Translator: Regina Anavy – Translating Cuba

Amid the Fuel Shortage, Cuba Denies Suspension of Activities

In a statement allegedly from the Presidency that went viral on social media, it was said that these measures were being adopted “in light of the escalation of hostile actions by the United States”

Before the arrest of Nicolás Maduro and the pause in the flow of Venezuelan oil to the Island, fuel shortages were already a constant / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, January 12, 2026 — The Government denied this Sunday rumors about the suspension of all labor and social activities starting this Monday on the Island. In a brief informational note, the Presidency stated that the information attributed to it, which had spread like wildfire on social media hours earlier, was not true and urged people to inform themselves “through official channels.”

The disavowed communication, which was headed with the phrase “Presidency of Cuba, official statement,” claimed that “all activities not considered of national priority are suspended.” The text added that state entities and companies would operate “only with indispensable personnel to guarantee essential services and the continuity of strategic activities.”

It further stated that there would also be no classes “at all educational levels (primary, secondary, pre-university, universities, and technical training) until further notice.”

Using language close to the tone of official communications, the supposed statement from the Presidency asserted that these measures were being adopted “in light of the escalation of hostile actions by the government of the United States” and urged Cubans to “remain calm and united.” continue reading

The alleged information from the Presidency claimed that these measures were being adopted “in light of the escalation of hostile actions by the United States”

In addition to the Presidency’s denial, some ministries, such as Labor and Education, also joined in the rebuttal, and dissemination relied on the full apparatus of state media, both on websites and on social media.

On Cubadebate, many readers responded to the note and pointed out that there was anxiety within the Cuban community abroad due to that statement. Nevertheless, the forum was also used by some to ask when information would be provided about the distribution of liquefied gas cylinders at points of sale. “Electricity continues to be heavily affected in the provinces,” wrote a user named El avileño.

This false statement surfaced amid a new threat by U.S. President Donald Trump toward the Castro regime. The Republican leader said this Sunday that Cuba must “reach an agreement” with Washington or face the definitive rupture of the economic ties that have sustained the Island for decades. Through his social network Truth Social, he added that “there will be no more oil or money for Cuba: zero!” in direct reference to the flow of crude oil and resources that Venezuela had supplied to Havana for years.

“There will be no more oil or money for Cuba: zero!” in direct reference to the flow of crude oil

Despite everything, the fuel shortage is beginning to be felt not only in the electricity generation deficit. Most gas stations in Havana are no longer dispensing fuel, as 14ymedio reported this Sunday. In East Havana, only 11 gas stations were offering service; another 10 were completely out of fuel. In the west of the capital, seven service stations had closed on Friday.

Uncertainty over Venezuelan oil shipments following the capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. troops on January 3 has further strained daily life, which was already marked by scarcity.

Another consequence of the lack of fuel was also felt in the capital last week. Hundreds of Havana residents were affected after almost all GAZelle minibuses operating in the city were taken out of service. Authorities reported last Wednesday that “only a small group” of these minibuses was operating and that “the few that are operational will not be able to carry out all planned trips.” Uncertainty was total, as the statement added that the lack of transportation would continue “until fuel allows it.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Most Cuban Season Ever for Pisa SC in Italy’s Series A

Young players Francesco Coppola and Brando Bettazzi, both born in Italy to Cuban mothers, have received several call-ups this season for the cup and the league.

Francesco Coppola is a 20-year-old center back, 6’5″ tall / Instagram

14ymedio, Matanzas, Andy Lans, January 12, 2026 — Players Francesco Coppola and Brando Bettazzi, both born in Italy to Cuban mothers, have received several call-ups to Pisa SC’s first team for the Coppa Italia and the current edition of Serie A, the top level of Italian football [soccer].

Pisa SC’s season has not been one for fireworks. After earning a commendable promotion in the previous campaign, the team currently finds itself in the relegation zone this season.

The squad includes well-known veterans such as Colombian international Juan Cuadrado and former Real Madrid player Raúl Albiol. However, a wave of injuries has also allowed head coach Alberto Gilardino, former AC Milan striker and member of Italy’s 2006 World Cup winning team, to add a Cuban flavor to the pitch.

In Francesco Coppola’s case, he comes from a very sports-oriented family. His older brothers, Domenico and Alessandro, have also been involved in football. Francesco played in Juventus’s youth system between 2019 and 2022, arriving from Torino. Nevertheless, it is in Pisa SC’s youth ranks that the now 20-year-old, 6’5″ tall center back has made his greatest progress. continue reading

It is in Pisa SC’s youth system where the now 20-year-old, 16’5″-tall center back has made his greatest progress.

In the 2023–2024 season, the young player became indispensable to the Under-19 squad, and in 2024–2025 he was sent on loan to Vis Pesaro of Serie C to gain experience at senior level. He started 35 matches in Italy’s third division and scored three goals, proving he was ready for more demanding professional challenges. Pisa had called him up for several Serie B and Serie A matches before, but his debut in Italy’s top flight did not come until the past week. On January 6, Coppola started and played the full 90 minutes in a 0–3 loss to Como, and on Saturday the 10th he came on at 90+4’ in the 2–2 draw against Udinese. Without a doubt, very important steps in his career.

Meanwhile, Brando Bettazzi is an 18-year-old left-footed attacking midfielder, physically strong, with a mother from Havana. His résumé includes six years in Empoli’s youth system. Later, in 2021, he began with the amateur club Margine Coperta, until in 2023 Pisa signed him for its Under-17 team. From 2024 to the present, he has played 38 matches with his current club’s Under-19 team in Primavera 2, scoring five goals and earning consideration for the first team. Gilardino has not yet given him his Serie A debut. In league play, he has had to watch matches from the bench. However, he was given nine minutes with the senior side on September 25 in the Coppa Italia, in a 0–1 loss to Torino.

Coppola and Bettazzi are eligible to represent the Cuban national team because their mothers were born on Cuban soil, as established by current world football regulations. Cuba, as has been reported, has relaxed its policies on calling up players born abroad to the senior national team. Nevertheless, in the cases of Francesco and Brando, early exposure to top-level football may further fuel their dream of representing their motherland.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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“There Will Be No More Oil or Money for Cuba: Zero!” Trump Threatens

Cuba’s foreign minister accuses the U.S. of behaving “like a criminal, out-of-control hegemon that threatens world peace and security”

“Cuba provided security services to the last two Venezuelan dictators. But no more!” Trump wrote. / EFE

14ymedio, Havana, January 11, 2026 — U.S. President Donald Trump issued an explicit warning to the Castro regime this Sunday: Cuba must “reach an agreement” with Washington or face the definitive rupture of the economic ties that have sustained the Island for decades. The Republican president stated on his social network Truth Social that “There will be no more oil or money for Cuba: zero!” in a direct reference to the flow of crude oil and resources that Venezuela supplied to Havana for years.

Shortly before, Trump shared on Truth Social a post by an X user suggesting that Secretary of State Marco Rubio could become “president of Cuba,” adding a comment that did not go unnoticed: “Sounds good to me!”

Trump expanded on his message: “For many years, Cuba lived off large amounts of oil and money from Venezuela. In return, Cuba provided security services to the last two Venezuelan dictators. But no more!” he wrote.

The U.S. president went even further when referring to the consequences of the recent military operation in Caracas. “Most of those Cubans are dead from the U.S. attack last week, and Venezuela no longer needs the protection of the thugs and extortionists who held it hostage for so many years,” he added, in one of the harshest statements to date against continue reading

the Cuban presence in Venezuela.

The bluntness of the message comes at a moment of maximum geopolitical tension in the region following the capture of Nicolás Maduro. The action has triggered a series of statements, warnings, and strategic realignments involving not only Washington and Caracas, but also Havana.

According to public records from Flightradar24, several U.S. military aircraft conducted flights near the northern coast of Cuba.

Since Saturday, January 3, Trump’s statements have oscillated between an emphasis on regional control and direct warnings to historic allies of Chavismo. In recent interviews, the president has said that the Cuban regime “is very close to falling” due to the loss of its main source of oil and financial backing, though he has avoided publicly committing to a direct military intervention on the Island.

Added to this verbal escalation in recent hours was an unusual movement in the regional airspace. According to public Flightradar24 records, several U.S. military aircraft, identified by their speed, altitude, and flight patterns, carried out flights near Cuba’s northern coast without entering Cuban airspace. The routes, visible in real time on the platform, showed paths parallel to the coastline and repeated turns off strategic points in the north of the Island, a deployment that analysts interpret as a signal of pressure and deterrence amid the hardening of Washington’s rhetoric. The aerial presence was widely discussed on social media and reinforced the perception that Trump’s warning to Havana is not limited to rhetoric alone.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has reinforced that message. Of Cuban-American origin and a long-time critic of the Havana regime, Rubio has repeatedly stated that Cuba played a key role in the survival of Chavismo and that Venezuela’s security structure was “basically full of Cubans.” In conferences and press briefings following the operation in Caracas, he emphasized that without that support, Maduro’s regime would have collapsed much earlier.

Official figures on casualties during Maduro’s capture vary by source, but dozens of Venezuelan security personnel and at least 32 Cuban soldiers and agents were officially reported as killed during the operation. The Cuban government ultimately acknowledged this figure after repeatedly denying any military presence in Venezuela.

The Cuban regime and its spokespeople respond with the usual repertoire of denial, victimization, and confrontation

This death toll comes amid a climate of sustained repression within Cuba, where hundreds of political prisoners continue to languish in the country’s jails for exercising basic rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, or peaceful protest.

Trump’s warning this Sunday also fits into a context of economic and social collapse that experts describe as unprecedented in the Island’s recent history. Cuba is experiencing an unparalleled crisis, marked by mass emigration, structural failures in essential services such as health care and education, and an exhausted economic model that no longer manages to cover the population’s basic needs.

The end of Venezuelan subsidies, which in 2025 supplied the Island with an average of some 27,000 barrels of oil per day, represents an additional blow to an economy already burdened by frequent blackouts, domestic production at historic lows, and chronic shortages of food and medicines.

The regime’s foreign minister, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, rejected Washington’s accusations on the social network X and denied any economic link to security services provided abroad. “Cuba does not receive nor has it ever received monetary or material compensation for the security services it has provided to any country,” he wrote.

In his message, Rodríguez contrasted that position with that of the United States, which he accused of “mercenarism, blackmail, and military coercion against other states,” and invoked the Island’s right to import fuel “from those markets willing to export it.” The foreign minister closed his statement with the customary rhetoric, calling the U.S. a “criminal, out-of-control hegemon” that threatens peace and security not only for Cuba and the hemisphere, but “for the entire world.”

Faced with pressure from the United States, the Cuban regime and its spokespeople respond with the usual repertoire of denial, victimization, and confrontation. But the clock, politicians and analysts warn, is rapidly running against Havana’s interests.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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In Havana, Most Gas Stations Are No Longer Dispensing Fuel

Even refilling a lighter has become a difficult task in Cuba due to the fuel shortage

“Maduro abandoned us,” a Cupet worker tells a customer. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana/Holguín, Darío Hernández and Miguel García, January 11, 2026 — Under the uneven shade of a tree in a park in Holguín, Genaro waits for someone to approach with a lighter. The scene has repeated itself for more than a decade: a folding table, several gas sprays, screwdrivers, and pliers. For years, that small family business, refilling disposable lighters, allowed them to put food on the table. Today, however, the lack of fuel threatens to extinguish even that minimal flame. “Now it’s cheaper to buy a new one than to repair it because gas has become incredibly expensive,” he says, arranging his tools with a mechanical gesture.

Genaro charges 100 pesos for each lighter he refills and 50 more if the flint has to be replaced. Until recently, that fee guaranteed a steady trickle of customers. Today, the flow has dropped sharply. “This is no longer profitable, and if things get worse,” he warns, “I’ll have to find something else.” His occupation—salvaging what in other countries is thrown away—becomes unviable in a context where even the gas used to refill lighters has turned into a luxury.

The problem is not limited to his improvised table. At home, he explains, they cook with firewood and with liquefied gas “when it shows up.” The balita—the small gas cylinder that sustains the domestic life of thousands of families—now costs 50,000 Cuban pesos on the informal market in Holguín. “You almost never find it, and when someone does offer it to you, they can sit back and demand continue reading

whatever they want, because people are desperate.” At state-run sales points, the supply was suspended weeks ago, with no date for resumption.

The cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies, following the capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. troops, has further strained a daily life already marked by shortages. What happens in Caracas translates almost immediately into extinguished stoves, paralyzed businesses, and reduced transportation in Cuba. The Island’s energy dependence turns any shock in the South American country into a domestic tremor.

In Havana, the situation is reflected in empty gas stations and in the conversations repeated under the roofs of the state company Cupet. In Telegram groups where virtual lines are organized, discouragement is palpable. This Saturday, in East Havana only 11 gas stations were offering service; another 10 were completely out of fuel. In the west of the capital, seven service stations had closed on Friday. No one dares to predict an improvement in the short term.

The mechanism for buying gasoline has become a digital maze. To even aspire to a turn, one must register in the Ticket app, enter an ID number, vehicle registration details, and the license plate. With luck, confirmation arrives in two or three months. But even then, the result can be frustrating: on the scheduled day, there may only be motor or regular gasoline of lower octane, unusable for many vehicles.

A tour of several Havana service stations confirms the picture. The central station at G and 25, in El Vedado, opened without fuel. The same scene repeats at its neighbor on La Rampa. Only at the nearby Tángana station was there still some supply for those waiting with a Ticket appointment, and in the entire central area only the station at L and 17 continued dispensing with some regularity.

The majority of gas stations in Havana are not operating.

Under the red sign reading “Your friend 24 hours a day” at G and 25, three men talk. They begin by discussing gasoline, but the conversation soon drifts toward Caracas, Washington’s warnings, and Marco Rubio’s statements urging Havana to choose between “change and collapse.” International politics seep into their words as yet another explanation for the empty tank.

“The situation is tight; I’ve never seen it this bad,” says a motorcyclist who came to Cupet just to confirm the obvious. He has a generator at home and urgently needs fuel. “My mother is bedridden with a relapse of chikungunya,” he explains. “At home we’re preparing for the worst, because this is just the beginning.”

At the Cupet stations on Vía Blanca and La Coubre, dispensing was limited to state vehicles, as it was at the station at the La Shell roundabout in Guanabacoa. Rafael, a Spanish businessman temporarily based in Cuba, described his fruitless tour of several stations in the Playa municipality. “They have no idea when fuel will come in again. They look lost,” he said.

One worker was more direct and, in a mocking tone, summed it up in four words: “Maduro abandoned us.” A tremor in Caracas is an earthquake in Havana.

“With what happened in Venezuela, I don’t think this will be fixed quickly,” / 14ymedio

In El Cerro, two brothers in the moving business have halted all operations. Their truck sits immobile while requests pile up unanswered. “With what happened in Venezuela, I don’t think this will be fixed quickly,” they say.

Early Sunday, many woke up glued to their phones after Donald Trump posted a message urging the Cuban regime to reach “an agreement, before it’s too late,” warning: “There will be no more oil or money for Cuba: zero!” For many, that message sealed the certainty that the severe fuel shortage will not be temporary.

On Havana’s Malecón, some look out to sea hoping for the silhouette of a tanker. For a young man singing boleros and guarachas to tourists, the definitive collapse will come “when El Morro goes dark.” Perhaps it will not require a mass exodus—only the absence of fuel and a wait that stretches on, like Genaro’s under the tree, with an empty lighter in his hand.

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The 14 Most Important Cuban Books of 2025

Novels, essay, and poetry in a year of memory, critique, and literary resistance

Read together, these books map out a complex cartography of Cuban literature in 2025. / Collage

14ymedio, Havana, January 10, 2026 — Cuban literature in 2025 once again demonstrated that, even in a context of editorial scarcity, censorship, and geographic dispersion, books remain one of the most effective tools for thinking about the country. From the Island and from exile, through major international imprints or independent publishers, Cuban authors released works that engaged with memory, power, intimacy, violence, and everyday survival. Throughout the year, 14ymedio reviewed these new publications, paying attention not only to literary quality but also to the texts’ ability to challenge and question the reality of the Island. From that ongoing coverage emerges this selection of the 14 most relevant Cuban books of 2025, read as a narrative and essayistic body that, taken together, offers a snapshot of the cultural moment.

Among the novels that achieved the greatest visibility is La viajera nocturna [The Night Traveler] (Ediciones B) by Armando Lucas Correa, a work that confirms the insertion of Cuban narrative into the international publishing circuit without losing historical depth or literary ambition. With effective prose and a narrative architecture designed for a broad readership, Correa once again demonstrates the power of telling stories of universal scope through an exploration of the traumas of the twentieth century and their present-day resonances.

In a completely different register, Juan Abreu returned with Debajo de la mesa [Under the Table] (Ladera Norte), an uncomfortable, ferocious, and deeply personal book. Abreu writes from memory not to idealize it, but to blow it apart. His prose, marked by exile, sexuality, and a break with any complacent canon, reminds us that an essential part of contemporary Cuban literature continues to be built from aesthetic and moral dissidence.

Psychological introspection also found a significant place in the novel Narcisos [Narcissus] (Editorial Huso) by Eduardo López Collazo. The lives of eight men are told through the gaze of Carmen, a psychologist who gradually discovers herself over the course of the narrative. The author, a renowned physician living in Spain, defines the novel as a search to understand “who we are when no one is looking at us, not even ourselves.” continue reading

The rawest fiction found one of its strongest exponents in Sórdida tropical (Sordid Tropics) by Carlos Lechuga.

In the realm of essay and political reflection, Entre Rusia y Cuba [Between Russia and Cuba] (Ladera Norte) by Jorge Ferrer offered one of the clearest views of a historical relationship that marked generations. Ferrer combines analysis, memory, and personal experience to dismantle both nostalgia and propaganda, proposing a critical reading of the ideological, economic, and human ties between the two countries.

That will to dismantle reaches one of its most forceful expressions in Del dicho al hecho. La leyenda de la sanidad en Cuba 1902–2024, (From Saying to Doing: The Legend of Health Care in Cuba, 1902–2024), self-published by Antonio Guedes. The book stands as one of the most necessary investigations of the moment, as it questions one of the pillars of the official narrative: the supposed excellence of the Cuban health care system. With data, historical context, and an accessible tone, Guedes dismantles myths and restores complexity to a debate hijacked for decades by propaganda.

The most unflinching fiction found in Sórdida tropical [Sordid Tropics] (Hypermedia) by Carlos Lechuga is one of its most solid examples. Also a filmmaker, Lechuga writes from disenchantment and rawness, without concessions to easy lyricism or revolutionary epic. His novel portrays a harsh Cuba, marked by symbolic and material violence, where characters survive in an environment that constantly expels them.

Poetry, for its part, found in Reina María Rodríguez one of its highest expressions with Mazorcas (Rialta). Considered one of the most important female voices in living Cuban poetry, Rodríguez delivers a mature collection in which the word functions as intimate archive, resistance, and reflection on time, the city, and loss. The volume confirms that poetry continues to be a privileged space for thinking the unsayable.

In the realm of internationally prominent narrative, Leonardo Padura once again occupied a central place with Morir en la arena (To Die in the Sand) (Tusquets). Far from repeating himself, Padura explores new layers of the crime genre to probe violence, memory, and moral decay, maintaining that unique ability to turn entertainment into a critical tool.

In Libertad vigilada: la poesía de Severo Sarduy (Guarded Freedom: The Poetry of Severo Sarduy) (Verbum), Joaquín Roses starts from a premise as simple as it is necessary: it is not possible to fully understand Sarduy’s writing without attending to his poetry, a claim the author himself made during his lifetime. This essay focuses on the twenty-one sonnets of Un testigo fugaz y disfrazado, 1985 (A Fleeting and Disguised Witness, 1985), a volume marked by the use of chromaticism and sonic geometry.

One of the year’s most ambitious editorial projects was José Lezama Lima: A Biography. Formative Years (1910–1939), by Ernesto Hernández Busto

The volume Bay of Pigs: The Two Sides of the Story (Ediciones Material) (published in English) by writer and journalist Miguel Ángel Sánchez Martínez opts for rigor, contrast, and shared memory. The book addresses the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 through meticulous, chronological research, drawing on declassified CIA documents and testimonies from both sides to dismantle opposing narratives and recover areas erased by official history.

One of the most ambitious publishing bets of the year was José Lezama Lima: una biografía. Años de formación, 1910–1939 (Editorial Pre-Textos) (José Lezama Lima: A Biography. Formative Years 1910-1939) (Editorial Pre-Textos), by Ernesto Hernández Busto. More than a traditional biography, the book reconstructs the cultural ecosystem in which Lezama was formed, offering a renewed reading of a central figure of the canon and engaging with the intellectual history of twentieth-century Cuba.

Meanwhile, the political thriller found a solid expression in El otro espía (The Other Spy) (Saturn Forlag), by Humberto López Guerra, a novel that uses espionage as a metaphor to explore loyalties, betrayals, and the exercise of power. Its narrative effectiveness and historical background made it one of the most talked-about reads of the year.

The editorial close of 2025 was marked by two milestones. First, the announcement of a new critical edition, revised and updated by Yoandy Cabrera, of the poetry of Delfín Prats, presented as a tribute on the poet’s birthday. The recovery of his work reaffirms the need to reread living classics with contemporary critical tools. Second, there is the publication of Cuba en mi memoria: república, castrismo, exilio, (El Ateje) (Cuba in My Memory: Republic, Castroism, Exile) by Manuel C. Díaz, a book of political memoirs that traverses three fundamental moments of national history and dialogues with the testimonial tradition of exile.

Read together, these books form a complex cartography of Cuban literature in 2025: a space shaped by memory, critique of power, intimate exploration, and the urgent need to narrate. For 14ymedio, highlighting these works has also been a way of affirming that, even in times of crisis, books remain one of the best ways to understand Cuba.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Dollar Sales to Cuba’s Private Sector Are Authorized, but with Strict Limits

Private businesses in Cuba — MSMEs* — will be able to buy foreign currency once a month, according to a calculation made by the Central Bank based on each company’s income in previous months.

There are not enough dollars in the system, and the State rations them sparingly. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, January 10, 2026 — The announcement by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) about opening a banking channel that allows private MSMEs to purchase foreign currency adds another layer to the already tangled foreign exchange market. The information was shared by Banco Metropolitano on its social media accounts and is presented as part of the new “ordering” task. Put simply: the State says that, from now on, some private businesses will be able to buy dollars legally through banks, but under very strict rules.

According to the explanation, purchases will be made based on the new floating exchange rate, which currently stands at 413 pesos per dollar. Only one purchase per month will be allowed, and business owners will not be able to choose the amount, because the bank will calculate it by taking the average of what entered the company’s tax account over the last three months, using only half of that amount and converting it at the floating exchange rate in effect at the time.

In practice, this means that if an MSME has had low or irregular income, it will be able to buy very few dollars, even if it urgently needs them to import raw materials, pay for services, or meet contractual obligations. And if the business is just starting out and does not yet have an income history, it may simply be left out altogether.

The BCC also made it clear that the entire process will be “banked.” Cuban pesos will be withdrawn compulsorily from the tax account, and the purchased foreign currency will be deposited only into a foreign-currency account belonging to the same economic actor. There will be no cash, no informal transfers, and no room for maneuvering. Before continue reading

approving the transaction, the bank will review the customer’s profile, accounts, and the origin of the funds, as part of the controls that currently weigh on any economic activity on the Island.

In recent years, several “solutions” for private-sector access to foreign currency have been introduced, almost all with big headlines and very modest results.

Applications must be submitted online, through the online Metropolitano en Línea service. On paper, it sounds modern and organized. In real life, many business owners recall that State banking platforms often fail, collapse, or become inaccessible precisely when they are most needed, especially outside Havana.

Beyond the technical language, the question many business owners are asking is quite straightforward: is this enough to solve anything? The answer, at least for now, seems to be no. The main problem remains the scarcity of foreign currency. The State is not offering new dollars; it is only saying how and to whom it will sell a portion of the few dollars it has.

Moreover, the floating rate set by the Central Bank, although periodically adjusted, still falls far short of reflecting the real street price of the dollar (460 pesos per dollar this Saturday), where most transactions take place. As long as that gap exists, many business owners will continue to find it less cumbersome and more efficient to turn to the informal market rather than submit to a lengthy banking process to purchase a limited amount of foreign currency.

This is not the first time the government has announced mechanisms of this kind. In recent years, several “solutions” for private-sector access to foreign currency have been rolled out, almost all with major announcements and very discreet outcomes.

For some SMEs with stable income, good relations with their bank, and the patience to deal with bureaucracy, this channel may serve as a complement. For most, however, the underlying problem remains unchanged: there are not enough dollars in the system, and the State dispenses them by the drop.

*Translator’s note: MSME is “micro, small and medium enterprises”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The “Espionage” Accusation Against Alejandro Gil Points to Damage to Venezuela

A document from the Cuban Prosecutor’s Office obtained by 14ymedio accuses the former minister of having revealed sensitive data to the CIA about cooperation between Caracas and Havana.

In August 2022, Gil met with Maduro at the Miraflores Palace, a meeting that was widely publicized by the official Cuban and Venezuelan press. / X / Nicolás Maduro

14ymedio, Havana,January 10, 2026 — The recent capture of Nicolás Maduro has once again put the spotlight on the close and opaque relationship between Caracas and Havana. In that context, a source with access to the documents of the trial against Alejandro Gil Fernández, former vice prime minister and minister of economy of Cuba, has provided 14ymedio with details from the provisional conclusions of the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic (FGR), in which Gil was accused, among other crimes, of espionage on behalf of U.S. intelligence services, allegedly causing strategic damage to relations with Venezuela.

According to the report signed by Edward Roberts Campbell, chief prosecutor of the Directorate for Combating Corruption and Illegalities, Gil allegedly handed over classified information to “an unidentified agent, but presumably belonging to the CIA,” compromising “Venezuelan national security.” The document claims that the information involved sensitive data on political, economic, and military cooperation between Cuba and the Maduro regime.

Among the leaked information were economic transactions between Cuba and Venezuela, the location of financial reserves, commercial agreements linked to oil exchanges and the deployment of Cuban medical brigades, as well as schemes for triangulating financial operations and the names of foreign agencies involved in the final destination of Venezuelan crude.

The accusation also included details about Cuban government support in cybersecurity and counterintelligence for Venezuelan intelligence services, as well as personal data about Nicolás Maduro himself. According to the source, Gil allegedly provided information about the president’s family, his residence, his assets in Venezuela and abroad—including in Cuba—and highly sensitive details about the security ring protecting continue reading

the Chavista leader, composed of several dozen Cuban soldiers belonging to the Ministry of the Interior and the Revolutionary Armed Forces.

It was State Security that recommended Gil attend Maduro instead of Díaz-Canel in 2022. / X / Nicolás Maduro

“These acts are considered a betrayal of the trust placed in him by the Cuban government and, specifically, by State Security,” the indictment stated, characterizing the conduct as espionage in favor of U.S. intelligence services, with the aim of “undermining Venezuelan sovereignty and overthrowing its legitimate president through a coup d’état.”

However, the very development of the case reveals contradictions that are difficult to ignore. According to testimony accessed by 14ymedio, it was initially planned for Miguel Díaz-Canel to meet with Maduro in August 2022 as part of a presidential tour of several Latin American and Caribbean countries. Instead, it was State Security that recommended Gil attend in his place.

“It was argued that, because of his performance and the high level of trust placed in him as a cadre of the Revolution, he deserved that meeting,” the source explains, adding that the visit was also meant to be used for meetings with other high-ranking Venezuelan officials, including the minister of economy. The decision is striking, given that a meeting between heads of state is not usually delegated to a sectoral minister.

State Security had been investigating Gil for at least four years, placing the initial suspicions in 2020.

The source clarifies that they only had access to the prosecutor’s indictment and do not know whether the alleged espionage related to Venezuela was proven during the trial. “I cannot state whether these facts were brought to trial with conclusive evidence or whether it was proven that Gil delivered sensitive Venezuelan information to the CIA,” the source notes. Nor do they have details about the grounds for the life sentence handed down by the Supreme Court.

The timeline of the case reinforces the doubts. Pro-government programs such as Razones de Cuba have claimed that State Security had been investigating Gil for at least four years, placing the suspicions as early as 2020. Even so, in August 2022 Gil met with Maduro at the Miraflores Palace, a meeting widely publicized by the official Cuban and Venezuelan press and publicly celebrated by the Chavista leader himself on social media.

Months later, in November of that same year, Gil accompanied Díaz-Canel on a tour of China, Algeria, Russia, and Turkey. In July 2023, he was also authorized to travel to New York as Cuba’s sole representative to the United Nations General Assembly. “If there were solid indications of espionage, these decisions do not hold up from a counterintelligence standpoint,” the source points out.

Alejandro Gil’s trial, far from clarifying the facts, exposes a web in which Venezuela, Maduro, and Cuban security are intertwined in a narrative full of gaps. Today, after the capture of the Chavista leader, those gaps weigh more heavily than ever. Because if Gil was a spy, he was one with inexplicable freedom; and if he was not, his conviction reveals how far a system can go when it needs a visible culprit to protect those operating at the highest levels of power.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Venezuela Has Released Eleven of the Nearly 900 Political Prisoners in the Country

The first day ends with the release of Venezuelans Enrique Márquez, Biagio Pilieri, Alejandro Rebolledo, and Larry Osorio Chía, who join the five Spaniards about to land in Madrid
Activists and opposition figures demand a “total amnesty”

Enrique Márquez Biaggio embraces family members as he leaves El Helicoide prison in Caracas. / Screenshot

14ymedio, Madrid, January 9, 2026 — The joy felt by the families of Venezuelan political prisoners following the announcement of releases by the president of Parliament, Jorge Rodríguez, has turned into tension due to the lack of concrete results. Of the nearly 900 people held in various prisons across the country, only nine had been released by nightfall: four Venezuelans and five Spaniards, who have already arrived in Spain.

The Venezuelans are Enrique Márquez, former presidential candidate former presidential candidate; Biagio Pilieri, a politician and collaborator of María Corina Machado; the lawyer Alejandro Rebolledo; and military officer Larry Osorio Chía. All four had been held until now in the feared El Helicoide prison, the Caracas headquarters of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Sebin), and their releases were confirmed by the NGO Foro Penal and a report by Realidad Helicoide. Early Friday morning, two additional cases were added, whose identities are still unknown.

The release of Márquez and Pilieri was captured on cellphone cameras by people gathered outside the prison awaiting news of their relatives. Both were able to embrace their loved ones amid great anticipation. Márquez was detained on January 7, 2025, after taking part in the July 28, 2024 presidential election and questioning the victory attributed to Nicolás Maduro by the National Electoral Council.

La excarcelación de Biagio Pilieri y Enrique Márquez es un alivio para sus familias, pero no borra la injusticia de su detención. Durante su prisión se le violaron de forma sistemática sus derechos humanos, fueron víctimas de desaparición forzada, no tuvieron acceso a sus… pic.twitter.com/tJSEUanvmz

— Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones (@oveprisiones) January 9, 2026

After his arrest, Interior and Justice Minister Diosdado Cabello claimed that the former candidate had proposed holding an inauguration ceremony for Edmundo González Urrutia at a Venezuelan embassy abroad. His release had been demanded by countless activists and leaders, including Colombian President Gustavo Petro, who described him as a friend.

Pilieri had spent even longer in prison. He was pursued and arrested on August 28, 2024, after participating in a protest rejecting the ruling of the Supreme Court of Justice that validated Maduro’s reelection. The politician was coordinator of the opposition party continue reading

Convergencia and a former lawmaker, as well as mayor of Bruzual in Yaracuy. Along with leader Freddy Superlano and Machado collaborator Perkins Rocha, he was accused of disseminating the electoral tally sheets produced by the main opposition to prove González Urrutia’s victory.

Hours later, the release of Larry Osorio Chía was announced. He is a second master sergeant in the Venezuelan Army and the brother of Rubén Darío, a retired soldier who worked as a human rights activist with Fundaredes. According to several NGOs, the young man’s only “crime” was his family tie to a soldier who defected to support Juan Guaidó in 2019.

The last Venezuelan released last night was Alejandro Rebolledo, a former Supreme Court justice in exile, who had been imprisoned since returning to Venezuela in 2024 to regularize his legal status after being forced into exile in 2017 and was instead charged with treason and conspiracy against the political order.

In addition, a prominent political prisoner, lawyer and former lawmaker Juan Pablo Guanipa, one of María Corina Machado’s closest collaborators, detained in May 2025, is expected to be released in the coming hours.

In addition, a prominent political prisoner, lawyer and former lawmaker Juan Pablo Guanipa, one of María Corina Machado’s closest collaborators, detained in May 2025, is expected to be released in the coming hours. Cabello accused him of an alleged plot against regional and legislative elections. Although his family hoped he would be home Thursday night, by midnight they acknowledged they would have to wait a bit longer.

Along with the release of these Venezuelans os the release of five Spaniards who are currently flying to Madrid: José María Basoa, Andrés Martínez Adasme, Miguel Moreno Dapena, Ernesto Gorbe Cardona, and the Spanish-Venezuelan Rocío San Miguel, who landed in Madrid shortly after 1:00 p.m. local time.

News of their release was announced Thursday by Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, the European Union and Cooperation, José Manuel Albares, and celebrated by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez as “an act of justice.” In an early-morning interview, the foreign minister welcomed the “new stage opening in Venezuela” and expressed hope that the “new government continues along that path.”

Albares thanked the “positive step taken by the new acting president” and said he spoke Thursday with those released. “All of them, without exception, were somewhat in shock, because they were informed in real time that they were going to be released,” he said. “They woke up one day thinking they would remain there for an indefinite period, and a few hours later they were at the residence of the Spanish ambassador,” he added. The Spanish government is watching to see whether at least one more Spaniard “may be released in the coming hours or days,” he said, without naming names.

[Link here]

Expectations at Madrid-Barajas Airport were very high around midday, with dozens of Venezuelans and Spaniards waiting for relatives and friends. However, cameras were unable to capture the arrival of the five, who for now have “restrictions” on speaking. According to El País, Rocío San Miguel’s spokesperson said patience was needed regarding the evacuees’ emotional state and that their lawyers must also assess those restrictions.

Minutes later, it was announced that all were already on their way to their places of origin. The group includes two Basques, one Canary Islander, and one Valencian, in addition to San Miguel.

Beyond these specific cases, the remaining prisoners are still waiting. The Committee of Mothers in Defense of Truth said Thursday that “the release of our loved ones has not been carried out, nor do we see signs that progress is being made.” In an Instagram post, the committee urged authorities to “ensure that our loved ones are included within the announced release process.”

“Based on the information we have, we estimate that just over 200 people remain unjustly detained in the context of post-election mobilizations,” the committee said, calling for progress toward “a general amnesty.”

Justice, Encounter and Forgiveness issued a statement warning that, despite the wait, releases “have not yet been fully carried out” and that calm must be maintained in order to confirm cases. “We reiterate that no information, list, or name will be made public until each case has been fully confirmed; that is, until individuals have effectively left detention centers and are in contact with their families,” the group said on X.

The NGO Foro Penal estimates that there were 863 political prisoners, among them 86 foreigners of various nationalities in Venezuelan prisons as of December 29, most detained after the July 28, 2024 presidential election.

In remarks to the media, Rodríguez said Thursday that the releases are part of a “unilateral gesture” by the Venezuelan government, now led by acting president Delcy Rodríguez, his sister. At Christmas and New Year, the Venezuelan government had already announced the release of 99 and 88 detainees following the presidential election, respectively, although prisoner associations were able to verify only 61 of them.

For her part, María Corina Machado shared an audio message on her social media in which she described the releases as “an act of moral restitution.” The opposition leader recalled that although “nothing gives back the stolen years, this day matters” because it acknowledges what she always knew: “that injustice will not be eternal and that truth, even when deeply wounded, eventually finds its way.”

The former lawmaker said this “brings a measure of peace” to families, but sent a message looking ahead: “We will not rest until all prisoners are free and all of Venezuela can embrace in full democracy and freedom.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Venezuelan Exiles Ask the U.S. to Intercede for Political Prisoners and Rein in Cabello’s Power

González Urrutia considers it an “act of revenge” that his son-in-law has been detained for a year

Trump described Maduro as a violent man who, he said, “tortured” people. / EFE

14ymedio/EFE, Washington, January 7, 2026 –The Organization of Venezuelans Persecuted Politically in Exile (Veppex) asked the U.S. government on Wednesday to intercede for the “unconditional” release of all political prisoners in Venezuela and to put an end to the influence of Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, following the capture of the ousted president, Nicolás Maduro.

“We respectfully request that the U.S. Government, within the framework of its policies toward Venezuela, prioritize and act decisively on these two points: the unconditional release of all political prisoners (and) effective measures to prevent Diosdado Cabello from continuing to wield de facto power to block democratic change,” the group said in a statement.

Veppex added that the situation “is complex,” but argued that these two requirements are “basic and urgent” to build confidence and move toward the country’s democratic normalization.

If Cabello, the second power in Chavismo, is not neutralized, the organization warned that “any transition will be extremely fragile and reversible.” It also accused Cabello of participating in “drug trafficking activities, corruption, and serious human rights violations.”

Over the weekend, the group of Venezuelans in exile had called for the arrest of several high-ranking officials of the Venezuelan regime in addition to Cabello, including Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, interim president Delcy Rodríguez, and the president of the National Assembly, Jorge Rodríguez. continue reading

“Right now what we want is to fix the oil, fix the country, bring it back, and have elections”

The issue of political prisoners in Venezuela has been sidelined, at least in public statements, in the new chapter that Caracas and Washington appear to have opened in their relations, marked by the interest of U.S. President Donald Trump in the South American country’s oil.

After the attacks on Venezuela and the capture of Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, Trump said that political prisoners are a secondary issue: “We haven’t gotten to that. Right now what we want is to fix the oil, fix the country, bring it back, and have elections,” the Republican said on Monday.

The president said on Tuesday that the Venezuelan government, now led by acting president Delcy Rodríguez, is willing to deliver between 30 and 50 million barrels of oil for sale on the U.S. market, and that he would control the proceeds from the sale “to ensure,” he said, “that it is used for the benefit of the Venezuelan people and the United States.”

Earlier, during a speech to Republican lawmakers at the Kennedy Center in Washington, Trump described Maduro as a violent man who, he said, “tortured” people.

“They have a torture chamber in downtown Caracas that is now being shut down, but it tortured people,” Trump said without giving further details. Although Trump did not name it explicitly, some Venezuelan NGOs assumed he was referring to El Helicoide, the Caracas headquarters of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, which has been identified as a torture center.

After Maduro’s capture, Trump said that political prisoners are a secondary issue.

However, this Tuesday there were no reports in Venezuela of releases or pardons. While Trump did not explicitly name it, some Venezuelan NGOs assumed he was referring to El Helicoide, the Caracas headquarters of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, which has been identified as a torture center.

The NGO Justice, Encounter and Forgiveness urged the Venezuelan government on Tuesday to release all detainees if the closure of that center is confirmed.

The organization Foro Penal, which leads the defense of political prisoners, counts 863 cases in the country, 86 of them involving people of another nationality.

On Christmas and New Year’s Day, Venezuelan authorities announced the release, under precautionary measures, of 99 and 88 political prisoners, respectively. However, local NGOs have not been able to verify all the cases.

So far, Maduro’s executive branch has claimed that the country is “free of political prisoners” and that those labeled as such are imprisoned for the “commission of terrible criminal acts.”

The International Criminal Court opened an investigation into Venezuela in 2018 for alleged crimes against humanity committed since 2017.

The government of Nicolás Maduro repeatedly attempted to halt the case, arguing that its judicial system was carrying out internal investigations, but the Court rejected that position in 2023 and authorized the resumption of the inquiry.

“I took it from the beginning for what it really is: pressure being put on me, and he is paying for being Edmundo González’s son-in-law”

Separately, opposition figure Edmundo González Urrutia said on Wednesday that it is an act of “revenge” against him that his son-in-law, Rafael Tudares, has been detained for exactly one year, a detention that occurred three days before Nicolás Maduro’s inauguration, after the latter was proclaimed reelected president in what the opposition and international observers say was a fraudulent process.

“This is more revenge than justice,” González Urrutia said on his X account. In this regard, he stated that the charges against him, stemming from an investigation and an arrest warrant in Venezuela, were “transferred” to Tudares, who was sentenced to 30 years in prison for the crimes of “forgery, conspiracy, terrorism, association, money laundering, and financing.”

“I took it from the beginning for what it really is: pressure being put on me, and he is paying for being the son-in-law of Edmundo González, the presidential candidate who won the election and whose victory this regime stole,” the opposition leader said, referring to the July 2024 presidential election.

He also reiterated that his son-in-law is in a situation of “enforced disappearance,” noting that his daughter, Mariana González, does not know his whereabouts or the place where Tudares has been held for the past year, a period González Urrutia described as “marked by the absence of information, legal guarantees, and justice.”

“Rafael has not been afforded respect for due process guarantees, access to private defense counsel, adequate medical care, dignified detention conditions, and effective judicial oversight, quite the opposite,” the opposition figure denounced.

He further argued that Tudares’s case “is not isolated,” but rather “part of a pattern that affects hundreds of people in Venezuela, including women and children, subjected to arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and systematic deprivation of rights.”

“As long as these practices persist, it will not be possible to speak of peace or democracy, or guarantees for anyone. Venezuela needs truth, justice, and freedom for all,” concluded the opposition leader, who claims the presidency from exile, asserting that he defeated Maduro in the 2024 presidential election.

Mariana González also said on Wednesday, in a message on X, that a year has passed without her husband: “One year without answers. I have no more words. Just truth, justice, and humanity. That is all we ask,” she said.

Tudares was detained on January 7 of last year, when human rights defender Carlos Correa, since released, and former opposition presidential candidate Enrique Márquez, who remains in prison, were also arrested.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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María Corina Machado: ‘Nothing and No One Is Going To Prevent Venezuela From Being Free’

In statements to La Patilla, the opposition leader said that “there can be no transition until the political prisoners are released.”
She defends the U.S. military operation: “International law exists to protect people, not those who hold weapons and steal resources.”

María Corina Machado, whose whereabouts are currently unknown, gave her first interview in Spanish to La Patilla. / Screenshot

14ymedio, Madrid January 8, 2026 — María Corina Machado is convinced that Chavismo is at the beginning of a transition that must be “as short and as fast as possible.” She told the independent Venezuelan outlet La Patilla that “The regime is being instructed to dismantle itself,” she said.

Among the opposition leader’s priorities, she said, are the release of political prisoners, an essential condition for the start of that transition, along with the restoration of the rights to assembly, expression, and association. “There can be no transition until the political prisoners are released. That is the first thing that has to happen in the next few hours,” she maintained. Her remarks, however, clash with what U.S. President Donald Trump has said so far. On Monday, when asked by the press about the political prisoners, he said: “We haven’t gotten to that. Right now what we want is to fix the oil, fix the country, bring it back, and have elections.”

This is another point of disagreement. María Corina Machado told La Patilla that there is already an elected president, Edmundo González Urrutia, whose mandate must be respected. The former diplomat, now exiled in Spain, obtained around 70% of the vote in the July 28, 2024 election, according to the tally sheets the opposition managed to obtain and present, an obligation Maduro had undertaken with international observers but never fulfilled. Machado, who was to be the presidential candidate of the Democratic Unitary Platform but was barred, told the outlet that this electoral result “must be respected.”

María Corina Machado told La Patilla that there is already an elected president, Edmundo González Urrutia, whose mandate must be respected.

The U.S. recognized González as president of Venezuela in November 2024, under the presidency of Joe Biden. However, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has disqualified last year’s elections, arguing that they were illegitimate because Machado’s candidacy was barred. “María Corina was not on the ballot in the last election; Edmundo was, so it was an illegitimate election, and therefore he is not a legitimate president,” he told the press, and he ruled out holding new elections in the short term. “It is premature at this moment. There is a lot of work ahead,” he said.

In an interview last Tuesday with NBC, Trump also ruled out holding a vote in Venezuela within the 30-day timeframe provided for in the Constitution. “First we have to fix the country. Elections cannot be held. There is no way people can vote,” he said.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Release of “a Significant Number of Venezuelans and Foreigners” Has Begun

Rocío San Miguel and four other Spaniards are among those released, confirmed the Foreign Ministry of Spain

Screenshot from the official Instagram account of Venezuela’s executive vice president, Delcy Rodríguez (center), speaking at a meeting on Sunday in Caracas (Venezuela). / EFE/@delcyrodriguezv

14ymedio, Madrid, January 8, 2026 — The president of the National Assembly and chief negotiator for Chavismo, Jorge Rodríguez, announced on Thursday that the regime “has begun the release of a significant number of Venezuelans and foreigners,” without specifying how many or whom the measure includes. It has been presented as a gesture to “consolidate peace and peaceful coexistence.”

The announcement avoids detailing criteria, timelines, or lists. Nor does it clarify whether the releases are definitive or whether they involve precautionary measures, a recurring practice in Venezuela that allows the state to maintain judicial and political control over those released. Human rights organizations warn that this type of announcement is often accompanied by new arrests, in a “revolving door” dynamic that does not reduce the total number of people imprisoned for political reasons. The decision reinforces U.S. President Donald Trump’s assertion that Delcy Rodríguez is cooperating with Washington, even as Chavismo continues to appeal publicly to rhetoric of sovereignty and external confrontation.

According to the most recent records from Foro Penal, 863 people considered political prisoners remain incarcerated in Venezuela, including 86 foreigners of various nationalities. Added to that figure are hundreds of citizens subject to restrictive measures such as periodic court appearances, bans on leaving the country, and house arrest. They are not counted as prisoners but live under judicial supervision. The tally includes military personnel and civilians, political leaders, activists, students, and citizens detained after protests or accused of conspiracy. continue reading

According to the most recent records from Foro Penal, 863 people considered political prisoners remain incarcerated in Venezuela.

Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares confirmed the identities of the five Spaniards released by Venezuela on Thursday: José María Basoa, Andrés Martínez Adasme, Miguel Moreno Dapena, Ernesto Gorbe Cardona, and the Spanish-Venezuelan Rocío San Miguel.

The main prisons and detention centers holding the largest number of prisoners of conscience are well known for reports of torture, incommunicado detention, and cruel treatment. Among them are El Helicoide and La Tumba, headquarters of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Sebin) in Caracas; the Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence; and prisons such as Tocorón and Rodeo I, as well as police commands and military holding cells throughout the country. Relatives and lawyers report systematic obstacles to visits, procedural delays, and fabricated case files.

From the United States, Senator Marco Rubio recently reiterated that the release of all political prisoners must be a central condition of any transition process or understanding with Caracas. Rubio has warned that selective or temporary releases do not amount to real change and has called for verifiable guarantees, access for international organizations, and an end to arbitrary detentions as minimum signs of respect for human rights.

In the same vein, opposition leader María Corina Machado has reiterated: “There can be no transition until the political prisoners are released. That is the first thing that has to happen in the next few hours.” The former lawmaker also believes that “the only thing that sustained Maduro and this weak criminal structure was fear. If terror is removed, nothing remains.”

The international community, for its part, has called for clarity. The European Union, the United Nations, and organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have demanded verifiable information on the scope of the releases and access to detention centers. The opacity of Rodríguez’s announcement, without figures, names, or a timetable, makes any independent assessment difficult.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Trump Demands that Venezuela End Relations with Cuba, China, Russia, and Iran

Beijing denounces U.S. “intimidation” in asking Caracas to break with China

EFE (via 14ymedio), Beijing, January 7, 2026 — The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has informed Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, that the country must comply with ending relations with Cuba, China, Russia, and Iran as part of a series of demands before extracting and marketing its oil, according to officials cited by The ABC network.

According to one of the officials quoted by the network, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in a private briefing with lawmakers that the U.S. believes it can pressure Caracas because its oil tankers are full, and warned that Venezuela would have only a couple of weeks before falling into financial insolvency if it fails to sell its reserves.

In an interview with ABC News, Senator Roger Wicker confirmed that the plan is based on control of Venezuelan oil and said it does not contemplate the deployment of U.S. troops.

So far, Venezuela, provisionally led by Rodríguez, has not issued any official statement regarding the demand put forward by Trump. continue reading

Delcy Rodríguez has not issued any official statement regarding the demand put forward by Trump.

In response on Wednesday, from Beijing, China denounced what it described as “intimidation” by the U.S. in demanding that Venezuela break its economic relations with Beijing, and affirmed that the South American country is a sovereign state with full control over its natural resources.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said at a press conference that Venezuela “is a sovereign country and enjoys full and permanent sovereignty over its natural resources and all economic activities within its territory,” when asked about reports published by the U.S. network ABC News regarding alleged demands from Washington to Caracas.

She described the alleged pressure as a “blatant use of force” and maintained that the attempt to have Venezuela dispose of its energy
resources according to a “United States first” approach constitutes “a typical case of intimidation” that “seriously violates international law, gravely infringes Venezuela’s sovereignty,” and “harms the rights of the Venezuelan people.”

“It seriously infringes Venezuela’s sovereignty” and “harms the rights of the Venezuelan people.”

“China firmly condemns this behavior,” the spokeswoman emphasized, adding that “it must be stressed that the legitimate rights and interests of China and of other countries in Venezuela must be protected.”

The spokeswoman also reiterated Beijing’s position in defense of economic cooperation among sovereign states and stressed that China “has always carried out exchanges and cooperation with other countries on the basis of mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit.”

Her remarks come amid growing international tension following the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by the U.S. and in the midst of an intense diplomatic debate over the legality of the use of force and the management of Venezuelan energy resources.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Delcy Rodríguez, Facing the Challenge of Keeping Venezuela’s ‘Chavismo’ United Under the Shadow of the U.S.

The president appoints as the new head of the Honor Guard and of military counterintelligence, a former director of Sebin

González López was minister of the Interior and Justice between 2015 and 2016, and director of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Sebin) between April 2019 and October 2024. / EFE

EFE (via 14ymedio), Caracas, 7 January 2026 — Three days after the U.S. military operation to capture Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, Chavismo has closed ranks around Venezuela’s acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, who said that “no external agent” governs the country.

Rodríguez, who was sworn in pursuant to an order from the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, faces the dilemma of keeping Chavismo united in its defiant stance toward Washington, while Donald Trump has demanded that she comply with his demands, under the threat that she will pay a price “higher than Maduro’s.”

“We are here governing alongside the people; the Government of Venezuela governs our country, no one else. There is no external agent governing Venezuela,” the official said Tuesday at an official event, where she said she has “grown spiritually to face the challenges, the aggressions, the threats.”

“On a personal level,” she added without elaborating, “to those who threaten me, I say this: my destiny is decided by no one but God. That is my answer.”

One of her first decisions was to appoint General Gustavo González López as commander of the Presidential Honor Guard and head of the General continue reading

Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM).

The appointment was announced in a Telegram message by Communications Minister Freddy Ñáñez, who said that González López replaces Major General Javier Marcano Tábata as head of the Honor Guard.

In this regard, he stated that Rodríguez “expressed her recognition” to the officer for “the dedication and loyalty demonstrated during the exercise of his duties.”

Likewise, the minister said, the acting president reaffirmed her confidence in the “career and vocation for service” of González López, who served as minister of the Interior and Justice between 2015 and 2016, and as director of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Sebin) between April 2019 and October 2024.

“These appointments are part of a dynamic of strengthening and institutional continuity, aimed at guaranteeing peace, the security of the people, and the full force of the Constitution of the Republic,” Ñáñez added.

“These appointments are part of a dynamic of strengthening and institutional continuity, aimed at guaranteeing peace, the security of the people, and the full force of the Constitution of the Republic”

Since the Supreme Court’s decision to entrust the Executive Branch to the then executive vice president, the Chavista leadership has shown unity and rallied around the now acting president, who was sworn in before her brother, Jorge Rodríguez, the speaker of the Parliament.

The ceremony took place one day after the military high command, led by Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, backed the high court’s decision and guaranteed the country’s governability.

On Tuesday, it was the turn of thousands of Chavista women who marched in Caracas in support of the acting president, while also joining the campaign to demand the release of Maduro and Flores.

“We tell our acting president that she is not alone; here she has an army of women who will accompany her in continuing to work so that our people feel cared for,” said Caracas Mayor Carmen Meléndez, who led the demonstration alongside the minister of the Interior and number two figure of Chavismo, Diosdado Cabello.

And it is that, after twelve years of Maduro’s government, the sudden capture of the president opens a new chapter of uncertainty about the future of the Bolivarian revolution, which has now been in power for 26 years.

Rodríguez, one of the best-known faces of Chavismo, has led key institutions, such as the ministries of Communication and Information, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and until recently, Hydrocarbons.

However, she has not been a popular leader nor held elected office, with the exception of serving as a deputy as part of the National Constituent Assembly, a body installed in 2017 after elections in which only Chavismo participated and whose disaggregated results were never made public.

Along with her brother, she has been sanctioned since 2018 by the U.S. Treasury Department, which accuses her of helping Maduro “maintain power and consolidate his authoritarian government,” as well as by the European Union.

Now, with no clear horizon as to how long her acting status will last, Rodríguez’s greatest challenge is to keep at bay a Trump administration determined to control Venezuela.

Now, with no clear horizon as to how long her acting status will last, Rodríguez’s greatest challenge is to keep at bay a Trump administration determined to control Venezuela

“What we need (from Delcy Rodríguez) is total access—total access to oil and other things in the country that allow us to rebuild it,” the Republican leader said, adding that new attacks are not ruled out. “If they don’t behave, we’ll launch a second attack,” the president warned on Sunday, one day after the surprise bombardment he ordered over areas of Caracas and three neighboring states.

In her first statement as acting president, Rodríguez extended an invitation to the United States to work on a joint “agenda of cooperation.” But this gesture has alternated with defiant speeches and messages from the acting president herself, as well as from other Chavista leaders, who insist they will seek the release of Maduro and Flores so that they can return to Venezuela.

During her swearing-in, Rodríguez described Maduro and Flores as “hostages” of the United States.

As one of her first acts after taking office, she visited the tomb of the late Hugo Chávez at the Cuartel de la Montaña, that of former Chavista minister Aristóbulo Istúriz, and that of her father, leftist leader Jorge Antonio Rodríguez, who was killed in 1973 during an interrogation over the kidnapping of a U.S. citizen in which he was implicated.

Rodríguez thus begins a new phase of the “revolution,” marked by the tension between the symbolic weight of Chávez’s legacy and the threat posed by an administration that maintains the largest air and naval deployment in the Caribbean and that carried out an unprecedented attack on Venezuelan soil.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The US Adds Venezuela and Cuba to the List of 25 New Countries Requiring Bonds for Visa Applications

Up to $15,000 must be deposited to apply for entry into the U.S., and the visa is not guaranteed.

The change will take effect starting January 21st / 14ymedio

EFE (via 14ymedio), January 7, 2026 — The U.S. government has added Venezuela and Cuba to a list of 25 new countries whose citizens must post bond of up to $15,000 in order to apply for entry into the U.S. the State Department specified this week.

The change will take effect on January 21; the expanded list includes Algeria, Angola, Gabon, Nepal, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and Uganda.

Any citizen or person traveling with a passport issued by one of those countries who is eligible for a B1 or B2 visa must post a bond of $5,000, $10,000, or $15,000. The amount will be determined at the time of the applicant’s interview.

The B1 visa allows travel for business purposes, and the B2 authorizes entry for tourism, personal, or medical reasons. In total, the list now includes 38 countries, most of them in Africa.

Paying without consular instruction will not be refunded

The State Department specified on Tuesday that the bond does not guarantee the issuance of a visa and warned that if someone pays the fee without being instructed to do so by a consular officer, the money will not be refunded.

As a condition of the bond, those who have posted it must continue reading

enter and leave the country through Washington Dulles International Airport, New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport, or Boston’s Logan Airport.

Failure to meet that requirement, it is warned, could result in denial of entry or cause the departure not to be properly recorded.

The digital outlet Axios notes that the State Department has not specified whether Venezuela’s inclusion is related to the military operation that resulted in the capture of Nicolás Maduro.

The arrest of the ousted Venezuelan leader, who is now being held in a New York prison, took place on January 3 in Caracas, along with the arrest his wife, Cilia Flores.

The formal indictment charges Maduro, among other offenses, with conspiracy to commit narco-terrorism

The formal indictment charges Maduro, among other offenses, with conspiracy to commit narco-terrorism and conspiracy to import cocaine, charges to which he has pleaded not guilty.

Following the operation that led to his capture, U.S. President Donald Trump stated that Cuba “has always survived thanks to Venezuela” and emphasized that the island is now “about to fall.”

The U.S. administration has not justified the inclusion of any of the newly added countries.

Last week, Washington added seven countries to the list of nations whose passport holders must post a bond: Bhutan, Botswana, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, and Turkmenistan. Before this announcement, 13 countries had been affected.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Switzerland Freezes the Assets of Maduro and His Associates With Immediate Effect

The measure will last at least four years

Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Celia Flores, as they are transferred to a New York court / EFE

EFE (via 14ymedio), Geneva, January 5, 2026 — The Swiss government announced this Monday that it has frozen the assets of Nicolás Maduro and his associates in the country with immediate effect “as a precautionary measure” and in view of the “volatile situation” created after the arrest of the Venezuelan leader by U.S. armed forces.

Swiss authorities stated in a communiqué that the asset freeze will not affect any member of the current Venezuelan government.

With this decision, which will remain in effect for four years, the government sought to ensure that no assets that may have been acquired illicitly are transferred out of Switzerland under the current circumstances.

The government sought to ensure that no assets have been acquired illicitly

Swiss authorities clarified that the reasons behind Maduro’s fall, or the question of whether it constituted a violation of international law, did not play a decisive role in the decision to block the funds.

“The decisive factor is that a collapse of power has occurred and that it is now possible for the country of origin to initiate judicial proceedings in relation to assets acquired illicitly,” the authorities continue reading

explained.

Switzerland invoked a federal law that provides for the freezing of assets belonging to “politically exposed” foreigners when there are reasons to assume they were acquired through corruption, criminal mismanagement, or other serious crimes.

Switzerland invoked a federal law that provides for the freezing of assets belonging to “politically exposed” foreigners.

If the latter is confirmed in future judicial proceedings, “Switzerland will strive to ensure that they benefit the Venezuelan people.”

Switzerland recalled that, following Maduro’s arrest, it has called for de-escalation, restraint, and compliance with international law, “including the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of respect for territorial integrity.”

The country has “repeatedly” offered its good offices to all parties to help find a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela, it noted.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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