Translating Cuba – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

University Admissions Without Entrance Exams Raises More Questions Than Opportunities in Matanzas, Cuba

The elimination of these tests has left thousands of students who spent years preparing feeling frustrated and has fueled fears of favoritism and declining academic standards.

José Luis Dubrocq Pre-University School in Matanzas. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Julio César Contreras, Matanzas, June 15, 2026 — In the mornings, small groups of students still gather in front of the old Secondary Education Institute of Matanzas on 2 de Mayo Street. On a marble wall, two teenagers chat without much enthusiasm, while a few yards away several pre-university students walk down the sidewalk with backpacks slung over their shoulders. The scene looks like any other end of the school year, but this year there is something different: for the first time in a long while, students finishing twelfth grade will not have to take the traditional university entrance exams.

The news surprised some and confirmed the predictions of others. The Ministry of Higher Education announced that the Mathematics, Spanish, and Cuban History exams had been suspended and that admission to higher education would be determined by students’ cumulative academic averages throughout their pre-university years.

For Betty, a twelfth-grade student at José Luis Dubrocq Pre-University School, the decision came too late and in the worst possible way.

“The way to earn a place in a good degree program was to get high scores on the exams. Now they’re changing the rules when we’re already at the finish line”

“I’ve been preparing for these tests since ninth grade. My parents have spent money on tutors, books, and study materials. Everyone knew that the way to get into a good degree program was to earn high marks on the entrance exams. Now they’re changing the rules when we’re already at the finish line,” she complains.

She hopes to study Psychology. She has a grade-point average of 98.9 but fears that may not be enough.

“They say they’re going to take ‘overall development’ into account. I was never very involved in political events or extracurricular activities. Now I see classmates with lower grades ranked above me. That raises a lot of questions.”

The concerns are precisely the topic most frequently discussed in family conversations. For years, the entrance exams served as a kind of final referee. People could debate the quality of the tests or continue reading

the inequalities between students who could afford tutors and those who could not, but in the end there was a common national evaluation for everyone.

Now, many parents believe the process will be more difficult to understand and, above all, harder to oversee.

Around the pre-university school on 2 de Mayo Street, where generations of Matanzas residents prepared for university admission, opinions are sharply divided.

“The best degree programs always end up in the hands of those with the most influence. That’s not just me saying it, everyone says it”

“My aunt has important connections in the Education Ministry and is already finding out how all of this works,” admits Magdiel, another senior-year student. “For me, it’s a good thing they got rid of the exams. What matters now is having the right contacts and being well positioned when it comes time to assign university places.”

The young man hopes to enter medical school and speaks with a frankness that makes some uncomfortable. “The best degree programs always end up in the hands of those with the most influence. That’s not just me saying it, everyone says it.”

Although some consider that perception exaggerated, it has spread among students and their families. The elimination of the exams has fueled suspicions that subjective factors may now carry greater weight in the allocation of university places.

A mathematics teacher, who prefers to remain anonymous, acknowledges that the change has caused dissatisfaction among many educators.

“I have outstanding students who spent years training for those exams. Some saw the tests as an opportunity to demonstrate what they knew regardless of their academic record or level of participation in school activities.”

The teacher believes the problem is not only the elimination of the exams. “What worries me is the message it sends. Tenth- and eleventh-grade students are seeing that the rules can change overnight. That affects academic motivation.”

Many teachers fear that the decision will deepen problems already affecting Cuban higher education

Authorities defend the measure by arguing that systematic evaluation over several years can reflect a student’s true performance better than an exam taken over a few hours. They also assure students that everyone will be guaranteed a university place, although not necessarily in the degree program of their choice.

In Matanzas, however, the debate has gone beyond the admissions process itself. Many teachers fear that the decision will aggravate existing problems in Cuban higher education: declining standards, a weakening culture of effort, and difficulties in selecting the best-prepared students.

Meanwhile, the school year is heading toward an early end. Classes will conclude several weeks ahead of schedule because of the energy and transportation difficulties facing the country.

In front of the old Secondary Education Institute building, now converted into a pre-university school, students continue to come and go on fragmented schedules. Some talk about university degree programs, others about blackouts, transportation, or emigration. Yet they all seem to share the same feeling: that they are living through a period of transition in which no one knows exactly what the rules of the game will be.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Spanish Platform EnvíosCuba, Linked to Gaesa, Suspends Operations

Unlike Katapulk, Supermarket23, Cubamax, and Cuballama, which continue to operate, this platform worked directly with Cimex stores.

EnvíosCuba promoted itself as a platform offering more than 10,000 products and coverage in every municipality across the country. / EnvíosCuba

14ymedio, Madrid, June 15, 2026 — “For reasons beyond our control, we are unable to continue providing our services.” With that brief message, EnvíosCuba announced on Sunday the closure of one of the main platforms used by Cuban emigrants to purchase food, household appliances, and personal care products for relatives on the Island.

The company did not clarify whether the suspension would be temporary or permanent, nor did it explain the reasons behind the decision. EnvíosCuba advertised itself as a platform with more than 10,000 products and a presence in every municipality in Cuba.

Under its umbrella, however, operated stores and websites such as La Puntilla, Plaza de Carlos III, Puerto Envío, ElectroEnvío, Mercado, and Almacén-On, all linked to the State retail networks Cimex and Tiendas Caribe, both controlled by the military conglomerate Gaesa. continue reading

Both companies shared the same address in Palma de Mallorca, and Almacén-On’s privacy policy even referred customers to Nactws

Almacén-On’s legal documentation further reveals that the platform used several interconnected Spanish companies. While EnvíosCuba was managed by Nactws, S.L.U., Almacén-On identified Lorengrave, S.L.U. as the responsible entity.

Both companies shared the same address in Palma de Mallorca, and Almacén-On’s privacy policy referred customers to Nactws for certain procedures and complaints. These overlaps point to a coordinated corporate structure rather than a collection of independent stores coincidentally hosted on the same platform.

Formally, EnvíosCuba was operated by Nactws, a Spanish company managed by Sonia Álvarez Pérez. Based on corporate records, Diario de Cuba reported that Álvarez Pérez owned 100% of the company’s capital.

Investigations published by CubaNet in 2023 linked Álvarez Pérez to her husband, Vladimir Graverán Becerra, and their daughter, Anabel Graverán Álvarez. All three were connected to a network of companies established in Canada and Spain to provide technology, remittance, and e-commerce services to Gaesa.

“It felt like dealing with the police. They asked for more information than State Security,” one customer told this newspaper

Nactws’ business expanded rapidly during its early years. The company’s revenue grew from approximately 264,000 euros in 2019 to 2.2 million in 2020 and 4.9 million in 2021, although the trend reversed after the pandemic. The latest available figures place its sales at roughly 1.2 million euros in 2024.

A former customer recalled that the purchasing process required extensive information about both the payer and the recipient in Cuba. “It felt like dealing with the police. They asked for more information than State Security,” he said.

In addition to addresses and telephone numbers, the platform requested identity information and other data intended, according to the company, to verify transactions and complete deliveries. Its privacy policy allowed such information to be shared with financial institutions, payment processors, and transportation and distribution companies.

The platform’s warranty conditions also referred customers to repair workshops operated by the Tiendas Caribe chain, another major state retail network. The company has not explained how it will handle pending orders or refunds.

The closure highlights EnvíosCuba’s strong dependence on the Cuban regime’s commercial and financial system. The platform served as an international storefront for State-run stores and converted part of the family assistance sent from abroad into purchases within the State-controlled retail network.

Instead of receiving money directly, relatives received goods purchased in euros or dollars from abroad

Instead of receiving money directly, relatives received goods purchased in euros or dollars from abroad. In this way, the Cuban State collected hard currency outside the country while delivering products inside Cuba that were generally sold at very high prices.

For now, EnvíosCuba’s disappearance contrasts with the continued operation of other platforms such as Katapulk, Supermarket23, Cubamax, and Cuballama. Their websites remained active on Sunday and continued offering deliveries and sales to recipients on the Island.

The difference may lie in the structure of their operations. Some of these companies collect and retain money outside Cuba, import goods through private firms, or maintain their own inventories and distribution networks. EnvíosCuba, by contrast, was directly connected to Cimex and Tiendas Caribe stores and to the payment infrastructure of the state retail system.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

The Guiteras Power Plant Goes Offline Again, for the Fifteenth Time So Far This Year

The boiler is experiencing another problem, three days after the last repair, and the expected deficit stands at 2,085 megawatts this Monday.

Workers repairing a breakdown on the Antonio Guiteras CTE, in an archive image. / Girón

14ymedio, Madrid, June 15, 2026 / WWhen state journalist Lázaro Manuel Alonso warned on his Facebook account this Monday morning about the Antonio Guiteras thermoelectric plant being taken offline from the national electricity system (SEN), among the responses received one stood out for its simple forcefulness: “It is in its natural state…that is not news.”

The Matanzas unit, the most important in the country, has once again suffered a boiler failure. Alonso highlighted two key facts that summarize the situation well. The first is that this is the fourteenth (fifteenth, as the state company later clarified) disconnection of the thermoelectric plant so far this year. The second is that more than half of those shutdowns have been related to the boiler, an “element showing significant wear due to the continuous burning of domestic crude oil and the postponement of major maintenance.”

Another commenter, in a more serious tone, said: “Stop spending anything more on that pile of charred scrap metal. Surrender!” The public is no longer willing to endure the level of struggle and resistance that the authorities boast about.

The Antonio Guiteras plant had reconnected to the SEN last Friday, after its fourteenth shutdown seven days earlier due to a boiler leak. The official press had published a glowing interview with Yandy Rojas Greenidge, a 37-year-old welder whose claim to fame is being the worker who has entered the unit’s boiler more times than anyone else. After 18 years dedicated to stitching together the guts of the famous thermoelectric plant, the man has not lost faith continue reading

in the Revolution.

Asked what his dream in life was, Rojas replied: “That the plant reaches 300 MW when we can carry out the capital investment project, which is what all of us workers at the plant want.” He also declared his happiness, and that of his children, at living on an Island that guarantees them schooling and medical care. “Despite the difficulties facing the sector, it will have to improve at some point, just as the electricity sector itself must recover,” he argued. This Monday, however, another disappointment awaited him.

The shutdown of the thermoelectric plant leaves a forecast of a significant deficit today, although such figures no longer impress anyone. The shortfall is expected to reach 2,085 megawatts (MW) during peak hours, when generation will amount to 995 MW against a demand of 3,050 MW. The morning will be somewhat calmer thanks to the contribution of solar parks, which yesterday, for example, produced 3,070 MWh, with an output of 489 MW.

However, Sunday’s total deficit reached 1,882 MW. Current breakdowns affect Unit 6 of the Máximo Gómez thermoelectric plant, Unit 3 of the Ernesto Guevara de la Serna plant, Unit 2 of the Lidio Ramón Pérez plant, and Unit 3 of the Antonio Maceo plant, in addition to Guiteras. Meanwhile, Unit 5 of the Mariel plant, Units 5 and 6 of the Renté plant, and Unit 5 of the Nuevitas plant are undergoing maintenance. In total, 277 MW of thermal generation capacity is out of service.

The biggest problem, once again, lies in distributed generation, as has been the case ever since oil began to become scarce and then largely stopped arriving. There are 106 plants of this type out of service due to a lack of fuel, representing 890 MW. Added to this are the “patana” [floating power plant] in Regla and the generating engines in Mariel and Moa, creating a gap of 1,203 MW. The official press, which today reports on the consequences of measures taken by the United States, attributes the shortage to what it calls an oil blockade. According to its account, 1,400 MW of capacity are unavailable and “cannot be used because Cuba cannot purchase the diesel and fuel oil required by those generating units, engines, and power barges due to the total blockade on access to oil and its derivatives.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

Revoked: Two Reports on Havana Syndrome for “Failing to Meet Analytical Standards”

These two assessments had concluded that it was “very unlikely” that the symptoms were caused by a foreign adversary.

The first cases of Havana Syndrome were reported by U.S. Embassy personnel in Cuba. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, June 15, 2026 — Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Tulsi Gabbard has revoked two National Intelligence Council assessments produced during the Biden administration that concluded it was “unlikely” that the so-called Havana Syndrome was the result of an attack directed by foreign adversaries.

According to a memorandum signed on June 11 by Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sara Lynn Picket and addressed to the entire intelligence community, the reports prepared during the Biden years have been dismissed “because those assessments did not comply with established analytical standards.”

Among the reports’ main shortcomings, the office cited the “selective exclusion of intelligence information and evidence that did not support the analytical conclusions” and the “omission of information necessary to understand the quality and reliability of sources.” It also argued that intelligence collection was restricted “to maintain an analytical line based on the absence of evidence.”

Among the reports’ main shortcomings, the office cited the “selective exclusion of intelligence information and evidence that did not support the analytical conclusions”

The so-called Havana Syndrome, also referred to by U.S. intelligence as “anomalous health incidents” (AHIs), consists of a range of neurological symptoms, including migraines, nausea, dizziness, and others, reported since 2016 by U.S. diplomats and government officials. Many patients have described their symptoms as beginning after hearing a sharp, localized sound, leading some investigations to explore the possibility of acoustic attacks. continue reading

The first cases were reported at the U.S. Embassy in Cuba—hence the name—although similar incidents were later reported in several countries, including China and Russia, without any consensus having emerged regarding their cause.

The appearance of these incidents in Havana was one of the reasons the normalization process with Cuba, initiated by President Barack Obama, did not continue. In 2017, during his first term, President Donald Trump suspended consular services in Havana and drastically reduced the diplomatic staff on the Island.

Bill Burns, CIA director under Joe Biden, had initially assumed that intelligence findings would eventually point to Russia as being responsible for the alleged targeted attacks and launched an extensive investigation. However, the lack of conclusive evidence gradually altered his position.

Victims argued that U.S. authorities were ignoring relevant evidence linking Russia to the incidents

One of the two reports revoked today, published in 2023, stated that the intelligence community was unable to connect any case to a foreign adversary and considered it unlikely that the illness resulted from a campaign directed by an enemy of the United States. In the second report, issued in January 2025, the intelligence community concluded that it was “very unlikely” that the symptoms had been caused by a foreign adversary, although an official from the Office of the DNI emphasized that analysts could not “rule out” that possibility in a small number of cases.

The two assessments now discarded generated divisions within the intelligence community. While senior intelligence officials pointed to possible medical or environmental causes, victims argued that U.S. authorities were overlooking significant evidence linking Russia to the incidents.

According to reports published in U.S. media last January, during the final months of Joe Biden’s presidency, the U.S. government secretly purchased, for more than $10 million, equipment containing Russian-made components that emitted pulsed radio waves, based on the hypothesis that such technology could produce the symptoms associated with Havana Syndrome.

Another investigation conducted by The Insider, 60 Minutes, and Der Spiegel, published in April 2024, asserted that the condition may have originated from “directed-energy” weapons operated by the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian Armed Forces.

“These flawed, fraudulent, and manipulated intelligence community assessments have caused significant harm.”

The revocation promoted by Gabbard has been welcomed by former officials who suffered from the condition, including Marc Polymeropoulos, a former senior CIA officer who experienced Havana Syndrome symptoms while in Russia. However, it remains unclear whether a major new investigation will be launched, as Gabbard is scheduled to leave her position next week and will not be in a position to oversee the matter.

Last January, the House Intelligence Committee requested that the Office of the DNI withdraw these assessments, arguing that new evidence had emerged supporting the theory that at least some cases may have been caused by a directed-energy weapon developed by a foreign adversary.

Republican Representative Rick Crawford, chairman of the committee, was unequivocal in comments following the revocation: “These flawed, fraudulent, and manipulated intelligence community assessments have caused significant harm to some of the bravest men and women in our nation.”

For Tulsi Gabbard, the move was one of her final actions before leaving office after submitting her resignation to President Donald Trump in order to care for her husband, who was recently diagnosed with a rare form of bone cancer.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

The 1940 Constitution: Cuba’s Democratic Bridge

Julio M. Shiling | Jun. 12, 2026 / The possibility of a successful democratic transition in Cuba rests upon two historic advantages that distinguish the Cuban case from many other societies emerging from totalitarian rule. These advantages are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Cuba possesses a republican tradition upon which democratic reconstruction can be built, and the Cuban nation that survived in exile preserved the cultural identity, historical memory, and civic traditions that the Castro-Communist regime attempted to erase. Together, these two realities provide the foundation for a constitutional renewal rooted not in political invention but in historical restoration.

The first advantage is Cuba’s own republican experience before 1959. Contrary to the historical narrative promoted by the Castro regime, Cuba was not a society without democratic foundations waiting to be liberated by revolutionary rule. Between independence in 1902 and the destruction of the constitutional order in 1959 (first derailed in 1952), Cuba experienced a functioning—although imperfect—republic. There were political parties representing different ideological currents, competitive elections, peaceful transfers of power, an active civil society, independent institutions, and a political culture shaped by constitutionalism. Cuba experienced periods of authoritarian interruption, particularly during military regimes, but these episodes did not destroy the foundations of republican life. Civil society remained vibrant, political pluralism survived, and the essential idea of Cuba as a constitutional republic endured.

The second advantage is the survival of the Cuban nation beyond the island itself. The millions of Cubans who went into exile did not merely carry personal belongings or memories of a lost homeland. They carried Cuba’s traditions, values, historical consciousness, religious practices, cultural expressions, and understanding of national identity. The exile community became a custodian continue reading

of a historical continuity that the communist state sought to sever. This preservation of identity is essential because democratic transitions are not only institutional transformations; they are also acts of national reconstruction. A society emerging from totalitarianism must recover its own historical narrative after decades of ideological manipulation.

For this reason, the 1940 Constitution represents a uniquely appropriate constitutional vehicle for Cuba’s democratic transition. The 1940 Constitution was the last legitimate constitutional text produced by a freely elected constitutional assembly representing Cuba’s major political forces and social sectors. It was the supreme expression of Cuba’s republican era and embodied the constitutional aspirations of the nation before the destruction of democratic governance. Unlike the Castro-Communist constitutional framework imposed after 1959, the 1940 Constitution emerged from popular sovereignty rather than revolutionary authority.

A democratic transition after communism must confront the past. This includes accountability for abuses, recognition of victims, restitution and reparations, institutional reform, and guarantees that dictatorial rule does not return. These are the essential components of transitional justice. Yet democratic reconstruction requires more than dismantling the structures of dictatorship. It also requires reconnecting a society with the legitimate historical foundations that preceded tyranny.

The restoration and modernization of the 1940 Constitution accomplishes both objectives. It provides a constitutional bridge between Cuba’s past and future. It allows Cubans to reconnect with their authentic republican tradition rather than accept the historical narrative constructed by Castro-Communism, which portrayed pre-1959 Cuba as a failed society requiring total ideological replacement. The regime attempted to redefine Cuban history around itself, treating everything before 1959 as morally illegitimate. A democratic Cuba must reject this historical rupture and recover the broader national story that existed before totalitarian rule.

Critics often misunderstand the proposed use of the 1940 Constitution by assuming that it would be applied exactly as written in 1940. That is not the proposal. Transitional constitutionalism requires flexibility. The interim governing authority would adopt the 1940 Constitution as the legitimate constitutional foundation of the transition while immediately suspending most provisions. During the transition period—ideally lasting several years—the country would be governed through emergency democratic decrees designed to stabilize institutions, restore rights, implement transitional justice, and prepare for elections.

The fundamental rights protections contained in Title IV of the 1940 text would provide an immediate constitutional anchor. These provisions include equality before the law, protection against discrimination, habeas corpus, due process guarantees, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, protection of private property, and the right of citizens to resist tyranny. These principles remain foundational to any democratic order.

Other sections of the 1940 Constitution also contain valuable institutional mechanisms worthy of preservation. Title V provides important protections for family, education, and culture. Titles XV and XVI establish meaningful municipal and provincial autonomy, limiting excessive centralization. Title XIV recognizes the importance of judicial independence and judicial review. Title XVII includes significant mechanisms of financial oversight through the Tribunal de Cuentas, a powerful anti-corruption institution capable of monitoring public finances.

After free, fair, and competitive elections, a democratically elected parliament could convene a constituent assembly responsible for modernizing the constitutional text. The resulting document would incorporate contemporary democratic standards, economic realities, and institutional safeguards. It would then be submitted to the Cuban people through a national referendum. The purpose of preserving the 1940 Constitution during transition is therefore not nostalgia; it is continuity, legitimacy, and national reconciliation.

The alternatives present serious problems. One option would be to retain and merely reform the current Castro-Communist constitutional text. This would be a profound mistake. That document emerged from totalitarian rule and lacks democratic legitimacy. Reforming it would risk preserving the legal foundations of the very system that transitional justice must dismantle.

The second option would be to create an entirely new constitution from nothing. While this may appear neutral, it would repeat one of the central errors of Castro-Communism: severing Cuba from its historical development. A new constitution without historical continuity would suggest that democratic Cuba has no roots, no inheritance, and no institutional memory. That would echo the revolutionary claim that the nation began anew in 1959.

Cuba is not a democratic orphan. It possessed an imperfect but functioning republic that was violently interrupted, not naturally exhausted or historically discredited. Its constitutional traditions, civic institutions, political culture, and national identity existed before the revolutionary rupture and survived despite decades of ideological transformation imposed from above. The democratic project after Castro-Communism should not invent a nation; it should restore and renew one. The Cuban democratic transition should recognize that Cuba’s future legitimacy will depend not only on building new institutions but also on reconnecting those institutions to the historical memory of the Cuban people. This includes embracing the constitutional ideals that preceded communist tyranny. A free Cuba must recover the understanding that democracy is not an import but a national inheritance.

Some objections to the 1940 Constitution deserve consideration. Some mistakenly describe it as a socialist constitution. This reflects confusion between socialism and social democracy or Christian democratic traditions. The constitutional assembly of 1939 included communists, but they represented only a minority. The document was primarily shaped by Cuba’s mainstream political traditions: liberals, conservatives, social democrats, and other democratic forces. Its social provisions reflected the constitutional trends of the twentieth century, not communist ideology.

Others argue that the Constitution is outdated. Age alone, however, does not determine constitutional value. Many successful democracies continue to rely on historic constitutional texts because legitimacy often comes from continuity as much as from contemporary drafting. The strongest criticism is that the 1940 Constitution is excessively detailed and attempts to regulate areas that modern constitutions typically leave to legislation. This criticism has merit. It is precisely why modernization is necessary. The objective is not to preserve every article but to preserve the constitutional lineage.

The most important question is not whether Cuba should return mechanically to 1940. The question is whether a free Cuba should reconnect with its own constitutional heritage. The answer should be yes. The 1940 Constitution offers something essential after decades of kleptocratic communist dictatorship: legitimacy, historical continuity, and healing. By adapting this historic document to modern democratic realities and submitting it to popular approval, Cuba can begin reconstruction not as a nation searching for an identity, but as a nation reclaiming one.

Leer en Español

Julio M. Shiling is a political scientist, writer, columnist, lecturer, media commentator, and director of Patria de Martí and The CubanAmerican Voice. He holds a master’s degree in Political Science from Florida International University (FIU) in Miami, Florida. He is a member of The American Political Science Association, The PEN Club (Cuban Writers in Exile Chapter) and the Academy of Cuban History in Exile.

With Hotels Closed and Few Flights, Cuba Received Just 30,883 Tourists in May

More than half of the visitors came from the US, mostly members of the Cuban community abroad.
In March 2025, 98,714 Canadians visited Cuba, while a year later, only 512 did

This Saturday, the Hotel Manzana was completely closed. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, June 15, 2026 / Kempinski, the German-Swiss luxury hotel chain, is maintaining complete silence, but its charismatic Manzana Hotel remains firmly closed at the moment, as 14ymedio was able to confirm. Opened in 2017 as Cuba’s first “high-standard” hotel, the establishment, located in Parque Central, opposite the Capitol Building and in one of Havana’s most important tourist areas, is not accepting reservations until at least August 1, as can be seen on its website when attempting to make a booking.

The Gran Hotel Manzana Kempinski belongs to Gaviota, the tourism company of the military conglomerate Gaesa, as do the other two hotels that the European company once managed on the island. The Cayo Guillermo Resort Kempinski, in the northern keys, was returned to Gaviota and is now called Hotel Playa Luxury Cayo Guillermo. The other property managed by the firm was the Bristol, which in August 2025 was taken over by Meliá. On June 3, when the Spanish hotel chain announced its divestment from 15 properties it managed, it included the Bristol on the list.

The silence and the message that it’s not possible to book the Gran Hotel Manzana until August leaves several questions about the future of the iconic establishment, but the fact that the sector is mortally wounded—for the moment—is undeniable. Tourism figures for May have just been released and reveal the catastrophe. Only 30,883 visitors arrived on the island in the fifth month of the year, although paradoxically, that was continue reading

332 more than in April. So far this year, Cuba has received 359,491 international travelers, 58.4% fewer than in 2015 for the same period.

There is no official statement from Kempinski, but reservations cannot be made on their website until August. / 14ymedio

Furthermore, of this meager total, the vast majority arrived in January (184,833), which, while a disastrous figure for a time of year that traditionally saw up to half a million tourists, could still be considered decent. With the announcement of the end of refueling for international flights, most airlines began evacuating their domestic passengers and ended up canceling unsustainable routes. Therefore, February held up, with very poor figures (77,663 passengers), but not yet disastrous. March is the turning point.

The National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI) also published on Monday the sector’s report for the first quarter of the year, which provides a more detailed look at other figures that highlight the collapse caused by the latest measures from the US government. Tourism in Cuba had not recovered since the pandemic, and the data, after a significant improvement in 2022 and 2023, foreshadowed an unmitigated crisis. But the energy embargo, which has grounded most flights, and the sanctions against GAESA, have dealt a final blow to one of the few sources of foreign currency not only for the state, but also for hundreds of thousands of people who depend on the sector for their livelihood in private businesses, from restaurants and craft shops to street vending.

The first-quarter report is devastating. At the start of this year, only 1.3 out of every 10 hotel rooms were occupied in Cuba. Visitors fell by 48% – 298,057 compared to 573,363 last year – overnight stays also plummeted by half – 1.8 million compared to 3.6 million – and gross revenue dropped from nearly 35 billion pesos (US$52 million, according to the informal exchange rate of 670 to 1) to around 20 billion. And all this considering that January was still considered a “normal” month.

The losses aren’t limited to hotels. The Onei* report, which includes quarterly revenue figures for other sectors, shows enormous declines across the board. The overall change has been from 48.4 billion to 27.9 billion pesos, but the hardest hit sector is gastronomy, which has lost almost half its revenue – from 19 billion to just 10 billion. This is followed by lodging, which has fallen from 14 billion to 8 billion pesos, transportation – from 5.7 billion to 3.9 billion – and retail – from 2.1 billion to 1.5 billion.

In addition, this report includes data on tourist arrivals by nationality for the month of March alone, providing a broader perspective on the catastrophe that is only hinted at when looking at cumulative figures. For example, in March 2025, 98,714 Canadians visited Cuba, while a year later, only 512 did: a drop of 95.5%, the steepest decline of all. It is worth noting that no Canadian airline—the leading source of tourists to the island for decades—currently operates flights to Cuba.

In the first quarter of the year, only 13 out of every 100 rooms were occupied.

Flights from Russia were also abruptly suspended that same February, effectively drying up that market, which was expected to be the miracle cure for Cuban tourism, especially after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions that banned Russian planes from European airspace. In March 2025, although the strategy was already proving ineffective, 11,135 Russians arrived on the island, compared to just 250 in the same month this year: a loss of over 97%.

These are the most significant drops, although no country escapes the declines, which mostly hover around 60% or 70%. Only two origins remain stable, and they are practically one and the same: the US. The Cuban community abroad contributed 11,256 travelers that month, half the number from a year ago, while Americans reached 5,243, almost a third compared to 2015, but not so bad when compared to other travelers.

Amid this shipwreck, the Cubanacán Group held a summer tourism fair this past weekend on the Comodoro Hotel boulevard, which has generated much criticism among the population. State agencies have tried to promote offers in destinations like Varadero, Viñales, and the Zapata Swamp, with free admission for children. But domestic tourists are not in the mood to travel, and international tourists, whose options have been severely limited, need almost a personal incentive to choose Cuba as a destination now, when most foreign affairs agencies worldwide advise against it.

Last Friday, when Miguel Díaz-Canel convinced the international press of reforms that were neither so extensive nor so new, he mentioned the inclusion of “new players in tourism.” This was, in reality, the only genuine novelty, but barely stated, no one knows what it might entail, because the attempt to get emigrants to invest in the sector is nothing new and has fallen on deaf ears. The US gaining the coveted control of the hotels remains the prediction of many experts, but we will have to wait to see if the regime relinquishes this key piece.

*National Office of Statistics and Information

______________________

Silvio Rodríguez Laments the Lack of Change in Cuba: “Our Model No Longer Worked”

The artist considers it “normal” that there are Cubans in favor of a US intervention, “given the increasing degree of hardship experienced by the majority of the population.”
Furthermore, he praises China and Vietnam for their level of development: “I don’t think that multiparty systems, a priori, are a guarantee of justice.”

Silvi Rodríguez has spoken again about the symbolic AKM he received from the Army. / Facebook / Minfar Cuba

14ymedio, Madrid, June 8, 2026 / Silvio Rodríguez hasn’t changed his stance in defense of the Revolution, but he once again offered several memorable quotes in his most recent interview. Perhaps the most striking, probably, the brief but incisive declaration of comprehension for those in Cuba who currently favor a US intervention. “I consider it normal, given the increasing hardships faced by the majority of our population,” he responded in his conversation with elDiario.es, published this Monday. The singer-songwriter answered the question of how he interprets the “perceived sympathies in the streets toward a hypothetical US intervention.”

Other criticisms of the Cuban government by the singer-songwriter are less surprising. For years he has opposed the repression following the all-Island protests of 11 July 2021, and has reiterated this stance on several occasions, so it is not surprising that, when asked what to expect if a similar outbreak occurs this summer, with the combination of heat and exacerbated power outages, he insists once again: “I believe in the right to free expression and assembly. I said then, and I repeat now, that law enforcement must protect demonstrations to prevent negative incidents,” he emphasizes. However, he makes it clear that some cannot “take advantage of the demonstrations for acts of vandalism and violence.”

In the interview, Rodríguez reviews the effects of the oil blockade, which has worsened the situation, though he performs a delicate balancing act to reconcile his understanding of the people’s weariness with his faith in their resilience. “I understand that for a visitor it must be difficult to imagine more endurance, seeing the situation we are living through. But anyone who has lived in this country for almost 80 years knows the resilience of this people. With this, I don’t mean to say that there isn’t exhaustion. Tiredness is human,” he admits.

“I believe in the right to free expression and assembly. I said then, and I repeat now, that law enforcement must protect demonstrations to prevent negative incidents.”

The troubadour believes this is the most serious moment in the history of the Revolution – “In Cuba, as far as I can remember, classes have never been suspended nor has the school year been disrupted,” although he omits the precedent of the pandemic – and speaks of the problems with garbage collection and the diseases this causes. In his opinion, the main culprit is the United States, and he doesn’t miss an opportunity to point this out, although he acknowledges his astonishment that no one in the Cuban government has changed anything, as – he emphasizes – Fidel Castro indicated.

“Fidel said that our model no longer worked for us, not even for us. He also said that the Revolution meant changing everything that needed to be changed. What I can’t understand is that decades have passed since those continue reading

statements and more effective measures haven’t been taken. I think that if a more realistic economic model had been adopted, what’s happening today wouldn’t be possible, or at least not in such a dramatic way,” he points out.

He does believe, however, that the excessive spending on tourism was a consequence of the thaw in relations with the US. “I think the construction of hotels was due to plans that emerged after contact with President Obama. I suppose that from that perspective, expenses were incurred that later made no sense to stop,” he argues.

Rodríguez believes that the situations in Cuba and Venezuela are very different and that the island lacks resources that would make it attractive to the US, beyond its climate and beaches. “I believe the only number one ranking we have worldwide is in harassment, aggression, and smear campaigns by the corporate press,” he argues.

In the conversation, he again mentions his now-famous AKM rifle and doesn’t rule out a US attack, but he is adamant in his conviction that the population will resist, even if it clashes with the understanding of the weariness of another part of the country. “I think it’s possible. And I’m sure that a good part of the Cuban people would fight to the bitter end. Of course, I wish, hope, and almost pray that this doesn’t happen,” he adds, and reaffirms: “I’m sure that in Cuba, an attack like the one they carried out in Venezuela wouldn’t have the same results.”

I believe it’s possible. And I’m sure that a large part of the Cuban people would fight to the bitter end. Of course, I wish, hope, and almost pray that this doesn’t happen.

Silvio Rodríguez, who will be touring Spain in September, with eight concerts, declines the interviewer’s opportunity to lament the lack of solidarity from other countries, which he attributes more to a fear of the three major powers vying for global dominance. “I think the old tactic of nuclear blackmail is playing a significant role in this situation,” he says.

In his view, China—one of those powers—is the only country in the world that “has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in just a few decades,” as has Vietnam, “after a devastating war.” Both countries have implemented economic liberalization measures that Cuba has not undertaken, even though they have one-party systems, two facts that Rodríguez highlights and that give an idea of the direction he would like the transition on the island to take. “Seeing the world as it is and the injustices that some commit, I don’t think that multiparty systems, a priori, are a guarantee of justice.”

The interview ends when he’s asked what he thinks will happen. “I’m no fortune teller. I don’t know the details of how decisions are made in the upper echelons. I only see the results,” says the troubadour, whose words don’t sound hopeful. “I’m worried that we’ll emerge from this situation more selfish than altruistic. That all this won’t make us better, but the opposite. I’m worried about the humanity we’re being stripped of with such cruelty,” he concludes.

______________________

Havana Chronicles: A Circus Facing Off Against Power, and a City Growing Increasingly Lonely

While a tent is set up next to Revolution Square, blackouts and urban decay deepen the isolation of Cubans.

The circus tent set up a few meters from the Council of State, with the tower of Revolution Square in the background. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Yoani Sánchez, Havana, June 14, 2026 / They’ve set up a circus in my neighborhood. A blue tent now stands just a few meters from the Council of State, and the tower of the Plaza de la Revolución blends into the horizon with the yellow stripes that crown its roo. Children wander around curiously, and the neighbors haven’t missed the opportunity to joke about the clowns and illusionists who always proliferate in the area. “If they’re the trainers, then we’re the animals,” an old woman warns me as soon as I approach the plaza where the hammering of preparations still echoed this Saturday.

I came here via Hidalgo Street. Earlier, I passed the bakery at the rationed market, with its endless line of people carrying empty bags. I had to dodge the stream of sewage that gushes from a drain and snakes for over a hundred meters. Garbage also stretches for entire blocks in what was once an area dominated by vegetation and tall buildings. Not anymore. Nuevo Vedado is, at this moment, like much of Havana, a succession of mountains of trash, broken streets, and weary faces.

“They didn’t cut off our power all night,” another neighbor tells me, relieved. He says it in a low voice, almost a whisper, as if afraid of alerting the electric company that our building had finally been able to sleep through the night for the first time in weeks. You almost feel guilty for having so many hours of electricity. When I woke up shortly after four in the morning and looked out onto the roof, I saw several buildings near Colón Street plunged into darkness. “Those are the victims of our left-on lights,” I thought to myself.

In my building, fewer and fewer people are using the elevator. The fear of being trapped in the middle of a power outage discourages anyone from entering that metal box, which transforms into a sauna as soon as the electricity goes out. Some neighbors spend entire days without leaving their homes because knee pain and other ailments prevent them from going up and down the stairs. The energy crisis has a less visible face: immobility and social isolation. Thousands, hundreds of thousands of Cubans across the island have lost contact with friends, acquaintances, and even family members because getting around has become too difficult.

A friend who lives in Central Havana tells me that an elderly man in her building died of “loneliness.” She says it just like that, abruptly, as if desolation had already crept into the Cuban medical lexicon as an official cause of death. continue reading

A friend who lives in Central Havana tells me that an elderly man in her building died of “loneliness”

“He stopped going out,” she explains. “Before, he would go to the bank to queue for his pension, but his legs were so sore, and he couldn’t stand for hours.” Then they suspended a social gathering where he met with other retirees to listen to boleros or dance danzón. The lack of electricity has canceled shows, social gatherings, and get-togethers. It has also silenced many conversations.

Finally, “he would just stand at the window watching the people walking down the street. He could go weeks without speaking to anyone.” The day they found him dead, it was the neighbors themselves who had to pay for the cremation.

“I kept the urn containing the ashes to see if my only son ever comes to Cuba, but for now we don’t even know how to find him.”

Abandonment and lack of communication kill, without a doubt.

“I’ve kept the urn containing the ashes to see if his only son ever comes to Cuba, but for now we don’t even know how to find him.”

After exploring the area around the circus, I head towards La Timba. I walk through several of its potholed streets and past its low houses, so different from the twelve-story buildings I’ve left behind. I pass by the National Theater. Everything is silent and empty. There was a time when it was rare for a weekend to go by without one of its halls being filled with children who had come to see a show. Now, only the echo of silence remains.

A woman asks me for the time just as I start to go down the main staircase of the complex.

We chatted for a few minutes about the weather, the power outages, and how bad the transportation system is. She blurts out sentences quickly, one after another, almost without pausing for breath. It seems like she’s been holding them in for too long.

“Oh, mija, it’s just that I have no one to talk to anymore,” she apologizes.

And I think then that this may be one of the most devastating consequences of the Cuban crisis: the epidemic of loneliness that is spreading everywhere.

Note: The above photo is a video in the original, but it failed an attempt to be copied and inserted in this post. It can be viewed (without translation) here.

Previous Havana Chronicles:

Chronicle of a Monday That Feels Like Wednesday

“We Used to Complain About the ‘CUC’, But Now We Miss It”

The Roar of Despair of a Cuban Woman Returning to Her Country After Many Years

The Tulipán Market Closed: “They’ve Given the Order To Go to the March for Raúl”

Along Carlos III Street and towards Ethiopia

Sleeping Is Also a Privilege in Havana

A Desperate Plea in the Middle of the Dark Havana Night: ‘Light!’

The Refuse of Disenchantment

Under a Picture-Postcard Blue Sky, the Country is Crumbling

Fatigue Barely Allows One to Enjoy the ‘Lights On’ in Havana

Dollars, the Classic Card, and a Havana Without Tourists

A Journey Through the Lost Names of Havana

The Shipwreck of a Ship Called “Cuba”

Havana Seen From ‘The Control Tower’

In Havana, the Only Ones Who Move Are the Mosquitoes

Reina, the Stately Street Where Garbage is Sold

Searching for Light Through the Deserted Streets of Havana

The Death Throes of ‘Granma’, the Mouthpiece of a Regime Cornered by Crisis

The Anxiety of the Disconnected Cuban

One Mella, Three Mellas, Life in Cuba Is Measured in Thousands of Pesos

It Is Forbidden To Leave Home in Cuba Today Because It Is a “Counter-Revolutionary Day”

Vedado, the Heart of Havana’s Nightlife, Is Now Converted Into a Desert

Havana, in Critical Condition
______________________

“A Transition Without Negotiation With the Military Would Be Very Difficult in Cuba”

Laura Tedesco and Rut Diamint warn that democratisation will require dismantling Gaesa’s economic power

“Members of the FAR [Revolutionary Armed Forces] do not enjoy as many privileges as those who are connected to FAR companies.”

14ymedio, Yunior García Aguilera, Madrid, 14 June 2026 / Laura Tedesco and Rut Diamint have spent years studying one of the most sensitive issues in any democratic transition: the role of the Armed Forces when an authoritarian regime falls, exhausts itself or transforms. Both Argentine academics – Tedesco is a professor at Saint Louis University in Madrid, and Diamint is a member of the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research in Argentina (Conicet) and a professor at the Torcuato Di Tella University – have researched civil-military relations in Latin America, the limits of military power, the democratic management of defence, and the risks that arise when uniformed personnel retain political, economic or corporate privileges after a change of regime.

Together they have analysed the Cuban case from a perspective rarely seen in public debate: not just what would happen to the Communist Party or to the opposition in a transition, but what role the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), the Ministry of the Interior and the business network formed by the powerful military conglomerate Gaesa – which controls the majority of the national economy – would play.

14ymedio submitted the questionnaire to both experts in writing; they agreed on their answers and replied jointly, except on one question, where they offered their opinions separately.

“Resistance to change does not come so much from the FAR as from other political and economic structures”

García Aguilera. Can there be a real democratic transition in Cuba without explicit negotiation with the military?

Tedesco and Diamint. There can be, although it is very difficult, and the military who enjoy privileges and benefits do not want to lose them. A transition without negotiation will weaken the new government. The first government must be clear that it will have to make concessions in order to achieve governability.

García Aguilera. After studying Latin American transitions and the Cuban case, do you believe the FAR can be part of the democratic solution, or are they, given their current structure, the main obstacle to any real change?

Laura Tedesco and Rut Diamint. They are not the main obstacle, but there is no visible leadership at this moment pointing towards a democratisation of the FAR. It is possible that the FAR will initially defend the new regime and, when existing conditions are no longer favourable, will find ways to adapt, just as happened continue reading

in other countries in Latin America.

García Aguilera. In a transition, how can one avoid the risks of a military coup, clandestine resistance from the repressive apparatus, a split between factions, or pockets of internal rebellion?

Laura Tedesco and Rut Diamint. Resistance to change does not come so much from the FAR as from other political and economic structures. Just as happened in the countries of the former Soviet Union, they adapted to change, and Cuba has forces accustomed to the party’s command – they have no tradition of staging coups.

In the Cuban case, what is uncertain is how those military personnel connected to the economy through Gaesa will react. Members of the FAR do not enjoy as many privileges as those who are connected to FAR companies.

“Truth, justice and reparation are necessary processes for a democratic transition”

García Aguilera. How can one prevent military commanders from converting their economic power into political impunity during a transition?

Diamint. The military are soldiers of the economic owners. They are not the ones who give the orders, but the economic reforms will be the easiest to implement and the ones that will face the least resistance.

Tedesco. I do not agree with this one hundred per cent. I believe that military hierarchs will negotiate their economic and political role. The military hierarchs connected to companies have a great deal to lose.

García Aguilera. What combination of truth, justice and reparation would be viable to address the victims without falling into the extremes of amnesia or vengeance?

Laura Tedesco and Rut Diamint. Without transitional justice there will be no change, but today there are no leaders visible with sufficient legitimacy to convince society of the futility of revenge.

Truth, justice and reparation are necessary processes for a democratic transition. It must be borne in mind that the dictatorship has been in government for decades. Will it be possible to return the properties confiscated in the 1960s? Probably not. Perhaps only those that have been converted into schools or other public institutions. Those properties that are in private hands should not be expropriated.

García Aguilera. Do you believe that a Ministry of Defence led by civilians should be created from the outset?

Laura Tedesco and Rut Diamint. Yes, with clear mandates defining what will and will not be accepted. And what role the FAR will have in a democracy. With a new name that separates them from the failure of the Revolution.

“We believe that leaders and society do not understand the military problem and the power they represent”

García Aguilera. Costa Rica abolished its army and Panama eliminated its military forces after the fall of Noriega. Are these useful models for Cuba, or historical exceptions that are difficult to replicate? Could part of the FAR structures be transformed into civil protection corps, coastguards, firefighters, forest rangers, natural disaster response units or infrastructure reconstruction teams? Once Castroism is over, would Cuba need an army?

Laura Tedesco and Rut Diamint. In a country so militarised it is difficult to contemplate eliminating them. All armed forces have secondary or subsidiary missions, but these cannot be their primary purpose. Furthermore, Costa Rica had an elite agreement to eliminate the military, and Noriega held a genuine military rank, unlike Raul Castro. Those experiences cannot be transplanted to Cuba – the times, the conditions and the hegemony of the United States are all different.

García Aguilera. What should the democratic opposition, civil society and the exile community be doing right now to prepare for the military problem?

Laura Tedesco and Rut Diamint. We believe that leaders and society do not understand the military problem and the power they represent. The wave of remilitarisation sweeping our region is closely linked to that ignorance among politicians of what the military is and how to use it.

The FAR will not vacate their privileged position of their own accord. A leader with broad legitimacy and well-advised must, in his or her first days in government, send a clear message and execute the necessary measures to begin the path towards civilian control of the Armed Forces.

In the case of the FAR, there must be civilian control of the military and the elimination of the economic role they exercise through Gaesa. The negotiation will be complicated and the FAR will put up every obstacle necessary to maintain their privileged position.

________

This text was produced in collaboration with Cuba Siglo 21 as part of the project “Cuba: stabilise and develop”.

Translated by GH.

______________________

“Fishing is Saving Us From Hunger”

For lack of fuel, Matanzas cannot celebrate the traditional red snapper run this year

Theo is an octogenarian who has left the boats behind to take up sport fishing from the wall of the San Juan River. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Pablo Padilla Cruz, Matanzas, 14 June 2026 / Like two liquid daggers, the San Juan and Yumurí rivers cut through the geography of Matanzas. Before dawn, human silhouettes are already etched against the riverbanks. They carry nylon line, bait bags, cast nets and sport fishing rods. The people of Matanzas have the relationship with water and fish in their blood, but today that bond does not answer to the pleasure of a pastime, but to a far more relentless force: the urgency of putting food on the table in a city where the engines of the fishing fleet have fallen silent.

The fuel crisis and general shortage of supplies have completely transformed the map of local fishing. What was once a thriving deep-sea industry is today a silent resistance waged along the river’s edge.

From a footbridge that divides the Yumurí River in two, Joel prepares his tackle with his gaze fixed on the current. He is one of that tide of citizens who have had to look to the water for the sustenance that the markets cannot provide. His tone carries a heavy urgency, that of a man who knows his day’s work decides what his family will eat.

A fish today in Cuba can make the difference between eating something or going to sleep with an empty stomach.

“My friend, fishing is saving us,” says Joel without taking his eyes off the water. “My family has lived close to the river for generations and it has saved us from hunger more than once. A fish today in Cuba can make the difference between eating something and going to bed with an empty stomach. Many of us fish out of tradition or because we enjoy it, but lately people also fish for what they can put on the table.”

From a pedestrian bridge that bisects the Yumurí River, Joel prepares his fishing gear, his gaze fixed on the current. / 14ymedio

As he casts his line, Joel confesses his frustration, gazing at the horizon, a place that seems forbidden to ordinary Cubans today: “I’ve always wanted to own a boat and fish in the open sea, but the way things are, many boat owners are like me, fishing from the shore. The rise in oil prices has hit them so hard that some haven’t been able to go out to sea for almost a year. How do you make a living when what you staked everything on as your way of life continue reading

ends?”

The dilemma Joel raises cuts to the heart of Matanzas’s fishing sector. Historically, June marked the beginning of the red snapper run. The fish would enter the bay and the water would become a dense mass of launches, boats and artisanal craft competing for the largest specimens, destined for sale or family consumption.

However, going after the red snapper is today a mathematical gamble in which the fishermen are set up to lose. This method requires keeping the engine running at low revs (usually between 4 and 7 knots) for hours, interspersed with short bursts at full throttle to reach the “ledge” or the reef edge and return before the weather turns.

A typical outing requires between 6 and 8 hours of navigation, with fuel consumption varying between 30 and 60 litres. Add to this the strict rule of thirds – one third of fuel to reach the spot, one third for the work and the final third to guarantee the return – and the actual fishing time is extremely short. Casting the nets badly or hitting a run of bad luck means not just coming back empty-handed, but facing ruin.

The river has become the region’s last social safety net / 14ymedio

On the docks of the San Juan River, Antuan, the captain of a boat he does not own, assesses the situation with the cold pragmatism and irony of someone who knows the operating costs of the sea inside out.

“The idea that fishing makes us rich might have worked before,” Antuan says with a bitter smile. “Now, without fuel, owning a boat is a matter of wanting it but not being able to. Some of us save fuel for the snapper run, but a bad catch can wipe out all our savings. Others couldn’t even afford to save a couple of liters. That’s why there’s a saying that’s popular among us: when you buy a boat, you’ll be happy three times: the first time when you buy it, the second time when you go fishing for the first time, and the third time when you sell it and pass the problem on to someone else.”

The paralysis of the fleet does not only affect the sailors: it also empties the tables of the city. The fish that remain in the sea are food that never reaches the homes of the people of Matanzas. Against this backdrop, the river has become the region’s last social safety net.

The fleet’s paralysis doesn’t just affect sailors: it also empties the city’s tables.

Theobulo, whom everyone in the neighbourhood affectionately calls Theo, is an octogenarian who has left the boats behind to take up sport fishing from the wall. With the perspective gained from decades walking the same quays, Theo offers a historical and melancholy view of the deterioration of river life.

Theo fishing in the San Juan River, in Matanzas. / 14ymedio

“Son, I grew up right here beside the river and I know more than half the owners of these boats,” relates Theo as he adjusts his rod. “Now, compared to a couple of decades ago, everything is harder. There’s no oil to go out fishing and there’s more hunger in the streets too. Those fish that don’t get caught no longer feed anyone in the city. Now many people, in the afternoon, take their lines and cast them trying to hook some little fish.”

Necessity has forced the people of Matanzas to break taboos and look for any alternative in the water – dynamics that the official narrative prefers to gloss over. “There’s even a woman who catches crabs and sells them,” the old man continues. “I think the newspaper Girón interviewed her a while back, but they never mentioned her need to sell what she takes from the river to get by.”

“There’s no fuel to go out fishing and there’s more hunger in the streets”

When asked whether he misses the adrenaline of sailing out to sea, Theo stares at the calm waters of the river, aware of his own good fortune but sceptical about the future: “My time at sea has passed. Now I fish on the shore for the odd little fish, for the fun of it. Luckily, I don’t need the river to eat… for now. Who knows about tomorrow,” he concludes at the very moment a small fish takes his hook and is pulled from the water.

The fishing landscape of Matanzas has been laid bare. While the red snapper complete their natural cycle in the bay, free from the pressure of the engines, the population crowds onto the bridges and riverbanks, trying to catch their daily sustenance by hand. The city’s fishing, stripped of its fuel, survives today on nylon line, patience and the bare necessity of keeping alive.

Translated by GH.

______________________

Silvano Pedroso, the First Black Bishop of the Church in Cuba, Has Died

The 73-year-old prelate of Guantánamo-Baracoa was remembered as a humble pastor who was close to the most vulnerable Cubans.

Pedroso had returned to Cuba on June 3 from Rome, where he had spent several months and undergone various medical tests. / Vida Nueva

14ymedio, Havana, 13 June 2026 / Monsignor Silvano Herminio Pedroso Montalvo, Bishop of Guantánamo-Baracoa and first Black prelate of the Cuban Catholic Church, died in the early hours of this Saturday in Havana, at the age of 73, after several weeks in a critical condition due to an oncological illness.

The Cuban Catholic Bishops’ Conference confirmed the death of the cleric and announced that his funeral would take place this same Saturday at the parish of Santa Catalina de Siena, located on the corner of 25th Street and Paseo, in the Havana neighbourhood of El Vedado. After the ceremony, the funeral cortège will make its way to the Colón Cemetery, where his remains will be interred.

Pedroso had returned to Cuba on 3 June, having come from Rome, where he spent several months undergoing various medical tests. During his stay in the Italian capital he received treatment at the Agostino Gemelli hospital and at the infirmary of the Society of Jesus.

The Cuban Church had initially announced, in February, that the bishop was suffering from severe gastritis, but subsequent examinations revealed the existence of an oncological illness. Last Thursday, two days before his death, the Episcopate communicated that his state of health was “very critical” and continue reading

asked for prayers for his recovery.

Born in Cárdenas, Matanzas, on 25 April 1953, Pedroso came to the priesthood after an unusual path among members of the Cuban clergy. He studied Geography at the University of Havana and worked from 1979 to 1982 at the Institute of Physical Planning in Las Tunas.

Pope Francis appointed him Bishop of Guantánamo-Baracoa on 29 March 2018

He did not enter the San Carlos and San Ambrosio Major Seminary until 1987, when he was 34 years old. He was ordained a priest on 12 June 1995 by Cardinal Jaime Ortega Alamino at Havana Cathedral. From that point on he carried out his pastoral work in various communities in Havana and Mayabeque. He served as parish priest in Quivicán, Bejucal, Melena del Sur, and Güines, as well as being responsible for vocational ministry and director of the San Juan María Vianney Priests’ House. From 2013 he had been in charge of the parish of Nuestra Señora del Pilar, in the Havana municipality of Cerro.

His parishioners describe him as a priest of direct contact, accustomed to walking through neighbourhoods and entering the homes of families. Following his episcopal appointment, he was described as a “street priest” – an expression that summed up his way of understanding ministry and his preference for a Church close to ordinary people.

Pope Francis appointed him Bishop of Guantánamo-Baracoa on 29 March 2018. His episcopal ordination took place on 27 May of that year at Havana Cathedral, and he took possession of the diocese on 9 June, during a ceremony held at the Cathedral of Santa Catalina de Ricci in Guantánamo.

His mission unfolded in one of the poorest and most isolated provinces of Cuba, with scattered rural settlements, transport difficulties, and a shortage of priests

He thus became the third holder of a diocese created in 1998 by John Paul II and the first Black bishop in the history of the Catholic Church in Cuba, a country where the ecclesiastical hierarchy has traditionally had a racial makeup that has reflected little of the composition of society.

On receiving the appointment, Pedroso stated that he wished to be close to the most needy communities, and chose as his episcopal motto a phrase from the Gospel of Saint John: “Love one another as I have loved you.” His mission unfolded in one of the poorest and most isolated provinces of Cuba, with scattered rural settlements, transport difficulties, a shortage of priests, and communities that suffer in an especially severe way from the deterioration of public services, the lack of food, and the energy crisis.

During his eight years at the head of the diocese, he maintained a discreet profile, removed from public confrontations with the authorities, but focused on pastoral and social care. His figure gained prominence through his support of vulnerable families and his visits to remote communities in the Guantánamo territory.

The United States Embassy in Havana expressed its condolences this Saturday to the Catholic Church and to those mourning his death. In its message, the diplomatic mission stated that Pedroso had dedicated his life “to the service of God and of ordinary Cubans.”

With his death, the diocese of Guantánamo-Baracoa, situated at the eastern tip of the country, falls vacant

“A humble and approachable pastor, he distinguished himself by accompanying those who suffered most and by walking alongside his communities in times of difficulty,” said the Embassy, which also highlighted his “deep love for Cuba” and his dedication to ensuring that citizens could live “with dignity and hope.”

Pedroso’s final journey to Rome was connected to the ad limina visit of the Cuban bishops, although the collective meeting had to be postponed due to the severe fuel shortage affecting the Island. The prelate nonetheless managed to meet with Pope Leo XIV on 20 February. The Holy See did not reveal the details of that conversation. By then, his health had begun to deteriorate and he had to remain in Italy to receive medical care.

With his death, the diocese of Guantánamo-Baracoa, situated at the eastern tip of the country, falls vacant. The Church will need to provisionally appoint a diocesan administrator until the Pope designates his successor.

“I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith,” wrote the US Embassy in its farewell to the bishop, quoting the Second Letter of Saint Paul to Timothy.

Translated by GH.

______________________

Díaz-Canel Creates False Expectations About Economic Reforms in Cuba

Only in tourism is there a possibility of change, still undefined, with “new approaches and new players” to exploit existing infrastructure.

Díaz-Canel speaks to the press about the approved changes. / cubadebate

14ymedio, Madrid, June 12 2026 / Cuba’s official press managed to create expectations for a few minutes by announcing that Miguel Díaz-Canel would make public this Friday a package of economic reforms that would include “new actors in tourism,” among other changes listed by the Cuban Television journalist Lázaro Manuel Alonso.

Among the alleged new features were “direct import and export, elimination of prohibited activities, reduction of the state apparatus, removal of obstacles to the development of companies, use of land by those who can truly produce, entry of new actors into the management and production of energy, and the encouragement of electric mobility.”

“Without first resolving a moderately functional framework for international integration, nothing else could be effective.”

“Belated pragmatism with no apparent clear connections between the measures. Without first resolving a moderately functional framework for international integration, nothing else could be effective. We’ll see the details,” said Cuban economist Pedro Monreal in a swift reaction. He was not mistaken.

At least three of the changes mentioned were already known and had little or no impact on social demands. One is the reduction of the size of the state, which was announced in May and finalized with the bill published this week. The number of ministries is reduced from 27 to 20, and a new Ministry of Information and Social Communication is created, which promises to be another instrument of ideological control.

On the same day, the draft Law on Agricultural and Forestry Lands was released, which establishes state ownership of most lands, with the exception of 20% that already belong to cooperatives and private individuals. The law opens the door for foreign companies to lease land for production, explicitly prohibits the sale of land to non-Cubans, and imposes restrictions on the freedom of continue reading

agricultural producers, who will be penalized if they leave land idle.

Everything announced is part of the so-called Economic and Social Program for 2026

Nor is the legislation reforming exports new. It was published in April through two decrees that foreshadowed the eventual loss of Acopio’s monopoly, thanks to the entry of private companies, although the state-owned company will continue to have an advantage due to its infrastructure and its political and business clout. These provisions also opened up direct sales, but the State reserved the most profitable sectors for itself.

After so much media fanfare, the announcement amounted to nothing when Cubadebate published the president’s remarks from a lengthy press conference whose duration didn’t reflect the novelty. Everything announced is part of the so-called Economic and Social Program for 2026. Only in tourism is there a glimpse of a possibility, so vague that it can hardly be called an announcement.

Díaz-Canel said that it is necessary to move towards “new modalities, with new players” that will allow for the development of “all the infrastructure we have,” after admitting that the sector has been hit hard by Washington’s sanctions. “We cannot think, at this time, only about the large chains when many of them, due to pressure from the United States government, have withdrawn from the country.” The president said: “We are managing businesses in the real estate and tourism sectors, with new modalities and with other actors who are not those who have traditionally been involved in these areas.” Without more details.

Regarding energy, more of the same. Díaz-Canel insisted that the focus now is on advancing the energy mix and moving towards solar. “We are going to remove, as much as possible, the limitations on vehicle imports. We will always prioritize, in terms of tariffs and prices, the import of electric vehicles that are charged with solar energy,” he added.

More promises: the retention of human capital. The president stated that there are “actions and measures” aimed at attracting, above all, young people, especially through higher wages. He did not explain how better wages can be offered in a devastated economy like Cuba’s, with all sectors destroyed, which has led to the loss of up to 20% of the population in recent years.

Nor was it surprising, in a speech that was yet another exercise in wishful thinking, that he said trade would be promoted and that electronic invoicing would be implemented.

It was also unsurprising, in a speech that was yet another exercise in good intentions by the Cuban regime, that he said trade would be promoted and electronic invoicing would be implemented—given the current state of the telecommunications system and the failure of the banking reform. Furthermore, he “announced”—as Cubadebate explicitly states —that “prohibited activities will be limited,” making it clear that they will not be eliminated entirely, but rather that the corporate purpose “will be as broad as possible” and “the possibilities for shareholding will be expanded.”

Díaz-Canel again appealed to Cuban emigrants for help and said that measures are being taken for the use of bank accounts by foreigners and for the elimination of obstacles, though he did not specify what those measures were. “Also discussed are two particular forms of investment by Cubans: that of Cubans residing abroad and that of Cubans in Cuba; and that they can participate on equal terms as economic actors alongside foreign direct investment, alongside state-owned enterprises, alongside non-state entities and cooperatives in the country’s economic and productive framework,” he insists now.

Another of the topics discussed that was already known is the possibility of different types of business associations, such as the decentralization of certain decisions to municipalities or the ability of each company to design its own salary system.

The talk was preceded by Díaz-Canel’s reflections on the real reason that has led to this point: the tightening of US sanctions. “The United States cannot forgive itself for the fact that, at this stage, with all the maximum pressure they have exerted, the Revolution continues to exist and the country continues to function. And not even they themselves believe what they talk about and repeat so much about a failed State,” he asserted, also announcing that the option of a people’s war remains on the table should an aggression occur.

The president spoke of a “multidimensional aggression as part of a totally aggressive policy by the United States government toward Cuba, with utter contempt and an interventionist character,” and said that this presents an opportunity for new ideas and mechanisms, as happened—he compared—in Vietnam. Then, however, he not only failed to announce anything that could counter the latest decisions from the White House, but rather, on the contrary, seemed to make it clear that there is no economic transition in sight. At least, not under his control.

______________________

New Cooking Gas Tariff in Havana Doubles Previous Price, According to Informal Notice to Residents

The price per cubic metre rises from 2.50 to 4.97 pesos, while prices for households without a meter range from 100 to 400 CUP depending on the number of occupants

14ymedio, Havana, 13 June 2026 / “Pass this on to the neighbours so everyone finds out in time.” That is the warning accompanying a new price table for manufactured gas – cooking gas – that has been circulating since this weekend through various WhatsApp groups in Havana. The table nearly doubles the current tariff and significantly increases the bill for customers who do not have a meter.

According to the message, the cubic metre will rise to 4.97 pesos, compared to the 2.50 established since January 2021. A household consuming 30 cubic metres a month, for example, will no longer pay 75 pesos but will instead owe 149.10.

The increase amounts to 98.8%, but the blow will be greater for so-called non-metered customers, whose bill does not depend on actual consumption but on a quantity of cubic metres assigned according to the number of residents in the dwelling.

The table being circulated sets a monthly payment of 99.40 pesos for households of one or two people, corresponding to 20 cubic metres. Households of between three and five residents will have to pay 298.20 pesos for 60 cubic metres, while dwellings with six or more occupants will be assigned 80 cubic metres and a bill of 397.60 pesos.

The informal document also sets the cost of a cut-off and reconnection at 370 pesos, far above the 50 pesos established in the regulations approved under the Tarea Ordenamiento. [Ordering Task].

The increase amounts to 98.8%, but the blow will be greater for so-called non-metered customers

As of this Saturday, neither the Manufactured Gas Company, nor Unión Cuba-Petróleo, nor the Ministry of Energy and Mines had published on their websites any communication confirming the new prices. Nor has the corresponding resolution been found in the Gaceta Oficial.

The message itself, as shared among customers, acknowledges that the information is still awaiting public release. “In any case, it will be announced through the company’s official channels,” states the text, which asks recipients to pass the warning on to their neighbours.

The absence of any official explanation has raised doubts about continue reading

the date of entry into force, the territorial scope of the measure, and the procedure for determining consumption in dwellings without a meter.

Manufactured gas is distributed primarily across several Havana municipalities through a pipeline network, unlike liquefied gas, which is sold in cylinders. Metered customers’ bills are calculated from the monthly meter reading, while non-metered customers are charged a fixed rate based on the composition of the household.

The most recent official tariff found appears in Extraordinary Official Gazette No. 68, published on 10 December 2020 as part of the monetary reform measures. The regulation set the retail price of manufactured gas at 2.50 CUP per cubic metre and that of liquefied gas at 21.30 pesos per kilogram.

The measure hits especially hard those dwellings that have no meter and cannot reduce their bill through conservation

The provision also established a maximum rate of 65 pesos per hour for new installation, renovation, modification, or equipment fitting work, and 50 pesos per hour for cut-off and reconnection services.

If the new table is confirmed, the price per cubic metre will have remained unchanged for more than five years before experiencing a near-100% rise. However, for some non-metered customers the total increase in the bill could be considerably greater, owing to the volume of consumption that will be automatically assigned to them.

A three-person household, for example, will have to pay for 60 cubic metres regardless of whether their actual consumption falls below that figure. The measure hits especially hard those dwellings that have no meter and cannot reduce their bill through conservation.

The informal circulation of such measures has become commonplace in Cuba, where users learn of price changes, service interruptions, and new regulations through neighbourhood groups before the authorities announce them publicly.

“Now we just need the bill to arrive,” commented a Havana resident after receiving the table in her building’s chat group. In a city subject to lengthy blackouts, manufactured gas remains one of the few relatively stable alternatives for cooking – but it may also be about to cease being one of the cheapest.

Translated by GH.

______________________

Cuba is 4th Worst in the World in Inflation, Surpassed Only By Venezuela, North Korea and Iran

Official data for May indicates a year-on-year increase of 15.89%, while the rise in prices in the informal market skyrockets by 66%.
Due to the depreciation of the peso – 40% in one year – powdered milk went from 2,000 pesos per kilo on April 7 to 2,400 on May 26 and 3,200 on June 4

Prices continue their relentless climb in formal markets and, even worse, in informal ones. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, June 12, 2026 / “The price of a four-pound package of chicken went up to 2,000 pesos, 100 pesos more in just one day. And powdered milk went up to 3,200 pesos per kilo,” lamented a Havana resident last week as he left a small business. The price surge has regained momentum in recent months, and official data reflects this. So far this year, the consumer price index stood at 9.16% in May, two points higher than in the same month last year, and the year-on-year variation reached 15.89%.

This is in the formal market; if we look at the informal market, things get worse. As of June 7, US economist Steve Hanke, who regularly analyzes country-by-country data including the informal market, placed Cuba’s inflation at 66% year-on-year. Venezuela remains the world champion, with 574% despite economic changes, followed by North Korea (201%) and Iran (115%). Cuba ranks fourth, its national currency having depreciated by 40% in a year, according to the same author.

The accelerating loss of purchasing power for Cubans is the final straw in this situation. The peso is plummeting so drastically that even the freely convertible currency [MLC] is gaining strength by leaps and bounds. This Wednesday, the MLC was trading at 430 pesos on the informal currency market, and just one day later, on Thursday night, it was already trading at 488 pesos. The euro remains unattainable, trading at 730 CUP, while the most important currency, the dollar, is trading at 642, nine days after reaching a record high of continue reading

600.

This Wednesday, the MLC was trading at 430 pesos in the informal currency market, and just one day later, on Thursday night, it was already trading at 488 pesos.

The most serious aspect of the situation is that there seems to be no end in sight. Data published by the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI) reflects considerable price increases in some food items, which 14ymedio has already observed in June. Powdered milk is one of the products that saw the largest price increase in May, according to ONEI, at 6.2%. This newspaper, which publishes weekly prices from various markets across the island, recorded a price of 2,000 pesos for this product on April 7, which rose to 2,400 pesos on May 26, and by June 4 had already reached 3,200 pesos.

Powdered milk has been identified by authorities as one of the products experiencing shortages— preventing its normal distribution to children, who are theoretically entitled to it by the state—due to the suspension of operations by several shipping companies for fear of US sanctions and because of fuel shortages. However, some traditionally domestic products, or even those currently exported, are also experiencing significant price increases.

This is the case with coffee, which in May—according to the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI)—rose 7.7%. Data from 14ymedio indicates that the price of coffee beans was 600 pesos on April 4, 750 on May 16, and 850 on May 30. As for sugar, once a mainstay of the Cuban economy and now a commodity that must be imported, the price increase recorded in May on the official market was 7.69%, and the rise continues, as this newspaper was able to verify. The price was 320 pesos per pound on April 26, 380 on May 30, and 450 on June 4.

Flour, salt, and all meats also saw price increases of between 2.5% and 9% in the CPI report. Furthermore, the restaurants and hotels division, which includes food cooked outside the home, rose 2.93% last month—only alcoholic beverages and tobacco, at 3.13%, exceeded this figure—and now represents a cumulative increase of 14.95% this year and 26.54% compared to last year.

Food is also almost 20% more expensive than in May 2025, the category that most affects the population. Transportation is not far behind; although it didn’t increase significantly in the last month analyzed, it is already officially 21.7% more expensive.

Food is also almost 20% more expensive than in May 2025, the category that most affects the population. Transportation is not far behind; although it didn’t increase significantly in the latest month analyzed, it is officially 21.7% more expensive.

The official press expressed annoyance at the attention given to this issue and dedicated an article to denouncing that the figure was “presented in a decontextualized and malicious way like the percentages of medicine shortages in Cuba.” According to the pro-government publication Razones de Cuba, this “destabilizing” content concealed a different reality: that it was “the deliberate consequence of a policy of economic strangulation designed precisely to generate this scenario of shortages and suffering among the Cuban population.”

______________________

With the Exception of Baracoa and Maisí, There Has Been No Electricity in Guantánamo, Cuba Since Thursday

The Antonio Guiteras power plant is reconnected to the national electricity grid after a week-long shutdown for repairs.

The Antonio Guiteras CTE (Transit Commission) is “in line with the National Electric System and increasing its load,” the UNE (National Union of Electricity Workers) said in a brief statement. / Girón

14ymedio, Havana, Juan Diego Rodríguez, June 12, 2206 / This Friday, two days later than announced, the Antonio Guiteras power plant in Matanzas was finally connected to the national power grid. “In line with the National Electric System and increasing load,” the Cuban Electric Union (UNE) said in a brief but eagerly awaited statement, after a week of repair work.

User comments show just how accustomed Cubans are to the ups and downs of the thermoelectric plants. “Let’s see how long it lasts,” one said. “They’re playing the seesaw game, going in and out, what’s the name of the construction project?” said another. A third, with the same resigned humor, wrote: “We’ll see, because the little girl loves to party on the weekends.” The Guiteras plant went out last Friday due to a leak in the boiler.

The reconnection of the country’s most important power plant comes as Guantánamo province has been disconnected from the national electricity grid (SEN) for a day, with little to no news beyond the local area and a corner of social media. A brief post from Radio Guantánamo indicated that the eastern territory had gone offline “due to a fault in the 110 kV [kilovolt] transmission line that connects the province with Santiago de Cuba,” and assured that “work is underway to locate the fault and resolve it.”

“In my house we haven’t been able to cook anything because my wife and I are chronic asthmatics and charcoal makes us very sick.”

The report also stated that only the municipalities of Baracoa and Maisí had electricity service, supplied through Moa, in Holguín.

“In my house, we haven’t been able to cook anything because my wife and I have chronic asthma, and charcoal makes us very ill. We depend on the electric stove to cook, so since yesterday we haven’t even been able to make coffee,” a man from Guantánamo explained sadly to 14ymedio. He added that neither he nor his wife had been able to continue reading

go to work.

“My wife works in a polyclinic lab, but when there’s no electricity, they can’t pump water to the tanks, and practically all the clinics and services have to close,” he explains. “I work at a small business that makes aluminum windows and doors. Most of the machines we use run on electricity, so the workshop doesn’t open when there’s a power outage.”

None of this is mentioned in the UNE’s daily report, which had already predicted early this morning that the Guiteras plant would be incorporated into the National Electric System (SEN) during peak hours. A total of eight thermal units are out of service: units 5 and 6 of the Máximo Gómez plant in Mariel (Artemisa); units 2 and 3 of the Ernesto Guevara de la Serna thermal power plant in Santa Cruz del Norte (Mayabeque); unit 2 of the Lidio Ramón Pérez plant in Felton (Holguín); unit 5 of the Nuevitas plant (Cienfuegos); and units 5 and 6 of the Renté plant in Santiago de Cuba.

The projected deficit for Friday evening is slightly better than in previous days. With a demand of 3,000 megawatts (MW), a shortfall of 1,690 MW is expected, affecting 1,720 MW, or 57.3% of the required capacity.

______________________