Translator: GH – Translating Cuba

The Cuban Regime Releases 21 Political Prisoners While Arresting 15 Protesters

The Cuban Observatory for Human Rights reports 35 repressive actions in just four days

The regime maintains its repressive apparatus intact and activates it swiftly whenever it detects any expression of public discontent. / EFE

14ymedio, Havana, 17 March 2026 — The Cuban regime has released 21 political prisoners as part of an agreement reached with the Vatican, but this move—presented by the authorities as a gesture of easing tensions—has coincided with a new wave of repression on the island. While some inmates have been freed, at least 15 people have been arbitrarily detained for taking part in protests in various provinces across the country, according to a report issued this Tuesday by the Cuban Observatory of Human Rights (OCDH).

The organization warned that, far from pointing to any real political opening, the releases have been accompanied by a spike in surveillance, threats, and arrests. “Since the Cuban regime announced the release of 51 political prisoners, an increase in repressive actions has been observed. Between March 13 and 16, 2026, at least 35 repressive actions were documented, targeting protesters, journalists, activists, relatives of political prisoners, and opposition figures,” the observatory said.

The release of 21 political prisoners—many of them convicted for taking part in the Island-wide 11 July 2021 protests—has not meant any reduction in pressure on dissent or on the social discontent that continues to surface in different parts of the country. On the contrary, repression seems to have shifted from prisons to the streets and into the homes of those who dare to protest or speak out.

Two minors are also on the list: Jonathan Muir Burgos, 16, and Kevin Samuel Echeverría, 15, who was also shot in the leg.

Among the most recent incidents are the arrests following protests in Morón, in the province of Ciego de Ávila. According to the OCDH, many of the 15 arbitrary detentions recorded in recent days are linked to those demonstrations. Alongside the arrests, the organization documented threats, constant police surveillance outside homes, de facto house arrests, police brutality against protesters, summonses, harassment of activists and journalists, and fresh reports of abuse inside prisons. continue reading

“These events show a pattern of pressure and control aimed at silencing protest and limiting the exercise of fundamental rights,” the NGO warned. The regime keeps its repressive apparatus fully intact and activates it quickly whenever it detects any expression of public discontent.

According to the information released, 12 people remain detained or their release has not been confirmed. The list includes Ángel Baldomero Quintana Martínez, Bryan Pérez Muñoz, Erick Simón Toledano, Iledier Tabuada Machado, Juan Manuel Griñán Clemente, Raicer Crespo, Silvio de la Caridad Quintana Martínez, Vladimir Ortiz Ortiz, Yaisdely Castillo Hernández, and Yosuan Naranjo. It also includes two minors: Jonathan Muir Burgos, 16, and Kevin Samuel Echeverría, 15, who, as mentioned, was shot in the leg.

The presence of teenagers among those detained once again puts the spotlight on the disproportionate use of force and the criminalization even of minors in protest situations. The case of Kevin Samuel Echeverría, wounded by gunfire, adds a particularly serious element to a chain of events in which the authorities have failed to provide convincing public explanations.

The regime is trying to score political points from the prisoner releases while keeping up intimidation against those protesting now.

So far, those released after these arbitrary detentions are Catherine Gutiérrez Sánchez, Elier Muir Ávila, and Rolando Pérez Lora. Their release, however, does not change the overall picture of repression reported by human rights organizations, which stress that short-term detentions, threats, and constant surveillance are also forms of political punishment.

Meanwhile, the list of political prisoners released under the Vatican deal has now reached 21 names. Most were convicted of sedition, contempt, public disorder, assault, or resistance—charges routinely used by the Cuban justice system to punish protest. Among them are Adael Jesús Leyva Díaz, Frank Aldama Rodríguez, José Luis Sánchez Tito, Roberto Ferrer Gener, and Wilmer Moreno Suárez, several of whom were serving sentences of between 13 and 18 years in prison. Many are from Havana, though others come from Artemisa, Holguín, Villa Clara, Santiago de Cuba, Camagüey, and Mayabeque.

The disproportionate nature of these sentences, imposed in many cases on participants in the July 11, 2021 protests, has been denounced for years by international bodies and human rights platforms. Vatican mediation has now secured the release of a group of prisoners, but the Cuban government has shown no sign of revising the legal and policing framework that made those convictions possible, nor of abandoning repression as its go-to response to dissent.

The regime is trying to politically capitalize on the releases while continuing to intimidate those protesting today. The partial release of political prisoners does not amount to any real improvement in public freedoms when repression against dissent continues at the same time.

Translated by GH

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A Report Calls for a Full Clean-Up of Venezuela’s Defence Sector After Years of Cuban Infiltration

The document puts the cost to Caracas of trading oil for repression at 63.8 billion dollars

Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez forged the oil alliance back in 2000. / Cubadebate

14ymedio, 19 March 2026, Madrid — The operational withdrawal of Cuban personnel from Venezuela isn’t enough if the country is to be democratized. That is the main conclusion of a report put together by the Miranda Center of Democracy, a US-based organization backed by the Republican Party, published this Wednesday. It recalls how chavismo has been swapping oil for repression—also the title of the report—to such an extent that a full purge of the security apparatus is being demanded if anything is to change in the country.

The document highlights the huge amount of money Venezuela has sent to Cuba since the 2000 agreements between Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro. According to the text, the figure comes to 44.5 billion dollars at current prices, which in real (inflation-adjusted) terms is 63.8 billion dollars. That’s the estimate of what’s been transferred in oil to Havana over all these years in exchange for, among other things, personnel services—although back in 2016 Nicolás Maduro put Venezuela’s “investment” in that exchange at around 250 billion dollars, very likely an exaggeration.

According to the report, the 2000–2004 agreement involved sending 53,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) on credit at 2% interest over 15 years, including a two-year grace period, with an official exchange of doctors and teachers. When it was renewed, the volumes stayed the same and a fixed price of 27 dollars per barrel was set, shielded from market increases.

The Group for Coordination and Liaison (Gruce) was set up between 2007 and 2008 when, fearing a coup after Chávez lost a referendum, he signed a secret deal with Castro

From 2005 to 2012, when oil production was strong, the amount rose to about 105,000 bpd on average, and the nominal value of the sales hit 3 billion dollars a year (thanks to high global oil prices, which Cuba didn’t have to suffer and even benefited from, since it resold part of that oil to other customers). During this period continue reading

, according to the report, the Group for Coordination and Liaison (Gruce) was created—a joint intelligence hub—and the “Cubanization” of Venezuelan services such as the Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence (Dgcim) and the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Sebin) took place.

In later years, oil shipments started to fall, averaging 69,000 bpd in 2016 and 55,000 bpd in 2017. Between 2020 and 2023, the estimated average was 30,000 to 40,000, years when Cuba’s power crisis went from bad to worse. The report says that in 2024 exports barely reached around 32,000 bpd, while in 2025 they rose to 52,000, to secure Gruce’s backing in case Maduro fell. However, tracking data suggests the real figure that year was much lower, around 27,400 bpd.

The Gruce is, in fact, the central focus of the report. According to available information, it was set up between 2007 and 2008 when, worried about a possible coup after losing a referendum, Chávez signed a secret agreement with Castro to lock in the regime’s survival. Its functions included monitoring both military personnel and civilians, training agents, and filtering out potential plans against the Government. It had a mixed composition of Cubans and Venezuelans.

“White rooms” were set up—interrogation centres where torture was carried out—documented by the UN—designed for the detainee’s “biological exhaustion”

The report mentions a group of about eight Cuban Armed Forces officers specializing in counterintelligence, psychological warfare and crowd control who operated out of Fuerte Tiuna, where 32 FAR soldiers died during the US attack aimed at capturing Maduro on January 3.

On the Venezuelan side, the visible figures were Iván Hernández Dala, described as having turned military intelligence into an internal repression body; Gustavo González López, seen as the main link with Cuba and appointed this week as Defence Minister; Alexander Granko Arteaga, in charge of tactical and shock operations; and Alexis Rodríguez Cabello, currently head of Sebin and, according to the report, a key figure in the Cabello family’s power circle and that of current president Delcy Rodríguez.

The Gruce, the document stresses, introduced three elements which, in the view of the Miranda Center of Democracy, are “irreparable.” First, they replaced Venezuelan military academy manuals with the Cuban doctrine of “War of the Entire People,” under which the opposition is considered an “internal enemy.” On the technological side, they control identity systems, registries and notaries, giving Cuba access to that key database. Lastly, they set up the “white rooms”—interrogation centres where torture was carried out, as documented by the UN, aimed at the detainee’s “biological exhaustion.”

“The deepest legacy of the Oil for Repression model is the total abdication of Venezuelan sovereignty through what is known as an ‘Invasion by invitation’”

Among the consequences of this system, up to 18,000 politically motivated detentions have been recorded since 2014, 2,000 of them during the protests following the 2024 elections, which were widely won by the opposition. There were also documented abuses in detention centres—El Helicoide (Sebin) and Boleíta (Dgcim)—including beatings, blows with blunt objects, suffocation with plastic bags, sexual violence and force-feeding. There are also two recorded deaths in custody: Fernando Albán (in 2018) and Alfredo Díaz at the end of 2025, due to lack of medical care.

“The deepest legacy of the Oil for Repression model is the total abdication of Venezuelan sovereignty through what is known as an ‘Invasion by invitation’,” the document states, accusing chavismo of allowing another State to penetrate the highest levels of national security and sensitive information.

“Any process of redemocratization must involve the expulsion of foreign actors operating under secret arrangements, as has occurred not only with Cuban actors but also with Iranian, Russian, Chinese or Belarusian ones, and the rebuilding of institutions that are beyond repair,” the text calls for. It was released the same day news broke of the replacement of Vladimir Padrino López after more than a decade as Defence Minister. Even so, Venezuela’s Armed Forces remain under the same senior military leadership and are commanded—with Washington’s blessing—by Delcy Rodríguez, identified in the report as a key figure in the civilian intelligence axis.

Translated by GH

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US Will Prevent the Arrival in Cuba of Two Oil Tankers Heading to the Island with Russian Fuel

• Faced with this ban, the Sea Horse has changed course and is now looking for another port in the Caribbean to sell its cargo
• The Anatoly Kolodkin, sanctioned by Washington, is continuing on its route and had a Russian Navy escort at the start of its voyage

The United States suddenly banned the sale of Russian crude to Cuba this Thursday. The Treasury Department, which on March 12 had issued a license authorizing the sale of Russian crude until April 11, added a new paragraph on Thursday listing countries where the transaction remains prohibited: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories.

In this way, the exception that had been agreed to try to ease the oil shortage caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the war in Iran does not apply to the Island—and the first consequences may already be playing out.

The tanker Sea Horse, flying the Hong Kong (China) flag, which until yesterday was heading to Cuba with 200,000 barrels of Russian diesel, has turned around and is now sailing toward Trinidad and Tobago. The vessel’s location—at 3:11 a.m. this Friday—was identified by New York Times (NYT) journalist Christiaan Triebert, a specialist in visual data investigations, who reports in the New York paper on the uncertain future that may also await the Anatoly Kolodkin, carrying around 730,000 barrels of Urals crude and expected to reach the port of Matanzas at the end of March.

The @RoyalNavy, which observed the vessels with HMS MERSEY and a Wildcat helicopter, said Russia stopped escorting the tanker once it entered the Atlantic. Russia said it's ready to provide Cuba with “all possible assistance” during “suffocating embargo.” https://t.co/S7zvhD7ED0 pic.twitter.com/a8EDB1nYKx

— Christiaan Triebert (@trbrtc) March 19, 2026

Triebert questions the version put forward by Windward—reported Thursday by 14ymedio—and believes it’s not possible that the Sea Horse reached Cuba and delivered an initial cargo in early March. According to that maritime intelligence firm, the ship—having departed from the Baltic bound for the Island—carried out a deceptive maneuver between mid and late February to force other vessels to give way. With that trick, it allegedly managed to reach Cuba with 190,000 barrels of Russian diesel.

This newspaper contacted University of Texas expert Jorge Piñón, who cast doubt on that maneuver. “Anything is possible, but tracking services, Reuters, and Bloomberg don’t show it,” he continue reading

warned.

Still, the tanker had been spotted again heading toward Cuba with a very similar cargo. “Our calculations indicate it would take approximately five days to reach Cuba’s north coast, 1,146 nautical miles away,” the specialist told 14ymedio on Thursday.

The NYT maintains—along the same lines as Reuters and Bloomberg—that Windward’s analysis doesn’t seem credible. “Analysts were puzzled when the tanker spent three weeks drifting in the Atlantic. Some claimed it manipulated its signal and secretly docked in Cuba; we don’t believe that’s true. It stopped because its owners feared retaliation from the United States,” Triebert argued on social media Thursday.

“According to Marine Traffic, the Sea Horse has changed course and moved away from Cuba, heading somewhere else in the Caribbean in search of a buyer for its nearly 200,000 barrels of diesel. (It has also been at sea for weeks; it needs to dock somewhere),” he added. Hours later, he confirmed the rerouting noted by the same platform, which flagged: “Automatic Identification System (AIS) destination changed.”

The question now is what will happen to the Anatoly Kolodkin. The tanker, owned by the Russian government, left the port of Primorsk in the Baltic Sea on March 9 and was initially traveling escorted by the Soobrazitelniy, a Russian Navy vessel, according to a British military source.
The tanker passed through the English Channel this week and is now heading across the Atlantic, after listing the port of Atlantida (US) as its destination in what looks like a pretty obvious ruse.

Both the Anatoly Kolodkin and its owner—the state shipping company Sovcomflot—have been under US sanctions since 2024, so that destination can basically be ruled out. Kpler says its real destination is Matanzas, citing an industry expert.

The expert explained that the 730,000 barrels of crude—if they make it—would be used to produce diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel, as well as generate electricity. But first it would have to be refined, and in any case it would only be a temporary fix, giving Cuba breathing room for “no more than 30 days.”

The NYT also spoke with Jorge Piñón for its Thursday report. The expert reiterated that the crude would serve to produce fuels and electricity, but would require refining and would only provide short-term relief—again, “no more than 30 days.”

Still, it wouldn’t be the first time the US Coast Guard has forced a Russian tanker to change course despite having a naval escort. At the beginning of January, US forces began tracking the Bella-1 (later renamed Marinera), used to transport hydrocarbons from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, which was heading to the latter. After two weeks under surveillance—and despite being accompanied by a submarine sent by Moscow—the vessel and its crew were detained, although the sailors were later released following an agreement between Trump and Putin.

Although the fleet operating in the Caribbean since the summer of 2025—when Washington stepped up pressure on Nicolás Maduro—has shrunk to support deployments in the Middle East, Coast Guard sources told the NYT there is “a continuous presence in the Florida Strait and the Caribbean.”
In that context, the head of Southern Command, Francis Donovan, told Congress on Thursday that the US military is not preparing for any takeover of Cuba, and added that he is unaware of any plan by the Trump administration to support Cuban opposition groups in exile in order to overthrow the government in Havana.

Translated by GH

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Mexico Sends the Final Shipment of Nearly Three Million Books Financed for Cuba

The former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador reappears to ask people to deposit “whatever they can” into a bank account to help the Island

Mexico has funded the production of more than 22 million textbooks for Cuba. / Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity

14ymedio, Havana, March 15, 2026 — Mexico delivered last January the final 2,992,844 copies of the 7,105,878 books promised and financed by the Government of Claudia Sheinbaum. According to the organization Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad (MCCI), the shipment sent on January 7 was valued at $3.8 million, with a unit price of $1.30 per volume.

MCCI denounced the lack of transparency of the current administration for attempting to conceal that the books were destined for Cuba. The contract states “the acquisition of 7,105,878 copies of 144 educational materials for the improvement of the National Education System,” but never mentions Havana as the final destination.

State coffers were drained of $10,104,587, which adds to the $22 million spent by the administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024) for 15 million copies.

The material left from the port of Veracruz and, according to data verified by MCCI from customs records reported by the authorities themselves, its destination in Havana was Editorial Pueblo y Educación, which used to print Cuba’s textbooks. continue reading

The material left from the port of Veracruz and, according to data verified by MCCI from customs records reported by the authorities themselves, its destination in Havana was Editorial Pueblo y Educación

The investigation reveals agreements and 13 shipments between 2023 and 2025 to supply books to Cuba through the Comisión Nacional de Libros de Texto Gratuitos (Conaliteg), a decentralized public body coordinated by the Secretaría de Educación Pública, headed by Morena politician Mario Delgado, whose purpose is to print, acquire and distribute free educational materials for Mexico’s national education system. The process also involves Impresora y Encuadernadora Progreso (Iepsa), responsible for producing the books.

Governments of the so-called Fourth Transformation (4T) have spent more than 576.8 million pesos (almost $33 million) on printing nearly 22 million textbooks for the Island, MCCI reported, noting that this figure does not include maritime shipping costs to Cuba.

Mexico’s support for the Cuban regime has also extended to oil supplies, the hiring of doctors and teachers, scholarships for students on the Island, and financing for projects run by the Cuban state company Neuronic.

Neuronic, which is also the regime-controlled company responsible for managing the funds and salaries that Mexico pays to Havana, received $29,938 in 2023 from the López Obrador government for research projects, mainly related to Alzheimer’s disease, and contracts with the Mexican company Birmex worth $5,880,398.

López Obrador himself appears on the front page this Sunday of the official Cuban outlet Cubadebate, having briefly ended his public retirement to ask for help for the Island.

“It hurts me that they seek to exterminate, because of their ideals of freedom and defense of sovereignty, the brotherly people of Cuba,” the former president wrote, adding that “to those who say it is someone else’s quarrel, I remind them of what General Lázaro Cárdenas said during the Bay of Pigs invasion: ‘It is not right to preach indifference toward their heroic struggle, because their fate is ours.’”

The man who promoted sending millions of dollars to the Cuban regime through various agreements has now called on supporters to deposit whatever they can into Banorte account number 1358451779 of the civil association Humanidad con América Latina

López Obrador himself is featured on the front page of the official Cubadebate this Sunday, having put his public retirement on hold to ask for help for the island.

The account, she explained, was opened by citizens, writers, and journalists “to buy food, medicine, oil, and gasoline, and to help the Cuban people. Let everyone contribute what they can!” The initiative was promoted by writer Laura Esquivel and painter Carlos Pellicer—nephew of the poet of the same name—and others, including Elena Poniatowska.

The signatories expressed their rejection of the US government under Donald Trump and its threat to impose tariffs on those who supply Cuba, which they consider an illegal, inhumane, and unjustified measure. They stated that this “latest escalation jeopardizes access to essential goods and services for the island’s inhabitants, harming their right to a dignified and healthy life.” Furthermore, they asserted that it restricts the freedom of other countries to decide on their trade, cooperation, and exchange relationships with this nation.

The letter stressed that respect for and sovereignty of countries – which originally and always resides in the people – must continue to be the cornerstone of coexistence between nations and of aspirations to achieve a more just and peaceful world.

Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel was quick to express his gratitude to López Obrador, whom he called brother. In a message on his social media accounts, he stated that he would never tire of “thanking Mexico for its generous solidarity and support of the heroic resistance of the Cuban people” and reaffirmed his “decisive support for strengthening this deep friendship” between Cuba and Mexico.

Meanwhile, the Cuban ambassador to Mexico, Eugenio Martínez , thanked López Obrador for the gesture and took the opportunity to express the “admiration” of the Cuban people, who “feel accompanied by the Mexican brothers and sisters who have confirmed that they are dignified and just in the face of the crime that the US commits against the Island.”

Translated by GH

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Fábrica de Arte Cubano Defies Censorship With a Body-Tattoo Performance

“Viva Cuba Libre” and “D-C singao” feature prominently on the back of the protagonist

“Viva Cuba Libre”, en una sesión de ‘body painting’ de este 15 de marzo de 2026 en la Fábrica de Arte Cubano (FAC), en La Habana. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Darío Hernández, Havana, 15 March 2026 — Nothing suggested that the Lienzo Vivo event this Saturday at Fábrica de Arte Cubano (FAC) would be anything more than a gathering devoted to the art of body tattooing. But the invitation for the audience to take part in a body-painting session, led by artist Indira Bazail, turned it into a clearly political expression.

Standing before the bare torso of a young man, whose face was painted with the Cuban flag and whose back bore the words “Long Live Cuba!”, the presenter, Yoel Arturo Salazar Ponce, encouraged the audience to complete the “living canvas,” appealing to “freedoms.” “Because we all deserve, and always will deserve, to be happy and free,” he said, before announcing the surprise that the young man’s back would serve as a “free space” on which to write whatever they wished.

Artist Indira Bazail and the young man who served as her “canvas” at the Cuban Art Factory. / 14ymedio

“Libre” (“Free”) was the first word written, completing the slogan that was already there. Then, above it, came “D-C singao*,” referring to the insult directed at Cuban president Miguel Díaz-Canel — a phrase that has led to prison sentences for people who have shouted it or written it on public posters.

“Down with everything,” “DC singao,” “Love,” “Long live free Cuba,” the words on the “living canvas.” / 14ymedio

“Be free, because art leads the hand and the mind must be free,” the performance’s host continued to encourage. Someone added, “Down with everything,” to the neckline. Finally, a girl wrote, “Love.” The host congratulated her: “Love is the force for everything.”

As the crowd painted slogans on the young man’s back, “Toxicity ” by the American alternative rock band System of a Down played. The song, whose chorus shouts the word “disorder,” has a passage that perfectly captures the current state of Havana, shrouded in smoke from burning garbage and plagued by long blackouts: “Somewhere between sacred silence and sleep, more wood for their fires, noisy neighbors, waking dreams with a flashlight hit by truck headlights, eating seeds as a pastime, the toxicity of our city.”

This is not the first time the FAC has defied censorship. Last November, the venue went ahead with a tribute to Celia Cruz on the centenary of her birth, a tribute that had been censored a month earlier.

That earlier decision by the National Center of Popular Music had been heavily criticized by members of the cultural community both inside and outside the island. Rosa Marquetti, a specialist on the life and work of the “Queen of Salsa,” said the “ban” on the tribute planned by the group El Público together with FAC added “one more chapter to the history of censorship and the use of political-commissar methods in Cuban culture.”

Translated by GH

*Translator’s note: “Díaz-Canel singao” is shouted and appears as graffiti. ‘Singao’ rhymes with Díaz-Canel, and is an epithet variously translated as ‘motherfucker’, ‘bastard’ and similar terms.

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Students at the University of Havana Ask Authorities To Stop the ‘Harassment’

A group called University Reform Action is formed, supportive of dialogue but also of democratizing the University Student Federation (FEU)

Image of students on the steps of the University of Havana, this Monday. / X/@CNN_Oppmann

14ymedio, Madrid, 12 March 2026 — University students have not buried the hatchet as it seemed they might have done on Tuesday, when the students who organized a sit-in the day before on the famous staircase of the University of Havana to make their complaints public agreed to continue meeting behind closed doors with the authorities. Far from that, they have now organized themselves under the name University Reform Action and have presented themselves as a collective in a statement outlining their upcoming plan of action.

The text contains a strong criticism of what happened last Monday, when the police cut off access to the staircase, preventing others from joining the initial group. That day, “one of them was physically subdued, identifications belonging to a group of students inside the university were withheld and taken away, and access to the area was blocked. We consider these actions absurd, unnecessary, and a flagrant violation of the right to peaceful demonstration established in Article 56 of the Constitution,” the manifesto states, calling for an end to any attempt at “deterrence, harassment, co-optation, disqualification, and sabotage.”

University Reform Action also expresses its discomfort with the fact that the meeting scheduled for the following day in Victor Hugo Park was “redirected to a university classroom, which violated the open spirit of this process.” From the very first lines of the statement, the students insist that their willingness to engage in dialogue should not be seen as “a sign of conformity or weakness,” and they warn that if their reform demands are not heard through dialogue they will again call for “alternative and forceful forms” of action. “We reject any act of violence and seek to ensure that none of our members take part in one. We demand the same treatment toward us.”

The collective also stresses from the outset that it represents the interests of students and not those of national or foreign political organizations. “We therefore do not accept the hijacking of our voice and opinion continue reading

by any institution or individual,” they warn.

The rest of the document focuses on the reforms they consider essential after gathering ideas in the meetings that have taken place. The first is the democratization of the University Student Federation (FEU), with candidates to be elected under a new electoral model that allows explanatory campaigning. “The possibility of being elected to a position within the organization should not be tied to academic results or to the candidates’ overall participation in extracurricular activities, but rather to their ability to represent the student body,” they argue. There should also be mechanisms for their removal and replacement if it is felt they are not fulfilling their duties.

“Once these reforms have been established and consulted on, immediate elections must be held under the new conditions to cleanse the organization of those leaders who currently make it up and who have shown themselves not to be reliable in defending the rights of their voters and those they represent,” they add bluntly.

The students also focus on two more practical issues. One is the need for a real solution to the situation created when Etecsa drastically raised its internet tariffs in May 2025. The dialogue that followed the student protests ended up papering over the crisis, since the well-known data package offered to students was already insufficient at the time and is even more so now “given the harsh conditions the country is facing.”

Another issue is the semi-remote format of classes, a measure adopted as part of a fuel-saving plan. The students believe a census should be carried out with “precise data on the availability of technological resources (devices and connectivity), stable access to electricity in students’ homes, and the geographic distance many students—especially those from other provinces—must travel to reach university campuses.” This is essential in order to determine whether conditions exist to maintain the current situation or whether the academic term should be suspended.

The statement also shows the collective’s goodwill toward the authorities by thanking the Minister of Higher Education, Walter Baluja García, for his willingness to listen and address their concerns. They will meet with him next Monday to present demands gathered nationwide, and they are asking other students to contribute. “Everyone’s opinion matters in pushing forward the changes we need so badly,” they conclude.

Translated by GH

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Cuban Authorities Admit They Haven’t Managed To Curb the Black Market in Foreign Currency

The Interior Ministry currently has more than 300 investigations open into the illegal buying and selling of foreign currencies

In just three months, the exchange rate has climbed to 470 pesos per dollar. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, 12 March 2026 — Three months after the introduction of a floating exchange rate in the official currency market aimed at fighting the illegal sale of foreign currency, “it’s no secret -the reality is that it still doesn’t operate in the way the Cuban economy needs,” Humberto López admitted bluntly on the TV program Hacemos Cuba this Wednesday.

The Interior Ministry currently has more than 300 investigations open into various economic crimes linked to illegal foreign-currency trading with connections abroad, three of which were described on the program. Taken together, the money seized in these operations amounts to almost 16 million pesos, close to $19,000 and around €15,000.

Lieutenant Colonel Gisnel Rivero Crespo, head of the Department for Combating Economic Crimes, said the scale of the problem was very significant and acknowledged that, despite the legislation that has been passed, “criminal structures that handle these financial flows outside the law persist, moving considerable volumes of money… These large flows unquestionably have a direct impact on macroeconomic stability.”

The officer highlighted three specific police operations. The first, and the most organized, took place in the Luyanó neighborhood (Diez de Octubre municipality), where “a criminal structure dedicated to illegal currency trading and the delivery of remittances was operating out of two homes,” functioning almost like a private bank. In the raid, at least one person was arrested. Police seized 13,278,560 pesos and €1,500, along with two 2025 Kia Picanto vehicles, five safes, and three money-counting machines. They also found 12 magnetic cards, phones, laptops, and documentation, which has allowed investigators to look into five other properties.

In the raid, at least one person was arrested. Police seized 13,278,560 pesos and €1,500, along with two 2025 Kia Picanto vehicles

Another of the networks under investigation in Havana had gained attention, according to the authorities, for how openly it operated and the steady, visible flow of customers. This one involved two homes in Plaza de la Revolución and one in Cerro. In that case, the owner of a private business was arrested while depositing that day’s takings at the premises in order to exchange them for dollars. The cash seized there totaled $17,210, €13,475 and 2,199,650 pesos. continue reading

The most recent case involved a house in El Vedado and another in Quiebra Hacha (Mariel, Artemisa). The main suspect, a partner in a small private company (mipyme) and a self-employed worker, already had a prior fine from the tax authority (ONAT) for more than 1.6 million pesos and was caught carrying out “cash dollar exchanges, trading in bank-linked currencies (MLC and CUP), and cryptocurrency operations.”

According to officials, his bank activity exceeded 36 million pesos in credits and 35 million in debits. During the search, officers seized 134,550 pesos, $815, money-counting machines, laptops, and eight bank cards, including one Clásica card and several foreign ones. The detainee was also involved “in delivering remittances via couriers.”

“We have established the participation of Cubans living abroad working with structures in Cuba that support this activity,” Rivero Crespo added. According to his explanation, there are “individuals who enter into negotiations with private economic actors to finance their imports. But those imports, which obviously are in dollars, are carried out according to a conversion rate imposed by them.”

The margin ranges between 6% and 12%, he said, “while at the same time drawing these actors into criminal networks.”

Rivero Crespo – ignoring that for years the state failed to offer a legal exchange market where private businesses could obtain the foreign currency they needed to import — accused these “financiers” of speculating by applying such high margins. This, in turn, forces entrepreneurs to pass the cost on to consumers in order to pay for it. That, he said, “distorts cost structures.”

The same happens with people involved in the illegal sale of foreign currency “in both physical and virtual spaces,” which often operates with margins of around 15%, contributing to the rising price of foreign currency and the depreciation of the peso.

The lieutenant added that structures still exist that simulate international phone top-ups while keeping the foreign currency abroad, so the money never returns to Cuba.

Some people “receive the foreign currency abroad and instead of sending those dollars here, they use them to finance imports. Then there are people here in Cuba who (…) collect the revenues from these economic actors.” Rather than depositing that money in banks, he complained, it is used -in national currency – to distribute remittances.

Finally, the officer referred to another classic method: the use of “mules” to take cash out of the country using the $5,000 limit allowed by Customs.
“What happens is that if this is done repeatedly and with several people, a considerable amount can be moved,” he said.

Finally, the officer referred to another classic method: the use of “mules” to take cash out of the country using the $5,000 limit allowed by Customs. “What happens is that if this is done repeatedly and with several people, a considerable amount can be moved,” he said.

Prosecutor Yudenia San Miguel Ramírez warned about the “strictness” with which the Penal Code is being applied in these cases, including the offense of “apology for crime” seen on social media.

“We are facing an aggravating circumstance of criminal responsibility when these tools [digital networks] are used to facilitate the commission of crimes… these individuals act outside these provisions and completely violate the legal framework,” she said.

On December 17, 2025, Cuba finally approved a long-announced third official exchange rate, a floating rate aimed at “individuals and non-state forms of management.” It began at 410 pesos per dollar, adding to the already existing rates of 24 pesos (for state companies) and 120 pesos (for entities able to generate foreign currency).

The measure was intended to close the enormous gap opened by the informal market, which was buying and selling dollars at three times the official rate, amid relentless demand driven by the need to shop in state stores that sell in foreign currency – the only ones properly stocked -and by the need to import goods into a country that produces very little.

However, in just three months the rate has climbed to 470 pesos per dollar.
That is still cheaper than the 510 pesos on the informal market, which actually has foreign currency available and delivers it immediately -unlike state banks and official exchange houses (Cadeca), which are limited to buying dollars rather than selling them.

According to U.S. economist Steve Hanke, the Cuban peso has lost 33% of its value over the past year, and year-on-year inflation is around 47%, although the government -which does not include the black market in its calculations – put the figure at 14% at the end of 2025.

Translated by GH

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Cuba Preferred to Pull Out the Medical Mission Instead of Accepting the New Conditions, Says Jamaica

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade assures that since last July, it started reaching out to the Island and hasn’t received a response

A group of the 277 Cuban specialists who were in Jamaica. / Ministry of Public Health of Cuba

14ymedio, Havana, March 9, 2026 – While the Cuban government accused Jamaica of caving in to pressure from the United States to pull the medical mission, the Caribbean island’s side of the story is different. The regime didn’t even respond to Kingston’s proposal, which suggested keeping the deal if they made direct payments to the specialists and let them hold onto their passports—conditions that they did accept in other countries.

According to a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, the Jamaican government “is disappointed” with Havana, which chose to withdraw 277 specialists rather than accept the terms laid out.

“We value the contribution of the medical personnel, respect the Cuban people, and maintain our commitment to cooperation. However, no program operating in Jamaica can continue under conditions that contradict Jamaican legislation and international conventions,” emphasized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade.

In the document, the authorities say they realized “that other Caribbean countries had arrangements under which direct payments were made to the Cuban medical personnel. This makes it even clearer that a lawful and transparent alternative was possible.”

Jamaica acknowledges that the review of the agreements on the medical missions proceeded after the US stated that this program constitutes a form of forced labor and following the revocation of visas for officials from several countries last June. continue reading

Jamaica acknowledges that the review of the agreements on the medical missions proceeded after the US stated that this program constitutes a form of forced labor.

“The so-called ‘medical missions’ aren’t humanitarian aid. They’re a multibillion-dollar business of forced labor, where the regime pockets up to 90% of the doctors’ salaries,” the Cuban-American legislator from Florida, María Elvira Salazar, pointed out on her social media,

Kingston noticed that the doctors weren’t carrying passports, so they took immediate steps to fix it. “The matter was raised with the Passport, Immigration and Citizenship Agency, as well as with the local Cuban authorities, to ensure that all personnel could carry their passports,” the statement notes.

Another concern was the salaries: “although they were calculated at the same level as those of their Jamaican counterparts, they were being paid by Jamaica to the Cuban authorities in US dollars,” without specifying the amounts.

The only payment the Cuban doctors got, according to the bulletin, was “overtime payments,” but there’s “no contractual provision” that specifies what portion of those payments should go to the workers.

Kingston initiated talks with the Cuban government last July to restructure the agreement.

“That agreement raised serious concerns under Jamaica’s labor and tax laws, as well as international labor conventions,” the official document states.

Kingston initiated talks with the Cuban government last July to restructure the agreement. From that point, they brought up the issues with payments and documents.

The topic made it to the Cabinet in October, and after discussion, they came up with a formal proposal. “Unfortunately, the continued lack of response had the practical effect of preserving an agreement that Jamaica could not justify,” the statement says.

Kingston’s decision joins the ones recently taken by other countries in the region that have modified or canceled similar agreements with Havana. Among them are Honduras, Guatemala, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Guyana, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

Translated by GH

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Fires and Pot-Banging Protests: Cuba in Apocalyptic Mode

It doesn’t matter whether the neighborhoods are more central or farther out—the soundtrack of the capital at night is protest, and during the day the smell is burning garbage.

Even though they try to erase them, you can still make out a phrase written on various walls that feels like the final word: “Se acabó” (“It’s over” / “We’re done”).

14ymedio, Darío Hernández, March 9, 2026 – Havana at night these days has an apocalyptic feel. If you walk around after the sun goes down—when the fear of being recognized fades—the soundtrack is pot-banging (cacerolazos) coming from different neighborhoods. It doesn’t matter anymore if they’re more central, more touristy, or farther out, more combative or less. The noise comes from everywhere.

More and more walls are showing up with anti-government slogans. Even though they try to paint over them, you can still read—in several places—that phrase that sounds like the end of the line: “Se acabó.”

Fires are also popping up all across the capital. Some come from people burning trash piles, which has become super common because there aren’t enough trucks or fuel to collect garbage properly anymore. Others are from charcoal fires that families light to cook since there’s no electricity or cooking gas.

Sometimes those fires get out of control. Other times, with the constant power flickers and surges, you get a short circuit.

Sometimes those fires get out of control. Other times, with the constant power flickers and surges, you get a short circuit. People think that’s what caused the fire last Saturday in a pizzeria in central Santiago de Cuba, on Enramada Street between Reloj and San Agustín—it ended up burning down four houses. continue reading

No one knows yet what caused the fire at the Cubos Factory in Matanzas, located in Playa right next to the Cocal substation. Although firefighters put it out in just 20 minutes that Sunday night, people were terrified because right beside the affected area there were piles of plastic waste, neighbors warned.

Meanwhile in Granma province, El Ranchón (a traditional spot) burned down in the early morning at the Guisa lookout point. Alianna Corona Rodríguez, First Secretary of the Communist Party in the province, told the press that “the flames spread easily because this is a traditional structure made of palm thatch and wood.” While the cause is still under investigation, the official added another layer: “carteles con propaganda contrarrevolucionaria” (posters with counter-revolutionary propaganda) were found at the site.

In the capital, blackouts have got much worse over the weekend, with some neighborhoods going up to 20 straight hours without power. The lack of electricity has fuelled people’s anger, and in various parts of Havana the water supply problems have got even more serious because there’s no energy to run the pumps.

Translated by GH

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Economic Agreements with the US, Cuban President Díaz-Canel’s Exit and the Castros Staying in Cuba

USA Today reveals a supposed plan to facilitate investments by U.S. companies in energy, ports and tourism on the Island

According to the newspaper, the agreement includes concessions in areas such as the Island’s ports. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, March 9, 2026 – The Donald Trump administration will soon announce an economic agreement with Cuba, according to two sources familiar with the conversations speaking to the American newspaper USA Today. According to this version, the deal includes lifting sanctions in the energy, ports and tourism sectors, plus easing the ban on Americans traveling to the Island. In exchange, President Miguel Díaz-Canel would leave the Island through a negotiated exit, but the Castros would stay.

The newspaper doesn’t give dates for when the exact content of the agreement will be known, but it believes it could be very soon—something reinforced by Donald Trump’s own statements. For days he has been hinting at an imminent change in Cuba, a country overwhelmed by blackouts lasting more than 20 hours in much of the country.

When asked about it, the White House refused to confirm anything and referred USA Today to the president’s recent remarks, the latest from this Saturday at the summit with his 12 right-wing counterparts in Miami, where he said: “Cuba is at the end of the road. It’s really at the end of the road. It has no money. It has no oil. It has a bad philosophy. It has a bad regime that has been bad for a very long time.”

The newspaper wraps up a weekend spent reporting on this apparently imminent agreement, in which it is still unclear what the United States gets in return. The story follows up on a report published the day before, which gave voice to businessmen from both sides who commented on the current and future relaxations. One of them is John Kavulich, president of the U.S.-Cuba Economic and Trade Council, who says he was sounded out by the Administration about whether members of his group would support Trump’s strategy of dealing directly with the private sector on the Island and possibly forming an entity called the Executive Directors Council for a Free and Democratic Cuba. continue reading

Kavulich says he was sounded out by the Administration about whether his group’s members would back Trump’s strategy of dealing directly with the private sector on the Island.

None of those consulted agreed, according to Kavulich. “They’re all terrified that the Administration will support them in the morning and be trashing them by lunchtime,” said the businessman, who claims they are waiting to see what happens. In his view, Trump’s strategy is very similar to the one Barack Obama began during the thaw, although this time it looks more likely to succeed than the previous one, since this U.S. Administration won’t hesitate to force things if the regime drags its feet.

Even so, Kavulich believes that once again Havana will come out less damaged than some expect. “They’re not liquidating, they’re reorganizing,” he said, and criticized that Trump’s strategy is less perestroika and more bankruptcy.

USA Today also spoke with Aldo Álvarez, presented as a Cuban businessman who, after spending several days with his merchandise stuck in a port due to lack of diesel, saw a certain amount arrive at the nearest gas station for private operators like him. “It’s a big change. I can guarantee my supply in a stable way… Undoubtedly, good news,” he told the newspaper. Álvarez is the owner of Mercatoria, dedicated to importing all kinds of products and publicized on Cubadebate. The project began as a local development in 2021, but soon became something much bigger, and its founder has even attended several events in the United States to try to establish ties with businessmen from the neighboring country, so now he feels delighted.

“The Trump Administration recognizes the Cuban private sector as a real sector and also as a key strategic partner on the ground to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis. We’ve never seen anything like this before,” said Ric Herrero, executive director of the Cuba Study Group, who is surprised by Trump’s change of approach.

Eric Jacobstein, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs during the Biden administration, who has made many trips to the Island to meet with entrepreneurs, praises Cuba’s private sector and considers it essential to support it from the United States. “It’s fundamental to involve them. They’re independent, they’re entrepreneurs… It’s a group that has embraced capitalism inside a decaying communist system,” he points out.

Michael Bustamante, from the Department of Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, fears how the Cuban exile community in Florida will react to these contacts between officials and businessmen from the Island, “something they have firmly opposed for years,” he stated. “I think it’s a surprise to a lot of people. Maybe it’s a surprise to Marco Rubio,” he considers.

The current Secretary of State, very critical of any lifting of sanctions and of Obama’s policy toward the Island, would now be making a similar move, according to these theses, even though he probably never imagined finding himself in this situation. Just two weeks ago, at the CARICOM Caribbean countries summit—where some of his advisors allegedly met with regime envoys—Rubio said: “The status quo is unacceptable… Cuba needs to change. It doesn’t have to change overnight. It doesn’t have to change from one day to the next… But Cuba needs to change. It needs to change dramatically.”

This Friday, several U.S. media outlets reported that a task force is being considered within the Department of Justice to bring possible criminal charges—related to drug trafficking, immigration or violence—to, as *The Washington Post* defined it, “overthrow the regime.”

But at the same time, the U.S. press keeps insistently mentioning the negotiations option, avoiding confrontation. “Maybe we’ll have a friendly takeover of Cuba,” Trump told a group of journalists last week.

“It was obvious that President Trump was not going to focus so much on eradicating communism from Cuba, but on prioritizing commercial, economic and financial interaction,” Kavulich reiterates. “I don’t think anyone should be surprised if we finally see Steve Witkoff [U.S. Special Envoy] and Jared Kushner [Trump advisor] in Havana negotiating with the Cuban government.”

Robert Muse, a Washington lawyer who helps U.S. companies in Cuba, told USA Today that businessmen are cautiously following events after so many times they thought the Island would become a China or Vietnam. Now, according to Muse, things are different. “Little by little people are realizing that this is the decisive year. This is a fundamental economic reform in Cuba,” he asserts.

As for when it will happen, the outlet returns to Trump’s statements in Doral, as the White House indicated: “We’re focused on Iran right now, and that’s what we’ll do. I’d say: ‘What are you going to do? Are you going to take two days off, Marco? Maybe an hour. He’ll take an hour off and then close a deal on Cuba’.”

Translated by GH

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The ‘War of the Whole People,’ the Final Crime Against Cubans

The supposed strategic genius of Fidel Castro was always an intellectual fraud

The regime is not only defying military logic but dismantling the legal framework that protects human life. / Facebook / Minfar Cuba

14ymedio, Rolando Gallardo, Huesca, Spain, 8 March 2026 — In the corridors of power in Cuba, the nervousness is obvious. As the regime watches its ideological cronies burning out and staggering on the global stage, the leadership in Havana seems determined to “poner sus bardas en remojo” — to start taking precautions — as the international pressure tightens around it. The response from the Castro successor to the pressure of a U.S. administration closing the net around the regime has not been openness or dialogue, but the dusting off of a disastrous plagiarism from Fidel: the doctrine of the “war of the whole people.”

Under the varnish of national sovereignty, this strategy hides a grim logic: mobilizing a mass of citizens with no military training and effectively turning them into legitimate targets for any potential expeditionary forces. This is not heroic defense but the design of a pre-planned massacre, intended to be used as propaganda leverage to portray the regime as a victim before world public opinion.

A caricature of fanaticism

The supposed strategic brilliance of Fidel Castro was always an intellectual fraud. The “war of the whole people” is nothing more than a caricature of the desperate tactics used by Adolf Hitler in the final days of the Third Reich. Just as the German dictator mobilized women, the elderly, and children in the Volkssturm to resist the unstoppable advance of the Allies, the Cuban regime now intends to sacrifice its population under a nihilistic premise: if the system cannot survive, the nation must perish with it.
It was Hitler himself who said the German people did not deserve to live if they were incapable of defeating their enemies. Today the PCC appears to share that same contempt for the lives of those it governs.

The “war of the whole people” is nothing more than a caricature of the desperate tactics used by Adolf Hitler in the final days of the Third Reich. / Polish National Archives

In practice, concepts such as “sovereignty,” “popular will,” or “collective good” are nothing but empty packaging. The reality is a political caste ready to sink the population into the sea if it cannot keep hold of the helm itself. What is sold as patriotism is essentially a Caribbean mutation of Hamas tactics in Gaza, where the value of a citizen is measured by their usefulness as a human shield or as a televised corpse that helps win the battle of global narrative.

The collapse of logistics and the Sierra myth

The viability of this armed resistance, under the island’s current conditions, is nonexistent. The regime appeals to nostalgia for the civil war of 1956–1959, but it deliberately ignores a crucial economic factor: the rebel groups continue reading

back then survived in the mountains thanks to an extensive supply network of food, medicine, and provisions coming from private businesses and prosperous farms — the very same economic base that Castroism itself later destroyed.

In the impoverished Cuba of 2026, marked by energy collapse and chronic shortages, sending elderly people and armed youths up into the mountains would immediately trigger a logistical disaster. Without an economic base to sustain them, any attempt at prolonged resistance would end either in mass surrender due to conditions incompatible with life or in widespread death from hunger and treatable diseases. Logistics — not enemy fire — would be the first executioner of this improvised militia.

International law and the loss of “protected person” status

By reviving this doctrine, the regime is not only defying military logic but dismantling the legal framework that protects human life. According to the Geneva Conventions, a civilian enjoys immunity from direct attack as long as they do not take part in hostilities. But the moment a citizen picks up a rifle or carries out acts of sabotage, that protection disappears and the person becomes a combatant.

This strategy creates a situation of “unprivileged combatants.” When the state hands out weapons, it is deliberately erasing the line of distinction. This ambiguity is a deadly trap; historically it has led to tragedies where expeditionary forces, unsure and fearing ambushes in urban environments, fire at any suspect, exponentially increasing collateral casualties.

For the ruling elite, this scenario is not a mistake but an objective: the more civilian victims there are, the more material they will have for their victimhood propaganda machine.

The leadership’s shield and the end of the mystique

The regime tries to suggest that armed resistance in the Middle East can tip the balance, ignoring that such movements are sustained by mystical indoctrination and a culture of martyrdom that has little to do with Cuban society. The people of Cuba are not looking for glory in the afterlife or sacrifice for a dying dogma. What most people want is prosperity, food, and freedom. After decades of deprivation, many openly long for the capitalist consumerism that official discourse condemns.

Arming a population that lacks even the most basic necessities is the final act of immorality by a dictatorship that knows it is nearing its end. By turning every neighborhood into a barracks and every citizen into an improvised soldier, the Cuban state is not defending the nation but building a wall of flesh and blood to protect the privileges of the elite at the expense of the physical safety of the population.

The “war of the whole people” confirms that, for Cuba’s leaders, sovereignty does not lie in the wellbeing of citizens but in the preservation of their own power. If history is any guide, this “final crime” will not be remembered as a heroic act of resistance but as the last gasp of a ruling caste that preferred the possibility of a national holocaust rather than accepting its own obsolescence.

Cuba today does not need rifles in the hands of civilians; it needs the state to stop using its people as bargaining chips in a war that exists only in the delusions of those unwilling to let go of control.

Translated by GH

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At Coppelia They No Longer Sell Ice Cream, Only Cooking Wine

One of the workers, without even looking up, answers that they’re closed and that “no one knows” when they’ll open again.

Under the sign that proclaims “Havana, real and wonderful,” five Coppelia employees kill time sitting around a table. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Juan Diego Rodríguez, Havana, 3 March 2026 — At the corner of 23 and L, where for decades Havana used to line up to enjoy a five-scoop ensalada (‘salad’), this Tuesday the only flavor on offer was the bitter aftertaste of frustration. The Coppelia ice cream parlor in Vedado, once nicknamed the “cathedral of ice cream,” is closed. Not for repairs, not for inventory, not for one of those usual pauses to paint the walls or rearrange the sections. The famous spot is out of ice cream and has no reopening date.

At the main entrance, under the sign that reads “Havana, real and wonderful,” five employees are just sitting around a table killing time. On the surface — instead of sundae glasses, syrups and little spoons — there are several jugs of seco cooking wine. The product, amber-colored with a faded label, seems like the unlikely replacement for the strawberry, chocolate or almond that made Cuba’s biggest ice cream shop famous.

The woman tries to convince the disappointed customer to take a gallon of seco wine

A customer approaches, still hopeful. “Got any ice cream?” he asks. One of the workers, without lifting her eyes, replies that they’re closed and that “no one knows” when they’ll reopen. The woman tries to hype up the disappointed guy, pushing him to take a gallon of that seco wine — the stuff that usually ends up in yellow rice or in a picadillo that has more imagination than meat. But the man isn’t buying it.

Over the next few minutes the same scene keeps repeating. Even though the city is practically paralyzed by the lack of fuel, Habaneros keep showing up with the dream of eating continue reading

a tres gracias or enjoying a Turquino. They come because even in the worst years of the Special Period, when the scoops got tiny and the flavors kept repeating, there was always something to put in your mouth at that central location. The ice cream might have been watery or scarce, but it existed. Now, not even that.

Translated by GH

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Cuba: A Country Carrying a Curse It Never Chose

Hatred was planted, managed, and turned into official state policy

The top brass decided the nation was their laboratory and the citizens were just replaceable parts. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Rafael Bordao, Miami, 5 March 2026 — Some nations move forward, stumble, and reinvent themselves. Others—like Cuba—have been sentenced to walk in circles, dragging along a sacrifice that stopped being noble a long time ago and turned into straight-up punishment. For decades, everyday life became one long string of giving things up: giving up freedom, giving up your voice, giving up any future, even giving up the basic right to imagine a different life.

The sacrifice stopped being heroic and became a control tool. The people were sacrificed to save the power structure—not the other way around. Generation after generation, the same shoulders carried the shortages, the surveillance, the forced obedience, the endless waiting. The ruling elite, shielded by their privileges, never once felt the sting of the ration lines, the blackouts, the fear, the forced exile. So the question becomes almost philosophical: What kind of system needs its own people to suffer just so it can keep existing?

The hatred didn’t come from the hearts of Cubans. It was sown, administered, turned into state policy. To justify the repression, they needed an enemy. To justify the poverty, they needed someone to blame. To justify the constant watching, they needed traitors.

Hatred has an ontological cost it destroys living together, it eats away at memory, and it fractures the shared identity of a people.

That hatred was fed with endless speeches, school textbooks that confused history with propaganda, newscasts repeating the same fear-based liturgy, compulsory marches where unanimity was just another way to stay alive. Hatred became a renewable resource—there was always someone to blame, continue reading

always an “other” threatening the purity of the project. But hatred carries a deep cost: it destroys coexistence, corrodes memory, and breaks the collective identity. And when a country lives too long under the logic of “the enemy,” it ends up suspicious even of itself.

Nobody voted for this sentence. Nobody chose to hand over their life to a dogma that can’t even sustain the air we breathe anymore. Nobody signed a contract to give up freedom of movement, freedom of thought, freedom to create. That decision was made by a small circle at the top that confused staying in power with saving the homeland, that turned ideology into a compulsory religion and history into a monologue with no cracks.

All that’s left is the question that tears everything apart: How much longer?

That elite decided the country had to keep paying forever for a dream that stopped being a dream and became an alibi; they decided the people had to immolate themselves so they could keep ruling; they decided the nation was a laboratory and the citizens were disposable pieces. Political philosophy teaches us that any power that demands sacrifice without offering freedom is an illegitimate power. But in Cuba that illegitimacy was normalized, ritualized, turned into the everyday scenery.

Today the official discourse floats around like an empty shell. The regulations no longer move anyone, the heroes no longer inspire, the promises no longer fool anybody. The country is exhausted. People don’t believe anymore, don’t hope anymore, don’t fear the way they used to. The dogma has become an ideological fossil that can’t explain the ruin, the massive emigration, the despair you can feel on every corner. When a dogma stops holding up, all that remains is the question that dismantles everything: How much longer?

Writing about Cuba is writing against silence. It’s an act of rebellion, but also of mourning. It’s recognizing that the country was wounded by the very people who swore to save it. It’s saying that memory can no longer be kidnapped by a single story. It’s claiming the right to ask questions, to doubt, to disagree, to imagine. Because a country isn’t saved with orders—it’s saved with truth. It isn’t rebuilt with fear—it’s rebuilt with dignity. It isn’t freed with hatred—it’s freed with justice.

Translated by GH

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Ecuador Declares the Entire Cuban Embassy Staff ‘Persona Non Grata’ and Gives Them 48 Hours To Leave the Country

“Will this mean a complete break in diplomatic relations between the two countries?” Prensa Latina wonders.

The Foreign Ministry cites Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as the basis for its decision. / Cuba Minrex

14ymedio, Madrid, 4 March 2026 — Ecuador’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility declared the Cuban ambassador in Quito, Basilio Gutiérrez, persona non grata this Wednesday—along with the whole diplomatic staff of the mission—and gave them 48 hours to get out of the country. The news was delivered to the embassy by the Directorate of Ceremonial and Protocol, according to the official agency Prensa Latina.

In a letter sent to the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba, the ministry lists the names of the 21 Cuban employees at the mission, including the consul, Vladimir González Fernández; the minister-counselor, Samuel Bibilonia Ballate; the first secretary, Ivette Franco Senen; and the vice-consul, Armando Bencomo Zamora. They’re given two days to leave “in accordance with diplomatic practice.”

The Foreign Ministry bases this on Article 9 of the Vienna Convention, which governs diplomatic relations. That article says: “The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona non grata or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable.” Ecuador really didn’t give any explanation, and it’s not clear whether this “will imply a rupture of continue reading

diplomatic relations between the two countries,” as Prensa Latina asks.

This move comes one day after Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa ended the functions of José María Borja López as Ecuador’s ambassador in Havana.

Shortly after the Ecuadorian government’s announcement, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement calling the decision “arbitrary and unjustified” and describing it as an “unprecedented and unfriendly act.”

Cuba’s Foreign Ministry said no reasons were provided for the declaration and that the move harms bilateral relations. They also warned that it “significantly damages the historic relations of friendship and cooperation between both countries and peoples.”

Cuban journalist José Raúl Gallego (who lives in Mexico) commented on the news: “Since 1959, Cuban diplomatic missions have been centers of interference and regional destabilization. The Cuban embassy in Ecuador has been one of the most active in those activities.”

This all happens right after President Daniel Noboa terminated José María Borja López’s role as Ecuador’s ambassador to Havana (he was also accredited to Dominica, Jamaica, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines). Borja had been appointed in October 2021 under then-president Guillermo Lasso.

In April 2025, Noboa won a comfortable re-election as president of Ecuador. He first came to power in November 2023 with a liberal economic platform and a tough-on-crime “mano dura” stance—very different from the correísta governments that ruled for over a decade and were openly aligned with Havana.

Last September, Ecuador tightened its migration policy and started requiring a temporary visitor/transit visa for nationals of 25 countries, including Cuba.

Translated by GH

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With the Legalization in Cuba of Mixed Companies Between the Private Sector and the State, the Regime Aims to Capture Efficiency

The new rule sparks skepticism among experts, and some fear it’s about “locking in state subordination of the private business sector.”

Some economists see this as a chance for mipymes (small and medium private businesses) to scale up. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, 4 March 2026 — “With the new rule on mixed mercantile companies, imported fuel sold by the private sector might finally have an outlet.” That’s the take from Daniel Torralba, economist and analyst at the consulting firm Auge, after Tuesday’s approval of the new decrees regulating partnerships between state and private companies in Cuba. The announcement opens up a bunch of possibilities—with their ups and downs—but distrust toward the government’s intentions dominates the chatter.

Decree-Law 114/2025 essentially allows two types of association: mixed Limited Liability Companies (S.R.L.) and economic association contracts. It also covers acquisitions—of private shares by the state—and absorptions. Companies must submit a feasibility study proving they can self-finance and generate profits, plus align with the corresponding territorial development strategy.

If the Ministry of Economy and Planning gives the green light, the company gets autonomy to manage its assets, import and export directly, set its own prices, and decide its structure and workforce. Unlike mipymes [MSMEs] and self-employment, all activities are permitted—except Health, Education, and the Armed Forces (except for some purely business-related activities in those areas).

“The private sector could invest in all kinds of markets that were restricted until now, as long as it is done jointly with the Cuban State. One of those markets would be fuel sales,”

“The private sector could invest in all kinds of markets that were restricted until now, as long as it is done jointly with the Cuban State. One of those markets would be fuel sales,” Torralba points out in a Facebook post he titled ¿Cupets mixtos? (“Mixed Cupets?”). “While a private mipyme or cooperative can’t sell gasoline or diesel on its own, the sales could go through if done via a mixed limited liability company. For example, a (or several) hypothetical mixed companies between Cupet and private mipymes,” he reasons.

The economist—who lives in London—admits it is not clear if the US, which has authorized sales to private entities, would allow it if the company is mixed. But he figures “the key thing is the internal barrier gets removed. continue reading

We would need to confirm if the Cuban State would actually agree to mixed investment in that part of the energy sector, but in principle the decree-law allows it.”

Torralba adds that a deeper analysis is needed and tons of questions remain, but several commenters agree with him that the loophole is open—and since it won’t go unnoticed by the Trump administration, it is fair to wonder if the measure was even weighed in some never-confirmed negotiations with Washington.

Teresita López Joy, also from Auge, analyzed the pros and cons on the firm’s blog. She calls it an opportunity “but one that is conditioned.” The economist warns that “the key to success in 2026 won’t be who partners up fastest, but who manages to structure alliances that protect the private business’s autonomy while tapping into the state’s capabilities.” She advises that before jumping into these deals, you have to consider “not just whether the law allows it, but whether the current economic and geopolitical environment recommends it.”

López Joy breaks down the two types. A Mixed Limited Liability Company (SRL) is like a “legal marriage”: two personalities and assets merge to create a third one that inherits existing rights and obligations. The union is stronger and complex to dissolve.

An Economic Association Contract is “a much more agile figure that doesn’t create a new legal entity. The parties keep their legal independence but join forces for a common purpose for a set time”

An Economic Association Contract is “a much more agile figure that doesn’t create a new legal entity. The parties keep their legal independence but join forces for a common purpose for a set time,” possibly even managing a shared fund without issuing capital. Her takeaway: the flexibility of this one “could paradoxically be the most solid way to build a sustainable private sector in today’s Cuba.”

One big downside she flags is the bureaucracy. Timelines are long (up to 110 days, though theoretically 40 days should resolve it), and the approval adds “an extra political-administrative filter.” On the plus side, for entrepreneurs is access to direct import/export and previously banned sectors; for the state sector, “the interest seems to be capturing efficiency” and agility.

“No analysis of this rule in 2026 would be complete without addressing the elephant in the room: the blockade and its recent tightening,” she warns, echoing her colleague Torralba. While a mixed company “inherits the ‘state characteristic,’” an Economic Association Contract “offers relative shielding.” “Since it doesn’t create a new legal person, the private company keeps its separate legal identity, which could make it easier to argue to international partners that certain operations don’t involve a direct link to the Cuban state sector,” she says.

Yulieta Hernández Díaz, president of Grupo de Construcciones Pilares, is more skeptical. She sees hints of an Asian-style economic transformation, but worries political changes might get left behind. The entrepreneur, based in Havana, thinks Miguel Díaz-Canel is finally taking economic reforms seriously, but she doesn’t see “the structural transformations that are really needed.”

The entrepreneur, based in Havana, thinks Miguel Díaz-Canel is finally taking economic reforms seriously, but she doesn’t see “the structural transformations that are really needed.”

“I’m worried that the reforms being pushed today—both by sectors of the US administration (which focus their rhetoric on economic openings) and by Cuba’s own leadership—get interpreted as real structural change when, deep down, they might not mean any significant opening,” she says, and calls for steps toward democratization, starting with releasing political prisoners.

Economist Pedro Monreal dropped three short messages on his X account after “a quick read.” “From a model perspective, it’s a ‘domesticated’ destatization mechanism that combines ‘satellization’ of parts of the state sector with an ‘oblique graduation’ of private mipymes,” he notes. The expert believes the new rule lets parts of state companies break free to “take advantage of advantageous synergies with national private capital to reinforce state subordination of the private business sector.” He warns about the risks of state control but points out a positive: “Applied to a private business sector forced into the mipyme format with no option to become a large company, the new rule offers an alternative for ‘oblique graduation’ toward greater scale.”

Translated by GH

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