14ymedio – Translating Cuba

The Exodus of Hotel Chains From Cuba Continues, With the Departure of the Asian Company Aston

Archipelago Internacional breaks its relationship with Gaesa, following in the footsteps of Spain’s Iberostar and Canada’s Blue Diamond.

The Grand Aston Havana hotel was controversial from its inception, built by Gaesa during a time of deep economic crisis in the country. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 2, 2026 / Archipelago International, Southeast Asia’s largest privately owned hotel management group, followed in the footsteps of Spain’s Iberostar and Canada’s Blue Diamond this week by ending its management of hotels linked to Gaviota, the chain controlled by the Business Administration Group SA (Gaesa), the conglomerate of the Armed Forces in Cuba.

The decision comes just days before the deadline, June 5, set by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), to end the operations of foreign companies linked to Gaesa, under threat of sanctions.

Archipelago’s hotels in Cuba, operating under the Aston brand—the Grand Aston Havana, Grand Aston Varadero, Grand Aston Cayo Paredón, Grand Aston Cayo Las Brujas, and Aston Costa Verde—are now in a situation similar to that of the properties abandoned by Iberostar and Blue Diamond. They may remain open, but would be managed by Gaviota, which, given the OFAC sanctions, will find it difficult to partner with a new foreign operator. 14ymedio confirmed this during a visit today to the Grand Aston in Havana, which remains open—albeit empty—under Gaviota’s management.

The Grand Aston Havana’s cafeteria was empty of customers on Tuesday. Hotel employees confirmed that the establishment has been taken over by Gaviota’s management.

Archipelago’s departure affects recently built, opulent hotels like the Grand Aston La Habana, controversial since its opening, given that Gaesa constructed it amidst a deep economic crisis that directly impacted the population. The Grand Aston, like the Iberostar Selection Habana—located in the controversial Torre K and now closed due to the crisis—was developed in the post-pandemic period. While shortages were growing and urban decay was evident in many areas of Havana, the Cuban state prioritized the construction continue reading

of large hotel facilities for international tourism.

The Grand Aston was controversial from its opening, given that Gaesa had built it at the same time as a deep economic crisis was developing that was affecting the population.

Before Archipelago’s withdrawal, announced yesterday, the Grand Aston was already suffering from the decline in tourism on the island. According to employee testimonies to 14ymedio, business had recently become so low that, in some cases, employees were told “not to come to work, there were no tourists.”

Meliá, for now, has not announced changes to its plans for Cuba. Half of its hotels are closed due to the consequences of the energy crisis, exacerbated by US sanctions and the oil embargo. Of Meliá’s 34 hotels in Cuba, at least 15 are co-managed by Gaviota : many of the large resorts on the keys and some of the newer hotels in Varadero.

In Havana, the majority of hotels operated by the Balearic company remain linked to the state-owned groups Cubanacán or Gran Caribe. This is the case with the Meliá Cohiba, the Meliá Habana, and the Hotel Sevilla, among others.

Meliá manages 14,053 rooms on the island, representing approximately 14% of its global portfolio. A withdrawal from Cuba would impact its stock price, which had risen 40% this year.

It is still unclear how the sanctions will affect Meliá’s presence in Cuba, or what the company’s strategy will be to disassociate itself from Gaesa if necessary.

The hotel chain’s president and CEO, Gabriel Escarrer, acknowledged last month that the situation in Cuba is “difficult” and “unsustainable,” and that the chain is continuing its strategy of consolidating the few tourists who visit the island into fewer hotels. “I think that today few people know what’s going to happen with Cuba,” he said at the time when asked about Meliá’s future in Cuba.

Escarrer—son of Escarrer Juliá, founder of the hotel chain and a close associate of Fidel Castro—was already sanctioned by OFAC in February 2020. At that time, the businessman, visiting Cuba to attend the Tourism Fair, claimed to be indifferent to the sanctions and said his intention was to remain on the island for at least another three decades. “We will not tremble in the face of any external pressures we may experience,” he insisted.

Last February, when Washington’s sanctions against Gaesa had not yet intensified, Escarrer had declared: “It is not our intention to withdraw [from Cuba] in any way and we feel very comfortable with the leadership position.”

The decision by the Asian airline Aston was revealed by the Dominican media outlet aerocoa.com, close to the deadline imposed by the U.S. State Department under Executive Order 14404, signed by President Donald Trump on May 1st. This order mandated sanctions against “those responsible for repression in Cuba and threats to U.S. national security and foreign policy.” A few days later, the decree began to take effect with specific sanctions against GAESA, its president, Ania Guillermina Lastres, and Moa Nickel SA.

Although Cubanacán is on OFAC’s SDN list and is sanctioned by the agency, it does not belong to the Gaesa conglomerate, which the State Department directly targeted.

This Monday, the Spanish company Iberostar announced its disassociation from Gaviota , leaving under its management in Cuba only those hotels that were owned by Cubanacán or Gran Caribe. Last Saturday, Blue Diamond announced that it would cease its operations and the use of its brands in Cuba “with immediate effect.”

Although Cubanacán is on the OFAC SDN list and is sanctioned by the agency, it does not belong to the Gaesa conglomerate, which the State Department directly targeted on May 7.

The sanctions, however, could also be extended to the state entities Cubanacán, Gran Caribe and Islazul if so determined by the State Department and OFAC, given that Executive Order 14400 considers as a criterion of linkage with the Government of Cuba the “ownership, control or direct management of the entities.”

______________________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

A Child Prisoner Is Beaten and Threatened With Solitary Confinement for Protesting in Morón, Cuba

Christian de Jesús Crespo Álvarez, 16, is being held in Canaleta prison and his family does not receive direct information about his health status

14ymedio, Madrid, May 30, 2026 / Christian de Jesús Crespo Álvarez even had the food his family had brought to prison for him taken away. When the 16-year-old complained about the disappearance of his belongings at the Canaleta prison in Ciego de Ávila, he was beaten. Afterward, according to Cubalex, he was threatened with being sent to solitary confinement. Since then, his family has been unable to find out anything about his condition.

Christian is one of the minors detained after the March 13 protest in Morón, a demonstration sparked by blackouts, shortages, and mounting frustration in a city that ultimately became the scene of yet another repressive operation. His case joins those of other teenagers in Cuba who are treated as highly dangerous criminals for their opposition to the government.

According to the alert published by Cubalex, the young man was transferred from Canaleta prison to the Provincial Instruction Unit for further questioning. He remained there for approximately four days. Upon returning to the prison, he discovered that his belongings were missing, and his complaint ended in violence.

According to the alert published by Cubalex, the young man was transferred from Canaleta prison to the Provincial Instruction Unit

In his last communication with his family, the teenager said he wasn’t feeling well, that he was very down, and that his urine was dark in color, a symptom that raised alarms among his relatives.

The family later learned, indirectly, that Christian had been taken to the prison infirmary. However, they received no information about a diagnosis, treatment, or medical progress. They have also had no direct contact with him since the call in which the boy alerted them to his physical and psychological continue reading

deterioration.

Cubalex maintains that Christian has suffered mistreatment at the hands of both other inmates and prison officials. The situation is especially serious because he is a teenager being held in conditions that the organization considers extremely vulnerable and lacking legal protection.

The minor is accused of sabotage, although, according to Cubalex, no formal charges have yet been filed. The accusation places the case in a highly serious legal context, despite the fact that the events originated during a social protest. The organization also reported that State Security continues to conduct forensic analysis based on videos posted on social media and recordings made by Communist Party officials during the demonstration.

The minor is accused of sabotage, although, according to Cubalex, there is no formal request from the prosecutor so far.

The pressure isn’t limited to Christian. Cubalex claims that the minors detained after the Morón protest are being subjected to constant interrogations to force them to confess to receiving payments for demonstrating and to record or sign statements of remorse. The organization alleges that the intention is to construct a political narrative that portrays a citizen protest as a foreign-funded operation.

At least four teenagers were identified by Cubalex among those detained for the events of March 13: Jonathan David Muir Burgos, 16; Christian de Jesús Crespo Álvarez, also 16; Kevin Samuel Echeverría Rodríguez and Yohasnel Estrada Rodríguez, both 17. All were caught in a penal machinery that the regime usually activates after protests: first the arrests, then incommunicado detention, later the exemplary accusations.

The case of Jonathan Muir had already raised concerns among international organizations. He, too, was accused of sabotage and sent to Canaleta prison. His family denounced the conditions of his confinement and the psychological impact of prison on a minor. Now, the complaint against Christian reinforces the suspicion that these are not isolated cases, but rather a practice aimed at intimidating other young people who might join future protests.

Cubalex demanded the immediate release of Christian and the other minors detained for exercising their rights. “Protest is not a crime,” the organization reiterated, also calling for an end to the isolation, violence, arbitrary punishments, and coercive interrogations of adolescents.

______________________

José Daniel Ferrer: The Voice of Cuba That Travels Through Europe

From Madrid to Stockholm: Cuba’s freedom knocks on the doors of the old continent

Ferrer carries with him a truth that the Cuban dictatorship has tried to hide for more than six decades. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Jorge Luis León, Houston, May 31, 2026 / There are moments in history when a single voice manages to express the feelings of millions. Not because it speaks louder than others, but because it speaks with the authority that comes from sacrifice, consistency, and perseverance. Today, that Cuban voice resonating across Europe is that of José Daniel Ferrer.

From Madrid to Stockholm, from parliaments to civil institutions, from political meetings to human rights forums, Ferrer carries with him a truth that the Cuban dictatorship has tried to hide for more than six decades: the tragedy of a nation deprived of freedom and the unyielding yearning of a people who wish to live with dignity.

The importance of this European tour transcends the agenda of meetings and diplomatic protocols. It is a task of enormous historical significance. Each encounter represents an opportunity to show the Cuban reality without propaganda filters; each intervention constitutes a denunciation of the repression; each contact strengthens the international ties that will be necessary for the democratic reconstruction of the nation.

Ferrer is building bridges with political leaders, democratic organizations, human rights institutions, and influential sectors of European society.

Europe listens because it recognizes the legitimacy that arises from resistance. José Daniel Ferrer doesn’t arrive backed by speeches crafted in comfortable offices or by advertising campaigns. He arrives backed by years of imprisonment, constant persecution, beatings, humiliations, and a will that never bowed to fear.

That trajectory transforms his words into something more than political opinions. They are testimonies of a struggle sustained for decades. They are living proof that in Cuba there are men and women who have confronted absolute power without renouncing their principles.

This trip also has a strategic dimension that should not be underestimated. Free nations understand the importance of preparing for the future. Ferrer is building bridges with political leaders, democratic organizations, human rights institutions, and influential sectors of European society. These are contacts that can play a significant role when the time comes for national transformation.

There is also a message of unity that runs through each of these days.

The future Cuba will need friends, cooperation, investment, institutional support, and international recognition. No democratic transition can be built in isolation. History shows that major changes are usually accompanied by intense diplomatic efforts and a broad network of international solidarity.

Therefore, this tour of Europe is not simply a political trip. It is part of the preparation for a new era. It is Cuba’s presence in arenas where, for too long, the regime’s official version has prevailed.

There is also a message of unity that runs through each of these days. Ferrer doesn’t speak solely on behalf of one organization or a specific sector. He speaks for political prisoners, for families separated by exile, for young people who dream of a better future, for those who suffer poverty, for those who have lost hope, and for those who continue to resist within the island.

This is no time for opportunistic leaders or fleeting prophets.

The voice that is heard in Europe today is that of a Cuba that refuses to surrender.

This is no time for false hopes or improvisation. This is no time for opportunistic leaders or fleeting prophets. This is a time for serious work, historical responsibility, and national unity.

As José Daniel Ferrer travels across Europe, the cause of Cuban freedom advances one step further. Every door that opens, every alliance that strengthens, and every awareness that awakens brings us a little closer to the day when Cuba will once again occupy its rightful place among the democratic nations of the world.

Tyranny can control newspapers, courts, and prisons. It can sow fear and build walls. But it cannot indefinitely halt the march of history.

_____________________

The Cuban Regime Presents Gaesa as the Entity That Has Made It Possible to Save the Revolution

In a statement defending the corporation, Havana denies accusations of “opacity” and claims it has always reported its activities “to the Party, the State, and the Government.”

Image of a Cimex office, part of Gaesa, in Holguín. / Granma

14ymedio, Madrid, June 2, 2026 — The Cuban Government has issued an institutional statement, published by the official press, defending the military conglomerate Gaesa, which has come under intense pressure from Washington over the past month. In the text, the regime argues that the group has provided “countless” services to the nation by generating foreign currency that was later used to “confront the economic war” waged by the United States.

In describing the company’s role, the Government focuses on investments made by the Business Administration Group (Gaesa) in the public sector, while overlooking one of the main reasons many Cubans resent the conglomerate: the high percentage of resources it devoted to hotel construction even as the tourism business was in clear decline. “Its objective has always been to bring together companies capable of generating foreign currency and resources that the State requires to maintain and develop social achievements and contribute to the advancement of sectors and branches of national life,” the statement argues.

To support its case, the statement cites the construction of more than 10,000 homes throughout the country

To support its case, the statement cites the construction of more than 10,000 homes throughout the country despite a housing deficit exceeding 600,000 units, the creation of a children’s pioneer camp and vacation programs, and “the way the Cuban economy was sustained during the pandemic years,” without specifying exactly what that means.

The foreign currency collected by Gaesa has also been used, the statement continues, to invest in the severely deteriorated continue reading

Lidio Ramón Pérez thermoelectric plant in Felton, Holguín; major hydraulic projects such as the East-West and North-South water transfer systems; as well as polyclinics, family doctor offices, and schools.

The statement attempts to strongly counter accusations of opacity surrounding the company, though it falls short by merely asserting that its activities have been “systematically reported to the leadership of the Party, the State, and the Government” and have been subject to maximum oversight and auditing by authorities. However, Gaesa does not even publish a basic annual activity or financial report, as would be expected from a company seeking to rebut allegations of “opacity” or “secrecy,” both terms explicitly mentioned in the text.

The statement suggests that information is withheld in order to avoid what the regime has often described as persecution. “Thousands of men and women, over the last 30 years, have been discreet guardians of the country’s resources and deserve recognition. Although their work has not been told often enough, it speaks for itself and rises above the state-sponsored slander orchestrated from Washington,” the text adds.

The defense of the military conglomerate occupies the second half of the statement, while the opening paragraphs appear aimed more directly at Miami than Washington. The White House is not spared criticism, however, being accused of “acting with deliberate intent” to destroy the Revolution, including its historical and current leaders, and thereby confuse both domestic and international public opinion. But the true architects of this strategy, the statement claims, are “ideologues of the Cuban-American far right, who pride themselves on being creative and unpredictable.”

But the true architects of this strategy, the statement claims, are “ideologues of the Cuban-American far right, who pride themselves on being creative and unpredictable

The statement says that the May 1 executive order, which opens the door to sanctions against foreign companies cooperating with Gaesa, “constitutes the most intense, disproportionate, and dangerous escalation in the recent history of relations” between the two countries, because it seeks to “isolate the country diplomatically, commercially, financially, and energetically; undermine the nation’s sustainability; condition dialogue; and evaluate options for military aggression.”

Since the announcement of the measure, several international companies have severed ties with the military corporation in sectors ranging from logistics to tourism. This comes in addition to earlier actions, such as pressure to end Cuba’s international medical missions and restrictions on oil shipments, under which only two fuel tankers have arrived in Cuba so far this year: one from Mexico in early January and another from Russia in March, after the new order had already been issued.

“The GAE”—as the statement refers to the company, omitting the final initials corresponding to “Corporation” (Sociedad Anónima)—“is not the product of secrecy, nor of elites, much less a vehicle for the enrichment of a few,” the document states. In recent weeks, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has estimated Gaesa’s reserves at $18 billion, based on financial information published by the Miami Herald in August 2025. However, The Economist argued last March that the military conglomerate is on the verge of bankruptcy precisely because of its excessive investments in tourism. “Before the United States tightened restrictions, Gaesa barely had one billion dollars in reserves,” the publication said.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

Costa Rica Announces a Regularization Program for Thousands of Cuban Asylum Applicants

Nicaraguans, Venezuelans, and Colombians are also included in the measure, which aims to ease pressure on an overwhelmed system.

The regularization program opens the door for hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers whose applications are either pending or have been denied. / Jesuit Migrant Service

14ymedio, Madrid, June 2, 2026 — Costa Rica announced on Monday the creation of an extraordinary regularization program for Cuban, Nicaraguan, Venezuelan, and Colombian asylum seekers whose applications are still pending or have been rejected.

“They may apply for the special temporary category for Nicaraguan, Venezuelan, Cuban, and Colombian nationals whose applications for refugee status recognition are pending resolution or have been denied,” states Article 1 of the resolution approving the measure, which was confirmed by Costa Rica’s General Directorate of Migration and Immigration (DGME) to the local press.

The official information refers to the “challenges and possible delays in the refugee status determination system” and notes that there is a “large number of people” from those nationalities with asylum cases awaiting resolution. This has led authorities to consider a regulation of this kind necessary in order to provide a “mechanism aimed at the protection and legal stay” of these individuals.

The greatest advantage of the resolution is that it will allow beneficiaries to work legally and thereby contribute to the formal economy, as specified in Article 2.

The greatest advantage of the resolution is that it will allow beneficiaries to work legally and thereby contribute to the formal economy, as specified in Article 2. “The beneficiary of this special category will have unrestricted authorization to engage in any paid employment activity, whether self-employed or working for an employer.”

The measure may benefit people who have continue reading

been living in the country illegally for many years, since it applies to those who applied for asylum between June 1, 2014, and May 7, 2026. The DGME will verify on its own that the application was filed and that applicants do not hold any other valid immigration status or have any regularization process other than an asylum claim.

The category will authorize residence in Costa Rica for a period of two years, renewable indefinitely for additional periods of the same length. “However, before the document is renewed, the foreign national’s migration movements will be verified in accordance with Article 36 of the General Migration and Immigration Law,” the resolution states.

Beneficiaries of the measure will be able to enter and leave Costa Rica subject to the usual controls. However, if irregular travel movements are detected, the individual must provide documents and evidence explaining “the reasons why such movement does not appear in the records. If the reasons are not justified, renewal will not be authorized.”

The DGME also warned that this status may be revoked if it is determined that the person poses a threat to public security or fails to meet the requirements for renewal. It will also be lost if the individual has been convicted of a crime within the previous ten years.

Estimates by the Costa Rican press place the number of Cubans residing in the country at between 10,000 and 15,000

The resolution also establishes that anyone who fails to renew the document within three months after its expiration will automatically lose the immigration benefit without further proceedings.

Costa Rica has traditionally served as a transit country for Cubans traveling from South America to the United States. However, thousands have settled in the country, one of the most politically and economically stable in the region, with high levels of security and quality of life. Estimates by the Costa Rican press suggest that between 10,000 and 15,000 Cubans currently reside there.

The DGME reports approximately 7,300 pending asylum applications from Cubans, making them the second- or third-largest nationality group seeking asylum, behind Nicaraguans—whose pending applications numbered around 190,000 in the summer of 2025—and, at times, Venezuelans.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

Iberostar Follows Blue Diamond’s Lead and Leaves Gaesa Hotels

The Spanish hotel chain remains active in Cuba through six properties belonging to Cubanacán and Gran Caribe.

The Grand Packard in Havana is one of the Gaviota hotels from which Iberostar is withdrawing. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 1, 2026 — On Monday, the Spanish hotel company Iberostar severed its ties with Gaviota, the hotel chain controlled by the Business Administration Group S.A. (Gaesa), and stopped managing the twelve hotels associated with that entity. The company will maintain its presence in Cuba through properties whose state-owned partners belong to other tourism groups not linked to the military conglomerate, including Cubanacán and Gran Caribe.

The decision became public shortly before the deadline imposed by the U.S. Department of State under Executive Order 14404, signed by President Donald Trump on May 1, 2026, which called for sanctions against “those responsible for repression in Cuba and threats to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” A few days later, the decree began taking concrete form through specific sanctions against Gaesa, its president Ania Guillermina Lastres, and Moa Nickel S.A.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) set June 5, 2026, as the deadline for companies to terminate their operations or risk exposure to sanctions.

“As of June 1, 2026, these establishments will no longer be managed, marketed, or promoted under the Iberostar brand”

On Monday, 14ymedio confirmed that several hotels previously managed by Iberostar and owned by Gaesa remain open, but are now under the direct administration of Gaviota, as occurred with the withdrawal of Blue Diamond Resorts last Saturday.

Staff at the Grand Packard Hotel explained: “If you try to book an Iberostar hotel in Havana through travel agencies, what will come up is Parque Central, which is still managed by that company. To book with us, you have to do it directly here or through Gaviota.” By contrast, representatives at the Parque Central Hotel—owned by Cubanacán—confirmed to 14ymedio that “Iberostar executives are working here today without any problem, and the company remains at this hotel.”

Iberostar continues operating the Selection Parque Central, a Cubanacán property. / 14ymedio

Iberostar’s withdrawal was announced through the Argentine tour operator Sudameria. In the company’s statement, it explained that, “as part of a process of adaptation to the international regulatory environment” and in order to preserve its standards of quality, compliance, and management, Iberostar Cuba Hotels & Resorts “will cease operating and continue reading

marketing a group of hotels in Cuba as of June 1, 2026.”

The company stated that the measure ends any commercial, operational, or branding relationship between Iberostar Cuba Hotels & Resorts and the establishments included in the decision.

Among the 12 hotels from which Iberostar is withdrawing and whose ownership is linked to Gaesa are the Hotel Grand Packard on Prado Avenue; the Iberostar Selection Habana, located in the controversial Torre K [K Tower] and currently closed due to the crisis; the Iberostar Selection Ensenachos in Cayo Santa María; the Iberostar Origin Bella Vista Varadero; and the Iberostar Selection Esmeralda, among others.

“As of June 1, 2026, these establishments will no longer be managed, marketed, or promoted under the Iberostar brand,” according to the statement. They will now be managed directly by Gaviota.

Although Cubanacán appears on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list and is sanctioned by the agency, it is not part of the Gaesa conglomerate, which the United States directly sanctioned on May 7

Through the Iberostar Cuba website, only hotels without links to Gaesa can currently be booked, including the Hotel Inglaterra and Iberostar Selection Parque Central, both Cubanacán properties in Havana, as well as the Iberostar Origin Daiquiri in Cayo Guillermo and the Iberostar Origin Taínos in Varadero, both owned by Gran Caribe.

Although Cubanacán appears on OFAC’s SDN list and is sanctioned by the agency, it is not part of the Gaesa conglomerate, which the U.S. State Department directly sanctioned on May 7.

The sanctions could nevertheless be extended to state-owned entities such as Cubanacán, Gran Caribe, and Islazul if the State Department and OFAC determine that they meet the criteria outlined in Orden Ejecutiva 14400, which includes “ownership, control, or direct management by the Government of Cuba.”

Iberostar is following the path taken by the Canadian hotel company Blue Diamond Resorts, one of the main foreign operators in Cuba’s tourism sector over the past decade, which ended its operations on the Island “with immediate effect” last Saturday.

The hotel chain Meliá, which operates between 32 and 35 properties in Cuba, also faces the possibility of sanctions and is under increasing pressure to define its position before the deadline established by the U.S. Department of State.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

Davisleydi Velazco, Triple Jumper Expelled from Cuba, Breaks a Record by 50 Centimeters in France

The athlete from Camagüey has been on the rise since leaving the Island and settling in Puerto Rico, the country she hopes to represent.

Davisleydi Velazco achieved the third-best mark in the world this season with her 14.83-meter jump. / Facebook

14ymedio, Havana, June 1, 2026 — Cuban athlete Davisleydi Velazco shattered the triple jump record at the International Meeting of Forbach, France, on Sunday, breaking a mark that had stood for 17 years. With only two attempts, one of them measuring 14.83 meters, the athlete, who left Cuba in 2023 in search of better opportunities, surpassed by half a meter the previous record of 14.33 meters set by France’s Tereza Nzola Mesa in the 2009 edition of the event.

The 26-year-old triple jumper, who was permanently removed from Cuba’s list of eligible athletes last September, also recorded a jump of 14.77 meters, which would likewise have erased the competition record from the books. Both marks were far superior to those achieved by the second- and third-place finishers. Silver went to France’s Ilionis Guillaume with a jump of 14.09 meters, while Germany’s Kira Wittmann completed the podium with 13.89 meters.

With her performance this weekend, Velazco, who competes as an independent athlete, provided further evidence of her excellent form just days after jumping 14.85 meters, her personal best and the third-best mark in the world this season, which earned her the gold medal at the Coqui International Cup held at Paseo de los Artistas in Caguas, Puerto Rico, on May 17.

“I confirmed that dreams can be achieved when you work with faith, discipline, and heart. We keep dreaming, we keep fighting, because this is only the beginning”

The competition was not easy, as she was engaged in a fierce battle with Dominica’s Thea Lafond, the reigning Olympic champion in the event, whom she defeated by just one continue reading

centimeter. “I confirmed that dreams can be achieved when you work with faith, discipline, and heart. We keep dreaming, we keep fighting, because this is only the beginning,” she said after winning the competition.

According to the specialized website Swing Completo, the athlete is likely to surpass the 15-meter mark, given the steady improvement she has shown since leaving Cuba and settling in Puerto Rico, the country she hopes to represent.

In 2025, she enjoyed the best season of her career. In March of last year, she recorded a jump of 14.36 meters at the Spring Break Classic in Carolina, Puerto Rico. That was followed by marks of 14.32 in Tucson, 14.26 in Kingston, 14.61 in Memphis, and 14.38 meters in Florence.

“Her 14.54-meter jump in Gothenburg last July showed she was ready to reach the biggest stages, and in Brussels, on August 22, she achieved one of her best results and a new personal best of 14.72,” the specialized outlet Deporcuba wrote late last year while following the athlete’s progress.

Although she won a bronze medal for Cuba at the 2018 World U20 Athletics Championships in Tampere, Finland, she was later sidelined in several national selection processes. In an interview published last December by the Puerto Rican newspaper El Vocero, the athlete said that her career in Cuba had become “stagnant.” With no prospects for growth and faced with “the economic situation,” she felt compelled to seek new opportunities and leave the Island.

The athlete said that in Cuba her career had become “stagnant,” with no prospects or growth

Her journey took her through four countries, including several months spent between Mexico and the United States, before a turning point arrived when she was contacted by veteran Cuban coach Ubaldo Duany. Duany helped shape the careers of Colombian triple jumper Caterine Ibargüen, who won Olympic gold at Rio 2016, and Pedro Pichardo, the Cuban-born jumper who has won Olympic gold and silver for Portugal at Tokyo 2020 and Paris 2024.

The coach invited Velazco to train for a couple of months at his club in Puerto Rico. She accepted and ultimately decided to stay, a decision that marked a major turning point in her career.

The exodus of athletes due to a lack of opportunities has become a common feature of Cuban athletics. In 2021, triple jumper Cristian Nápoles and sprinter Reynier Mena requested their release from the Cuban Athletics Federation. Time has vindicated several of them. In June of last year, Mena won the 200-meter race at the Diamond League meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, with a time of 20.05 seconds. Days earlier, he had also won meets in Savona, Italy (20.15 seconds), and Norway (20.20 seconds).

As for the triple jumpers who have left Cuba, the event that most clearly highlighted Cuba’s shortcomings and the development of its expatriate athletes was the Paris 2024 Olympics. At those Games, emigrant jumpers swept the podium. Jordan Díaz, competing for Spain, won gold with a jump of 17.86 meters. Silver and bronze went to Pedro Pablo Pichardo of Portugal (17.84 meters) and Andy Díaz of Italy (17.64 meters), respectively.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

Cuban Consulate in Cancún Urged to Speak Out Against Wave of Discrimination

Island Residents Report Sackings, Obstacles to Renting Housing and Social Rejection Following an Altercation in Supermanzana 23

The local press reported that the case began with a neighbourhood dispute related to a dog bite and ended with a strong public backlash

14ymedio, Havana, 31 May 2026 / Cuban residents in Mexico have called on the Island’s Foreign Ministry and its Consulate in Cancún to issue a public response to the hostile climate that, they claim, has been unleashed against the Cuban community in Quintana Roo following a recent incident in Supermanzana 23 of that tourist city. In a statement circulated on social media, the signatories denounce the fact that the diplomatic mission has remained silent in the face of episodes of discrimination that are no longer confined to the digital sphere but have begun to affect the daily lives of Cuban families who had no involvement in the events.

The text, titled The Need for Active and Impartial Consular Representation, expresses the “profound concern” of Cuban residents at “the lack of an official statement from the Cuban Foreign Ministry” after the case sparked a strong reaction on social media and, according to those making the complaint, gave rise to “real episodes of exclusion and discrimination” in the state of Quintana Roo.

The source of the tension was an altercation in Supermanzana 23 in Cancún, where Cubans Rigoberto “N” and Yudelmis “N” were detained by Mexican authorities and placed at the disposal of the National Migration Institute. The local press reported that the case began with a neighbourhood dispute related to a dog bite and ended with the intervention of security officers, damage to a property and a strong public backlash against those involved. From that point on, outrage directed at two individuals escalated, according to migrant support organisations, into a broader reaction against Cubans living in the area.

The demand is directed squarely at the Cuban General Consulate in Cancún, located in Supermanzana 20, just a few blocks from where the crisis unfolded

“Sadly, we watched with alarm as this online climate spilled over into daily life, affecting our hard-working families who had absolutely no part in these events,” the statement reads. The document cites reports from the civil organisation Cisvac – International Council Uniting Venezuela – which works with migrants and claims to have documented “multiple daily cases” of Cubans who have lost jobs, faced tenancy disputes or suffered direct workplace exclusion following the incident.

The demand is directed squarely at the Cuban General Consulate in Cancún, located in Supermanzana 20, just a few blocks from where the crisis unfolded. For the signatories, that proximity makes the absence of a public position all the more inexplicable. “We find it paradoxical and incomprehensible that our Consulate in Cancún has maintained absolute public silence,” the text states. continue reading

The absence of any response, they add, left the community “in a position of clear social and media vulnerability.” The reproach is not confined to the Cancún case. The document links that silence to a broader critique of Cuban consular work in Mexico – a country that has become a transit territory for those heading towards the northern border, or a place of waiting or forced return for thousands of Island migrants deported from the United States.

The residents’ perception is of a diplomacy that is absent when it comes to defending nationals who are not part of associations aligned with the Cuban Government

In recent years, Mexico has been one of the main routes for Cubans attempting to reach the United States, but also a chokepoint for those who fail to cross, are detained or are sent back from American territory. Added to this are those left stranded in southern Mexico, at immigration offices or on the northern border, without documents, without steady work and with no clear way out.

“A considerable number of our compatriots are stranded at various borders within Mexico, facing a severe migration limbo,” the statement warns. The text also refers to Cubans “deported or returned from the United States to Mexican territory,” who are left “in conditions of extreme vulnerability.”

The signatories argue that, given this situation, there should be “vigorous, high-level” consular management with Mexican immigration authorities to guarantee dignified treatment for Cubans in transit or forced return. However, the residents’ perception is the opposite: a diplomacy that is absent when it comes to defending nationals who are not part of associations aligned with the Cuban Government.

“Meetings are frequently organised at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico itself, directed exclusively at resident groups that maintain a direct affinity with the official discourse”

The statement touches on one of the most sensitive points in the relationship between the regime and its diaspora: selective representation. The signatories recall that consular protection consists of “inalienable rights, not political concessions,” enshrined in International Law and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In that regard, they question the fact that the Cuban Embassy in Mexico frequently organises meetings with resident groups aligned with the official line, while ignoring a broader majority that is plural, critical, or simply outside those circles.

“Meetings are frequently organised at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico itself, directed exclusively at resident groups that maintain a direct affinity with the official discourse,” they denounce. That practice, they add, “reinforces an unrealistic rhetoric that attempts to project the idea that all of us abroad support the Government, deliberately rendering invisible the vast majority of our community.”

The text insists that the most vulnerable Cubans are typically not members of those privileged associations. They are, precisely, those facing “migration limbo, border returns or workplace discrimination.” For these people, the signatories say, consular assistance should be exercised “in a strict, impartial manner, free from ideological bias of any kind.”

The statement concludes with three concrete demands: that the Cuban Foreign Ministry issue a public declaration on the situation of vulnerability facing the community in Cancún; that it establish transparent communication channels with civil organisations working with migrants on the ground; and that it assume “an active, inclusive and equitable role of diplomatic management in defence of all its nationals, without political conditions.”

Translated by GH

______________________

Opposition Figure Roberto Veiga Returns to Cuba After Seven Years in Spain

The Catholic intellectual advocated dialogue with the regime, in contrast to the roadmap of the Pasos de Cambio coalition, which ratified the Liberation Agreement this Sunday in Madrid

Roberto Veiga says his organisation is committed to breaking a dynamic of confrontation that has borne no fruit / Facebook R.V.

14ymedio, Madrid, 1 June 2026 / Roberto Veiga González, director of the Centre for Studies on the Rule of Law Cuba Próxima, has returned to the Island in recent weeks to take up permanent residence there after nearly seven years in exile. The decision was announced by the organisation he founded in 2021 through a statement informing that State Security had already detained him upon his arrival – on a date they have not disclosed – and subjected him to several interrogations.

Veiga took this decision in order to “represent, from within the reality of a people afflicted by power cuts, scarcity, and social fracture, the political proposal entitled The Agreed Opening: A Roadmap for National Reconstruction.” This is a transition pathway proposed by Cuba Próxima last April that would “replace sterile confrontation with political realism.”

The platform – which also includes Michel Fernández, Ileana de La Guardia, and Pavel Vidal, among others – argues that inaction is not an option in the face of “a systemic crisis that has overwhelmed the current model,” and that “profound change is an ethical and national security imperative” under present circumstances. Accordingly, Veiga González returns to promote, alongside others, “a process of reciprocal and verifiable steps” that would break the current dynamic.

“The director of Cuba Próxima calmly accepts the hardships and pressures that political activism from within Cuba entails, which have already begun.”

“The director of Cuba Próxima calmly accepts the hardships and pressures that political activism from within Cuba entails, which have already begun,” the communiqué states, without going into much detail about the measures taken by State Security. “The rigour of commitment demands that personal sacrifice not be an instrument for victimhood or the pursuit of admiration, but a bridge of encounter so that other Cubans may move towards a shared solution,” the text underlines.

Cuba Próxima established eight strategic pillars in its proposal: full guarantee of all rights; a democratic and social rule-of-law state, with separation of powers and local autonomy; equal opportunities and social inclusion without discrimination; efficient public bodies at the service of the citizen; a free economy with social responsibility; centrality of the labour question and dignified wages; health, education, and social security as universal services; and sovereignty and strategic neutrality, grounded in peace and mutual respect. continue reading

The organisation believes that Veiga’s return demonstrates its commitment to this agenda and that “the freedom of the Cuban people is its non-negotiable destiny.” With this gesture, the Centre places itself, the statement asserts, “at the core of national necessity, convinced that Cuba can afford no further delays.”

The agreed opening proposal formalised by the organisation on 13 April last sets out a roadmap divided into three phases for national reconstruction through what it calls an internal “Multi-Actor Sovereign Dialogue” and the normalisation of relations with the United States. The document, drawn up by the board of directors, identifies as immediate priorities the release of political prisoners under an Amnesty Law, the restructuring of the military conglomerate Gaesa, and reform of the Electoral Law, all under the umbrella of international technical mediation.

The document also contains a list of demands addressed to the United States, including an end to the energy blockade imposed by Donald Trump since 29 January last.

The document also contains a list of demands addressed to the United States, including an end to the energy blockade imposed by Donald Trump since 29 January last, the removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, the lifting of the travel ban, and support for certain economic sectors, including emergency financing for an emergency food programme, a healthcare programme, and an energy programme.

The proposal has not been without controversy within the Cuban opposition, as those sectors that favour US intervention argue that the Cuban Government has shown no willingness to engage in dialogue over decades. Veiga and his team, on the other hand, believe that confrontation has likewise led nowhere.

The news comes precisely one day after the Pasos de Cambio coalition ratified in Madrid the Liberation Agreement presented in March in Miami – a document establishing a unified roadmap to guide a democratic transition in Cuba after 67 years of communism. Led by opposition figures such as Rosa María Payá and backed by organisations both on the Island and in exile, the plan opts for a pathway in which the regime plays no part.

The project envisages the creation of a provisional government to address the humanitarian emergency, release political prisoners, and restore citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms.

These opposing positions are precisely what led to the split between the lawyer and intellectual and his partner of more than 15 years, Lenier González. Both served as directors of the magazine Espacio Laical and the think tank Cuba Posible, which over time came to be regarded by the Cuban authorities as a threat, as it promoted conciliatory positions that were gaining traction – as both recounted in various interviews – among the more moderate members of the Communist Party.

The regime launched a campaign of harassment against the pair, who ultimately went into exile. Veiga settled in Spain, where he founded Cuba Próxima, while González moved to the United States and turned to academia, stepping back from politics. However, the latter has publicly criticised the former, attributing to him connections with senior government officials that have caused him serious reputational damage, as Veiga himself has recently lamented.

Translated by GH.

______________________

Héctor Maseda, Prisoner of the Black Spring and Widower of Laura Pollán, Dies in Exile

An independent journalist and nuclear engineer, he was sentenced to 20 years in prison in 2003 and refused for years to accept exile as the price of his release.

Héctor Maseda, after his release in 2011, alongside his wife, Laura Pollán, leader of the Ladies in White. / Euronews

14ymedio Héctor Maseda Gutiérrez, an independent journalist, Cuban dissident, and one of the political prisoners of the Group of 75, died this Saturday in exile, according to journalist Camila Acosta. Members of the Cuban American National Foundation confirmed his death in Miami at the age of 83. His name became linked to one of the harshest chapters of Castro’s repression, the Black Spring of 2003, and also to the history of the Ladies in White, the movement that his wife, Laura Pollán, helped found and led for years to demand the freedom of those imprisoned.

A nuclear engineer by training, Maseda was born in Havana on January 18, 1943. Before becoming a leading voice in independent journalism, he worked in the scientific field until his lack of “political credibility” prevented him from pursuing a professional career within state institutions. In the mid-1990s, he began collaborating with the non-official press and was a founding member of the Decoro Working Group, an independent news agency persecuted by the regime.

His life changed forever in March 2003, when Fidel Castro’s regime launched a wave of repression against dissidents, librarians, independent journalists, and human rights activists. Maseda was arrested along with 74 other dissidents and sentenced to 20 years in prison. He was 60 years old at the time. The operation, known as Black Spring, sought to decapitate the peaceful opposition and send a warning message to any voice that deviated from the official narrative.

“I will withstand whatever comes”

In prison, Maseda was held in several penitentiaries, including Las Alambradas de Manaca, La Pendiente, and Agüica, according to records released by the Ladies in White. His file within the movement also included a phrase that characterized him: “I will resist whatever comes.”

During those years, Laura Pollán ceased to be merely the wife of a political prisoner and became one of the most recognizable figures of the Cuban dissident movement. Along with other women dressed in white, she walked every Sunday along Fifth Avenue in Miramar after attending Mass at continue reading

the Santa Rita Church. The image of those wives, mothers, and daughters with gladioli in their hands became unbearable for a regime accustomed to repression without witnesses. Pollán died in October 2011, a few months after her husband’s release, leaving behind a legacy of peaceful resistance that transcended the island.

From prison he wrote ‘Buried Alive’, a testimony about Cuban political imprisonment that circulated clandestinely

Maseda was released from prison on February 12, 2011, on parole, after nearly eight years behind bars. He refused the forced exile that the regime negotiated with the Catholic Church and the Spanish government to empty the prisons without acknowledging the innocence of those convicted. Reporters Without Borders emphasized at the time that his release did not overturn the 2003 sentence and that Maseda was part of the group of dissidents who refused to leave Cuba as a condition for their release.

In 2008, while still imprisoned, he received the International Press Freedom Award from the Committee to Protect Journalists. From prison, he wrote Buried Alive, a memoir about Cuban political imprisonment that circulated clandestinely and whose title encapsulated the experience of those condemned for exercising basic rights.

Maseda belongs to a generation of opposition figures who confronted Castroism without social media, with slower international coverage, and under a much more restrictive surveillance system. His case encapsulated several of the regime’s obsessions: the fear of independent journalism, the suppression of civic autonomy, and the desire to make exile an extension of imprisonment.

First Anniversary of the Death of Laura Pollán / Yoani Sanchez

Raúl Castro, From General to Prisoner

The former Cuban defense minister has many crimes for which he could be tried in the US

File photo of former Cuban President Raúl Castro. / EFE

14ymedio, Miami, Pedro Corzo, May 31, 2026 / I confess that few things would please me more than seeing Raúl Castro dressed in the orange jumpsuit of ordinary US prisoners, serving his sentence in a more severe prison. Although I doubt that a US prison of that kind would be any harsher than the less malevolent Castro regime’s prisons.

For 67 years, there has been no shortage of Cuba experts who emphatically assert that the younger Castro brother, the more organized, familial, and even condescending, compared to his brother, the greatest criminal in Cuban history, thankfully now deceased. While I have no evidence to refute most of the labels applied to Raúl, I can assure you that he is anything but tolerant, because I vividly recall one of the photos of this man published in early January 1959, showing him hanging a peasant in the Sierra Maestra mountains during the insurrection.

He then ordered hundreds of executions, including the San Juan Hill massacre in Santiago de Cuba, which occurred 11 days after the insurrection’s triumph, in which 71 men were summarily executed in a single night. They even used bulldozers, in true Hitlerian style.

Raúl was without a doubt Fidel’s most loyal servant. It is true that there have been stories of disagreements between the two autocrats, but even if they were true, the pair’s shared interests prevailed, to the great misfortune of the Cuban people. continue reading

Unfortunately, the most numerous and horrendous crimes of Castro’s totalitarianism have been against the Cuban people.

Raúl Castro, the serial killer Ernesto “Che” Guevara, and the “Butcher of Artemisa,” Ramiro Valdés, chose from the very first days of the revolutionary victory to assume the role of the most intransigent defenders of the process led by Fidel Castro. This bloody triad, headed by the criminal Raúl, was the one that, obeying the orders of the supreme leader, directed the spiritual and material destruction of a country that, with all its flaws, was at the forefront of many of the most important areas of development in Latin America.

I confess I haven’t the faintest idea how the trial will unfold against the man who gave the order to shoot down two unarmed planes flying in international waters, with the sole objective of saving lives in danger. The former Cuban Minister of Defense said, “I said, well, shoot them down in the sea when they appear and don’t ask questions,” a statement very similar to Guevara’s, who advised his henchmen, “Kill him, ask questions later,” or another, more institutional one, from the serial killer: “To send men to the firing squad, judicial proof is unnecessary.” Of Ramiro Valdés, there are no expressions, only murders.

Unfortunately, the most numerous and horrendous crimes of Castro’s totalitarian regime have been committed against the Cuban people within the country’s borders, but those crimes will have to be judged by their own citizens when the political situation in Cuba changes. For now, we must welcome the fact that the current US government has decided to take legal action against a self-confessed murderer like Raúl Castro, just as it did against the drug trafficker Nicolás Maduro, for a crime that could also be attributed to the second-in-command in the destruction of Cuba.

Raul Castro has many crimes for which he can be tried in the United States

According to a Miami Herald article, Raúl Castro met with Colombian drug traffickers in 1980 and authorized them to use Cuban ports for their drug trafficking to the US, in exchange for providing weapons and ammunition to the M-19 guerrillas. Years later, he met with one of Manuel Antonio Noriega’s men to mediate a dispute the Panamanian general was having with Colombian drug traffickers.

Manuel de Beunza, a former major in the Castro regime’s intelligence services, testified at a Senate hearing in Washington that Raúl Castro ordered Generoso Escudero replaced as head of the naval unit in Cienfuegos because he refused to cooperate in the deployment of speedboats transporting cocaine to the southern coast of Cuba. Furthermore, John Jairo “Popeye” Velásquez, a close associate of Pablo Escobar Gaviria, stated that the fugitive general maintained close ties with the Medellín cocaine cartel and protected drug shipments passing through Cuba en route to the southern coast of Florida.

Raul Castro has many crimes for which he can be tried by the United States.

______________________

Cubans in Mexico Ask the Consulate in Cancún to Speak Out Against a Wave of Discrimination

Island residents report dismissals from jobs, obstacles to renting housing, and social rejection following an altercation in Supermanzana 23.

Local media reported that the case began with a neighborhood dispute related to a dog bite and ended with strong public backlash. / Screenshot

14ymedio, Havana, May 31, 2026 — Cubans living in Mexico have called on Cuba’s Foreign Ministry and its Consulate in Cancún to issue a public response to what they say is a climate of hostility that has been unleashed against the Cuban community in Quintana Roo following a recent incident in the Supermanzana 23 neighborhood of Cancún. In a statement circulated on social media, the signatories denounce the diplomatic mission’s silence in the face of discrimination that, they say, has gone beyond online debate and has begun affecting the daily lives of Cuban families unrelated to the events.

The text, titled The Need for Active and Impartial Consular Representation expresses the Cuban residents’ “deep concern” over “the lack of an official statement from Cuba’s Foreign Ministry” after the case sparked a strong reaction on social media and, according to those making the complaint, led to “real episodes of exclusion and discrimination” in the state of Quintana Roo.

The source of the tension was an altercation in Cancún’s Supermanzana 23, where Cubans Rigoberto “N” and Yudelmis “N” were detained by Mexican authorities and turned over to the National Migration Institute. Local media reported that the case began with a neighborhood dispute involving a dog bite and ended with the intervention of security agents, damage to a home, and strong public condemnation of those involved. From that point on, outrage directed at two individuals evolved, according to migrant-support organizations, into a broader reaction against Cubans living in the area.

The complaint is directed specifically at the Cuban Consulate General in Cancún, located in Supermanzana 20, just a few blocks from where the crisis unfolded

“Unfortunately, we watched with alarm as this online climate spilled over into daily life, affecting our hardworking families who were completely unrelated to those events,” the statement says. It cites reports from Cisvac — International Council Adding Venezuela — a foundation for the defense of human rights, which works with migrants and says it has documented “multiple daily cases” of Cubans who have lost jobs, faced rental disputes, or experienced direct workplace exclusion following the incident.

The complaint points directly to the Cuban Consulate General in Cancún, located continue reading

in Supermanzana 20, only a short distance from where the crisis occurred. For the signatories, that proximity makes the lack of a public position even more difficult to understand. “We find it paradoxical and incomprehensible that our Consulate in Cancún has maintained absolute public silence,” the text states.

The absence of a response, they add, has left the community “in a position of clear social and media vulnerability.” The criticism goes beyond the Cancún case. The document links that silence to broader concerns about Cuban consular work in Mexico, a country that has become a transit point toward the U.S. border, a waiting area, or a destination for forced returns for thousands of Cuban migrants deported from the United States.

Residents perceive a diplomacy that is absent when it comes to defending nationals who are not part of organizations aligned with the Cuban Government

In recent years, Mexico has been one of the main routes for Cubans seeking to reach the United States, but it has also become a bottleneck for those who fail to cross, are detained, or are returned from U.S. territory. Added to that are those stranded in southern Mexico, at immigration offices, or along the northern border, without documents, stable employment, or a clear path forward.

“A considerable number of our compatriots are stranded at various borders throughout Mexico, facing a severe migratory limbo,” the statement warns. It also refers to Cubans “deported or returned from the United States to Mexican territory,” who are left “in conditions of extreme vulnerability.”

The signatories argue that, given this situation, there should be “energetic, high-level consular engagement” with Mexican immigration authorities to ensure dignified treatment of Cubans in transit or facing forced return. However, residents’ perception is the opposite: a diplomacy absent when it comes to defending nationals who do not belong to organizations aligned with the Cuban Government.

“Meetings are frequently organized at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico exclusively for groups of residents who maintain a direct affinity with the official discourse”

The statement touches on one of the most sensitive aspects of the relationship between the regime and its diaspora: selective representation. The signatories recall that consular protection and assistance “are not political concessions, but inalienable rights,” protected by international law and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In that regard, they question the fact that the Cuban Embassy in Mexico frequently organizes meetings with resident groups aligned with the official narrative while ignoring a broader, more diverse community that may be critical of, or simply uninvolved in, those circles.

“Meetings are frequently organized at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico exclusively for groups of residents who maintain a direct affinity with the official discourse,” they state. This practice, they add, “reinforces an unrealistic narrative that attempts to project the idea that all of us abroad support the Government, while deliberately rendering invisible the immense majority of our community.”

The text insists that the most vulnerable Cubans generally do not belong to those favored associations. They are precisely the people facing “migratory limbo, border returns, or labor discrimination.” For them, the signatories argue, consular assistance should be provided “strictly, impartially, and without ideological bias of any kind.”

The statement concludes with three specific demands: that Cuba’s Foreign Ministry issue a public declaration regarding the vulnerability of the Cuban community in Cancún; that it establish transparent communication channels with civil organizations working directly with migrants; and that it assume “an active, inclusive, and equitable diplomatic role in defense of all its nationals, without political conditions.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

The Mansions of Vedado Open Their Doors, But Not All Their Secrets

During an event organised by Unesco, former Republican-era palaces converted into state offices revealed stained glass, marble, staircases – and sealed-off areas

“The hardest thing is the contrast with the rest of Havana, which is falling apart.” / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, Darío Hernández, 31 May 2026 — The first thing they ask of you before entering is not silence, nor respect for the heritage, nor care for the old floors. It is your identity card. At the entrance to each building, an official photographs visitors’ documents, as if a visit to a heritage property were also a bureaucratic formality – or entry to the Embassy of the Past. Only after that gesture, so routine in a Cuba under surveillance and so ill-suited to a cultural outing, does the tour of several Vedado mansions begin, opened to the public for the Open Doors Day organised by Unesco.

There were quite a few people. Families, curious passers-by, students, neighbours who had spent years walking past those facades without ever being able to cross the threshold. Some stared upwards, as if trying to take in all at once the cornices, balconies, columns and black ironwork. Others walked with the discretion of someone entering a stranger’s home – even though that home no longer has a visible owner, only acronyms, custodians, offices and official portraits of Raúl Castro and Miguel Díaz-Canel.

The Mansions of Vedado Open Their Doors, But Not All Their Secrets

In each building, students and professors of Art History were on hand to explain mouldings, stained glass, styles, dates and materials. At times the tour felt like a living lesson in Republican-era architecture; at times, like an excursion through the inventory of a private wealth converted into state heritage. The guides’ voices tried to impose order upon the beauty, but visitors could not help looking also at what was not being explained.

“The hardest thing is the contrast with the rest of Havana, which is falling apart,” murmured a man as he crossed one of the reception rooms. Outside, the city peels, is propped up, collapses, or survives patched together with breeze blocks, corrugated zinc and miracles. Inside, by contrast, there remain chandeliers, sweeping staircases, interior courtyards, gardens and high ceilings – that sense of spaciousness which today seems almost obscene in a capital where so many families live crammed together amid leaking roofs and power cuts.

Some were expropriated; of others it is said, with the convenient formula of the official narrative, that their owners left the country and “left no heirs.” / 14ymedio

The route included some of the most imposing mansions in Vedado: the headquarters of the Ministry of Culture; the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), on Paseo and 13th Street; the Casa de la Prensa, headquarters of the Union of Cuban Journalists (Upec), on 23rd and I; and the Fidel Castro Ruz Centre. All share the fact that they were built or inhabited by wealthy families during the Republic – many of Spanish origin or descent from Spaniards – and after 1959 passed into the hands of the new power. Some were expropriated; of others it is said, with the convenient formula of the official narrative, that their owners left the country and “left no heirs.”

At the headquarters of the Ministry of Culture, the former home of Ernesto Sarrá and Loló Larrea commands attention even before one enters. It occupies almost an entire block and still retains the air of a family palace it must have had when the owner of one of Cuba’s largest pharmaceutical fortunes lived there with his wife. From the street, the building promises a novel of money, parties, alliances, servants, china and automobiles pulling through the gateway. Inside, however, the mansion no longer functions as a home. It is a collection of offices from which the culture of the island is administered – and kept under watch.

“What beauty, and what a waste not to be able to see it in its entirety,” commented a woman as she left one of the rooms. / 14ymedio

Many areas were closed to the public. Some because they are offices; others because they are “not in a fit state.” This was a constant throughout the tour: half-open doors that could not be passed through, staircases leading nowhere, sealed-off corridors, or areas that the guide mentioned without showing them. Visitors could barely reconstruct, from fragments, the scale of what once was.

At the FMC headquarters, amid stained glass windows, a female sculpture and rooms altered by bureaucratic use, the guide explained ornamental details while visitors raised their eyes to the ceilings, the doors and the columns. “What beauty, and what a waste not to be able to see it in its entirety,” commented a woman as she left one of the rooms. The remark hung in the air with an unintentional precision. The heritage is shown, but with caution; conservation is spoken of, but the history of ownership is barely touched upon.

The Casa de la Prensa, headquarters of Upec, preserves an uncomfortable memory for official journalism. The building on 23rd and I is associated with the García Osuna family, connected to Republican-era politics. From 1963, the organisation that brings together pro-government journalists was installed there. In its salons, where private life, receptions and family conversations once took place, propaganda subordinated to the single Party is now produced. The architecture, with its ornate iron grilles and its old-world elegance, seems to retain more freedom than the institution that occupies it.

The former mansion of the Conill family has become a civic temple to the leader who governed the country in which properties such as this one were confiscated. / 14ymedio

The starkest contrast appears at the Fidel Castro Ruz Centre. The former mansion of the Conill family, with its restored grandeur, its well-kept gardens and its museum-style displays, has become a civic temple to the leader who governed the country in which properties such as this one were confiscated, seized or absorbed by the State. Official sources acknowledge that the house belonged to the Hidalgo de Conill family and that Enrique Conill Rafecas was a captain in the Liberation Army. They also admit that, after 1959, the family left the country and the property was put to uses connected with the Ministry of the Interior.

Here the paradox achieves an almost theatrical clarity. A Republican-era palace, born of private wealth, converted into a shrine of the Revolution. A building that must once have held family albums, china, bedrooms, parties and inheritances, now transformed into the stage set of a single, carefully illuminated memory. “You spend your whole life walking past this place and you have no idea what’s inside,” said a visitor standing before the mansion in which Fidel Castro’s Mercedes-Benz is displayed as if it were a relic.

That detail alone would be enough for a different tour – less ornamental and more honest: one that passes not only through the columns, the stained glass and the ironwork, but through property records, nationalisations, exiles, emptied houses and the official versions that explain too much with too little. Who exactly were the owners? What became of them? What documents prove the transfer of ownership? Was there confiscation, abandonment, donation, seizure, litigation? Where are those archives? On the visit, that part appeared only as a footnote, as if the social history of the mansions were less important than the marble.

The public, however, did not seem indifferent. Many entered in amazement; others, with a mixture of curiosity and suspicion. They walked slowly, photographed stained glass, discreetly touched a banister, lingered before a staircase, looked up at the ceilings as if discovering a hidden city above the visible one. For decades, a large part of the Republican residential heritage has remained behind railings, custodians, ministries, mass organisations, embassies and state offices.

The Unesco open day has value because it allows one to look. And in Cuba, looking inward is already something. But looking is not enough. A country that prides itself on its heritage should also account for how that heritage came into state hands, who built it, who lived in it, who lost it and through what mechanisms. Without that information, the tour remains an incomplete postcard of a Havana that is beautiful, deteriorating and under surveillance – where the visitor hands over their identity card before entering and leaves with more questions than answers.

Translated by GH.

______________________

Cuba Among the Countries Whose Nationals Most Frequently Obtained Spanish Citizenship in 2025

Around 14,390 Cubans became Spanish citizens in 2025, 79% more than the previous year, according to the INE

Nearly 300,000 people born in Cuba reside in Spain, according to INE data. / X/@monasterioR

14ymedio, Madrid, 31 May 2026 / Cubans ranked among the leading groups of foreigners to acquire Spanish nationality in 2025, according to data published last Thursday by the National Statistics Institute (INE).

A total of 14,390 Cuban-born citizens obtained Spanish citizenship during the past year, a figure that places Cuba as the sixth most common country of origin among new Spanish nationals, surpassed only by Morocco, Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras and Peru, and ahead of much more populous countries such as Ecuador, Argentina, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua.

Compared to the 8,045 Cuban-born citizens who obtained Spanish nationality in 2024, last year’s figure represents almost double. Cubans represent one of the Latin American migrant communities with the greatest growth in Spain in recent years, a consequence of the wave of emigration triggered by the economic and political crisis on the island.

Cubans are the sixth most frequent nationality among ‘new Spaniards’

Cubans – among nationals of Ibero-American countries – enjoy advantages when it comes to obtaining Spanish citizenship, as they may apply for it after two years of legal residence, compared with the ten years generally required. In addition, many benefit from the so-called Democratic Memory Law, which allows descendants of emigrated Spaniards to obtain nationality. This law has had a particular impact in Cuba, where more than 600,000 people have begun or completed the process through continue reading

this route.

At the start of 2025, there were 252,290 residents born in Cuba living in Spain, according to INE reports. In the subsequent months, a further 43,300 arrivals from the island were recorded, according to the Continuous Population Statistics, as of 1 April 2026.

At the start of 2025, there were 252,290 residents born in Cuba living in Spain. In the subsequent months, a further 43,300 arrivals from the island were recorded.

According to the Jesuit Refugee Service, in 2025 there were 88,367 residents born in Cuba who retained Cuban nationality, and 61,209 held a residence permit. This is a population group that is “growing notably,” the organisation noted. Based on data from the start of 2025 provided by the Foundation of Savings Banks (Funcas), the centre estimated that the number of Cubans in an irregular situation in Spain stood at around 16,000, while 72,270 had legal or “quasi-legal” residency.

14ymedio has reported on several occasions on Cuba’s demographic collapse. The government acknowledges a population of fewer than 10 million inhabitants, while demographer Juan Carlos Albizu-Campos argues that the effective population may be around eight million – 24% less than just four years ago. Between 2021 and 2024, Cuba lost more than one million inhabitants to emigration.

In total, Spain granted nationality to 299,732 foreigners in 2025, the highest figure in the past decade.

In total, Spain granted nationality to 299,732 foreigners in 2025, the highest figure in the past decade. This represents an increase of 18.7% on the previous year.

The majority of the new citizens were of Latin American origin.Most of the grants were made on the grounds of residency. Of the nearly 300,000 applications resolved favourably, 253,836 corresponded to this procedure. The report also notes that the most common year of arrival among those who obtained nationality was 2019, indicating that the full process from arrival to the granting of citizenship took around six years in the majority of cases.

Catalonia, with 70,933 new Spanish citizens, and the Community of Madrid, with 69,566, together accounted for nearly half of all nationalisations recorded across the country.

Translated by GH.

______________________

Cuba: In Ciego de Ávila They Warn: Solar Parks in Cayo Coco ‘Will Harm Local Wildlife’

The “builders, far from merely meeting deadlines and budgets, are called upon to be the foremost guardians of the fragile island ecosystem,” Invasor urges.

The project, which will cover 8.5 hectares, will create “heat islands” that could lead to the loss of forest. / Invasor

14ymedio, Havana, May 31, 2026 – The construction of the first of two photovoltaic solar parks planned for the Jardines del Rey region of Cayo Coco, in Ciego de Ávila, could impact the already “fragile” local ecosystem. Antonio García Quintas, a doctor in Community Ecology and associate researcher at the Center for Coastal Ecosystem Research (CIEC), warns that the project, which will cover 8.5 hectares, “will harm local wildlife, including endemic and threatened species, while migratory birds would be affected by the construction.”

An article published this Sunday in Invasor warns that the installation of the panels, a plan envisioned 10 years ago but only now moving forward, will create “heat islands,” leading to the “loss of a well-preserved evergreen forest that, paradoxically, forms part of the buffer zone that should be protected” in El Bagá Natural Park.

The risk is considerable. According to Raúl Gómez Fernández, a CIEC specialist, in these territories “it is difficult to draw on a map the exact line” separating anthropized zones where human activity has transformed the environment from areas that have not been disturbed.

In response, the specialists consulted by Invasor offer viable alternatives in locations with “secondary vegetation or areas continue reading

converted into solid waste dumps, at higher elevations, less prone to flooding, with lower salt exposure, and located much closer to generating units or electrical substations.”

“What is being proposed is not to halt the investment, but to do it properly, in a place where established forests are not sacrificed”

Because of the impact the project could have, it has undergone modifications since 2016. The site initially selected—western Cayo Coco—was part of non-anthropized ecosystems. Shortly afterward, the Provincial Directorate of Territorial Planning and Urban Development of Ciego de Ávila evaluated the project’s impact there and denied construction in order to protect the flora and fauna. It was then decided that the solar parks would be installed in the eastern part of the cay, although on a smaller area than originally planned, since the initial proposal called for the use of 13 hectares.

“What is being proposed is not to halt the investment, but to do it properly, in a place where established forests are not sacrificed, where existing infrastructure can be utilized, degraded areas rehabilitated, and where construction and maintenance costs would be significantly lower,” Invasor states.

Marialina Herrera Riera, director of investments for the Ciego de Ávila Electric Company, assures that the construction of the photovoltaic solar park will be carried out “under the strictest compliance with all established regulations, without violating any legal provisions.” According to the official, the goal is “to minimize possible impacts on the environment.”

Nevertheless, the provincial newspaper emphasizes that “the solar energy the country so desperately needs, and which is increasingly necessary to generate on the cays themselves where tourism development exists, deserves to be installed in locations that are technically and environmentally justified, not in places that condemn it to greater expenses, accelerated deterioration, or conflict with protective legislation.”

“The solar energy the country so desperately needs, and which is increasingly necessary to generate, deserves to be installed in locations that are technically and environmentally justified”

For this reason, Invasor states in a demanding tone, “its builders, far from merely meeting deadlines and budgets, are called upon to be the foremost guardians of the fragile island ecosystem, protecting wetlands and respecting native wildlife corridors, especially the migratory birds that nest there, ensuring that every panel, every cable, and every movement of earth is carried out with the smallest ecological footprint possible.” Only in this way, it adds, “will this project cease to be a simple renewable-energy undertaking and become a true symbol of coherence.”

The appeal stems from cases such as El Bagá Park, “a themed natural park that existed and disappeared more quickly than it took to build,” because “sustainability is not determined by the type of technology used, but by the way it is integrated into the territory. From the mistakes of the past should finally emerge the wisdom not to repeat them in the present.”

“Today, those same decisions are being paid for through irreversible environmental damage and maintenance costs that no one calculated at the time. This is not about stopping development but about understanding that a poorly located project is not development. It is a legacy of problems for future generations,” the article insists.

The authorities’ strategy for trying to address the country’s energy crisis, with blackouts exceeding 20 hours in several parts of the Island, is the massive installation of solar panels. The program is expected to be fully completed provided the planned schedule is met: within 24 years, by 2050.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________