Translating Cuba

“The Trump administration continues to target key sources of revenue for the illegitimate Cuban regime by imposing sanctions. We are also combating the regime’s evasion of sanctions,” the State Department emphasizes.

The regime must now resort to subterfuge and illegality just to obtain a small portion of the fuel entering the country, instead of controlling the entire market.

This statement was issued in the context of Washington’s offensive against fuel shipments intended for the state sector. On October 7, agencies of the Department of Homeland Security announced the seizure of 90 shipments of biodiesel, 71 at Port Everglades, Florida, and 19 in Houston, Texas. Their value was around $2.8 million, and their destination was the state-owned company Enetec, which was added to the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions list on July 13.

Washington’s acknowledgment confirms what this newspaper has been documenting since April, when the authorities began leasing state-owned gas stations to MSMEs* like Acapulco, in Nuevo Vedado, to dispense fuel purchased in the United States. It had been possible to establish since then that the Ticket platform, managed by Cimex, a corporation belonging to the Gaesa military conglomerate and sanctioned by OFAC, was already selling gasoline and diesel in dollars in Havana when only private businesses were permitted to import them from the United States.

A month later, this newspaper confirmed that Transmed vehicles and those of other state-owned companies were refueling at the former Shell station in Guanabacoa, using pumps leased by private operators, which U.S. regulations expressly prohibit.

In September, 14ymedio revealed this connection in a more disturbing way: the El Eficiente gas station, one block from Villa Marista, was supplying vehicles belonging to the state-owned Sepsa, trucks operated by the so-called Black Berets—special brigades of the Ministry of the Interior—and Suzuki motorcycles belonging to State Security. More than five months had passed since the last oil tanker carrying hydrocarbons had arrived in Cuba—the Anatoly Kolodkin, from Russia—and since the Minister of Energy and Mines, Vicente de la O Levy, had publicly declared: “We have absolutely no fuel oil; we have absolutely no diesel.”

Among the documents demonstrating this connection is an invoice dated September 21 from Cimex-Mariel to an Oro Negro service station for more than 23,000 liters of gasoline

Just a few weeks ago, an incident once again exposed this connection: a fire in a fuel tank at Azutecnia, a subsidiary of the state-owned Azcuba company, in Granma province. The official information does not specify what type of fuel burned or where it came from, but Cuba lacks the capacity to produce refined fuel from its domestic crude oil.

As of today, the Ticket platform, which continues to sell fuel at state-owned service stations, remains the most visible indication. Not only are gasoline and diesel sales still taking place in the provinces, but prices have also fallen over the past several months.

An investigation by ADN Cuba and Martí Noticias, published this Friday, has confirmed that Cimex purchases fuel from 21 suppliers, at least 16 of them MSMEs*, and resells it through its network of service stations, in addition to supplying the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. Among the documents demonstrating this connection is an invoice dated September 21 from Cimex-Mariel to an Oro Negro service station for more than 23,000 liters of gasoline. Cimex does not appear as a direct importer, but rather as a purchaser of fuel supplied by Cuban MSMEs.

From January through August of this year, the total value of petroleum products exported from the United States to the Island reached $231.74 million, an unprecedented figure in the entire history of trade relations between the two countries.

These specific figures did not prevent De la O Levy from stating in a recent interview with Reuters about those imports: “I would venture to say that the quantity entering the country does not even cover 3% of its fuel needs.”

“No Cuban state-owned company has managed to secure a fuel contract, whether for small or large quantities,” the minister said at the time.

*Micro, Small, Medium Enterprises

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Passenger journeys in Cuba have fallen by 75%, from the 781.8 million recorded in 2025 to an estimated 195.45 million this year

Even worse is the decline in journeys on buses for workers, which has reached 90% and takes on particularly serious significance when considered alongside figures from the National Office of Statistics and Information. In 2025, there were only 32.6 million such trips, following a sharp decline from just over 37 million the previous year. This year, the figure would fall to barely 3.2 million. Daily trips from Havana to the other provinces have dropped from 419 to just 11, while the number of national bus routes has fallen from 100 to only 21.

“Traditional public transportation is at one of the lowest points in its history,” Rodríguez Dávila summarized. He is one of the current government’s most highly regarded ministers because of his interactions with users on social media. The official told Reuters that the Island is working “at full speed on the construction of solar charging stations”—known as solineras—to change the energy source as quickly as possible. He said that 60 such facilities are expected to be established throughout the country.

The Island is working “at full speed on the construction of solar charging stations”—known as solineras—to change the energy source as quickly as possible

In the midst of the energy blockade, which began when the U.S. president prohibited shipments of crude oil to Cuba from any country in January 2026, the only fuel reaching the Island is precisely the fuel that private businesses purchase in the neighboring United States and that the State obtains in violation of export regulations. Under these circumstances, gasoline is a scarce commodity and, moreover, extremely expensive for individual consumers.

“These are families who cannot travel, people who cannot visit sick loved ones, and others who cannot get to a hospital. The underlying human drama of these shortages is complex,” Rodríguez Dávila said in the days leading up to the United Nations General Assembly vote on the resolution against the embargo, which the regime promotes every year and for which the United States is trying, more forcefully than ever, to secure a less unfavorable outcome than usual. This has triggered an exchange of accusations and propaganda campaigns on both sides that are more intense than in previous years.

Domestic freight transportation is expected to fall to around 20 million tons this year, slightly more than one-third of the 70 million tons transported in 2025

The minister also said that domestic freight transportation is expected to fall to around 20 million tons this year, slightly more than one-third of the 70 million tons transported in 2025.

The British news agency reported that the minister took journalists on a tour to present yellow electric tricycles owned by a state-run company that were sitting idle in a parking lot because there was no electricity available to charge them. “The frustrated taxi drivers expressed their dissatisfaction,” the report says, concluding with an account of Rodríguez Dávila grimacing as he acknowledged the situation. “These are the problems we have,” he said.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

“We learned from the Artemisa Tourism Delegation that there are non-state economic actors interested in taking over management of the complex,” it states confidently, while also acknowledging that “in fact, when speaking with some of the workers at the Soroa hotel, they have no clear idea of where the negotiations stand.”

“We learned from the Artemisa Tourism Delegation that there are non-state economic actors interested in taking over management of the complex”

The article devotes numerous paragraphs to encouraging investors to take an interest in an area with specific potential for ecotourism because of its natural attributes, a sector that offers tax and fiscal benefits to business owners. “The changes make it possible both to add new options to the business models already in place (joint ventures and management contracts) for tourism activities and to lease properties to foreign investors, Cubans residing abroad, and those living in the country,” El Artemiseño states, warning of the risks posed by the authorities’ inaction if they fail to implement the much-publicized 176 measures to transform the economy.

The article emphasizes the importance of restoring Soroa for the more than one hundred workers who have now had to be reassigned to other destinations, the new opportunities for tour guides and other tourism professionals who have received new authorizations to work independently of the State, and a series of other advantages. There are so many that they raise doubts about the private sector’s purported interest in managing the complex.

“If there is no prompt action on the established timetable to approve the model to be followed at the appropriate levels; if workers are kept in the dark about what is happening and how it will be done; if the property lacks the essential maintenance needed to prevent deterioration; and if the decision is pushed beyond the immediate present, the cost of reviving it will be high,” the report adds.

Soroa’s abandonment is far from recent. Although El Artemiseño indicates that the deterioration affects “the facilities that once offered unique experiences in those parts,” the turning point dates back to 2020. That year, 14ymedio visited the region to report on how a population that until then had depended on tourism, both directly and indirectly, had been profoundly disrupted by the closure of the borders.

Those who rented rooms, offered excursions or horseback rides, prepared meals, or even sold orchids—the result of widespread illegal cultivation—were then forced to reinvent themselves to the point of turning their land into vegetable gardens. This newspaper even interviewed a woman who had lost her job after the hotel closed and could not even find work cleaning houses. None of those interviewed was optimistic about escaping a predicament they had never faced before.

And they were not wrong. Despite the very slow and modest recovery in tourism following the reopening of the borders, visitor numbers plummeted, especially beginning in 2023. This continued until the final collapse in 2026, when only 450,353 international tourists arrived on the Island between January and August, 64.4% fewer than during the same period in 2025, which had already been a very bad year. The September figures will be released in a few days

As long as problems such as the lack of flights due to fuel shortages remain unresolved, along with shortages of electricity, water, and food supplies, which hotels can circumvent through investment, and the absence of managers for the facilities since most foreigners left because of the sanctions, the incentives that the press highlights for Cuban or foreign investors will do little good.

“The complexity of securing financing kept postponing the project until, in coordination with the small and medium-sized private company VitallCons, with which working ties already existed, it was decided to begin the project”

Nevertheless, the private sector is beginning to become, albeit on a very small scale for now, the national economy’s only lifeline. On Wednesday, the Las Tunas press reported on the restoration of the old railway station, which will be brought back to life as an intermodal terminal for trains, buses, and trucks, complete with a fuel station. “The complexity of securing financing kept postponing the project until, in coordination with the small and medium-sized private company VitallCons, with which working ties already existed, it was decided to begin the project,” the report explains.

The same has happened in the food sector with the Artemisa Poultry Company and Don Pereda, a medium-sized private company, which have joined forces in an association to reestablish the José Antonio Labrador farm. The facility recently suffered a shortage of animal feed, and after 29 days with no feed at all, it lost most of its poultry stock, while production fell from 28,000 eggs a day to just 38.

“With the guarantee of importing animal feed, the new management model takes responsibility for more than 80,000 laying hens, nearly 42,000 of them already adults, with the remainder being young hens awaiting their first laying cycle,” the report states. According to the article, wages have doubled, and incentive payments can reach 15,000 pesos, three times the monthly salary.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The Cuban draft bill keeps school administration in the hands of the State

This does not amount to authorizing the general opening of private schools. The Cuban draft bill keeps school administration in the hands of the State. The reform allows greater non-state economic participation around the education system, but does not establish general freedom to create independent schools.

In the political sphere, the provisions are equally explicit. Article 11 recognizes students’ right to form and freely express their opinions, to be heard, and to participate in decisions that affect them. However, the following article, which addresses their duties, requires them to “defend the principles of the Revolution, preserving national independence and security.” The document does not clarify how a conflict between these two provisions would be resolved or what would happen to a student who openly advocated political ideas opposed to socialism.

The draft bill also establishes ideological obligations for teachers. Article 14 stipulates that teaching and non-teaching staff must “defend the Socialist Homeland, the principles of the Revolution, and the values of Cuban society.” It also requires them to maintain their political and ideological preparation and systematically keep up to date on national and international events that affect their educational work. Another provision requires them to maintain ethical conduct on social media, without precisely defining the scope of that obligation.

The requirement of political loyalty has explicit precedents. In 2019, the then Deputy Minister of Higher Education, Martha del Carmen Mesa Valenciano, argued that university professors should act as activists for revolutionary policy. In her statement, published on the Ministry’s official website, she invoked Fidel Castro’s definition of the ideological role of educators and maintained that anyone who did not share that commitment should resign from university teaching.

For more than six decades, curricula, student organizations, and school activities have been linked to defending the regime

The new regulation also specifies its doctrinal foundations. Article 6 stipulates that the educational process will promote national values and ideals based on “Martíist, Fidelist, Marxist, and Leninist” thought. Article 50 also includes the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba among the bodies to which certain higher education institutions are subordinate.

This is not a case of political indoctrination only now arriving in Cuban schools. For more than six decades, curricula, student organizations, and school activities have been linked to defending the regime. The new draft bill performs a balancing act to bring these ideological requirements together in new legislation that also proclaims supposed individual rights and the “democratic and participatory” nature of education.

A comparison with other Latin American laws highlights the differences. In Argentina, Article 67 of the National Education Law recognizes teachers’ right to teach on the basis of academic freedom and freedom of instruction. In Uruguay, Article 11 of the General Education Law requires teachers to facilitate access to different sources of information, presenting a broad and balanced range of viewpoints so that students can form their own judgments.

Uruguayan legislation also stipulates that a plurality of opinions and the rational and democratic confrontation of knowledge and beliefs must be guaranteed. The Cuban draft bill, by contrast, does not establish an equivalent general guarantee of academic freedom, although it recognizes a degree of “academic autonomy” in specific activities, such as tutoring and academic supervision.

Another difference from much of Latin America concerns compulsory schooling. While Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay extend it through the completion of secondary education, the Cuban proposal maintains compulsory schooling from preschool through ninth grade. Subsequent levels are presented as a social aspiration that the State should promote, but not as an obligation for everyone.

Universities are not exempt from ideological requirements either. The proposal recognizes students’ right to participate in institutional management, but only within “agreed-upon degrees of relative autonomy.” Another provision makes that autonomy conditional on its consistency with “the principles of socialist society.”

The energy crisis has also endangered the day-to-day operation of educational institutions

In March of this year, the Technological University of Havana (Cujae) decided not to renew Professor Abel Tablada’s contract after he published critical comments about the Government’s economic decisions, according to the professor’s account. His departure sparked protests among students and professors in Cujae’s Faculty of Architecture.

Among the provisions favoring student rights are safeguards against school violence, reporting mechanisms, and protection against retaliation. However, many of these rights were already recognized in the 2025 Code of Children, Adolescents, and Youth. The future law develops the procedures and institutional responsibilities associated with these rights rather than establishing them for the first time.

The document also promises decent working conditions for teachers, school meals, teaching materials, accessibility, and technological resources, although it sets no quantified budgetary commitments to make these guarantees effective. The possibility of turning to business income and supplementary funding sources takes on particular importance in this context. In August, the Education Minister herself acknowledged that only 73% of teaching positions were filled and that in-person attendance throughout the school year could not be guaranteed.

The energy crisis has also endangered the day-to-day operation of educational institutions. In May, UNESCO warned that power outages, fuel shortages, and the deterioration of basic services threatened Cuban education by making it more difficult for students and teachers to attend school and for classes to proceed normally.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Alayn Daniel Blanco’s defection is the second reported this month and the third in less than 30 days. The previous reported defection was that of Carlos Adrián Hernández, who was part of the preliminary roster of the Cuban team that competed in the Under-15 World Cup held in Mexico during the first week of October. The pitcher also arrived in the Dominican Republic to begin training.

The previous reported defection was that of Carlos Adrián Hernández, who was part of the preliminary roster of the Cuban team that competed in the Under-15 World Cup

At the end of September, the departure of Leandro Forteza García, 19, was also reported. The pitcher from Sancti Spíritus was a member of the Cuban team that competed in the 2025 Under-18 World Cup in Japan. In three games in the tournament, he recorded two wins and one loss, with an earned run average of 3.36, in addition to striking out seven batters in 8.1 innings.

According to Francys Romero’s records, Forteza García is the eighth member of the World Cup team to have left the Island.

Another case was that of Richard Bouquet, a 17-year-old right-handed pitcher from Holguín, who left Cuba last July and came under the guidance of Bailli Baseball, an academy in the Dominican Republic founded by former Cuban baseball player Kenen Bailli, who played in the National Series and in the Major Leagues with Toronto.

Of that Cuban youth team that competed in Japan, the first to leave the country was left-handed pitcher César Morales, from Villa Clara, in July 2025. He began training in Santo Domingo under representation by the Wasserman agency. Marcos Fuentes, Alejandro Cairo, and Cristian Rojas followed in August of last year, while Javier Zambrano left in November.

One of the reasons is the low salaries, which amount to 3,500 pesos for a player competing in the National Series

The departure of these young players adds to the problems Cuban baseball has faced for years. On the one hand, it is estimated that of the more than 1,000 athletes who have left the Island over the past decade, at least 700 are young baseball players with promising futures. To a large extent, the lack of opportunities for growth and the limited prospects of achieving a better life force athletes to seek opportunities far from the Island. One reason is the low salaries, which amount to 3,500 pesos for players competing in the National Series and 8,500 for those in the Elite League, in a country where a carton of eggs can cost as much as 4,300 pesos.

Furthermore, sporting results are getting progressively worse. In the most recent World Baseball Classic, the team known as Team Asere delivered the worst performance in its history, failing even to qualify for the second round after being eliminated with two wins and two losses.

Previously, apart from the unexpected fourth-place finish achieved by the Cuban team in the most recent World Baseball Classic in 2023, the national team has recorded nothing but failures in the various international events in which it has competed. In the Premier 12 tournament, which brings together the world’s best teams, the team fell from sixth place in 2015 to second-to-last place (11th), tied with Puerto Rico, in 2024.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The authorization OFAC issued to Sherritt covers the sale, transportation, export, delivery, and payment of the fuel, and includes the supplier, banks, vessel operators, and insurers involved. The company expects the first shipment to set sail during this quarter of the year and says it is already “in the process of finalizing the initial fuel shipment.”

The company expects the first shipment to set sail during this quarter of the year and says it is already “in the process of finalizing the initial fuel shipment”

For the permit to be feasible, Sherritt signed a provisional agreement on September 23 with Moa Bay Mining Co., which holds a certified claim against the joint venture Moa Nickel — equally owned by Sherritt and the Cuban state-owned General Nickel Company — under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. Moa Bay now approves the shipments in exchange for fees to be paid by Sherritt or someone on its behalf, and agrees not to sue the authorized participants. Both parties also obtained another OFAC authorization to carry out the agreement, according to the statement.

These claims complicated the negotiations, but lawyers had already anticipated an agreement and believed that a legal solution could set a precedent to facilitate new U.S. investments in Cuba that also face lawsuits from former owners protected under the Helms-Burton Act.

In the same official announcement, Sherritt acknowledges that it continues to face limited liquidity and doubts about its ability to continue as a going concern. Its recovery depends on new financing and a recapitalization, neither of which is guaranteed. “The Corporation remains in active discussions with its lenders and potential sources of government and other strategic capital, including Gillon Capital.”

Gillon Capital belongs to a family of Texas businesspeople whose central figure, Ray Washburne, was appointed by Donald Trump in 2017 to head the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and subsequently became a member of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board.

Moa Bay now approves the shipments in exchange for fees to be paid by Sherritt or someone on its behalf, and agrees not to sue the authorized participants

When Gillon and Sherritt signed the nonbinding agreement in May, the Canadian mining company said at the time that the State and Treasury departments did not oppose Gillon’s negotiations and did not consider those discussions contrary to U.S. law, although any agreement would require their approval.

For his part, Cuban Energy and Mines Minister Vicente de la O Levy said in a recent interview with Reuters that he sees no problem with the possible purchase of Sherritt shares by U.S. businesspeople.

“We have always made it clear that what the U.S. company would be buying is shares in Sherritt, not in the joint venture,” he said, emphasizing: “The Canadian company is publicly traded, and any investor has the right to buy its shares.”

“But any restart would require discussions about how to supply fuel and spare parts, and also how to handle payments for exports and production inputs,” he said, referring to Washington’s sanctions as an obstacle to business. “If the intention is to resume nickel production, all those issues would need to be resolved.”

Following Executive Order 14404, signed by Donald Trump, which tightened sanctions against individuals and companies doing business linked to the Cuban state, Sherritt withdrew its direct stake in the joint venture on the Island on May 7. A few days later, the Canadian company announced that it was suspending its plan to exit Cuba and disclosed the preliminary agreement with Gillon Capital.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.