The opposition leader was abandoned on a road in Artemisa after being intimidated for supporting protests called for the anniversary of the Island-wide ’11J’ protests of 2021
Cuesta Morúa has suffered numerous arrests and acts of harassment for his political activism. / Council for Democratic Transition in Cuba
14ymedio, Madrid, June 21, 2026 / Cuban opposition leader Manuel Cuesta Morúa was released this Saturday after being detained, mistreated and threatened with death by State Security agents.
The Council for Democratic Transition in Cuba (CTDC)—an organization chaired by Cuesta Morúa— had denounced his forced disappearance hours earlier, stating that he was being held incommunicado. The opposition member was arrested at the Zanja police station in Central Havana, handcuffed, and forcibly taken away in a patrol car along with two State Security agents and two police officers.
According to information released by the CTDC this Sunday, Cuesta Morúa was beaten and threatened with death during the ride in the patrol car. The organization also reported that the officers confiscated his wallet and destroyed his identity card in his presence.
Instead of being taken to a detention center, Cuesta Morúa was taken to an isolated area in the province of Artemisa. According to the complaint, officers forced him through a fence into a densely wooded area, where he was physically assaulted and threatened with death.
There, the agents warned him that they would shoot him in the head “if he continued to promote ‘the pot-banging protests’ and encourage citizens to demonstrate on 11 July.”
The officers warned him that they would shoot him in the head “if he continued to promote ‘the pot-banging protests’ and encourage citizens to demonstrate on July 11th.”
The allusion refers to a campaign driven by activists calling on Cubans to demand the release of political prisoners and to protest against food shortages, blackouts, and the lack of drinking water, coinciding with the fifth anniversary of the Island-wide anti-government demonstrations of 11 July 2021.
Cuesta Morúa was abandoned by the officers on the road known as Ocho Vías, in Artemisa, without documents, money, or continue reading
means of communication. According to the complaint, he remained there for five to six hours until a passerby helped him and took him back to Havana.
In a statement released Sunday, the organization described the incident as part of a “systematic pattern of action by the Cuban regime” against those who peacefully exercise their rights and demand greater freedoms. “Any Cuban citizen can be a victim of repression for expressing their opinions or demanding democratic changes,” the statement reads.
“Any Cuban citizen can be a victim of repression for expressing their opinions or demanding democratic changes.”
In this regard, the organization calls on the international community, democratic governments, international bodies and human rights organizations to recognize this reality and “join the Cuban people’s demand for an immediate end to the human rights violations that the Cuban regime constantly perpetrates against its own people.”
A philosopher and historian by training, Manuel Cuesta Morúa is one of the best-known figures in the Cuban opposition and has suffered numerous arrests and acts of harassment for his political activism. Since January 2026, he has presided over the CTDC —one of the main platforms for coordinating the opposition both on and off the island—after succeeding José Daniel Ferrer, who went into exile in Miami in October 2025.
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Amid blackouts, protests, and empty bus stops, Cubans are receiving the 176 economic measures announced by the government with skepticism.
Solar-powered traffic light on Vía Blanca, out of service. / 14ymedio
14ymedio, Yoani Sánchez, Havana, June 20, 2026 / She carefully climbs onto the electric tricycle, while clarifying that she has had knee surgery. At 81, she says she dedicated her entire life to training athletes and that, many days, she has to choose between paying for transportation or buying food. “I won’t live to see any results from these measures,” she declares about the package of economic reforms announced this week by the Cuban government, which has failed to inspire hope or enthusiasm on the streets.
The days have become stifling in Cuba. By day, the sun beats down relentlessly; by night, the bonfires of the protests, fueled by mountains of garbage, dot the horizon with flames. I walk to the Faculty of Arts and Letters, where I graduated a quarter of a century ago. The dust accumulated on the windows and the silence that pervades the hallways reveal the academic paralysis that began last February. I turn to the right and begin to climb the hill that leads to the Calixto García Hospital. Next to the fence of the university stadium, more than fifty people try to share a tiny patch of shade.
“I won’t live to see any results from those measures.”
Some sweat under the sun; others seek refuge under umbrellas. They all share the same expression of annoyance while waiting for a bus to take them somewhere in a city where most of the stops remain empty. People have lost hope that any bus will ever come, and those images of passengers overflowing like bunches of grapes from the doors of the 22, the 30, or the 195 are a thing of the past. If during the Special Period passengers were practically hanging out of the windows, now many don’t even try to get around. They have given up on mobility.
Near the Physics Faculty, a woman and her teenage son sleep on the sidewalk. It’s evident they’ve been there for several days: they’ve improvised a bed, hung bags from a tree, and spread out blankets on which they display items salvaged from the trash, hoping to sell them. There are cables, a doll lacking one arm, and a few books. One of them is a manual of socialist economics, one of those texts that warned us continue reading
that the market was taboo and that communism couldn’t be built with the tools of capitalism.
How many thermoelectric plants could have been built with the money invested in this giant without guests?
Did Miguel Díaz-Canel study a book like this? Very likely. However, this week he insisted that the new measures aim for more socialism, even though they more closely resemble a roadmap for a crony capitalism, where the future Cuban oligarchs will be the same ones who today ask us to resist and tighten our belts.
I continue walking to J Street and quicken my pace towards 25th. As I approach the Torre K hotel, with its immense ugliness of 42 stories, I’m struck by the desolation of the place. No taxis picking up passengers, no buses unloading tourists to enjoy the views from the top. The access street is completely empty.
How many thermoelectric plants could have been built with the money invested in this giant without guests? I ask myself as I continue towards L Street. I pass a small cafe where “everything is hot because we’ve hardly had electricity,” a young vendor explains to a woman with an obviously thirsty face.
“And now, with all these measures, what about the inspectors?” she asks. The package of relaxations has overturned many of the prohibitions that fueled the fines and bribes of those blue-coated employees who have become the scourge of entrepreneurs.
“They don’t have the time to implement any of that, neither the time nor the desire.”
But the young man doesn’t seem to share the official enthusiasm. “They don’t have the time to implement any of that, neither the time nor the inclination,” he says. While some foreign media outlets are calling the 176 measures approved by the National Assembly “the most profound economic reform” undertaken in seven decades in Cuba, the same optimism isn’t widespread on the streets. The long blackouts and the harshness of reality dampen any jubilation.
“What we need is for them to leave,” the frustrated customer concludes, as she continues searching for cold water.
A very thin boy approaches me offering instant soda for 60 pesos a pack. I give him a 100-peso bill and return the colorful envelope he placed in my hands. Begging and child labor are everywhere. Further on, a teenager plays the violin on the sidewalk, hoping someone from a nearby café will leave him a tip. Inside, everyone looks away and pretends not to hear the melody flowing from the strings.
My mobile phone rings. It’s a call from home: “The power came on at 12:52 and went out at 12:58.”
We no longer have any food in the freezer. It’s not worth it. Food spoils during the long hours without electricity, and we have to cook only what will fit on the plate that we’ll eat that same day. Canned goods, preserves, and dehydrated products are going up in price as fast as refrigerators are becoming increasingly useless. A few days ago, I opened four eggs, one after the other, and they were all bad. The loss was over 400 pesos.
“If they had done all this decades ago, my children wouldn’t have had to leave, but now it’s too late.”
“They’re going to let us wear hats now that we don’t even have heads left,” jokes a neighbor I bump into on my way back to my building. Eight years ago, she saw her son off to the Darién jungle, and two years ago, she watched her daughter leave for Uruguay. “If they had done all this decades ago, my children wouldn’t have had to leave, but now it’s too late.”
The time for possible reforms ended a long time ago.
A few hours later, the flames of accumulated garbage and the banging of pots and pans in indignation once again heated up the night. In Central Havana, a woman threw wood and paper onto a bonfire that grew out of control. The sheets fell and charred almost immediately, just as the measures incapable of quelling the popular hunger for immediate and total change had been reduced to ashes.
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Johann Wadephul stated this Sunday that he does not believe a U.S. blockade exists against the Island.
German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul responded to a citizen who referred to the U.S. “blockade” of Cuba. / X
14ymedio/EFE, Berlin, June 22, 2026 – German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul stated this Sunday that he does not see a U.S. blockade against Cuba and that the requirement for Cubans to enjoy greater well-being is for them to be governed better.
An “unjust regime” prevails in Cuba, Wadephul said during a dialogue with citizens as part of the government’s open house events, which he cited as an example of how a democratic society functions, where “everyone can express their opinion without fearing harassment afterward.”
“That would be the first thing I would say, as the German Government, about Cuba,” he said in response to a citizen’s question.
The conservative minister explained that Cuba in the past “benefited greatly” from economic ties and oil imports from Venezuela, a situation that no longer exists “by decision of the Venezuelan government.”
For the Island’s population to live better, the “decisive prerequisite” would be for the country to be “governed better,” he indicated. “I do not see a blockade of the kind you describe,” he told his interlocutor.
Wadephul expressed the hope that the Cuban people can enjoy a better future and stated that Germany contributes toward that goal “through active assistance measures.”
Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla denounced on Saturday that the United States is imposing a “total blockade” on the country through a “plan of economic strangulation” that includes preventing foreign companies from selling parts and technology for Cuban thermoelectric plants and preventing any company in the world from selling oil to the Island.
U.S. President Donald Trump issued an executive order on May 1 threatening sanctions against foreign entities operating in Cuba’s energy, defense, mining, and financial services sectors, in addition to the oil restrictions imposed in January, which have prolonged the blackouts that citizens had already been experiencing for several years throughout the country.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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The measure maintains the tariff exemption for those products but excludes powdered detergent.
Since July 2024, cut chicken could not be sold for more than 680 pesos per kilogram, while the maximum price for cooking oil was 990 pesos per liter. / 14ymedio
14ymedio, Havana, June 21, 2026 – The Cuban Government has eliminated the maximum prices established for the retail sale of cut chicken, cooking oil, powdered milk, pasta, and sausages, after President Miguel Díaz-Canel himself acknowledged this week that the price caps failed to contain inflation and ultimately caused products to disappear from the market.
The decision appears in Resolution 150/2026 of the Ministry of Finance and Prices, published this Saturday in Extraordinary Official Gazette No. 73. The regulation took effect the same day and maintains the exemption from customs duties for the importation of those five groups of food products.
The resolution repeals provisions 225 and 310 of 2024, through which the government had approved both the customs benefit and the maximum retail prices. By nullifying both regulations, the nationwide limits imposed on merchants disappear.
Since July 2024, cut chicken could not be sold for more than 680 pesos per kilogram, while the maximum price for cooking oil was 990 pesos per liter. Powdered milk had a limit of 1,675 pesos per kilogram, pasta 835 pesos, and sausages 1,075 pesos.
“Price caps, in practice, failed to contain inflation”
However, the official caps had already been widely exceeded in practice. According to the price update published this Sunday by 14ymedio, a liter of oil sells continue reading
in private small and medium-sized businesses (mipymes) for 1,600 pesos and reaches 1,850 pesos at the Correo de Pueblo Nuevo market fair in Holguín, and 1,900 pesos at the Delio Luna Echemendía fairgrounds in Sancti Spíritus, nearly double the former maximum.
A kilogram of powdered milk costs 3,200 pesos in the mipymes and reaches 3,700 pesos at the Holguín fair, more than double the limit established in 2024. A pound of chicken, meanwhile, sells for 550 pesos in that same market and for 650 pesos at the Sancti Spíritus fairgrounds. Converted to kilograms, those prices are approximately 1,213 and 1,433 pesos, respectively, far above the 680 pesos authorized until this Saturday.
The failure of the price-cap policy was acknowledged this week by Díaz-Canel during the closing session of the Extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. “Price caps, in practice, failed to contain inflation,” the ruler admitted. According to his assessment, those measures “often caused products to disappear, encouraged diversion into illegality, led to higher prices, reduced tax revenues, and created an impossible race between real prices and administrative decisions that always arrived too late.”
Díaz-Canel also acknowledged that the limits remained “unchanged despite a changing economic reality” and that they hindered those trying to carry out economic activity legally. “Therefore, we are not going to continue imposing general price caps, as the prime minister explained,” he concluded.
Many economists had been calling for years for the end of price caps, which were incapable of containing inflation and were often responsible for emptying markets
The president added that the Government must correct “distortions in the tax system” that make production chains more expensive and ultimately get passed on to final prices. He also linked the abandonment of price caps to the announced transition from subsidizing products to subsidizing people, a long-standing promise of the government that has still not been broadly implemented.
The text of the Gazette stipulates that imports of cut chicken, edible oils—except olive oil—powdered milk, pasta, and sausages are exempt from customs duties, in accordance with the tariff subcategories included in the annex.
In the case of chicken, the exemption covers frozen chicken pieces and offal. For oils, the regulation lists soybean, palm, sunflower, safflower, and cottonseed oils. The list also includes different types of powdered milk and cream, pasta products, and various meat preparations.
One of the notable changes is the exclusion of powdered detergent. This product had been part of the package of six goods benefiting from the exemption in 2024, but it does not appear among the imports exempted by Resolution 150. The preamble itself specifies that the previous exemption remains in effect, “except for powdered detergent.”
Many economists had been calling for years for the end of price caps, which were incapable of containing inflation and were often responsible for emptying markets. But lifting them in the midst of the current crisis, without a recovery in supply, real wages, or the value of the peso, has fueled fears among many Cubans that prices could soar to levels that are difficult to imagine today.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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The license is granted following progress in peace talks; in addition to the island, North Korea, Crimea, and Ukrainian territories under pro-Russian control are also excluded.
The decision by the administration of President Donald Trump opens a window through August 21.
EFE (via 14ymedio), Washington, June 22, 2026 / The United States Treasury Department issued a license on Monday authorizing the sale of Iranian-produced oil for 60 days, after describing the peace negotiations in Switzerland as “productive” and highlighting Tehran’s commitment to guaranteeing traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
The decision by the administration of President Donald Trump opens a window through August 21 for the production, sale, transport, and import of Iranian crude, petrochemical products, and other petroleum derivatives, even though the main economic sanctions against Tehran – dating from 2019 – remain in force.
The license expressly excludes transactions involving persons or entities from North Korea, Cuba, Crimea, and the eastern Ukrainian territories under pro-Russian control.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated on X that “in keeping with the productive talks taking place in Switzerland, Iran has committed to guaranteeing free and open transit through the Strait of Hormuz and to allowing inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to enter its territory.”
Before the imposition of the US blockade, Iran used to load more than 1.5 million barrels per day for export. Last May, that volume fell to 260,000 barrels per day.
“As part of this framework, the Treasury Department has issued a temporary 60-day general license authorizing the production, supply, and sale of Iranian oil,” Bessent said of the measure, which is included in the memorandum of understanding signed by both countries as a pathway to a definitive peace agreement.
Also on Monday, US Vice President JD Vance, speaking from Bürgenstock, Switzerland, confirmed that “very good progress” had been made on continue reading
Sunday regarding negotiations with Tehran, and stated that “the Strait of Hormuz is open” and that the IAEA will be able to enter Iran.
After reaching a framework agreement, the US lifted last week the blockade on Iranian ports and coastlines that had been imposed in April to pressure the Islamic Republic, whose economy depends on oil.
Before the imposition of the US blockade, Iran used to load more than 1.5 million barrels per day for export. Last May, that volume fell to 260,000 barrels per day, according to analysis by the CNBC network.
The Iranian delegation left Switzerland on Monday, while the technical teams of both countries will continue talks throughout the week on the implementation mechanisms of the memorandum of understanding.
Translated by GH.
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As the fifth anniversary of ’11J’ approaches, an increase in patrols is evident across several municipalities.
The conditions are ripe and the police presence is multiplying as a constant reminder of what can happen to anyone who protests.
14ymedio, Havana, Diego Hernández, 22 June 2026 / The weekend has given no respite to the Havana municipality of Regla. Hours of heat, lack of water and absence of electricity have been piling up, made worse, perhaps, by a transformer breakdown on Sunday. Or perhaps not, since the day before, pots and pans were banging in protest again across the area in broad daylight after 30 consecutive hours without power. That movement is under the microscope. The authorities are doing everything in their power to prevent a new 11J whose fifth anniversary is fast approaching. That explains the reinforced military and police presence right in the heart of the capital.
“The guards were patrolling up and down the busiest spots, and especially in front of the People’s Power offices. You saw them on every corner. They were going past the cafeterias and bars on Calle 24 de Febrero and just staring at you. They’ve been at it for about three days now,” a resident of the area tells 14ymedio as an abnormal presence of olive green is visible in the streets. These images were taken by this newspaper on Saturday night through to Sunday, though they could not be sent to the editorial office until the following day, as the lack of power has kept communications at a bare minimum for many weeks now.
Protests in Regla have been recurring in recent days. On Thursday, around thirty residents demonstrated outside the Communist Party headquarters, and the following day they overturned rubbish bins and set them alight.
The regime’s fear of an explosion is plain to see. The conditions are ripe and the police presence is multiplying as a constant reminder of what can happen to anyone who protests. What happened this Sunday in El Vedado is another example. At least four patrol cars and several police motorcycles gathered in front of the Malecon, where a handful of young people had gone to take a dip. Images taken from the Giron building have gone viral, and although several people have welcomed the idea of officers removing people continue reading
from a dangerous area – where swimming is prohibited – the criticism has grown louder.
“Once again the police are acting as a repressive instrument against kids who have no water, no electricity, and probably no food in their homes. They weren’t doing any harm to anyone – they were simply swimming at the Malecon. For this there’s fuel. The people against the people,” said a witness who reported that at least one person was detained over the incident.
“If they saved all the fuel burned daily on police deployments, we wouldn’t have so many electricity problems,” wrote one social media user. “Yes, because the deployment is across all of Cuba, not just Havana,” they added.
That was not an idle observation. On Friday, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel paid a visit to the very same area in his capacity as president of the National Defence Council. “The Defence Zone must be the Party and the Government of every community, both in times of peace and in times of war – that is what the complex situation Cuba is living through demands,” said the leader, who made reference to the high population density of the Carmelo neighbourhood in El Vedado.
On Friday, Miguel Diaz-Canel visited the area in his capacity as president of the National Defence Council
Diaz-Canel spoke of periodic military exercises that must be carried out, while highlighting defence plans including the protection of vulnerable people and “citizens’ prior knowledge of shelters to ensure a smooth evacuation.” Jorge Luis Aneiros Alonso, president of that defence zone, said it is important for citizens to know “in the event of an aggression against the country, where they can go to be better protected. The first thing is to identify and verify the locations available to us in the zone that offer safety… making use, above all, of basements, semi-basements and certain tunnels,” he explained.
The sight of uniformed personnel, however, is not reassuring to a population focused primarily on carrying out the most basic tasks of survival – eating, drinking, sleeping – in the midst of unbearable blackouts. On Sunday, the state electricity company Union Electrica dedicated its social media accounts to paying tribute to the recently deceased commander Ramiro Valde’s Menendez through numerous messages in his honour, including one praising him for leading “the Government programme, together with the country’s highest authorities, for the recovery of the National Electricity System and actions related to the energy transition.” “RIP, but I want to talk about something else,” responded users exhausted by hours without power and the company’s failure to provide any answers.
In the early hours of this Monday, the Antonio Guiteras thermoelectric plant in Matanzas – Cuba’s largest – began restarting after its most recent breakdown, which took it offline for the fifteenth time this year. But not even that gives anyone hope any more. With it or without it, a deficit of 2,000 megawatts has become virtually permanent on the Island, and the regime is mobilising its control apparatus to ensure that no new mass protest like the one five years ago erupts – one that would first trigger repression on its part and, ultimately, a possible response from the United States.
Translated by GH.
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A central figure of Castroism for more than six decades, he survived every purge.
He never expressed regret; on the contrary, he defended violence as a political and moral principle. / EFE
14ymedio, Havana, June 21, 2026 – Cuban leader Miguel Díaz-Canel announced this Sunday the death, at age 94, of Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, Commander of the Revolution and one of the main architects of the Cuban regime’s repressive apparatus. “The physical departure of Commander of the Revolution Ramiro Valdés Menéndez hurts deeply, like that of a father. That is how I always loved and respected him,” he wrote on social media. Díaz-Canel also recalled “his support and advice, his discreet collaboration, and his exemplary dedication in service to the Homeland.”
Díaz-Canel highlighted Valdés’s “absolute loyalty” to Fidel Castro and Raúl Castro and linked his death to the celebration of Father’s Day in Cuba this Sunday. “Every act in the life of Commander Ramiro was marked by his absolute loyalty to the leadership of Fidel and Raúl, to his comrades in struggle, and to the Moncada Program, whose quest for justice he defended from the assault on the dictatorship’s fortress in 1953 until the last breath of his exemplary life,” he stated.
No details have been provided regarding the cause, time, or place of death. His passing closes the biography of one of the most feared men of Castroism, known inside and outside the Island by the nicknames “Pool of Blood” and “The Butcher of Artemisa,” a reputation forged through his role in repression and the memory of thousands of victims.
With his death, the small group of historic leaders who still maintain a public or institutional presence is reduced even further
Valdés was one of the central figures of the so-called Historic Generation, made up of the leaders who accompanied Fidel Castro before the revolutionary victory of 1959 and who occupied the highest positions of power for decades.
He participated in the assault on the Moncada Barracks in 1953, traveled aboard the Granma in 1956, and was part of the column led by Ernesto Che Guevara during the invasion toward the center and west of the Island. He was the only member of the Castroist leadership who took part in all three episodes and lived into this century.
With his death, the small group of historic leaders who still retain continue reading
a public or institutional presence is reduced even further, including Raúl Castro, José Ramón Machado Ventura, Guillermo García Frías, and Ramón Pardo Guerra. The rest of that first leadership circle has either died or disappeared from political life.
His supporters affectionately called him Ramirito, just as some referred to Machado Ventura as Machadito. When he headed the Ministry of Information Technology and Communications, he was credited with the phrase, “We must tame the wild colt of the internet.” He also described himself as a “Cerberus of the Revolution,” an expression that summarized the role of ideological watchdog that he played for decades.
His last official public appearance was on October 3, 2025, during the ceremony commemorating the 60th anniversary of the first Central Committee of the CCP. / Presidency
In recent months, Valdés had disappeared from public view. His absence was especially noticeable during the funeral ceremonies for the 32 Cuban military personnel who died in Venezuela on January 3. At those ceremonies, the regime deliberately displayed almost all of its historic leadership. Valdés, however, was absent from the reception of the remains at José Martí International Airport, did not appear in the honor guard at the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and also failed to attend the burial ceremonies and events related to the national tribute.
Nor did he participate in the Council of Ministers meetings held between October and December 2025, according to official broadcasts, in which his seat remained empty. One of his last verifiable public appearances took place on October 3, 2025, during the ceremony commemorating the 60th anniversary of the first Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. A month earlier, he had been seen at the inauguration of a solar park in Sancti Spíritus.
From then on, the silence was almost total. He also missed the December session of the National Assembly, a forum traditionally attended by the historic figures of Castroism. His absence was equally striking on June 5 during the ceremony marking the 65th anniversary of the Ministry of the Interior, the institution he founded and first led.
That void fueled persistent rumors about his health. Some versions spoke of a prolonged hospitalization and severe physical deterioration. As is customary in Cuba, official secrecy replaced public information. Valdés’s death confirms that those absences were not accidental but rather the prelude to an ending managed in silence.
Valdés was born on April 28, 1932, in the Artemisa neighborhood of La Matilde, from which a significant number of the young people who participated in the assault on the Moncada Barracks emerged, despite it being located on the opposite end of the country. His mother had sworn that none of her five children would become a stepping stone for any politician, but she could not prevent the second-youngest son from serving as a rung in elevating Fidel Castro’s figure.
Valdés was, according to multiple consistent testimonies, an enforcer convinced that terror was an effective instrument for maintaining power
Coming from a very poor family, with little education and no established trade, he decided to follow Castro to Moncada, prison, exile, and later the Granma yacht. In the Sierra Maestra he became one of Guevara’s trusted men and ended the war as second-in-command of the invading column led by the Argentine revolutionary.
After 1959, he occupied decisive positions in the architecture of control of the new State. He served twice as Minister of the Interior and, from those posts, directed the apparatus responsible for State Security, intelligence, the police, and the prison system.
Under his authority, practices documented for decades by human rights organizations, former political prisoners, and former regime officials became entrenched: arbitrary detentions, violent interrogations, summary trials, prolonged imprisonment for ideological reasons, and a prison system designed as a tool of intimidation.
Valdés was, according to multiple consistent testimonies, an enforcer convinced that terror was an effective instrument for maintaining power. During his first period at the head of the Ministry of the Interior, the State Security organs that would pursue opponents, dissidents, religious believers, intellectuals, and former revolutionaries opposed to Fidel Castro were organized and structured.
In interviews and public statements given at different points in his life, Valdés defended methods of violent struggle. In testimony collected by pro-government journalists, he boasted of having participated in the placement of explosive devices in public spaces during the insurgent period and presented those actions as heroic and necessary. He never expressed regret. On the contrary, he defended violence as a political and moral principle.
His career was marked by at least two moments when he was removed from power. The first occurred in July 1968, when he was removed from the Ministry of the Interior amid internal adjustments within the security apparatus. After several years away from the political forefront, he returned to important positions during the following decade.
The second documented removal occurred in December 1985, when he was again dismissed as Minister of the Interior without any public explanation. Although he lost positions and was assigned other responsibilities, he never suffered a definitive downfall like other historic leaders subjected to purges.
That ability to survive politically was one of the most notable traits of his career. Valdés was displaced, rehabilitated, and reassigned on several occasions, but he always retained the fundamental trust of the Castro brothers.
In 2009, he returned to the visible core of power as vice president of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. Later, he remained linked to the telecommunications, energy, and strategic investment sectors. Since the entry into force of the 2019 Constitution, he had served as Deputy Prime Minister.
The legacy of Ramiro Valdés Menéndez is another: that of a leader who decisively contributed to turning repression into State policy and fear into a form of government
On a personal level, Valdés leaves behind descendants whose circumstances illustrate one of the regime’s most persistent contradictions. Several of his children live outside the Island, established in countries where they enjoy civil liberties, mobility, and material conditions denied to most Cubans.
That reality, known and discussed for years in opposition and exile circles, contrasted sharply with the official discourse that Valdés defended until the end. While he was one of the principal architects of migration control, ideological surveillance, and punishment of dissent, part of his family chose to live outside the model he helped impose.
During the Island-wide protests of 11 July 2021 [’11J’], Valdés was involved in one of the most uncomfortable episodes of his long political career when he was booed in Palma Soriano. Amid social tensions and the deployment of repressive forces, his presence in the streets, intended by the government to project control and authority, provoked hostile reactions from citizens.
Far from being welcomed as a historic figure, some demonstrators responded with shouts, insults, and open rejection. The episode, quickly silenced by the official press, was significant not only because it reflected the loss of fear in public spaces, but also because it showed one of the regime’s most feared men confronting, face to face and without intermediaries, the popular discontent that he himself had helped suppress for decades.
Official propaganda will now seek to cement the image of an “exemplary fighter,” a man of “absolute loyalty,” and a “defender of sovereignty.” Outside that epic narrative, the legacy of Ramiro Valdés Menéndez is another: that of a leader who decisively contributed to turning repression into State policy and fear into a form of government.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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Bruno Rodriguez denounces “a total blockade, akin to a military one” while the US “openly calls for the subversion of the constitutional order”
Archive photo of Bruno Rodríguez at the opening of the Cuban Embassy in Washington. / Cubadebate
14ymedio, Havana, June 21, 2026 / The Cuban Government has made Marco Rubio the primary target of its propaganda offensive against Washington. This Saturday, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez again accused the US Secretary of State of lying, concealing the consequences of the sanctions and, above all, of contradicting President Donald Trump.
“When the US Secretary of State speaks of incompetence in Cuba, one would have to ask him why he lies chronically and contradicts the President of the United States and his spokesperson,” Rodriguez wrote on X.
For months, Havana’s propaganda apparatus has been attempting to portray Trump as a leader manipulated by Rubio and by Cuban-American politicians from Florida. According to this narrative, the president would not be the main party responsible for the measures against the Island, but rather the victim of the deceits of a subordinate obsessed with bringing down the Cuban regime.
The official State newspaper Granma went as far as stating, last November, that Trump was “being used, led and steered by his close associate Marco Rubio.” In other articles, the Communist Party newspaper has portrayed the Secretary of State as the operator who “tightens the screws” of US policy and drags the president towards a confrontation that he supposedly does not fully understand. continue reading
Even more uncomfortable for the regime is that this external pressure has forced it to dismantle some of the bureaucratic obstacles which Cubans themselves have for decades identified as the “internal blockade.”
Rodriguez himself has now revived that formula by accusing Rubio of denying the existence of “a total fuel blockade” which, according to the foreign minister, the White House does acknowledge. The post casts the Secretary as the architect of a meticulous plan to prevent the arrival of oil, spare parts for thermoelectric plants, tourism investment and technology for mining.
However, the argument contains a contradiction that is difficult to conceal. The main measures that Rodriguez attributes to Rubio’s manoeuvres were not adopted behind Trump’s back, but were signed, endorsed or publicly deployed by the president himself as instruments of pressure against Havana. Even more uncomfortable for the regime is that this external pressure has forced it to dismantle some of the bureaucratic obstacles, prohibitions and restrictions which Cubans themselves have for decades identified as the “internal blockade.”
Havana’s insistence on separating the two officials serves another purpose. It allows the conflict to be presented as the result of the personal obsession of a Cuban-American politician, thus sidestepping any debate about the regime’s own responsibility for the economic deterioration.
Rodriguez lists the hardships caused by the sanctions, but says nothing about the decisions taken over decades by the Cuban authorities. He makes no mention, for example, of the billions spent on building hotels while the thermoelectric plants aged without adequate maintenance, the water system collapsed and the housing stock continued to deteriorate.
The foreign minister also makes no reference to the workings of Gaesa, which controls hotels, banks, ports, hard-currency stores, petrol stations, remittances and a large share of foreign trade.
The emblem of that policy is Havana’s Torre K, the tallest hotel in Cuba, linked to the military conglomerate Gaesa. The 42-storey building with some 600 rooms was erected in the midst of one of the worst economic crises in the Island’s recent history and remains practically empty.
Hotel occupancy had already fallen to 21.5% during the first half of 2025, long before Trump signed, in January 2026, the executive order to intensify pressure on Havana following the capture of Nicolas Maduro in Caracas – the Cuban regime’s principal benefactor. Cuba closed that year with a mere 1.8 million visitors, compared with the 4.7 million recorded in 2018. Despite the collapse in tourism, the State continued to prioritise property and hotel investment over essential sectors such as agriculture, industry, housing and electricity generation.
The foreign minister also makes no reference to the workings of Gaesa, the conglomerate controlled by the Armed Forces that dominates hotels, banks, ports, hard-currency stores, petrol stations, remittances and a large share of foreign trade. Its accounts are not public, it is not subject to citizen oversight, and its real weight in the economy remains hidden even from many state institutions.
Rodriguez also presents Cupet as a company with the infrastructure and capabilities needed to manage fuel supplies. But he offers no explanation of how a supposedly efficient state company allowed the country to reach a state of chronic shortage, with deteriorated refineries and near-total dependence on political benefactors such as Venezuela, Mexico and Russia.
Havana appears to trust that it can pit Trump against his own Secretary of State, convincing the president that Rubio exploits Cuba policy for his own ends.
US sanctions undoubtedly aggravate the crisis and reduce the possibilities of importing oil, obtaining credit or carrying out international transactions. However, that pressure alone does not explain the empty hotels, the lack of transparency at Gaesa, agricultural unproductivity or the decades of neglect of the electricity infrastructure.
By attributing the entire disaster to Rubio, the regime avoids answering the accusation that most unsettles it. The incompetence denounced by Washington does not consist merely in the inability to obtain fuel, but in having built a centralised, monopolistic economy that privileges the business interests of the ruling elite over the needs of citizens.
Havana appears to trust that it can pit Trump against his own Secretary of State, convincing the president that Rubio exploits Cuba policy for his own ends. So far, however, there is no sign whatsoever of a rift between the two. What does exist is a country where food, transport and electricity are in short supply, while the Government keeps its monopolies intact and points towards Washington every time anyone asks where Cuba’s resources have gone.
Translated by GH.
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The fuel crisis and the disappearance of state-run routes turn every journey between San Jose de las Lajas and Guines into a battle
14ymedio, Julio César Contreras, San José de las Lajas (Mayabeque), 21 June 2026 / Although Fernando and Marianne were both born and raised in Guines, they met at the old train station in San Jose de las Lajas, in the daily struggle to travel back to their municipality. The two often find themselves together beneath the potholed roof of the platform, where no locomotive whistle is heard any more, nor the screech of carriages on rails. In their place predominate the resigned conversations of those waiting, the shouts of private taxi drivers calling out their destinations, and the murmur of a crowd that seems to have taken up permanent residence there.
The old railway terminal has become a kind of improvised refuge for travellers caught between the lack of fuel, the disappearance of state-run routes, and the constant rise in the cost of private transport. The rails still cut across the ground, but they jut up through the grass like a relic of better times. Sitting on the walls of the building, dozens of people wait under the midday sun with shopping bags, backpacks, plastic buckets, and even sacks of root vegetables. Some have been there for hours.
“With all this fuel shortage, even private cars are nowhere to be seen. Sometimes hours go by without anything appearing for us to get on,” says Marianne.
A specialist at the Mayabeque Electric Company, the young woman admits that she can rarely complete her full working hours. The problem is not the work itself, but getting home.
The young woman admits that she can rarely complete her full working hours
“After two in the afternoon it’s practically impossible to get on anything heading to Guines. Right now there’s only one lorry leaving from there at six in the morning, which is the same one I take at midday. If I miss that chance I have to pay 600, 700, even 1,000 pesos for a car. At that rate my salary wouldn’t last me a week, and it’s 5,200 pesos that have to cover everything for the whole month.”
As she speaks, she watches the road anxiously. Every time a cloud of dust appears or the engine of some vehicle is heard, several people leap to their feet thinking that the lorry has finally arrived. Almost always it is a false alarm.
The same scenes repeat themselves every day at the station. / 14ymedio
The waiting has something of a collective ritual about it. An elderly woman continue reading
shields herself from the sun with a red umbrella, worn out by the years. A young man holds a bicycle wheel he has just repaired. Several students in uniform sit chatting on their backpacks. Near them, a pregnant woman searches for shade while shifting the weight of her body. All share the same uncertainty.
The most the sole employee who remains in the old building can do is try to manage the queue.
“In their desperation to get on, people resort to the law of the strongest, pushing and shoving included”
“In the end, there’s no point getting in last, because when the lorry arrives, people in their desperation to get on resort to the law of the strongest, pushing and shoving included,” Marianne complains, growing worried as she realises she should already be on her way home. “Today I really can’t take a shared taxi. I’ve got just enough money.”
The same scenes repeat themselves every day. When a lorry adapted for passengers finally shows up, people cluster around the door even before the vehicle has finished stopping. Boarding becomes a silent competition where every second counts. No one wants to be left behind to face several more hours of uncertainty.
When it comes to economic hardship, Fernando has his own stories.
“I was moved by an elderly woman who had just asked me for 100 pesos to make up her fare. In just a few days the cost has gone up four times, from 200 to 500 pesos. If the driver arrives today and charges more, there’s no choice but to pay whatever he asks. It’s true that diesel is hard to come by, but it’s also true that we poor people are being squeezed from every direction.”
Fernando travels daily to San Jose to care for his father, bedridden with a chronic illness. Every journey brings an added worry for his budget.
A trained industrial engineer now working for himself, Fernando travels daily to San Jose to care for his father, bedridden with a chronic illness. Every journey brings an added worry for his budget.
It is lunchtime and in front of the terminal, several kiosks are selling pizzas and soft drinks. Few people, however, go up to buy anything. For most, every peso must be kept back for transport. Eating has become a secondary expense when there is a chance that the next journey might cost even more.
“From five daily bus routes that at one point existed between Guines and San Jose, we’ve ended up with none,” Fernando recalls. “The worst of it is that in this country, things that disappear never come back. I myself am lucky enough to earn more than any professional’s salary, and yet I can’t afford to hire a taxi regularly, not even to ride one throughout the whole week.”
Many workers leave in the small hours to guarantee their return journey / 14ymedio
The transport crisis has ended up reshaping habits, schedules, and even family relationships. Many workers leave in the small hours to guarantee their return journey. Others have cut back on visits to sick relatives or have given up jobs that involve moving between municipalities. The distance between Guines and San Jose de las Lajas has not changed on the map, but for those who depend on public transport it seems today far greater than it did a few years ago.
The distance between Guines and San Jose de las Lajas has not changed on the map, but for those who depend on public transport it seems far greater today
Both Fernando and Marianne are working out ways to travel less and less. Logic has won out over desire.
“State buses are already out of service and the price of fares in private cars is going to keep rising without limit. So the best thing you can do is go as little as possible beyond the area where you live, because even with the money in your hand you can’t be sure of getting where you’re going in peace.”
As she speaks, the long-awaited lorry finally appears. The crowd gets to its feet almost all at once. Conversations break off, shopping bags change hands, and the queue dissolves into disorder within seconds. At the old train station in San Jose de las Lajas, where trains stopped coming years ago, there are still people waiting. They are no longer waiting for a train. They are waiting for something far more basic: the chance to get home.
Translated by GH.
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The study by Sergio Arboleda University reveals that vaccines promised by Havana and a rice export project never materialized.
Havana seeks to replicate in Colombia a model of influence already applied in Venezuela and Mexico. / Estudios Revolución
14ymedio, Madrid, June 21, 2026 — During the government of Gustavo Petro, the Cuban regime expanded its influence over various Colombian institutions through cooperation agreements in sectors such as health, agriculture, education, and culture, according to an investigation by the Cuba Program of Sergio Arboleda University, based in Bogotá.
The study, titled The Silent Co-optation of the Colombian State by the Cuban Regime During the Government of Gustavo Petro, argues that these ties are part of a strategy of gradual interference by Havana, publicly presented as “bilateral cooperation.”
The research, which began in 2025, has already produced two installments, with a third containing the complete findings currently in preparation. Sergio Ángel, director of the Cuba Program, explained in an interview with Martí Noticias that the team requested information from various government agencies through formal public information requests.
One of the most significant findings concerns the 2,000 yellow fever vaccines that the Cuban regime announced it would donate to Colombia continue reading
during a public health crisis.
“One out of every three institutions in Colombia entered into some type of agreement with some type of Cuban institution,” Ángel stated, describing the figure as “alarming” when compared with previous governments and after analyzing the content of the collaborations.
The researcher noted that the rapprochement between Bogotá and Havana was less visible than in other countries in the region because Colombia did not receive the usual Cuban medical missions during these four years. Nevertheless, ties developed through other programs and institutional agreements.
One of the most significant findings concerns the 2,000 yellow fever vaccines that the Cuban regime announced it would donate to Colombia during a public health crisis. The offer was publicized by the Cuban Embassy and publicly celebrated by Colombia’s then-Foreign Minister, Laura Sarabia.
However, a response from the Ministry of Health obtained by the researchers confirmed that the vaccines never arrived. The Cuban Embassy also provided no explanation when questioned by the newspaper El Espectador, according to Ángel.
For the director of the Cuba Program, the announcement allowed Havana to project an image of solidarity and create the appearance of reciprocal cooperation, even though the aid never materialized.
“What matters is not sending the vaccines, but demonstrating that they have a cooperative relationship,” Ángel said. In his view, such announcements serve to justify the subsequent transfer of Colombian resources to the Island.
The investigation also examined an alleged export of 300 tons of Colombian rice to Cuba
Colombia shipped a 100-ton cargo of humanitarian aid from Cartagena containing non-perishable food, medicines, hospital supplies, solar panels, electrical materials, and household goods. The operation was managed by the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation.
“There is no reciprocity in this type of relationship,” Ángel argued, maintaining that the Cuban regime obtains resources, diplomatic support, and political legitimacy in exchange for contributions that, in some cases, amount only to propaganda announcements.
The investigation also examined an alleged export of 300 tons of Colombian rice to Cuba. The Rural Development Agency promoted the operation on its social media accounts and presented it as a commercial opportunity for producers in the Meta department.
However, an official response indicated that the Cuban importer was never authorized, meaning the export never actually took place. Despite this, according to Ángel, the Colombian producers received the corresponding payment.
“Who paid for that rice?” the researcher asked. According to the study, the funds may have come from the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation, which is attached to the Presidency.
The publication coincides with the second round of Colombia’s presidential election taking place this Sunday
The case, he added, suggests that an operation presented as a commercial export may have ended up diverting Colombian public funds for unknown purposes, while the Cuban regime obtained propaganda benefits without bearing the cost of the purchase.
Another agreement examined involves Cuban participation in CampeSENA, a program of the National Learning Service aimed at farmers and rural workers. Ángel questioned why Cuba, a country that imports most of the food it consumes and is experiencing a severe agricultural crisis, is being presented as an “agro-industrial reference” for Colombia.
The study also identifies collaborations in education and culture, although details will be included in the third installment. The researchers state that several government agencies responded incompletely and that they had to file additional requests and legal actions to obtain the information.
Ángel argues that Petro’s government represented only the first stage of Cuba’s strategy in Colombia. According to his analysis, Havana seeks to reproduce a model of influence already implemented in Venezuela and Mexico, based on political alliances, state agreements, and economic assistance.
The publication coincides with the second round of Colombia’s presidential election taking place this Sunday. More than 41 million citizens have been called to choose Gustavo Petro’s successor between left-wing candidate Iván Cepeda, who represents continuity with the current administration, and right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella. According to the study’s authors, the outcome will also determine whether the agreements established with Havana during the past four years are maintained or reviewed.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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Washington’s criticism, which demands much deeper changes, contrasts with the enthusiastic assessment of Mexico’s Sheinbaum.
Havana has once again resorted to a “typical strategy” of announcing “supposed reforms to create the illusion of a commitment to change.” / 14ymedio
14ymedio, Havana, June 20, 2026 — The United States described the economic reforms approved this Thursday by the Cuban regime as “smoke signals” and called for much deeper political and economic changes. Washington’s reaction contrasts with the support expressed by Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, who considered the opening to be an “important change.”
“These gradual ‘economic reforms’ are modest, long overdue, and ultimately amount to superficial smoke signals from the Cuban regime,” a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department told AFP.
U.S. authorities believe that Havana has once again resorted to a “typical strategy” of announcing “supposed reforms to create the illusion of a commitment to change, only to quickly reverse them whenever the regime’s total control appears threatened.”
Washington demanded “much more substantial economic and political reforms that make Cuba attractive to investors” and that provide its citizens with “the freedom, dignity, and opportunities they deserve,” added the official, whose identity was not disclosed.
The reaction is a cold shower for Havana, which presented the 176 measures as a profound economic transformation while insisting that the Government will not abandon socialism or allow the market to replace continue reading
state planning.
Sheinbaum offered her support to Havana, although Mexico has complied with Washington’s demand not to send fuel to Cuba.
Among the proposals are the entry of private banks, direct investment in Cuban businesses by citizens living abroad, the possibility for a single owner to manage more than one company, and the elimination of the current limit of 100 employees for small and medium-sized private enterprises (mipymes).
The package also opens the door to the sale of state-owned properties to individuals and legal entities, domestic or foreign, and to the transformation of some public enterprises into commercial corporations with capital participation. However, the timelines, legal mechanisms, and specific conditions for implementing many of these measures remain unknown. Their similarity to Russia’s transition has raised concerns about a concealed appropriation of state assets by members of the current regime’s leadership.
Prime Minister Manuel Marrero stated during the extraordinary session of the National Assembly that the market will be recognized as “an instrument for the efficient allocation of resources,” an unusual formulation in official Cuban discourse. Meanwhile, Miguel Díaz-Canel made clear that the changes do not represent a break with the political model. “We are not renouncing socialism,” the ruler said before lawmakers unanimously approved the program.
While Washington received the measures with skepticism, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum praised the regime’s decision on Friday. “It is an important change in a decision that Cubans themselves are making to open their economy,” the president said during her daily press conference.
Sheinbaum particularly highlighted the possibility of attracting private capital and resources from emigrants. “They are doing it for investment, even calling on Cubans who left the Island long ago to invest in Cuba,” she noted.
The Mexican president also offered her government’s support to Mexican companies interested in participating in the opening. Her reaction maintains the line of political and economic support that Mexico has extended to Havana despite increased pressure from the United States, although it has complied with Washington’s demand not to send fuel to Cuba.
The former ambassador recalled that previous partial-opening processes ended up being halted by the official structures themselves.
A very different view was expressed by Ricardo Pascoe Pierce, who served as Mexico’s ambassador to Cuba between 2000 and 2002. The diplomat acknowledged that the measures could represent “a very radical transformation of the Cuban economy” and pave the way toward a market economy, but he doubted that the state apparatus would allow genuine competition.
“The real test is whether state enterprises will truly accept the existence of competition, a genuinely open market,” Pascoe said in an interview with W Radio.
The former ambassador recalled that previous partial liberalization processes were ultimately blocked by the official structures themselves. “The companies that have been created have always been successful, and the reaction of state enterprises is to prevent their continuation,” he explained.
Pascoe said that any real change will depend on whether Havana fulfills its promises and grants autonomy to businesses. He also questioned the possibility of attracting the necessary capital while the current political and legal system remains unchanged. “Who is going to invest under those conditions when there is no legal certainty?” he asked.
The U.S. response confirms that Havana’s economic concessions alone will not be sufficient to bring about a thaw with the Trump administration. Washington is demanding not only greater market liberalization but also political transformations that the Cuban regime has not included in its program.
For that reason, Trump recalled in an interview one day after the announcement of the reform package that he still considered “possible” a U.S. intervention in Cuba similar to the one that led to the capture, on January 3, of then-president Nicolás Maduro.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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More than a hundred residents marched in Centro Habana, while in other neighbourhoods barricades went up and rubbish bins burned
Remains of a rubbish bin set on fire during Friday’s protests in Regla, Havana. /
14ymedio, Havana, 20 June 2026 / After more than 40 hours without electricity, more than a hundred residents took to the streets on Friday afternoon to protest in the San Leopoldo neighbourhood, in Centro Habana.
“They set fire to things right around the corner and everything,” one protester said in a video circulating on social media. “The police came with the ‘securocrats’ and they put the power back on,” she added, though it was cut again within minutes. “The situation we are living through in this country is unbearable and unsustainable.”
The footage shows entire families gathered in the street, in the area around Calle Rayo, between Zanja and San Jose. Some residents remained on pavements and balconies, while dozens of people occupied the roadway demanding answers from the authorities, banging their pots and pans.
“There are children, there are elderly people, and we have no way to cook,” one woman declared. Other protesters chanted “Freedom!” and expressed their rejection of the Government, in a protest that began over the lack of power but quickly took on a political tone. For a moment the gathering recalled the ’11J’ protests of 11 July 2021, with residents marching together, apparently in the direction of the Havana Capitol building.
For a moment the gathering recalled the protests of 11J, with residents marching together, apparently in the direction of the Havana Capitol building.
An increased police presence was reported in the area, though at the time of publication there was no confirmed information on arrests or continue reading
confrontations.
Likewise, during the night simultaneous protests were recorded across several municipalities of the capital. 14ymedio confirmed protests in the municipality of Regla, which have been recurring daily over the past week. On Friday, rubbish bins were overturned and set alight. The previous Thursday, around thirty residents demonstrated outside the headquarters of the Communist Party. Although the Municipal Sanitation Services removed the bins to prevent them from being set on fire, waste continues to pile up in the streets and serves as fuel for the bonfires. Residents of the area confirm that, following the protests, the duration of the blackouts has been reduced.
On Friday, in another neighbourhood within the same municipality of Regla, after 72 hours without electricity, a group of residents blocked the street and gathered in broad daylight to bang pots and pans. Although the protest did not reach the intensity of those recorded in Centro Habana, police arrived quickly at the scene and shortly afterwards the electricity supply was restored, according to a report by CubaNet.
Among the most tense protests of the night was one that took place in the central area of Buena Vista, in the municipality of Playa, where dozens of residents gathered and burned rubbish bins in the street while banging pots, pans, and metal objects, demanding amid shouts that the power be restored.
Notable among the protesters was the presence of women and children, who threw combustible items onto the fire while striking any piece of metal within reach with force.
The situation was equally tense in Centro Habana, on Calle Escobar, between Neptuno and Concordia, where a group of residents lit bonfires to block the road. In the videos circulating online, the presence of women and children among the protesters stands out; they threw combustible items onto the fire while striking any piece of metal within reach with force. The police, who were watching without intervening, did not stop the minors from surrounding the officers while continuing to bang their pots.
Other spontaneous protests were reported in San Miguel del Padron, where residents burned tyres in the street after more than 24 hours of blackout. In El Cotorro, several rubbish bins were also set on fire. According to videos circulating on social media, in Barbosa, an area of the municipality of Playa bordering La Lisa, a number of protesters lit bonfires on Calle 23.
Protests have spread across different parts of the country as the duration of the blackouts has increased, in some cases exceeding 30 and 40 consecutive hours in the capital. Combined with the summer heat, food is spoiling and disease-carrying insects are proliferating. The prolonged power cuts are also affecting the supply of drinking water and the functioning of public services, including hospitals. Indignation increasingly appears to be overcoming fear of reprisals.
Indignation increasingly appears to be overcoming fear of reprisals.
In the early hours of Friday, after a week of consecutive blackouts lasting more than 24 hours, residents of the Valle Grande community in La Lisa – a neighbourhood surrounded by Ministry of the Interior and State Security installations – took to the streets and banged pots and pans until the electricity was restored, according to a report by 14ymedio.
Last Thursday, residents of Alamar took to the streets to protest in broad daylight after 28 hours without power, according to information from Alas Tensas. After a police deployment that cordoned off the area, the electricity came back on.
According to the information bulletin issued by the Electrical Union (UNE), a deficit of 1,989 megawatts (MW) was reported on Friday at 20:50 hours. Saturday night is also ex
pected to be difficult. With nine thermoelectric units out of service – among them the Antonio Guiteras plant, which has left the grid on 14 occasions so far this year – and 1,203 MW offline due to fuel shortages at distributed generation plants, an impact of 1,935 MW is estimated for peak demand hours, against a national demand of 3,050 MW.
Translated by GH.
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The US president says that Marco Rubio plays a central role in the policy towards Havana
The question about Cuba came immediately after Trump claimed that the United States is “running Venezuela.” / Screenshot / Axios
14ymedio, Havana, June 19, 2026 / Donald Trump considers it “possible” that a US operation in Cuba could unfold similarly to the military incursion that led to the capture of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. The US president left open this possibility during an interview on Thursday with The Axios Show.
“Do you see the operation in Cuba unfolding in a similar way?” journalist Marc Caputo asked, referring to the U.S. operation that culminated in the arrest of the Venezuelan president in January. “Possibly. It’s possible,” Trump replied.
The question about Cuba came immediately after Trump asserted that the United States is “running Venezuela” together with the authorities who remain in the country. The president immediately justified his response by citing the geographical proximity of Cuba and Venezuela, in contrast to the distance separating the US from Iran, the scene of another of the military operations he claimed responsibility for continue reading
during the conversation.
“Venezuela has oil. Cuba doesn’t. Cuba has good properties and a beautiful coastline.”
“Well, there’s something else. Those places are close. On the other hand, if you look at Iran, it’s a very long trip. I’ve flown to that area several times, for reasons unrelated to this, but it’s an 18-hour flight, that’s a long time. Venezuela is relatively close and Cuba is just a hop, skip, and a jump,” he said.
The president also compared the resources of Cuba and Venezuela. “Venezuela has oil. Cuba doesn’t. Cuba has good properties and a beautiful coast,” he declared, reducing the island’s economic appeal to its territory and coastline.
After discussing a possible operation, Trump asserted that Secretary of State Marco Rubio would play a central role in the policy toward Havana. “We’re going to get Marco involved with Cuba. Cuba is very eager to talk,” he said.
When asked about the strong support he receives among Cuban Americans, Trump stated that approximately 95% of that community had voted for him. “I love them,” he added after Caputo mentioned that a significant portion of his political base is among Cuban exiles.
Axios reported that Trump declined to set a timeline for potential action on Cuba, stating only that his position remains “flexible.” The report also indicated that Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants and a leading advocate of a maximum pressure policy against the Havana regime, is “deeply involved.”
“We’re going to get Marco involved with Cuba. Cuba is very eager to talk.”
The outlet itself noted that Trump has not authorized an invasion and that, at least publicly, he has expressed his preference for a peaceful transition to a free Cuba. However, his words constitute one of his most direct allusions to the possibility of replicating the model applied in Venezuela on the island.
In the interview, Trump again boasted about the speed of the operation against Maduro. “Look at Venezuela. It was all over in 48 minutes,” he stated. He later insisted that U.S. troops entered the country in less favorable weather conditions than anticipated and that the mission concluded in that same amount of time, despite Venezuela having a large number of soldiers.
The comparison comes after several reports about Washington’s preparations for a possible collapse of the Cuban regime. In late May, Axios revealed that Washington had analyzed various military response plans for a scenario of chaos on the island, which some officials considered possible as early as this summer.
Meanwhile, the administration has intensified economic and political pressure on Havana, with the stated intention of depriving the regime of resources. The capture of Maduro and the disruption of oil shipments from Venezuela have exacerbated Cuba’s energy crisis, characterized by prolonged blackouts, fuel shortages, and a sharp contraction in economic activity.
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Díaz-Canel stated that Cuba “is living through the most difficult hours of this century, and we have the historic responsibility to save it.”
Díaz-Canel stressed that under the current circumstances, “it is time to change everything that needs to be changed in order to move forward.” / EFE
14ymedio/EFE, Havana, June 19, 2026 – Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel denied on Thursday that the package of economic reforms recently approved on the Island is a response to pressure from the United States, asserting instead that it is a “sovereign” decision by his country.
“We are not doing this because of pressure from the Yankees, but because we have reached a moment of maturity and reflection,” Díaz-Canel emphasized in the speech that closed the extraordinary session of the National Assembly of People’s Power, where the measures were approved after receiving the green light from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba the day before.
Díaz-Canel maintained that “Cuba decides without any permission other than that of its people” and “sovereignly designs and proposes the changes it needs.” continue reading
Díaz-Canel maintained that “Cuba decides without any permission other than that of its people” and “sovereignly designs and proposes the changes it needs”
He also reiterated that his government is willing to discuss all possible issues with Washington “without hatred, but without fear,” adding that this willingness has been “historically proven.”
The president added that “Cuba is ready for a civilized and respectful relationship that benefits both peoples,” and said, “if they truly want to help the Cuban people, let them live.”
He also described the energy blockade and the latest U.S. sanctions against the island as a “barbaric, undeserved, and unbearable punishment,” worsened by what he called the United States’ “real, daily” financial persecution of his country.
On the same day, U.S. Vice President JD Vance said that if the Cuban authorities make “smart decisions,” Washington could have “a much better relationship” with the Island.
Díaz-Canel stated that Cuba “is living through the most difficult hours of this century, and we have the historic responsibility to save it.” He also stressed that under the current circumstances, “it is time to change everything that needs to be changed in order to move forward.”
Regarding the package of measures, he said that “it had to be done anyway,” although he acknowledged that “it is not easy” because the changes will be implemented “under very complex conditions.”
Regarding the package of measures, he said that “it had to be done anyway,” although he acknowledged that “it is not easy” because the changes will be implemented “under very complex conditions”
The economic reforms first announced last Friday by Díaz-Canel include allowing “new actors” into the tourism sector, promoting foreign direct investment, and introducing changes intended to stimulate agriculture and foreign trade, while decentralizing decision-making in order to grant greater “autonomy” to state-owned enterprises and municipalities.
Since last January, the Trump administration of has imposed an oil blockade on the Island and has threatened to “take control” of Cuba to force economic and political changes. Cuba has responded that it will defend its sovereignty and has accused Washington of preparing a military action against it.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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The academic spent ten hours under arrest and will provide more details this Friday.
This Thursday marked two years since the protest that has left the academic awaiting trial. / Facebook
EFE/14ymedio, Havana, June 19, 2026 – Academic and dissident Alina Bárbara López Hernández was once again detained this Thursday in Matanzas during her customary peaceful protest held on the 18th of every month, according to a family source.
“Alina has just been detained in Parque de la Libertad while attempting to exercise her right to peaceful protest,” confirmed Cecilia Borroto López, the intellectual’s daughter, on social media.
Borroto also indicated that her mother was allegedly taken to a police station located in the Playa district of Matanzas.
Borroto also indicated that her mother was allegedly taken to a police station located in the Playa district of Matanzas
Later that night, Borroto reported on social media that the academic “was released after ten hours” and advised that on Friday she herself would provide more details about the detention.
Hours earlier, the historian, essayist, and editor had published a message on social media commenting on the package of economic reforms approved the previous day by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba.
“They are trying to buy time. That is an old stratagem of the ruling group,” López commented, arguing that the proposals are “more or less the same” as those put forward but never implemented nineteen years ago, referring to the “Updating of the Cuban Economic and Social Model” promoted in 2007 by then-President Raúl Castro. At that time, the proposals were not known in such detail; the measures ultimately do involve economic changes, but not political ones.
“So much reform, and today they took away Alina Bárbara López Hernández under arrest. So much reform without releasing the political prisoners. So much reform, and repression continues. This is the real fraudulent change,” commented activist Adriana Ryukiyoi. continue reading
The academic has been detained several times in recent years for carrying out symbolic protests, and as a result of those actions she was sentenced at the end of 2023 to pay a fine for the offense of disobedience, which she refused to do.
The academic has been detained several times in recent years for carrying out symbolic protests, and as a result of those actions she was sentenced at the end of 2023 to pay a fine for the offense of disobedience, which she refused to do
She is also awaiting trial since late 2025 after prosecutors charged her with the alleged offenses of disobedience, contempt, and assault in connection with a detention that occurred exactly two years ago yesterday, on June 18, 2024. Prosecutors are seeking a sentence of four years of corrective labor.
The events occurred when López and fellow academic and dissident Jenny Pantola, for whom prosecutors are seeking one year less of corrective labor, were traveling by taxi from Matanzas to Havana with the intention of participating in a protest event.
According to López, she asked about the legality of the detention and the reasons for it, to which a police officer responded with multiple acts of violence. Prosecutors, for their part, stated that it was López who struggled with and insulted the officers, and that the physical injuries alleged by both women “were not real.”
Translated by Regina Anavy
______________________
COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.
14ymedio, Madrid, June 21, 2026 / Cuban opposition leader Manuel Cuesta Morúa was released this Saturday after being detained, mistreated and threatened with death by State Security agents.
