Translating Cuba – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

Havana Chronicles: The ‘Chemical’ Adds Collapsed Bodies to the Havana Landscape

In San Lázaro, a young man slumped against a wall barely manages to attract the attention of passersby.

On the wall, of the mutilated street name, only one word survives: “Persevere”. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, Yoani Sánchez, September 27, 2026 / In San Lázaro, you have to look both up and down at the same time. Up, to avoid the sight of gutted balconies, exposed beams, and pieces of buildings that seem to be calculating when to collapse. Down, to avoid tripping over the holes in the sidewalk and discovering, from time to time, someone else who has also fallen.

Next to a tree and against the blue wall of a house, a young man sits on the ground. He is strong, wearing a black T-shirt and shorts, but his body is slumped, his head bowed on his chest, in a posture that Havana residents have come to recognize. Lacking a diagnosis, those who pass by the area have a street word for situations like this: “on drugs.”

Life goes on just a few meters away. Pedestrians, classic cars, and tricycles pass by. No one seems too surprised. Perhaps that is the most unsettling thing: these scenes have ceased to be exceptional in some areas of Havana.

In the absence of a diagnosis, those who pass through the area already have a street word for situations like this: “enchemicado” (‘chemicaled’).

In the absence of a diagnosis, those who pass through the area already have a street word for situations like this: “enquimicado” [‘chemicaled’]. / 14ymedio

In a few years the “chemical,” as several synthetic cannabinoids are popularly known, has gone from being an issue that the authorities rarely spoke of, to become a problem even official television recognizes. In May 2025 , the Ministry of the Interior reported 342 people accused of drug trafficking and use in Havana and 810 cases opened by the Public Prosecutor’s Office related to these crimes. The police had identified 74 “complex environments” in the capital at that time and highlighted eight particularly problematic areas. continue reading

The list included neighborhoods in Playa, Marianao, La Lisa, Boyeros, Old Havana, San Miguel del Padrón, and Cerro. Central Havana needed no introduction: there, as even the official spokesman Humberto López admitted at the time, “drugs exist, everyone knows it, and they’ve existed for years.” Authorities also acknowledged their concern about drug use among minors.

Since then, the geography seems to have become less precise because the problem is now occurring in broad daylight and on busy avenues. Just a few weeks ago, at the corner of Reina and Galiano, two young men were collapsed under the influence of the drug. While they were incapacitated, a man took advantage of the situation to steal one of their backpacks and disappeared into the crowd. The incident happened the day after a drug raid on that same street.

San Lázaro Street looks like an open scar that runs through the city from Old Havana to Vedado. / 14ymedio

Now the scene repeats itself, with different coordinates: San Lázaro. Few avenues could offer a more fitting backdrop for this young man paralyzed by the drug, because the entire street resembles an open wound that cuts through the city from Old Havana to Vedado. On both sides, are buildings surviving with amputated balconies, walls without plaster, boarded-up windows, and supports that long ago ceased to aspire to elegance, focusing instead simply on not collapsing.

On a corner, an old yellow car drives past a facade riddled with rubble. On the wall, bearing the street name, also mutilated, only one word survives: “Persevere.” A little further on, the young man will remain, for hours, slumped against a wall.

The Jibacoa Campgrounds, Between Shortages and Abandonment

Only some rooms at Los Cocos and a few cabins at Las Caletas remain in use amid overgrowth, ruins, and lack of fuel.

The pool at Los Cocos, one of the few areas still usable, also shows the general deterioration. / 14ymedio

Darío Hernández, Mayabeque, September 27, 2026 – What for years was one of the most affordable options for taking a family vacation in Cuba now survives amid overgrowth, dismantled cabins, and recreational areas in ruins. A tour of the popular campgrounds near Jibacoa Beach –Los Cocos, Las Caletas, El Abra, and La Laguna– reveals the deterioration of facilities that once had to be reserved at least a week in advance and now show clear signs of abandonment.

According to what 14ymedio was able to observe on site, in Santa Cruz del Norte, Mayabeque, only the rooms and the pool at Los Cocos were operating, along with a few cabins at Las Caletas. The rest of the facilities were in very poor condition: structures surrounded by brush, common areas without maintenance, and recreational areas that barely retain traces of their former use.

The Jibacoa campgrounds, between shortages and abandonment. /14ymedio

A worker in the area explained to this newspaper that one of the main problems is the inability to cover the cost of some services. “It is becoming very difficult to maintain them, especially because of the brush cutting,” he commented. Because these are large areas, clearing the overgrowth depends on brush cutters that operate with fuel, an increasingly scarce and expensive resource on the Island. According to his testimony, the last time the work was done it cost 25,000 pesos, an amount that is now almost impossible to afford. continue reading

The lack of clearing is visible at a glance. Around many of the cabins, grass grows unchecked and reaches the entrances. Some structures have lost their doors and windows, while others retain little more than their framework. The deterioration of the accommodations is compounded by the condition of the communal spaces. Play areas, cafeterias, open-air structures, and other recreational facilities show obvious deterioration and give the impression of having gone a long time without repairs or attention.

Where there were once spaces designed for leisure and rest, abandonment and lack of maintenance now predominate. / 14ymedio

In several areas, the pavement appears cracked, dirty, or overrun by vegetation. Where there were once spaces designed for leisure and rest, abandonment and lack of maintenance now predominate. The scene contrasts with the natural beauty of the Jibacoa surroundings, one of the best-known beach destinations in the western part of the country.

The pool at Los Cocos, one of the few areas still usable, also shows the general deterioration. Although it remains open, part of the facility is out of service and dirty, confirming the campground’s partial operating condition. Even in the best-preserved complex in the area, the abandonment is evident.

The difference from previous years is notable. According to testimonies gathered in the area, at this time of year it was customary for the cabins to be in high demand, even though conditions were already poor back then. Now, however, demand appears to have collapsed at the same pace as the condition of the facilities. “Except for the first cabins at Los Cocos, this looks like a Resident Evil movie,” one camper says during the tour.

The scene contrasts with the natural beauty of the Jibacoa surroundings, one of the best-known beach destinations in the western part of the country. / 14ymedio

Beyond the extreme appearance of some areas, the underlying problem is the same one affecting almost all services in Cuba: lack of resources, fuel shortages, and accumulated deterioration. In the case of the campgrounds, this deterioration also has symbolic value. For many years, popular camping was presented by the Young Communist League as an affordable leisure alternative for Cubans, especially students and working families who could not aspire to hotels or more expensive destinations.

Today, in many of these enclaves, the official promise has been reduced to a handful of rooms in use and facilities that are barely holding together. The case of the Jibacoa campgrounds also illustrates a deterioration that does not appear to be temporary. It is not merely a lack of paint or an isolated breakdown, but a deep deterioration of the infrastructure and basic maintenance services. It is no longer only food, transportation, or electricity that is in short supply: the few places where generations of Cubans could afford a modest vacation near the sea are also falling apart.

Some structures have lost their doors and windows, while others retain little more than their framework. / 14ymedio

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Public Health Acknowledges Deterioration of the Epidemiological Situation in Cuba

The vice minister links the increase in infections to problems with sanitation, water treatment, and waste collection.

Mientras continúan las dificultades para garantizar el agua, el saneamiento y la recogida de residuos, el deterioro de los servicios sanitarios tampoco ayuda a contener las enfermedades. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, September 27, 2026 / The Ministry of Public Health acknowledged concerns surrounding the epidemiological situation in Cuba and pointed to an increase in cases of various diseases, which it attributed to deficiencies in sanitation, water treatment, and waste collection, amid the serious water and health crisis affecting the Island.

Deputy Minister of Public Health Carilda Peña García admitted this Friday on Cuban television that there has been an increase in acute respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases, and hepatitis, as well as a notable rise in arboviruses, including dengue and chikungunya. She also acknowledged the relationship between the deterioration of sanitary conditions and the increase in diseases, linking it to poor hygienic conditions and problems with water supply and treatment.

Regarding respiratory diseases, the official explained that endemic coronaviruses are circulating in the country, in addition to SARS-CoV-2 –with a predominance of Omicron subvariants–, as well as the influenza virus and other agents. The vice minister noted, however, that no severity comparable to that of the COVID-19 pandemic is being observed, although she also did not provide precise figures.

Endemic coronaviruses are circulating in the country, in addition to SARS-CoV-2 –with a predominance of Omicron subvariants–, as well as the influenza virus and other agents

The greatest cause for alarm, however, is arboviruses. Peña García confirmed the circulation of chikungunya, although she rejected the idea that there is an “excessive” increase in the disease and specifically denied the unofficial reports circulating on social media, again without providing precise data to contradict them. According to the vice minister, cases are concentrated mainly in territories where the incidence of the disease was lower during the previous period, while those who became ill then now have lower susceptibility. continue reading

Regarding dengue, the vice minister confirmed that all four serotypes of the virus are circulating, with serotype 2 predominating. She attributed the increase in the vector population to “high temperatures, rainfall, and humidity,” but acknowledged that these factors are joined by “other avoidable and controllable factors, fundamentally linked to existing conditions inside and around homes.”

Peña García said that the increase in dengue cases “corresponds to the seasonal rise also being recorded in other countries in the region,” but the Ministry of Public Health has not publicly updated its data on the disease since June. At that time, it had reported 298 cases, while the Global Dengue Observatory estimated 2,173 infections in July and 3,214 in August.

The organization, which gathers information from government sources and international health organizations, estimated that as of September 18 there had been 7,133 cumulative cases in Cuba, about 7.4 times more than expected for this date, thus placing the Island among the countries in the region with the highest relative incidence. The figure is concerning because October is usually the month with the highest incidence of dengue in Cuba.

The situation is occurring in a “context marked by limitations in environmental sanitation systems, water treatment, and wastewater collection”

Another concern acknowledged by the Ministry of Public Health is the increase in acute diarrheal diseases and hepatitis. “Various microorganisms associated with these conditions are circulating, including viruses and bacteria,” said the vice minister, who added that the situation is occurring in a “context marked by limitations in environmental sanitation systems, water treatment, and wastewater collection.”

At the beginning of September, the U.S. Embassy in Havana issued a health alert over the increase in diarrheal diseases and recommended taking extra precautions with water, food, and ice.

The Spanish Government also currently maintains a health warning for Cuba and notes that outbreaks of hepatitis A are occurring on the Island.

A report published this week by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention added another warning sign: between June 2024 and February 2026, 249 cases of hepatitis A were recorded in Florida, 76 of which were associated with recent travel to Cuba. Among the cases genetically studied, 15 of 18 shared the same strain, consistent with a common origin.

In May, the Ministry of Public Health had ruled out the existence of an epidemic of this disease, but acknowledged a “very complex” health situation and cases in several provinces.

While difficulties in guaranteeing water, sanitation, and waste collection persist, the deterioration of health services is also doing little to contain the diseases. According to testimonies collected by 14ymedio, some Havana residents with suspicious symptoms have chosen not to go to health centers and instead self-medicate with drugs purchased on the informal market, making it even more difficult to record official figures.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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“The ‘Guajiro’ Who Doesn’t Have a Three-Wheeled Vehicle or a Mare Loses His Food in the Countryside”

The lack of fuel and state transportation affects passengers, students, and farmers in Guantánamo alike.

“People depend on this because state buses no longer leave from here to get to those little towns.” / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Dayamí Rojas, Guantánamo, September 26, 2026 – Outside the Guantánamo bus terminal, where travelers once looked for a bus route that would take them closer to their municipality, they now wait for an electric three-wheeler, a private car, a motorcycle, or, if the destination and distance allow, even a horse-drawn carriage. There are passengers asking questions, drivers negotiating, and small vehicles where every seat counts.

“The price of a liter of gasoline here is above 2,500 pesos and diesel is 1,900, so that drives up all the prices for these vehicles,” a driver of an old Ford that travels from the station to other towns in the province explains to 14ymedio. “People depend on this because state buses no longer leave from here to get to those little towns.”

The transportation crisis, severe within the city of Guantánamo, takes on another dimension when one looks toward the municipalities and rural communities. There, it is not simply a matter of arriving late to work or walking several stops: the lack of vehicles affects school attendance, a medical appointment, and even the possibility of getting a harvest out of the countryside before it spoils.

“There is no pocket that can withstand it”: the daily ordeal of getting around Guantánamo.

Juan Carlos, 59, has been doing the math for days. His daughter is hospitalized in a hospital in the provincial capital and he needs to visit her every day. “A three-wheeler costs you 500 or 600 pesos,” he laments. In addition to visiting her, he has to bring her food. “Every day you have to bring her food, so that’s 500 pesos there and 500 pesos back; there is no pocket that can withstand that.” continue reading

On the streets of Guantánamo, electric three-wheelers have become an essential means of transportation. Some are blue, some black, with canopies to protect passengers from the sun and modifications made on the fly. Small groups gather around them, waiting for a seat or asking the price before getting in. The scene is repeated as state bus routes have practically disappeared and mobility has been left in the hands of private transport operators.

For those who live outside the city, the problem begins much earlier. Ramona lives in Cuneira, a rural community in the municipality of El Salvador located 23 kilometers from Guantánamo, and she must regularly travel to the provincial capital to receive treatment related to her diabetes. Each trip has become an operation requiring money, time, and luck.

“I have a horse-drawn carriage with a mare and I pick up passengers, but I also transport root vegetables and fruit to Guantánamo, where my brother has a pushcart for selling them”

“We used to have the train, but now not even that; we depend on the three-wheelers all the time,” she says. For students in those areas, especially those who must travel to schools far from their homes, the transportation shortage also turns the school day into an obstacle course. Getting to the classroom often depends on finding a vehicle, having money to pay for it, or walking part of the way.

But the crisis does not only affect the transportation of people. It also leaves products stranded in the fields that should end up in the city’s markets.

“I have a horse-drawn carriage with a mare and I pick up passengers, but I also transport root vegetables and fruit to Guantánamo, where my brother has a pushcart for selling them,” explains a resident of El Salvador. The animal-drawn vehicle, associated for decades with short trips and rural areas, is once again gaining prominence because of the lack of fuel.

“The guajiro who doesn’t have something like this or hasn’t bought an electric three-wheeler has his food rotting in the field because there is no fuel to get it out,” he sums up.

The consequence ultimately reaches the consumer as well. If transporting a sack of produce costs more, that expense ends up incorporated into the selling price. Expensive fuel, the lack of state transportation, and the need to resort to private alternatives form a chain that begins in the furrow and ends in the consumer’s pocket.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Cuban Regime Complains That U.S. Sanctions Are Hindering Economic Reforms on the Island

Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío rejects the possibility that Cuba could cede its mineral wealth to the United States, as Venezuela did with its oil.

The Cuban deputy foreign minister ruled out the possibility that economic pressure alone could bring down the Government and advocated a negotiated solution. / Granma / Dunia Álvarez Palacios

14ymedio, Havana, September 26, 2026 – The Cuban Government now maintains that U.S. sanctions are preventing the economic reforms it is attempting to implement from succeeding, reforms intended to give greater space to the private sector and the market. Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío made the statement in an interview with Bloomberg This Weekend (Bloomberg) , in which he also rejected the possibility that Havana could offer Washington access to its mineral resources by following the path taken by Delcy Rodríguez’s Venezuela.

“If the United States reduces the pressure, those transformations in Cuba can advance significantly and become truly irreversible, which is our objective and, in theory, what the United States wants to happen,” the diplomat said in a conversation with journalist David Gura of Bloomberg.

De Cossío was referring to the package of 176 measures with which the Government intends to modify some of the pillars of an economy that has been in crisis for years, giving more space to the private sector, decentralizing some decisions, and expanding certain foreign-currency operations. The deputy foreign minister himself had admitted days earlier that Havana does not know what the outcome of those transformations will be. “We cannot know what the final outcome will be, but we must do something to change the current reality,” he said at the time.

“Cuba’s resources belong to the people,” he said. “Our Government has no right to deprive them of those resources and hand them over to another country”

On this occasion, however, he blamed Washington for making the process more difficult. According to De Cossío, the reforms cannot reach their full potential while the United States maintains what he described as a policy of “oppression and suffocation” against the Cuban population.

The deputy foreign minister also responded to Donald Trump, who this week described Cuba as a “failed state” during his address to the United Nations. “He said that Cuba is a totally failed state, but in the same sentence he says that the United States is exerting more pressure than ever. In other words, he acknowledges that U.S. pressure is the cause of the failure,” De Cossío replied. continue reading

One of the most significant moments of the interview came when Bloomberg asked the official about the possibility that Cuba could follow the Venezuelan model and offer the U.S. privileged access to its natural resources. De Cossío flatly ruled out a similar formula for Cuban deposits. “Cuba’s resources belong to the people,” he said. “Our Government has no right to deprive them of those resources and hand them over to another country.”

“Ally is too strong a word”

The statement comes at a particularly sensitive moment for Cuban mining. Canadian company Sherritt International suspended its direct participation in its nickel and cobalt joint ventures on the Island in May and is currently negotiating a recapitalization with U.S. firm Gillon Capital, which could end up controlling 55% of the company. The transaction remains subject to regulatory approvals and to longstanding claims involving properties nationalized after 1959.

The diplomat also distanced himself from Venezuela, for decades Havana’s main political and energy partner. Asked by Bloomberg whether Cuba still considers the South American country an ally, he replied: “Ally is too strong a word.”

De Cossío also expressed misgivings about another apparently contradictory phenomenon: while Washington is tightening sanctions against the Cuban Government, U.S. shipments destined primarily for the Island’s emerging private sector have increased.

Havana, the deputy foreign minister said, welcomes those goods, although it considers their volume insufficient to meet demand. He then attributed a political intention to the trade. “It is evident that the United States seeks to create a situation of dependency,” he said. “We do not want to be dominated by any other country.”

The statements coincide with a notable increase in commercial traffic from U.S. ports to Cuba. Some 45 vessels have made more than 200 trips to the Island during 2026, carrying nearly 327,000 tons of goods through the end of August. Between January and July, U.S. exports to Cuba reached approximately $674 million, 61.8% more than during the same period in 2025.

“We want to reach a solution with the United States as soon as possible”

Despite the deterioration in relations, De Cossío said that Havana does not want to wait for a possible change in the U.S. political balance after the November midterm elections to alter policy toward the Island. Some Cubans, he acknowledged, hope that a Democratic victory in Congress will reduce pressure from the Trump Administration, but he described that possibility as an “illusion.”

“We cannot sit idly by,” he said. “We want to reach a solution with the United States as soon as possible. And what happens internally in the United States will not have a real impact on Cuba.”

Talks between the two governments are, according to the deputy foreign minister, virtually at a standstill. Even so, he ruled out the possibility that economic pressure alone could bring down the Cuban Government and advocated a negotiated way out.

“We would welcome a solution,” he said. And he acknowledged that such a formula could be “far from what we want, but less than what some people in the United States might expect.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Canadian Diplomats Affected by “Havana Syndrome” Were Sharing Information with the CIA

The intelligence operations would have been of special value to the US because of the close relationship between Canada and Cuba

The US sent satellite equipment to the Canadian embassy in Havana in diplomatic containers at the end of 2016. / OnCuba

14ymedio, Madrid, September 26, 2026 – When the mysterious symptoms of the so-called “Havana syndrome” began to appear among US and Canadian diplomats in Cuba, between 2016 and 2018, officials from both countries were collaborating on intelligence operations, the Canadian outlet The Globe and Mail revealed this Saturday.

A Canadian diplomat was sharing information with US agents, and Canada was using satellite equipment smuggled onto the island by the US, according to two sources close to the operations, who are not identified by The Globe since they could face serious charges for revealing government secrets.

One of the sources said that a diplomat assigned to the Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP) at the Canadian embassy in Havana gathered information for Canada and its allies. The data were sent to the security and intelligence division of Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and to Canada’s partners in the Five Eyes alliance: the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

“At times they could be asked to send the information directly” to a CIA agent at the US embassy, the source told The Globe. continue reading

“At times they could be asked to send the information directly” to a CIA agent at the US embassy

The information gathering would have been of special value to the US because of the close relationship between Canada and Cuba. Canadian diplomats had better access to Cuban officials and could travel outside Havana, while the US mission was then headed by a chargé d’affaires rather than an ambassador.

The second source revealed that the US sent satellite equipment to the Canadian embassy in Cuba in diplomatic containers by sea at the end of 2016. As these were diplomatic pouches, the Cuban authorities could not open the containers under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

According to this source, the equipment was installed on the roof of the Canadian embassy and in the homes of some of that country’s diplomats. The antennas, the source explained, “could be used for anything: you could use them to access the internet, you could use them for whatever you wanted.”

A former senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said there was a conviction within the department that Russia was behind the sonic attacks

This situation began precisely during the so-called “thaw,” after US President Barack Obama began in 2015 to restore diplomatic relations with Cuba, broken off since 1961. In early 2017, Canadian and US diplomats in Havana began to present a set of unexplained symptoms – nosebleeds, nausea, migraines, blurred vision and memory loss. The exact causes of these ailments have not been determined to this day, despite multiple investigative efforts in different countries – mostly in the US – and have been a source of controversy for years.

A former senior official of Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited by The Globe said there was a conviction within the department that Russia was behind the sonic attacks, although Ottawa could not say so publicly because it lacked evidence. According to this source, some Canadian officials believed that Russia sought to obstruct the rapprochement between the US and Cuba, in which Canada had played a role. The targets, according to this interpretation, would have been Americans and Canadians linked to intelligence-gathering activities.

The hypothesis coincides with investigations in the US that have pointed to a Russian military intelligence unit as possibly responsible for some of the so-called “anomalous health incidents.” But this explanation has not been unanimously accepted.

The GSRP, for which the Canadian diplomat in Havana worked between 2016 and 2018, is a specialized unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially tasked with obtaining open-source information on political and security matters. The Ministry denied to The Globe that the diplomats in Cuba shared information with US spies.

The department also denied that the GSRP is an intelligence-gathering program. According to the official version, the officials in that program are accredited diplomats who carry out their activities openly and legally and comply with the Vienna Convention.

However, a Canadian parliamentary investigation cited by The Globe had pointed to problems with the program’s oversight. A 2023 report by the body responsible for reviewing Canada’s security and intelligence activities described the GSRP as sitting in a “clearly gray zone.” The report noted that some of its officials had maintained contacts with foreign intelligence agencies and appeared to have obtained classified information from certain sources.

The revelations by ‘The Globe’ coincide with a legal battle between the Canadian Government and diplomats who were working in Havana when the symptoms began

The revelations by The Globe coincide with a legal battle between the Canadian Government and diplomats who were working in Havana when the symptoms began, which has been kept secret since last year, when new information was submitted in the proceedings.

This Friday, Canada’s Department of Justice confirmed to The Globe that the Government invoked a rule restricting the disclosure of information whose publication could harm national security, national defense or international relations. The Government has not explained what information it seeks to keep secret because the case is still before the courts.

The lawsuit was initially filed in 2019 by ten diplomats and their family members. The plaintiffs accused the Canadian Government of failing to provide them with sufficiently advanced medical care, withholding relevant information from them and minimizing the severity of the brain injuries they attributed to the attacks.

In a statement released on Friday, Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted that there is no “definitive common cause” for the illnesses that affected officials posted at its embassy in Havana and declined to comment further on the litigation because it is before the courts.

In a report published in February 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that its officials’ unexplained ailments were not the result of a malicious act by a foreign power. For its part, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police investigated the cases after Canadian officials began reporting symptoms in 2017. Six years later, the police force published a heavily redacted report that did not reach definitive conclusions.

Translated by GH

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Cuban Consulates Are a Gold Mine for the Regime, According to an Investigation by ‘El Toque’

Internal documents from the Embassy in Washington reveal revenues of more than $270 million between 2019 and 2025

How much money does the entire network of consular services really contribute to the Cuban State, and what does it end up being spent on? / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, September 26, 2026 /Cuban consular services in the United States have for years functioned as an extraordinary source of foreign currency for the Havana Government. An investigation published this Friday by El Toque, based on thousands of leaked internal documents from the Cuban Embassy in Washington, reveals that the diplomatic mission collected more than $270 million between 2019 and 2025, a figure that could be even higher because the records obtained are incomplete.

The investigation, by journalist Ernesto Eimil, draws on 4,713 files from the institutional email accounts of the ambassador, the consul and an administrative assistant. El Toque obtained the documents at the end of 2025 through a collaboration with Systema, the investigative unit of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and says it verified and cross-checked them before publishing them.

More than the amounts collected, the documents show that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set specific financial targets for its consular services. In 2019, for example, the target set for the Embassy in Washington was close to $96 million. By July of that year, approximately 67% of the plan had already been met.

In the first seven months of 2019 alone, according to the records analyzed, the Consulate processed 64,480 passport applications, which then cost $350, and 86,104 extensions, at $160 each

The money came mainly from issuing passports, legalizations and notarial procedures, and the sale of tourist cards. Until July 2023, fees were also charged for the mandatory extensions of the Cuban passport.

In the first seven months of 2019 alone, according to the records analyzed, the Consulate processed 64,480 passport applications, which then cost $350, and 86,104 extensions, at $160 each. On top of this came 486,965 tourist cards sold at $50. Those three items alone accounted for around $60.7 million. continue reading

The pandemic caused travel to plummet, but did not completely dry up the source of income. In 2021, up to July 30, the Cuban mission had brought in $27.1 million, 63.12% of its annual plan. According to the documents cited by El Toque, that year Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez congratulated the consular staff for “overfulfilling the established plan.”

With the recovery of travel, the money came back too. By September 2022, the Embassy had collected $52.2 million, 121.49% of the target set for the entire year. In the same period of 2023 it had taken in $44.9 million, although in that case it had reached only 72.42% of what was planned.

In 2023 the Government lowered the price of the passport abroad, extended its validity from six to ten years for those over 16 and eliminated the extensions every two years

The migration reform of July 2023 later reduced a significant part of that income. The Government lowered the price of the passport abroad, extended its validity from six to ten years for those over 16 and eliminated the extensions every two years. As a result, Washington’s revenue plan fell to $36 million in 2024 and to $30 million in 2025.

Even that more modest target makes it possible to gauge the economic weight of the consular services. Another of the leaked documents puts the total budget of the Cuban Embassy in Washington for 2025 at $2,442,423. Of that amount, a maximum of $468,025 was earmarked for salaries and just over a million for renting housing for its officials. In January, about 50 people worked there.

The consular revenue target for that same year – $30 million – was therefore equivalent to more than 12 times the entire budget of the diplomatic mission. The comparison does not make it possible to establish the net profit obtained by the Cuban State, since all the costs associated with providing these services are unknown, but it shows the enormous gap between the volume of revenue and the mission’s budgeted expenses.

Starting this coming October 1, the passport for those over 16 will rise – once again – from 180 to 200 dollars or euros, while that for minors will go up from 140 to 160

The publication of the documents also coincides with a new increase in consular fees. Starting this coming October 1, the passport for those over 16 will go from 180 to 200 dollars or euros, while that for minors will rise from 140 to 160. Civil Registry certifications, academic documents, legalizations and numerous legal procedures will also go up.

The Foreign Ministry justified the price increase by citing the “complex international macroeconomic outlook” and “sustained global inflation,” and claimed that the new prices will make it possible to improve the quality, security and efficiency of the services.

If a single diplomatic mission, the one in Washington, was able to gather more than $270 million in seven years, the question the files leave open is much bigger: how much money the entire network of consular services really contributes to the Cuban State, and what it ends up being spent on.

Translated by GH

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More Sanctions and More Trade: The US Is Now Cuba’s Main Supplier

It went from tenth to first place among the island’s trading partners, leaving behind Spain and China, which previously topped the list

The volume accumulated by the United States in just seven months is already approaching the total of Spain’s exports to Cuba for all of 2025. / Facebook/ ZED Mariel

14ymedio, Havana, September 26, 2026 / In just three years, the United States has gone from occupying a secondary place in trade with Cuba to becoming its largest supplier, ahead of Spain and China, at the same time as the Trump Administration is tightening sanctions against Havana. In 2023, the US ranked only tenth among the island’s trading partners.

Between January and July 2026, US exports to Cuba reached $674 million, above those recorded by Spain and China over the same period. The comparison confirms the turnaround: the US, which just three years ago ranked tenth among the island’s trading partners, now heads the list, although it only sells to the island and buys almost nothing from it.

On another level, the volume accumulated by the United States in just seven months is already approaching the total of Spain’s exports to Cuba for the whole of 2025 (682.4 million euros) and the $684.2 million that China had shipped between January and August of that same year. continue reading

In the first seven months of the year, the US had already exported the equivalent of 83.2% of everything recorded in 2025

The US surge has been dizzying. In July alone, exports reached $148.9 million, the highest monthly figure since the U.S. Census Bureau began tracking them in 1992. In the first seven months of the year, the US had already exported the equivalent of 83.2% of everything recorded in 2025.

Between 2021 and 2025, US exports to Cuba grew by 148%, from about $327 million to more than $809 million.

The growing exchange is also visible in the ports. Some 45 cargo ships have made more than 200 trips from the United States to Cuba this year. By the end of August they had transported nearly 327,000 tons of goods from Miami, Houston, New Orleans, Jacksonville, Wilmington and other US ports.

The shipments include food, automobiles, motorcycles, solar power systems and petroleum products, which have gained weight amid Cuba’s severe energy crisis. In June, the US sent Cuba 778,000 barrels of fuel, 63.4% more than in May and the largest monthly volume recorded up to then in 2026.

While the United States exported $674 million to Cuba through July, it imported barely half a million dollars’ worth of goods from the island (exactly $515,550) over the same period

During the first half of the year, shipments totaled 1.67 million barrels. Washington authorizes these exports of fuel when they are destined for the Cuban private sector, although 14ymedio has documented numerous illegal sales to the state apparatus.

Between January and September 2025 alone, the island imported $355 million in agricultural products from the US, 15% more than in the same period of the previous year. Among the purchases that grew the most were pork, sugar, coffee, grains and animal feed.

Trade, moreover, flows in only one direction. While the United States exported $674 million to Cuba through July, it imported barely half a million dollars’ worth of goods from the island (exactly $515,550) over the same period. Of the total, $459,543 corresponded to works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques (90%); $52,319 to machinery and mechanical appliances, and $3,688 to plastics and plastic products, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.

Bloomberg noted that, as a result of the restrictions imposed by Washington on the large European shipping companies, some exports from third countries must pass through US ports.

Translated by GH.

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Raúl Castro’s Son-in-Law Owns Three Tourist Apartments in Barcelona

The Spanish newspaper ‘El Confidencial’ claims that Paolo Titolo managed the investments of Portuguese magnate Américo Ferreira Amorim in Spain for years.

Paolo Titolo’s apartment on Viladomat street in Barcelona’s Eixample district, according to information published by ‘El Confidencial’. / Google Maps

14ymedio, Madrid, 25 September 2026 / Paolo Titolo, Mariela Castro’s second husband, owns up to three tourist apartments in Barcelona, according to a report published Friday by El Confidencial. Citing sources in the Property Registry and people close to Raúl Castro’s son-in-law, the Spanish online newspaper indicates that he purchased them in 2015, 2017, and 2019, respectively.

The first property is a 155-square-meter [approximately 1,700-square-feet] apartment near Plaza de España and the Las Arenas shopping center, which, as El Confidencial points out, “is beyond the reach of the average citizen.” According to real estate websites, the price per square meter in this area is over €6,600, leading the Spanish online newspaper to estimate its market value at between €950,000 and €1,250,000.

On June 9, 2017, the publication details, he acquired his second property, an apartment in La Barceloneta, the old fishing neighborhood by the sea. Measuring 32 square meters, its value is estimated between €160,000 and €210,000, according to El Confidencial, “although the price could be higher, as the building has an elevator.” These types of apartments, the newspaper says, “were highly sought after in past decades by investors who, after renovating them, converted them into studio lofts and rented them out to tourists.” continue reading

Titolo, an Italian national and photojournalist by profession, “swarmed around Spain” for years, especially Barcelona, to look for investments for Cuba.

The third apartment Titolo acquired in 2019, is on Viladomat Street in the Eixample district, “in a building associated with tourist apartments, well-built and with soundproof windows,” El Confidencial reports. Also 32 square meters, the price of this property ranges between 180,000 and 220,000 euros.

El Confidencial reports that Titolo, an Italian national and photojournalist by profession, “swarmed around Spain” for years, especially Barcelona, seeking investments for Cuba. His main occupation, the online publication states, was “managing the businesses” of Américo Ferreira Amorim, who died in 2017. Amorim was once the richest man in Portugal and became friends with Fidel Castro and his brother in the 1960s. Titolo told El Confidencial that a businessman he knows personsally “decided how to invest” the money from the Portuguese magnate, owner of the Amorim conglomerate that sent “six or seven million euros.” At the same time, Raúl Castro’s son-in-law “was involved in other business dealings.”

In Barcelona, the publication reports, “he knocked on many doors, met with businesspeople, and asked to be introduced to elite economic circles to facilitate business deals in Havana. He became a simple commission agent, charging exorbitant fees for his political connections; after all, he was the boss’s son-in-law.” One of the deals he attempted, according to El Confidencial, was to obtain the Nissan dealership in Cuba, which “failed to go through” because “the Japanese wouldn’t budge” and continued to leave it in the hands of a Mexican billionaire.

Gaia Mercado, in Havana, owned by Lisa Titolo Castro, granddaughter of Raúl Castro. / 14ymedio

The online newspaper highlights the paradox that Titolo realized all these operations while the mayor of Barcelona was the leftist Ada Colau, who declared open war on tourist apartments during her administration. Her first deputy mayor, moreover, was Gerardo Pisarello, who to this day maintains close ties with the Communist Party of Cuba. He was, in fact, one of the passengers last March on the so-called Convoy Nuestra América organized by far-left organizations in solidarity with the regime and against the US embargo.

According to reports in the independent press, the Castro Titolo family and their children are among the wealthiest on the island. CubaNet, for example, revealed that Lisa Titolo Castro, owner of the Gaia Mercado local development project, is linked to a network of businesses built on the privileges of her surname, including fuel imports. In addition to Gaia, Lisa manages two agricultural farms, a meat processing company, and two micro-enterprises that supply construction materials, CubaNet asserted .

Residents of Central Havana, for their part, have pointed to Mariela Castro as a shadowy figure in businesses that were once privileged, such as the Tribe Caribe hotel, founded by Andrés Levín, and El Biky, but her name does not appear in them officially.

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For Cuba, Political Change Must Precede Economic Change

The CubanAmerican Voice, Julio M. Shiling , September 25, 2026 / For more than six decades the Castro-Communist dictatorship has survived by weaponizing scarcity, fear, and the patient calculation that democratic nations eventually tire of principle. That calculation is now under pressure. American foreign policy continues to treat the removal of this regime as a matter of national security for the United States, for the West, and for Latin America itself.

Recent evidence is plain: President Trump’s direct indictment at the United Nations of Havana’s role in fostering communist subversion; the Army Reserve’s quiet examination of whether it can supply Southern Command with police, medical, and support units on short notice; and the State Department’s continuous round of sanctions targeting Cuba’s elites, financial channels, and resource-extraction apparatus. These are not gestures. They are the concrete instruments of a long-held strategic judgment.

Cuban exiles have answered in kind. In Miami—the second-largest Cuban city after Havana—an impressive coalition of Cuban-American business leaders has convened to announce the creation of the Cuban-American National Chamber of Commerce and to declare readiness to underwrite the island’s post-communist reconstruction. Their message is clear and welcome: the exiled nation is prepared to foot the bill for a free Cuba. Washington notices. Regime change suddenly looks more fiscally attractive. continue reading

Yet attraction is not the same as wisdom. The central truth that both the American government and the Cuban-American community must keep in mind is this: in Cuba, political change must come before economic change. Under a totalitarian system, the two cannot safely proceed in tandem during the opening phase of transition. A market order does not create democracy; it operates under the political order that already exists. China, Vietnam, and post-Soviet Russia stand as enduring reminders. Capital can flow, private enterprise can flourish, and the same dictatorial structures—or their recycled successors—can remain firmly in control.

Castroism is not merely a set of inefficient policies. It is an institutional, epistemic, and hegemonic system that has colonized every formal and informal structure of Cuban life. Courts, universities, security organs, media, labor organizations, and even the language of daily discourse have been shaped to preserve the regime’s monopoly. Opening investment coffers while those structures remain intact would not liberate Cubans; it would subsidize the very apparatus that has kept them captive. The result would not be a democratic market economy but a hybrid despotism—capitalism without liberty, enrichment without accountability, and a new generation of nomenklatura wearing different suits.

What is required first is a deliberate period of transitional justice. This is essential. It is the systematic uprooting of the toxicity that totalitarianism leaves behind: the purging of compromised institutions, the recovery of historical truth, the dismantling of networks of privilege and surveillance, and the establishment of the rule of law as something more than a slogan. Only after that cleansing can genuine economic reconstruction begin without the risk of communism returning in recycled form. Emergency humanitarian aid and basic measures to alleviate suffering must arrive immediately. But the larger capital flows—the reconstruction that Cuban-American wealth, as well as foreign investors, is prepared to finance—should cautiously wait until the political foundations have been secured.

The belief that capitalism by itself will automatically produce democracy is a comforting illusion that history has repeatedly refuted. Markets are instruments. They amplify the purposes of the political order that directs them. When that order remains totalitarian or even a soft authoritarian variant, markets become tools of elite enrichment and regime longevity rather than engines of popular freedom. The Soviet collapse itself demonstrated the cost of premature economic liberalization without parallel political and institutional purification: the emergence of oligarchic and dictatorial successors that still menace the region.

Cuban exiles have preserved, across generations of departure, the best of the nation’s history, culture, and democratic aspirations. That inheritance now places upon them a dual responsibility: to support the material reconstruction of the homeland and, more urgently, to insist that reconstruction not become the mechanism by which Castroism survives under another name. The American government, for its part, must resist the temptation to treat capital as a substitute for the harder work of supporting genuine political rupture and transitional justice.

The sequence is non-negotiable. Political change first. Institutional cleansing next. Only then the full force of Cuban-American capital and Western engagement. Reverse that order, and Cuba risks exchanging one form of captivity for another—more prosperous for a few, still unfree for the many, and still a strategic liability for the hemisphere. The opportunity before us is historic. Squandering it by confusing investment with liberation would be a tragedy of our making.

Cuba’s Etecsa Users Ask Where the Millions of Dollars from the ‘Tarifazo’ Have Gone

Customers complain about “paying for a service they cannot use” because of the blackouts and because the monopoly has not modernized its infrastructure.

Etecsa has accumulated around 77,000 reports of interrupted fixed-line services. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, September 25, 2026 – On July 15, 2025, Prime Minister Manuel Marrero reported before the National Assembly that the new measures generated by Etecsa — Cuba’s State Telecommunications Company — had generated $24,839,000 in just 46 days, about $540,000 a day, compared with approximately $10,000 it had previously taken in. The head of government said at the time that those resources would be allocated to infrastructure recovery, new investments, and the expansion and development of services using new technologies.

Fourteen months later, Etecsa acknowledges that it cannot guarantee the stability of a large portion of those services and that it has had to reorganize its investments in an attempt to keep the infrastructure it already has operating. The explanation, published Thursday by Cubadebate, triggered a cascade of comments from customers who returned to a question Etecsa did not answer: what is happening to the money of those who pay for a service they cannot use?

The state monopoly acknowledged that during the latest nationwide blackout, more than 80% of radio base station sites and nearly 70% of the cabinets – telecommunications equipment installed at various points throughout the network – were out of operation. Internet traffic plunged by as much as 58%. In addition, Etecsa has accumulated around 77,000 reports of interrupted fixed-line services, which it attributes both to the shortage of resources and to the high cost of maintaining technology that the company itself describes as obsolete. continue reading

Although the infrastructure that makes it possible to use data plans remains out of service, the package clock keeps running

“We are paying for a service we cannot use. Money the customer loses,” summarized Omar Peña Ávila among the comments published by Cubadebate. The user recognizes the severity of the crisis facing the country, but points out that both fixed-line and mobile telephone services remain affected while subscribers must continue paying to keep their lines. “It isn’t reasonable,” he protests.

Leonardo Ruz Revilla raises the same problem with data packages. The customer says that the previous month he stopped using more than one gigabyte because of the lack of access to the network and that, despite this, the package expired when it reached its expiration date. “I am paying for a service I am not fully receiving,” he wrote, before asking that megabytes not used because of interruptions be allowed to accumulate.

The additional data plans established by Etecsa are valid for 35 days. The contradiction is particularly evident during prolonged blackouts, because although the infrastructure that makes it possible to use them remains out of service, the package clock keeps running.

The company, however, does provide adjustments when other services are interrupted. Last February, Etecsa’s Consumer Protection Department acknowledged the case of a customer who had been without fixed-line telephone service and Nauta Hogar since November 2024. After verifying that she had generated no traffic for six months, the company credited her 1,800 pesos for the internet service she had not received.

In addition, the Nauta Hogar postpaid option introduced in December 2025 allows up to 1,080 unused hours to accumulate and provides for adjustments to the bill when service interruptions occur. Etecsa therefore has compensation mechanisms for some products, while users of mobile packages are demanding that a similar principle be applied when blackouts prevent them from connecting.

The complaints published by Cubadebate also show that the problem predates the latest electrical collapse. A resident of Marianao says she has been without a fixed-line telephone for nearly a year, despite having to continue paying and keeping Nauta Hogar active. Another customer responds that he has also gone more than three years without fixed-line telephone service and must continue paying for the service so as not to lose the line.

The company maintains that it is not viable to continue expanding the access network – radio base stations, cabinets, and Wi-Fi zones – without first guaranteeing electrical backup for that infrastructure

Even more serious is the testimony of a reader from Entronque de Herradura, in Consolación del Sur, Pinar del Río. According to his account, following a traffic accident two weeks earlier in which a driver was in critical condition, there were no communications available to request an ambulance. A neighbor had to drive to the municipal center to request one in person. The commenter wondered what would happen in similar circumstances in the event of a heart attack or a fire.

In response to the deterioration, Etecsa has decided to change its priorities. The company maintains that it is not viable to continue expanding the access network – radio base stations, cabinets, and Wi-Fi zones – without first guaranteeing electrical backup for that infrastructure. So far, it has equipped the main centers in 64 municipal capitals with photovoltaic systems, although it admits that the installed capacity does not always allow services to be maintained around the clock. Some generators have had to operate for more than 20 consecutive hours.

Etecsa also says that the recovery of its revenues since the second half of 2025 has allowed it to pay part of its overdue debts and international services, install more than 140 radio base stations, expand frequencies to enable 4G in more than a hundred locations, and acquire licenses to increase the capacity of another 300.

Customers, however, remember the promise made when the new rates were imposed. From San José de las Lajas, one reader says that during the day mobile data speeds do not reach 500 kbps and asks what portion of those millions reached his municipality.

One final comment recalls that the increase in revenue was presented precisely as the means to purchase radio base stations, batteries, and other parts. After now reading that some of the money was used to pay accumulated debts and that the network still cannot be expanded, he leaves Etecsa with a simple warning: “Do the math, because the people are doing their own.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

*See also articles reporting on the “tarifazo” — huge price increases for telecommunications services.

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Henry Constantín Enters Kilo 7 Prison in a Process Marked by Lack of Information

Authorities postpone the habeas corpus hearing, which was supposed to be held this Friday.

Henry Constantín said that he was calm and firm last Wednesday during a visit by his partner to Villa María Luisa. / La Hora de Cuba

14ymedio, Madrid, September 25, 2026 – Independent journalist Henry Constantín, director of La Hora de Cuba and vice president of the Inter American Press Association (IAPA) in the region, entered Kilo 7 prison in Camagüey this Thursday. The information, confirmed by him personally in a call to his partner, journalist Alejandra García, contradicts the measure issued during the investigation, which indicated that he would be transferred to Cerámica prison, in the same province.

The alert began Thursday morning, when the journalist’s lawyer reported that Constantín had been transferred from Villa María Luisa, the State Security operations and interrogation headquarters in the Garrido neighborhood of Camagüey, without the family’s knowledge. The news spread on the assumption that the journalist had been taken to the place stated in the official record.

The news spread on the assumption that the journalist had been taken to the place stated in the official record

Constantín, who was subject to a precautionary measure of preventive detention amid an investigation for “disobedience,” had told those close to him last Tuesday that there were rumors that he would be transferred. However, in the end, it was other prisoners who left the facility. On Wednesday, when his family went to visit him, they received no notice of the transfer, which ultimately took place unexpectedly on Thursday.

La Hora de Cuba has denounced the accumulation of illegalities, since the lack of news was followed by false information, given that the precautionary measure indicated that the preventive detention was to be served in Cerámica. Added to all this is the postponement of the habeas corpus hearing filed Monday, which was supposed to take place this Friday. continue reading

The Provincial Popular Court, where Constantín’s family went to inquire about the situation, indicated that although the hearing was scheduled for September 25, “due to work changes” in the country, “it is perhaps postponed until Monday,” although, the publication adds, “most likely it will be next Tuesday the 29th.”

The family has denounced a violation of the Criminal Procedure Law, which establishes that the court has 72 hours from the time it admits the habeas corpus to hold the hearing. “A ruling cannot contradict what the procedural law says; that violates the law of a legal process of the hierarchy,” said law graduate Luis Orlando Bermúdez.

However, the subsequent article specifies that this must be complied with “unless there are justified causes that prevent it,” which would allow for a legal loophole on which to rely. Bermúdez, in any case, considers that the cause is not justified. “I think that if there is a habeas corpus there should be a judge, during the rotation due to the change of work. It cannot be that my procedural guarantees are violated because you have a change of work; that is crazy. You cannot arrange for there to be a change of work on Friday when there is a labor code that says Friday is a work day,” he maintains.

Henry Constantín is accused of a crime of disobedience for failing to appear for a summons issued for last September 9

Henry Constantín is accused of a crime of disobedience for failing to appear for a summons issued for last September 9 at the Directorate of Identification, Immigration and Foreigners, in the Vista Hermosa neighborhood. Shortly afterward, on the 16th, the journalist received another communication instructing him to appear at the Second Unit of the Revolutionary National Police, located on Carretera Central, where he was arrested, supposedly, for the events that occurred the previous week.

Since then, his lawyer has complained about the misinformation that obstructs his right to a defense, beginning with the lack of access to the case file, without which she cannot appeal any of the measures adopted.

Last Wednesday, during a visit of about 20 minutes, Constantín assured his partner that he is facing his current situation with determination. “I am calm and I remain firm,” he said.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Uruguay Will Pay Cuban Doctors Directly, Says Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin

The U.S. and Cuba agree on this new method of remuneration, the diplomat told journalist Gabriel Pereyra.

Lubetkin told Pereyra that a solution is being found to “a technical problem, which is changing the method of payment to these doctors.” / Video screenshot/Presidency of Uruguay

14ymedio, Havana, September 24, 2026 – “Uruguay reached an agreement with both the Government of the United States and that of Cuba to resolve the case of Cuban doctors.” This was confirmed by Uruguay’s Foreign Minister, Mario Lubetkin, to Radio Sarandí journalist Gabriel Pereyra. The Government of Yamandú Orsi offered to “pay the professionals from the Island directly,” the journalist emphasized.

The Uruguayan diplomat was approached by the journalist in New York, and he confirmed that Cuba had accepted the new method of payment to professionals working in the country, including 21 Cuban ophthalmologists, anesthesiologists, nurses, and technicians who are currently at the José Martí Eye Hospital. However, Lubetkin clarified that “Uruguay cannot interfere in other possible movements, such as, for example, the doctors being forced to transfer that money to Cuba.”

At the beginning of September, Washington threatened the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense with including Uruguay on a “blacklist” of countries using slave labor for maintaining the agreement with Cuba. This would mean, Pereyra indicated, no longer receiving military aid from the U.S.

Lubetkin told Pereyra that a solution is being found to “a technical problem, which is changing the method of payment to these doctors.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working together with the Ministry of Public Health, the State Health Services Administration, and the Social Security Bank to implement changes to the program and formalize the new agreement.

The healthcare relationship between Uruguay and Cuba dates back to 2005, when Operation Miracle began, the ophthalmology program promoted for low-income patients and initially financed by Venezuela as part of the regional integration project Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). continue reading

Cuban ophthalmologists traveled to Uruguay to select patients who were then transported to the Island for eye surgeries. Between 2005 and 2007, some thirty flights carrying 2,037 Uruguayans were recorded, according to data from the Cuban Foreign Ministry.

The president of Uruguay’s Social Security Bank (BPS), Jimena Pardo, confirmed in mid-September the disbursement of $250,000 annually from the institution’s budget to Operation Miracle. The official clarified that the money does not correspond to the salaries of the 21 Cuban professionals currently working at the José Martí Eye Hospital, which is part of the Gustavo Saint Bois Hospital Center and under state administration, but rather “is a stipend, a reimbursement of expenses.”

A total of 21 Cuban ophthalmologists, anesthesiologists, nurses, and technicians currently work at the José Martí Eye Hospital in Uruguay. / Video screenshot/Presidency of Uruguay

Pardo emphasized that payment of the doctors’ salaries is the responsibility of Havana. The BPS transfers the funds to an account belonging to the brigade established by the Ministry of Public Health. She also indicated that it is stipulated that they remain in Uruguay for three-year periods.

There is no official information on the salaries received by these specialists. In May 2020, Uruguay’s Ministry of Public Health refused to disclose the remuneration and number of Cuban professionals collaborating at the José Martí Eye Hospital due to the “nonexistence of data held by this State Secretariat.”

In 2015, Uruguay’s Senate forgave a debt of $31.5 million plus interest ($55 million in total) that Cuba had incurred in 1986. The decision, they argued, was made in consideration of the “numerous instances of cooperation” that Montevideo had received from the Island “in different areas.”

Between 2008 and 2022, the presence of seven brigades in the South American nation was recorded, with around 160 professionals.

Honduras, Guatemala, and Antigua and Barbuda, as well as Guyana, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, have ended their medical cooperation projects with Cuba following pressure exerted by Washington.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuba Receives a New Shipment of 5,000 Photovoltaic Systems Donated by China

Díaz-Canel announced this Wednesday the intention to “make Havana’s water pumping independent” with solar energy.

Image shared by the Chinese ambassador on social media. / EmbHuaXin

EFE/14ymedio, Havana, September 24, 2026 – A new shipment of 5,000 solar photovoltaic systems donated by the Chinese Government arrived in Cuba, destined for a project to electrify public facilities and homes in remote regions of the Island.

China’s ambassador to Cuba, Hua Xin, announced on social media the arrival of the donation, which came from his country and was transported in 200 containers.

“China is supporting Cuba’s energy transition and supporting its efforts to improve the living conditions of the people with concrete actions,” the Chinese diplomat said in a video accompanying the announcement.

“China is supporting Cuba’s energy transition and supporting its efforts to improve the living conditions of the people with concrete actions”

Havana and Beijing maintain close political and economic relations in which the Asian country stands out as one of the Island’s main allies, although the statements have gone no further than mere verbal support and occasional donations such as the current one.

In a message on social media, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez thanked “the Party, Government and people of China for their solidarity and sincere material assistance, at a time when the U.S. Government is intensifying its blockade against Cuba and maintaining an energy siege that causes considerable harm to the population.”

This is the third donation of 5,000 photovoltaic panels sent by China in recent months, following the one received in November 2025 for homes that were left isolated in the easternmost part of the Island after the passage of Hurricane Melissa. continue reading

Last August, a similar shipment arrived and was assigned to health services and emergency medical institutions, daycare centers, funeral homes, state facilities for children without family protection, and bank branches, among other facilities, according to information provided at the time by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment.

The Ministry of Energy and Mines reported in March on a plan to install solar systems at vital facilities in all of the country’s municipalities, as well as in isolated homes, including those that have never had access to electricity.

This Wednesday, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel said in his new radio program, Criterio Compartido [Shared Views], that, to date, 1,418 megawatts (MW) of photovoltaic capacity have been installed in the country, distributed among 144 parks, and he cited a target of more than 1,500 MW by the end of the year.

Regarding renewable sources, he said that they currently account for 21.4% of the country’s electricity generation. He also detailed that these have been installed in 99% of polyclinics, 47% of hospitals, 89% of nursing homes and grandparents’ homes, 99% of maternity homes, 98% of funeral homes, and 16% of state homes for children without family protection.

He also indicated that 72% of banks, 97% of radio stations, and 25% of radio base stations have photovoltaic systems.

He also indicated that 72% of banks, 97% of radio stations, and 25% of radio base stations have photovoltaic systems

The intention is also to achieve, in the first months of next year, “the independence of Havana’s water pumping from the SEN.”

The biggest problems are still the lack of batteries to store the energy generated, as well as the impossibility of using the total amount so as not to further destabilize the shortage of thermal generation. Most of the thermoelectric power plants, responsible for 40% of generation, were built in the 1960s and 1970s, and every day around half of the 16 generating units installed are not operational because of breakdowns or lack of maintenance.

Under these circumstances, the country’s energy situation is “critical” and “extremely tense,” and has reached record levels in recent months with eight total disconnections of the National Electric System (SEN) so far in 2026.

The Cuban Government’s main strategy for emerging from this crisis has been solar energy, mainly with Chinese support, and it has launched a program to build 92 solar parks with companies from that country to reach a total installed capacity of about 2,000 megawatts (MW).

But the scale of the crisis is such that the deficit continues to increase despite the expansion of solar energy. For this Thursday, an impact of 2,133 MW is forecast during the peak hour, after reaching 2,170 MW yesterday.

Electricity production from the photovoltaic solar parks this Wednesday was 3,343 MWh, with 520 MW as the maximum power delivered, which moderated the deficit during the morning hours, when it was 1,660 MW.

The lack of fuel for distributed generation and breakdowns at the thermoelectric plants, which reduce this contribution by 467 MW, are at the root of the precarious situation. Unit 8 of Mariel, Antonio Guiteras, Unit 6 of Nuevitas, Unit 2 of Felton, and Unit 6 of Renté are out of service. Due to maintenance, Units 3 of Santa Cruz del Norte, 5 of Nuevitas, and 5 of Renté are also not contributing.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Cuban Government Raises the Cost of Passports Abroad, Increasing the Price to 200 Dollars or Euros

Fees for birth, marriage, death, and criminal-record certificates also increase.

The new fee schedule sets charges in euros for countries that use this currency and takes the dollar as the reference in other territories. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, September 24, 2026 – Cubans residing abroad will have to pay more for their passports, for several of the documents most commonly requested to emigrate, to validate studies, and to carry out family-related procedures. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Resolution 37/2026, updating the consular fee schedule, will take effect on October 1.

The passport for those over 16 will increase from 180 to 200 dollars or euros, while the price for minors will rise from 140 to 160. These prices had been in effect since 2023 under a previous resolution that lowered the price of the document at consulates and extended its validity from six to ten years for adults, in addition to eliminating the old two-year extensions.

The new fee schedule sets charges in euros for countries that use this currency and takes the dollar as the reference in other territories, with the possibility of charging the equivalent in local currency.

The Foreign Ministry justified the increase by citing the “complex international macroeconomic landscape” and “sustained global inflation,” and said that the update will make it possible to improve the “quality, security, and efficiency” of consular services. continue reading

Although the update does not affect the price of passports issued in Cuba, which remains at 2,500 pesos, procedures within the Island are far from simple

The increase will be more pronounced for Civil Registry certificates. Birth, marriage, common-law union, death, criminal-record, divorce, last-will, declaration of heirs, and single-status documents will cost 110 dollars or euros, to which another 30 will have to be added for the application.

For those who pay in euros, for example, obtaining one of these certificates had until now cost 100 euros: 25 to request it and 75 for its issuance. Starting in October, it will cost 140, a 40% increase, not including possible legalizations. In the other countries, the previous fee varied: issuance cost 80 dollars, and in the United States 100 dollars.

Although the update does not affect the price of passports issued in Cuba, which remains at 2,500 pesos according to Annex 4 of Law 113 of the Tax System, modified by Decree-Law 21/2020 and still in force, procedures within the Island are far from simple.

Long waits at Civil Registry offices to obtain birth, marriage, and death certificates have worsened with the increase in requests related to emigration. In 2023, the Ministry of Justice itself acknowledged a “notable increase” in requests for criminal-record certificates, which are required by numerous consulates to issue visas.

The graduate certificate and certificate of a valid, non-invalidated degree will increase from 185 to 240 euros, plus the 30-euro application fee

Academic documents are also becoming more expensive. For those who process them in euros, transcripts, study programs, and subject plans will increase from 225 to 290 euros, while the application fee will rise from 25 to 30. The combined cost thus increases from 250 to 320 euros, before legalizations. The graduate certificate and certificate of a valid, non-invalidated degree will increase from 185 to 240 euros, plus the 30-euro application fee.

Other procedures may be added to those amounts. The legalization of teaching documents in those countries will increase from 95 to 110 euros, legalization at a foreign embassy in Havana will rise from 55 to 70, and legalization, now handled by Cuba’s Ministry of Justice, will increase from 35 to 50 euros.

The increase in the price of the Cuban passport comes after confusion generated at the beginning of this year by reports that put the price at 234 dollars. The Foreign Ministry then denied that the consular fee schedule had been changed. That figure corresponded to another legal service associated with obtaining the document and not to the price charged directly by consulates.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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