Translating Cuba – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

The Guardian Criticizes Trump’s Circle and Exiles for Pursuing “Opportunities” if the Regime Falls

The British newspaper says executives from the U.S. president’s companies have met with Raúl Castro’s grandson.

File photograph of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and President Donald Trump. / EFE/EPA/Ken Cedeno

14ymedio, Madrid, September 18, 2026 – Several executives from the Trump Organization have traveled to the Island several times in recent months, where they have held meetings with Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, alias El Cangrejo, grandson of Raúl Castro, to “explore opportunities” following the departure of Spanish hotel companies Meliá and Iberostar due to the threat of U.S. sanctions.

The Guardian says so in a report published this Thursday, in which it questions the activities of the U.S. president’s circle. The British newspaper’s headline says they are seeking “control of Cuba’s assets if the regime falls,” while Washington continues to impose sanctions on people and entities within the Cuban Government that affect any foreign company with any type of connection, the most recent sanctions having been announced this Thursday.

“If I had done during the Biden Administration what Trump’s friends have done now, I would have ended up in prison,” a source with decades of experience in U.S. policy toward the Island, who requested anonymity, told The Guardian. And indeed, while giants such as the Spanish hotel chains, Canada’s Sherritt, shipping companies, Visa, Mastercard and several others have been forced to abandon their businesses on the Island due to the threat of being sanctioned under Trump’s executive order of May 1, others are trying to profit.

“If I had done during the Biden Administration what Trump’s friends have done now, I would have ended up in prison”

Specifically, The Guardian says, people close to the U.S. Administration. “A growing group of influential people in Washington and Florida – from Trump-affiliated billionaires and Rubio-linked lobbies to Cuban exiles – are vying to control key assets of the communist-ruled island nation,” says the newspaper, which also asserts that “they charge hefty sums to help their clients navigate the ever-expanding sanctions network and position themselves to take advantage of lucrative business opportunities should the regime collapse.” continue reading

One of them is Franklin Graham, chief executive of the evangelical aid organization Samaritan’s Purse, who, according to The Guardian’s sources, “recently obtained a $40 million federal contract to distribute humanitarian aid in Cuba, despite lacking the capacity to effectively carry out such a contract on the Island.” A spokesperson for the NGO did not deny the information to the British newspaper, although the spokesperson clarified: “Details about aid for Cuba are still being worked out and have not been finalized.”

The Guardian points to several similar cases that are already known, such as the dispute between Ray Washburne, a former Trump adviser, and Albert Huddleston, another magnate with ties to the White House, over entering Sherritt International after it suspended its operations at the Moa mines, or the case of Antilles Gold. After being blacklisted for its work in Cuba, the Australian firm received the Trump Administration’s approval to negotiate the transfer of its stake in the Nueva Sabana deposits in Ciego de Ávila and La Demajagua, on the Isle of Youth, to Global Emerging Markets, a multibillion-dollar investment fund based in New York.

Likewise, the newspaper recalls the oil blockade since the intervention in Venezuela in January, while fuel exports authorized by the Treasury Department from Florida and Texas to the Island “have surged, exceeding $160 million so far this year.”

Those exports are conditioned on their being received by private mipymes, but, as 14ymedio has documented, the State sector is fully involved in the business.

Another example is found among Florida shipping companies, such as Crowley, which is a donor to the campaigns of Cuban-American Republican congressmen Mario Díaz-Balart and María Elvira Salazar, and which “appear to benefit from the new sanctions that have affected foreign shipping companies and forced trade destined for Cuba to be redirected through Florida.”

“Ironically, some of those who have most vehemently demanded tougher sanctions are also profiting economically”

The privileges include communications companies, such as Digital News Association Inc., which received a $250,000 contract from the U.S. Government’s Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) – initially canceled and demonized by Donald Trump after taking office – to carry out “investigative journalism, studies and media production,” and whose main website has done nothing but publish interviews that repeat the thesis included in the State Department report Cuba, Capital of 21st-Century Socialism.

“Ironically, some of those who have most vehemently demanded tougher sanctions are also profiting economically,” The Guardian also states, mentioning the lobbying firm Continental Strategy, which has close ties to Trump and Rubio and agreed to represent the Spanish company Vima – a partner of Gaesa – although it canceled the contract five weeks after signing it and after receiving nearly $40,000.

“It has been interesting to watch how quickly some hard-line ideologues become pragmatic when money is involved,” another source told the British newspaper. The reason, Erik Cartelle, a consultant who works to connect prominent exiles with Rubio’s team, told the The Guardian, “is regime change.” And he said: “I have clients who want to do a lot of business in Cuba, and the Administration is betting that Cuban Americans will travel to the Island and invest.”

What The Guardian does not say is that the Havana regime itself has repeatedly called on the Cuban diaspora to invest in the Island.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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With the Dollar at 730 Pesos and Much Opacity, Cuba’s First Private Currency Exchange House Opens

The main shareholder, holding 70% of the business, comes from the food service sector and claims the State has no stake

Images taken by ‘El Toque’ of the new private currency exchange house, in Santa Clara.

14ymedio, Madrid, September 18, 2026 / Cuba’s first private currency exchange house has the dollar through the roof. On the first day after it emerged that it was already operating, ADT 64 was buying the US currency at 710 pesos and selling it at 730. The rate was not only much higher than the official Cadeca rate – 664 this Thursday (three pesos less than today, Friday) – but it also beat the demonized rate published by El Toque, set at 700 since Wednesday.

Located at Aires de Tristá Street No. 64, in Santa Clara, ADT 64 is close to the Santa Clara Libre hotel and a state-run currency exchange house. According to the independent outlet El Toque, which has thoroughly examined the new business, the company’s stated line of business was food services, at least according to what is on record in the registry. There are online references describing it as an ice cream parlor and seller of pizzas and hamburgers, but also old images of a sign reading Bar-Cafetería.

The photographs of its façade that began circulating this Thursday showed a different picture: digital screens displaying the changing value of nine international currencies. The euro, for example, is bought at 815 pesos and sold at 839. Nobody is selling, neighbors told El Toque.

Martí Noticias was able to speak with Arnel Matos Freire, whose contact details – phone number and address – matched those of the company, and who confirmed he is the owner of 70% of the business. “Asked by Martí Noticias whether the remaining 30% belonged to the Cuban State, the businessman said no. Matos explained that the business operates under the structure of a micro, small, or medium-sized enterprise (mipyme), with another private partner”, the report states.

Trend in official-market dollar prices for private businesses since they were approved. / BCC

The owner did not give many more details, but maintained that he submitted a proposal to the authorities to set up the business and received approval for it to become a pilot experience that could be extended to the rest of the country. The project was advised by a doctor of Economic Sciences, and operations began on August 31. continue reading

It is not known at what rates it has been exchanging the currency, but there is public record of the trend in official rates, which have risen sharply over the same period. On September 1, the price of the US currency according to the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) was 636 pesos; a week later it was already at 644, and on the 15th, at 659. And rising.

Matos told Martí Noticias that the price of the currency is not set by the informal market – as with El Toque’s estimate – but is established by calculating a percentage above the BCC rate, which must authorize it daily. As of today, that commission stands at 7%. The owner stated in the interview that the dollar via bank transfer currently stands at 950 pesos, implying how profitable his business is. However, there is no evidence that this is so.

The businessman also stated that there is no limit on the purchase of foreign currency, though there is for its sale. In addition, people must prove the origin and destination of the money to prevent money laundering and fraud. In the case of companies and self-employed workers, company documents are required, along with “justifying the purchase through the offer of a foreign or domestic supplier certifying the use of the funds”. Information on the financial activity is submitted daily to the Central Bank of Cuba.

Cuban economist Pedro Monreal, based in Spain, has analyzed the initial information about ADT 64. The expert addresses two very different aspects: on one hand, he questions the opacity surrounding the operation and the authorization to open the establishment. On the other, its practical scope.

“As long as the detailed regulation is not published, the authorization of private currency exchange houses functions more as a discretionary power of the BCC than as a right that any interested party could aspire to under known conditions,” he notes regarding the first issue. Monreal acknowledges that the regulator has not only the power to create this mechanism but, almost, the duty to do so, in order to monitor the situation through a concrete, controlled example to learn from and correct the official market.

“This does not mean, he stresses, that it can operate ‘without detailed public regulations’, something that ‘affects legal certainty, competition, oversight, and the credibility of the officially announced opening’”

This does not mean, he stresses, that it can operate “without detailed public regulations”, something that “affects legal certainty, competition, oversight, and the credibility of the officially announced opening”. The discretionary nature, he adds, will not favor the incorporation of other players, the promotion of competition, or the flow of information.

Furthermore, the economist warns of the practical need for the activity to expand if the idea is to build a reference rate. “A diverse and statistically adequate sample is needed: different cities, multiple owners, both sides of the market – buying and selling – different scales of customers, and mechanisms to filter out atypical days and circumstantial inventories,” he warns.

Monreal also believes that the first piece of evidence left by the ADT 64 rate is that the accusations the regime made against El Toque for years were mistaken, if not malicious. Official discourse even attributed crimes to the outlet’s founders, whom it accused of intending to trigger social unrest by inflating currency prices, which in turn drove up the cost of living. Now, the rate approved by the BCC is even higher than that of the informal market.

“For the BCC, the risk is twofold. On one hand, the segment III rate (private actors) could end up moving closer to the ‘street’ rate and losing the current anchor of 1 dollar = 660 pesos. On the other, if the central bank ignores the pilot’s initial data and keeps the administered rate, the experiment would remain a costly showcase, inconsistent with the exchange rate the State itself publishes,” he concludes.

Translated by GH.

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Costa Rica Confirms the Rupture of Its Diplomatic Relations with the Cuban “Despotic Regime”

Manuel Tovar states that the decision has nothing to do with the alleged US pressure denounced by the Cuban foreign minister

Manuel Tovar, Costa Rican foreign minister, in an interview. / EFE

14ymedio, Madrid, September 18, 2026 / The Government of Costa Rica takes a further step in its estrangement from Cuba, and six months after Rodrigo Chaves’s government closed the Embassy in Havana, that of his successor, Laura Fernández, announces that the decision has greater implications.

“There is a rupture of diplomatic relations,” said Foreign Minister Manuel Tovar Rivera in an interview with the Miami Herald. The foreign minister maintains that the measure will remain in place until the people of Cuba “regain their freedom” and that it represents nothing more than the continuation of traditional Costa Rican policy, broken only in 2009, during the government of Óscar Arias. “A foreign policy mistake,” the official maintains.

“Costa Rica will no longer lend itself to legitimizing a tyrannical and despotic regime that has robbed its people of the most fundamental freedom of a democracy,” he adds. For the time being, consular services for Costa Ricans visiting or passing through Cuba have been routed to the Embassy of Panama, while Cubans living in Costa Rica continue to handle their paperwork in San José. The previous government asked Havana to withdraw its diplomats, and this occurred, although citizen services continue to be handled, something relevant for the thousands of Cubans residing in the Central American country.

“Costa Rica will no longer lend itself to legitimizing a tyrannical and despotic regime that has robbed its people of the most fundamental freedom of a democracy”

According to press estimates, the number could be between 10,000 and 15,000, based on the sum of nearly 3,000 who hold residency cards, the 7,000 who have applied for refuge in the last six years, and the mass of undocumented persons, which could range between 2,000 and 4,000. continue reading

Tovar also referred to the number of Nicaraguans and Venezuelans who have arrived in the country, for whom, as for Cubans, an immigration regularization process was being prepared. The figure for Nicaraguan exiles is striking, as it is around 600,000 to 650,000, and all of them are entitled to free education and healthcare. “Someone has to pay those costs, and it’s Costa Ricans,” the official laments, although he stresses that his country will continue to be a refuge for whoever needs it.

However, he maintained – without providing data – that the number of migrants has dropped notably as a result of Donald Trump’s “deterrent policies”. One of the trade-offs for Costa Rica has been agreeing to be a “safe third country”, which means it receives around 100 people a month of various nationalities whom neither the US nor their country of origin will accept. Between April, when the flights began, and early June, 149 deportees arrived who, according to the minister, mostly returned to their homes, with notable exceptions: Asians, Eastern Europeans, and those seeking asylum.

“We did not receive any advice, any guidance, any instruction, any suggestion from any Government, neither from the United States nor from any other”

The minister, who met this Wednesday in Tovar with Marco Rubio, also rejected the accusations from the Cuban regime, which attributes the Costa Rican government’s stance to pressure from Washington. “It was a sovereign decision made by the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica. We did not receive any advice, any guidance, any instruction, any suggestion from any Government, neither from the United States nor from any other,” he stated, in response to Bruno Rodríguez, his counterpart on the island. The Cuban foreign minister accused the previous administration of “servility” in March, following the announcement of the Embassy’s closure.

Tovar did say, however, that he spoke with the US Secretary of State about “the return to a democratic path in Cuba and Nicaragua” – without mentioning Venezuela – a topic that will be discussed at the meetings of the Shield of the Americas, on the sidelines of the 81st General Assembly of the United Nations.

In that space, other issues will also be addressed, such as the fight against drug trafficking and other transnational crimes, arms and human trafficking, money laundering, environmental damage, and resource extraction.

Translated by GH.

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Venezuela Unlocks Media Outlets, Cuba Maintains Its Restrictions

The reopening of several websites censored by Caracas serves as a reminder that on the island it is necessary to overcome blockades to access the independent media press.

14ymedio, Havana, Yoani Sánchez, September 17, 2026 / Some news stories, when read from Cuba, take on a different meaning. This Thursday, when I learned that Venezuela had begun unblocking digital sites censored for years, I inevitably thought of a mobile phone screen in Havana trying to open the newspaper 14ymedio. The scroll wheel spins, minutes pass, and finally nothing appears. We’ve been like this for twelve years, since that 21st of May 2014, when this newspaper was born.

In Venezuela, the telecommunications regulator began lifting restrictions on several websites. The organization VE Sin Filtro had counted approximately 200 blocked domains as of yesterday and confirmed that at least nine media outlets had regained access, including Efecto Cocuyo, El Pitazo, Runrun.es, and Crónica Uno. The organization described the measure, if it continues, as one of the first significant setbacks in Venezuelan digital censorship, although it warned that numerous sites remain restricted.

The news evokes a mixture of joy and envy in me from the island. I think of Luz Mely Reyes and her colleagues at Efecto Cocuyo, obliged for years to find alternative ways to reach their readers. Just last month, Reyes denounced the lack of transparency in the political dialogue between the government and part of the opposition, a dialogue to which journalists weren’t even allowed access to cover the initial greetings. This contradiction helps put today’s easing of restrictions into perspective: opening a few pages doesn’t mean that the restrictions on the press have disappeared.

How many readers have we lost because clicking a link leads to a page that won’t load? How many gave up after several attempts to access our site?

From Cuba we know all too well about this. The censorship against 14ymedio has had a cost that’s difficult to calculate. How many readers have we lost because clicking a link leads to a page that won’t load? How many gave up after several attempts to access our site? How many Cubans only learned of our existence after emigrating and being able to browse the web without restrictions? continue reading

But every wall forces you to find a crack. Over these twelve years, we’ve learned to distribute content through social media, newsletters, messaging apps, emails, and any other means that allows us to circumvent the barrier. Censorship deprived us of a potential audience, but it also forced us to become more creative.

Paradoxically, while the Cuban regime tried to keep independent media out of sight of the the national audience, its own press system was weakening. Official newsrooms have lost journalists to the mass exodus; there is a lack of transportation, fuel, and resources to send reporters to cover events, and reality has ultimately moved too quickly for the old mechanism of waiting for instructions before reporting it.

Independent media outlets have grown in this space, but so have Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, and other platforms where much of the information consumed by Cubans now circulates. A blackout, a protest, or an accident might be reported first by a shaky video from a neighbor rather than a news item in the official press. If there were a mass unblocking of independent websites, it is expected that they would displace the antiquated newspapers controlled by the Communist Party.

However, we agree not to confuse a half-open door with a house one can freely enter or leave. Venezuela maintains important information restrictions, and VE Sin Filtro is demanding that the lifting of these restrictions also extend to other media outlets, civil organizations, communication platforms, and VPN tools. Even the opposition participating in the dialogue with Delcy Rodríguez’s interim government has called for a complete and permanent unblocking of these resources.

Meanwhile, the Castro regime is taking note of what is happening in its former ally. Because controlling a country through a monopoly on information is one thing, but dealing with a free press is quite another.

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Living Among the Remains of What We Once Were

‘Cannibalized’ cars, collapsed buildings and abandoned structures accompany daily life in Havana

The cars are corpses stripped of doors, windows, engines, and every screw that might have kept another vehicle running. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, Yoani Sánchez, Generation Y, September 14, 2026 / In Havana, we don’t walk through streets, but rather through the interior of a shipwreck. Debris is everywhere: a propped-up building, a broken pipe that no one fixes, a mountain of garbage, the skeleton of a collapsed building. We have become so accustomed to the rubble that we hardly see it anymore. We sidestep around the gap, dodge the chunk of concrete, and keep going.

On Ayestarán Street, as on so many others, there is a great variety of ruins. Under a zinc roof and on the dry grass, several disassembled cars are piled up. One is missing its front end; of another, barely the body remains; a third conserves something resembling its former form. They are corpses stripped of doors, windows, engines, and every screw that might serve to keep another vehicle running.

The official entities seem to have lost the energy to remove the remains, because getting rid of a ruin requires resources that simply don’t exist.

It is difficult to imagine the moment when they were new. Perhaps one transported a reporter from the state-run press to a boring People’s Power assembly. Another might have had as a regular passenger a manager in a tight guayabera, with a chauffeur waiting at the door. There was a time when ministries, companies, and state agencies had enough fuel, spare parts, and cars to transport their officials and employees.

Of that spoilage remains these shells that form part of the landscape. The official entities seem to have lost even the energy to retire the remains, because dismantling a ruin requires resources that no longer exist.

The worst thing about living among the wreckage isn’t the hideousness, but the habit. We walk past it, incorporate it into our routines, and end up accepting it as an inevitable part of the scenery.

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The European Parliament Approves Another Resolution To Suspend the Political Agreement With Cuba

It is the seventh time that the European Parliament has made this request in the past five years, and it received 374 votes in favor, 198 against and 19 abstentions.

Saylí and Félix Navarro have been nominated for the Sakharov Prize this year. / Collage

EP/14ymedio, Madrid, September 17, 2026 – The European Parliament called on the European Council this Thursday to suspend the implementation of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement that structures relations between the European Union and Cuba, citing “systematic violations” of Human Rights by the Island’s authorities against political prisoners and their relatives.

The resolution, approved by the European Parliament with 374 votes in favor, 198 against and 19 abstentions, focuses on the case of 72-year-old Félix Navarro and his daughter Saylí Navarro – co-founder of the Ladies in White, awarded the Sakharov Prize in 2005 – who were detained in 2021 and subsequently sentenced to nine and eight years in prison, respectively.

This week, the Cuba Siglo 21 platform and its management committee of former political prisoners formally proposed the candidacy of both for the Sakharov Prize.

Members of the European Parliament denounced “the absence of fair trials, the use of torture during detentions and the systematic use of forced exile as a condition for the release of opponents,” while expressing concern over Navarro’s deteriorating health and calling for his release, along with that of “all other political prisoners.”

The resolution focuses on the case of 72-year-old Félix Navarro and his daughter Saylí Navarro

“In the absence of concrete and verifiable steps by the regime toward multiparty democracy, Parliament reiterates its call for the immediate suspension of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement and for sanctions to be imposed on those responsible for repression in Cuba, beginning with President Miguel Díaz-Canel,” the resolution states.

The document approved by the European Parliament notes that Cuba keeps “1,339 political prisoners” in jail, including 38 minors. The text also points out that among these people are 463 who suffer from “serious physical illnesses” and 54 who “suffer from serious mental disorders,” despite which they “do not receive adequate medical care.”

In the past five years, the European Parliament has voted on at least seven resolutions of this kind, the most recent last June. However, these acts are legally non-binding, since the authority to make the decision rests with the Council, through a complex procedure that must be initiated by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or by the European Commission.

The resolutions, however, have a symbolic character, and their pressure could ultimately motivate action by the executive bodies, although to date this has not happened.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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State Security Detains Henry Constantín and Threatens Dagoberto Valdés

The director of ‘La Hora de Cuba’ is being investigated for “disobedience,” while the head of ‘Convivencia’ was prohibited from attending an event at the U.S. Embassy.

Although both repressive incidents occurred in distant provinces, they took place just hours before an event organized by the U.S. Embassy in Havana. / Collage

14ymedio, Havana, September 17, 2026 – State Security is holding independent journalist Henry Constantín, director of La Hora de Cuba, in detention in Camagüey. Meanwhile, in Pinar del Río, a political police officer went to the home of intellectual Dagoberto Valdés to prohibit members of the Center for the Study of Coexistence (CEC) from attending an event organized by the U.S. Embassy in Havana.

Constantín has remained since Wednesday afternoon at Villa María Luisa, the State Security headquarters for operations and interrogations in Camagüey, and is being investigated for an alleged offense of “disobedience,” La Hora de Cuba reported Thursday.

The information was communicated to Alejandra García, a journalist and Constantín’s partner, when she went to an appointment with the investigator in charge of the case this Thursday. The official was not there, but another officer explained to her that the investigation was related to a previous summons, scheduled for September 9 at the Directorate of Identification, Immigration and Foreigners, in the Vista Hermosa neighborhood. According to La Hora de Cuba, the authorities maintain that Constantín “did not arrive on time” for that meeting and that such conduct could constitute “disobedience.”

A female official even claimed that the journalist was not registered at that unit

The current episode of repression began last Tuesday, around 2:30 in the afternoon, when an agent identified as Felipe verbally informed Constantín that he had to appear the following day at 8:30 in the morning at the Second Unit of the National Revolutionary Police, located on Carretera Central.

Constantín went to the station, and his last communication with his colleagues took place at around 8:48 in the morning. Around one in the afternoon, members of La Hora de Cuba tried to find out where he was but received contradictory answers, and a female official even claimed that the journalist was not registered at that unit. Hours later it became known that he had been transferred to Villa María Luisa. continue reading

This is not the first time Constantín has been held at those facilities. In June 2025, he was detained while accompanying journalist Iris Mariño to a summons and was also transferred to Villa María Luisa. During 2026 he has also suffered several arrests and summonses, as documented by organizations and independent media.

“We are coming to tell you in advance so that you don’t have a bad night”

More than 500 kilometers away, in Pinar del Río, the pressure took another form this Thursday. The Center for the Study of Coexistence denounced that a State Security officer identified as Major John went to the home of its director, Dagoberto Valdés Hernández, to warn that members of the organization were prohibited from participating in the American Nights event, organized by the U.S. Embassy in Havana.

“We are coming to tell you in advance so that you don’t have a bad night,” the officer said, according to the statement issued by Convivencia.

Major John had previously intervened in actions against the CEC. On April 8, he participated, together with Major Juan Manuel Pérez, head of the brigade responsible for confronting the “counterrevolution” in Pinar del Río, in the interrogations of Valdés and Yoandy Izquierdo at the Immigration and Foreigners offices. The Center itself identified John at the time as the new officer responsible for “handling” the organization.

As on previous occasions, State Security resorted to different methods to prevent those meetings from taking place normally

Those interrogations took place after several visits by agents to Valdés’s home and the detention of members of the environmental project Naturpaz. According to the CEC, the officers then warned that they would not allow certain workshops or links between Convivencia and other independent projects.

Nor is this the first time that authorities have tried to prevent Valdés from participating in diplomatic gatherings. In June 2025, State Security summoned him to warn him that it would not allow residents of other provinces to travel to Havana for a U.S. Embassy reception for the Fourth of July. In January of this year, Valdés and Yoandy Izquierdo were detained in Pinar del Río for contacts with U.S. diplomats.

Although both repressive incidents occurred in distant provinces, they took place just hours before an event organized by the U.S. Embassy in Havana, to which several members of civil society had been expressly invited. As on previous occasions, State Security resorted to different methods to prevent those meetings from taking place normally.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuba Withdraws Half Its Staff from Its Embassy in South Korea Without Explanation

The two countries restored relations in 2024 and opened diplomatic missions in 2025 in both capitals, provoking North Korea’s displeasure

El embajador, Claudio Raúl Monzón Baeza, pronuncia un discurso, el 10 de junio de 2025, durante la ceremonia de apertura de la representación de Cuba en Seúl. / Yonhap

14ymedio, Madrid, September 17, 2026 / Half of the diplomats at the Cuban Embassy in Seoul have recently returned to Cuba, reducing the island’s representation in the Asian country from four to two. The information was revealed by the newspaper Seoul Economic Daily, which cites a source from the South Korean foreign ministry and specifically indicates that the return is not due to a routine staff rotation, but rather a decision made by Havana.

Remaining in Seoul are Ambassador Claudio Monzón and Counselor Patricia Flechilla Prometa.

When consulted by the outlet, the Cuban Embassy gave no explanation for this significant staff reduction, but asserted that the decision has no political motivations. In diplomatic circles, according to the Seoul Economic Daily, there was some concern that Havana might have wanted to express some discontent with South Korea this way or, worse still, that it could be a step backward in the recovery of relations between the two countries. Seoul, the outlet notes, has made a significant effort in recent years to win the trust of North Korea’s traditional allies, as is the case with Cuba.

Seoul, the outlet notes, has made a significant effort in recent years to win the trust of North Korea’s traditional allies, as is the case with Cuba

The reopening of the embassies in Havana and Seoul formalized the restoration of ties broken in 1959, when Fidel Castro came to power and severed relations with the country, while exchanging diplomats with North Korea in less than a year. For decades, South Korea and the island lived, in a sense, with their backs turned to each other, though a relative rapprochement began in 2015, coinciding with the thaw between Washington and Havana. That year, economic exchanges in technology and energy began, though they were limited by the lack of a favorable diplomatic setting.

In 2022, according to data from South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the country exported goods to Cuba worth 14 million dollars and imported another 7 million dollars’ worth. Before the pandemic, around 14,000 South Korean citizens traveled to the island each year, and around a thousand descendants of Koreans who migrated during the Japanese occupation (1910-1945) lived in Cuba. All of them need “systematic consular assistance,” the foreign ministry warned in 2023. continue reading

In February 2024, Seoul surprised many by announcing the restoration of relations with Havana. The statement noted that Cuba’s government was the only one on the continent with which it had no ties, even though “the two countries have expanded cooperation, focusing on non-political fields such as culture, people-to-people exchange, and development cooperation. In particular, it is considered that the spread of friendly awareness between the two peoples through recent active cultural exchange contributed to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.”

In early 2025, it was announced who would head the diplomatic missions, with Claudio Monzón in Seoul and Lee Ho-yul – who until then had been part of the delegation in Mexico – in Havana. “We hope the opening of the embassy will improve the comfort of our citizens residing in or visiting Cuba by providing them with consular services and protection, and that it will contribute to expanding exchanges and bilateral cooperation,” the South Korean Foreign Ministry said in a statement in mid-January, when it opened the mission.

At the time, the Asian press was already speculating about Pyongyang’s displeasure, to the point that North Korean media went nearly a year publishing almost nothing about Cuba – an anomaly in the country and a symptom worth noting in such an opaque nation.

The state news agency KCNA briefly reported on the New Year’s message sent by Kim Jong-un to Miguel Díaz-Canel, notably omitting the usual references to Cuba’s “brother people.”

According to the ‘Seoul Economic Daily’, there are five people posted at the South Korean embassy in Havana and there are no plans to make changes

The diplomatic rapprochement has been very effective in the areas of humanitarian cooperation and trade exchange. The South Korean government has made significant shipments of food aid, with rice as the main item, and provided technical assistance to address the energy collapse the island is suffering. This June, delegations from the Cuban Chamber of Commerce and the Korea Importers Association (KOIMA) held a meeting in Seoul to boost bilateral trade, which has stagnated at around 40 million dollars – 43 million in 2023, of which 36 million favored the Asian country.
The main products exported from Korea are technology, vehicles – especially heavy machinery – and plastic products, while Cuba sends tobacco, alcohol, scrap metal, and biotechnology products.

“Companies cannot approach the market the same way they would elsewhere,” Ambassador Lee said this June, while calling for business deals to be analyzed “case by case” to avoid problems with sanctions. “Korean companies with assets or financial ties in the United States should act with a high degree of caution,” he added.

According to the Seoul Economic Daily, there are five people posted at the South Korean embassy in Havana, and there are no plans to make changes.

Translated by GH.

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Police Detain 13 People for Drug Trafficking in Centro Habana

Authorities seized ‘chemical’ and cocaine, along with cash

The corner of Reina and Belascoaín (near the site of the operation), Central Havana. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, September 17, 2026 / Agents from the Ministry of the Interior detained 13 people on Tuesday in Centro Habana, allegedly linked to drug trafficking. The operation continued this Wednesday with searches of at least six residences, five of them in the Los Sitios neighborhood, specifically on Reina Street, between Campanario and Lealtad.

During the operation, police seized 184 strips, two ID-card-sized cutouts, and half a letter-size sheet apparently impregnated with synthetic cannabinoids, along with phones and cash in both national currency and dollars. In addition, according to the information, several packets of cocaine reportedly turned up – a drug historically less prevalent on the island because of its higher cost. However, the government acknowledges that it is the narcotic that arrives most on the island, coming from washed-up packages – drug parcels thrown into the sea by boats being pursued by border patrols.

During the operation, police seized 184 strips, two ID-card-sized cutouts, and half a letter-size sheet apparently impregnated with synthetic cannabinoid

During 2025, authorities seized a total of 507 kilos, of which cocaine accounted for the largest share. They did not break down the quantities, but did mention the entry, also by air and across borders, of 27 kilos of all types of substances, including cocaine, synthetic cannabinoids, and methamphetamines. Chemical remains the drug that generates the most concern among authorities and the public, since its low prices have made its use widespread, especially in highly marginalized sectors of the population. continue reading

The neighborhood where yesterday’s search took place is precisely among those areas. In Los Sitios and Colón – where a residence was also visited – overcrowded tenement buildings and vacant lots abound. There, this Wednesday, 14ymedio took a striking photo showing two young men lying on the ground showing signs of having used this cheap cannabinoid.

In Los Sitios and Colón – where a residence was also visited – overcrowded tenement buildings and vacant lots abound

The neighborhood also has severe water supply problems and an environment conducive to illegality, ranging from bolita (an illegal lottery) to the sale and use of drugs.

Information about the operation has been disclosed through channels close to the government, although there has been no formal statement from the Ministry of the Interior. According to these accounts, “the investigation remains open and further searches or arrests are not ruled out, so the number of people implicated could rise in the coming hours. To date, no expanded official report on the case has been released.”

Translated by GH

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“My Life’s Role Was Not Something I Chose; It Was Given to Me”: Aniette González and the Flag That Accompanies Her

The Cuban activist looks back on her three years in prison for wrapping herself in the flag in support of Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, the deterioration of her health behind bars and her firm decision not to remain silent in exile.

Cuban activist and former political prisoner Aniette González. / Courtesy

14ymedio, Luz Escobar, Madrid, September 16, 2026 – They stole Aniette González’s air, her voice and three years of freedom, but there is something that neither prison nor State Security interrogations managed to take from her, and that is her desire to speak. Even when her vocal cords close up because of problems with her larynx that were aggravated in prison, she settles into her chair, tightens her abdomen to find some momentum and releases the words like someone who refuses to give up.

In March 2023, amid The Flag Belongs to Everyone campaign, launched to bring visibility to the cause of political prisoner Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, Aniette decided to wrap herself in the Cuban flag and post the photos on her social media from Camagüey. That gesture cost her a conviction on charges of “outrage against national symbols.”

The photos that led to Aniette’s imprisonment / Facebook

Today, after leaving the Island, she looks back on her ordeal, the pain of family separation and the certainty that the tricolor fabric will never belong to a regime.

Question. When you decided to pose with the flag in Camagüey to support the initiative in favor of Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, did you imagine that the regime’s response would be so fierce?

Answer. When I decided to pose wrapped in the Cuban flag, I did not think about the risks, that is the truth. I only thought that I wanted to support the initiative. Because in reality I did not see, and I do not see, the crime in doing so. It was to support Luis Manuel, who was imprisoned for a “crime,” in quotation marks, like that.

Q. For those in power, in Cuba, using national symbols outside the official script is punished with prison. What does that piece of fabric mean to you?

A. The Cuban flag (no, the flag of any country) is not a symbol of submission. The flag is a symbol of rebellion, otherwise it would not be what represents us. The flag does not only represent Cubans who support the Government; it represents all of us, whether we support it or not. They cannot appropriate a symbol that belongs to everyone. continue reading

The flag does not only represent Cubans who support the Government; it represents all of us, whether we support it or not

Q. After your arrest came three years under extreme conditions. Today you have difficulty breathing and speaking. What happened inside the prison?

A. I spent months sleeping on the bare floor because it was very hot and I could not even put my mattress down. Bathing with cold water at any hour, the lack of medications, the fact that they did not take me to the doctor in time to treat me… I already had previous throat problems, but all of that worsened my situation to what you see today.

Q. Do you believe there was intentional abandonment by the prison authorities?

A. I am sure there was medical negligence in my case and in the case of all the prisoners. And I am not talking only about political prisoners, it is everyone. The Minint (Ministry of the Interior) doctors do what they are ordered to do. If State Security says there is no logistical support, that there is no gasoline for the car or for the agents’ motorcycles who have to escort you to the hospital, they simply tell the doctor: “Tell her no.” And the doctor obeys.

Q. You served your sentence, but when you got out onto the street, the persecution did not end…

A. The same day I got out, they picked up two friends and me. They told them that they had to keep me quiet, and when they called me, they threatened me, saying that I could not publish or talk about what I had gone through in there. But I had served my sentence; I did not owe them anything, nor do I owe them anything. After that I have suffered brief arrests, and they took a young man, a friend of mine, to State Security for 18 days simply for having a relationship with me.

Q. You left Cuba, but a fundamental part of your life remained on the Island. How are you coping with that separation?

I will always be against the regime and in favor of political prisoners

A. The issue of my daughter is very sensitive for me. With her and with the girls, I have left half of my soul there. She was my support in Havana, the arm I could hold on to. In prison, the hardest moments were when they left after visits. Seeing your daughter and your granddaughters walk out the door, crying… that breaks anyone’s heart. But she decided to stay and fight from there in her own way, and I respect that.

Q. What comes next for Aniette González?

A. First of all, I need to recover my voice. But look, assuming that I cannot speak again, I don’t know: I will learn sign language, I will write on the walls or I will speak on social media with my fingers. I will always be against the regime and in favor of political prisoners. This life’s role was not something I chose; it was given to me. It was given to me and I accept it, and I also enjoy it, because I am not going to remain silent even if I am left without a voice.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Eight Cubans Enter the Race for the 2026 Latin Grammys

Omara Portuondo, Leoni Torres, Dayhan Díaz, Alex Cuba, Yeisy Rojas, Gonzalo Rubalcaba, Yainer Horta and Tania León Are Among the Candidates

Gonzalo Rubalcaba es el cubano con más presencia en la lista, con dos candidaturas. / Instagram

14ymedio, Havana, September 16, 2026 / Cuban music will have eight representatives among the nominees for the 27th Latin Grammy Awards, announced this Wednesday by the Latin Recording Academy. Omara Portuondo, Leoni Torres, Dayhan Díaz, Alex Cuba, Yeisy Rojas, Gonzalo Rubalcaba, Yainer Horta and Tania León will compete in categories ranging from tropical music to jazz, instrumental and classical.

The largest Cuban concentration is in Best Traditional Tropical Album, where three of the five candidates are from the island. Omara Portuondo is aiming for the award with Eternamente Omara, Leoni Torres is competing with Cualquiera se enamora, and trumpeter Dayhan Díaz is in the running with Algo nuevo de ayer.

For Torres this will be his third Latin Grammy nomination and, once again, in the same category. The singer had previously been nominated for Alma Cubana and Canten, without winning the gramophone so far. His new album, Cualquiera se enamora, once again places him in one of the categories where Cuban presence has historically been strongest.

Dayhan Díaz arrives with an eight-track album released in May that revisits the tradition of popular Cuban music from a contemporary perspective. continue reading

The album dedicated to Benny Moré and Nat King Cole also comes with an important endorsement: it already won the US Grammy for Best Latin Jazz Album in February

Gonzalo Rubalcaba is the Cuban with the most presence on the list, with two nominations. The Havana-born pianist appears in Best Instrumental Album for A Tribute to Benny Moré and Nat King Cole, alongside Yainer Horta and Joey Calveiro, and also in Best Latin Jazz/Jazz Album for Gonzalo Plays Pino. Horta, a saxophonist and arranger born in Cuba, thus adds his own nomination thanks to the first of those works.

The album dedicated to Benny Moré and Nat King Cole also comes with an important endorsement: it already won the US Grammy for Best Latin Jazz Album in February, before now entering the race for the Latin Grammy.

Another well-known name from the diaspora, Alex Cuba, born Alexis Puentes in Artemisa and based in Canada for years, is nominated for Best Contemporary Tropical Album for Índole.

In Best Tropical Song, Yeisy Rojas appears as songwriter of Latino, performed together with Manolito Simonet and Ricardo Amaray. In this latter case, the nomination formally corresponds to Rojas as the song’s author.

Outside Cuba, Edgar Barrera once again leads the overall tally with ten nominations

Composer and conductor Tania León completes the Cuban representation. Born in Havana and winner of the 2021 Pulitzer Prize for Music for Stride, she is among the candidates for Best Classical Composition for Raíces (Origins) – Live.

Outside Cuba, Edgar Barrera once again leads the overall tally with ten nominations. He is followed, with seven each, by Karol G, Rosalía, Jorge Drexler and the Argentine duo CA7RIEL & Paco Amoroso. Silvana Estrada and Mon Laferte each received six nominations, confirming the strong weight of Mexico, Colombia, Spain, Uruguay and Argentina in the main categories.

Competing for Record of the Year are, among others, Ha Ha, by CA7RIEL & Paco Amoroso; ¿Cómo se ama?, by Drexler; Dime, by Silvana Estrada; Coleccionando heridas, by Karol G with Marco Antonio Solís; Femme Fatale, by Mon Laferte; Desde que te tengo, by Carín León; Niño, by Milo J; and La perla, by Rosalía with Yahritza y Su Esencia. Rounding out the category are O Amor Nos Encontrou, by Loulu Gilberto, and Alma, by Elena Rose.

The Academy chose Daddy Yankee as 2026 Person of the Year, and he will be honored on 11 November, on the eve of the gala

Rosalía is also once again competing for Album of the Year with LUX (Complete Works), while Karol G is in the running with Tropicoqueta. Also appearing are Anitta with EQUILIBRIVM, CA7RIEL & Paco Amoroso, Jorge Drexler, Silvana Estrada, Mon Laferte, Carín León, Milo J and Rawayana. No Cuban appears this year in the four general categories of Album, Record, Song of the Year and Best New Artist.

The ceremony will be held on 12 November at the MGM Grand Garden Arena in Las Vegas and will be broadcast live by Univision. The Academy brings together some 7,000 voting members from 62 countries, and this edition also comes with changes to eligibility rules and to some categories.

One of the most recognizable names in urban music, Daddy Yankee, will this time have a different role from that of the competitors. The Academy chose him as 2026 Person of the Year, and he will be honored on 11 November, on the eve of the gala. He also becomes the first artist from Latin urban music to receive that distinction.

Translated by GH.

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US Accuses Two Cubans and a Venezuelan of Collaborating with a Russian Assassination Network

One of the Cubans is the same man sought by Lithuania for recruiting agents and carrying out attacks in Europe

Oemis Romagoza Durruthy, long sought by Lithuania, is now also accused by the US

EFE (via 14ymedio), Havana, September 16, 2026 / The United States Department of Justice accused two Cuban citizens and one Venezuelan on Tuesday of allegedly collaborating with a network linked to Russian intelligence services in an international plot involving assassinations and terrorist attacks, including an alleged plan to kill a Russian dissident on US soil.

The accused are Cubans Oemis Romagoza Durruthy, 35, and Yaidel Delgado Suárez, 35, and Venezuelan Angel Eduardo Castro, 22, in addition to Russians Yuri Khrameev, 63, a former colonel in the Russian intelligence services, and his son Kirill Khrameev, 27, a member of the Federal Security Service.

The first of them – alias “Dios” [“God”] – is the same man identified by Lithuania and sought by Europol and Interpol as the ringleader of a network recruiting agents to carry out arson attacks in Europe.

Now, the indictment filed in New York charges him, along with the four others – all of whose whereabouts are unknown – with conspiracy to finance terrorism. continue reading

Delgado Suárez and Castro recruited a person residing in the United States this summer to surveil a Russian dissident they believed to be based in Washington

The indictment details that Delgado Suárez and Castro recruited a person residing in the United States this summer to surveil a Russian dissident they believed to be based in Washington.

The accused offered him between 1,000 and 1,500 dollars to photograph and film locations related to the target, and later 40,000 dollars to kill him or make him disappear. Prosecutors say Suárez also sought out other people who could carry out the job.

The Prosecutor’s Office also accuses Yuri and Kirill Khrameev of having attempted, in 2025, to recruit a US citizen to assassinate another person in Lithuania whom they had singled out for spreading negative information about Russia.

After the citizen turned down the assignment, he received a proposal to set fire to a warehouse or attack an electrical substation, according to the indictment.

Prosecutors describe the organization as a Russian intelligence services network dedicated to pursuing dissidents and carrying out attacks against countries considered allies of Ukraine.

Yuri Khrameev, Delgado Suárez, and Castro also face a charge of conspiracy to commit murder for hire, which carries a maximum sentence of ten years.

Translated by GH.
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Cuba’s New 10,000- and 20,000-Peso Banknotes Begin Circulating This Wednesday

The first private exchange house opens in Santa Clara, without specifying how the rates will be calculated.
The Observatory of Currency and Finance publishes a report on the advantages and disadvantages of dollarization.

New 20,000-peso banknote, featuring Vilma Espín. / BCC

14ymedio, Madrid, September 16, 2026 – Cubans have outgrown the 2,000- and 5,000-peso banknotes that began circulating less than half a year ago and that, amid rampant inflation, already have bigger siblings. Guerrillas Haydée Santamaría and Vilma Espín will be the faces of the new 10,000- and 20,000-peso denominations that will begin circulating this Wednesday, according to an announcement by the president of the Central Bank of Cuba, Juana Lilia Delgado Portal, during a Round Table program in which other changes were announced to “restore the role of banks in the economy.”

The official said that with the new banknotes, “the modification we had announced in our monetary denominations is complete” in order to adapt to the “price conditions and the needs of monetary circulation.” In March, when the previous ones were presented with the faces of Mariana Grajales and Celia Sánchez, it was not mentioned that higher denominations were planned, so it is reasonable to assume that this is more a reaction to the unstoppable rise in prices (officially 25% year-on-year, but much higher in the informal economy) and the collapse of the national currency.

The television program addressed the main reforms that the State hopes to incorporate into the system, grouped into four areas by the Central Bank: opening and capitalization; credit, savings and financing; innovation and new channels; and the foreign-exchange market and remittances. The most notable announcement was the confirmation that the Island’s first private exchange house is already operating, whose imminent launch was discussed by Prime Minister Manuel Marrero in July. The establishment is in Santa Clara (Villa Clara), and according to Ian Pedro Carbonell Karell, a BCC official, there are several requests to create similar entities. continue reading

Once again, details were lacking about the exchange rate being applied, and it was only mentioned that it “provides highly relevant information,” since “it does not respond to posts on social networks or buying or selling intentions”

Once again, details were lacking about the exchange rate being applied, and it was only mentioned that it “provides highly relevant information,” since “it does not respond to posts on social networks or buying or selling intentions, but rather to real, settled and confirmed exchange transactions, which make it possible to better substantiate the official exchange rate” for individuals and the private sector.

Carbonell Karell reviewed some of the measures that are already underway and whose operation has been uneven. Among them is the expansion of the transfer threshold, which at the end of July rose from 120,000 pesos per month, the limit imposed in 2023, to 2.5 million or more, provided that they are declared. This resolves the inconvenience of having to travel to branches to carry out transactions that at this time involve a very small amount of money. The official assured that the printing of new banknotes is fundamental in this case, since it puts more money into circulation and resolves the shortage of cash.

Although this remains to be verified, Carbonell said that the country will move from a model of cash rationing to one of planning to meet demand. Institutions will have to adapt to their customers, accompany them, advise them and agree with them on the financial cycles most appropriate to their situation. “The service must be different for an individual and for a company, because their needs are not the same,” he said.

The official also reviewed the latest resolution allowing private businesses to operate accounts abroad without prior authorization, although they must report their opening, or to deposit foreign currency in cash, a package of reforms presented last week that takes effect this Thursday, September 17.

Another previously known issue that was emphasized was the outsourcing to private businesses of pension payments. The solution, adopted months ago as a response to the banks’ lack of liquidity, already has a model representative: El Olímpico. It is a private venture, which the official press calls a casilla, a food sales outlet, that is paying retirees in Santiago de Cuba through an agreement with the bank. Its owner is none other than Eriel Sánchez, a former baseball player and manager of the Cuban team whose record includes less honorable episodes, such as managing the Under-23 team from which half the squad fled during the 2021 World Cup in Mexico, or the five-year suspension imposed in 2025 by the National Baseball Commission after he struck sports legend Miguel Rojas Rodríguez with a bat.

The officials also spoke about providing greater incentives, especially by reducing commissions for digital payments, since there remains a conviction that online banking can be modernized, which would make it possible to reduce the number of branches while increasing transactions and customer service. All this despite the previous failure of the so-called banking reform. The easing of credit, particularly to finance renewable energy sources, was another of the new developments mentioned, although the experience is also not proving very positive in practice, as the official press itself has warned. In addition, they discussed the imminent updating of regulations related to the use of cryptocurrencies.

“One of the Central Bank’s main objectives is to restore the functionality of the national currency and return greater usefulness to the Cuban peso within the economy,” said Delgado Portal, an analysis that clashes head-on with the opinion of Cuban economist Pavel Vidal. In the preceding hours, the expert sent out a bulletin from the Observatory of Currency and Finance of Cuba (OMFi) in which he precisely points out that “the new rules expand the dollarization of wholesale transactions between companies (State and private) and, to a lesser extent, of consumer markets.” The phenomenon, he adds, is not new, but the current changes “represent another step in reversing the dedollarization process begun in 2004 and also depart from the purpose of the Monetary Ordering in 2021 of restoring the Cuban peso as the economy’s sole monetary sign.”

“One of the Central Bank’s main objectives is to restore the functionality of the national currency and return greater usefulness to the Cuban peso within the economy”

Vidal considers it difficult for the Cuban regime, whether forcibly or through negotiation, to secure another international partner other than the United States, making the dollarization of an economy that is already, de facto, dependent on its northern neighbor almost inevitable. Washington’s sanctions have limited imports, travel and all kinds of investment from any other country, so the generalization of the currency appears “natural” and “logical.”

However, this could be very useful in an initial phase of stabilization—as the Cuba Transformación document points out—to facilitate the entry of capital and financing while the national currency gains strength and confidence. But it recommends that it not be extended unnecessarily, since it creates distortions and inequalities between those who have access to foreign currency and those who do not. In addition, a single exchange rate is important, which these processes do not favor. “Dollarization provides monetary stability but limits responses to international or domestic shocks and increases the economic and social cost of economic adjustments.”

Vidal believes that although the Cuban peso has lost value extraordinarily and the rise in prices has been unstoppable, hyperinflation has not been reached, which allows the national currency to recover its functions over time, relying on some reforms already carried out and others that should be added. Among his proposals are a greater reduction in the fiscal deficit, the unification of all exchange rates, an increase in interest rates, the formalization of the foreign-exchange market and the transfer to the BCC of the international reserves currently controlled by the military conglomerate Gaesa.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Former Public Health Minister Manipulates Infant Mortality Data to Blame the U.S.

The official press reproduces a post by Roberto Morales Ojeda that falsely says there has been a “148% increase in the last year.”

Infant mortality recorded its worst figure of the century in 2025. / Cubahora. / Cubahora

14ymedio, Madrid, September 15, 2026 – Roberto Morales Ojeda, secretary of Organization of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), came up with the idea of writing a post last week to denounce the effects of the new U.S. sanctions on the regime, distorting one of the figures most sensitive to the population: infant mortality. The brief text, which might have gone largely unnoticed had it remained on his social media accounts, has been on the front page of the newspaper Tribuna de La Habana since yesterday, a piece of content that highlights the inability of the official press to respond to false information. More than that: it adopts it as its own and elevates it to the status of news.

Morales Ojeda could easily have spoken about the repercussions of U.S. policies without departing from the truth. The shortage of fuel for transporting patients and the sick, and the shortage of electricity needed to keep essential hospital equipment running, are examples of a worsening of the already difficult conditions under which the healthcare system has operated for decades, and which stem from the oil blockade. But the official has chosen rampant falsehood.

“In the last year, infant mortality in Cuba has increased by 148%, going from 4 to 9.9 per thousand live births,” Morales Ojeda says in the post. This is the figure the authorities reported in January of this year, corresponding to 2025. Although it is likely that this figure could worsen in 2026, it is currently unknown. But this is not the greatest problem with his presentation. The official figures are public and cannot be modified retroactively. In 2024, infant mortality was already far from 4 per thousand, a number that requires looking much further back, to the best years in the Island’s recent history. continue reading

In 2024, infant mortality was already far from 4 per thousand, a number that requires looking much further back, to the best years in the Island’s recent history

Cuba was, because of the widespread implementation and expansion throughout the population of public health programs such as Pami (National Maternal and Child Care Program), one of the countries with the best infant mortality figures in the region, even ahead of the U.S. In 2000, the Island began to stabilize the relatively poor figures from the years of the Special Period and remained for several years at around 6 deaths per thousand live births. Starting in 2006, things began to improve significantly, and by 2008 the rate had reached 4.7 per thousand, continuing to improve until the record years: 2017 and 2018, when it reached the 4 that the official now recalls.

Everything changed in 2019, when it rose by one point, but the major rupture came in 2021. The pandemic hit the healthcare sector very hard. That year, not only was the figure unusually high for the Island, at 7.9 per thousand, but there were truly dramatic figures. This was the case in Ciego de Ávila, where 13.8 deaths per thousand live births were recorded, more than double the previous year and even higher than the figures for Mexico (11) and El Salvador (12). On that occasion, the province’s official newspaper, Invasor, sought responsibility and found it much closer than in Washington.

“Low birth weight and prematurity contribute to morbidity and mortality in the territory, fundamentally associated with high blood pressure, intrauterine growth retardation and adolescent pregnancy. Many babies arrive at the Neonatology service with extremely low weights (less than 1,500 and 1,000 grams), putting their lives at risk and extending their hospital stay,” said Luis Carmenate Martínez, head of the gynecology and obstetrics department in the province and a Pami official.

The physician warned of the lack of a health promotion and education system. The working groups are incomplete and there is a lack of support from the sector, he added

Those statements were spontaneously answered by a physician, Ernesto René, who worked for 34 years in Pami, and who denounced that the intersectoral work of the program had begun to be dismantled 20 years ago. “Today it does not work,” he warned. The physician warned of the lack of a health promotion and education system. The working groups are incomplete and there is a lack of support from the sector, he added. “Professionals with experience in PAMI have been lost due to completely misguided policies and decisions by the province’s directors, lacking entirely in science and experience.”

It surprised no one that, following the pandemic, these figures continued, and Cuba was unable to return to the rates it had achieved for decades. In 2022, the figure reached 7.5; in 2023 and 2024 it declined slightly to 7.1; and in 2025 it deteriorated severely, reaching the 9.9 cited by Morales Ojeda. That is 39.9% higher than the previous year, although not the 148% claimed by the official when going back to figures from eight years ago. The numbers come from the National Office of Statistics and Information, but Tribuna de La Habana has not deemed it necessary to correct the party’s secretary of Organization and former Public Health minister, who speaks of a “punishment that is taking it out on the innocent” by resorting to a false figure.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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After the Flight of Its Foreign Partners, Islazul Seeks Private Investors Within Cuba

The State-run company is inviting a dozen or so food-service establishments in Santiago de Cuba to tender offers.

The Balcón del Caribe Hotel leases the services and food-service area. / Islazul

14ymedio, Madrid, September 15, 2026 – As many as eight hotels and two entertainment venues in Santiago de Cuba are seeking private investors to give them some much-needed support for the entire establishment or just part of it. The provincial branch of the State-run Islazul chain announced on social media this Monday the tendering of this substantial package of facilities to manage them under the modalities of “leasing, cooperation and consignment.” Interested parties may submit their proposals until next October 1, in an offer that highlights the radical – forced – shift in national tourism policy.

The proposal includes the leasing of the services and food-service areas at the Costa Morena and Balcón del Caribe hotels, the Bucanero and Cabaret Tricontinental restaurants and the Compay café at the Hotel Las Américas; the restaurant, grill and bar at the Hotel Gran Piedra; the terrace, bar and restaurant at the Hotel Deportivo; the bar at the Hotel Perla; the complete food-service complex – cabaret-restaurant, bar and café – at Rancho Club and Villa San Juan; the terrace at the Hotel Rex; and the terrace and bar at the Hotel Libertad.

To be eligible to manage these establishments, the required documentation must be submitted in an envelope identifying the location being sought and including the applicant’s information and the project. The latter consists of the technical plan and financial proposal. The message posted on social media also provides the address and telephone number for further information. However, there are no tender documents available – as is customary in international practice – containing, among other things, the terms and conditions, financial fees and other specific matters. continue reading

However, there are no tender documents available – as is customary in international practice – containing, among other things, the terms and conditions, financial fees and other specific matters

Since 2022, a resolution of the Ministry of Domestic Trade has regulated tendering processes allowing non-state economic actors to take over facilities that are underused or in poor condition. The regulation specifies that ownership remains with the State. Under this system, countless properties have passed into private hands, with private operators improving premises, services and products, and what began almost as an experiment has spread to all kinds of sectors. Although food service leads the tenders by far, there are cinemas, parks, workshops, bakeries and all kinds of businesses that have changed hands.

However, the leasing of food-service spaces in hotels is another step following the abandonment by the major hotel chains, with which a preferred partner had previously been sought. In 2019, the company presented an investment plan for its establishments throughout the country, as well as plans to open new venues.

At that time, when the State-run company was celebrating its 25th anniversary, the president of Islazul presented the project to the official press, giving priority to the arrival of foreign capital. “We are open to foreign investment, especially management with financing and marketing. For this, we already have a management contract with Meliá,” he commented. The Spanish hotel company had management agreements at several of the Cuban chain’s hotels, and the executive hoped to expand through that channel. He announced that negotiations were underway with foreign operators and that tenders were being held in several destinations, including Santiago de Cuba, as well as Havana, Varadero, Camagüey and Sancti Spíritus.

That path has been completely closed since foreign hotel companies, mostly Spanish, left the Island following Donald Trump’s executive order warning of sanctions against companies from any country that did business with the Cuban regime. Meliá has been the case with the greatest impact, since until this year it had been managing 34 establishments on the Island and, even despite the negative outlook for the tourism sector – in decline, since 2019, and in outright collapse since 2026 – had declared its intention to remain in Cuba. The responsibilities to the shareholders of this publicly traded company have outweighed the friendship of its executive chairman with the regime, a relationship he inherited from his father.

In this situation, and with no flights to Cuba, the Government has begun a timid opening in the tourism sector while at the same time expanding its search for domestic private capital for these establishments. The population, however, is skeptical. “Cuban capitalists are no longer traitors; now they are dollar-traffickers. They are stone-faced, buddy, but when it comes to asking for something, they’re the first to say no,” one user comments on the State-run company’s post, where distrustful reactions were abundant. “So that afterward you spend your money, make it look nice, and they take it away from you.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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