising even for a currency that has spent years trapped in a spiral of devaluation. “The situation for the Cuban Government is worsening, and no understanding with the United States that could bring improvement is in sight. The main indicators of the Cuban economy continue in free fall, and their impact is reflected in the depreciation of the Cuban peso over the last five years,” stated the May bulletin of the Observatory of Currencies and Finance (OMFi), directed by Pavel Vidal.

That analysis was released in mid-May, when the dollar was trading at 540 pesos, according to El Toque’s informal exchange rate. On June 2, the currency jumped eight points and reached 600.

The more they earn, the more everything around them becomes more expensive. “And there are also the hard-currency stores, where shopping becomes more expensive too”

“For those of us who receive remittances, it benefits us in a certain way, although food, toiletries, and everything else go up in price. So in the end, it makes no difference,” says Roberto, a reseller in Havana who echoes not only the fears of the poorest Cubans continue reading

but also the concerns of people like himself who do business. The more they earn, the more everything around them becomes more expensive. “And there are also the hard-currency stores, where shopping becomes more expensive too,” he adds.

Prices have risen significantly, and people are noticing. “The imported garlic bulbs that I bought a few weeks ago for 50 pesos are now 150. Cristal beer already costs 400 pesos in the neighborhood’s private markets, and all imported products are going up,” María told this newspaper.

In December 2025, the Government launched a floating exchange rate in an attempt to compete with the informal market rate, which had become the real benchmark among the population. After years of open warfare with El Toque for publishing an exchange rate far higher than the State’s, the official buying and selling price was set at 410 pesos per dollar—in addition to the other existing rates of 24 for state enterprises, and 120 for entities capable of generating foreign currency. Besides being an attempt to recapture the lost foreign-exchange market, the regime was also trying to contain inflation, which continues to climb, although less dramatically than in 2023 and 2024, not because of economic improvement, but because of generalized poverty.

The official exchange rate stands this Wednesday at 524 pesos per dollar. “Nobody sells to the State,” Roberto insists. “It’s like stealing from yourself,” he says mischievously. María agrees. “The other day I overheard an argument about that between a neighbor and a cousin who had just arrived from Europe and made the mistake of exchanging a few hundred dollars at the Havana airport when he landed. ‘Boy, you don’t do that, you lost out every way possible,’ the one who lives here in our building told him,” she recalls. “Any vendor at the farmers’ market will give you more pesos for that amount of dollars. Here people will come looking for you, carry your bags, and even shine your shoes if it means you’ll sell them your dollars,” she adds.

Private business owners sometimes use that trick to justify only a tiny portion of all the dollars they handle

Although it is not always easy. “You have to go to several places looking for someone who will pay a better price. Some small and medium-sized businesses want to take them 30 or 40 pesos below the El Toque rate, so you go from one business to another until you find a better deal,” Roberto explains.

“There’s a self-employed businessman here who buys dollars and always posts ‘five pesos below El Toque‘, so it’s still above the State’s rate. Serious guy, money neatly bundled in groups of 1,000 pesos, and a trusted clientele. No lines, and you don’t even have to show your ID card. So who would go to the State with that other offer?” the reseller argues.

For Laritza, some people do, but they are the minority. “The naïve, the newly arrived, or people who need a record of the transaction. Private business owners sometimes use that trick to justify only a tiny portion of all the dollars they handle. That way they have a receipt to show inspectors to justify purchases of certain goods in dollar stores,” she says.

The retiree, who resells to a “mule” who brings merchandise from Panama, speaks about the mixed blessings of these increases in the value of foreign currency. “She’s always chasing us around asking whether we have a Cabezón (the 100-dollar bill with Benjamin Franklin’s face on it). She’s told us she has had to raise the prices of all the products in her little shop because, with the current dollar exchange rate, the merchandise she brings in has become more expensive. As an added advantage—and we don’t know how she does it—she always pays in cash and with large bills, but other informal currency traders are having a very hard time obtaining enough cash to give their customers,” she notes.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Exodus of Hotel Chains From Cuba Continues, With the Departure of the Asian Company Aston

Archipelago Internacional breaks its relationship with Gaesa, following in the footsteps of Spain’s Iberostar and Canada’s Blue Diamond.

The Grand Aston Havana hotel was controversial from its inception, built by Gaesa during a time of deep economic crisis in the country. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 2, 2026 / Archipelago International, Southeast Asia’s largest privately owned hotel management group, followed in the footsteps of Spain’s Iberostar and Canada’s Blue Diamond this week by ending its management of hotels linked to Gaviota, the chain controlled by the Business Administration Group SA (Gaesa), the conglomerate of the Armed Forces in Cuba.

The decision comes just days before the deadline, June 5, set by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), to end the operations of foreign companies linked to Gaesa, under threat of sanctions.

Archipelago’s hotels in Cuba, operating under the Aston brand—the Grand Aston Havana, Grand Aston Varadero, Grand Aston Cayo Paredón, Grand Aston Cayo Las Brujas, and Aston Costa Verde—are now in a situation similar to that of the properties abandoned by Iberostar and Blue Diamond. They may remain open, but would be managed by Gaviota, which, given the OFAC sanctions, will find it difficult to partner with a new foreign operator. 14ymedio confirmed this during a visit today to the Grand Aston in Havana, which remains open—albeit empty—under Gaviota’s management.

The Grand Aston Havana’s cafeteria was empty of customers on Tuesday. Hotel employees confirmed that the establishment has been taken over by Gaviota’s management.

Archipelago’s departure affects recently built, opulent hotels like the Grand Aston La Habana, controversial since its opening, given that Gaesa constructed it amidst a deep economic crisis that directly impacted the population. The Grand Aston, like the Iberostar Selection Habana—located in the controversial Torre K and now closed due to the crisis—was developed in the post-pandemic period. While shortages were growing and urban decay was evident in many areas of Havana, the Cuban state prioritized the construction continue reading

of large hotel facilities for international tourism.

The Grand Aston was controversial from its opening, given that Gaesa had built it at the same time as a deep economic crisis was developing that was affecting the population.

Before Archipelago’s withdrawal, announced yesterday, the Grand Aston was already suffering from the decline in tourism on the island. According to employee testimonies to 14ymedio, business had recently become so low that, in some cases, employees were told “not to come to work, there were no tourists.”

Meliá, for now, has not announced changes to its plans for Cuba. Half of its hotels are closed due to the consequences of the energy crisis, exacerbated by US sanctions and the oil embargo. Of Meliá’s 34 hotels in Cuba, at least 15 are co-managed by Gaviota : many of the large resorts on the keys and some of the newer hotels in Varadero.

In Havana, the majority of hotels operated by the Balearic company remain linked to the state-owned groups Cubanacán or Gran Caribe. This is the case with the Meliá Cohiba, the Meliá Habana, and the Hotel Sevilla, among others.

Meliá manages 14,053 rooms on the island, representing approximately 14% of its global portfolio. A withdrawal from Cuba would impact its stock price, which had risen 40% this year.

It is still unclear how the sanctions will affect Meliá’s presence in Cuba, or what the company’s strategy will be to disassociate itself from Gaesa if necessary.

The hotel chain’s president and CEO, Gabriel Escarrer, acknowledged last month that the situation in Cuba is “difficult” and “unsustainable,” and that the chain is continuing its strategy of consolidating the few tourists who visit the island into fewer hotels. “I think that today few people know what’s going to happen with Cuba,” he said at the time when asked about Meliá’s future in Cuba.

Escarrer—son of Escarrer Juliá, founder of the hotel chain and a close associate of Fidel Castro—was already sanctioned by OFAC in February 2020. At that time, the businessman, visiting Cuba to attend the Tourism Fair, claimed to be indifferent to the sanctions and said his intention was to remain on the island for at least another three decades. “We will not tremble in the face of any external pressures we may experience,” he insisted.

Last February, when Washington’s sanctions against Gaesa had not yet intensified, Escarrer had declared: “It is not our intention to withdraw [from Cuba] in any way and we feel very comfortable with the leadership position.”

The decision by the Asian airline Aston was revealed by the Dominican media outlet aerocoa.com, close to the deadline imposed by the U.S. State Department under Executive Order 14404, signed by President Donald Trump on May 1st. This order mandated sanctions against “those responsible for repression in Cuba and threats to U.S. national security and foreign policy.” A few days later, the decree began to take effect with specific sanctions against GAESA, its president, Ania Guillermina Lastres, and Moa Nickel SA.

Although Cubanacán is on OFAC’s SDN list and is sanctioned by the agency, it does not belong to the Gaesa conglomerate, which the State Department directly targeted.

This Monday, the Spanish company Iberostar announced its disassociation from Gaviota , leaving under its management in Cuba only those hotels that were owned by Cubanacán or Gran Caribe. Last Saturday, Blue Diamond announced that it would cease its operations and the use of its brands in Cuba “with immediate effect.”

Although Cubanacán is on the OFAC SDN list and is sanctioned by the agency, it does not belong to the Gaesa conglomerate, which the State Department directly targeted on May 7.

The sanctions, however, could also be extended to the state entities Cubanacán, Gran Caribe and Islazul if so determined by the State Department and OFAC, given that Executive Order 14400 considers as a criterion of linkage with the Government of Cuba the “ownership, control or direct management of the entities.”

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A Child Prisoner Is Beaten and Threatened With Solitary Confinement for Protesting in Morón, Cuba

Christian de Jesús Crespo Álvarez, 16, is being held in Canaleta prison and his family does not receive direct information about his health status

14ymedio, Madrid, May 30, 2026 / Christian de Jesús Crespo Álvarez even had the food his family had brought to prison for him taken away. When the 16-year-old complained about the disappearance of his belongings at the Canaleta prison in Ciego de Ávila, he was beaten. Afterward, according to Cubalex, he was threatened with being sent to solitary confinement. Since then, his family has been unable to find out anything about his condition.

Christian is one of the minors detained after the March 13 protest in Morón, a demonstration sparked by blackouts, shortages, and mounting frustration in a city that ultimately became the scene of yet another repressive operation. His case joins those of other teenagers in Cuba who are treated as highly dangerous criminals for their opposition to the government.

According to the alert published by Cubalex, the young man was transferred from Canaleta prison to the Provincial Instruction Unit for further questioning. He remained there for approximately four days. Upon returning to the prison, he discovered that his belongings were missing, and his complaint ended in violence.

According to the alert published by Cubalex, the young man was transferred from Canaleta prison to the Provincial Instruction Unit

In his last communication with his family, the teenager said he wasn’t feeling well, that he was very down, and that his urine was dark in color, a symptom that raised alarms among his relatives.

The family later learned, indirectly, that Christian had been taken to the prison infirmary. However, they received no information about a diagnosis, treatment, or medical progress. They have also had no direct contact with him since the call in which the boy alerted them to his physical and psychological continue reading

deterioration.

Cubalex maintains that Christian has suffered mistreatment at the hands of both other inmates and prison officials. The situation is especially serious because he is a teenager being held in conditions that the organization considers extremely vulnerable and lacking legal protection.

The minor is accused of sabotage, although, according to Cubalex, no formal charges have yet been filed. The accusation places the case in a highly serious legal context, despite the fact that the events originated during a social protest. The organization also reported that State Security continues to conduct forensic analysis based on videos posted on social media and recordings made by Communist Party officials during the demonstration.

The minor is accused of sabotage, although, according to Cubalex, there is no formal request from the prosecutor so far.

The pressure isn’t limited to Christian. Cubalex claims that the minors detained after the Morón protest are being subjected to constant interrogations to force them to confess to receiving payments for demonstrating and to record or sign statements of remorse. The organization alleges that the intention is to construct a political narrative that portrays a citizen protest as a foreign-funded operation.

At least four teenagers were identified by Cubalex among those detained for the events of March 13: Jonathan David Muir Burgos, 16; Christian de Jesús Crespo Álvarez, also 16; Kevin Samuel Echeverría Rodríguez and Yohasnel Estrada Rodríguez, both 17. All were caught in a penal machinery that the regime usually activates after protests: first the arrests, then incommunicado detention, later the exemplary accusations.

The case of Jonathan Muir had already raised concerns among international organizations. He, too, was accused of sabotage and sent to Canaleta prison. His family denounced the conditions of his confinement and the psychological impact of prison on a minor. Now, the complaint against Christian reinforces the suspicion that these are not isolated cases, but rather a practice aimed at intimidating other young people who might join future protests.

Cubalex demanded the immediate release of Christian and the other minors detained for exercising their rights. “Protest is not a crime,” the organization reiterated, also calling for an end to the isolation, violence, arbitrary punishments, and coercive interrogations of adolescents.

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José Daniel Ferrer: The Voice of Cuba That Travels Through Europe

From Madrid to Stockholm: Cuba’s freedom knocks on the doors of the old continent

Ferrer carries with him a truth that the Cuban dictatorship has tried to hide for more than six decades. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Jorge Luis León, Houston, May 31, 2026 / There are moments in history when a single voice manages to express the feelings of millions. Not because it speaks louder than others, but because it speaks with the authority that comes from sacrifice, consistency, and perseverance. Today, that Cuban voice resonating across Europe is that of José Daniel Ferrer.

From Madrid to Stockholm, from parliaments to civil institutions, from political meetings to human rights forums, Ferrer carries with him a truth that the Cuban dictatorship has tried to hide for more than six decades: the tragedy of a nation deprived of freedom and the unyielding yearning of a people who wish to live with dignity.

The importance of this European tour transcends the agenda of meetings and diplomatic protocols. It is a task of enormous historical significance. Each encounter represents an opportunity to show the Cuban reality without propaganda filters; each intervention constitutes a denunciation of the repression; each contact strengthens the international ties that will be necessary for the democratic reconstruction of the nation.

Ferrer is building bridges with political leaders, democratic organizations, human rights institutions, and influential sectors of European society.

Europe listens because it recognizes the legitimacy that arises from resistance. José Daniel Ferrer doesn’t arrive backed by speeches crafted in comfortable offices or by advertising campaigns. He arrives backed by years of imprisonment, constant persecution, beatings, humiliations, and a will that never bowed to fear.

That trajectory transforms his words into something more than political opinions. They are testimonies of a struggle sustained for decades. They are living proof that in Cuba there are men and women who have confronted absolute power without renouncing their principles.

This trip also has a strategic dimension that should not be underestimated. Free nations understand the importance of preparing for the future. Ferrer is building bridges with political leaders, democratic organizations, human rights institutions, and influential sectors of European society. These are contacts that can play a significant role when the time comes for national transformation.

There is also a message of unity that runs through each of these days.

The future Cuba will need friends, cooperation, investment, institutional support, and international recognition. No democratic transition can be built in isolation. History shows that major changes are usually accompanied by intense diplomatic efforts and a broad network of international solidarity.

Therefore, this tour of Europe is not simply a political trip. It is part of the preparation for a new era. It is Cuba’s presence in arenas where, for too long, the regime’s official version has prevailed.

There is also a message of unity that runs through each of these days. Ferrer doesn’t speak solely on behalf of one organization or a specific sector. He speaks for political prisoners, for families separated by exile, for young people who dream of a better future, for those who suffer poverty, for those who have lost hope, and for those who continue to resist within the island.

This is no time for opportunistic leaders or fleeting prophets.

The voice that is heard in Europe today is that of a Cuba that refuses to surrender.

This is no time for false hopes or improvisation. This is no time for opportunistic leaders or fleeting prophets. This is a time for serious work, historical responsibility, and national unity.

As José Daniel Ferrer travels across Europe, the cause of Cuban freedom advances one step further. Every door that opens, every alliance that strengthens, and every awareness that awakens brings us a little closer to the day when Cuba will once again occupy its rightful place among the democratic nations of the world.

Tyranny can control newspapers, courts, and prisons. It can sow fear and build walls. But it cannot indefinitely halt the march of history.

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The Cuban Regime Presents Gaesa as the Entity That Has Made It Possible to Save the Revolution

In a statement defending the corporation, Havana denies accusations of “opacity” and claims it has always reported its activities “to the Party, the State, and the Government.”

Image of a Cimex office, part of Gaesa, in Holguín. / Granma

14ymedio, Madrid, June 2, 2026 — The Cuban Government has issued an institutional statement, published by the official press, defending the military conglomerate Gaesa, which has come under intense pressure from Washington over the past month. In the text, the regime argues that the group has provided “countless” services to the nation by generating foreign currency that was later used to “confront the economic war” waged by the United States.

In describing the company’s role, the Government focuses on investments made by the Business Administration Group (Gaesa) in the public sector, while overlooking one of the main reasons many Cubans resent the conglomerate: the high percentage of resources it devoted to hotel construction even as the tourism business was in clear decline. “Its objective has always been to bring together companies capable of generating foreign currency and resources that the State requires to maintain and develop social achievements and contribute to the advancement of sectors and branches of national life,” the statement argues.

To support its case, the statement cites the construction of more than 10,000 homes throughout the country

To support its case, the statement cites the construction of more than 10,000 homes throughout the country despite a housing deficit exceeding 600,000 units, the creation of a children’s pioneer camp and vacation programs, and “the way the Cuban economy was sustained during the pandemic years,” without specifying exactly what that means.

The foreign currency collected by Gaesa has also been used, the statement continues, to invest in the severely deteriorated continue reading

Lidio Ramón Pérez thermoelectric plant in Felton, Holguín; major hydraulic projects such as the East-West and North-South water transfer systems; as well as polyclinics, family doctor offices, and schools.

The statement attempts to strongly counter accusations of opacity surrounding the company, though it falls short by merely asserting that its activities have been “systematically reported to the leadership of the Party, the State, and the Government” and have been subject to maximum oversight and auditing by authorities. However, Gaesa does not even publish a basic annual activity or financial report, as would be expected from a company seeking to rebut allegations of “opacity” or “secrecy,” both terms explicitly mentioned in the text.

The statement suggests that information is withheld in order to avoid what the regime has often described as persecution. “Thousands of men and women, over the last 30 years, have been discreet guardians of the country’s resources and deserve recognition. Although their work has not been told often enough, it speaks for itself and rises above the state-sponsored slander orchestrated from Washington,” the text adds.

The defense of the military conglomerate occupies the second half of the statement, while the opening paragraphs appear aimed more directly at Miami than Washington. The White House is not spared criticism, however, being accused of “acting with deliberate intent” to destroy the Revolution, including its historical and current leaders, and thereby confuse both domestic and international public opinion. But the true architects of this strategy, the statement claims, are “ideologues of the Cuban-American far right, who pride themselves on being creative and unpredictable.”

But the true architects of this strategy, the statement claims, are “ideologues of the Cuban-American far right, who pride themselves on being creative and unpredictable

The statement says that the May 1 executive order, which opens the door to sanctions against foreign companies cooperating with Gaesa, “constitutes the most intense, disproportionate, and dangerous escalation in the recent history of relations” between the two countries, because it seeks to “isolate the country diplomatically, commercially, financially, and energetically; undermine the nation’s sustainability; condition dialogue; and evaluate options for military aggression.”

Since the announcement of the measure, several international companies have severed ties with the military corporation in sectors ranging from logistics to tourism. This comes in addition to earlier actions, such as pressure to end Cuba’s international medical missions and restrictions on oil shipments, under which only two fuel tankers have arrived in Cuba so far this year: one from Mexico in early January and another from Russia in March, after the new order had already been issued.

“The GAE”—as the statement refers to the company, omitting the final initials corresponding to “Corporation” (Sociedad Anónima)—“is not the product of secrecy, nor of elites, much less a vehicle for the enrichment of a few,” the document states. In recent weeks, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has estimated Gaesa’s reserves at $18 billion, based on financial information published by the Miami Herald in August 2025. However, The Economist argued last March that the military conglomerate is on the verge of bankruptcy precisely because of its excessive investments in tourism. “Before the United States tightened restrictions, Gaesa barely had one billion dollars in reserves,” the publication said.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Costa Rica Announces a Regularization Program for Thousands of Cuban Asylum Applicants

Nicaraguans, Venezuelans, and Colombians are also included in the measure, which aims to ease pressure on an overwhelmed system.

The regularization program opens the door for hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers whose applications are either pending or have been denied. / Jesuit Migrant Service

14ymedio, Madrid, June 2, 2026 — Costa Rica announced on Monday the creation of an extraordinary regularization program for Cuban, Nicaraguan, Venezuelan, and Colombian asylum seekers whose applications are still pending or have been rejected.

“They may apply for the special temporary category for Nicaraguan, Venezuelan, Cuban, and Colombian nationals whose applications for refugee status recognition are pending resolution or have been denied,” states Article 1 of the resolution approving the measure, which was confirmed by Costa Rica’s General Directorate of Migration and Immigration (DGME) to the local press.

The official information refers to the “challenges and possible delays in the refugee status determination system” and notes that there is a “large number of people” from those nationalities with asylum cases awaiting resolution. This has led authorities to consider a regulation of this kind necessary in order to provide a “mechanism aimed at the protection and legal stay” of these individuals.

The greatest advantage of the resolution is that it will allow beneficiaries to work legally and thereby contribute to the formal economy, as specified in Article 2.

The greatest advantage of the resolution is that it will allow beneficiaries to work legally and thereby contribute to the formal economy, as specified in Article 2. “The beneficiary of this special category will have unrestricted authorization to engage in any paid employment activity, whether self-employed or working for an employer.”

The measure may benefit people who have continue reading

been living in the country illegally for many years, since it applies to those who applied for asylum between June 1, 2014, and May 7, 2026. The DGME will verify on its own that the application was filed and that applicants do not hold any other valid immigration status or have any regularization process other than an asylum claim.

The category will authorize residence in Costa Rica for a period of two years, renewable indefinitely for additional periods of the same length. “However, before the document is renewed, the foreign national’s migration movements will be verified in accordance with Article 36 of the General Migration and Immigration Law,” the resolution states.

Beneficiaries of the measure will be able to enter and leave Costa Rica subject to the usual controls. However, if irregular travel movements are detected, the individual must provide documents and evidence explaining “the reasons why such movement does not appear in the records. If the reasons are not justified, renewal will not be authorized.”

The DGME also warned that this status may be revoked if it is determined that the person poses a threat to public security or fails to meet the requirements for renewal. It will also be lost if the individual has been convicted of a crime within the previous ten years.

Estimates by the Costa Rican press place the number of Cubans residing in the country at between 10,000 and 15,000

The resolution also establishes that anyone who fails to renew the document within three months after its expiration will automatically lose the immigration benefit without further proceedings.

Costa Rica has traditionally served as a transit country for Cubans traveling from South America to the United States. However, thousands have settled in the country, one of the most politically and economically stable in the region, with high levels of security and quality of life. Estimates by the Costa Rican press suggest that between 10,000 and 15,000 Cubans currently reside there.

The DGME reports approximately 7,300 pending asylum applications from Cubans, making them the second- or third-largest nationality group seeking asylum, behind Nicaraguans—whose pending applications numbered around 190,000 in the summer of 2025—and, at times, Venezuelans.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Iberostar Follows Blue Diamond’s Lead and Leaves Gaesa Hotels

The Spanish hotel chain remains active in Cuba through six properties belonging to Cubanacán and Gran Caribe.

The Grand Packard in Havana is one of the Gaviota hotels from which Iberostar is withdrawing. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 1, 2026 — On Monday, the Spanish hotel company Iberostar severed its ties with Gaviota, the hotel chain controlled by the Business Administration Group S.A. (Gaesa), and stopped managing the twelve hotels associated with that entity. The company will maintain its presence in Cuba through properties whose state-owned partners belong to other tourism groups not linked to the military conglomerate, including Cubanacán and Gran Caribe.

The decision became public shortly before the deadline imposed by the U.S. Department of State under Executive Order 14404, signed by President Donald Trump on May 1, 2026, which called for sanctions against “those responsible for repression in Cuba and threats to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” A few days later, the decree began taking concrete form through specific sanctions against Gaesa, its president Ania Guillermina Lastres, and Moa Nickel S.A.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) set June 5, 2026, as the deadline for companies to terminate their operations or risk exposure to sanctions.

“As of June 1, 2026, these establishments will no longer be managed, marketed, or promoted under the Iberostar brand”

On Monday, 14ymedio confirmed that several hotels previously managed by Iberostar and owned by Gaesa remain open, but are now under the direct administration of Gaviota, as occurred with the withdrawal of Blue Diamond Resorts last Saturday.

Staff at the Grand Packard Hotel explained: “If you try to book an Iberostar hotel in Havana through travel agencies, what will come up is Parque Central, which is still managed by that company. To book with us, you have to do it directly here or through Gaviota.” By contrast, representatives at the Parque Central Hotel—owned by Cubanacán—confirmed to 14ymedio that “Iberostar executives are working here today without any problem, and the company remains at this hotel.”

Iberostar continues operating the Selection Parque Central, a Cubanacán property. / 14ymedio

Iberostar’s withdrawal was announced through the Argentine tour operator Sudameria. In the company’s statement, it explained that, “as part of a process of adaptation to the international regulatory environment” and in order to preserve its standards of quality, compliance, and management, Iberostar Cuba Hotels & Resorts “will cease operating and continue reading

marketing a group of hotels in Cuba as of June 1, 2026.”

The company stated that the measure ends any commercial, operational, or branding relationship between Iberostar Cuba Hotels & Resorts and the establishments included in the decision.

Among the 12 hotels from which Iberostar is withdrawing and whose ownership is linked to Gaesa are the Hotel Grand Packard on Prado Avenue; the Iberostar Selection Habana, located in the controversial Torre K [K Tower] and currently closed due to the crisis; the Iberostar Selection Ensenachos in Cayo Santa María; the Iberostar Origin Bella Vista Varadero; and the Iberostar Selection Esmeralda, among others.

“As of June 1, 2026, these establishments will no longer be managed, marketed, or promoted under the Iberostar brand,” according to the statement. They will now be managed directly by Gaviota.

Although Cubanacán appears on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list and is sanctioned by the agency, it is not part of the Gaesa conglomerate, which the United States directly sanctioned on May 7

Through the Iberostar Cuba website, only hotels without links to Gaesa can currently be booked, including the Hotel Inglaterra and Iberostar Selection Parque Central, both Cubanacán properties in Havana, as well as the Iberostar Origin Daiquiri in Cayo Guillermo and the Iberostar Origin Taínos in Varadero, both owned by Gran Caribe.

Although Cubanacán appears on OFAC’s SDN list and is sanctioned by the agency, it is not part of the Gaesa conglomerate, which the U.S. State Department directly sanctioned on May 7.

The sanctions could nevertheless be extended to state-owned entities such as Cubanacán, Gran Caribe, and Islazul if the State Department and OFAC determine that they meet the criteria outlined in Orden Ejecutiva 14400, which includes “ownership, control, or direct management by the Government of Cuba.”

Iberostar is following the path taken by the Canadian hotel company Blue Diamond Resorts, one of the main foreign operators in Cuba’s tourism sector over the past decade, which ended its operations on the Island “with immediate effect” last Saturday.

The hotel chain Meliá, which operates between 32 and 35 properties in Cuba, also faces the possibility of sanctions and is under increasing pressure to define its position before the deadline established by the U.S. Department of State.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Davisleydi Velazco, Triple Jumper Expelled from Cuba, Breaks a Record by 50 Centimeters in France

The athlete from Camagüey has been on the rise since leaving the Island and settling in Puerto Rico, the country she hopes to represent.

Davisleydi Velazco achieved the third-best mark in the world this season with her 14.83-meter jump. / Facebook

14ymedio, Havana, June 1, 2026 — Cuban athlete Davisleydi Velazco shattered the triple jump record at the International Meeting of Forbach, France, on Sunday, breaking a mark that had stood for 17 years. With only two attempts, one of them measuring 14.83 meters, the athlete, who left Cuba in 2023 in search of better opportunities, surpassed by half a meter the previous record of 14.33 meters set by France’s Tereza Nzola Mesa in the 2009 edition of the event.

The 26-year-old triple jumper, who was permanently removed from Cuba’s list of eligible athletes last September, also recorded a jump of 14.77 meters, which would likewise have erased the competition record from the books. Both marks were far superior to those achieved by the second- and third-place finishers. Silver went to France’s Ilionis Guillaume with a jump of 14.09 meters, while Germany’s Kira Wittmann completed the podium with 13.89 meters.

With her performance this weekend, Velazco, who competes as an independent athlete, provided further evidence of her excellent form just days after jumping 14.85 meters, her personal best and the third-best mark in the world this season, which earned her the gold medal at the Coqui International Cup held at Paseo de los Artistas in Caguas, Puerto Rico, on May 17.

“I confirmed that dreams can be achieved when you work with faith, discipline, and heart. We keep dreaming, we keep fighting, because this is only the beginning”

The competition was not easy, as she was engaged in a fierce battle with Dominica’s Thea Lafond, the reigning Olympic champion in the event, whom she defeated by just one continue reading

centimeter. “I confirmed that dreams can be achieved when you work with faith, discipline, and heart. We keep dreaming, we keep fighting, because this is only the beginning,” she said after winning the competition.

According to the specialized website Swing Completo, the athlete is likely to surpass the 15-meter mark, given the steady improvement she has shown since leaving Cuba and settling in Puerto Rico, the country she hopes to represent.

In 2025, she enjoyed the best season of her career. In March of last year, she recorded a jump of 14.36 meters at the Spring Break Classic in Carolina, Puerto Rico. That was followed by marks of 14.32 in Tucson, 14.26 in Kingston, 14.61 in Memphis, and 14.38 meters in Florence.

“Her 14.54-meter jump in Gothenburg last July showed she was ready to reach the biggest stages, and in Brussels, on August 22, she achieved one of her best results and a new personal best of 14.72,” the specialized outlet Deporcuba wrote late last year while following the athlete’s progress.

Although she won a bronze medal for Cuba at the 2018 World U20 Athletics Championships in Tampere, Finland, she was later sidelined in several national selection processes. In an interview published last December by the Puerto Rican newspaper El Vocero, the athlete said that her career in Cuba had become “stagnant.” With no prospects for growth and faced with “the economic situation,” she felt compelled to seek new opportunities and leave the Island.

The athlete said that in Cuba her career had become “stagnant,” with no prospects or growth

Her journey took her through four countries, including several months spent between Mexico and the United States, before a turning point arrived when she was contacted by veteran Cuban coach Ubaldo Duany. Duany helped shape the careers of Colombian triple jumper Caterine Ibargüen, who won Olympic gold at Rio 2016, and Pedro Pichardo, the Cuban-born jumper who has won Olympic gold and silver for Portugal at Tokyo 2020 and Paris 2024.

The coach invited Velazco to train for a couple of months at his club in Puerto Rico. She accepted and ultimately decided to stay, a decision that marked a major turning point in her career.

The exodus of athletes due to a lack of opportunities has become a common feature of Cuban athletics. In 2021, triple jumper Cristian Nápoles and sprinter Reynier Mena requested their release from the Cuban Athletics Federation. Time has vindicated several of them. In June of last year, Mena won the 200-meter race at the Diamond League meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, with a time of 20.05 seconds. Days earlier, he had also won meets in Savona, Italy (20.15 seconds), and Norway (20.20 seconds).

As for the triple jumpers who have left Cuba, the event that most clearly highlighted Cuba’s shortcomings and the development of its expatriate athletes was the Paris 2024 Olympics. At those Games, emigrant jumpers swept the podium. Jordan Díaz, competing for Spain, won gold with a jump of 17.86 meters. Silver and bronze went to Pedro Pablo Pichardo of Portugal (17.84 meters) and Andy Díaz of Italy (17.64 meters), respectively.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuban Consulate in Cancún Urged to Speak Out Against Wave of Discrimination

Island Residents Report Sackings, Obstacles to Renting Housing and Social Rejection Following an Altercation in Supermanzana 23

The local press reported that the case began with a neighbourhood dispute related to a dog bite and ended with a strong public backlash

14ymedio, Havana, 31 May 2026 / Cuban residents in Mexico have called on the Island’s Foreign Ministry and its Consulate in Cancún to issue a public response to the hostile climate that, they claim, has been unleashed against the Cuban community in Quintana Roo following a recent incident in Supermanzana 23 of that tourist city. In a statement circulated on social media, the signatories denounce the fact that the diplomatic mission has remained silent in the face of episodes of discrimination that are no longer confined to the digital sphere but have begun to affect the daily lives of Cuban families who had no involvement in the events.

The text, titled The Need for Active and Impartial Consular Representation, expresses the “profound concern” of Cuban residents at “the lack of an official statement from the Cuban Foreign Ministry” after the case sparked a strong reaction on social media and, according to those making the complaint, gave rise to “real episodes of exclusion and discrimination” in the state of Quintana Roo.

The source of the tension was an altercation in Supermanzana 23 in Cancún, where Cubans Rigoberto “N” and Yudelmis “N” were detained by Mexican authorities and placed at the disposal of the National Migration Institute. The local press reported that the case began with a neighbourhood dispute related to a dog bite and ended with the intervention of security officers, damage to a property and a strong public backlash against those involved. From that point on, outrage directed at two individuals escalated, according to migrant support organisations, into a broader reaction against Cubans living in the area.

The demand is directed squarely at the Cuban General Consulate in Cancún, located in Supermanzana 20, just a few blocks from where the crisis unfolded

“Sadly, we watched with alarm as this online climate spilled over into daily life, affecting our hard-working families who had absolutely no part in these events,” the statement reads. The document cites reports from the civil organisation Cisvac – International Council Uniting Venezuela – which works with migrants and claims to have documented “multiple daily cases” of Cubans who have lost jobs, faced tenancy disputes or suffered direct workplace exclusion following the incident.

The demand is directed squarely at the Cuban General Consulate in Cancún, located in Supermanzana 20, just a few blocks from where the crisis unfolded. For the signatories, that proximity makes the absence of a public position all the more inexplicable. “We find it paradoxical and incomprehensible that our Consulate in Cancún has maintained absolute public silence,” the text states. continue reading

The absence of any response, they add, left the community “in a position of clear social and media vulnerability.” The reproach is not confined to the Cancún case. The document links that silence to a broader critique of Cuban consular work in Mexico – a country that has become a transit territory for those heading towards the northern border, or a place of waiting or forced return for thousands of Island migrants deported from the United States.

The residents’ perception is of a diplomacy that is absent when it comes to defending nationals who are not part of associations aligned with the Cuban Government

In recent years, Mexico has been one of the main routes for Cubans attempting to reach the United States, but also a chokepoint for those who fail to cross, are detained or are sent back from American territory. Added to this are those left stranded in southern Mexico, at immigration offices or on the northern border, without documents, without steady work and with no clear way out.

“A considerable number of our compatriots are stranded at various borders within Mexico, facing a severe migration limbo,” the statement warns. The text also refers to Cubans “deported or returned from the United States to Mexican territory,” who are left “in conditions of extreme vulnerability.”

The signatories argue that, given this situation, there should be “vigorous, high-level” consular management with Mexican immigration authorities to guarantee dignified treatment for Cubans in transit or forced return. However, the residents’ perception is the opposite: a diplomacy that is absent when it comes to defending nationals who are not part of associations aligned with the Cuban Government.

“Meetings are frequently organised at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico itself, directed exclusively at resident groups that maintain a direct affinity with the official discourse”

The statement touches on one of the most sensitive points in the relationship between the regime and its diaspora: selective representation. The signatories recall that consular protection consists of “inalienable rights, not political concessions,” enshrined in International Law and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In that regard, they question the fact that the Cuban Embassy in Mexico frequently organises meetings with resident groups aligned with the official line, while ignoring a broader majority that is plural, critical, or simply outside those circles.

“Meetings are frequently organised at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico itself, directed exclusively at resident groups that maintain a direct affinity with the official discourse,” they denounce. That practice, they add, “reinforces an unrealistic rhetoric that attempts to project the idea that all of us abroad support the Government, deliberately rendering invisible the vast majority of our community.”

The text insists that the most vulnerable Cubans are typically not members of those privileged associations. They are, precisely, those facing “migration limbo, border returns or workplace discrimination.” For these people, the signatories say, consular assistance should be exercised “in a strict, impartial manner, free from ideological bias of any kind.”

The statement concludes with three concrete demands: that the Cuban Foreign Ministry issue a public declaration on the situation of vulnerability facing the community in Cancún; that it establish transparent communication channels with civil organisations working with migrants on the ground; and that it assume “an active, inclusive and equitable role of diplomatic management in defence of all its nationals, without political conditions.”

Translated by GH

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Cuban Organizations in Europe Sign the Freedom Accord in Madrid

The ceremony, organized by Pasos de Cambio, brought together Cubans from cities across Spain and the rest of Europe in support of the Cuban opposition’s democratic transition roadmap.

MADRID, SPAIN — The Pasos de Cambio coalition held a signing ceremony in Madrid this Sunday for the historic Freedom Accord, with Cuban organizations from cities across Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Switzerland and Spain. The Accord was originally signed on March 2, 2026 in Miami by the two largest coalitions and forces of the Cuban opposition from inside the island and in exile.

The Accord was presented by Rosa María Payá, founder of Cuba Decide and coordinator of Pasos de Cambio; Brian Infante, representative of the Partido del Pueblo; Víctor Dueñas, Director of the NewGeneration Foundation; and Rocío Monasterio, for the first time as a member of the advisory board of the Fundación para la Democracia Panamericana.

Esperanza Aguirre, former President of the Community of Madrid and former President of the Senate of Spain, participated as a guest at the ceremony and shared her experience of solidarity with the cause of Cuba’s freedom from Spain.

Rosa María Payá stated at the close of the event:

“A moving gathering today in Madrid for the signing of the historic continue reading

Freedom Accord by Cuban organizations in Europe. Thank you to all Pasos de Cambio participants who traveled from cities across Spain and Europe to support with their presence and commitment our unity in favor of Cuba’s freedom. We are determined to work together for a free and democratic Cuba. The republic that will be home to all Cubans.”

Rocío Monasterio, who signed the Freedom Accord at the Madrid ceremony, declared:

“The Freedom Accord that we have signed today in Madrid is the path to freedom for all Cubans. It is of the utmost importance because of the role played by the unity of all opposition groups, and the unity of all Cubans — because all Cubans are now part of the opposition.”

The Freedom Accord establishes a three-phase democratic transition roadmap — Liberation; Stabilization and Reconstruction; and Democratization — culminating in Cuba’s first free, fair and multiparty elections in more than seventy years. It provides for a provisional transitional government with a limited mandate, the immediate release of all political prisoners, the restoration of fundamental freedoms, and the creation of nine specialized working commissions covering the principal areas of national life.

The Madrid ceremony takes place at a moment of historic acceleration for the Cuban cause: amid unceasing civic protests in Cuba, days after the United States government announced the indictment of Raúl Castro, and following the recent visit of Pasos de Cambio representatives to the European Parliament, where Members from across the political spectrum called for the suspension of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between the European Union and the Cuban regime.

The Madrid signing represents a concrete step in broadening and building the unity of Cuba’s democratic forces, and consolidates the Freedom Accord as a transition framework recognized on both sides of the Atlantic.

CONTACT: info@pasosdecambio.com

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About Pasos de Cambio

Pasos de Cambio is a platform of Cuban organizations, from inside the island and in exile, signatories of the Agreement for Democracy, which serves as a space to coordinate actions aimed at promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

Opposition Figure Roberto Veiga Returns to Cuba After Seven Years in Spain

The Catholic intellectual advocated dialogue with the regime, in contrast to the roadmap of the Pasos de Cambio coalition, which ratified the Liberation Agreement this Sunday in Madrid

Roberto Veiga says his organisation is committed to breaking a dynamic of confrontation that has borne no fruit / Facebook R.V.

14ymedio, Madrid, 1 June 2026 / Roberto Veiga González, director of the Centre for Studies on the Rule of Law Cuba Próxima, has returned to the Island in recent weeks to take up permanent residence there after nearly seven years in exile. The decision was announced by the organisation he founded in 2021 through a statement informing that State Security had already detained him upon his arrival – on a date they have not disclosed – and subjected him to several interrogations.

Veiga took this decision in order to “represent, from within the reality of a people afflicted by power cuts, scarcity, and social fracture, the political proposal entitled The Agreed Opening: A Roadmap for National Reconstruction.” This is a transition pathway proposed by Cuba Próxima last April that would “replace sterile confrontation with political realism.”

The platform – which also includes Michel Fernández, Ileana de La Guardia, and Pavel Vidal, among others – argues that inaction is not an option in the face of “a systemic crisis that has overwhelmed the current model,” and that “profound change is an ethical and national security imperative” under present circumstances. Accordingly, Veiga González returns to promote, alongside others, “a process of reciprocal and verifiable steps” that would break the current dynamic.

“The director of Cuba Próxima calmly accepts the hardships and pressures that political activism from within Cuba entails, which have already begun.”

“The director of Cuba Próxima calmly accepts the hardships and pressures that political activism from within Cuba entails, which have already begun,” the communiqué states, without going into much detail about the measures taken by State Security. “The rigour of commitment demands that personal sacrifice not be an instrument for victimhood or the pursuit of admiration, but a bridge of encounter so that other Cubans may move towards a shared solution,” the text underlines.

Cuba Próxima established eight strategic pillars in its proposal: full guarantee of all rights; a democratic and social rule-of-law state, with separation of powers and local autonomy; equal opportunities and social inclusion without discrimination; efficient public bodies at the service of the citizen; a free economy with social responsibility; centrality of the labour question and dignified wages; health, education, and social security as universal services; and sovereignty and strategic neutrality, grounded in peace and mutual respect. continue reading

The organisation believes that Veiga’s return demonstrates its commitment to this agenda and that “the freedom of the Cuban people is its non-negotiable destiny.” With this gesture, the Centre places itself, the statement asserts, “at the core of national necessity, convinced that Cuba can afford no further delays.”

The agreed opening proposal formalised by the organisation on 13 April last sets out a roadmap divided into three phases for national reconstruction through what it calls an internal “Multi-Actor Sovereign Dialogue” and the normalisation of relations with the United States. The document, drawn up by the board of directors, identifies as immediate priorities the release of political prisoners under an Amnesty Law, the restructuring of the military conglomerate Gaesa, and reform of the Electoral Law, all under the umbrella of international technical mediation.

The document also contains a list of demands addressed to the United States, including an end to the energy blockade imposed by Donald Trump since 29 January last.

The document also contains a list of demands addressed to the United States, including an end to the energy blockade imposed by Donald Trump since 29 January last, the removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, the lifting of the travel ban, and support for certain economic sectors, including emergency financing for an emergency food programme, a healthcare programme, and an energy programme.

The proposal has not been without controversy within the Cuban opposition, as those sectors that favour US intervention argue that the Cuban Government has shown no willingness to engage in dialogue over decades. Veiga and his team, on the other hand, believe that confrontation has likewise led nowhere.

The news comes precisely one day after the Pasos de Cambio coalition ratified in Madrid the Liberation Agreement presented in March in Miami – a document establishing a unified roadmap to guide a democratic transition in Cuba after 67 years of communism. Led by opposition figures such as Rosa María Payá and backed by organisations both on the Island and in exile, the plan opts for a pathway in which the regime plays no part.

The project envisages the creation of a provisional government to address the humanitarian emergency, release political prisoners, and restore citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms.

These opposing positions are precisely what led to the split between the lawyer and intellectual and his partner of more than 15 years, Lenier González. Both served as directors of the magazine Espacio Laical and the think tank Cuba Posible, which over time came to be regarded by the Cuban authorities as a threat, as it promoted conciliatory positions that were gaining traction – as both recounted in various interviews – among the more moderate members of the Communist Party.

The regime launched a campaign of harassment against the pair, who ultimately went into exile. Veiga settled in Spain, where he founded Cuba Próxima, while González moved to the United States and turned to academia, stepping back from politics. However, the latter has publicly criticised the former, attributing to him connections with senior government officials that have caused him serious reputational damage, as Veiga himself has recently lamented.

Translated by GH.

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Héctor Maseda, Prisoner of the Black Spring and Widower of Laura Pollán, Dies in Exile

An independent journalist and nuclear engineer, he was sentenced to 20 years in prison in 2003 and refused for years to accept exile as the price of his release.

Héctor Maseda, after his release in 2011, alongside his wife, Laura Pollán, leader of the Ladies in White. / Euronews

14ymedio Héctor Maseda Gutiérrez, an independent journalist, Cuban dissident, and one of the political prisoners of the Group of 75, died this Saturday in exile, according to journalist Camila Acosta. Members of the Cuban American National Foundation confirmed his death in Miami at the age of 83. His name became linked to one of the harshest chapters of Castro’s repression, the Black Spring of 2003, and also to the history of the Ladies in White, the movement that his wife, Laura Pollán, helped found and led for years to demand the freedom of those imprisoned.

A nuclear engineer by training, Maseda was born in Havana on January 18, 1943. Before becoming a leading voice in independent journalism, he worked in the scientific field until his lack of “political credibility” prevented him from pursuing a professional career within state institutions. In the mid-1990s, he began collaborating with the non-official press and was a founding member of the Decoro Working Group, an independent news agency persecuted by the regime.

His life changed forever in March 2003, when Fidel Castro’s regime launched a wave of repression against dissidents, librarians, independent journalists, and human rights activists. Maseda was arrested along with 74 other dissidents and sentenced to 20 years in prison. He was 60 years old at the time. The operation, known as Black Spring, sought to decapitate the peaceful opposition and send a warning message to any voice that deviated from the official narrative.

“I will withstand whatever comes”

In prison, Maseda was held in several penitentiaries, including Las Alambradas de Manaca, La Pendiente, and Agüica, according to records released by the Ladies in White. His file within the movement also included a phrase that characterized him: “I will resist whatever comes.”

During those years, Laura Pollán ceased to be merely the wife of a political prisoner and became one of the most recognizable figures of the Cuban dissident movement. Along with other women dressed in white, she walked every Sunday along Fifth Avenue in Miramar after attending Mass at continue reading

the Santa Rita Church. The image of those wives, mothers, and daughters with gladioli in their hands became unbearable for a regime accustomed to repression without witnesses. Pollán died in October 2011, a few months after her husband’s release, leaving behind a legacy of peaceful resistance that transcended the island.

From prison he wrote ‘Buried Alive’, a testimony about Cuban political imprisonment that circulated clandestinely

Maseda was released from prison on February 12, 2011, on parole, after nearly eight years behind bars. He refused the forced exile that the regime negotiated with the Catholic Church and the Spanish government to empty the prisons without acknowledging the innocence of those convicted. Reporters Without Borders emphasized at the time that his release did not overturn the 2003 sentence and that Maseda was part of the group of dissidents who refused to leave Cuba as a condition for their release.

In 2008, while still imprisoned, he received the International Press Freedom Award from the Committee to Protect Journalists. From prison, he wrote Buried Alive, a memoir about Cuban political imprisonment that circulated clandestinely and whose title encapsulated the experience of those condemned for exercising basic rights.

Maseda belongs to a generation of opposition figures who confronted Castroism without social media, with slower international coverage, and under a much more restrictive surveillance system. His case encapsulated several of the regime’s obsessions: the fear of independent journalism, the suppression of civic autonomy, and the desire to make exile an extension of imprisonment.

First Anniversary of the Death of Laura Pollán / Yoani Sanchez

Raúl Castro, From General to Prisoner

The former Cuban defense minister has many crimes for which he could be tried in the US

File photo of former Cuban President Raúl Castro. / EFE

14ymedio, Miami, Pedro Corzo, May 31, 2026 / I confess that few things would please me more than seeing Raúl Castro dressed in the orange jumpsuit of ordinary US prisoners, serving his sentence in a more severe prison. Although I doubt that a US prison of that kind would be any harsher than the less malevolent Castro regime’s prisons.

For 67 years, there has been no shortage of Cuba experts who emphatically assert that the younger Castro brother, the more organized, familial, and even condescending, compared to his brother, the greatest criminal in Cuban history, thankfully now deceased. While I have no evidence to refute most of the labels applied to Raúl, I can assure you that he is anything but tolerant, because I vividly recall one of the photos of this man published in early January 1959, showing him hanging a peasant in the Sierra Maestra mountains during the insurrection.

He then ordered hundreds of executions, including the San Juan Hill massacre in Santiago de Cuba, which occurred 11 days after the insurrection’s triumph, in which 71 men were summarily executed in a single night. They even used bulldozers, in true Hitlerian style.

Raúl was without a doubt Fidel’s most loyal servant. It is true that there have been stories of disagreements between the two autocrats, but even if they were true, the pair’s shared interests prevailed, to the great misfortune of the Cuban people. continue reading

Unfortunately, the most numerous and horrendous crimes of Castro’s totalitarianism have been against the Cuban people.

Raúl Castro, the serial killer Ernesto “Che” Guevara, and the “Butcher of Artemisa,” Ramiro Valdés, chose from the very first days of the revolutionary victory to assume the role of the most intransigent defenders of the process led by Fidel Castro. This bloody triad, headed by the criminal Raúl, was the one that, obeying the orders of the supreme leader, directed the spiritual and material destruction of a country that, with all its flaws, was at the forefront of many of the most important areas of development in Latin America.

I confess I haven’t the faintest idea how the trial will unfold against the man who gave the order to shoot down two unarmed planes flying in international waters, with the sole objective of saving lives in danger. The former Cuban Minister of Defense said, “I said, well, shoot them down in the sea when they appear and don’t ask questions,” a statement very similar to Guevara’s, who advised his henchmen, “Kill him, ask questions later,” or another, more institutional one, from the serial killer: “To send men to the firing squad, judicial proof is unnecessary.” Of Ramiro Valdés, there are no expressions, only murders.

Unfortunately, the most numerous and horrendous crimes of Castro’s totalitarian regime have been committed against the Cuban people within the country’s borders, but those crimes will have to be judged by their own citizens when the political situation in Cuba changes. For now, we must welcome the fact that the current US government has decided to take legal action against a self-confessed murderer like Raúl Castro, just as it did against the drug trafficker Nicolás Maduro, for a crime that could also be attributed to the second-in-command in the destruction of Cuba.

Raul Castro has many crimes for which he can be tried in the United States

According to a Miami Herald article, Raúl Castro met with Colombian drug traffickers in 1980 and authorized them to use Cuban ports for their drug trafficking to the US, in exchange for providing weapons and ammunition to the M-19 guerrillas. Years later, he met with one of Manuel Antonio Noriega’s men to mediate a dispute the Panamanian general was having with Colombian drug traffickers.

Manuel de Beunza, a former major in the Castro regime’s intelligence services, testified at a Senate hearing in Washington that Raúl Castro ordered Generoso Escudero replaced as head of the naval unit in Cienfuegos because he refused to cooperate in the deployment of speedboats transporting cocaine to the southern coast of Cuba. Furthermore, John Jairo “Popeye” Velásquez, a close associate of Pablo Escobar Gaviria, stated that the fugitive general maintained close ties with the Medellín cocaine cartel and protected drug shipments passing through Cuba en route to the southern coast of Florida.

Raul Castro has many crimes for which he can be tried by the United States.

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