An Acquaintance Coordinated the Defections of Cuban Athletes Melissa Hurtado and Vanessa Godínez in France

The athlete says she left behind tobacco, kimonos and some belongings and boarded a train.

According to Hurtado, the plan was to slip away after participating in the Paris Grand Slam. / Facebook

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, September 7, 2026 — From the moment she boarded the flight that would take her to France, along with 14 other judokas as part of the training process, Melissa Hurtado knew it would be the last trip she would make with the Cuban team. “I already knew I wasn’t going to return,” the athlete says in videos posted to her Instagram account. More than three years after that January 21, she says that “this story was not easy.”

The woman maintains that the abandonment by Cuban athletes abroad is a story that “has no end.” In the first quarter of that year, 20 competitors took advantage of trips abroad to escape. Most significantly, among that group, led by Olympic medalist Idalis Ortiz and under the direction of Yordanis Arencibia, the judokas Vanessa Godínez (48 kilograms), Santa Virgen Romero (78 kg), Blanca Elena Torres (52 kg) and Lutmary García (63 kg) also defected in Paris.

According to Hurtado, the plan was to slip away after participating in the Paris Grand Slam. However, she learned that her teammate Vanessa Godínez also wanted to flee. They had to coordinate their plans and take advantage of their stay in Amiens, which was not easy.

“You couldn’t talk about that because you don’t know who is who, or whether someone is an informant who is going to tell the coach,” the judoka recounts. She had just won the gold medal after defeating continue reading

Switzerland’s Fabienne Kocher at the European Judo Open in Australia.

According to Hurtado, the plan was to slip away after participating in the Paris Grand Slam. However, she learned that her teammate Vanessa Godínez also wanted to flee

An acquaintance coordinated Hurtado and Godínez’s escape. According to her account, he warned her that if she did not do it, after her teammate left, everything “was going to get ugly.”

The woman recalls that on the day she defected, she left behind boxes of cigars that she had brought to sell and make some money on the Island, and later learned that “the coaches kept them.” The kimonos and some of her belongings “were divided up among the girls, and they did the right thing.”

She experienced tense moments on the day of the escape because her roommate, who knew nothing about it, would not fall asleep. “We left in the early morning,” she says, “without speaking French and without our suitcases.” Hurtado recalls that they walked for about 30 minutes to a train station. “There was a train leaving for Paris at 6:00 in the morning. It was bitterly cold.”

They boarded the train without knowing, “We didn’t even pay for the train. We didn’t know. If an inspector had caught us, they might even have fined us,” the athlete recounts.

The officials in charge of the training camp realized that the athletes had fled in the morning. “The FBI” (as she refers to the Cuban security agents) “broke down the door of the other girls who were left on the team.” They intimidated them “by saying that there was a group that had stayed” with them.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Four Months and an Endless Line To Get a Cuban Passport

Cuba’s energy crisis exacerbates delays in document preparation, and there are days when offices cannot serve a single applicant.

Identification, Immigration and Foreigners Office at 17th Street, in El Vedado (Havana). / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Natalia López Maya, Havana, September 7, 2026 – The day begins long before they open the doors of the Identification, Immigration and Foreigners Office on 17th Street in El Vedado. When dawn breaks, dozens of people are already waiting in the vicinity, and some have spent much of the morning there. Obtaining a Cuban passport has become another race of resistance within the crisis that the country is going through.

Waiting, moreover, does not guarantee that applicants can complete the procedure. If electricity does not arrive during the early hours of official business hours, the line may extend until mid-morning and end up dissolving without employees having attended to a single person.

To the problems of starting the process is added another, much more distressing: the preparation and delivery of passports currently involves about four months of delay, according to reports collected by 14ymedio. The situation particularly affects those who have planned trips, family reunions, or need to return abroad.

“I came to apply in mid-May and still nothing. Every time I ask what day the passports are being handed over, I realize that progress is very slow”

“I came to apply in mid-May and still nothing. Every time I ask what day the passports are being handed over, I realize that progress is very slow; there are weeks when the line doesn’t move a single day,” said a mother of two children who is continue reading

waiting for documents to travel to Brazil, where her husband is.

The problem is not new, though now deadlines have multiplied. In November 2022, this newspaper documented delays that were then around 30 business days, compared to the usual two weeks previously. An employee explained that the offices did not prepare the documents there and depended on their transfer in vehicles of Sepsa, a company then responsible for transporting them under custody and already suffering fuel shortages.

Four years later, the energy crisis has added new obstacles to an already deteriorating system. Power outages make it difficult to reach the public and add to the transportation and resource shortages affecting many state agencies.

“I came to Havana to visit my mother and my passport was damaged because we had some leaks in the house, so I requested it again and I have been waiting for more than three months for the new one and nothing”, a young Cuban naturalized Spanish and settled in Seville tells 14ymedio. His stay on the Island, which was supposed to be temporary, is prolonged while waiting for the document.

A few meters from the 17th Street office, a parking attendant in a red vest guards several cars and electric motorcycles while watching the crowd grow daily. “I counted more than 300 people here one morning. Since there is so much delay, the line is getting bigger and the people look more desperate,” he says.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Official Statistics on Femicides in Cuba “Reflect the Delay in Judicial Processes,” Expert Admits

Specialists warn that the 173 cases of sexual violence tried in 2025 are highly unrepresentative of reality

More than 12% of women aged 15 to 49 worldwide have been victims of physical or sexual violence by a partner or ex-partner in the past year. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Dariel Pradas (IPS Cuba), Havana, September 7, 2026 / Cuban courts closed 49 cases last year of women over 15 years of age “killed for reasons of gender,” representing a rate of 1.19 per 100,000 women and a decrease compared to the 76 trials in 2024 and the 60 in 2023, the island’s government reported in August.

“That statistic doesn’t give me any real triumphs in terms of a decrease in the problem, but rather a reflection of the delay in judicial processes. These are not the deaths of 2025,” Arlín Pérez, a law professor at the University of Havana with more than 30 years of experience in the courts, told IPS.

According to Pérez, the cases considered tried in 2025 are not about murders from that year, but mainly from 2023 and some from 2024.

“Given all the scarcities in Cuba, including the shortage of personnel in the police, the prosecutor’s office and the courts, as well as power cuts or the fact that people work four days a week (a cost-saving measure following the oil blockade in January), a criminal proceeding such as a woman’s death, which could technically take six months according to the Criminal Procedure Law, is taking two or three years,” she explained.

The figure is so unreal that if conditions in the legal apparatus were suddenly to improve in 2027 and the backlog from previous years were cleared, that year would show a record number of femicides, she added

The figure is so unreal that if conditions in the legal apparatus were suddenly to improve in 2027 and the backlog from previous years were cleared, that year would show a record number of femicides, she added.

Article 345.2 of the new Penal Code, approved in 2022, stipulates that a person who “causes the death of a woman as a result of gender-based violence” incurs sentences of 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment, life imprisonment, or death – the same sentences that would apply if continue reading

it were another type of murder.

According to Pérez, Cuba’s body of law does not literally use the term femicide – although she said she would prefer it – to refer to these cases, as happens in other Latin American countries, which have incorporated it as a crime in their penal codes or specific laws.

In Cuba, the reason for distinguishing gender-based motives in a murder is not because it constitutes an aggravating factor in sentencing – since such murders already carry the maximum penalties – but rather a matter of legal technique and, above all, of statistics.

The Cuban Observatory on Gender Equality (Ocig), a platform linked to the National Statistics and Information Office (Onei) and the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), updated some femicide indicators for the island on August 18.

Of those 49 women murdered, whose cases were tried in 2025, 47% died at the hands of an ex-partner, nearly 90% died in their own home, and 75.5% had no employment ties. Most were white and between 20 and 44 years old (38 cases).

The Ocig, which was created in 2023 and has since updated a set of gender-related indicators once a year, also recorded 33 cases in urban areas and 16 in rural areas, where the femicide rate reached 1.65 per 100,000 women.

While the declining figure for tried femicides reported by the Ocig is not, for now, a real gauge of violence against women, Pérez likewise does not venture to claim that the trend has been increasing.

For its part, the Alas Tensas Gender Observatory (Ogat) is another organization that has kept its own count since 2019, compiled from citizen reports, mainly through social media.

The Ogat has reported 47 women murdered so far this year, as of August 24, and has kept a case-by-case count of 350 femicide victims from 2019 through the first half of 2026.

“Although the Alas Tensas Observatory is politically committed (against the Cuban government), that doesn’t change the fact that it often posts on social media about the existence of real cases”

“Although the Alas Tensas Observatory is politically committed (against the Cuban government), that doesn’t change the fact that it often posts on social media about the existence of real cases,” said Pérez. For the jurist, the most reliable data comes from the courts, but it is not enough.

For example, the so-called Interoperable Registry – which is not public and to which only the Prosecutor’s Office, the police, criminal investigators and, soon, the courts have access – provides “very clear information about what happens in cases from the moment of the official complaint.”

In fact, several femicide cases have not been tried because the perpetrator later committed suicide, and this is data that is not processed nor reflected in the Ocig statistics, she said.

Another important figure released by the Ocig was that, in 2025, Cuban courts processed 173 cases of sexual violence against women aged 15 and older, of which 90 corresponded to the crime of sexual assault and 83 to other types of sexual violence.

Women aged 20 to 44 accounted for the majority of victims (73, or 5.33 per 100,000 women), but adolescents aged 15 to 17 were the most affected (49 victims, 31.52 per 100,000 women).

“Sexual assault came to include all attacks of greater severity against a person’s freedom and bodily integrity,” the jurist said.

Under Article 395 of the Penal Code, sexual assault is punishable by seven to 15 years’ imprisonment for anyone who, “using force, violence or intimidation, has carnal access to another person,” by whatever means or methods.

The sentence is 8 to 20 years if, for example, the crime results from gender-based or domestic violence, or from discriminatory motives.

Of lesser severity are other forms of sexual violence such as “sexual abuse” – unlike the previous crime, it does not involve “carnal access” – or “harassment and sexual outrage,” which includes forms of harassment carried out directly or through any means of communication. In both cases, the penalties are fines or prison terms of six months to two years.

The 173 cases of sexual violence tried in 2025 represent a sharp decrease compared to the 230 cases in 2024 and the 378 in 2023, to the point that the rate of such cases brought to justice fell from 8.62 per 100,000 women in 2023 to 4.19 in 2025. Of that total of 781 cases, 419 (53.6%) correspond to sexual assaults and 362 (46.4%) to other types of sexual violence.

“These figures are very unrepresentative of reality. A woman endures so much harassment every day for these numbers to mean anything. In any case, they speak to how poorly Cuban justice functions for these cases of sexual violence,” said Claris, a student at the Technological University of Havana who preferred to withhold her last name.

Many Cuban specialists and activists agree that the available statistics offer only a partial view of a problem that, according to independent feminist groups, faces significant underreporting.

The Ocig’s contribution is further limited by the fact that it provides data only on tried cases, rendering invisible sexual violence against girls under 15 and against boys.

“With sexual violence there is always a very large degree of underreporting. First, because of the victim’s silence, and second, because sexual violence crimes, by law, require that a complaint be filed: they require an official report from the victim or, if she is a minor, from her parents. These are crimes, as is classically said, crimes of solitude,” Pérez noted.

“With sexual violence there is always a very large degree of underreporting. First, because of the victim’s silence, and second, because sexual violence crimes, by law, require that a complaint be filed: they require an official report”

Despite legislative progress, studies confirm the persistence on a global scale of challenges for victims of sexual violence in accessing justice, such as shame and fear of reprisals; revictimization and a lack of awareness among judicial officials; a lack of support networks; and socioeconomic inequalities.

More than 12% of women aged 15 to 49 worldwide have been victims of physical or sexual violence by a partner or ex-partner in the past year, according to the Gender Snapshot (2025) from UN Women.

When it comes to reporting cases of sexual violence, there is also the length of time it takes for a criminal action to lapse, which in Cuba can range from 3 to 25 years depending on the sentence associated with a given crime, although femicide cases should not have a statute of limitations, since murder carries the maximum penalty.

To support victims through the process, in November 2025 Cuba inaugurated the Specialized Office for the Comprehensive Care of Victims of Gender-Based Violence, an initiative of the National Organization of Collective Law Firms, which already has 40 locations across the island.

Attorney Ana Isabel Zamora, who belongs to one of the offices in Havana, explained to IPS that the initiative’s role is to offer legal advice, procedural representation and support to victims of gender-based violence. But in its first few months, her office has handled only about 20 cases.

Zamora acknowledged that “it still isn’t as visible as we would like. Out of fear, shame, or stereotypes, victims fail to reach out to these places where they could be helped.”

Translated by GH.

Editor’s note: This text was published by IPS Cuba

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

A Month of Rumors: Raúl Is Dying, Díaz-Canel Resigns, and the Americans Are on Their Way

The arrival of two American warships in Guantánamo capped off a particularly fertile month for rumors

Raúl Castro, flanked by Díaz-Canel and his grandson Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez, this weekend / Screen capture

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, September 7, 2026 – August ended in Cuba the way it began: with blackouts, uncertainty, and a collection of rumors that spread through the streets, social media, and instant messaging services. That universe of speculation had a bit of everything: changes at the top of the presidency, the disappearance of the Cuban peso, the resignation of Miguel Díaz-Canel, internet restrictions, and, to close out the month, an imminent US invasion.

The most persistent rumor once again starred Raúl Castro. Messages and posts claimed that the 95-year-old general was gravely ill after suffering a stroke, and some declared him outright dead. The story grew until it jumped from social media into some news outlets.

This is not the first time Fidel Castro’s younger brother has been buried ahead of schedule. With the general’s obituary “frozen” for years in numerous newsrooms, every piece of news about his health triggers a mix of anxiety, expectation, and speculation about the day after. In Cuba, where leaders’ medical bulletins tend to be state secrets, official silence also provides magnificent fertilizer for the imagination.

This is not the first time Fidel Castro’s younger brother has been buried ahead of schedule. With the general’s obituary “frozen” for years in numerous newsrooms

Another WhatsApp chain resolved the succession question more expeditiously. Inés María Chapman, the deputy prime minister, was supposedly “the Cuban Delcy Rodríguez,” on the verge of becoming “CUBA’S NEW PRESIDENT,” no less than with Washington’s backing. The sustained use of capital letters, indispensable in the diplomacy of hoax chain messages, stood in for continue reading

any source, document, or statement that might have backed up such a political turnaround.

A supposed Central Bank statement also circulated, announcing the “definitive elimination” of the Cuban peso as legal tender and the full dollarization of the economy. However, the national currency remains officially alive – even if its purchasing power looks more dead by the day.

Miguel Díaz-Canel was made to resign once again. A fake letter, circulated under the usual “Breaking News” label, opened with a solemn “Compatriots” and presented an unexpectedly self-critical president, willing to admit that he had underestimated the economic crisis, reacted too late to food and medicine shortages, and failed to keep his promises. Perhaps the element that most quickly gave away the hoax was precisely so much contrition in one place.

The state telecom monopoly Etecsa didn’t escape the rumor mill either. Another fake statement, carefully drafted in bureaucratic style, announced that starting September 1st Cubans would only be able to use mobile data for four hours a day, between ten at night and two in the morning. Given recent experience with rate hikes, restrictions, and connection troubles, many people didn’t even need much convincing to believe it. When reality has spent years training the public for the worst, rumor-mongers have much of their work already done for them.

But August saved its action movie for the very end. On the 31st, two US military ships, the USS Billings and the USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul, arrived at the Guantánamo Naval Base. The presence of both vessels is documented by the US Navy itself; the Billings arrived as part of a scheduled deployment, and the Minneapolis-Saint Paul had left Mayport, Florida, on August 27th to begin its own.

The two vessels were enough to dust off rumors of an American military intervention, further fueled by regional tensions

For some, however, it took only a few forwarded messages to leap from that to invasion. The two vessels were enough to dust off rumors of an American military intervention, further fueled by regional tensions. For certain influencers, the ships were definitive proof that “something big” was about to happen.

None of it happened. But the rumors thrived because each one touched a real anxiety: who will control the country after Raúl, how much further the national currency can deteriorate, how far the restrictions will go, and how a crisis that seems bottomless will end. In today’s Cuba, a rumor doesn’t need to be true. It’s enough for it to look too much like something that could happen.

Translated by GH.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Emir Mesa Corona, the General Who Protects Raúl Castro from Assassination Attempts and Rumors About His Health

The man in charge of the security of Cuba’s leadership appears alongside the former head of state.

The man responsible for watching the backs of the leadership has stepped out, at least for a few minutes, into the spotlight. / Cubadebate

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, September 6, 2026 – Emir Mesa Corona has spent nearly three decades appearing just a few meters from power in Cuba, but until now his name has meant little outside the circles of the Ministry of the Interior. He has no known official biography, his place and date of birth are unknown, and it is not even clear when he attained the rank of general. However, this weekend he partially emerged from the shadows. Holding the rank of brigadier general, he was presented as head of the Directorate of Personal Security, one of the most opaque and sensitive organs of the Cuban apparatus.

Raúl Castro’s reappearance at the ceremony also carried added significance. In the preceding days, rumors had circulated about his death and an alleged serious deterioration in his health, after Diario de las Américas reported that the 95-year-old general had supposedly suffered a stroke and was being kept alive with life-support equipment. The information, attributed to unidentified sources, quickly spread through media outlets and social networks, while the Cuban Government remained silent. His presence at the event, applauded and surrounded precisely by the men responsible for protecting him, ultimately disproved at least the reports of his death. As if Personal Security had had to save the younger Castro not only from attacks and threats, but this time also from rumors about his own death.

It was Mesa Corona who presented the army general with a recognition for his status, alongside Fidel, as “founding chief” of Personal Security during Saturday’s ceremony marking the 65th anniversary of that structure. He also delivered the central remarks at a ceremony attended by Miguel Díaz-Canel and much of the country’s political and military leadership.

The appearance also makes it possible to put a face and a name to a military officer whose career can be traced through documents at least as far back as 1998

His speech offered a glimpse into the nature of an organization that goes far beyond placing bodyguards around the leaders. Mesa Corona spoke of coordination with the Armed Forces, Military Counterintelligence, and other structures of the Ministry of the Interior. He also stressed the need to anticipate threats and openly raised the question of what would happen in the event of an attempt to “kidnap or assassinate” any of the country’s top leaders.

The appearance also makes it possible to put a face and a name to a military officer whose career can be traced through documents at least as far back as 1998. In February of that year, the newspaper continue reading

Granma identified him as a captain and “head of the Military House Unit” when he took part in the presentation of the credentials of Bolivia’s then-ambassador. The Military House is precisely part of the apparatus associated with the care and protection of the top leadership.

Fifteen years later, he had made a considerable leap. During the Bastión 2013 military exercise, Raúl Castro visited the Command Post of the Organization for Security and Internal Order. There, then-Colonel Emir Mesa Corona, introduced as the “second head of the Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior,” briefed the ruler on the progress of the operations.

That information suggests that Mesa Corona joined the Ministry of the Interior no later than the early 1990s

In February 2018, he still held the rank of colonel. That year, the Council of State awarded him the Eliseo Reyes Medal, Second Class, along with other senior officers, including Ramón Romero Curbelo, now one of the most influential figures within Cuba’s intelligence apparatus. The decree justified the award on the basis of a career spanning more than 25 to more than 30 years within the Ministry of the Interior and the fulfillment of “important missions and tasks” related to state security and internal order.

That information suggests that Mesa Corona joined the Ministry of the Interior no later than the early 1990s, although there is no public information specifying the date.

By May 2023, he was already a general, and his position was much less ambiguous. An official publication of Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security included him in a Cuban delegation headed by Interior Minister Lázaro Alberto Álvarez Casas and identified him as the head or commander of the organization responsible for protecting senior leaders.

The delegation also included the Interior Ministry’s head of logistics, the head of International Relations and the director of Cimeq, the hospital traditionally reserved for the ruling elite. The trip establishes that Mesa Corona had held a position equivalent to head of Personal Security at least since 2023, although the resolution by which he was appointed has not been made public.

It is possible that Raúl’s grandson headed the structure for a period, that he was later replaced by Mesa Corona, or that his actual responsibility was always his grandfather’s direct security detail rather than command of the entire apparatus

A year later, he reappeared at a security meeting held in Managua with Nikolai Patrushev, then secretary of Russia’s Security Council and one of the most powerful men in Moscow’s security apparatus. Interior Minister Álvarez Casas was accompanied by Brigadier Generals Mesa Corona and Ramón Romero Curbelo. The meeting also brought together senior officials from Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Bolivia.

His current position, however, raises a question. Several media outlets assumed that the person who had taken over the Directorate General of Personal Security in 2016 was Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, El Cangrejo, Raúl Castro’s grandson and bodyguard. The initial information came from Juan Juan Almeida and said that Rodríguez Castro had replaced General Humberto Francis Pardo.

Francis Pardo is well documented as the former head of the organization. Granma still identified him as head of Personal Security in 2013, and when he died in 2021, Díaz-Canel himself recalled that he had led that “troop of loyal men” for 30 of his 56 years in the Ministry of the Interior.

The exact role of El Cangrejo is now less clear. This year he has again been described as responsible for his grandfather’s personal security and has acquired unprecedented political visibility, but he is not known to formally hold any position in the Government, the Party, or the Armed Forces. The official identification of Mesa Corona as head of the Directorate of Personal Security therefore requires qualifying the version that for a decade attributed that position to Rodríguez Castro. It is possible that Raúl’s grandson headed the structure for a period, that he was later replaced by Mesa Corona, or that his actual responsibility was always his grandfather’s direct security detail rather than command of the entire apparatus.

In an organization designed to keep safe those who rule Cuba’s destiny, discretion is part of the job

Mesa Corona also does not appear to limit himself to physically protecting Díaz-Canel and the Castros. In his speech on Saturday, he paid special tribute to the 32 Cuban soldiers killed in Venezuela and called for their example to guide the daily work of Personal Security. The presence of relatives of those who died at the ceremony reinforces the evidence of the link between that Directorate and the Cuban apparatus deployed around Venezuela’s leadership.

Much remains unknown. There is no known date of birth, academic résumé, family information or public record of his assignments. Nor is it known exactly when he was promoted to brigadier general or when he assumed the position he holds today.

The scarcity of information is not accidental. In an organization designed to keep safe those who rule Cuba’s destiny, discretion is part of the job. Mesa Corona has spent nearly 30 years rising through that world without becoming a public figure. Now, as the regime once again speaks openly of assassination attempts, kidnappings, and external enemies, the man responsible for watching the backs of the leadership has stepped out, at least for a few minutes, into the spotlight.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Cuba’s New Heroes and Founding Fathers of the Fatherland

EcoFlow, solar panels and solar-powered generators replace the old revolutionary epic in blackout-ridden Cuba

The national electricity system – SEN for short – has suffered so many outages that the word “national” is starting to sound like the most optimistic part of its name. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, José A. Adrián Torres, Málaga, September 6, 2026 / Perhaps one of the few things that isn’t scarce in Cuba is the sun. It rises every day without the Electric Union announcing its synchronization with the National Electric System (SEN), it doesn’t need fuel oil, it doesn’t wait for a spare part, and so far no breakdown has taken it offline. Nor does it depend on a friendly oil tanker docking or a Political Bureau meeting concluding. On the Island of Blackouts, the sun is the only energy provider that still doesn’t require foreign currency for its supply.

The Revolution and its leaders took almost seven decades to see the sun as a lifeline, even though it had always been right in front of their Fidel-style caps. Now the government is presenting photovoltaic energy as the path to energy sovereignty and claims that the more than 50 installed solar parks, with over 1,000 megawatts peak capacity, provide around 38% of the energy consumed during the day during peak sunlight hours. This is positive news, of course. At this point, arguing with the sun would be absurd, even for a system that has been arguing with the real economy for years.

The sun works for free, but storing its energy comes at a price: Cuba lacks sufficient battery banks and a stable grid capable of integrating them. The first storage systems serve primarily to regulate frequency, not to shift the midday to the nighttime peak. When the sun sets, the aging thermoelectric plants return, along with out-of-service units, high-sulfur Cuban crude, a shortage of spare parts, and generators without fuel. Demand hovers around 3,000 megawatts, and the deficits have left more than half the country simultaneously in darkness. The national electricity system—SEN to its ‘friends’—has suffered so many collapses that the word “national” is beginning to sound like the most optimistic part of its name.

The embargo did not age the thermoelectric plants, it did not deplete on its own  the reserves of spare parts, nor did it impose decades of insufficient investment and misguided priorities.

The oil embargo imposed by Washington has aggravated the shortages to an extreme; to omit this would be to deceive. But the embargo did not age the thermoelectric plants, nor did it single-handedly deplete the reserves of spare parts, nor did it impose decades of insufficient investment and misguided priorities. External pressure explains much of the acceleration of the crisis; it does not absolve 67 years of energy policy. This is a renewed Special Period, without continue reading

a name: perhaps the authorities avoid calling it that because a temporary emergency that lasts for decades is beginning to resemble the system itself too closely.

In homes, physics has imposed a less solemn solution: a panel, a battery, and the meticulous management of every watt. This is how EcoFlow has ascended to the pantheon of Cuban household icons. EcoFlow is a Chinese brand of portable power stations, founded in 2017, but in Cuba, its name is beginning to function as a common noun, just as other brands have

An Old Cargo Truck Converted into a Water Tanker Makes Its Way Through the Streets of Havana

The tank fitted into the truck’s cargo compartment illustrates the precariousness of a city battered by blackouts and breakdowns.

Any truck that can still start may end up being converted into a water tanker, even as garbage piles up on street corners because there are not enough vehicles to collect it. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Juan Diego Rodríguez, Havana, September 5, 2026 – At first glance, it looks like an old cargo truck stopped alongside the curb. But a look at the back reveals the contraption. A cylindrical tank has been installed inside the vehicle’s cargo bed, and at one end an outlet allows the water to be discharged. The result is an improvised water tanker, one of those emergency solutions that in Havana eventually become part of the landscape as if they had always been there.

The vehicle, seen by 14ymedio on Reina Street in Centro Habana, retains virtually intact the structure of an old Soviet-made Kamaz. The tank has been fitted inside the compartment originally intended to transport cargo, far removed from the configuration of a truck specifically built to carry liquids. The adaptation is rudimentary, but apparently it does the job.

The scene would be little more than a mechanical curiosity if it did not appear amid the severe supply crisis affecting the capital. In recent months, dozens of neighborhoods have suffered prolonged interruptions caused by breaks in water mains, equipment being out of service, leaks, and above all, blackouts that leave pumping systems without electricity.

This summer, several Havana residents have reported prices of between 40,000 and 60,000 pesos for a water tanker

Recent breakdowns in systems such as Cuenca Sur and Oeste have affected densely populated municipalities, including Centro Habana, Cerro, Plaza de la Revolución, Diez de Octubre, Playa, and Boyeros. Aguas de La Habana reports almost daily on new interruptions caused by lack of electricity, breakdowns, and repair work. The problem of obtaining electricity thus adds another increasingly basic problem: turning on the tap and having water continue reading

come out.

When the network stops working, water tankers go from being an auxiliary service to becoming a lifeline. But even for that, resources are not plentiful. Vehicles in good condition, with spare parts and fuel, are also scarce, and the Government itself has acknowledged difficulties in meeting distribution schedules using tanker trucks.

The shortage has also created a lucrative informal market. This summer, several Havana residents have reported prices of between 40,000 and 60,000 pesos for a water tanker, with some cases reaching as high as 80,000, depending on the neighborhood and the buyer’s urgency. Just a few years ago, in 2021, getting a water tanker on the black market cost between 400 and 600 pesos.

A resident of Luyanó tells this newspaper that the supply crisis has fueled a growing informal business around water. “In areas where water never comes in, they have to buy it for 2,500 pesos per tank, a 20-liter bottle for 300 pesos, or spend 100 pesos for a frozen water cucumber [Mexican beverage made from cucumber, water, lime juice and sugar],” she explains.

One service plugs another’s hole and, meanwhile, the precariousness keeps going around in circles

The lack of water also drives residents into the streets. Protests by residents tired of going days without service have been recorded in several parts of Havana, some involving mothers with their children. At the end of August, Sady Campanioni, a Havana mother who had spent days reporting that no water was reaching her block and had publicly demanded a fairer distribution, was arrested. Her arrest showed the extent to which a supply crisis can lead to punitive actions by the authorities, when demanding a basic service ends up provoking surveillance, threats, or arrests.

The Kamaz truck on Reina Street sums up this chain of shortages. Faced with a lack of specialized equipment, a tank is installed on an old truck, extending a little further the useful life of a machine that arrived on the Island decades ago.

The same logic is repeated inside people’s homes. In houses, any bucket, bottle, cooking pot, or tank serves to store water when it finally appears. On the street, any truck that can still start may end up being converted into a water tanker, even as garbage piles up on street corners because there are not enough vehicles to collect it. One service plugs another’s hole and, meanwhile, the precariousness keeps going around in circles.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Police Deploy More Than a Dozen Patrol Cars To Break Up a Protest in Havana’s Fontanar Neighborhood

  • Residents report power cuts lasting more than 20 hours, while some housing developments with swimming pools never experience blackouts.
  • The assault on a truck loaded with cooking oil reflects the worsening social tensions in Cuba.
Residents of Fontanar organized to block Rancho Boyeros Avenue this Friday in protest against the blackouts. / Social media

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, September 5, 2026 – Despite the fines imposed on demonstrators, the police repression, and neighborhood surveillance, pot-banging demonstrations – cacerolazos – continue in different parts of the Island. These protests against daily blackouts that last more than 20 hours, problems with water supplies, and living conditions in general are now more organized.

This Saturday, in the community of Fontanar, in the Boyeros municipality of Havana, dozens of residents took to the streets banging pots and blocked Rancho Boyeros Avenue while chanting, “We want electricity!”

Videos circulated on social media show the residents’ determination as they stand in front of vehicles, preventing them from passing along the blocked road, while police patrol cars arrived to contain the demonstration. It was the second consecutive day that the same neighborhood had taken to the streets to protest the blackouts.

“More than 10 police patrol cars came. They beat a couple of people, took away two or three, and put an end to the action,” one of the participants told 14ymedio. “We are already thinking of doing it again, but more organized, so that more people will come.”

“More than 10 police patrol cars came. They beat a couple of people, took away two or three, and put an end to the action”

“They’ve been cutting our electricity for more than 24 hours for several days, and we have no water,” the resident added. “Meanwhile, there is electricity all around us, such as in the rental houses with swimming pools in the Río Cristal and Abel Santamaría housing developments. They never cut their power because they say they pay for it.” continue reading

According to witness accounts gathered by Martí Noticias, those detained were “a woman and a young man,” although their identities could not be confirmed. The same sources said that five patrol cars arrived at the scene, along with the so-called Black Berets and Red Berets, the feared special forces of the Ministry of the Interior and the Armed Forces, which specialize in suppressing disturbances and were recently sanctioned by the U.S. Government.

Cacerolazos have become an increasingly common response to the alarming energy crisis affecting the Island. In June, Cubalex recorded 253 protests in Cuba, the highest monthly figure since it began tracking such events in 2022.

With the summer heat, as Cuba faces its worst economic crisis since 1959, the fuel shortage has also worsened the healthcare situation and basic services. The country has recorded new outbreaks of mosquito-borne diseases and, amid the collapse of the healthcare system, deaths have been reported that could have been prevented under other circumstances.

“This city is like a madman’s house, which he keeps filling with garbage, excrement and junk”

Water supply problems, affecting more than half a million Havana residents, according to figures acknowledged by the authorities themselves, combined with the garbage collection crisis caused by the lack of fuel, have made the city a difficult place to get around. “There is a horrible stench in the streets; there is sewage water everywhere, garbage, the smell of excrement,” says a resident of Luyanó. “This city is like a madman’s house, which he keeps filling with garbage, excrement and junk.”

These problems are compounded by inflation and the steadily rising cost of basic products such as cooking oil, eggs, and powdered milk. The severity of the situation was exposed this Friday in the capital’s La Lisa municipality, where dozens of people stormed a truck loaded with cooking oil, in an incident that spread on social media.

According to information published by journalist Gilberto Dorrego, the vehicle was guarded by police officers, but residents rushed the truck to take bottles of oil. The video circulated shows a crowd of people trying to climb onto the truck and distribute the merchandise among themselves. Many children and mothers can be seen in the crowd, running to grab a bottle.

A liter of sunflower oil has reached prices of as much as 5,000 or even 6,000 pesos on the Island’s informal market, approximately the equivalent of $10 at the street exchange rate, nearly two monthly minimum wages in Cuba.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The Paradox of US-Cuba Relations: Exports Grow as Sanctions Increase

The island increasingly depends on fuel, vehicles, and medicines sent by “the empire,” even as food purchases show a small decline

Between January and July, the accumulated value reached 674 million dollars, 61.8% more than in the same period of 2025. / ACN

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, 4 September 2026 / U.S. exports to Cuba reached a monthly record of 148.9 million dollars in July, according to new data from the U.S. Census Bureau, which has tracked trade in goods between the two countries since 1992. The figure far exceeds June’s 117.6 million and is more than double the 73.2 million recorded a year earlier, in July 2025.

The jump in the latest month confirms the trend seen since January: U.S. sales to the island are growing rapidly even as Washington tightens sanctions against the Cuban regime. Between January and July, the accumulated value reached 674 million dollars, 61.8% more than in the same period of 2025.

The accumulated figure for this period already equals 83% of the 809.6 million dollars the U.S. exported to Cuba during all of last year. If the current pace continues, 2026 could become one of the years with the greatest exchange of goods between the two countries in recent decades.

Fuel has become one of the main drivers of the increase

Washington’s pressure campaign has led the island to depend on the U.S. to import food, fuel, and medicine. Axios went so far as to describe this situation as Cuba having become a de facto “renegade colony” of the United States.

Fuel has become one of the main drivers of the increase, after Washington authorized at the start of the year sales of petroleum derivatives to the Cuban private sector. In June, the figure reached a record 47,842,674 dollars, double the previous month’s total and half continue reading

of the accumulated total for 2026. Overall, U.S. exports of fuels and oils had reached 95.7 million dollars between January and June, according to records compiled by the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council.

By contrast, Cuban purchases of food from the United States have declined compared with the previous year. In the first six months of 2026, U.S. exports of agricultural and food products totaled 218.8 million dollars, 10% less than in the same period of 2025. Chicken remains the top product among Cuban purchases, but sales of other foods have fallen in recent months.

In the first half of the year, exports of automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, bicycles, and other vehicles had exceeded 41 million dollars

Vehicles are the other major component of the new trade pattern. In the first half of the year, exports of automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, bicycles, and other vehicles had exceeded 41 million dollars. The value of these sales has soared since 2022, when Washington began authorizing certain vehicle exports to Cuban citizens and private businesses. By 2025, vehicle sales had already reached about 149.4 million dollars.

The phenomenon reflects growing demand from the Cuban private sector, which turns to U.S. suppliers to obtain products that the Cuban state fails to import in sufficient quantities.

The increase is notable because it is occurring while Washington maintains its trade embargo on Cuba. But this framework does not amount to a total ban on U.S. exports. Commerce Department regulations permit certain transactions, including sales of agricultural products and – through licenses – medicines and medical devices. In addition, the exception for Support for the Cuban People, in the export regulations, authorizes certain goods intended to improve “living conditions” and support private economic activity.

The U.S. has sold 674 million dollars in merchandise to Cuba between January and July

The Census Bureau’s statistics account for the total value of merchandise exported and do not make it possible to determine what proportion corresponds directly to MSMEs, the Cuban state, or other buyers.

The trade relationship between the two countries also remains highly unbalanced: while the U.S. sold 674 million dollars in merchandise to Cuba between January and July, U.S. imports from the island reached barely about 500,000 dollars in that same period.

An analysis published in April by the consulting firm Auge noted that U.S. exports to Cuba grew 148% between 2021 and 2025, from 327 million to about 810 million dollars, in parallel with the expansion of MSMEs and the increase in remittances from the U.S. Auge estimated at the time that U.S. exports could reach as much as 1.3 billion dollars by 2028 if current conditions persist and trade opportunities expand.

Translated by GH.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Since January, the Cuban Economy Has Been Falling at Twice the Rate Recorded at the Worst Point of the Special Period

Economist Pedro Monreal estimates a GDP contraction of up to 31% this year, three times more than the ECLAC forecast.14:15

Rising prices will significantly worsen the decline in goods production in 2026. / 14ymedio

14ymedio biggerThe drop in gross domestic product could be double that of 1993, considered the worst year of the Special Period. This calculation comes from Pedro Monreal, a Cuban economist residing in Spain, and is based on data regarding State Production of Goods and Services for the first half of 2026, published this Tuesday by the National Office of Statistics and Information. Projecting the provided figures, the expert estimates that GDP could fall this year between 26% – in the best-case scenario – and 31% in the worst.

Monreal describes the situation as a “recession that is no longer within the realm of the forecasts.” The figures are double the 14.9% drop in GDP that occurred in 1993 and triple the ECLAC estimate of 10.3% for this year.

To calculate this, the economist used the value—published in national currency—of the production of goods and services by the state sector, which totaled 495.353 billion pesos—20.6397 billion dollars at the official exchange rate of 24 pesos per dollar—13.4% less than last year. In the first half of 2025, the figure was 571.760 billion pesos—23.8233 billion dollars—but inflation changes the picture.

Monreal estimates two possible deflators to complete the calculation based on the same period in 2025. If prices had risen by 15%, GDP would have plummeted by 26.4%, while if inflation were 20%, the figure would climb to 30.7%.

Monreal’s estimates for this year’s GDP. / PM

The expert believes these figures could set the tone for the rest of the year, as there are no signs of improvement. Although the picture of the Cuban economy is incomplete due continue reading

to the lack of information from the private sector—which is playing an increasingly important role in the country—the state sector, which has concentrated the majority of national activity for decades, continues to dictate the trend.

Monreal had already warned a year ago, and on more than one occasion, that Cuban economic data showed it was reaching a point worse than in the 1990s, when the fall of the Soviet Union and the resulting end of subsidies left the Cuban state vulnerable. However, the deterioration has taken a giant leap forward since the kidnapping of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and the US sanctions, as the economist points out.

“The Cuban economy was already suffering from a structural crisis with internal distortions—low productivity, a distorted investment pattern, fiscal imbalances, a precarious electrical grid, and incomplete and failed reforms—but the short-term worsening is mainly explained by the tightening of US sanctions in 2026,” the specialist summarizes.

In his view, the oil blockade has cut off “access to the fuels that sustained electricity generation, transportation, and food distribution; the broad group of entities ‘designated’ on the sanctions lists, and secondary pressures have driven out hotels, airlines, and payment channels.” Against this backdrop, tourism, fuel, and foreign exchange, which had already entered negative territory in 2019, have collapsed, leading to a humanitarian crisis that is worse than that of the 1990s, “particularly in terms of vital services, inequality, and hopelessness.”

“Although the exact GDP figure for the first half of the year is not yet statistically confirmed, the contraction is already translating into hunger, blackouts, health collapse and exodus, a deterioration that the 2026 US sanctions did not create on their own, but did trigger by multiplying the internal failures of a structurally fragile economy,” he says.

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A Surgery in Havana Forces the Postponement of Di Battista’s Transfer to Italy

The former leader of the Five Star Movement remains admitted to Hermanos Ameijeiras and there is still no new date for his repatriation

The former deputy, 48, had arrived in Cuba to work on a series of reports. / Facebook/ Alessandro Di Battista

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/ Agencies, Havana, September 5, 2026 / The former Italian deputy Alessandro Di Battista underwent surgery in Havana after suffering a new health setback that forced the postponement of his return to Italy, initially planned for this Friday and later for this Saturday. The politician, known as the Italian Che, remains admitted to the Hermanos Ameijeiras hospital and, for the time being, there is no new date for his repatriation.

The operation was confirmed this Saturday by the Italian news agency Ansa, which noted that the operation forced the transfer to be delayed. The Schierarsi association, of which Di Battista is vice president, limited itself to stating that his return had been postponed and asked for “maximum discretion and caution” when disseminating information about his health status.

“Alessandro Di Battista’s return to Italy, planned for today, has been postponed,” the organization reported. “We ask everyone to maintain maximum discretion and caution in disseminating information, while awaiting further updates.”

According to what was explained at the time, the costs of the transfer would be covered by the travel insurance he had taken out before traveling to Cuba

Di Battista has been hospitalized since last August 28, when he suffered a severe episode while in Santa Clara, where he was preparing a series of reports on Cuba. After initially being treated in that province, he was transferred to Hermanos Ameijeiras, in Havana.

The situation seemed to have evolved favorably in recent days. The former leader of the Five Star Movement himself had reported last Wednesday that he was feeling “much better” and announced that he would leave the island on September 4 aboard an air ambulance. According to what was explained at the time, the costs of the transfer would be covered by the travel insurance he had taken out before traveling to Cuba.

The departure, however, was first postponed and ultimately suspended following the surgical procedure.

The Italian press still offers few details about continue reading

what forced doctors to operate on the politician. Ansa does not report the type of surgery or provide a precise diagnosis. According to information gathered by the newspaper Corriere della Sera, the former deputy reportedly suffered a stroke in Santa Clara. After regaining consciousness, he was transferred by ambulance to Havana, where he remained awake throughout the trip and underwent a contrast CT scan at the Hermanos Ameijeiras hospital. Cuban doctors then advised against his transfer to Italy, considering that such a long trip could pose risks to his health.

A medical team from the Gemelli polyclinic in Rome traveled to Cuba to collaborate with specialists from Hermanos Ameijeiras and assess the conditions under which Di Battista could be transferred to Italy

The case has also mobilized Italian doctors. A medical team from the Gemelli polyclinic in Rome traveled to Cuba to collaborate with specialists from Hermanos Ameijeiras and assess the conditions under which Di Battista could be transferred to Italy. Ansa notes that the Italian professionals worked alongside the Cuban medical team.

The former deputy, 48, had arrived in Cuba to work on a series of reports for Il Fatto Quotidiano and its audiovisual branch, TvLoft. His hospitalization interrupted the trip while he was in the center of the country.

In his first messages after being admitted, Di Battista praised the care received from Cuban doctors and conveyed an optimistic picture of his recovery. The announcement that he would travel by air ambulance reinforced the impression that the most delicate phase was behind him.

The new postponement and, above all, the news of the surgery now show that his condition has required more complex care than was initially known.

Translated by GH

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Shaka, a Chemical Jolt with Massive Doses of Caffeine, Vodka, and Sugar, is Consumed in Cuba

Manufactured in Spain, where its sale is prohibited, this beverage is consumed mainly in Cuba.

Among the accumulating garbage, empty Shaka cans stand out, with their bluish color and the characteristic lion in their logo. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana/Madrid, September 4, 2026 – On sidewalks or along the curb, among all the accumulating garbage, empty Shaka cans stand out, with their bluish color and the characteristic lion in their logo. It is a scene that any Cuban who goes out into the street can observe, and tangible evidence of its high consumption on the Island, which has health authorities on alert.

Where did this beverage come from, whose effects were first warned about, unusually, by the Government itself? According to its label, W Shaka, its official name, is manufactured and marketed by Venerable Capital S.L., a company based in Madrid. However, it is neither sold nor consumed in Spain, as an employee of the firm confirmed to 14ymedio. “We are the producers and distributors, but we do not sell in Spain; we only send the product abroad,” the employee explained by telephone, without being able to explain why.

In the European country, ordinary energy drinks, without being mixed, are highly regulated, and consumption in regions such as Galicia is directly prohibited for minors, according to a law passed at the end of last year. One of the countries where Venerable Capital sells, Ivory Coast, has prohibited imports of Shaka and other similar beverages since 2023.

The composition of the product, in its usual presentation on the Island, the vodka version, consists of 18% alcohol by total volume and vitamins B2, B6, B12, niacin, and pantothenic acid. / 14ymedio

Shaka would not be legal in Spain either, and not precisely because of the alcohol or its combination with taurine or caffeine, something that is not prohibited per se. It is the vitamins it contains that are prohibited from being mixed with alcohol, according to European regulations. Specifically, Regulation 1925 of 2006 establishes that vitamins or minerals may not continue reading

be added to beverages containing more than 1.2% alcohol.

The composition of the product, in its usual presentation on the Island, the vodka version, in a recognizable blue-and-black can, consists of 18% alcohol by total volume and, among other ingredients such as sugar and preservatives, vitamins B2, B6, B12, niacin, and pantothenic acid. The vodka content is 45%, almost half, while taurine accounts for 0.37%, the equivalent of 370 milligrams per 100 milliliters, and caffeine for 0.03%, or 300 mg/liter.

Showing this equivalence is relevant: above 150 mg/l, the European Union considers it a “high caffeine content,” and alongside this specific warning, the label must state, “Not recommended for children or pregnant or breastfeeding women.” This is a requirement Shaka does comply with, although bureaucratic formalities do nothing whatsoever to reduce its danger.

Last Sunday, a report in the official press again warned, based on several accounts, about the harmful effects of the energy drink. “They call it an energy drink so that it sounds like healthy fuel, but the reality is very different,” physician and university professor Julio César Hernández Perera explained in the report. “That word is nothing more than a marketing hook,” he denounced. “The energy they promise is not nutritional, but rather a dangerous artificial stimulation, a chemical jolt caused by massive doses of caffeine and an excess of sugar that punishes the cardiovascular system as if it were a violent acceleration.”

When the mixture is combined with alcohol, “the danger doubles, because it masks alcohol intoxication and leads young people into a state of false wakefulness”

When the mixture is combined with alcohol, he continued, “as happens with the famous Shaka Mixer, the danger doubles, because it masks alcohol intoxication and leads young people into a state of false wakefulness that can end in the emergency room.”

The media in Sancti Spíritus have also reported the story of five young people, between 18 and 22 years old, who ended up in that situation and were treated for intoxication at the Camilo Cienfuegos Provincial Hospital. One of them arrived unconscious and had to be admitted to the intensive care unit.

Yaneisy Valdés Gutiérrez, a toxicology specialist, explained this to a reporter from Radio Sancti Spíritus, who added: “This video aims to alert not only those adolescents and young people but also their parents, so they know what is happening.” The doctor said that the five patients came from the same group of friends, and four of them presented “mild symptoms” such as “sweating, irritability, nervousness, severe headache, and weakness.”

The young people, Valdés reported, described effects such as “I feel very bad” or “I feel like I’m going to die,” but they were treated “appropriately” and recovered without complications. The friend who arrived “in a coma” did require hospitalization, as well as “mechanical ventilation to save her life.” The young woman had consumed two cans of Shaka, according to the doctor’s account based on the girl’s own testimony once she regained consciousness.

She told the specialists that after a first can, “sealed” and opened by herself, her behavior began to change, and her friends even told her that “she wasn’t herself.” After drinking the second can, “she doesn’t remember what happened.”

What is happening with Shaka in Cuba is reminiscent of what happened in the United States with Four Loko

Another young man, the same report indicated, in an “altered state” resulting not only from drinking Shaka but also from mixing it with other alcoholic beverages, broke a glass door at the hospital. “We are talking about an intoxication that has presented moderate to severe symptoms in some of these cases,” the doctor insisted, recalling the composition of the concoction. The pleasant flavors in which the product is offered, such as strawberry, coconut, apple, or pineapple, Valdés said, “mask” the alcohol and are therefore “a motivation to continue consuming it.” Shaka, she added, causes dependence; “it is addictive.”

What is happening with Shaka in Cuba is reminiscent of what happened in the United States with Four Loko. Introduced in 2005, the original formulation of this beverage contained malt alcohol (12% by volume), caffeine, taurine, and guarana. With high doses of sugar and flavorings and bright colors, it became a phenomenon among young people and came to be known as “liquid cocaine.”

Alcohol intoxication and other problems associated with its consumption among students first led certain educational institutions to prohibit its consumption and then prompted U.S. authorities to take action. Specifically, they warned that caffeine caused people who drank Four Loko to feel awake without realizing that they were actually affected by the alcohol, just as happens with Shaka.

In 2010, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the U.S. food and drug agency, sent letters to four beverage manufacturers—including Phusion Projects, the owner of Four Loko—saying that caffeine added directly to alcohol was an “unsafe food additive” and threatening to remove the products from the market. It never carried out that action because Four Loko removed caffeine, taurine, and guarana from its formulation, and it continues to be sold that way today.

“So many things are prohibited in Cuba, yet they don’t prohibit Shaka as they do in other civilized societies”

Of course, there is no similar regulation on the Island, which is why Venerable Capital has been able to enter that market. “So many things are prohibited in Cuba, yet they don’t prohibit Shaka as they do in other civilized societies,” a doctor tells 14ymedio. “It seems that our country is the captive market of a bunch of profiteers.”

On paper, a Spanish company can manufacture products that are prohibited in the country and export them. To do so, it has to apply to the Ministry of Health, a procedure that can be completed online. This means that at least this agency has all the details about the manufacture of Shaka in Spain.

According to its own website, Venerable Capital, which is primarily dedicated to marketing alcohol and tobacco—although it also sells non-perishable foods such as canned goods, pasta, and oil—exports to Latin American countries, in addition to Cuba, such as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, but mainly to African countries such as Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Togo. It also claims to have a presence in Dubai, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Tibet.

Its brands—for example, Olé packaged products, Bravo cigarettes, Santa Isabel beer, Bernardo Gálvez brandy, and Friday gin—are not seen in Spanish supermarkets, in any case, at least not on the mainland. Venerable Capital says it sells in Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary Islands, territories with special tax regimes.

It is precisely on these islands and in Africa that the business group itself originated, according to the history recounted on the same corporate website, which dates back to the founding, in 1876 in Oran, Algeria, of Tabacos Jorro by Alicante native Vicente Jorro Tours. The boost provided by the entry into the company of Mallorcan financier and smuggler Juan March, at the beginning of the 20th century, enabled them to expand throughout Algeria and Morocco.

Always linked to tobacco, successive generations of the Jorro family continued expanding the business, until Fernando Jorro Sainz de Rozas promoted the creation of Compañía de Tabacos del Mediterráneo (Comet S.A.), the “embryo” of Venerable Capital. Today, the conglomerate itself states, it “brings together businesses involved in the trade, manufacture, and distribution of tobacco, beverages, food, flooring, and services.”

Shaka was quietly launched in the 2010s, but it did not reach Cuba until last year. There are no available sales figures, but there are indications that the Island has become the beverage’s main market within just a few months. Perhaps the desperation of young Cubans in the face of their lack of prospects has a great deal to do with the phenomenon.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The Necessary Death of Castro-Communism

Julio M. Shiling, Miami, 4 September 2026 / Dictator Raúl Castro is ninety-five. Rumors of his impending death—or of his already having died—circulate with the grim inevitability that attends any long-lived tyrant. Whether the reports prove premature or not, the underlying truth remains: the last foundational brother of Cuba’s bloody ruling duo is nearing the end of his biological tenure. That fact is not incidental. It is a political inflection point.

Castro-Communism was never merely another Marxist-Leninist regime. It fused the totalitarian apparatus of the party-state with a sultanist structure of highly centralized, personalistic power. Fidel Castro supplied the charismatic ideology and the revolutionary myth. Raúl supplied the institutional muscle and the dynastic continuity. The death of the older dictator Fidel in 2016 produced a foundational rupture. The surviving brother absorbed the remaining personalist authority and kept the system intact. With Raúl’s own exit, that personalist core is finally exhausted. What remains is the apparatus itself—still operational, still predatory, still staffed at its highest levels by the family and its retainers.

The evidence of sultanism is not subtle. Alejandro Castro Espín, Raúl’s son, long known as el tuerto, has headed the counterintelligence apparatus. Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, the grandson called el cangrejo, has directed the grandfather’s personal security and affairs. Cousins and other relatives occupy commanding positions across the military, the security services, and the economic fiefdoms that constitute the regime’s kleptocratic backbone. This is not the impersonal bureaucracy of classical continue reading

Leninism. It is a family enterprise wrapped in Marxist- Leninist language and enforced by a totalitarian security state. The nomenclature “Castro- Communism” is therefore precise: it names both the ideology and the dynastic mechanism that has sustained it for sixty-seven years.

The death of any tyrant is cause for celebration. The moral ledger is unambiguous. Fidel and Raúl Castro presided over a system that murdered, imprisoned, exiled hundreds of thousands of Cubans and basically, destroyed a country. The Castro dictatorship exported violence and subversion across Latin America, Africa, and beyond. It treated American citizens and others as disposable instruments of geopolitical theater. That they escaped formal justice is a tragedy measured in unmarked graves, broken families, and decades of silenced testimony. Their physical disappearance does not erase the crimes. It merely removes the last living founders from the stage.

Yet the system they built outlives them. Castro-Communism is not a personality cult that collapses with its cult figures. It is a structured order of party control, military dominance, economic monopoly, and systematic repression. The death of Raúl Castro will accelerate the disintegration of the personalist cement that held the structure together, but it will not automatically dissolve the structure. Those who continue to staff and benefit from it—party officials, generals, security chiefs, and the extended family network—have every incentive to preserve the arrangements that guarantee their power and their plunder. Continuity is their project.

Justice, therefore, requires more than the natural death of a cruel old man. It requires the deliberate death of the system. Cuba must be de-Castro-Communized. The communist- kleptocratic monstrosity that has ruled the island for nearly seven decades must be comprehensively dismantled. That project is not vengeance. It is the necessary precursor to any genuine democratic opening. An ambitious process of transitional justice must examine the full record: the political prisons, the extrajudicial killings, the forced exile of an entire generation, the economic sabotage of the nation, and the international crimes committed in the name of “internationalism.” The bloody legacy of the Castro brothers must be documented, publicized, and adjudicated so that it cannot be sanitized by successors who will otherwise claim reform while retaining the essential levers of control.

The alternative is familiar and depressing. A managed succession, cosmetic liberalization, selective repression, and the continued extraction of wealth by the same networks under new labels. History offers too many examples of totalitarian regimes that outlived their founders only to reproduce the same pathologies under different faces. Castro-Communism has already demonstrated its capacity for adaptation without surrender of power. Only the systematic dismantling of its institutions, the exposure of its crimes, and the removal from authority of those who sustained it can prevent that outcome.

Raúl Castro’s death, when it comes, will be a contribution to the regime’s disintegration. It will not be the victory itself. Victory and true liberation will arrive only with the death of Castro- Communism in its entirety—the ideology, the security apparatus, the dynastic privileges, and the culture of impunity that has defined Cuban public life since 1959. Until that larger death is achieved, the Cuban people remain subject to a system designed to outlast any single man, however long he lived and however many he destroyed.

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The Cuban Foreign Minister Calls Sanctions Against a Grandson of Raúl Castro and Banco Exterior a “Cruel and Ruthless Aggression”

“The U.S. Secretary of State has been lying about Cuba again for two consecutive days. It’s a habit he cannot shake,” Rodríguez says.

Banco Exterior de Cuba has been included on the list of entities sanctioned by the U.S. since yesterday. / Prensa Libre>

14ymedio biggerEFE (via 14ymedio), Havana, September 4, 2026 / Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez accused the U.S. Government on Thursday of “cruel and ruthless aggression” against the people of the Island and of imposing measures intended to trigger “a humanitarian crisis.”

The Cuban foreign minister was reacting to the new sanctions announced by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio against Fidel Ernesto Castro Calis, grandson of former Cuban President Raúl Castro, the state-owned financial institution Banco Exterior de Cuba, and several energy companies.

Rodríguez said on social media that “the U.S. Secretary of State has been lying about Cuba again for two consecutive days. It’s a habit he cannot shake.”

“It is his way, and that of his Government, of trying to justify a cruel and ruthless aggression against the Cuban people that admits no political or moral excuse,” the head of Cuba’s diplomacy maintained.

He also stressed that “collective punishment is a crime” and that it is also “a crime to cause suffering to an entire population through measures coldly calculated to trigger a humanitarian crisis.”

“Enough of the abuse. Put an end to the blockade once and for all and allow Cuba to live in peace, through its own efforts and with the united support of its noble and brave people,” the foreign minister demanded.

Rubio said in a statement that the new designations imposed on Cuba this Thursday “reflect President Trump’s unwavering vision of a free Cuba.”

In recent months, Washington has imposed sanctions on Cuban state entities and officials, including the country’s president, Miguel Díaz-Canel, as well as members of the Castro family, Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) Álvaro López Miera, and deputy ministers of that portfolio.

On May 1, President Trump issued an Executive Order threatening sanctions against any person or entity that provides financial, material, or technological support to the Cuban Government or operates in key sectors of the Island, such as energy, defense, finance, and mining.

It also includes a ban on entry into the United States for foreign nationals who have had or currently have relations with Cuban government entities.

It also includes a ban on entry into U.S. territory for foreign nationals who have maintained or currently maintain relationships with Cuban government entities, are involved in human rights violations, or are involved in acts of corruption.

Since then, batches of sanctions announced by the U.S. have followed every two weeks, beginning with the FAR’s business conglomerate, Gaesa, and its president, Ania Guillermina Lastres.

It later added Communications Minister Mayra Arevich and Energy and Mines Minister Vicente de la O Levy, the ministries of Tourism and Construction, and mining companies such as Moa Nickel S.A., Geominera S.A., Cubapetróleo, and the José Martí Steelworks (Antillana de Acero), among other officials and entities.

Cuba has been experiencing a deep energy crisis since mid-2024, worsened since January by the U.S. oil pressure campaign, with blackouts lasting more than 20 hours in Havana and up to 72 consecutive hours in the rest of the country, which has aggravated the economic crisis the Island has endured for six years.

Translated by Regina Anavy
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Another Electric Utility Lineman Dies While Performing Maintenance Work in Havana

In 2025, 38 workers died in Cuba, and the electricity sector, along with construction, suffered the most workplace accidents

UNE linemen usually work with few safety resources / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, September 4, 2026 / Cuba’s Electric Utility (Unión Eléctrica) reported this Thursday the death, that same morning, of Edisvey Rolando Pérez Rodríguez, a 32-year-old lineman who was part of the brigade that had come from Sancti Spíritus to carry out maintenance work in Havana.

The state-owned company has not given further details about the cause of death, although it has made clear that he suffered a workplace accident. According to one of the colleagues who sent condolences, the young man – a native of La Sierpe – was doing maintenance work in Guanabacoa.

“My condolences to the family. We regret the loss of this young man. It is a profound sorrow for all of us who work in the sector and, above all, for those of us who had the opportunity to work with him. He was an excellent colleague and a devoted, committed worker,” read one of the many messages that employees of the Sancti Spíritus electric company left following the announcement of his death.

“I hope they empathize and decide not to send them to another province just to meet those needs, when they are needed here too”

Among the comments, some lamented the harsh working conditions endured by linemen, a job they described as exhausting and undervalued. “I hope they empathize and decide not to send them to another province just to meet those needs, when they are needed here too,” one user noted. “Perhaps the same thing would have happened to him here, but he would have been close to his family.”

UNE has been quick this time in reporting the death, a response diametrically different from that of last June, when 39-year-old Osmani Rosales Núñez, a worker for the Cárdenas Electric Company, lost his life. The lineman received a high-voltage electric shock while carrying out repair work in that city in Matanzas, but the state-owned company remained silent about the incident, on which only Tecnotur – the Ministry’s Technology, Solutions and Tourism Equipment Company – commented, since the deceased’s father worked there.

At the time, an electrical worker who contacted the media El Toque, denounced the conditions under which his work was carried out. “They are terrible and dangerous, lacking all safety and protection resources,” he stated, adding: “The harnesses and safety belts for working at height are in terrible condition and there are barely any. Sometimes continue reading

one is available for the whole brigade, when it should be personal equipment.”

The worker explained that there were also no uniforms, boots, or helmets, and, worst of all, there are barely any dielectric gloves for working with live current. “If a cable falls, we have to think about where to remove one that’s out of use to repair it with; if a transformer, or ‘lechera’ (milk can) as it’s called on the street, burns out, we have to think about where to take a less-used one from to provide service to the population, and it’s all like that because the warehouses are bare, grim,” he denounced.

In September 2025, Cleivi Pujada Castro lost his life while carrying out repair work on a circuit at the Playa Baracoa substation in Bauta, Artemisa province. The UNE worker died after coming into contact with a high-voltage line, according to the account of a colleague who reported what happened.

“The harnesses and safety belts for working at height are in terrible condition and there are barely any. Sometimes one is available for the whole brigade, when it should be personal equipment.”

A different fate, days earlier, befell Osmani Hernández Madroza, 35, who suffered burns while working on a fault in San Miguel del Padrón, repairing a conductor. The lineman had both arms amputated as a result of the burns. In March 2024, Leonel Carroso Machín, a lineman for the Havana Electric Company, died after falling from a pole in the municipality of Boyeros.

Workplace accident statistics in Cuba confirm that this is, after construction, one of the sectors with the most accidents and fatalities. In 2025, there were 664 incidents in which 38 workers died and 701 were injured. The electricity sector accounted for five deaths, half as many as construction and the same number as gas and water supply.

Although there were more deaths in 2024 – 52 nationwide and 7 in the electricity sector – the decrease could be explained not only by the decline in the general population, but specifically by the loss of UNE workers. Between 2021 and 2023 alone, the company lost 15,000 workers by its own account, a situation that has worsened in recent years. The workforce numbers around 40,000 workers, but the Ministry of Energy and Mines has repeatedly stated that there is a labor shortage and that increasingly less-qualified personnel are facing complex tasks due to the lack of replacement and qualified staff.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.