Category: Translator: GH

El Algarrobo, in any case, according to the official media report, is part of the cooperation program with China to incorporate a total of 92 photovoltaic parks by 2028, which would amount to a generation capacity of 2,000 megawatts (MW). According to official data, as of March there were 52 completed solar installations on the island, which together contribute more than 1,000 MW, accounting for up to 38% of the electricity “consumed during daytime hours at times of peak solar output,” according to authorities.

Like most of its kind on the island, El Algarrobo has no storage system, so it only delivers its output — 21.8 MW — during daylight hours, and only when there are no clouds.

The fanfare-filled announcement of the plant’s inauguration in Guantánamo coincides with accusations from Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez against the United States for extending the energy blockade to photovoltaic parks. “Now shipping companies are being threatened not to bring in solar panels and batteries for the new photovoltaic parks that we have learned to install in 45 days,” the Minister of Foreign Affairs said via his X account this past Monday.

In the same post, Rodríguez — who that same day had presented to friendly press a report “on the blockade” estimating the value of damages from U.S. sanctions between March 2025 and February 2026 at more than 8 billion dollars — referred to the rest of the pressures stemming from the executive order signed by U.S. President Donald Trump on January 29, 2026, following the intervention in Venezuela that ended with the capture of Nicolás Maduro. “If fuel and diesel could be imported for the distributed generation generator sets, the blackout could be reduced to a minimum, but the fuel blockade prevents importing them,” the Foreign Minister wrote.

If fuel and diesel could be imported for the distributed generation generator sets, the blackout could be reduced to a minimum, but the fuel blockade prevents importing them,” the Foreign Minister wrote

The Minister did not say a single word about China or its departure, but it is a fact that, at least until early last month, both countries displayed their usual cordiality. On August 7, for example, the Asian giant delivered the first batch of materials corresponding to another 5,000 photovoltaic systems for isolated homes. The ceremony included Hua Xin and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Trade Óscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga. The Chinese Embassy presented the operation as further evidence of the speed of its cooperation with Cuba.

The delivery took place after the new U.S. sanctions announced this year and the July measures against Cuban entities related to foreign trade and ports. So far, Havana has not publicly identified any specific shipping company that has refused to transport solar panels, nor has it detailed what cargo may have been held up as a direct result of those pressures.

What is documented is that the problems with the photovoltaic program begin at the ports. In January 2025, difficulties became known during the construction of Ciego Norte, one of the first major parks in the Chinese program. Cuban workers acknowledged at the time that they were barely able to complete two structures per day and that the assembly required far more precision than anticipated.

China had to send operators after some of its machines began breaking down, having been subjected by the Cuban side to stresses greater than those for which they had been designed. The Asian specialists also imposed a work pace that the official report itself described as far higher than usual among local brigades.

The lack of materials at that time was also not attributable to a U.S. ban on panels. Some 200 containers with inverters, transformers, and other components had not arrived on time, while workers complained that they could have started months earlier if they had had the resources “on site.”

Translated by GH.

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their heads. Experts calculated that this, along with the oil blockade Washington introduced afterward, would leave the island without reserves within weeks, forcing them to accept.

According to the Herald, the permission granted in February for US companies to sell to private parties in Cuba was a goodwill gesture on the part of the United States, just as authorizing private individuals to import it was on Cuba’s part. But the regime was not satisfied with the Americans wanting to take full control of its reserves through Cupet. That is why Trump’s envoys offered an alternative: acquiring the company jointly with the Cuban government and bringing in investors from other countries. One condition, however, was resolving ExxonMobil’s ownership claims against the state oil company.

According to the sources, the Cuban regime began weighing this offer, which would help solve the population’s problems and, by extension, its own. With growing power shortages, the economy had no chance of recovering either, and discontent did it no favors. But then Axios leaked the negotiations and the exile community cried foul.

According to the Herald, Cuban American representatives could not believe that Rubio — who had always voiced the same views as them toward the Castro leadership — was brokering deals with Raúl Castro’s favorite grandson. Some even dismissed the talks as false, and many expressed, both openly and quietly, their fear that things would play out as they did in Venezuela, where the population has seen the Americans take control of its oil while leaving Chavismo in power.

Cuban American representatives could not believe that Rubio — who had always voiced the same views as them toward the Castro leadership — was brokering deals with Raúl Castro’s favorite grandson

“The Cuban people deserve freedom, not another deal to keep the same regime in power. I made it clear: no negotiations with the Castro family to preserve a dictatorship. Cuba’s future must be decided by its people, not a dynasty,” said María Elvira Salazar.

Although Havana agreed — reluctantly, according to the source — to reforms liberalizing the economy in some respects, it insisted there was a red line. Rodríguez Castro himself reportedly said that, “with his grandparents’ blessing, he was open to all kinds of economic reforms and agreements with the United States, but that the US government could not dictate how Cubans should be governed.”

The source also described El Cangrejo as an “unpredictable element” and said that his newfound prominence had not done the favorite grandson any good. His days of enjoying luxury with a degree of anonymity had apparently come to an end, much to his displeasure. To make matters worse, Díaz-Canel began taking up more space, adopting a defiant rhetoric to appease the hardliners.

In the end, “the Cubans were not ready yet,” the Herald’s source says.

What followed was Washington’s abandonment of its conciliatory strategy, which ended in a wave of sanctions and the indictment of Raúl Castro over the shootdown of the Brothers to the Rescue planes.

In recent months, the talks have apparently stalled, something Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez also stated when presenting the report on the damage caused by the US “blockade.” Nevertheless, fuel continues to reach private businesses, and the contract to enter the mining sector shows that something is still moving.

Translated by GH

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Furthermore, no medicine not registered with the Cuban regulator may be marketed.

In this regard, the official said that consideration is being given to using the “temporary health registration,” valid for two years, to evaluate a product’s performance and determine whether to apply for its permanent registration. The list has existed for almost 20 years, but the arrival of new economic actors, with the capacity to import medicines that until now lack certification from the Center for State Control of Medicines, Equipment, and Medical Devices (Cecmed), gives it new relevance.

Private businesses could manufacture – an activity now permitted in partnership with state industry – and also purchase products abroad thanks to this special authorization, which allows medicines to be marketed for a limited period, speeding up the timeline for permanent registration. While the temporary registration is expected to take around 30 days, the permanent one usually takes at least six months.

In any case, the official said that a guidance list has been drawn up of the products with the highest demand – and lowest supply – on the island, to “support those who develop this model,” that is, urging them to supply the population with what the State lacks the capacity to provide.

A guidance list has been drawn up of the products with the highest demand – and lowest supply – on the island, to “support those who develop this model,” that is, urging them to supply the population with what the State lacks the capacity to provide

That said, purchases made outside Cuba must go through the state channel. “All imports have to pass through the two importers we have, which are Medicuba, under the Ministry of Public Health, and Farmacuba, under the Cuban pharmaceutical industry.” Both are prepared, she added, “to support the new forms of management at the different stages of the process, including identifying suppliers and the procedures associated with importing.” The state-run Emcomed has also offered to collaborate.

Lara Bastanzuri stressed in the interview that the requirements and controls for this sector will receive special care, since they are linked to the health of the population.

Her account makes clear that the establishment marketed as “the first private pharmacy” in Havana is, as this newspaper has previously reported, a private shop in the municipality of Regla that has been selling medicines for two years. The establishment is located on Martí Street, between Albuquerque and Agramonte, with a first room offering toiletries, cosmetics, and clothing, and a second room where medicines are dispensed.

The volume dispensed is substantial, almost as much so as the prices. During a 14ymedio visit last August, one customer nonetheless expressed relief at not having to turn to the black market. “The prices are expensive, yes, but since they’re everywhere anyway, on the side, on the street. At least this is a store, and it’s legal,” she said. However, the official’s remarks make clear that this business is being conducted without the required authorization.

Translated by GH.
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it were another type of murder.

According to Pérez, Cuba’s body of law does not literally use the term femicide – although she said she would prefer it – to refer to these cases, as happens in other Latin American countries, which have incorporated it as a crime in their penal codes or specific laws.

In Cuba, the reason for distinguishing gender-based motives in a murder is not because it constitutes an aggravating factor in sentencing – since such murders already carry the maximum penalties – but rather a matter of legal technique and, above all, of statistics.

The Cuban Observatory on Gender Equality (Ocig), a platform linked to the National Statistics and Information Office (Onei) and the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), updated some femicide indicators for the island on August 18.

Of those 49 women murdered, whose cases were tried in 2025, 47% died at the hands of an ex-partner, nearly 90% died in their own home, and 75.5% had no employment ties. Most were white and between 20 and 44 years old (38 cases).

The Ocig, which was created in 2023 and has since updated a set of gender-related indicators once a year, also recorded 33 cases in urban areas and 16 in rural areas, where the femicide rate reached 1.65 per 100,000 women.

While the declining figure for tried femicides reported by the Ocig is not, for now, a real gauge of violence against women, Pérez likewise does not venture to claim that the trend has been increasing.

For its part, the Alas Tensas Gender Observatory (Ogat) is another organization that has kept its own count since 2019, compiled from citizen reports, mainly through social media.

The Ogat has reported 47 women murdered so far this year, as of August 24, and has kept a case-by-case count of 350 femicide victims from 2019 through the first half of 2026.

“Although the Alas Tensas Observatory is politically committed (against the Cuban government), that doesn’t change the fact that it often posts on social media about the existence of real cases”

“Although the Alas Tensas Observatory is politically committed (against the Cuban government), that doesn’t change the fact that it often posts on social media about the existence of real cases,” said Pérez. For the jurist, the most reliable data comes from the courts, but it is not enough.

For example, the so-called Interoperable Registry – which is not public and to which only the Prosecutor’s Office, the police, criminal investigators and, soon, the courts have access – provides “very clear information about what happens in cases from the moment of the official complaint.”

In fact, several femicide cases have not been tried because the perpetrator later committed suicide, and this is data that is not processed nor reflected in the Ocig statistics, she said.

Another important figure released by the Ocig was that, in 2025, Cuban courts processed 173 cases of sexual violence against women aged 15 and older, of which 90 corresponded to the crime of sexual assault and 83 to other types of sexual violence.

Women aged 20 to 44 accounted for the majority of victims (73, or 5.33 per 100,000 women), but adolescents aged 15 to 17 were the most affected (49 victims, 31.52 per 100,000 women).

“Sexual assault came to include all attacks of greater severity against a person’s freedom and bodily integrity,” the jurist said.

Under Article 395 of the Penal Code, sexual assault is punishable by seven to 15 years’ imprisonment for anyone who, “using force, violence or intimidation, has carnal access to another person,” by whatever means or methods.

The sentence is 8 to 20 years if, for example, the crime results from gender-based or domestic violence, or from discriminatory motives.

Of lesser severity are other forms of sexual violence such as “sexual abuse” – unlike the previous crime, it does not involve “carnal access” – or “harassment and sexual outrage,” which includes forms of harassment carried out directly or through any means of communication. In both cases, the penalties are fines or prison terms of six months to two years.

The 173 cases of sexual violence tried in 2025 represent a sharp decrease compared to the 230 cases in 2024 and the 378 in 2023, to the point that the rate of such cases brought to justice fell from 8.62 per 100,000 women in 2023 to 4.19 in 2025. Of that total of 781 cases, 419 (53.6%) correspond to sexual assaults and 362 (46.4%) to other types of sexual violence.

“These figures are very unrepresentative of reality. A woman endures so much harassment every day for these numbers to mean anything. In any case, they speak to how poorly Cuban justice functions for these cases of sexual violence,” said Claris, a student at the Technological University of Havana who preferred to withhold her last name.

Many Cuban specialists and activists agree that the available statistics offer only a partial view of a problem that, according to independent feminist groups, faces significant underreporting.

The Ocig’s contribution is further limited by the fact that it provides data only on tried cases, rendering invisible sexual violence against girls under 15 and against boys.

“With sexual violence there is always a very large degree of underreporting. First, because of the victim’s silence, and second, because sexual violence crimes, by law, require that a complaint be filed: they require an official report from the victim or, if she is a minor, from her parents. These are crimes, as is classically said, crimes of solitude,” Pérez noted.

“With sexual violence there is always a very large degree of underreporting. First, because of the victim’s silence, and second, because sexual violence crimes, by law, require that a complaint be filed: they require an official report”

Despite legislative progress, studies confirm the persistence on a global scale of challenges for victims of sexual violence in accessing justice, such as shame and fear of reprisals; revictimization and a lack of awareness among judicial officials; a lack of support networks; and socioeconomic inequalities.

More than 12% of women aged 15 to 49 worldwide have been victims of physical or sexual violence by a partner or ex-partner in the past year, according to the Gender Snapshot (2025) from UN Women.

When it comes to reporting cases of sexual violence, there is also the length of time it takes for a criminal action to lapse, which in Cuba can range from 3 to 25 years depending on the sentence associated with a given crime, although femicide cases should not have a statute of limitations, since murder carries the maximum penalty.

To support victims through the process, in November 2025 Cuba inaugurated the Specialized Office for the Comprehensive Care of Victims of Gender-Based Violence, an initiative of the National Organization of Collective Law Firms, which already has 40 locations across the island.

Attorney Ana Isabel Zamora, who belongs to one of the offices in Havana, explained to IPS that the initiative’s role is to offer legal advice, procedural representation and support to victims of gender-based violence. But in its first few months, her office has handled only about 20 cases.

Zamora acknowledged that “it still isn’t as visible as we would like. Out of fear, shame, or stereotypes, victims fail to reach out to these places where they could be helped.”

Translated by GH.

Editor’s note: This text was published by IPS Cuba

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any source, document, or statement that might have backed up such a political turnaround.

A supposed Central Bank statement also circulated, announcing the “definitive elimination” of the Cuban peso as legal tender and the full dollarization of the economy. However, the national currency remains officially alive – even if its purchasing power looks more dead by the day.

Miguel Díaz-Canel was made to resign once again. A fake letter, circulated under the usual “Breaking News” label, opened with a solemn “Compatriots” and presented an unexpectedly self-critical president, willing to admit that he had underestimated the economic crisis, reacted too late to food and medicine shortages, and failed to keep his promises. Perhaps the element that most quickly gave away the hoax was precisely so much contrition in one place.

The state telecom monopoly Etecsa didn’t escape the rumor mill either. Another fake statement, carefully drafted in bureaucratic style, announced that starting September 1st Cubans would only be able to use mobile data for four hours a day, between ten at night and two in the morning. Given recent experience with rate hikes, restrictions, and connection troubles, many people didn’t even need much convincing to believe it. When reality has spent years training the public for the worst, rumor-mongers have much of their work already done for them.

But August saved its action movie for the very end. On the 31st, two US military ships, the USS Billings and the USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul, arrived at the Guantánamo Naval Base. The presence of both vessels is documented by the US Navy itself; the Billings arrived as part of a scheduled deployment, and the Minneapolis-Saint Paul had left Mayport, Florida, on August 27th to begin its own.

The two vessels were enough to dust off rumors of an American military intervention, further fueled by regional tensions

For some, however, it took only a few forwarded messages to leap from that to invasion. The two vessels were enough to dust off rumors of an American military intervention, further fueled by regional tensions. For certain influencers, the ships were definitive proof that “something big” was about to happen.

None of it happened. But the rumors thrived because each one touched a real anxiety: who will control the country after Raúl, how much further the national currency can deteriorate, how far the restrictions will go, and how a crisis that seems bottomless will end. In today’s Cuba, a rumor doesn’t need to be true. It’s enough for it to look too much like something that could happen.

Translated by GH.

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of the accumulated total for 2026. Overall, U.S. exports of fuels and oils had reached 95.7 million dollars between January and June, according to records compiled by the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council.

By contrast, Cuban purchases of food from the United States have declined compared with the previous year. In the first six months of 2026, U.S. exports of agricultural and food products totaled 218.8 million dollars, 10% less than in the same period of 2025. Chicken remains the top product among Cuban purchases, but sales of other foods have fallen in recent months.

In the first half of the year, exports of automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, bicycles, and other vehicles had exceeded 41 million dollars

Vehicles are the other major component of the new trade pattern. In the first half of the year, exports of automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, bicycles, and other vehicles had exceeded 41 million dollars. The value of these sales has soared since 2022, when Washington began authorizing certain vehicle exports to Cuban citizens and private businesses. By 2025, vehicle sales had already reached about 149.4 million dollars.

The phenomenon reflects growing demand from the Cuban private sector, which turns to U.S. suppliers to obtain products that the Cuban state fails to import in sufficient quantities.

The increase is notable because it is occurring while Washington maintains its trade embargo on Cuba. But this framework does not amount to a total ban on U.S. exports. Commerce Department regulations permit certain transactions, including sales of agricultural products and – through licenses – medicines and medical devices. In addition, the exception for Support for the Cuban People, in the export regulations, authorizes certain goods intended to improve “living conditions” and support private economic activity.

The U.S. has sold 674 million dollars in merchandise to Cuba between January and July

The Census Bureau’s statistics account for the total value of merchandise exported and do not make it possible to determine what proportion corresponds directly to MSMEs, the Cuban state, or other buyers.

The trade relationship between the two countries also remains highly unbalanced: while the U.S. sold 674 million dollars in merchandise to Cuba between January and July, U.S. imports from the island reached barely about 500,000 dollars in that same period.

An analysis published in April by the consulting firm Auge noted that U.S. exports to Cuba grew 148% between 2021 and 2025, from 327 million to about 810 million dollars, in parallel with the expansion of MSMEs and the increase in remittances from the U.S. Auge estimated at the time that U.S. exports could reach as much as 1.3 billion dollars by 2028 if current conditions persist and trade opportunities expand.

Translated by GH.

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what forced doctors to operate on the politician. Ansa does not report the type of surgery or provide a precise diagnosis. According to information gathered by the newspaper Corriere della Sera, the former deputy reportedly suffered a stroke in Santa Clara. After regaining consciousness, he was transferred by ambulance to Havana, where he remained awake throughout the trip and underwent a contrast CT scan at the Hermanos Ameijeiras hospital. Cuban doctors then advised against his transfer to Italy, considering that such a long trip could pose risks to his health.

A medical team from the Gemelli polyclinic in Rome traveled to Cuba to collaborate with specialists from Hermanos Ameijeiras and assess the conditions under which Di Battista could be transferred to Italy

The case has also mobilized Italian doctors. A medical team from the Gemelli polyclinic in Rome traveled to Cuba to collaborate with specialists from Hermanos Ameijeiras and assess the conditions under which Di Battista could be transferred to Italy. Ansa notes that the Italian professionals worked alongside the Cuban medical team.

The former deputy, 48, had arrived in Cuba to work on a series of reports for Il Fatto Quotidiano and its audiovisual branch, TvLoft. His hospitalization interrupted the trip while he was in the center of the country.

In his first messages after being admitted, Di Battista praised the care received from Cuban doctors and conveyed an optimistic picture of his recovery. The announcement that he would travel by air ambulance reinforced the impression that the most delicate phase was behind him.

The new postponement and, above all, the news of the surgery now show that his condition has required more complex care than was initially known.

Translated by GH

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one is available for the whole brigade, when it should be personal equipment.”

The worker explained that there were also no uniforms, boots, or helmets, and, worst of all, there are barely any dielectric gloves for working with live current. “If a cable falls, we have to think about where to remove one that’s out of use to repair it with; if a transformer, or ‘lechera’ (milk can) as it’s called on the street, burns out, we have to think about where to take a less-used one from to provide service to the population, and it’s all like that because the warehouses are bare, grim,” he denounced.

In September 2025, Cleivi Pujada Castro lost his life while carrying out repair work on a circuit at the Playa Baracoa substation in Bauta, Artemisa province. The UNE worker died after coming into contact with a high-voltage line, according to the account of a colleague who reported what happened.

“The harnesses and safety belts for working at height are in terrible condition and there are barely any. Sometimes one is available for the whole brigade, when it should be personal equipment.”

A different fate, days earlier, befell Osmani Hernández Madroza, 35, who suffered burns while working on a fault in San Miguel del Padrón, repairing a conductor. The lineman had both arms amputated as a result of the burns. In March 2024, Leonel Carroso Machín, a lineman for the Havana Electric Company, died after falling from a pole in the municipality of Boyeros.

Workplace accident statistics in Cuba confirm that this is, after construction, one of the sectors with the most accidents and fatalities. In 2025, there were 664 incidents in which 38 workers died and 701 were injured. The electricity sector accounted for five deaths, half as many as construction and the same number as gas and water supply.

Although there were more deaths in 2024 – 52 nationwide and 7 in the electricity sector – the decrease could be explained not only by the decline in the general population, but specifically by the loss of UNE workers. Between 2021 and 2023 alone, the company lost 15,000 workers by its own account, a situation that has worsened in recent years. The workforce numbers around 40,000 workers, but the Ministry of Energy and Mines has repeatedly stated that there is a labor shortage and that increasingly less-qualified personnel are facing complex tasks due to the lack of replacement and qualified staff.

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a status symbol.

Chen Zhi’s obsession with breaking into London’s elite – which did not accept a Chinese millionaire the way it would a millionaire from any other Western country – led him to use the Cuban brand as a status symbol

Before the Chinese businessman arrived at Habanos, the brand reported stable annual revenues of five hundred million dollars, the FT notes. Afterward, by 2022, the money
began to surge, reaching 827 million in 2024. The newspaper cites another surprising figure: the brand doubled its prices in 2023 and raised them more moderately afterward – a Cohiba Behike 52 that sold for 55 euros in January 2022 reached 230 euros by January 2026.

To arrive at that point, the FT reconstructs Chen’s biography. He first arrived in Havana in 2022, accompanying the entourage of the prime minister of Cambodia, the country where he had become a naturalized citizen. There he had built good relationships, including with relatives of the government elite, and made his fortune, which, according to his lawyers, came from good management of real estate businesses. For the United States, however, he is “involved in illicit activities.”

Be that as it may, Chen moved to the United Kingdom, but the luxurious buildings and offices he bought did nothing to impress the British. But Chen – the FT says – “had a secret weapon in his seduction campaign: Cuban cigars.” The report contains several anecdotes that illustrate this, such as a visit by journalists to one of the businessman’s warehouses, where they found abundant boxes of Cuban cigars in the hallway.

Sandy Zhou, sent to London as Chen’s emissary and identified by the United States as a collaborator in the Prince Group’s “corrupt and criminal activities,” told Laurence Davis that the businessman wanted to create a smokers’ club in the United Kingdom with a membership fee of 100,000 pounds, although this never materialized and, according to his spokespeople, never went beyond a comment, with no business plan. “I think he saw it as a great opportunity. All those rich and famous businessmen from around the world were going to be here, they would go to his club and sit at his table,” Davis says.

Charlie Minato, co-founder of the specialized website Halfwheel, based in the United States, also speaks about the economic leap in Cuban cigar prices, citing the annual charity auction gala as an example. “There was a time when these humidors sold for between 150,000 and 200,000 dollars. But then Middle Eastern buyers appeared and prices skyrocketed: 400,000 and 500,000 dollars,” he recalls. Later would come the record of 2.6 million dollars for a single box of 550 cigars.

By that point, Chen had already turned the Cuban cigar into a highly coveted product among the Chinese. Mitchell Orchant, founder of the British tobacconist chain C.Gars, recalls that they then began to be sold as luxury gifts. “They would come and take 100 boxes at once.” Although he spoke to them about the merits of the tobacco, the customers would respond, “No, I smoke other brands, but this one is perfect for gift-giving.”

“They would come and take 100 boxes at once.” Although he spoke to them about the merits of the tobacco, the customers would respond, “No, I smoke other brands, but this one is perfect for gift-giving.”

In April 2022 – the text continues – Habanos decreed that global prices would be tied to those in Hong Kong, among the most expensive in the world due to its high taxes. “Cuba hopes to eliminate this gray market and reposition Cohiba and Trinidad as super-luxury brands, accessible only to those with very high purchasing power,” a retailer told his customers at the time.

London businessmen note that it was a boom time, despite initial fears over the price hikes. Consumers who already sought status now valued the brand even more. Davis notes that one Chinese customer spent 120,000 pounds in a single purchase – a sales volume that for him would normally represent “an extraordinary two weeks.” Habanos’ revenue rose 45% between 2021 and 2024, and everything seemed to be going well. But the empire began to crumble, first with the sanctions imposed on Chen – by the United Kingdom and the United States in October 2025 and by the EU in July of this year, which has contributed to the suspension of the Swedish license of Elite Trading Scandinavia AB, which distributed the product – and the accusations against him. A New York court charged the businessman with having turned the Prince Group into “one of the largest transnational criminal organizations in Asia” and found that his workers in Cambodia were victims of trafficking.

On January 6, 2026, Chen was extradited from Cambodia to China, where, according to court documents, not even his lawyers have been able to contact him, the FT notes, adding that a judge in the British Virgin Islands appointed provisional liquidators for 30 companies linked to Chen and the Prince Group, among them Simply Advanced, through which he controlled nearly a third of Habanos’ shares. The tobacco business is not mentioned in any case against Chen, but since the liquidators are seeking a new owner for the company, it is believed that the magnate will soon be out of the consortium.

Even so, the damage to the brand is already a fact. “Before [2020], I smoked Cuban cigars 95% of the time. Now I smoke Cuban cigars 40% of the time, if I can even get them. We have people who smoke two or three cigars a day. Their bill has gone from 55-60 pounds to 120-130 pounds. What they’ve done is cut back their consumption and start smoking Nicaraguan cigars, and now I think there’s no turning back,” Davis says.

Today, the world’s leading exporter is the Dominican Republic, with 8.4 billion units a year compared to 70 million Cuban cigars

The businessman is referring to new brands that have emerged on the continent through the work of Cuban exiles. Those interviewed cannot stop emphasizing the distinctive qualities of Cuban tobacco. “It’s the most incredible symbol of capitalism produced in one of the last bastions of communism. It’s one of those strange things, right? They make the best cigars in the world,” says Orchant. “In most cases, I can tell within 90 seconds whether a cigar is Cuban or not. Often I can do it even before lighting it. There’s something different about that tobacco; it has a particular sweetness,” Minato notes, estimating that tens of thousands of people smoke a Cuban cigar in the United States every week “at the very least,” even though their sale is not legal there.

The industry, however, has remained frozen in time. “There’s been no investment; they still plant by hand,” Davis says. There are also the consequences of the fuel blockade. “This isn’t the first time we’ve had supply shortages, but this time it’s a bit more complicated. The cigars are still being made in the factories every day, the workers are bused to the factories… the problem lies in exporting the product,” Orchant notes.

Today, the world’s leading exporter is the Dominican Republic, with 8.4 billion units a year compared to 70 million Cuban cigars. My Father Cigars has plants in Honduras and Nicaragua; the company was founded by the descendants of a Cuban cigar roller – José Pepín García – who emigrated to Miami in 2003. According to Davis, its capacity is 85 million cigars a year.

Translated by GH.

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compared with the previous year, with 88,525 arrivals – compared with 140,546 in the first seven months of 2025. The drop is enormous, at 37%, but compared with other countries it is the smallest loss recorded. Something similar is happening with US travelers: although the figure has been cut by more than half, it still reaches 37,351, compared with more than 77,000 in July of last year. Air connectivity with the US is among the most resilient, which explains these figures.

However, this Monday Delta Airlines – which announced in June the cancellation of its direct route between Havana and Atlanta and cut its operations from Miami by 50% – requested an extension of its permit to reduce flights. In a filing to the US Department of Transportation, the airline is asking to keep unused its permit to operate to Havana during the winter season, which runs from October 25, 2026 to March 27, 2027. The company claims that “market conditions did not improve sufficiently” to operate at full capacity.

Although Spain continues to appear on the list of leading source countries for tourists, it has suffered a major decline of nearly 65%

On the opposite end is Canada, which still leads in absolute visitor volume, with 127,645 arrivals, down 70% compared with 2025 levels. Most Canadian tourists, moreover, were received in January and early February, before all the North American country’s airlines canceled their routes to the island. In January 2026 alone, nearly 100,000 Canadians arrived in Cuba, while a month later that figure fell to 24,559. Since then, travelers from that country have arrived only in trickles.

Russia, although it has never reached the same outbound levels as Canada, was also one of the great hopes for the Cuban market, which in 2024 aimed to attract 200,000 tourists from that country. Now, a 70.4% drop is being reported, as only 21,374 Russians have vacationed on the island so far this year, of which 20,668 correspond to the first two months, before – likewise – all the Eurasian nation’s airlines canceled their connections with the country.

As for Europeans, the pattern that has been in place for years continues to repeat itself, which, in the view of the Cuban regime, is due to the visa restrictions imposed on EU citizens – beneficiaries of the ESTA visa waiver program – who have traveled to Cuba. Notable within this group is the case of Spain which, although it continues to appear on the list of leading source countries for tourists, has suffered a major decline – of nearly 65% – despite the fact that its airlines have held out the longest despite the situation.

Air Europa is one of the only connections between the continent and the island, and it plans to continue on that path, with up to five or six weekly flights in December and a daily frequency starting April 1, 2027. Spain is, however, home to the second-largest Cuban community abroad, after the US.

As an anecdotal data point, there is also the figure for Chinese travelers to Cuba. It is the country losing the least market share, although the numbers remain minimal. With 9,209 travelers so far this year – compared with 14,439 in July 2025 – it is “only” down 36.2%.

Translated by GH

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government. The island’s leaders have expressed their gratitude for the commitment of Globalia – the tourism group owned by the Hidalgos – to maintaining its operations in Cuba, where it is also developing real estate projects.

Not everything seems to be going well for Air Europa this year: the company is under judicial investigation over the 475 million euro bailout it received from the Spanish state in 2020. Last June, a Madrid court admitted the criminal complaints filed by the PP and Vox over an alleged crime of administrative malfeasance.

In 2026, numerous airlines have suspended their flights to Cuba, reduced frequencies, or modified their operations due to the fuel shortage and falling demand. Some have had to add technical stopovers in third countries to refuel before continuing on to the island. Among the companies that have withdrawn are Air Canada, Air France, WestJet, Sunwing, Air Transat, Iberia, Latam Perú and Turkish Airlines.

“Flights to Havana, scheduled to begin on October 25, have been canceled”

The Turkish airline, which holds 26.5% of Air Europa’s capital after investing 300 million euros in the company at the end of last year, had recently announced the renewal of its Moscow-Istanbul-Havana route, a decision that had raised expectations about the recovery of the Russian tourist market in Cuba. However, it became known this Thursday that the company had decided to cancel that route. “Flights to Havana, scheduled to begin on October 25, have been canceled,” a Turkish Airlines spokesperson told Diario de Cuba. For now, the airline maintains its connection to Havana via Panama, where passengers must change planes to continue their journey with Copa Airlines.

The withdrawal of several airlines from Cuba has not been a direct consequence of US sanctions against companies linked to the regime, as some media outlets have suggested, but rather of the kerosene crisis, falling demand, and the collapse of tourism. These factors are related to the profound crisis affecting the island, worsened this year by Washington’s oil blockade against Cuba and OFAC sanctions against the economic pillars of the Cuban regime.

Air China, the other operator maintaining the Madrid-Havana route, retains two weekly frequencies. According to the reservation system, the Chinese state airline will maintain these operations until the summer of 2027. Iberia, for its part, has extended the suspension of its flights until July 2027, although it continues to offer connections to Havana via Panama City, with the final leg operated by Copa.

Translated by GH.

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respond to questions from doctors and nurses. He was taken to the 19th floor and immediately underwent vital-sign monitoring and other specialized tests.

So far, no official medical bulletin with a precise diagnosis has been released. Some Italian media have floated various hypotheses based on the intensity of the headaches and the temporary loss of consciousness, but neither Cuban nor Italian authorities have publicly confirmed the cause of the episode.

The newspaper itself confirmed that he was working on the island when he began to suffer “strange headaches” that grew progressively worse

Giorgia Meloni’s government is closely following the case and has a medically equipped plane on standby to repatriate Di Battista. The transfer will depend, however, on the doctors’ decision, who must determine whether the trip poses any risk to his health. Italy’s ambassador to Cuba, Simona De Martino, traveled to Santa Clara, while the foreign minister, Antonio Tajani, said he was in contact with the diplomatic mission and with the former lawmaker’s family.

Di Battista was not in Cuba on vacation. Having stayed away from Parliament for years, he has devoted himself to journalism, books and travel, and on this occasion was preparing a series of reports for Il Fatto Quotidiano and its audiovisual arm, TvLoft, titled La polvere del mondo (The Dust of the World). The newspaper itself confirmed that he was working on the island when he began to suffer “strange headaches” that grew progressively worse.

That the episode occurred in Santa Clara is particularly striking given the Italian’s political biography. Ansa recalled this Saturday that Ernesto Guevara is one of the figures Di Battista has championed for years. Of the Argentine guerrilla fighter, he once said he had left as a lesson what “the fervent will of a human being” can achieve.

‘La Razón’ highlighted his travels through Latin America and his profile as an agitator within the M5S.

The association between the two goes back a long way. In 2018, the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia titled a profile on Di Battista The Return of the Che Grillino after he returned to Rome following more than six months traveling through the Americas. The paper recalled at the time that he had publicly recommended reading Che and Marx, and that he had even spoken of Guevara in the Italian Parliament as a man capable of making history by standing up to power.

A year later, another Spanish newspaper, La Razón, presented him outright as the “Italian Che Guevara,” after Di Battista and Luigi Di Maio staged an outreach to the French yellow vests that caused a serious diplomatic rift between Rome and Paris. The paper highlighted at the time his travels through Latin America and his profile as an agitator within the M5S.

He is currently vice president of Schierarsi, a political activism association that has driven campaigns related to Palestine.

Born in Rome in 1978, Di Battista was a lawmaker between 2013 and 2018 and became one of the M5S’s most charismatic leaders. His vehement style and his rhetoric against traditional politics gave him enormous popularity among the party’s grassroots, although he never held the main institutional posts.

He then progressively withdrew from the front line and broke with the M5S in 2021, in disagreement with the movement’s support for Mario Draghi’s government. He is currently vice president of Schierarsi, a political activism association that has driven campaigns related to Palestine, public water and other social causes.

Italian politics, despite deep divisions between parties, reacted in almost unanimous fashion to the news of his hospitalization. The M5S expressed its “great concern” and voiced solidarity with his family, while leaders from political forces on both the left and the right sent messages of support.

Translated by GH

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set product assortments, sales methods, and prices, to participate in public procurement, and to “create chains of stores, restaurants, and light food service networks of recognized or other brands that extend throughout the country.”

The Decree further orders the “promotion of public-private relations” and facilitation of the development of both domestic and foreign actors. For wholesalers, the language appears to be lifted directly from a market economy manual: they must consider “market signals,” study customers’ “tastes and preferences,” and favor domestic production whenever it is competitive “in quality, price, and timing.”

Meanwhile, provincial and municipal authorities are rolling out a new offensive of price caps, inspections, fines, seizures, forced sales, and closures

All this comes after Mônica Bergamo, of Folha de S.Paulo, asked Díaz-Canel directly whether it was necessary to “promote capitalism to save socialism.” “There are no capitalist reforms,” the president replied, invoking the precedent of the Special Period and recalling that Fidel Castro had accepted “concessions” at that time in order to preserve the Revolution and socialism.

The contradiction does not remain merely at the level of words. While the central government expands the space available to private businesses by decree, provincial and municipal authorities are rolling out a new offensive of price caps, limits on trade margins, inspections, fines, seizures, forced sales, and closures.

In June, as part of the 176 measures, the Government had announced the general elimination of price caps. Not even two months had passed before Artemisa, Matanzas, Holguín, and other territories began setting maximum trade margins of 30%, while municipalities in Guantánamo, Santiago de Cuba, and other provinces imposed maximum prices or, under another name, “reference” prices.

Resolution 15 repeals the rules with which the Ministry of Domestic Trade itself tightened wholesale trade for MSMEs, cooperatives, and self-employed workers in 2024

Nor has the result been unexpected. In some places, products subject to greater administrative pressure, such as cooking oil, have disappeared from stores or returned to the informal market at higher prices.

The Gazette itself unwittingly sums up this ambivalence. Alongside competition and market signals, Decree 167 enshrines “centralized administrative measures” intended to induce economic actors to make decisions “in line with the interests of society.” It also reserves for the State the ability to introduce restrictions or prohibitions and to intervene in price formation in the name of “social interest.”

Even one of the resolutions published this Friday acknowledges another about-face. Resolution 15 repeals the rules with which the Ministry of Domestic Trade itself tightened wholesale trade for MSMEs, cooperatives, and self-employed workers in 2024. It now deems it necessary to “ease” those regulations.

This looping pattern also has precedents. In 1986, Fidel Castro launched the “Rectification of Errors and Negative Tendencies,” initially aimed at economic mechanisms that the leadership considered deviations from socialism. Decades later, the Ordering Task (Tarea Ordenamiento) was again presented as the solution to distortions accumulated over years. Beginning in January 2021, it was meant, among other things, to end monetary duality and restore the Cuban peso’s central role in the economy. Barely a month after it took effect, Granma was already publishing an article titled “Prices and Cost Cards: ‘Ordering’ the Ordering Task,” while the Government introduced new mechanisms to contain prices that had exceeded its projections.

The Cuban economy remains trapped in the same pendulum swing: opening up when the crisis leaves no alternative, correcting course when the opening threatens to escape control, and opening up again when the restrictions produce a new suffocation

Five years later, the new commercial legislation in fact enshrines another dual system. Decree 168, within the same Gazette, divides the Central Commercial Registry into two sections – one for “Cuban Pesos” and another for “Foreign Currency” – and requires establishments that sell in both currencies to hold a license for each. Registering or re-registering a business that operates in foreign currency can cost $500, updating its records $370, and obtaining a duplicate license $450, while the same procedures cost 1,300, 600, and 1,000 Cuban pesos, respectively, for those operating in national currency. Resolution 195 itself justifies these fees on the grounds of “partial dollarization in inter-enterprise and commercial operations.”

After six decades, the Cuban economy remains trapped in the same pendulum swing: opening up when the crisis leaves no alternative, correcting course when the opening threatens to escape control, and opening up again when the restrictions produce a new suffocation.

Translated by GH.

______________________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

bring her social media posts to the sector chief on a claim of “defamation.” Activist Tania Tasé, who has followed the case and remains in contact with the family, says she has identified this official as Yanelis, a delegate of the Poder Popular (People’s Power) and a lieutenant colonel in the Revolutionary Armed Forces.

In a message sent to Tasé during her niece’s illness, Companioni said that “the water truck and the delegate” passed by her house some days without stopping. “She only stops when she’s paid, and as soon as I have proof I’m going to file a formal complaint,” she wrote.

Companioni also reported that at Aballí hospital “there isn’t even drinking water for the children”

The situation worsened as an eight-year-old niece of Companioni’s grew sicker after several days of vomiting, diarrhea, and fever. The family took her repeatedly to the Ángel Arturo Aballí Maternal and Child Hospital and to the William Soler hospital, but she was initially sent home. After vomiting bile with traces of blood and, later, developing bleeding gums, she was finally admitted, and tests determined that she had dengue with warning signs and, according to relatives, several inflamed organs, meaning she needed to be transferred to a pediatric facility with intensive care. Companioni also reported that at the Aballí hospital “there isn’t even drinking water for the children, literally.”

While the girl remained hospitalized, the family continued to have no regular water supply at home. Companioni said they even relied on collecting rainwater. “Today at home we don’t have a single drop of water, because it hasn’t rained,” she wrote to Tasé. “I’m not going to stay silent in the face of so much shamelessness and helplessness,” she added.

The government’s own leadership acknowledged the severity of the problem this week. On Thursday, Miguel Díaz-Canel visited the Paso Seco water supply source in Boyeros, a strategic point for pumping water to the southern and central parts of Havana. The official press acknowledged that the facility had entered a “critical situation” and that work is underway to restore equipment, motors, and power lines to sustain service during the prolonged blackouts. The president had ordered that “permanent protection” be sought for the water supply of the capital, home to nearly two million people.

A day later, the United States Embassy in Havana issued a health alert warning that Cuba’s water supply infrastructure is “increasingly unstable” and that there are residential neighborhoods that go long periods without receiving water from the municipal networks. The diplomatic mission noted that the supply problems, worsened by the blackouts and the drought, pose “significant challenges for health and safety.” That same Friday, police detained Companioni, whose protest had begun precisely over one of those prolonged water cutoffs.

A conflict presented as a neighborhood dispute is serving to conceal a reprisal that is political in nature

The conflict began in early August, when the woman reported that her family had gone about 15 days without water service. She went to the municipal government’s command post and to other institutions, including the Communist Party headquarters, without obtaining an effective solution. Days later, a state water truck arrived on her block. Neighbors were able to fill their containers, but she was denied water. When she tried to film the scene, an official warned her that she could be detained if she continued photographing or filming what was happening.

The sequence of events now makes it difficult to reduce the case to a simple neighborhood dispute. That she was detained by a group of police officers that included Search and Capture personnel and high-ranking officers, after weeks of public complaints against local authorities, shows the significance that has been attached to the case. In addition, the reference to an official linked to the FAR, the prior threats, and the speed with which an alleged accusation of “defamation” turned into an arrest all support the belief that a conflict presented as a neighborhood dispute is serving to conceal a reprisal that is political in nature.

Companioni had not led an organized protest or issued any opposition call to action. She had demanded something more basic: water for her home while a girl in her family was seriously ill. And despite admitting her fears, she had made clear she did not intend to stay silent.
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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.