Without Electricity and Lacking Sound Equipment, Sílvia Pérez Cruz Sings to an Emotional Audience in Havana

The Spanish singer chose the San Francisco El Nuevo church for her concert.

Spanish singer Sílvia Pérez Cruz, at the San Francisco El Nuevo church in Old Havana. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Darío Hernández, Havana, August 26, 2026 – Sílvia Pérez Cruz’s velvet voice, capable of moving from flamenco to bolero, from jazz to fado, from copla to French chanson, from Mediterranean folk music to all the colors of the Americas, could not be appreciated in all its splendor this Sunday in Cuba. The concert she gave, free of charge, at the San Francisco El Nuevo church, in the heart of Old Havana, disappointed part of the audience because of the poor sound.

The Renaissance-era church had been deliberately chosen by the Spanish singer precisely because of its acoustics, so that she could offer a recital without electricity and by candlelight. But it did not work out. The cacophony eventually prompted the artist to use a microphone, although it did little to help. The smiles and tireless efforts of the ensemble, completed by the trio of Bori Alberto (bass), Marta Roma (cello) and Carlos Monfort (violin), did not quite succeed.


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With the church packed with people, spectators scattered across the floors, the doors open letting in all the noise from the street, and the heat activating hundreds of fans, it was difficult to hear. Her own songs, such as Verde o Mañana, and versions of others, much beloved in Cuba, such as Veinte años and La tarde gradually made their way through.

The cacophony eventually prompted Sílvia Pérez Cruz to use a microphone, although it did little to help. / 14ymedio

“For a reason, Havana’s orchestras give their concerts at the San Francisco de Asís convent or the San Felipe Neri Oratory, which do have good acoustics,” an expert explained to 14ymedio.

“You can’t understand anything at all, not a single word,” a woman complained before leaving the venue, barely half an hour after the concert had begun. Like her, many others left the concert early.

Another spectator said: “Everyone appreciates that someone like her comes to Havana under these circumstances and gives a free concert, but did no one do a sound check? Someone here didn’t do their job.”

The night before, those attending the private bar La Casa de la Bombilla Verde, in El Vedado, had better luck. There, Sílvia Pérez Cruz sang some “improvised songs,” as she herself described them on her social media, alongside her friend Roly Berrío, and she could be heard flawlessly. continue reading

The Cuban singer — who takes part in the Catalan artist’s song Nombrar es imposible from the album Toda la vida, un día, whose music video was filmed in Havana in 2022 — also attended the San Francisco El Nuevo concert and told 14ymedio about the difficulties of the performance.

The Renaissance-era church had been deliberately chosen by the Spanish singer precisely because of its acoustics, so that she could offer a recital without electricity and by candlelight. / 14ymedio

“It was a beautifully difficult concert. A lot of people, an immense space and a tiny bit of audio, just enough for the voice to float a little above the acoustic, unplugged instruments,” she said in her defense. For the artist, the experience “required a supernatural silence and stillness that was achieved, but which could be broken by little more than a fan moving against the heat.”

Berrío asserts that it was “a very loving concert. Added to the delicacy of the songs and the performance was a strong energy of desire, of wanting to be there, to share, to reach out. Giving and giving and giving. I enjoyed it very much and I will be grateful for it all my life.”

The applause from those who did stay until the end confirms that this was the majority sentiment. At the end of the concert, the artist asked everyone to join together for “one more,” and together they sang De qué callada manera, by Pablo Milanés.

Pérez Cruz herself has spoken of her “intimate relationship” with the Island, which she first came to know through her father, jazz musician Cástor Pérez, who, she says, taught her La tarde, by the legendary Sindo Garay, when she was four years old. She recorded a version of this bolero in 2010, when her father died. He was an expert in Cuban music, as well as a researcher and composer of habanera music, which became enormously popular in Spain beginning in the 19th century.

Another Cuban composer featured in her discography is Marta Valdés, to whom she dedicated an entire album, En la imaginación, in 2011, together with Javier Colina’s trio.

Born in Palafrugell (Girona), Pérez Cruz began her musical career as a member of Las Migas, an original female quartet that has received several Latin Grammy awards, shortly after graduating from the prestigious Catalonia College of Music.

The celebrated Rosalía also studied there, and she has stated that Pérez Cruz was always an inspiration to her and, in fact, invited her to collaborate on La rumba del perdón from her most recent album, Lux.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The El Vedado Project to Collect Garbage with Tricycles Fails

The vehicles the Government was supposed to provide have not arrived, nor has the “solinera” charging station.

Garbage trucks in El Vedado, Havana, in an image shared last July 22. / Pedro Garcés/Gente de Barrio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, August 26, 2026 – Barely two months after it was announced, the El Rampeño local development project in Havana’s El Vedado, intended to collect garbage using electric tricycles, is considered a failure. Its own organizer, Pedro Garcés, president of the Rampa Popular Council, announced this on Tuesday on his active Telegram channel, lamenting that the objective “has not been achieved.”

The official cites several reasons, one of them being the lack of tricycles, which were supposed to be donated “by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and the central Government,” and the fact that the charging station they promised has not been built at the corner of 23rd and J streets. Garcés adds “the delay in the project’s search for alternatives to overcome the country’s own energy needs,” even while having “the support of some institutions and workplaces that help charge the tricycles.”

According to Garcés, the group held a working meeting “with the project’s leadership,” after which they hope “that what was agreed upon by both parties will soon be resolved.”

“The current reality is that we have a mostly clean council, but not the one we optimally need and deserve”

“The current reality is that we have a mostly clean council, but not the one we optimally need and deserve,” the official estimates, despite the fact that the flooding of waste has continue reading

clearly not spared an area once as well-kept as El Vedado.

Garcés asks residents “to double their vigilance and join the fight if they want to achieve a pleasant environment,” and he adds: “Social indiscipline continues to be a cancer that is slowly consuming us, and it is very sad that this is happening.”

And he assures: “Nothing and no one will prevent our Rampa Popular Council from continuing to aspire to be the cleanest, healthiest and most beautified council in the capital of all Cubans.”

Launched last July 1, El Rampeño faced difficulties from the outset, as 14ymedio documented. That same morning, very few containers were emptied, and only five of the 30 planned tricycles were operating.

“We still don’t know where it’s going; we’ve just started and we’re waiting for the delegate to say something,” one of the garbage collectors told a resident of the area at the time. The improvisation was evident, since even the workers themselves did not know where they were supposed to go.

The charging station that was to accompany the project, to charge not only those tricycles but also other vehicles and equipment, remains uncertain. According to initial reports, it would be built in part with funds from the 1% municipal tax on state and private companies. But residents were also supposed to contribute 100 pesos per household, although Garcés said the main payments would not come from individuals but from “entities of all kinds.”

During the past few weeks, the official, who is active in all kinds of community initiatives, has not spoken again about El Rampeño. Not even on July 22, when he reported that garbage had been collected from 15th to 19th streets and from G Street to the Malecón. That was done by ordinary trucks, not tricycles.

The news of El Rampeño’s fiasco, however, coincides with statements by China’s ambassador to Cuba, Hua Xin, who expressed satisfaction on Monday that his country is contributing to garbage collection in the Island’s capital. “Chinese electric tricycles are helping clean Havana,” he wrote on his social media accounts.

In light of what Garcés says, there are not enough vehicles for everything.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Everyone Against Everyone

Céspedes, Martí, Maceo, and Gómez also experienced rumor, defamation, and friendly fire.

Cartoon “Céspedes, immoral and bigamous”, published in 1870 as part of the satirical campaign of the Spanish press against Céspedes. / Clipping / El Moro Muza

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, Yunior García Aguilera, August 22, 2026 / There are days when you open Cuban social media and get the impression that democracy is about to arrive, but it can’t because we’re all too busy attacking each other. The regime delightedly contemplates the spectacle. Now, some of the dirty work is done for free, from Miami, Madrid, Havana, or any corner with Wi-Fi. The official cyber-catfish barely have to lift a finger. We ourselves provide the fuel for the smear campaign.

Perhaps the problem is that we expect too much from our own people. We don’t want people capable of making mistakes, correcting them, irritating us, or disappointing us. We want heroes. But not just any kind of heroes. We want them like those we read about in history books, which were more like coloring books. We want them already cast in bronze, without compromising photos or chats. The bad news is that those heroes never existed.

Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, for example, did not walk peacefully from La Demajagua to the pedestal. His own comrades deposed him as president of the Republic in Arms in 1873. Then came the restrictions, the surveillance, and the bitterness. His correspondence was intercepted, and even his ability to reunite with his family abroad was hindered. He ended up isolated in San Lorenzo, where he died months later facing a Spanish column, alone and possibly betrayed.

“Urgent. The truth about Céspedes’ double life”; “Now we know why they call him the Father of the Nation”

Attacks also circulated regarding his private life. Céspedes had children with Candelaria Acosta, known as Cambula, while he was married, and there were also suspicions that he financially favored his family, accusations against which he defended himself in letters.

Imagine if Facebook had existed: “Urgent. The truth about Céspedes’ double life”; “Now we know why they call him the Father of the Nation.” Céspedes probably wouldn’t have survived a week against continue reading

the algorithm.

Máximo Gómez wouldn’t have fared any better. For Spanish propaganda, he was the Dominican who had gone to Cuba to burn other people’s property. They called him “old Chinaman,” “fox,” a mercenary, and a dictator. If he attacked, he was bloodthirsty. If he maneuvered

Otero Alcántara Receives the 27,000 Letters That Did Not Reach Him While He Was Imprisoned in Cuba

“Despite not having the physical letters, in that moment of anguish, the energy and love of everyone reached me behind the bars.”

Cuban artist Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara at the event ‘Letters of Freedom and Solidarity’, this Tuesday in Miami. / EFE/Alberto Boal

14ymedio biggerEFE (via 14ymedio), Pablo Urbón, Miami / Cuban artist Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara received over 27,000 letters and messages of support on Tuesday in Miami, Florida, from Amnesty International (AI). These messages, sent to him by people from around the world during his five years imprisoned in Cuba, were presented to him at an event called Letters of Freedom and Solidarity held at El Espacio 23, the Miami art center where the Cuban artist is an artist-in-residence until September, having arrived in the U.S. city as an exile on July 18.

“Despite not having the physical letters, in that moment of anguish, everyone’s energy and love reached me behind bars. They nourished my heart and kept me believing that a better future is possible,” the artist wrote in his reply, dated August 22, which he read to the audience. “I thank you all for so much love; you saved my life,” he affirmed.

The letters and postcards come from Escribe por los Derechos [Write for Rights], Amnesty International’s annual campaign through which it selects a dozen cases in need of global solidarity. Otero Alcántara was one of those chosen in 2022, when he was serving a sentence on the island, and the organization declared him a prisoner of conscience.

“A letter may seem like a small thing, a simple gesture, but when a person is unjustly imprisoned, a letter can mean much more than a piece of paper.”

“A letter may seem like a small thing, a simple gesture, but when a person is unjustly imprisoned, a letter can mean much more than continue reading

a piece of paper,” said Amnesty International’s Deputy Director of Research for the Americas, Astrid Valencia, who delivered the letters along with two colleagues from the organization.

“Each letter represents a person who decided to reaffirm the dignity, who decided to refuse to accept injustice as normal,” he added.

In prison, the artist recounted, inmates keep letters for years and reread them again and again. “Giving a photo, giving a letter, writing something by hand meant a reaffirmation of concern from one person to another,” he explained. It was, he added, a pact of friendship in a place where no one is anyone’s friend.

“I was literally convinced that if the artworks didn’t leave, I wouldn’t leave either,” he said, referring to the drawings he made in his cell and couldn’t take out: he would describe them over the phone to artist friends, who would interpret them on the outside. That exercise in communication and resistance, he said, was the true work.

As a token of gratitude, he gave AI a drawing of a door he made in prison, one of the ways, he explained, of seeking a way out: “they are light within the darkness,” Otero concluded, referring to the organization.

Otero Alcántara, co-founder in 2018 of the San Isidro Movement, a collective of artists and intellectuals against cultural censorship in Cuba, arrived in Miami after being released from prison on the condition that he abandon the Island.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Cuba’s Foreign Minister Describes the Renewal of the US Embargo, in Effect Since 1960, as a ‘Genocidal Policy’

Like all his predecessors, Trump invokes his country’s “national interest” to justify his decision

Bruno Rodríguez accused the measure of “coming at the cruellest moment of the US offensive against Cuba in recent years” / X @BrunoRguezP

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, August 25, 2026 / Amid an unprecedented oil embargo against Cuba, US President Donald Trump extended the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), one of the historical legal pillars used to maintain economic sanctions against the island, for another year, until September 2027.

Hours after the extension was published, Havana condemned the measure through Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, who referred to the mechanism as “a genocidal policy that has been maintained against our people for more than six decades.” In a message on X, the Foreign Minister stated that “the renewal of the so-called Trading with the Enemy Act until September 2027 is not a minor administrative act, but rather confirmation that Washington persists in its aim to suffocate an entire nation. This extension comes at the most cruel moment of the US offensive against Cuba in recent years.”

The decision, which appears as Presidential Determination 2026-21, was signed by Trump on August 20 and reinforces the network of sanctions that Havana describes as an “economic, financial and commercial blockade”.

It reinforces the network of sanctions that Havana describes as an “economic, financial and commercial blockade”

“The continuation of the exercise of those powers with respect to Cuba for one year is in the national interest of the United States,” Trump said in the document issued from the White House.

The TWEA, in force since 1917, was applied to Cuba on October 19, 1960 by then-President Dwight Eisenhower in response to the nationalization of American properties after the triumph of the Castro Revolution in 1959. Two years later, President John F. Kennedy signed the decree that continue reading

turned it into an embargo prohibiting commercial and financial transactions with the island.

Over the decades, the policy was codified and strengthened through laws such as the Torricelli Act (1992) and the Helms-Burton Act (1996), which extended its reach to third countries and foreign companies. Since then, every U.S. president has annually renewed the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to Cuba.

The renewal of the embargo does not include new sanctions, travel bans, additional restrictions on remittances, or new Cuban companies on the US blacklist. However, it comes at a very different time than in previous years, as this year the White House has deployed a new sanctions program specifically targeting Cuban officials, state-owned enterprises, and strategic sectors of the Cuban economy.

Trump signed an order expanding sanctions against the Cuban government and authorizing the freezing of assets belonging to officials, state-owned companies, and financial institutions.

On May 1, Trump signed an order expanding sanctions against the Cuban government and authorizing the blocking of assets belonging to officials, state-owned companies, financial entities, and individuals linked to repression, corruption, or strategic sectors of the island’s economy.

This has impacted shipping companies and insurers that transport crude oil and commercial cargo to Cuba, which have canceled deliveries of fuel and other products. Furthermore, the financial embargo has also intensified, potentially leading to multimillion-dollar fines for foreign banks conducting business with Cuban entities, while companies from third countries are threatened with reprisals if they invest in or maintain a presence in strategic sectors such as tourism and mining, triggering a mass exodus of foreign companies from the country.

Havana has repeatedly denounced that US sanctions seek to “suffocate” the national economy, limit access to markets and technologies, and cause shortages of essential goods, with the aim of triggering a social explosion.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Eloy Nebreda and the Call-Up of a Cuban Player in Spain’s Second Division Football

Throughout history, 15 footballers linked to Cuba have played in Spanish soccer’s silver category

Eloy Nebreda received his first official call-up with the Basque institution’s B team / Instagram

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Any Lans, Matanzas, August 25, 2026 /
In soccer, as in life, great achievements rarely happen overnight. Eloy Nebreda was 11 or 12 years old when he began in Real Sociedad’s youth academy. This past August 14, at age 19, on the opening matchday of Spain’s Second Division, he received his first official call-up with the Basque institution’s B team.

The match took place at the Zubieta Sports City Stadium in San Sebastián. The opponent was Castellón, who ultimately won the match 1-0. Eloy sat on the bench for Real’s reserve team, wearing number 33, waiting for his chance to take the field – an opportunity that did not come this time.

But how did a Cuban footballer make his way into Spanish soccer’s second-highest level? First, we need to tell the story of how Eloy Nebreda became Cuban. Although the left-footed winger was born in the Basque Country, his Cuban roots run deep: “My mother is from Alquízar, a town about 60 kilometers from Havana that, curiously enough, was founded by a Basque. She was a dance teacher in Cuba and came to San Sebastián on an artistic tour. There she met my father and ended up staying. At first she kept up with dance, but it’s not easy to make a living from that here. She had to change jobs several times, making her way as best she could. Eventually she managed to start her own insurance company, which is no small thing. The truth is that, like a good Cuban, she has a real entrepreneurial spirit. I admire her enormously for everything she has fought through. To me, she’s a clear example of overcoming adversity.”

“Cuba is present in my life from the moment I wake up. Every morning, the first thing I see from my bed is a Cuban flag hanging in my room”

Although an ocean separates the Iberian Peninsula from a Caribbean island, the memory of his mother’s homeland never leaves him: “Cuba is present in my life from the moment I wake up. Every morning, the first thing I see from my bed is a Cuban flag hanging in my room. After that, Cuban food and music are with me every day. My mother has always been proud of her origins,” Eloy continue reading

points out.

For that reason, when the opportunity arose to represent the senior Cuban national team, the young winger didn’t think twice: “The Cuban Soccer Association contacted me back around March 2025 and told me they had been following me. They asked if I would be willing to play for the Cuban national team. It was a tremendous thrill, and of course I said yes. I’ve always felt very connected to Cuba, I’ve traveled there many times since I was a child, and besides, I was already in the process of applying for Cuban citizenship. That allowed me to get my Cuban passport in September and make my debut with Cuba in November.”

In recent years, Nebreda’s rise at Real Sociedad has been meteoric. In the 2023-2024 season, he had a fruitful loan spell with CD Vasconia, which allowed him to play in the top youth category, the División de Honor, at just 16 years old. During that time, he also made a favorable impression as a left back. In 2024-2025 he was part of Real’s main Under-19 squad and played three matches in the Fourth Division with Real Sociedad C. He spent the entire 2025-2026 season with that third team, this time in the fifth tier, where he responded with two goals in 22 matches. For 2026-2027, a possible debut with the B team in the Second Division cannot be ruled out, although he is most likely to see more playing time with the C team.

“I got to Real Sociedad through some training sessions and tournaments the club organizes with a lot of players”

“I got to Real Sociedad through some training sessions and tournaments the club organizes with a lot of players. At first there were a lot of us, but then the number kept dropping. After a LaLiga Promises tournament that the club had entered me in, they told my parents they wanted me to play for Real Sociedad, and when they told me, I couldn’t believe it, I was so happy. That’s when I realized I was starting to take steps toward fulfilling my dream. Right now, this club is like my second home because of the way they treat me, because here I feel valued and I know they have confidence in me,” he notes.

“I couldn’t tell you which single person has helped me most since I arrived. So I’m grateful to everyone I’ve crossed paths with,” he says, looking back on his time with the club. Even so, one person does come to mind: “I would like to have a special memory for Mitxel Badiola, a coordinator I had through the youth ranks, who sadly is no longer with us. He helped me believe in my own potential, and for that I will always be grateful.” That’s how the defender who arrived from CD Kostkas describes his bond with the San Sebastián side.

Asked about his role models on Real Sociedad’s first team, Eloy replies: “Well, since I’m a winger, I look more to players like Takefusa Kubo or Ander Barrenetxea, who are more the dribbling type, and I identify with them more.”

With Eloy Nebreda’s recent call-up, the count now stands at 15 footballers linked to Cuba in the history of Spanish soccer’s silver category.

“Since I’m a winger, I look more to players like Takefusa Kubo or Ander Barrenetxea, who are more the dribbling type, and I identify with them more”

Because of his ties to the Cuban clubs Olimpia Sporting Club and Real Iberia, some specialized sites attribute Cuban nationality to the Galician-born José Torres Mourelle, who played in the Second Division between 1928 and 1934 with Deportivo La Coruña.

Francisco Betancourt, whose father was Cuban and who is recognized as the first Black footballer to play an official match with FC Barcelona, played 102 matches in the silver division across different spells between 1934 and 1951 with Badalona, Sabadell, and Constancia.

Another player with a past at Barça who also played in the Second Division with Deportivo La Coruña in the 1940s was midfielder Joan Muntaner, born in Chaparra, Cuba, in 1916.

Other players born in Cuba who also passed through Real Madrid were forwards Chus Alonso and Enrique Ferrer, as well as goalkeeper Mario Inchausti. All three played in the second tier. Alonso did so in 1935-1936 with Real Valladolid and in 1949-1950 with Zaragoza; Ferrer played eight matches with Nacional de Madrid in 1935-1936; and Inchausti featured for Zaragoza in 1935-1936 and for Betis in 1940-1941.

Francisco Martín Arencibia, born in Alquízar, had his moment in the Second Division with Granada, between 1947 and 1949

An Atlético de Madrid legend, Francisco Martín Arencibia, born in Alquízar, had his moment in the Second Division with Granada, between 1947 and 1949. The Divino Calvo (“Divine Bald One”) played 33 matches during that stretch, scoring a couple of goals, and flirted with promotion in 1948-1949, when the Andalusians finished third in the standings.

A particular case is that of brothers José and Emilio Álvarez Gutiérrez. Both Cubans played for Cultural Leonesa during the 1974-1975 campaign, in which the team finished last.

In this millennium there is the case of goalkeeper Christian Joel Sánchez, son of fellow Cuban goalkeeper Lázaro Joel Sánchez. Christian Joel had 212 call-ups in the Second Division with Sporting de Gijón between 2018 and 2026. He played 16 matches in the competition, conceding 16 goals and keeping four clean sheets.

Defender Carlos Vázquez, known as Cavafe, and a Cuban national team international on more than one occasion, was called up three times by Alcorcón at the start of the 2020-2021 season.

Alberto Moleiro, whose father is Cuban and who is now a Villarreal star, made his name with UD Las Palmas in the silver category

Forward Alberto Moleiro, whose father is Cuban and who is now a Villarreal star, made his name with UD Las Palmas in the silver category. At that level, he took part in 75 matches between 2021 and 2023, with three goals and nine assists. And, as if that weren’t enough, he experienced promotion to the First Division with the Canary Islanders.

During the 2021-2022 campaign, forward Jorge Aguirre, now a Cuban international whose mother is from Havana, played one match in the silver division with Real Sociedad B, and eight with Mirandés in the other half of the season.

Another player called up for a Second Division match with Real Sociedad B was fullback Alex Carbonell, whose father is from Guantánamo, on November 12, 2021, although he did not see any playing time that time.

Translated by GH
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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The Chinese Ambassador Boasts About Electric Tricycles Helping Collect Trash in Havana

China is helping keep the island afloat, but does not seem willing to become its financial lifeline

China’s ambassador to Cuba, Hua Xin, joined trash collection efforts in Vedado. / @EmbHuaXin

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, August 25, 2026 / The hyperactive Chinese ambassador to Cuba, Hua Xin, highlighted on Monday the use of Chinese-made electric tricycles for collecting trash in Havana and stated that products from his country are contributing both to public services and to the island’s energy transition. The diplomat joined trash collection efforts in Vedado.

“Chinese electric tricycles are helping clean up Havana,” Hua wrote on social media. Chinese cooperation is reaching vital sectors at a time when fuel shortages, blackouts, and the economic crisis have left the capital’s basic services on the verge of collapse.

Hua also noted that he has visited other assembly and welding projects for trucks dedicated to urban sanitation. “Chinese products are contributing to Cuba’s public services and energy transition,” the diplomat said.

The aid has taken on great importance for an economy facing an unprecedented energy crisis and growing ever more dependent on foreign support. Havana and Beijing maintain close political and economic ties – a closeness both governments have repeatedly sought to emphasize in their recent statements. The Asian country has established itself as one of the few allies the island has left.

“Chinese electric tricycles are helping clean up Havana”

Cuba’s energy crisis combines the deterioration of aging infrastructure and decades of low investment with the difficulty of importing fuel, worsened this year by Washington’s pressure measures. China has responded with a series of donations. This month, a new shipment of 15,000 tons of rice arrived in Cuba, part of a 60,000-ton donation. Days earlier, the second phase of a donation of 5,000 photovoltaic solar systems had continue reading

begun.

The Asian country has also committed to a program to install 92 solar parks in Cuba, with a combined capacity of nearly 2,000 megawatts, and Xi Jinping approved assistance in January that includes 80 million dollars for the island.

Beijing has turned solar energy into the main instrument of its cooperation with Havana. Cuban imports of Chinese solar panels rose from about five million dollars in 2023 to 117 million in 2025. By the middle of this year, at least 49 solar parks built with Chinese technology were connected to the national power grid.

But Cuba’s power grid remains deteriorated, storage capacity is insufficient, and most of the energy generated by the solar panels is lost before reaching consumers. Even with the solar rollout, Cuba continues to face blackouts of more than 20 hours a day.

An analysis warns that China does not need Cuba to thrive: it is enough to keep it standing and maintain a relationship that is strategic and manageable for China

A BBC Mundo analysis published in May concluded that, despite the donations and Beijing’s growing role in renewable energy, its support for Havana remains limited. Experts consulted by the BBC noted that China is more cautious than Cuba’s other historic allies and does not intend to take on the role the Soviet Union once played as the island’s almost unlimited financier.

Another analysis from The Diplomat argues that every gap created by US sanctions – from fuel to energy infrastructure – offers Beijing an opportunity to increase its presence on the island. But the same analysis warns that China does not need Cuba to thrive: it is enough to keep it standing and maintain a relationship that is strategic and manageable for China. It sends rice when food is scarce, panels when electricity is scarce, tricycles when fuel is scarce, and assistance when infrastructure is at its limit, but it does not cover the enormous financial hole the island would need to fill to get out of the crisis.

The relationship with Cuba is part of the broader dispute between China and the US for economic and strategic influence in the region

The relationship with Cuba is no longer solely a bilateral matter between Havana and Beijing: it is also part of the broader dispute between China and the US for economic and strategic influence in the region.

Beijing has reasons to keep Cuba on its side. The island occupies a strategic position facing the US and constitutes one of China’s main political footholds in the Caribbean. That geopolitical component has gained more importance as relations between Cuba and the US deteriorate. In the round of sanctions Washington imposed on August 6 against Cuban officials and companies linked to military cooperation with other countries, it specifically singled out the Cuban military attaché in Beijing, whom it accused of taking part in acquiring military equipment from China.

Beijing responded to the sanctions on August 10, which, according to Washington, were related to Cuba’s military cooperation with China and Russia. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun called Chinese-Cuban cooperation “legitimate and transparent” and called on the US to lift its sanctions and the embargo.

Translated by GH
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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Despite Sentences of More Than 10 Years in Prison, Dielectric Oil Thefts Spread Throughout the Country

The official press in Holguín, where 28 cases have been reported, calls these acts an “epidemic” and calls for a firm hand

Repair of a transformer following the theft of dielectric oil, in a file photo. / Granma

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, August 25, 2026 / However much the Cuban regime has toughened penalties for the theft of dielectric oil, the thefts have not let up. In Holguín alone, according to a note published this Monday in the official press, 28 cases have been reported so far, although it is not made clear since when. These incidents, laments ¡Ahora!, “have become a kind of epidemic spread across the entire country, with apparent impunity, given the slowness with which the judicial proceedings opened against those who commit these serious crimes unfold.”

The provincial newspaper cites the most recent cases as examples, which have taken place, for instance, in the town of Levisa (in Mayarí), in the Las Torres neighborhood of the municipality of Urbano Noris, in Moa, and at the Farallones substation, which supplies Cayo Grande. In Levisa, the theft of this oil – which functions as an insulator and coolant and prevents equipment from overheating – affected not only that community but also Nicaro and Cabonico, and in Las Torres, according to ¡Ahora!, it left 69 homes without power.

From a substation in Moa, 3,000 liters of oil were stolen, which harmed 2,000 people “unable to enjoy the mere three hours of electricity that the national electrical system (SEN) can guarantee, as a consequence of the energy siege imposed by the bad neighbor to the North,” the official newspaper stated, referring to the crisis worsened by the energy blockade that the US has been carrying out since the beginning of the year. continue reading

Moa is, precisely, where the most cases have been recorded (7), followed by Mayarí (6), Urbano Noris (4) and Cueto (4)

Moa is, precisely, where the most cases have been recorded (7), followed by Mayarí (6), Urbano Noris (4) and Cueto (4). “Generally the wrongdoers operate in areas far from the towns, which makes their misdeeds easier, but all the territories report this type of impact,” says the official newspaper’s note, which laments that the remedies put in place by the authorities are not producing results.

“Restoring damaged perimeter fences, installing padlocks where warranted, sealing transformer valves, and increasing patrols and inspections of substations are among the measures established by the National Electric Union to prevent these acts of vandalism, which warrant a greater and more coordinated popular rejection given their impact,” they proclaim.

The note recalls that the theft of dielectric oil is classified in the Penal Code as the crime of sabotage and can carry sentences of between 7 and 15 years in prison, and up to 30 years or life imprisonment “if the sabotage causes serious damage or accidents.” In fact, ¡Ahora! notes, citing figures from the Electric Union, “one hundred percent of those convicted of crimes against the SEN received sentences of more than 10 years in prison.”

“The slowness with which the proceedings against the accused unfold, due to adherence to regulations, creates the illusion of impunity”

However, even this is not enough, the Holguín newspaper also acknowledges, stating: “The slowness with which the proceedings against the accused unfold, due to adherence to regulations, creates the illusion of impunity, which encourages the criminal and causes a sense of powerlessness among the population and discredits the police and judicial institutions.”

Two of the trials that have come to light, indeed, show the lengthy sentences. Last May 23, the Prosecutor’s Office sought 12 years in prison against a 36-year-old man accused of stealing 70 liters from a substation in Cayajabos, Artemisa. In July, another sentence of 12 years became known for the theft of oil in Bungo 2 (Contramaestre, Santiago de Cuba), which caused about 48 hours of power outages. But neither the threat of lengthy sentences nor the calls by Prime Minister Manuel Marrero to apply a “firm hand” seem to stop the phenomenon.

In Santiago de Cuba, the theft of dielectric oil from a transformer supplying Molecular Medicine last week not only left the facility affected but also forced the transfer of samples all the way to Granma for a patient in serious condition who needed urgent tests.

It was the most recent incident in the long series of similar thefts that has affected the entire island in recent months. The product, which functions as an insulator and coolant and prevents equipment from overheating, can be used as fuel, in place of diesel, and as a lubricant, which is why it has become prized on the street.

Translated by GH.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Botswana Pays Cuban Doctors One-Quarter of the Salary It Pays the Regime

The mission even prohibits specialists from buying or driving a vehicle.

Cuban pediatrician in Botswana, in an image published by the Island’s state press. / Cubadebate

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, August 25, 2026 – A Cuban doctor on a mission in Botswana receives only $1,000 a month out of the $4,000 that the country’s government pays Havana. That is, 24.4% of the total. The figures were revealed Tuesday in a report by the organization Prisoners Defenders (PD), which obtained access to the bilateral agreement.

According to this document, which, like others of its kind, is not publicly available, Botswana pays Cuba more than $4.2 million annually for 90 specialists. In addition, an internal document, signed just this past July 3, 2026, by the head of the brigade, Pablo Ricardo Betancourt Álvarez, confirms something that has also been documented in other missions: that Cuban healthcare workers are subject to restrictions on “travel, visits, friendships, overnight stays, use of vehicles, freedom of expression, and social life.”

“They live in a prison, and not in Cuba, but in Botswana,” said Javier Larrondo, president of Prisoners Defenders, who cites Betancourt Álvarez’s complete letter. It establishes “mandatory regulations for Cubans, despite their being residents of Botswana.” Among the provisions, the first is a restriction on the “collaborators” leaving their respective districts except for “professional or health matters, and always after prior consultation with the Head of the Cuban Medical Brigade in Botswana.”

Likewise, they are prohibited from “having people who are not part of the Cuban Medical Brigade present in their homes, whether visiting or intending to stay overnight”

Likewise, they are prohibited from “having people who are not part of the Cuban Medical Brigade present in their homes, whether visiting or intending to stay overnight, as well as brigade members staying overnight outside them,” a ban that extends to brigade members visiting the homes of Cuban residents outside the mission, and to activities other than those organized by the brigade.

Specialists on the mission are even prohibited from buying or driving a vehicle without express authorization. And so it goes, through ten regulations, all specifically detailed in the continue reading

Prisoners Defenders report, which adds that it has firsthand sources: professionals who were assigned to Botswana.

For the Madrid-based NGO, the Government of Botswana “cannot claim ignorance of the mechanism that takes away most of the remuneration from Cuban professionals,” because the agreement it signed with Havana “requires the Cuban side to issue a monthly invoice that expressly separates the amount intended for professionals from the amount transferred to Cuba.” Moreover, the African government itself informed its Parliament — on April 1, 2025, according to PD, as recorded in the parliamentary Hansard — of the contractual rate for each doctor: 3,500 euros per month, equivalent to $4,094.65 at the official exchange rate.

And not only that, but administrative documents from Princess Marina Hospital in Gaborone also record remuneration. The example cited by PD consists of reports dating from March 2020 onward, which allocate up to $800 for 18 specialist or coordination positions and were submitted to the Botswana Ministry of Finance.

“State complicity therefore cannot be attributed to ignorance of the payment mechanism”

“State complicity therefore cannot be attributed to ignorance of the payment mechanism,” Prisoners Defenders asserts, accusing Botswana of “acting in complicity with the exploitation, as it finances, controls, directs, and with full knowledge implements the Cuban slave system.”

The organization points out that the initial annual ceiling established in the Agreement, equivalent to $2,889,200, should correspond to 62 positions — 46 specialists and 16 auxiliary professionals — but, it continues, in 2025 the national coordinator of the brigade stated that the actual contingent consisted of 90 professionals. Based on this number, PD applies the contractual rates signed with the Cuban regime and concludes that the actual contingent represents an estimated cost of $350,500 per month; “that is, $4,206,000 annually: $1,316,800 above the initial ceiling.”

This deployment, the NGO observes, “therefore requires an addendum, a budget increase, or another financial instrument that the Government of Botswana has not made transparent to the public or to its Parliament, the Botswana Hansard.” What provision allowed this increase? PD asks in a series of questions that it says the Botswana state must answer.

These include questions such as “What did the Ministries of Health and Finance know about the withholding [of salaries], passport confiscation and the disciplinary regime?” “Did Botswana know about or authorize the July 3, 2026 order?” “How many professionals have requested to end their mission, been replaced, repatriated or declared deserters?”

“Why is there no independent, confidential reporting channel outside the control of the Cuban leadership?”

At the end of its report, the NGO calls on the Botswana government to “publish the complete agreement, all its addenda, budget authorizations, monthly invoices and payments made, protecting only legitimate personal data.” It also calls for each professional to be paid directly “the full amount corresponding to their work, subject only to ordinary and transparent taxes, and prohibiting forced salary transfers to third parties.”

Finally, it urges the government to “suspend and investigate” the implementation of the mission chief’s July 3 order, “which is incompatible with the Constitution and labor legislation of Botswana”

It also asks the Botswana government to interview the aid workers individually, “without the presence of Cuban coordinators,” and to guarantee that they retain their passports, contracts and all their freedoms. Finally, it urges the government to “suspend and investigate” the implementation of the mission chief’s July 3 order, “which is incompatible with the Constitution and labor legislation of Botswana.”

The publication of this report on Botswana comes one week after Prisoners Defenders launched a digital platform aimed at collecting data and information related to “the regulations, payments, and reported violations” involving Cuban medical missions around the world over more than six decades.

According to PD, it is “a verifiable country-by-country dossier,” containing historical data, contracts and regulations, and it “allows users to investigate, compare and download information about Cuban medical missions in 209 countries and territories.”

According to the NGO, it “distinguishes between active, inactive, canceled or pilot missions” and contains information related to approximately “1,185 protected testimonies and 217 public testimonies” from 60 countries, which have been examined by the United Nations, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and Human Rights Watch.

In recent months, and under pressure from the United States, Honduras, Guatemala, Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago suspended their medical cooperation with Cuba or revised the terms.

Before that came the cases of Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador and El Salvador, which ended their programs between 2018 and 2019. In Brazil, it was Cuba that decided to withdraw the mission after the government of Jair Bolsonaro demanded that doctors receive directly the entirety of the salaries paid by the country. More than 8,000 professionals then returned to the Island.

In 2019, the missions in Bolivia and Ecuador also ended, fmollowing political changes in both countries. El Salvador ended its medical cooperation with Cuba during that same period.

For Cuba, the hemorrhaging of its main source of income is significant. Prisoners Defenders, for example, estimates that medical missions generated nearly $5.976 billion in 2021, based on official Cuban statistics and international trade data.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

When Flirting Started To Be a Way To ‘Resolve’ Daily Life in Cuba

How the Revolution turned the Cuban art of flirting into a survival strategy

The Revolution can perhaps claim one last moral victory: it has reduced prostitution, not because it has redeemed the prostitutes, but because it has scared away the tourists. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, José A. Adrián Torres, Málaga, August 23, 2026 / For years I have resisted writing about Cuban jineterismo. Not out of decency or shame, nor because the subject was taboo, but for something almost worse for a columnist: because it seemed to have been written about too many times. Between the lubricated curiosity of the tourist, the revolutionary sermon, and the moral condemnation, the jinetera had been reduced to a prostitute and the jinetero to a hustler. Much was said about their bodies and very little about the society that had produced them.

It only interested me to revisit the topic if I could find a perspective that permitted me to understand it as a historical, sociocultural, and psychological phenomenon: as the transformation, under revolutionary necessity, of a much older repertoire of cunning, charm, sociability, and satire. Because jineterismo didn’t invent the Cuban art of charming; it made it a means of earning a living.

The word satería deserves a brief reappraisal. The Dictionary of Americanisms of the Association of Spanish Language Academies defines “sato” or “sata” as a person who is “flattering and excessive with those of the opposite sex.” In Cuba, however, the word possesses nuances that no dictionary can fully capture. Satería is not merely flirtation. It is the mixture of grace, effusiveness, theatricality, charm, and mischief with which someone can attract attention, obtain a favor, or disarm resistance without directly asking for anything. continue reading

‘Satear’ is to insinuate without committing, to promise without forming the promise, and to withdraw, leaving the other person with the impression of having been at the point of achieving something.

Satear is to insinuate without committing, to promise without forming the promise, and to withdraw, leaving the other person with the impression of having almost achieved something. It could be a self-serving practice, certainly, but also a social game, a small performance, and even a form of female power within a society organized by men. La satería didn’t promise surrender; it managed the possibility.

Although there were—and are—men perfectly capable of wielding it, Cuban culture ended up associating it primarily with a certain Havana woman: flattering, charming, quick-witted, aware of her influence, and not at all inclined to hide it. It wasn’t a genetic condition nor some tropical essence dissolved in the waters of the Almendares River. It was a historical persona learned and perfected over generations.

If we look for its distant relatives, we look first to the Spanish picaresque tradition. From Lazarillo de Tormes in the 16th century to the great rogues of the 17th, the character survives by reading others’ weaknesses, changing masters, feigning, exaggerating, and finding a way out where the straight path is reserved for others. The rogue doesn’t reform the social order: he learns to outwit it. He is, in a sense, a precocious expert at problem-solving 

It is no coincidence that some of that literature and that attitude toward life matured in southern Spain, around the diverse and theatrical port cities of Seville and Cádiz. Through them the riches of the Indies passed, but they didn’t always end up in the hands of those who loaded the ships. Visible abundance and real poverty are often excellent schools for mischief.

Between those ports and Havana, circulated goods, words, music, gestures, and forms of interacting. Andalusian and Canarian Spanish provided a good part of the Antillean linguistic base, but the satería language did not disembark already formed from a galleon. Cuba reworked it in its own unique blend: port life, the Afro-Creole experience, the tenement courtyard, music, the street, theater, and a sociability accustomed to turning any conversation into a performance.

They were not schools of prostitution, but living archives of gestures and attitudes that could later reappear in other contexts.

The Spanish cuplé, zarzuela, and sainete found in the island a kind of comic theater, guaracha music, and mockery. Later came the revue, the vedette, and the cabaret. In all of these, a stage femininity was perfected, capable of holding an audience’s gaze, timing a pause, and converting a swaying of the hips into social commentary. These were not schools of prostitution, but living archives of gestures and attitudes that could later reappear in other contexts.

La Macorina represents one of the most provocative forms of that autonomy. María Calvo Nodarse was not a prostitute before her time, but an exceptional courtesan within a society where prostitution was perfectly recognized, hierarchical, and localized. Legend later retouched her biography, but preserved the essential: this woman who drove cars, displayed jewelry, and smoked with an ease then reserved for men, transformed her beauty into money, independence, and a public personage.

It isn’t necessary to moralize her or whitewash her profession. Her importance is in having reversed, as far as possible, a power relationship: she didn’t appear as a chosen woman, but as a woman who made choices. Her case was extraordinary precisely because the majority of prostitutes of the era didn’t drive convertibles nor receive musical tributes. She worked in brothels, bars, and low-life dens, principally around the port and the red-light districts.

Rita Montaner embodied another side, very distinct and entirely artistic facet of cubanía. With a solid musical background, she moved from zarzuela to guaracha, from theater to radio, film, and cabaret, commanding a presence didn’t need to ask permission. In Rita, her grace was not submission or subservience, but stage presence. She knew how to charm without demeaning herself and how to make irreverence a form of authority. They called her La Única (The One and Only) because any other classification fell short of describing her.

La Macorina transformed the desires of others into a personal legend; Rita Montaner transformed talent and personality into national art. There is no need to confuse them or morally link them. Together, they serve as a reminder that, long before the rise of jineterismo, Cuba already possessed a feminine repertoire of defiance, sensuality, theatricality, and mastery of the male gaze.

La Macorina transformed the desires of others into a personal legend; Rita Montaner transformed talent and personality into national art. There is no need to confuse them or morally link them.

Nor  should we imagine the Republic as a succession of elegant couplets, red cars, and lavish cabarets. Prostitution was widespread and, in many cases, miserable. American sailors constituted a significant clientele, especially in the port areas, but not the only one: there were Cubans, merchants, tourists, gamblers, and travelers. Alongside a few high-class courtesans, there existed a mass of women exploited in disreputable establishments. Furthermore, the commercial sexualization of mulatto women predated 1959.

Castro’s propaganda has always been known how to employ a half-truth as if it were the whole truth. The existence of that reality doesn’t mean all of Havana was a brothel, but neither is it necessary to perfume the Republic to criticize what came after. The fundamental difference is not that there was artistic seduction before and prostitution after. It is that the former prostitution had designated spaces, intermediaries, and a recognizable professional identity, while revolutionary jineterismo ultimately decentralized and expanded the trade.

During the early 1960s, the new regime closed bordellos, prosecuted pimps, and subjected many prostitutes to rehabilitation and work programs. The regime presented the disappearance of red-light districts as the definitive end of the phenomenon. In a certain measure it succeeded in dismantling that visible circuit. But eliminating the geography of a practice does not eliminate the conditions that can reproduce it.

When Soviet subsidies collapsed and the so-called Special Period began, prostitution didn’t return to its old neighborhoods. It reappeared in a different, more dispersed, and far more ambiguous form. The dollar was legalized, tourism became the state’s lifeline, and foreigners began circulating on the island like walking currency exchanges with legs. A doctor, an engineer, or a teacher earned a salary in pesos that wasn’t enough to fill a refrigerator; any tip or gift from a tourist could acquire exorbitant value.

The Revolution proclaimed that it had redeemed Cuban women and ended up building an economy in which a smile paid for in dollars was worth more than a university degree.

The Revolution proclaimed that it had redeemed Cuban women and ended up building an economy in which a smile paid in dollars was worth more than a university degree paid in pesos.

That’s where jineterismo truly emerged as a revolutionary creature: not because the government decreed it, nor because sexual exchange didn’t exist before, but because the economic organization of Castroism produced that specific form. Prostitution was ancient; jineterismo, on the other hand, was a genuine child of the Revolution, not of its ideals, but of its failure.

A study by Charles Trumbull published in 201, based on fieldwork in Cuba and various sources from the 1990s, observed precisely this difference. A large network of brothels had not reappeared, nor was the traditional pimp predominant. Many relationships were established directly in hotels, discotheques, on beaches, in the streets, or through friendships. The jinetera might not consider herself a prostitute, nor might she work full-time: she could be a student, a technician, an employee, or a mother, and occasionally resort to a relationship with a foreigner to obtain what neither her salary nor the ration book could give her.

In that nocturnal economy, the boundaries between prostitution, hustling, and seduction with a migratory horizon were porous. Daliany Jerónimo Kersh notes that the expression jinetera-mambisa was already circulating in the 1980s … The jinetera became more associated with immediate or professional transactions, while the mambisa aspired to become involved with a foreigner and, if the “military campaign” prospered, to marry and leave the country. It was said of those mambisas, with the customary mockery, that they were “finishing off the Spaniards”; later, the enemy became multinational.

The boundaries, of course, remained fluid. There were Havana women who knew the ropes, girls from the provinces who circumvented residency restrictions to try their luck in the capital, and women who went out for a single night and ended up in show business. They weren’t distinct species or military ranks in a sexual taxonomy, but rather shifting positions within a continuum of necessity, curiosity, fun, ambition, and survival. Old-fashioned prostitution required entering a circuit; to hustle, all it took was finding a tourist and knowing how to please him.

The whole country was learning how to ‘resolve’, to get by: obtaining ‘on the left’ what couldn’t be obtained on the right, diverting resources, inventing family ties, feigning enthusiasm, and cultivating the right contacts.

Hustling wasn’t limited to sex, nor was it exclusively female. A hustler could sell counterfeit tobacco, find a room, act as a guide, fetch fuel, serve as an intermediary, or cultivate a self-serving friendship. There were also men who offered sexual services. The term encompassed much more than just the bed: it referred to any way of “riding” foreigners to overcome the scarcities.

That is why it came to be said that in Cuba anyone could hustle. It didn’t mean everyone was a prostitute, but rather that the logic of the transaction was no longer confined to a specific profession. The entire country learned how to ‘resolve’: obtaining ‘under the table’ means what couldn’t be obtained through legitimate means, diverting resources, inventing family ties, feigning enthusiasm, and cultivating the right contacts. The picaresque provided the method; satire, the style; the Revolution, the necessity.

The decisive transformation occurred in the meaning of the gesture. The ‘sata‘ turned another’s desire into triumph; the prostitute needed to turn it into income. One could enjoy leaving the admirer waiting; the other depended on that wait eventually paying for dinner, soap, perfume, or a passport. Perhaps the smile was the same, but the freedom from which it was offered had changed.

It was not, therefore, a natural evolution of Cuban street smarts into prostitution, but rather a repurposing of them under economic duress. Necessity requisitioned old social skills and put them to work. Sympathy became an investment, conversation a probing exercise, and romance a possibility through migration. There were sincere relationships, real affection, and marriages that cannot be reduced to a mere calculation. But therein lay the psychological complexity of the phenomenon: need, affection, and friendship could coexist without even those involved knowing where one ended and the other began.

Meanwhile, the State condemned the prostitute for doing on a retail basis what it practiced wholesale: selling a tropical fantasy to foreigners in exchange for currency. Tourist campaigns offered rum, music, sensuality, and smiling bodies, while the police watched over the Cuban woman who approached a visitor, trying to “smother” him. They called it “the siege of tourism.” She sold companionship; the State sold the island.

Havana could make fun of even that back room, but romanticizing jineterismo would be another way of misrepresenting it.

As it grew, this initially scattered activity also created its own rearguard. There wasn’t always a recognizable pimp: sometimes that role was played by the husband, the “little husband”—the informal partner—or even a brother who waited at home and participated in the takings; other times, it was the taxi driver who brought the tourist, the owner of a brothel who lent the room, or the policeman who took bribes to look the other way.

The girls who arrived from the provinces could rely on fellow countrymen and relatives to find lodging, protection, and a work area, or to move around certain nightclubs and bars. In some circles, there was even talk of groups identified by their province of origin, closer to networks of local ties, mutual aid, and territorial division than to organized crime groups. Among the newcomers, the old-fashioned solidarity of the eastern guajira and the good nature of many of those girls and women often outweighed any underworld discipline. The Revolution had closed the brothels; necessity rebuilt the supply chain.

Havana could make light of even that back room, but romanticizing prostitution would be another way of distorting it. There was exploitation, deception, violence, degradation, and a profound erosion of trust. When every kindness can conceal a price and every infatuation a visa application, sensitivity ends up defending itself through cynicism. The foreigner learns to interpret every smile as an offer; the Cuban, to see every foreigner as a possible way out of a problem. The moral damage lies not in the loss of a supposed purity or freshness of sex, but in the colonization of intimacy by survival.

The art of distance was also lost. The old satire thrived on insinuation, circumlocution, and what might never actually happen. Revolutionary urgency shortened the distance between a wink and the price, with brazenness as the only stop along the way. The so-called “flip-flop slap” or ” flip-flop-ification” wasn’t about poverty or footwear, but about the disappearance of ceremony, the ritual of courtship: when seduction ceased to be a game and became a mere formality.

Now that ecosystem is also dying out. According to official figures from the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI), during the first half of 2026 the number of international visitors received by Cuba was only 39.3% of that recorded in the same period of the previous year. Even the caricature of a tropical paradise is beginning to lose its audience.

In Cuba, meanwhile, the concern has become less erotic and more electric. Desire needs a certain confidence in tomorrow, some intimacy, and, if it’s not too much to ask, electricity. Before thinking about falling in love, seducing, or procreating, one has to find out what time the power comes back on.

The Revolution can perhaps claim one last moral victory: it has reduced prostitution, not because it has redeemed the prostitutes, but because it has scared away tourists and because many of them left to build their futures in other countries, far from the revolutionary “burundanga” that had driven them to seek work.

Today, the Cuban people, exhausted even from practicing that old art of catcalling, wait for someone or something to change their destiny. But no collective destiny changes simply by waiting, however much, ninety miles away, there may be those longing for a good excuse to act. In the Cuba where once people went out to meet tourists, today they wait for the tide to turn. And even flirting waits its turn to start its engine.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

“If You Don’t Live in Cuba, You Can’t Understand What the Blockade Is”

This is how Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel dodges the uncomfortable questions from a friendly journalist from Folha de S. Paulo.

Miguel Díaz-Canel during the interview with Mônica Bergamo of Folha de S.Paulo. / Screenshot/Folha de S.Paulo

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Rolando Gallardo, Madrid, August 24, 2026 – The interview, granted to Mônica Bergamo of Folha de S. Paulo and published on August 23, 2026, begins with a scene bordering on surrealism. Before the first question, Lis Cuesta, the first lady, uses saliva to smooth her husband’s gray strands, trying to tame unruly hair over a drawn, gaunt face. It is the image of power without filters. But as soon as he begins to speak, the fragility disappears: Díaz-Canel regains narrative control with figures, dates and metaphors already repeated in at least five previous interviews.

That control is the most revealing fact: not what Díaz-Canel says, but that he had already said it as a theatrical performance to NBC, Newsweek, RT en Español, Radio 750 and now Bergamo. The “multidimensional war” and the same dates as the origin of the “energy blockade” return with a fidelity that demonstrates the practice of a permanent memorization exercise: the emphasis always falls in the same place, the silences are repeated, and even the pauses come at the same point in each answer.

He constantly repeats the word “genocide.” But the term, as he uses it –and as he demands “international condemnations” for it– does not correspond to the legal standard he invokes. The 1948 Genocide Convention requires proof of the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group “as such.” Washington’s sanctions, however harsh and questionable they may be, are intended to pressure a government clinging to power, not to annihilate or depopulate the Cuban nation. It is a political accusation prepared for the headlines of the state-run press.

The journalist recounts that, while traveling around the Island, she heard an expression that did not come from the dissidents but from the streets, from ordinary people: “internal blockade.” Díaz-Canel denies it twice

The most interesting moment, however, lies in the crack that Bergamo manages to open. The journalist recounts that, while traveling around the Island, she heard an expression that did not come from the dissidents but from the streets, from ordinary people: “internal blockade.” Díaz-Canel denies it twice and reduces it to “dissatisfaction with bureaucracy and slowness,” ending with a categorical phrase: “even if we had done everything right, without defects, the main cause… is the blockade.” First he shrinks the problem; then he dismisses it.

The pattern is measurable. Over the course of the hour, words that shift blame to Washington – blockade, genocide, sanctions, imperialism, suffocation, pressure, crime – appear 79 times. An acknowledgment of his own failure appears only once and is neutralized continue reading

in the following sentence. Seventy-nine to one, it is clear that for Diaz-Canel the regime bears no blame.

That exclusive causality also does not withstand comparison with Cuba’s economic history. The deterioration of health, education and vaccination is not recent: it has been developing for nearly two decades and became more exposed during the pandemic, when the State allocated 45.5% of its investment to real estate services – the domain of Gaesa, the military conglomerate that controls tourism – compared with barely 0.8% for health, while hundreds of Cubans died from a lack of oxygen. Gaesa today controls between 40% and 70% of the Cuban economy, with revenues three times the State budget. Eight economists consulted by EFE in 2025 agreed that sanctions harm the country, but that the deeper problems come from the model: centralized planning is, according to Pedro Monreal, “the pillar that does not work.”

Before the first question, Lis Cuesta, the first lady, uses saliva to smooth her husband’s gray strands, trying to tame unruly hair over a drawn, gaunt face. / Screenshot/Folha de Sao Paulo

The figures Díaz-Canel gives on infant mortality are accurate: the rate, which historically hovered between 4 and 5 per thousand live births, ended 2025 at 9.9, according to the Ministry of Public Health itself, a figure confirmed by the UN. The deterioration is real. What is not true is to present it as sudden damage caused solely by this year’s energy blockade: the indicator had already been rising since 2018, the same years in which the country was building luxury hotels that today have occupancy below 30%.

There lies the real diagnosis, beyond any reading of his state of mind: a president managing real data from a country in collapse, and who, instead of using them to open a serious conversation about 20 years of bad decisions, reinserts them into the narrative already prepared to absolve himself of blame. When Bergamo takes him into territory he does not control, the response is not an argument but a shutdown: “If you don’t live in Cuba, you can’t understand what the blockade is.” A phrase that cancels the question, and the exact distance between the script and the real country that Bergamo found cooking with charcoal.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Jaimanitas Takes to the Streets Openly To Protest Power and Water Cuts in Cuba

Other demonstrations took place in Old Havana and Cienfuegos.

Por lo que puede apreciarse, a los manifestantes en Jaimanitas se enfrentaron partidarios del régimen. / Captura

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, August 24, 2026 – A new pot-banging protest shook Havana Sunday night. This time, it was in Jaimanitas, in the municipality of Playa. In images posted on his social media by rapper Eliexer Márquez (El Funky), a crowd can be seen in the middle of the street, shouting at one another as the banging of pots rings out.

In the midst of them, a police officer tries to calm the situation. Judging by what can be seen, regime supporters confronted the protesters. Although Jaimanitas has a social makeup of fishermen, workers, artists, and people involved in tourism, it borders neighborhoods reserved for Cuba’s political elite.

At one point, a car suddenly speeds into the middle of the crowd, which had to move aside to avoid being run over. “Jaimanitas in the streets, no electricity, no water, nothing!” El Funky, co-author of Patria y Vida and an exile in Miami, posted.

Over the weekend, there were again mobilizations, both in Havana and elsewhere on the Island. According to information from CubaNet, residents of a building in Old Havana blocked Villegas between Teniente Rey and Muralla on Saturday because of continuous blackouts and the authorities’ lack of attention.

“Jaimanitas in the streets, no electricity, no water, nothing!” El Funky, co-author of Patria y Vida and an exile in Miami, posted

“People are protesting because one phase always goes down, the power goes out, and they don’t come to fix it,” a source told the independent newspaper. “The breakers caught fire and nobody does anything, so the people in that building got fed up and closed the block.”

That same Saturday, in Cienfuegos, Martí Noticias reported, about twenty residents gathered outside the Provincial Government headquarters after being without electricity since Thursday morning. The complaint, according to activist continue reading

Raúl González González, coordinator of the Consenso Ciudadano movement, is that there are no service interruptions in the neighborhoods where the officials live. “They have protected circuits for entire weeks,” he told Martí Noticias.

Independent journalist Yoanni Limonta, who also lives in Cienfuegos, told the Cuban-American newspaper details of the demonstration: “Several mothers with sick children, children in their arms, went to the government, showed up there, and demanded answers regarding the excessive power cuts.”

For that day, the Electric Union had forecast a deficit of 2,240 megawatts (MW) during peak hours, against demand of 3,300 MW. That is, nearly 68% of the energy needed. The outages were compounded by the fact that the Lidio Ramón Pérez thermoelectric plant, known as Felton, was unable to resolve the breakdown that has left both of its units shut down.

“A crack in the upper area of the boiler, very close to the dome, increased water consumption in the preceding days and forced a reduction in power generation before the decision was made to shut down the unit,” Cubadebate explained in a report in which it warned that repairs to a leak in the boiler could not be completed Friday, as planned, because “they proved to be the most complex tasks on the critical path.”

Translated by Regina Anavy
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Price Controls and Fines Are Causing the Little Oil That Available in Cuba To Disappear From Stores

Authorities issue alert over the sale of adulterated oil in Mayabeque

A crowd gathered at the doors of the Perla del Caribe state-run store in Sancti Spíritus. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Mercedes García/Miguel García, Sancti Spíritus/Holguín, August 23, 2026 / The shortage of cooking oil has once again sparked riots at the few stores where it is available. In Sancti Spíritus, this occurred on two consecutive days, the first on Friday at the La Época store, where, according to eyewitnesses, “people started fighting.”

This Saturday, the state-run Perla de Cuba store offered a liter of at $2.85, with a limit of two bottles per person, and the police had to intervene to control the situation. A large crowd of people gathered in two lines, one on each side of the store’s entrance—which belongs to the Caribe corporation, part of the Gaesa military conglomerate—while two officers allowed people inside.

The product could be paid for with the Classic card or in cash, but many didn’t make it. “It’s a nightmare trying to get a number,” an elderly woman told 14ymedio as, in despair, she ended up leaving after a two-and-a-half-hour wait. Like her, there were many others, not without first complaining about everything.

“People suddenly arrive with three people and cut in front of me. I’ve been standing in the sun for hours and I’m starving, I’m going home,” explained one young man. “This country is a shithole,” another blurted out, before getting on his electric scooter and speeding off.

A retiree responded loudly to the entire rally: “That’s how it is, but it’s nothing new. This country has always been the same, no matter what anyone says. People say we lived better under the USSR, but we didn’t live better at all: there were shortages and it was awful, and they supported us.”

In Holguín, this past Saturday, they enforced a “forced sale” of cooking oil at 2,200 pesos per liter at the Correo del Pueblo Nuevo market. “The inspectors showed up unannounced and found everything in an uproar, with people selling bottles on the black market,” a private merchant told this newspaper, detailing the extent of the inspections. “They’re conducting large-scale raids in continue reading

several areas of Holguín.”

A crowd of people gathered in two lines, one on each side of the store entrance, while two officers allowed people inside. 

The result of the new monitoring, established in the last two weeks to try to curb inflation, especially of basic necessities such as oil or eggs, has only two types of effect for the moment: either higher prices in the informal market or, directly, the disappearance of the products from every establishment.

“You can’t even find an egg in this city, let alone cooking oil,” asserts a resident of the Havana neighborhood of Luyanó. From El Vedado, also in the capital, another resident recounts: “I just got a bottle of Brazilian cooking oil for 4,500 bolivars, and it was hidden like it was drugs.”

Even worse is the sale of adulterated oil, as shown in the alert issued this Saturday by the General Directorate of Public Health of Mayabeque. In a post disseminated by official media, it is reported that “you should not consume oil sold at the El Rodeo Fairgrounds” in the provincial capital, “since it was determined after testing that it is crude vegetable oil for animal consumption and not for human consumption.”

“People suddenly arrive with three people and cut in front of me. I’ve been standing in the sun for hours and I’m starving, I’m going home.” / 14ymedio

Several local residents have told 14ymedio about the offers of this “dark” oil. “It’s supposed to be for cooking, but it’s dark and thick,” says a woman from Mayabeque. “I wouldn’t buy that for anything; I’d rather boil everything in water.”

Since August 11, various provinces have implemented restrictive measures aimed at controlling prices, such as establishing a 30% profit margin for private businesses and increasing inspections and fines for those who violate the regulations. These measures represent a blatant step backward from the economic liberalization reforms announced by the government last June .

President Miguel Díaz-Canel himself declared at the time in a public appearance: “Price caps, in practice, failed to contain inflation: many times they caused the disappearance of products, diversions towards illegality, higher prices, less tax collection and an impossible race between real prices and administrative decisions that always arrived late.
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Two-Year-Old Twins, Who Were on a Boat of Cuban Rafters That Was Rescued in Mexico, Die

Relatives had said that at least 19 people were traveling, including 7 minors, but the Mexican Navy claimed to have rescued 16, including four children.

Images of the Cuban rafters rescued by the Mexican Navy. / Semar

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Mexico, August 23, 2026 / Twin boys Leosdel and Leosniel Oviedo Garrobo, who were traveling on the boat carrying Cuban rafters that was located on Thursday after being missing at sea for more than a week, died during the crossing. This was confirmed to Martí Noticias on Saturday via text message by Leobel Ricardo Oviedo, the father of the little boys who were only two-years-old.

Just a day earlier, he had told the Cuban-American media outlet, “I am very grateful because they have made a great effort to find them.” At that time, as evidenced by interviews he gave to other journalists,  he was certain his sons were in good health.

According to Martí Noticias,  Adacheli Sosa, Oviedo’s cousin, recounted that the father, who has lived in Cancún for almost a year, went to “the place where the migrants were staying”—the Yucatecan city of Progreso—to reunite with his family, originally from Vertientes (Camagüey), but upon arrival, only his wife, Yusimy Garrobo Leiva, 35, was there. “He met with his wife, and she confirmed that the two young children had died during the journey, apparently from dehydration,” Sosa told the news outlet.

According to statements from a relative of other rafters who were on board, they had to throw the bodies into the sea because the smell they gave off was attracting sharks.

According to statements made to Mario Vallejo by a relative of other rafters who were on board, they had to throw the bodies into the sea because the smell they gave off was attracting sharks. “The mother of the children was in very bad shape,” the relative told the reporter.

The Mexican Navy had released an image on Thursday of the boat, found 10 nautical miles from Chicxulub Puerto, in the state of Yucatán, by some fishermen, who helped the migrants and notified the authorities.

They had been missing since the boat departed for Mexico from Pinar del Río on August 11. The alert was raised by the rafters’ families, who were asking for help from the authorities or anyone who might know if they had been rescued by the coast guard, a recreational boat, or fishermen.

Journalist Mario Vallejo issued a plea on his social media accounts, posting images taken by the rafters themselves inside the vessel. According to initial reports, at least 19 people were on board, including 7 minors.

However, the Mexican Navy reported the rescue of 16 migrants, including four minors. All of them were taken to facilities of the Ninth Naval Zone in Progreso, from where personnel from the National Migration Institute (INM) were contacted “to determine their status and carry out the corresponding procedures,” official sources told 14ymedio.

So far, neither the authorities nor the families have provided any further details or explanations regarding the discrepancy in the figures.

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It Was Etecsa, Not Google, That Issued the False Earthquake Alert

The state-owned company acknowledges a “technical-human error,” as the scientific magazine ‘Juventud Técnica’ had anticipated

“We are aware of the concern and distress generated as a result of the error, and therefore we apologize to the population,” Etecsa admits. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, August 22, 2026 – Etecsa was finally forced to acknowledge that the error was its own. The false earthquake alert that caused thousands of Cubans to hurriedly leave their homes last Tuesday was generated by specialists from the company itself while they were conducting tests on the telecommunications network. The admission comes three days after the incident, when the authorities had blamed Google’s alert system and only after an investigation by the state-run magazine Juventud Técnica dismantled that explanation and followed the clues to the Island’s telecommunications monopoly.

“On the afternoon of August 18, users in several areas of the country received messages on their mobile phones with an earthquake alert,” begins the brief statement published by Etecsa. After assuring that it had launched an investigation, the company admits that “the messages were issued due to a technical-human error, generated by our specialists who were conducting tests on the telecommunications network.”

The company also says that “the corresponding analyses were carried out, measures were adopted with those responsible, and actions are being implemented to prevent similar incidents in the future.” It does not identify those responsible, specify what measures were taken, or explain how an internal test managed to become an earthquake alarm distributed to phones across much of the country. “We are aware of the concern and distress generated as a result of the error, and therefore we apologize to the population,” it concludes.

In a country where finding a foreign culprit is often considerably faster than finding a domestic solution, Google seemed to be carrying the blame for an earthquake that never existed

The episode began at around three in the afternoon on Tuesday. Thousands of Android phones suddenly emitted a shrill “earthquake alert” warning that recommended seeking shelter. In Havana, numerous residents left their homes, many of them in the middle of a blackout. Testimonies gathered at the time described elderly people going down stairs with walkers, people who came outside in their underwear, and neighbors trying to get their pets to safety. In a building in Luyanó, the pleas of an elderly woman asking not to be left to die alone could be heard.

The ground, however, had not moved. continue reading

Minutes later, Civil Defense reported that the National Center for Seismological Research (Cenais) had not recorded any seismic movement. Enrique Diego Arango Arias, head of the National Seismological Service, called the alarm “completely false.”

As questions mounted, initial suspicions circulated on social media about Etecsa and a possible failed drill. Cubadebate, however, was quick to dismiss that possibility and presented Google’s earthquake alert system for Android as a possible explanation, a system that uses the accelerometers in phones to detect vibrations. Suddenly, in a country where finding a foreign culprit is often considerably faster than finding a domestic solution, Google seemed to be carrying the blame for an earthquake that never existed.

When ‘Juventud Técnica’ approached Etecsa seeking answers, the company did not accept any responsibility at the time and referred the questions to Civil Defense

The version began to fall apart when Juventud Técnica asked the multinational company directly. “These claims are incorrect. The Android Earthquake Alerts System did not detect an earthquake or send alerts in Cuba,” a Google spokesperson responded.

The magazine went further. By analyzing the format of the messages and Android’s source code, it determined that the alert was compatible with the ETWS protocol, used to transmit earthquake and tsunami warnings through Cell Broadcast. Under that system, Google is not the entity that sends the message; the public mobile network does. In Cuba, that network belongs exclusively to Etecsa. Android even distinguishes between the code intended for an actual earthquake alert and the one reserved for a test.

When Juventud Técnica approached Etecsa seeking answers, the company did not accept any responsibility at the time and referred the questions to Civil Defense. That move now leaves an additional question. Amneris Santos Hernández, head of Civil Defense’s Preparation and Communication Department, acknowledged to the publication that the agency was “exploring the use of these alerts,” although she assured that they were not yet being implemented and that the incident was under investigation.

Arango Arias pointed to the greatest danger of all: that a false alarm could happen again and, when a real one arrives, the population might stop believing it

That statement and Etecsa’s subsequent confession leave unresolved what role Civil Defense played in the tests. There is currently no public evidence that would allow anyone to say that it ordered the test or participated directly in it, but it is significant that Etecsa initially referred questions about a test that it now acknowledges was its own to that agency, and that Civil Defense admitted that it was experimenting with precisely this technology.

The damage, in any case, was not limited to a computer error. Arango Arias warned after the incident that there were still “many unanswered questions” and pointed to the greatest danger of all: that a false alarm could happen again and, when a real one arrives, the population might stop believing it.

That is the most serious consequence of those minutes of panic. An early warning system depends on an immediate response, not on citizens first having to determine whether Etecsa is conducting tests. What remains to be learned is who ordered the test, for what purpose, and how the drill managed to go much farther than the explanation.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.