Translating Cuba – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

The People of Artemisa Dream of Reviving the Soroa Tourist Complex with the Private Sector

Small and medium-sized private businesses are becoming lifelines for state-owned companies throughout the country.

The hotels were already on their last legs since the pandemic and are now closed. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, October 22, 2026 / Soroa has long been buried in oblivion because of the decline in tourism. The coronavirus pandemic devastated one of the Island’s most privileged areas. Its location, just 80 kilometers from Havana, and the beauty of its natural landscapes had earned it, quite deservedly, the nickname “The Rainbow of Cuba.” But its case perfectly illustrates the blow dealt to an industry that has never been able to recover since COVID-19 and that recent U.S. sanctions have finally finished off.

For the past four months, the tourist complex has been firmly shut, with the exception of the six security guards and 15 workers who, according to a report in the local press, “are dedicated to maintaining the place, at least keeping it free of weeds, dust, and other predictable effects, as they bring even the hands of the clock to a halt.” El Artemiseño states that, in addition to the shortcomings of the electrical system, there is an “absence of drinking water.”

The article notes that a “No Entry” sign warns of the situation at the complex, located in Artemisa—in the Sierra del Rosario and very close to Candelaria—and comprised of a hotel, an orchid garden, several lodging villas, and the picturesque Castle in the Clouds. Hurricane Rafael, which struck the province nearly two years ago, left “damage that has yet to be repaired,” the outlet acknowledges, although it remains optimistic.

“We learned from the Artemisa Tourism Delegation that there are non-state economic actors interested in taking over management of the complex,” it states confidently, while also acknowledging that “in fact, when speaking with some of the workers at the Soroa hotel, they have no clear idea of where the negotiations stand.” continue reading

“We learned from the Artemisa Tourism Delegation that there are non-state economic actors interested in taking over management of the complex”

The article devotes numerous paragraphs to encouraging investors to take an interest in an area with specific potential for ecotourism because of its natural attributes, a sector that offers tax and fiscal benefits to business owners. “The changes make it possible both to add new options to the business models already in place (joint ventures and management contracts) for tourism activities and to lease properties to foreign investors, Cubans residing abroad, and those living in the country,” El Artemiseño states, warning of the risks posed by the authorities’ inaction if they fail to implement the much-publicized 176 measures to transform the economy.

The article emphasizes the importance of restoring Soroa for the more than one hundred workers who have now had to be reassigned to other destinations, the new opportunities for tour guides and other tourism professionals who have received new authorizations to work independently of the State, and a series of other advantages. There are so many that they raise doubts about the private sector’s purported interest in managing the complex.

“If there is no prompt action on the established timetable to approve the model to be followed at the appropriate levels; if workers are kept in the dark about what is happening and how it will be done; if the property lacks the essential maintenance needed to prevent deterioration; and if the decision is pushed beyond the immediate present, the cost of reviving it will be high,” the report adds.

Soroa’s abandonment is far from recent. Although El Artemiseño indicates that the deterioration affects “the facilities that once offered unique experiences in those parts,” the turning point dates back to 2020. That year, 14ymedio visited the region to report on how a population that until then had depended on tourism, both directly and indirectly, had been profoundly disrupted by the closure of the borders.

Those who rented rooms, offered excursions or horseback rides, prepared meals, or even sold orchids—the result of widespread illegal cultivation—were then forced to reinvent themselves to the point of turning their land into vegetable gardens. This newspaper even interviewed a woman who had lost her job after the hotel closed and could not even find work cleaning houses. None of those interviewed was optimistic about escaping a predicament they had never faced before.

And they were not wrong. Despite the very slow and modest recovery in tourism following the reopening of the borders, visitor numbers plummeted, especially beginning in 2023. This continued until the final collapse in 2026, when only 450,353 international tourists arrived on the Island between January and August, 64.4% fewer than during the same period in 2025, which had already been a very bad year. The September figures will be released in a few days

As long as problems such as the lack of flights due to fuel shortages remain unresolved, along with shortages of electricity, water, and food supplies, which hotels can circumvent through investment, and the absence of managers for the facilities since most foreigners left because of the sanctions, the incentives that the press highlights for Cuban or foreign investors will do little good.

“The complexity of securing financing kept postponing the project until, in coordination with the small and medium-sized private company VitallCons, with which working ties already existed, it was decided to begin the project”

Nevertheless, the private sector is beginning to become, albeit on a very small scale for now, the national economy’s only lifeline. On Wednesday, the Las Tunas press reported on the restoration of the old railway station, which will be brought back to life as an intermodal terminal for trains, buses, and trucks, complete with a fuel station. “The complexity of securing financing kept postponing the project until, in coordination with the small and medium-sized private company VitallCons, with which working ties already existed, it was decided to begin the project,” the report explains.

The same has happened in the food sector with the Artemisa Poultry Company and Don Pereda, a medium-sized private company, which have joined forces in an association to reestablish the José Antonio Labrador farm. The facility recently suffered a shortage of animal feed, and after 29 days with no feed at all, it lost most of its poultry stock, while production fell from 28,000 eggs a day to just 38.

“With the guarantee of importing animal feed, the new management model takes responsibility for more than 80,000 laying hens, nearly 42,000 of them already adults, with the remainder being young hens awaiting their first laying cycle,” the report states. According to the article, wages have doubled, and incentive payments can reach 15,000 pesos, three times the monthly salary.

Translated by Regina Anavy

___________________________________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Havana Chronicles: Havana, A City of Desperate Searches

From Nuevo Vedado to Carlos III, a journey through blackouts, ruined buildings, and people searching for a connection or something to eat.

From several blocks around, people arrive looking for something that is becoming as scarce as electricity: an internet connection. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Yoani Sánchez, Havana, October 21, 2026 / Just having left my house, on the outskirts of the Ministry of Agriculture, I came across a group of people sitting on the curb, as if waiting for a bus that never comes. But no one was looking toward nearby Rancho Boyeros Avenue for a bus. They all had their heads bent over a cell phone screen. Some were typing rapidly, others were holding the device close to their face, and a woman was straining to hear a voice message over the noise of the traffic.

The proximity of a telecommunications tower has transformed this stretch of sidewalk into an improvised internet café. People arrive from several blocks around, seeking something that is becoming as scarce as electricity: an internet connection. In much of Nuevo Vedado, mobile data has become an intermittent luxury. The signal appears, disappears, and forces people to pursue it through the streets.

This Wednesday morning the sky is overcast and a cool breeze relieves the wait. Other days, those who sit in front of the enormous building end up with sunburnt skin, as if they’d spent hours at the beach. Except they haven’t seen the sea or enjoyed a vacation. They’ve remained in the open air trying to send an email, talk to a relative who’s emigrated, or download a document.

“Things are so bad that, between the sacks of cement and the bricks I move, I also have to work as a taxi driver.”

I continue toward Ayestarán. Recent rains have converted the sidewalks into a series of puddles and mud. One wrong step could leave my shoe sinking in a mixture of mud and dirty water. I decide to hop on an electric tricycle. The driver is an older man with weathered arms and an easygoing manner. He explains that he doesn’t usually pick up passengers. His business consists of transporting goods from a few private hardware stores to customers’ homes. But these aren’t times for specialization. continue reading

“Things are so bad that, between the sacks of cement and the bricks I move, I also have to act as a taxi driver,” he tells me while trying to dodge a van whose driver seems convinced that the size of his vehicle gives him priority on the road.

At the intersection of Ayestarán and 20 de Mayo, the traffic light is out. It’s not the first one we’ve found not working. The power outage extends across large areas of Havana, and intersections have become places where each driver calculates for themselves when to proceed, stop, or simply rely on luck.

“Looks like they’re going to take Díaz-Canel for a walk,” my driver quips as he looks towards the nearby tower of the Plaza of the Revolution

Here, however, a policewoman tries to bring order to the cars, motorcycles, and tricycles. Two officers, in their impecable uniforms, join the operation.

“Looks like they’re going to take Díaz-Canel for a stroll,” my driver quips, glancing at the nearby tower in the Plaza of the Revolution. “Now they’re taking him to a place where everything looks spic and span,” he adds sarcastically.

A little further on, the landscape belies any pretense of a polished city. In the dilapidated doorway of a building that lost part of its roof years ago, a couple has set up their makeshift home. Bags, wood, and plastic sheeting define a dwelling without doors or walls. Trees sprout from the balconies and eaves, seemingly determined to finish the demolition. No one dares to pass beneath that structure for fear of collapse, but they live there.

We turn right onto Carlos III Avenue. In front of the commercial center, a woman is selling trinkets on a blanket spread out on the sidewalk. The tricycle stops, and the driver takes the opportunity to wipe his sweat. “That’s in dollars. I haven’t lost anything there because I don’t have any,” he says, pointing at the establishment.

I glance toward the gates of the Plaza. A old woman hunched over raises her hand every time someone approaches and asks for “something to eat.” Her voice barely manages to cut through the noise of the engines and the bustle of the street. Havana has become a city where we all desperately chase after something: an internet signal, a roof, even if it threatens to collapse, a few dollars, or simply something as basic as being able to eat every day.

A New Education Law for Cuba, but with the Same Ideological Control

The draft bill opens space for the private sector in educational services and financing, but keeps schools in the hands of the State.

The draft bill also includes ideological obligations for teachers. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, October 2026 / Cuban students will have, on paper, the right to express their opinions freely, but they will also be required to “defend the principles of the Revolution.” This is one of the contradictions in the draft bill for the new Education Law, with which the Government intends to replace Law 680 of 1959 and bring together, within a single legal framework, numerous provisions that until now have been scattered across different regulations. The document, comprising 243 articles, incorporates guarantees for students and teachers and opens up new opportunities for private-sector participation, but preserves one of the fundamental characteristics of the Cuban education system: its total subordination to the official ideology.

Economic openness is one of the most interesting new features of the proposal. Although Article 41 keeps the administration and financing of educational institutions in the hands of the State, it allows resources from non-state management models and national and international cooperation to be incorporated. Article 239 also authorizes educational institutions to establish mechanisms for generating supplementary income, including the creation of foundations, interface companies, mipymes (micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises), and other authorized structures.

This is not a possibility entirely foreign to the current reality. At the end of August, several private companies committed to sponsoring more than 50 schools in the municipality of Florida, Camagüey, to help with repairs, painting, cleaning, and maintenance. The initiative, promoted by local authorities, was a response to the State’s difficulties in ensuring adequate material conditions for the school year.

The Cuban draft bill keeps school administration in the hands of the State

This does not amount to authorizing the general opening of private schools. The Cuban draft bill keeps school administration in the hands of the State. The reform allows greater non-state economic participation around the education system, but does not establish general freedom to create independent schools. continue reading

In the political sphere, the provisions are equally explicit. Article 11 recognizes students’ right to form and freely express their opinions, to be heard, and to participate in decisions that affect them. However, the following article, which addresses their duties, requires them to “defend the principles of the Revolution, preserving national independence and security.” The document does not clarify how a conflict between these two provisions would be resolved or what would happen to a student who openly advocated political ideas opposed to socialism.

The draft bill also establishes ideological obligations for teachers. Article 14 stipulates that teaching and non-teaching staff must “defend the Socialist Homeland, the principles of the Revolution, and the values of Cuban society.” It also requires them to maintain their political and ideological preparation and systematically keep up to date on national and international events that affect their educational work. Another provision requires them to maintain ethical conduct on social media, without precisely defining the scope of that obligation.

The requirement of political loyalty has explicit precedents. In 2019, the then Deputy Minister of Higher Education, Martha del Carmen Mesa Valenciano, argued that university professors should act as activists for revolutionary policy. In her statement, published on the Ministry’s official website, she invoked Fidel Castro’s definition of the ideological role of educators and maintained that anyone who did not share that commitment should resign from university teaching.

For more than six decades, curricula, student organizations, and school activities have been linked to defending the regime

The new regulation also specifies its doctrinal foundations. Article 6 stipulates that the educational process will promote national values and ideals based on “Martíist, Fidelist, Marxist, and Leninist” thought. Article 50 also includes the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba among the bodies to which certain higher education institutions are subordinate.

This is not a case of political indoctrination only now arriving in Cuban schools. For more than six decades, curricula, student organizations, and school activities have been linked to defending the regime. The new draft bill performs a balancing act to bring these ideological requirements together in new legislation that also proclaims supposed individual rights and the “democratic and participatory” nature of education.

A comparison with other Latin American laws highlights the differences. In Argentina, Article 67 of the National Education Law recognizes teachers’ right to teach on the basis of academic freedom and freedom of instruction. In Uruguay, Article 11 of the General Education Law requires teachers to facilitate access to different sources of information, presenting a broad and balanced range of viewpoints so that students can form their own judgments.

Uruguayan legislation also stipulates that a plurality of opinions and the rational and democratic confrontation of knowledge and beliefs must be guaranteed. The Cuban draft bill, by contrast, does not establish an equivalent general guarantee of academic freedom, although it recognizes a degree of “academic autonomy” in specific activities, such as tutoring and academic supervision.

Another difference from much of Latin America concerns compulsory schooling. While Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay extend it through the completion of secondary education, the Cuban proposal maintains compulsory schooling from preschool through ninth grade. Subsequent levels are presented as a social aspiration that the State should promote, but not as an obligation for everyone.

Universities are not exempt from ideological requirements either. The proposal recognizes students’ right to participate in institutional management, but only within “agreed-upon degrees of relative autonomy.” Another provision makes that autonomy conditional on its consistency with “the principles of socialist society.”

The energy crisis has also endangered the day-to-day operation of educational institutions

In March of this year, the Technological University of Havana (Cujae) decided not to renew Professor Abel Tablada’s contract after he published critical comments about the Government’s economic decisions, according to the professor’s account. His departure sparked protests among students and professors in Cujae’s Faculty of Architecture.

Among the provisions favoring student rights are safeguards against school violence, reporting mechanisms, and protection against retaliation. However, many of these rights were already recognized in the 2025 Code of Children, Adolescents, and Youth. The future law develops the procedures and institutional responsibilities associated with these rights rather than establishing them for the first time.

The document also promises decent working conditions for teachers, school meals, teaching materials, accessibility, and technological resources, although it sets no quantified budgetary commitments to make these guarantees effective. The possibility of turning to business income and supplementary funding sources takes on particular importance in this context. In August, the Education Minister herself acknowledged that only 73% of teaching positions were filled and that in-person attendance throughout the school year could not be guaranteed.

The energy crisis has also endangered the day-to-day operation of educational institutions. In May, UNESCO warned that power outages, fuel shortages, and the deterioration of basic services threatened Cuban education by making it more difficult for students and teachers to attend school and for classes to proceed normally.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

Alayn Daniel Blanco, the Second Young Cuban Baseball Prospect to Defect This Month

It is estimated that of the more than 1,000 athletes who have left the Island over the past decade, at least 700 are baseball players.

Alayn Daniel Blanco has already recorded a pitching speed of over 90 miles per hour / Facebook

14ymedio, Havana, October 21, 2026 / Alayn Daniel Blanco, 18, is the latest Cuban baseball prospect to defect. The young man is following the path taken by players from the Island who are seeking to reach Major League Baseball (MLB) in the United States: traveling to the Dominican Republic. The pitcher’s departure was reported by expert Francys Romero, who noted on Monday that the athlete is seeking to sign a contract with an MLB organization.

The player, who was born in Matanzas and stands 1.92 meters tall, has already recorded a pitching speed of over 90 miles per hour, Romero points out, the average speed needed to compete in Major League Baseball.

The drain of talent is beginning to take its toll on Cuban sports. As journalist Yasel Porto recalls, “one of the keys to this defeat is that the largest percentage of Cuba’s top-level baseball players, aged 14 and 15, are in the Dominican Republic, in academies run by Major League teams or in private academies, seeking a contract.”

Alayn Daniel Blanco’s defection is the second reported this month and the third in less than 30 days. The previous reported defection was that of Carlos Adrián Hernández, who was part of the preliminary roster of the Cuban team that competed in the Under-15 World Cup held in Mexico during the first week of October. The pitcher also arrived in the Dominican Republic to begin training. continue reading

The previous reported defection was that of Carlos Adrián Hernández, who was part of the preliminary roster of the Cuban team that competed in the Under-15 World Cup

At the end of September, the departure of Leandro Forteza García, 19, was also reported. The pitcher from Sancti Spíritus was a member of the Cuban team that competed in the 2025 Under-18 World Cup in Japan. In three games in the tournament, he recorded two wins and one loss, with an earned run average of 3.36, in addition to striking out seven batters in 8.1 innings.

According to Francys Romero’s records, Forteza García is the eighth member of the World Cup team to have left the Island.

Another case was that of Richard Bouquet, a 17-year-old right-handed pitcher from Holguín, who left Cuba last July and came under the guidance of Bailli Baseball, an academy in the Dominican Republic founded by former Cuban baseball player Kenen Bailli, who played in the National Series and in the Major Leagues with Toronto.

Of that Cuban youth team that competed in Japan, the first to leave the country was left-handed pitcher César Morales, from Villa Clara, in July 2025. He began training in Santo Domingo under representation by the Wasserman agency. Marcos Fuentes, Alejandro Cairo, and Cristian Rojas followed in August of last year, while Javier Zambrano left in November.

One of the reasons is the low salaries, which amount to 3,500 pesos for a player competing in the National Series

The departure of these young players adds to the problems Cuban baseball has faced for years. On the one hand, it is estimated that of the more than 1,000 athletes who have left the Island over the past decade, at least 700 are young baseball players with promising futures. To a large extent, the lack of opportunities for growth and the limited prospects of achieving a better life force athletes to seek opportunities far from the Island. One reason is the low salaries, which amount to 3,500 pesos for players competing in the National Series and 8,500 for those in the Elite League, in a country where a carton of eggs can cost as much as 4,300 pesos.

Furthermore, sporting results are getting progressively worse. In the most recent World Baseball Classic, the team known as Team Asere delivered the worst performance in its history, failing even to qualify for the second round after being eliminated with two wins and two losses.

Previously, apart from the unexpected fourth-place finish achieved by the Cuban team in the most recent World Baseball Classic in 2023, the national team has recorded nothing but failures in the various international events in which it has competed. In the Premier 12 tournament, which brings together the world’s best teams, the team fell from sixth place in 2015 to second-to-last place (11th), tied with Puerto Rico, in 2024.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

China, Russia and Iran Close Ranks with Raúl Castro, “Revolutionary Leader of Great Prestige”

Tehran calls the arrest warrant against the former president for the shootdown of the Brothers to the Rescue planes “criminal”; Moscow points to “revenge by Miami’s anti-Cuban lobby” and Beijing offers its “firm support”

Xi Jinping with Raúl Castro during a meeting in Havana in 2014. / Xinhua

14ymedio, Madrid, October 21, 2026 / China has been the latest friendly country to join the club of solidarity with the Cuban regime following the indictment of Raúl Castro in the case of the 1996 shootdown of two light aircraft belonging to the Brothers to the Rescue organization, expanded this Monday by a Florida judge. The measure, signed on Friday by Ariana Fajardo Orshan, charges the former ruler with conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, in a case separate from the federal proceedings opened in May over the deaths of four members of the organization.

“Raúl Castro is a highly respected leader of the Cuban Revolution,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said this Wednesday, adding that the former leader “enjoys great international prestige.”

Xinhua echoed these statements, made at a regular press conference at which the spokesperson was asked about the matter. “China has consistently opposed the abuse of judicial means to pressure Cuba,” she said, before stressing that Beijing “firmly supports” the island in “protecting its national sovereignty and rejecting foreign interference.”

“China has consistently opposed the abuse of judicial means to pressure Cuba”

Mao once again called on the United States to “put an end to its blockade of Cuba and to any other form of coercion or pressure,” and urged it to “stop violating the Cuban people’s rights to survival and development.”

Beijing had been preceded by two other regular partners of Havana, one of them Iran, whose Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement through the state news agency IRNA in which it described the issuing of the arrest warrant against Castro as “criminal and illegal.” Tehran denounced Washington’s “interventionist actions,” including sanctions it called “inhumane” and attempts to threaten and intimidate Cuban authorities and public figures. continue reading

The Ministry added that the policy of sanctions, pressure and intimidation “applied against the Cuban people for more than seven decades violates the Charter of the United Nations and contradicts the principles and norms of international law and human rights.” In the view of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Washington will have to answer for the “catastrophic consequences” of these decisions on the daily life of the population, with which it expressed its solidarity in the face of these “criminal actions.”

Moscow was not missing from the group either: quite the contrary: it was the one that opened fire, criticizing the “unfounded and false accusation” that comes “more than 30 years later.” In the view of the Russian Foreign Ministry, this “is nothing more than revenge by Miami’s anti-Cuban lobby, a desire to settle scores with Castro, who celebrated his 95th birthday in June.”

After “categorically” rejecting and condemning the arrest warrant against Castro, the statement said that it is nothing more than part of “a broader escalation of tensions around the Island of Freedom [as Moscow calls Cuba], which is going through extremely difficult times due to an unprecedented commercial, economic, financial and energy blockade, and could destabilize the entire Latin American and Caribbean region.”

The note concludes with a personal message to the former Cuban leader himself: “We wish Comrade Raúl Castro, a friend of Russia, good health and that he maintain his unwavering bravery, courage and strength.” Although the Russian Foreign Ministry took the opportunity to reaffirm its solidarity with the Cuban regime, with which it will continue “strengthening the close ties of friendship, mutual support, assistance and comprehensive cooperation,” the words once again remain just that. Like those of Iran and China. So far this year, the three countries have not stopped expressing, almost weekly, their support and backing for an island in need of resources that none of them has fully decided to send.

While China is the one that has contributed the most goods, products and donations to the regime, Iran and Russia are the partners that have not dared to defy Washington to send the much-desired fuel that could serve as an immediate lifeline for the regime. Chinese support through solar energy, underway for more than two years, represents a slower and more gradual change in the energy matrix, while the oil tankers that Tehran and Moscow could deliver would give Havana breathing room, as happened in April.

On the last day of March, the Anatoly Kolodkin arrived on the island with 730,000 barrels of Russian crude, an entry authorized by Washington, which did not try to prevent the tanker’s arrival, as it later did with other attempts, without Russia daring to enter into direct confrontation. Iran has not even tried, despite being in open war with the US, which it has repeatedly defied, but only in relation to its own territory and surrounding areas.

“Well, I think it’s political. It’s political and it also has to do with the November election, from my point of view”

Mexico is another of the countries that has tried to find legal loopholes to keep supplying oil to Cuba while avoiding a clash with the US, with which it maintains relations vital to its economy. Its president, Claudia Sheinbaum, was asked by the press this Monday for her opinion on Castro’s new indictment, which she attributes to the pre-election climate in the neighboring country. “Well, I think it’s political. It’s political and it also has to do with the November election, from my point of view,” she said. “And the votes they want to win on one side and the other,” said the president, who went no further in her remarks.

Paradoxically, her opinion is shared by many Cuban-American users on social media, who reacted to the news the other day by calling it a “circus” or “theater,” explicitly linking it to the November elections, as CiberCuba has reported, based on comments on its social media accounts. These messages do not reflect sympathy for the elderly former president, but rather disappointment with Trump’s handling of the Cuban issue and with other political decisions that are causing dismay among his base of loyal Cuban voters and followers.

The reasons go beyond his policy toward the island – or his lack of action – and extend to his attitude toward Venezuela, where he has shown that he puts the oil business ahead of democracy, and to his open animosity toward the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, in contrast to the sympathy he shows for Russia’s Vladimir Putin and for Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un themselves.

Translated by GH

______________________

Cuba Is Now the Oldest Country in the Americas, with 26.7% of the Population over 60

Havana’s Plaza de la Revolución municipality tops the list with 38.2%, followed by the province of Villa Clara with 30.2%, while Guantánamo is the youngest region, with 23.3% having reached old age

The increase in the lowest pensions represents “a bag of milk or a bottle of oil” bought from a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME). / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, October 21, 2026 / Cuba has the largest population over 60 on the entire continent, and the figures are advancing by leaps and bounds. This is revealed in the 2025 yearbook on demographic aging, published this Tuesday by the National Office of Statistics and Information [ONEI]. Older adults now account for 26.7% of the total population, an increase of exactly one point compared with 2024, when the figure stood at 25.7%.

Data from Cepal [ECLAC, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean] show that this is by far the highest figure in the continent’s statistics and classify the country as having “very accelerated” aging. Second on the list is Uruguay, with 21.8%, followed by Chile with 19.5% and Argentina with 17.2%. However, a quick look at the trajectory of its main competitors in the category is enough to see the difference.

In 2015, the population over 60 in Cuba was 19.4%, which means growth of 7.3 points in just ten years. Uruguay had 19.4% a decade ago and now has 21.8% (2.7 points), while Argentina went from 14.9% to 17% (2.1 more). Chile, the only one with faster growth, has gone from 15% to 19.5%, which represents 4.5 points over the whole decade.

Moreover, zooming in even further, it can be seen that in Cuba the acceleration has become extreme in the last five years, since 2021

Moreover, zooming in even further, it can be seen that in Cuba the acceleration has become extreme in the last five years, since 2021. While between the years 2014 and 2019 to 2021 aging remained between 18% and 21%, the big rise came in the last four years, with a jump of 5 points. The timing coincides with the combination of two factors that triggered the migration crisis on the island: the end of the pandemic – which opened doors that had been almost completely shut for two years – and the Island-wide protests of 11 July 2021, which brought thousands of people into the streets against the regime. continue reading

Frustration over the change that did not happen and the repression of the protesters were the last straw for thousands of people who left Cuba in search of a better future. Officially, the loss is estimated at 15%, more than 1.6 million people. Independent experts speak of 24%, 80% of them in the 15 to 59 age bracket, that is, people of working and childbearing age.

By province, Villa Clara takes first place, with 30.2% of adults over 60, but Havana follows closely, with 29.1%, even though it is one of the territories that benefits most from internal migration, gaining population that moves to the capital in search of work – which affects a younger segment.

Havana is currently home to 1,673,208 people, of whom 486,650 are over 60, almost a third of the total, which highlights the alarming problem in the care sector, along with other closely related ones such as health. By contrast, children under 14 number barely 251,527, confirming the low birth rate of the province, which also has the oldest municipality on the island: Plaza de la Revolución, with 38.2%.

At the opposite end are Guantánamo, the youngest, with 23.3% – and which in turn is home to the municipality with the fewest older people, 17.9% – along with Santiago de Cuba and Artemisa, both with 24.2%. In this case, although these provinces retain a high number of retirees who stay in these areas, poverty – which holds back migration – and higher fertility rates – which coincide with eastern Cuba – bring the average age down.

At the opposite end are Guantánamo, the youngest, with 23.3% – and which in turn is home to the municipality with the fewest older people, 17.9% – along with Santiago de Cuba and Artemisa, both with 24.2%

In its introduction, the ONEI points out that births are also at extremely low levels, with just 68,064 births and a total fertility rate of only 1.29 children per woman, the lowest figure in history. The report notes that, given the progressive aging of its population, Cuba faces the challenge of “reorienting its economic model toward demographic sustainability, promoting inclusive employment, technological innovation and policies that integrate older adults into the economy.”

In a long interview with this newspaper, demographer Juan Carlos Albizu* warned of the risks of not making changes to deal with the island’s demographic crisis, including reform of the pension system. “If what has to change hasn’t changed, we’re going to have a very hard time, because the State, which is already socioeconomically bankrupt, would have no other way out than to abandon people to their fate.”

According to ONEI experts, Cuba will reach 36% population aging by 2040, and the population will have fallen to 8.3 million inhabitants. Unlike other countries, the island currently has no prospect of changing this dynamic through immigration.

Translated by GH

______________________

El Cerro, a Havana Neighborhood Incommunicado for a Month

Residents walk several kilometers to communicate and others keep paying 1,000 pesos for ‘Nauta Hogar’ Internet for fear of losing the service

The entire area around Casino Deportivo, in the Havana neighborhood of El Cerro, has been without telephone service or internet connection / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, October 21, 2026 / The entire area around Casino Deportivo, in the Havana neighborhood of El Cerro, has been without telephone service or internet connection for almost a month due to a fire in the cables of the Electric Union (UNE), which also damaged the lines of Etecsa [Cuba’s state telecommunications company]. The electric company repaired its fault weeks ago, but the telecommunications monopoly says it does not have the cables to restore communications, residents told 14ymedio.

The lack of service affects both those in that part of the municipality of Cerro who use landlines and the homes that depend on Nauta Hogar, Etecsa’s home internet service, which needs the damaged infrastructure to work. Faced with this unresolved situation, residents must travel several kilometers to make a call or connect to the internet.

Among the places they go is the ground floor of the Ministry of Agriculture – located on Conill Street, at the corner of Independencia Avenue, in Nuevo Vedado – where, as this newspaper was able to confirm, residents also come from around Primelles and from the side of Calzada de Ayestarán that belongs to the municipality of Cerro.

On top of being cut off, there is a financial problem for families who have contracted Nauta Hogar, the web browsing service offered over fiber-optic cables. According to customers who spoke to this newspaper, many pay more than 1,000 pesos a month and have already lost practically an entire period of connection because of a fault that was not their responsibility. continue reading

Many pay more than 1,000 pesos a month for the Nauta Hogar service and have already lost practically an entire period of connection

Now, customers of the cable connection service face the dilemma of paying out the money again without knowing when they will be able to use the service, since they fear that if they stop topping up their accounts while the outage lasts, they will end up losing access to Nauta Hogar. Some are considering continuing to pay while waiting for Etecsa to replace the line damaged by the flames.

Residents, however, can file a claim under Cuban law. Decree 124 of 2025, which regulates Etecsa’s concession, establishes in its Article 13 that the company must not charge its customers for the time they remain without service. It would not be the first time the company has had to compensate an affected customer: in February 2026 it acknowledged that it owed a credit of 1,800 pesos to a user who had spent several months without a landline or Nauta Hogar because of a cable fault.

Decree 124 of 2025 establishes in its Article 13 that Etecsa must not charge its customers for the time they remain without service

In the building where the 14ymedio newsroom is located, many of the apartments have been without a landline for more than a year because of another fault that also burned the cables. Since then, Etecsa has not been able to replace the line.

In the rest of Havana, blackouts not only leave residents in the dark and cut off: they also pit them against one another over the few hours of electricity they receive, even provoking a “war” between the circuits that receive unequal treatment from the UNE.

In Luyanó, residents of the less favored areas protested because the circuits that supply two hospitals, the Miguel Enríquez Clinical Surgical Hospital and the Diez de Octubre Gynecological-Obstetric Hospital, hardly suffered any outages. After months of complaints, petition drives and representations to the authorities, they managed to have the blackouts shared out between the two sides week by week.

The measure had an additional consequence. A resident of the favored circuit explained that when the power is cut to the buildings in the other sector, they are also left without internet, because the Etecsa antenna is installed there. Having power is not enough to be connected. Very often the exact opposite happens.

Last weekend, the discontent also reached Nuevo Vedado, where circuit PZ15 racked up 37 hours and 19 minutes without electricity. Residents staged cacerolazos [pot-banging protests] and shouted from the buildings to demand that the supply be restored. The protest was especially striking in an area where numerous officials and people linked to the ruling party live.

Translated by GH

______________________

Sherritt Partners with Gillon Capital to Obtain a License to Ship Fuel to Cuba

The alliance between the Canadian company and a firm close to Trump has made it possible to sign an agreement with the heirs of Moa Bay, which was confiscated in 1960.

Image of the nickel mines in Moa, Holguín, shared by Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez as he criticized the new U.S. sanctions. / X/@BrunoRguezP

14ymedio, Madrid, October 20, 2026 — Canadian mining company Sherritt International announced Tuesday that the U.S. Department of the Treasury has granted it a specific license to purchase and deliver fuel, fuel oil, and sulfur to the nickel and cobalt plant it shares with the Cuban state in Holguín, Moa Nickel. It is the first in a series of emergency licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) that the company has begun processing alongside U.S. firm Gillon Capital to restart mining and processing in Cuba, as well as refining in Canada, according to the company’s announcement.

The statement explains that Sherritt prepared and submitted its applications to OFAC in close coordination with Gillon Capital, which aims to take control of the mining company. The agency issued the license while both companies are asking it to consider a broader transaction in which a U.S.-based investment fund would acquire a majority stake. According to Sherritt, this license is the first of those Gillon would need to complete the acquisition.

Gillon Capital, which is linked to Ray Washburne, a former official in the Trump administration, and Sherritt signed a preliminary, nonbinding offer in May that would allow the Texas-based company to acquire 55% of the shares. The transaction would allow the mining company to continue operating on the island with Washington’s approval. Another proposal had emerged to compete with Gillon: a consortium led by Swiss giant Glencore, with a U.S. “anchor” investor, oil businessman Albert Huddleston, but it appears that the negotiations ultimately favored Gillon.

The authorization OFAC issued to Sherritt covers the sale, transportation, export, delivery, and payment of the fuel, and includes the supplier, banks, vessel operators, and insurers involved. The company expects the first shipment to set sail during this quarter of the year and says it is already “in the process of finalizing the initial fuel shipment.” continue reading

The company expects the first shipment to set sail during this quarter of the year and says it is already “in the process of finalizing the initial fuel shipment”

For the permit to be feasible, Sherritt signed a provisional agreement on September 23 with Moa Bay Mining Co., which holds a certified claim against the joint venture Moa Nickel — equally owned by Sherritt and the Cuban state-owned General Nickel Company — under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. Moa Bay now approves the shipments in exchange for fees to be paid by Sherritt or someone on its behalf, and agrees not to sue the authorized participants. Both parties also obtained another OFAC authorization to carry out the agreement, according to the statement.

These claims complicated the negotiations, but lawyers had already anticipated an agreement and believed that a legal solution could set a precedent to facilitate new U.S. investments in Cuba that also face lawsuits from former owners protected under the Helms-Burton Act.

In the same official announcement, Sherritt acknowledges that it continues to face limited liquidity and doubts about its ability to continue as a going concern. Its recovery depends on new financing and a recapitalization, neither of which is guaranteed. “The Corporation remains in active discussions with its lenders and potential sources of government and other strategic capital, including Gillon Capital.”

Gillon Capital belongs to a family of Texas businesspeople whose central figure, Ray Washburne, was appointed by Donald Trump in 2017 to head the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and subsequently became a member of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board.

Moa Bay now approves the shipments in exchange for fees to be paid by Sherritt or someone on its behalf, and agrees not to sue the authorized participants

When Gillon and Sherritt signed the nonbinding agreement in May, the Canadian mining company said at the time that the State and Treasury departments did not oppose Gillon’s negotiations and did not consider those discussions contrary to U.S. law, although any agreement would require their approval.

For his part, Cuban Energy and Mines Minister Vicente de la O Levy said in a recent interview with Reuters that he sees no problem with the possible purchase of Sherritt shares by U.S. businesspeople.

“We have always made it clear that what the U.S. company would be buying is shares in Sherritt, not in the joint venture,” he said, emphasizing: “The Canadian company is publicly traded, and any investor has the right to buy its shares.”

“But any restart would require discussions about how to supply fuel and spare parts, and also how to handle payments for exports and production inputs,” he said, referring to Washington’s sanctions as an obstacle to business. “If the intention is to resume nickel production, all those issues would need to be resolved.”

Following Executive Order 14404, signed by Donald Trump, which tightened sanctions against individuals and companies doing business linked to the Cuban state, Sherritt withdrew its direct stake in the joint venture on the Island on May 7. A few days later, the Canadian company announced that it was suspending its plan to exit Cuba and disclosed the preliminary agreement with Gillon Capital.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

Havana’s 3rd and 70th Street Supermarket Goes from Dollar Luxury to Empty Refrigerators

Shortages, a lack of tourists, and restrictions on payments with foreign cards have left the establishment practically without merchandise or customers.

LThe few refrigerators containing merchandise display enormous cuts of beef or whole fish that “sell very little,” an employee acknowledges. / 14ymedio / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Natalia López Moya, Havana, October 20, 2026 / Pablo has been sitting for a while on his electric tricycle in front of the 3rd and 70th Street Supermarket, in Havana’s Playa municipality. He is waiting for a shopper to come out carrying bags and hire him for “a ride right to their front door,” but this Tuesday, luck does not seem to be on his side either. “Very few people are coming because they already know this place is practically empty,” he tells 14ymedio as he watches the entrance to the establishment.

“I used to wait for passengers here until the afternoon, but now I stay for a while, and if I see that I’m not going to get anywhere, I take 3rd Street toward the Iron Bridge to look for passengers,” he explains. His business has shrunk at the same pace as the supermarket’s merchandise. The store opened amid great expectations on December 31, 2024, and became one of the symbols of the dollarization of Cuba’s state-run retail trade.

That gleaming establishment, with its 12 cash registers, fully stocked shelves, and clientele that included diplomats, foreigners, and Cubans with dollars, now seems like a distant memory. Where cheeses, meats, cold cuts, canned goods, and imported products were once displayed, empty refrigerators now predominate. The glass doors still shine under the ceiling lights, but behind them, little remains beyond the metal frames of the baskets.

“Hardly any meat products are coming in. What’s in the refrigerators is inventory that has been sitting here for a while because these aren’t goods that are in much demand”

The few refrigerators containing merchandise display enormous cuts of beef or whole fish that “sell very little,” an employee acknowledges. There are no eggs, chicken, sausages, beer, or cheese. On the shelves, bottles of water multiply into long rows, a strategy to disguise the lack of variety that had already become evident during the first months of this year. continue reading

“Hardly any meat products are coming in. What’s in the refrigerators is inventory that has been sitting here for a while because these aren’t goods that are in much demand,” explains an employee in the warehouse department. “People don’t buy such large cuts of meat because of the problems they have refrigerating them afterward.”

The smell that greets visitors as soon as they cross the entrance adds another troubling sign. Keeping food properly preserved has become a challenge even for this privileged establishment. “We have a generator, but there have been times when the power goes out and we don’t have fuel to get it running. That interrupts the cold chain, and some foods can’t withstand that,” the worker acknowledges.

The Spanish company Vima’s logo remains on some refrigerators, although no merchandise is left behind their doors. The company, a commercial partner of Gaesa, has begun reducing its presence in Cuba. At the end of September, it removed its signs from the store at Infanta and Santa Marta streets in Central Havana, and it left two of its three storage warehouses in Berroa practically empty.

“Very few people are coming because they already know this place is practically empty,” the driver says as he watches the entrance to the 3rd and 70th Street Supermarket. / 14ymedio

Something similar appears to be happening with Richmeat, the company registered in Mexico whose corporate structure and ties to the Cuban leadership have raised numerous questions. Its popular La Favorita sausages and El Cocinerito chicken ground-meat tubes have disappeared from the refrigerators, although the brand’s advertisements remain, featuring photographs of appetizing hot dogs that contrast with the bare baskets.

The collapse of the business cannot be explained by shortages alone. “This place was also intended to supply an area that was very touristy, but now there’s no tourism,” the employee says, pointing toward the imposing Gran Muthu Habana hotel, built above the shopping complex.

Adding to the loss of customers was the inability, starting in June, to pay with Visa and Mastercard cards after a foreign bank interrupted its operations with Fincimex. “Diplomatic personnel used to come more often, churches did their shopping here, and so did other international organizations, but almost all of them use foreign cards,” the worker regrets.

The decline is especially significant because the supermarket was created as a showcase of abundance in a city full of poorly stocked stores. Its opening ultimately sealed the fate of the former 3rd and 70th Street market, located directly across the street, which was dismantled and converted into a warehouse.

Now, the establishment that was supposed to represent the future of dollar-based retail trade reproduces the same image of scarcity that has characterized state-run commerce in pesos for years. Outside, Pablo looks toward the entrance again. No one comes out with enough purchases to need his tricycle. Perhaps it is time to set off toward the Iron Bridge.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

Yúnior García Aguilera: 27N, Archipiélago and the Future of Cuba

Yúnior García Aguilera: 27N, Archipiélago and the Future of Cuba

Screen shot below. Link to watch it here.

A link to the interview video subtitled in English.. . ENJOY!

Note: TranslatingCuba did not contribute to this post.

Florida Officially Issues Arrest Warrant for Raúl Castro for the Downing of Brothers to the Rescue Planes

“It wasn’t an accident, it was murder,” the Florida attorney general said, vowing to bring the perpetrator to justice.

Florida Attorney General accuses Raúl Castro of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder / ‘Cybercuba’

Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier officially filed a state arrest warrant for Raúl Castro this Monday for the downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996. The measure, signed Friday by Ariana Fajardo Orshan, presiding judge of Florida’s Eleventh Judicial Circuit, accuses the former Cuban leader of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, in a case separate from the federal proceedings opened in May for the deaths of four members of the organization.

“It was not an accident, it was murder,” afirmed Uthmeier during a press conference held at Florida International University. The prosecutor reiterated that the evidence points to the involvement of Cuban spies infiltrated within the organization and questioned the lack of legal action over the past three decades.

“Castro is not here in Florida and will not be going to trial anytime soon,” the prosecutor acknowledged.

“Castro is not here in Florida and will not be going to trial anytime soon,” the prosecutor acknowledged. However, she defended the warrant as necessary to hold those responsible accountable and warned that they will continue investigating to ensure the guilty parties are brought to Justice.

Uthmeier insisted that the crimes must have consequences and criticized the authorities for turning a blind eye for 30 years. The order does not contemplate the possibility of release on bail and was the result of an investigation by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.

The federal prosecutor’s office also considers the former Cuban leader a fugitive. Castro, 95, was Minister of the Armed Forces when the planes were shot down. The federal order, however, has limited practical scope while he remains in Cuba, beyond the reach of U.S. justice. Although it increases legal and political pressure on Havana, it does not guarantee that he will appear in court. Uthmeier warned on Monday that Castro could be arrested and extradited to the United States if he travels to a country with extradition treaties, even to receive medical treatment. continue reading

Raúl Castro could be arrested and extradited to the US if he travels to a country with extradition treaties, even to receive medical treatment.

According to the court order and affidavit obtained by the Miami Herald and the Tampa Bay Times, two Cuban agents infiltrated Brothers to the Rescue, transmitted information about the organization’s flights, and monitored naval installations in Key West. The state prosecutor’s office maintains that these activities, carried out on U.S. territory, justify Florida’s prosecution of Castro for conspiracy.

The spies had received instructions to avoid Brothers to the Rescue flights between February 24 and 27, 1996. One of them returned to Cuba on the 23rd, just 24 hours before the downing.

“Spies for the Castro regime operated in our communities, provided information to Havana, and contributed to civilian pilots becoming targets of Cuban MiGs,” Uthmeier stated in a press release from the Florida Attorney General’s office also released Monday. He added that “additional charges may be filed.”

Raúl Castro’s direct involvement in the downing had already been documented in a recording released by El Nuevo Herald in August 2006. During a meeting with official journalists in Holguín on June 21, 1996, the then Minister of the Armed Forces related how he gave the orders to the military commanders: “Well, shoot them down in the sea when they appear; and don’t consult those who have the authority.” He also explained that he had delegated the decision to act to five generals.

Also participating in the hearing were the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, Jason Reding Quiñones, and Miami-Dade Sheriff Rosie Cordero-Stutz. The latter emphasized that the passage of time should not be used as an excuse to abandon the investigations and reiterated her commitment to the victims’ families.

Miami-Dade Sheriff Rosie Cordero-Stutz insisted that the passage of time should not be used as an excuse to abandon the investigations.

On February 24, 1996, Cuban military fighter jets shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes over international waters. Brothers to the Rescue was an organization dedicated to locating rafters in the Florida Straits. Carlos Costa, Armando Alejandre Jr., and Mario de la Peña, all U.S. citizens, and Pablo Morales, a U.S. permanent resident, were killed. Havana maintained that the aircraft had violated its airspace, a claim refuted by international investigations.

The state investigation was reopened in March by Uthmeier. In May, the U.S. Department of Justice filed federal charges against Castro and five other military personnel for the same attack, including murder, conspiracy to kill U.S. citizens, and destruction of aircraft.

______________________

In Luyanó, Cuba, the Sky Provides Better Supplies Than the Aqueduct

After more than ten days without running water, the residents of this Havana neighborhood are taking advantage of the rains to fill their tanks.

Residents of Luyanó, in Havana, collecting rainwater this Monday. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Juan Diego Rodríguez, Havana, October 19, 2026 / Monday’s rain was received in some streets of Luyanó with more enthusiasm than any announcement of water infrastructure investments. After more than ten days without running water, the residents of this Havana neighborhood have found in the sky a supplier far more reliable than the state. While it’s not potable, it also doesn’t require contracts, send inspectors, or promise that service will be restored within hours. It simply turns on the tap whenever it feels like it.

On a street lined with peeling facades, weathered balconies, and doorways that have seen too many crises, the rain has got the residents moving. A man loads an enormous blue tank onto a small wheelbarrow. Beside him, a plastic container fills, little by little, with the stream cascading from a rooftop. The scene has something of a communal water distribution day, only this time the supplier is several kilometers above their heads.

For decades, Cubans have developed a domestic engineering of buckets, basins, hoses, and recycled containers to store as much water as possible.

For decades, Cubans have developed a domestic engineering of buckets, basins, hoses, and recycled containers to store as much water as possible. These emergency solutions have become a regular part of urban life. If the sky clouds over, the first thing they do is not to rush to grab an umbrella, but rather some container to collect every drop they can wrest from nature.

This Monday, from early morning, the rain soaked the street, trickled from the eaves, and poured from the roofs. What in other circumstances would be a annoyance for passersby became a not to be missed opportunity. Every liter collected could be used to flush a toilet, clean the floor, or wash clothes. The residents of Luyanó had to look upwards to solve the problem of what should be coming down from below.

In this case, the weather report has proven more useful than the promises of those responsible for the aqueduct.

Watch video here

______________________

Cuba’s New Oil Law Runs Up Against the Private Sector’s Limited Investment Capacity

Experts also point to the “hyper-centralization” that the State maintains over the sector as an obstacle.

Sergio Soto Refinery, in Cabaiguán, Sancti Spíritus. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, October 19, 2026 – State hyper-centralization and the private sector’s financial inability to undertake the large investments required by the hydrocarbon industry are the main threats facing a sector that completes its opening this Monday, with the entry into force of the new legislation announced seven days ago.

The regulatory package published last Monday in Official Gazette No. 85, which also encourages investment by Cubans and foreigners in the oil and gas sectors, allows fuel to be sold directly to the public and authorizes refineries to market their products wholesale, among other things.

Speaking to the Spanish news agency EFE, Cuban economist Daniel Torralbas warns that “regulatory authorization will not resolve the financial bottleneck, because this is a capital-intensive type of activity.” The expert has argued that “the Cuban private sector is small by definition,” and that this industry requires “investing a great deal of money and a considerable amount in technology, machinery, and training.”

Where “private-sector participation in the oil value chain can indeed expand is in areas where it has already begun investing: marketing, importing, storing, and selling fuels”

“This is an activity,” he added, “for large industries and companies that depend on economies of scale, and the Cuban economy will not be able to meet the financing needs involved.” In his view, “private-sector participation in the oil value chain can indeed expand in areas where it has already begun investing: marketing, importing, storing, and selling fuels.”

The agency published these statements as figures for fuel exports from the United States to the Island were being consolidated. Despite a downward revision, the volumes and prices involved continue to rise. Through August, the Island had imported petroleum derivatives worth $231.7 million. continue reading

These shipments are handled by private companies on the Island that have received authorization from the regime, which has been granting such permits since February, following the oil blockade decreed by Donald Trump. The Republican administration, in turn, gave U.S. companies permission to sell fuel to the Island, provided it was destined for the private sector and did not end up in the hands of the State, a condition that is not being met in practice.

In July, Prime Minister Manuel Marrero announced that more than 100 private companies had been authorized to market fuels wholesale. He also reported the approval of an initial business venture with foreign investment to import, distribute, and sell fuel. Although he did not identify the company, he was presumably referring to A granel, a private enterprise with foreign capital whose facilities 14ymedio visited on Avenida del Puerto in Havana.

So far in 2026, the trade has been driven mainly by private companies on the Island that transport diesel and gasoline to meet their needs, particularly those related to transportation or their own businesses.

Cuban economist Omar Everleny Pérez, also consulted by EFE, expressed regret that the State continues to refrain from liberalizing the hydrocarbons sector as would be desirable. The law, he said, “seeks to organize and normalize everything related to oil and gas exploration, but the regime reserves for itself ‘very strict control and hyper-centralization’ over these resources.”

“All permits for anything anyone wants to do must be approved at the highest levels of government (…), which continues to use rhetoric emphasizing extensive control“

All permits for anything anyone wants to do must be approved at the highest levels of government (…), which continues to use rhetoric emphasizing extensive control,” the specialist alleges.

Pedro Abigantus León, director of Oil and Gas Investments and Business at the Ministry of Energy and Mines, explained when presenting the new regulations a week ago that the reform “covers a value chain that begins with hydrocarbon exploration and extraction.” He said it seeks to ensure that “the development of the sector does not depend solely on the incorporation of capital for extraction operations,” while also facilitating the mobilization of “national capacities in the various services and activities required by the industry.”

Pérez, however, argues that “although when discussing the participants it is said that both individuals and legal entities can take part, in practice this is a business for large companies.” That kind of business ecosystem does not currently exist on the Island, although foreign capital could make it possible.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

Cuba Received Far Less Fuel Than Announced: The U.S. Confused Liters with Barrels

The Island did not purchase 3.2 million barrels of petroleum products in July, but rather 182,932

Adams explains that the error occurred when filling out shipping forms at the ports of Miami and Tampa, where the quantities were entered in liters or gallons instead of barrels. / Screenshot

14ymedio, Madrid, October 19, 2026 — The surprising amount of fuel that the United States was exporting to Cuba has turned out to be unreal. Last Thursday, the U.S.-Cuba Economic and Trade Council (US-Cuba Trade) published a brief note announcing “corrections to certain products, in response to inquiries initiated by the data user community.” Although the figure focuses on the shipment with the largest discrepancies — 2.5 million barrels were reported when the actual amount was 87,000 — the total shipments for that month amounted to 182,932 barrels when diesel and oils from Miami and Tampa are added together, compared with the nearly 3.2 million previously reported.

The document containing the corrections is a spreadsheet in which the U.S. Census Bureau and the Energy Information Administration (EIA) correct several erroneous figures detected throughout the year in fuel exports and imports. It reveals that the data on sales to Cuba have been incorrect all year, although the most obvious discrepancies appear in July. Official figures showed that the Island received $61.1 million worth of fuel that month, and that is true; however, the quantities were recorded wildly incorrectly.

Now, with the figures corrected, the agency states that one shipment from Miami, for which 2,530,802 barrels had been recorded, actually amounted to 87,753. But this was not the only serious error. Another shipment from the same port was listed as 496,677 barrels, when the actual amount was 87,341. In addition, another correction concerns the port of Tampa, where a shipment recorded as 57,638 barrels actually amounted to 4,798 barrels. continue reading

Another shipment from the same port was listed as 496,677 barrels, when the actual amount was 87,341. In addition, another correction concerns the port of Tampa, where a shipment recorded as 57,638 barrels actually amounted to 4,798 barrels

The price, by contrast, matches the reported figure perfectly, making it clear that the error occurred when recording the shipment. Despite the enormous discrepancy revealed by the error, the news has gone unnoticed by most media outlets. Only one program, América Noticias USA, on America TeVé, covered the information on Miguel Cossío’s La Resistencia, where he spoke with journalist David Adams about what they called a “historic error.” During the conversation, Adams explains that the error occurred when filling out shipping forms at the ports of Miami and Tampa, where the quantities were entered in liters or gallons instead of barrels. One barrel equals 158 liters or 48 gallons.

Adams explains that the data are submitted to the U.S. Census Bureau based on receipts from shipping companies and ports, and the EIA then publishes the information. The confusion resulted in a report that was 28 times higher than the actual amount. “Look, I’ve already pulled up the figure here: 87,000 barrels compared to 2.5 million is 3.48%. In other words, that would represent 0.0348; it’s ridiculous. We’re talking about a margin of error of more than 96%.”

A closer look at the corrected figures shows that the situation is far from being limited to a single month. The incorrectly reported data date back to almost the entire year. The first errors appear in March, although in those cases they did not involve changes to the volume shipped but rather mistakes in product classification. In the third month of the year, for example, a shipment that had been recorded as a single category of oils was reclassified into two separate entries by byproduct: 1,053 barrels of heavy petroleum products and 2,203 barrels of light distillates.

By April, several shipments had been drastically reduced, most notably one that fell from 24,730 to 4,581 barrels and another that went from 95,392 to an actual total of 880. Several shipments were also reclassified in May, resulting in a considerable overall decline, from a combined 296,036 barrels to 36,321.

In June, Miami corrected a record for heavy oils that had listed 365,103 barrels, reducing it to just 56,896, although the invoice remained unchanged at $9.1 million. In addition, the port of Tampa reduced a report for the same month and under the same category from 55,761 barrels to just 1,952 barrels, while also retaining the original price of $310,460.

Although the August figures are not yet available, the value is known – $74.8 million – as this newspaper reported on October 9, and the Census Bureau’s errata sheet also identifies another substantial error. It corrects a shipment from Miami recorded as 310,753 barrels that actually amounted to just 127,471 barrels, for which $23,847,744 was paid.

The U.S. correction helps explain some of the questions raised by experts, such as University of Texas researcher Jorge Piñón, who had shared his concerns with this newspaper about the storage capacity available for the fuel supposedly received by the private sector, since only the State, through Cimex and Cupet, has the capacity to maintain inventories of the size previously reported.

The quantity reported for July pointed to figures incredibly higher than those Venezuela had sent to the Island at certain times during the era of Hugo Chávez

The quantity reported for July pointed to figures incredibly higher than those Venezuela had sent to the Island at certain times during the era of Hugo Chávez and before the state oil company Pdvsa’s reserves began to dwindle because of sanctions and the mismanagement of Nicolás Maduro. Before the first year that marked the turning point, 2017, Caracas exported around 90,000 barrels a day to the Island under the agreement, amounting to approximately 2.7 million barrels a month. That was far less than the 3.2 million that the United States mistakenly reported.

Since late January, when the United States ordered a total blockade on shipments of oil and petroleum products to Cuba, it has allowed American businesses to sell these products as long as the private sector is the intended recipient. On October 7, authorities revealed that they had halted 90 shipments destined for the sanctioned Cuban state-owned company Enetec, 71 of which were detected at Port Everglades in Florida and 19 at the port of Houston, Texas. In total, authorities seized 600,000 gallons of oil (2.27 million liters), valued at $2.8 million.

This newspaper has documented on numerous occasions, however, that fuel reaching Cuban private businesses ends up in the hands of the State, which purchases it from the importing micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (mipymes). Last week, the Minister of Energy and Mines, Vicente de la O Levy, stated in an interview with Reuters that the quantities reaching the Island are negligible: “I would dare say that the amount entering the country does not even cover 3% of its fuel needs.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

The OCDH Demands an Investigation Into Irregularities in the Proceedings Against Henry Constantin

The organization alleges that the knife found in his cell could be fabricated evidence to frame him.

Henry Constantín is in pretrial detention at Kilo 7 prison in Camagüey / Facebook

The Cuban Observatory for Human Rights (OCDH) is demanding an investigation into the “serious irregularities” in the case against independent journalist Henry Constantín Ferreiro, who has been imprisoned in Camagüey since September 16. The Madrid-based organization warned of a possible frame-up and called for the intervention of the Supreme People’s Court and the Attorney General’s Office to clarify the facts.

The formal complaint from the Cuban Human Rights Observatory (OCDH) was filed with the Camagüey Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, with a copy to the Military Prosecutor’s Office, requesting clarification regarding the alleged discovery of a homemade knife among the journalist’s belongings during a search at Kilo 7 prison. Constantín, director of La Hora de Cuba, denies any responsibility and suspects the weapon was planted to frame him.

According to the OCDH, there are indications that justify investigating possible tampering with evidence and the involvement of State Security agents. Constantín now faces a sentence of at least 15 days of solitary confinement as a result of these events. He was notified of the sentence this Thursday, which will prevent him from receiving the family and conjugal visit scheduled for Monday, October 19.

The organization also denounces the lack of confirmed location of his criminal case file as another irregularity. The Camagüey Municipal Court reported that it had returned it to the Prosecutor’s Office and later claimed to have sent it on October 9, but none of the judicial and prosecutorial institutions consulted have confirmed receiving it. According to the OCDH, this situation hinders the defense’s work, prolongs the uncertainty of the process , and fuels suspicions of possible political interference in the judges’ decisions. continue reading

There are indications that justify investigating possible manipulation of evidence and the involvement of State Security agents.

The Observatory calls on the Public Prosecutor’s Office to conduct an objective and thorough investigation, free from pressure, that preserves evidence and identifies those responsible. It demands that the Supreme Court clarify the irregularities in the handling of the case and guarantee the independence of the judges. “No authority can influence judicial decisions or cover up illegal activities,” the statement asserts.

The organization also demands protective measures against possible reprisals, threats, or intimidation directed at the complainant, the journalist’s family and friends, their lawyers, and potential witnesses, with a guarantee of confidentiality. If wrongdoing is established, it requests that disciplinary proceedings be initiated and, if there is evidence of a crime, criminal proceedings be pursued.

The OCDH also demands guarantees for Constantin’s physical and psychological integrity, the immediate location of the case file, and an urgent review of his pretrial detention.

The independent journalist marks one month in custody this Friday in Camagüey, accused of disobedience for allegedly failing to appear at a police summons. He maintains that he did go, but that the officers had already left.

“No authority can influence judicial decisions or cover up illegal activities.”

At the beginning of October, the Municipal Court returned the case file to the Prosecutor’s Office without opening a trial , while the journalist’s lawyer requested a modification of the precautionary measure so that he could await trial at liberty. Despite the charge being one of disobedience, which does not carry a prison sentence, Constantín remains in pretrial detention and now faces a new disciplinary measure that further restricts his contact with the outside world.

Constantin’s imprisonment has prompted statements from international press freedom organizations, including the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Reporters Without Borders (RSF), which have called for his release. The journalist is also the regional vice president of the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) and has a long history of arrests and harassment for his reporting.

______________________