Category: Translator: Regina Anavy

active involvement—or ensure that others are involved—in making the land productive, applying good agricultural practices, and delivering to the State what has been agreed upon.

These agreements may be revoked if the heir fails to fulfill the obligations assumed with the owner. At the same time, the owner is prohibited from selling or donating the land to a third party while the agreement remains in force; otherwise, compensation must be paid to the heir. Such agreements cannot be verbal and must be registered before a notary and in the corresponding registry.

Another sensitive issue is the treatment of land owned by emigrants. The law divides them into two categories depending on whether they left the country before or after July 2024. Those who emigrated before that date, when the Migration Law was approved but not published until a few weeks ago and still not in force, retain ownership of their land as long as it was not confiscated. However, they lose the right to transfer it, meaning that upon their death the land passes to the State, according to an additional provision of the law.

The only concession to heirs is that they will have a preferential right to obtain the land in usufruct if it is determined that they have no other means of livelihood. In that case, and if authorized by the Municipal Commission on Agrarian Affairs, family members will receive preferential rights to use the land.

The second group consists of emigrants who left after July 2024 and are already subject to the current regulations. It is presumed that they benefited from the elimination of the “automatic confiscation of assets upon permanent departure from the country,” although this was never confirmed because the law remained unpublished for two years. In their case, the determining factor is effective migratory residence, meaning they may lose their land if they fail to keep it actively productive.

If an owner exceeds the permitted absence period without legal justification, it will be considered “abandonment of the land,” triggering sanction procedures that may lead to confiscation of both the land and agricultural assets

The current law imposes travel and residency restrictions abroad on landowners, tied directly to the productivity of the land. Farmers may remain outside Cuba for a maximum of one year and must grant a notarized power of attorney authorizing someone else to temporarily manage the farm during that period. The only exception is in cases of force majeure.

If the owner remains absent beyond the allowed period without legal justification, the situation will be classified as “abandonment of the land,” activating sanctions that may result in the seizure of the land and agricultural assets for failing to fulfill the social function of production.

For producers who do not own their land but hold it in usufruct, the restrictions are even stricter, since the land belongs to the State and their contract requires active use. These farmers must also grant a notarized power of attorney authorizing another person to manage the land, but only for a maximum period of six months. If that period is exceeded without justification, the usufruct contract is terminated and the State reclaims the land.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Yesterday, Sunday, eleven of the country’s 16 thermoelectric generating units—most of which operate on domestically produced crude oil—were out of service due to breakdowns or maintenance work. Forecasts for Monday are very similar, with 10 units offline.

Among them is the Antonio Guiteras thermoelectric plant, the Island’s largest power generator, which had been contributing 220 MW. It disconnected from the National Electric System (SEN) last Friday for the thirteenth time this year, and repairs will still “take the necessary time under established controls,” according to its director, Román Pérez Castañeda.

The structural problems affecting thermoelectric plants, which are responsible for 40% of electricity generation, stem mainly from decades of operation beyond their intended service life and from a chronic lack of investment.

Protests are recurring frequently in different parts of Havana and other provinces, with pot-banging demonstrations, garbage fires, and road blockades

These incidences are compounded by generation limitations caused by fuel shortages. A total of 106 distributed-generation plants remain out of service, creating a deficit of 890 MW. The Turkish floating power plant [“patana“] in Regla is in the same situation.

According to the UNE report, electrical service was affected by insufficient generating capacity throughout all 24 hours on Sunday, and the disruption continued during the early morning hours, reaching a maximum deficit of 1,953 MW at 9:20 p.m. For Monday, a deficit of 2,045 MW is forecast during peak hours, equivalent to nearly 67% of the estimated demand of 3,050 MW.

Protests were also reported on Sunday in the municipality of Regla during the daytime. Demonstrations have become frequent in different areas of Havana and other provinces, especially during blackout nights, involving pot-banging protests, the burning of garbage piles, and road blockades. Many of these demonstrations have ended with police repression and the detentions of participants.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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parts of the country. In Matanzas, Andrés Lamas Acevedo, director of the Provincial Center for Hygiene, Epidemiology and Microbiology, confirmed in early May the existence of active hepatitis cases in the province, in areas such as Versalles, the Plácido district, La Cumbre, and “isolated cases in all municipalities.”

Although the physician stated in an interview with Girón that all outbreaks were “fairly well controlled,” the same outlet noted at the beginning of its report that, a couple of weeks earlier, “residents of Matanzas Province remain concerned” about the situation.

Regarding the province, the official explained that hepatitis transmission cases had spread “from person to person” and not through water, “as happened 20 years ago in Versalles.” He also attempted to downplay the outbreak: “In reality, there have been few cases.”

Provincial authorities had already announced that epidemiological surveillance had been strengthened in response to the outbreaks

In early April, provincial authorities announced that they had reinforced epidemiological surveillance due to hepatitis outbreaks in several municipalities, with the most critical situation concentrated in the Versalles neighborhood, where 18 active cases were recorded at that time.

Other outbreaks have also been reported in Camagüey. On April 23, provincial television interviewed a health-sector official who acknowledged that there was “an increase in our province of suspected and probable hepatitis A virus cases, mainly concentrated in our municipality.”

In the report, Televisión Camagüey stated that “in a scenario where there are serious problems with solid waste collection, it is urgent to intensify hygiene and sanitation measures.” Despite this situation, the health official interviewed maintained that “at this time, we do not have an outbreak in the municipality of Camagüey, despite a notable increase in the disease.”

“Camagüey has been full of hepatitis cases for months. Where I live, more than 20 people that I know of have had hepatitis. Please, take this seriously,” one user responded to the report published on Facebook. Another commenter also questioned the official message: “Calling them isolated cases is not accurate, because when you diagnose 30 to 40 positive cases in a single day in an emergency room, that is an outbreak.”

“Calling them isolated cases is not accurate, because when you diagnose 30 to 40 positive cases in a single day in an emergency room, that is an outbreak”

At the beginning of the year, health authorities in Ciego de Ávila reported through official media that they were investigating several suspected hepatitis cases detected in different municipalities of the province.

As often happens, no figures were provided, and officials limited themselves to reporting that, after detecting the first patients with symptoms consistent with the disease, the protocols established by the health system had been activated.

Hepatitis is a disease characterized by inflammation of the liver. Among its most common symptoms are fatigue, yellowing of the skin and eyes, nausea, abdominal pain, and dark urine, although it may also occur without symptoms. In severe cases, however, extreme fatigue, fever between 37 and 38 degrees Celsius, headache, muscle aches, loss of appetite, and bleeding gums may occur.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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and deeply subjective perspective. In a time of mass emigration and collective disillusionment, Perro cubano joins a current of works seeking to document, through individual experience, the emotional and social transformations taking place on the Island.

Morir de exilio: Lejos de Cuba (To Die in Exile: Far from Cuba), by Uva de Aragón, returns this year in an expanded edition published by Eriginal Books

The memory of exile also occupies center stage in Morir de exilio: Lejos de Cuba, by Uva de Aragón, which returns this year in an expanded edition published by Eriginal Books to mark the twentieth anniversary of its original publication. The work brings together nearly ninety articles and biographical sketches dedicated to Cuban figures who died outside their native country.

More than a collection of biographical profiles, the book functions as an extensive emotional map of the Cuban exile experience. Writers, artists, activists, academics, and public figures are portrayed in texts that reconstruct individual trajectories while documenting a collective history marked by separation, nostalgia, and the rebuilding of identities far from Cuba.

Another significant publication is the bilingual monograph devoted to Cuban-American painter Humberto Castro, written by art historian and critic Francine Birbragher. The volume examines in detail the three fundamental stages of the artist’s career: his formative years in 1980s Cuba, where he became one of the leading figures of the so-called Golden Generation of visual arts; his period in France during the 1990s; and his subsequent creative development in the United States.

Throughout May, Objetos perdidos (Lost Objects), the new novel by Karla Suárez published by Editorial Comba in Spain, continued its publishing journey

The study allows readers to explore a complex body of work that engages with mythology, memory, displacement, and the cultural tensions of contemporary life. Beyond its artistic value, the book offers a valuable perspective on the many ways in which the migratory experience has shaped Cuban visual production over the past decades.

Although officially released in April, Objetos perdidos, the new novel by Karla Suárez published by Editorial Comba in Spain, continued to gain attention throughout May. The story follows Giselle, a Cuban dancer who becomes stranded in Barcelona after losing her handbag and being forced to survive for several days in the area surrounding the Sagrada Familia.

The search for documents, memories, and objects laden with sentimental meaning becomes a much deeper exploration of identity, shattered dreams, emigration, and the need to rebuild oneself. With restrained and effective prose, Suárez once again addresses some of the themes that have defined her fiction: uprootedness, memory, and the fragility of personal projects. It is no coincidence that the novel has been enthusiastically received by critics, who have highlighted both the strength of its protagonist and the sensitivity with which it approaches the visible and invisible losses that accompany human displacement.

Through conversations held inside a taxi, Wig documents decisive events

Finally, May continued to consolidate the impact of Havana Taxi: Cuba y Los años de ilusión (Havana Taxi: Cuba and the Years of Illusion), by Norwegian anthropologist Ståle Wig. The result of several years of field research in Havana, the book reconstructs the everyday lives of three Cuban individuals during a decade marked by expectations of change and subsequent disappointment.

Through conversations he conducted inside a taxi, Wig documents decisive events such as the expansion of the internet, the diplomatic rapprochement between Cuba and the United States, the death of Fidel Castro, and the protests of July 11, 2021. The result is a work that combines anthropological rigor with a remarkable narrative ability to capture the tensions between hope and stagnation that have defined the recent Cuban experience.

Taken together, May’s publishing releases reflect a shared concern with preserving memory and understanding the human consequences of exile, migration, and social transformation. From poetry to academic research, and from novels to testimonial writing, the books published or presented during the month paint a portrait of a nation geographically dispersed, yet determined to tell its own story.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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nickel mines in Moa. “The other mining companies working in Cuba are facing very similar problems,” he said.

The sanction came at a particularly delicate moment for Antilles Gold. Just one day before the trading halt, the company reported that construction at Nueva Sabana was moving forward and that the Chinese company Xinhai Mining Technology & Equipment was advancing the manufacture of the mine’s concentrator. Antilles Gold itself described Nueva Sabana as “the first stage of its partnership with GeoMinera,” while La Demajagua remained scheduled as a second project for 2027–2028.

The structure of the venture illustrates the extent to which the project was designed to mitigate Cuban risk. Antilles Gold participates in Minera La Victoria, a 50-50 joint venture with GeoMinera, Cuba’s state mining company. The engineering, procurement, and construction contract for Nueva Sabana, awarded to Xinhai, was valued at $29.5 million and covered about 85% of the remaining development costs. Xinhai also offered a $17.1 million credit line, deferring part of its payments.

The Nueva Sabana project was intended to produce gold and copper. Antilles Gold presented it as a relatively small open-pit mine capable of entering production quickly. According to the company’s own estimates, adjusted for recent metal prices, the two Cuban projects, Nueva Sabana and La Demajagua, could generate more than 2.5 billion Australian dollars (US$1.763 billion) in cash surplus attributable to Antilles Gold between 2027 and 2037.

In addition to Gaesa’s extensive control over mining, the shutdown is also linked to “Cuba’s economic situation, with its complete lack of electrical resources and the fuel necessary to operate mining activities”

La Demajagua, located on the Isle of Youth, added another attraction: besides gold and silver, it contains antimony, a mineral considered strategic because of its industrial and military applications. Under Antilles Gold’s plans, the second project was expected to produce gold and arsenic concentrates as well as antimony concentrates or cathodes.

For a small company dependent on external financing, Chinese contractors, and international concentrate buyers, being associated with a Cuban entity placed on Washington’s blacklist may be enough to freeze access to banks, insurers, suppliers, and potential investors.

Pitt himself links the episode to Cuba’s structural crisis. In addition to Gaesa’s overwhelming control over mining, the setback is also due to “Cuba’s economic situation, with its complete lack of electrical resources and the fuel necessary to operate mining,” the expert said.

Pitt also connects the case to Sherritt, which, besides producing nickel and cobalt, participates in Energas, a key company for natural gas processing and electricity generation. “Apparently, only oil extraction continues, and even then we are already seeing Energas and Sherritt beginning to have problems delivering natural gas to the city,” he warned.

“It remains to be seen whether Antilles Gold will follow a path similar to Sherritt’s or whether, given that it does not have a major investment at stake, it will simply let events run their course without doing anything further,” Pitt concluded.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The reappearance came two days after the United States imposed new sanctions on Díaz-Canel, his wife Lis Cuesta, several members of the Castro family circle, and regime entities, including the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. Washington had already intensified its offensive in May against Cuba’s economic and military apparatus, particularly against Gaesa, the military-controlled conglomerate.

In that context, Díaz-Canel devoted a substantial portion of his speech to defending Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. “The attack on Gaesa is no coincidence; it is not just another media campaign,” he said. According to the ruler, the United States is targeting the business system “because it knows of its effectiveness in the face of the permanent economic siege” and because “the contributions of its companies to the country’s socioeconomic development are significant.” He also denied the existence of corruption or enrichment within the military elite, dismissing such accusations as “another great lie,” despite numerous indications regarding Gaesa’s opaque management of billions of dollars in funds.

What he did not mention, however, is that those “infiltrators” were Cubans residing in the United States and that the episode remains shrouded in considerable opacity

“The reaction of several companies leaving Cuba these days is the result of coercive measures by the U.S. government,” Díaz-Canel said. He did not name any hotel chain or company specifically, but framed those departures as part of a broader offensive that, according to him, seeks to cut off fuel, investment, credit, trade, food, medicine, and basic supplies.

The speech also revived a military tone. Before Raúl, Interior Ministry commanders, and Armed Forces chiefs, Díaz-Canel recalled the 32 Cubans “who fell in Venezuela on January 3.” According to his account, those men “went into combat” despite the “element of surprise” and the enemy’s “superiority in weapons and forces.” Their deaths, he said, left “a clear message of how millions of Cubans would act in defense of the homeland if it were attacked.”

He then referred to another episode presented by the Government as evidence of armed infiltration. Five Border Guard Troops members, he said, neutralized a group of ten men who intended to establish themselves in Cuban territory with “a considerable cache of military weapons.” “Five defeated ten!” he exclaimed, before highlighting that the commander of the vessel, though seriously wounded, “never abandoned his mission.” What he failed to mention, however, is that those “infiltrators” were Cubans living in the United States and that the incident remains surrounded by significant unanswered questions.

The closing remarks took the ceremony to Guantánamo. Díaz-Canel invoked Operation Patty, an alleged 1961 CIA plot to assassinate Raúl Castro in Santiago de Cuba and stage an attack against the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo in order to justify military intervention. According to Díaz-Canel, the newly created Ministry of the Interior dismantled the operation through a counterplan called Candela, which “preserved Raúl’s life and publicly exposed” Washington.

The reference is directly linked to a recent event. On May 29, the commander of the U.S. Southern Command, General Francis Donovan, met at the perimeter of the Guantánamo Naval Base with General Roberto Legrá Sotolongo, chief of the General Staff and first deputy minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. According to reports, both sides discussed operational security matters and agreed to maintain communication channels.

Díaz-Canel thus linked past and present in a tense speech marked by nervous gestures. Operation Candela, the Guantánamo enclave, the 32 deaths in Venezuela, the intercepted boat, the sanctions, the departure of companies, and fuel shortages were all woven into a single narrative of a besieged nation.

“If the homeland is attacked, we will respond in legitimate self-defense,” he warned. “And if they attempt to enter, let there be no doubt: there will be determined and resolute combat!”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Uribe’s defense was led by attorney Jaime Granados, who is also the lawyer for the former president in his judicial cases. He said on several occasions that there were false witnesses and even media manipulation in the trial.

“Judicial decisions must be respected and complied with. However, through the legal mechanisms enshrined in the legal system, we will continue to defend the innocence of Santiago, because the 16 years of knowledge of this case allow us to warn that he is being unjustly condemned,” Granados stated.

Allí added that he and his team will study “the full content of the decision and the votes,” after which they will announce “more details.”

Former President Uribe, meanwhile, has been denounced for his alleged links with the paramilitaries in his years as governor of Antioquia

Former President Uribe, meanwhile, has been denounced for his alleged ties with the paramilitaries in his years as governor of Antioquia (1995-1997), including one that indirectly links him to the massacre at El Aro, in which 17 farmers were killed in October 1997.

Commenting on the events, Colombian president Gustavo Petro assured that Colombia must “free itself from the paramilitary governance left in the northern region of Antioquia” by the group of The Twelve Apostles.

“I want to turn that page and ensure the creation of a national agreement so that this era does not repeat itself. Differences between Colombians are not resolved by weeding out the other, but by building a safe and permanent path of coexistence. The methods of Santiago Uribe Vélez must not be repeated again in Colombia,” added Petro.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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the situation on the Island is of particular interest to him and stressed that his goal was to avoid chaos.

“Clearly, there are individuals within the power structure who understand that what they have is not sustainable and that it must be rebuilt. But they have no power. And if they do have it, they do not know how to do it,” he insisted.

Rubio again criticized the Government by referring to the military conglomerate Gaesa, saying that he would not “allow them to benefit from the game they have been playing, in which they steal money from the Cuban people for the benefit of that conglomerate at the expense of the people of Cuba.” He nevertheless emphasized a negotiated path.

“I think we want to look at models like the Czech Republic or Poland, how they made the transition. And one of the things they did was preserve some institutions in their society to provide stability and longevity to the project,” he explained. His remarks continued the message he delivered the previous day when, while discussing the Island’s precarious situation and its affinity with states supposedly hostile to the United States, such as China and Russia, he argued that change required a new system, inseparable from new leadership.

“They need serious systemic reform,” he said before asking and answering whether the country could take care of itself. “I think the answer is yes, they can, but I do not believe this system is capable of reforming itself unless new people take control or a new mindset is imposed,” he emphasized.

“We have spoken with them, we have offered them what I believe needs to happen for their economy to recover,” he said, without providing further details.

In recent months, the international press has cited as part of the negotiations Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, the grandson of the former president and who is known as El Cangrejo [The Crab], reportedly having spoken directly with Rubio. Another name mentioned has been Alejandro Castro Espín.

Venezuela also came up during the hearing when Rubio was asked about possible elections in the South American country, precisely five months after the capture of Nicolás Maduro.

“We would like to see them as soon as possible, but remember that only five months have passed: not five years, not 50 months,” he said regarding elections in Venezuela.

“We would like to see them as soon as possible, but remember that only five months have passed: not five years, not 50 months. Five months is not a long time for a country that has gone through what that country has gone through, but clearly we need a new electoral commission,” he declared.

Salazar, speaking after the hearing, suggested that elections in Venezuela could be held in 2027, although she said that 2028 would also be acceptable if that ensured the proper conditions for legitimate elections.

“I am betting on elections being held in 2027, but if it is in 2028, that is fine. These are processes that need to be properly established so that the results are good,” she maintained.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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available to hear the condemned men’s final confessions before they faced the firing squad. While Fidel estimated that fewer than 450 men would be executed, his younger brother boasted that “a thousand might die.”

The scene at Santiago’s firing range reads like a preview of the country that was to come. A trench twelve meters long, three meters wide, and three meters deep; prisoners transferred before dawn from Boniato prison; confessions heard by six priests; condemned men with their hands tied; and bodies falling into the pit. One rebel murmured: “Let it end quickly. I have pain in my soul.” By noon, according to the account, 70 prisoners had died.

In that architecture of terror, Raúl Castro does not appear as an improviser, but as an enforcer. Fidel justified the repression with fiery speeches and appeals to the suffering of Batista’s victims. Raúl, by contrast, embodied the administrative side of violence: organizing, commanding, carrying out, and sustaining the mechanism. That difference would define much of his later career within the regime. Fidel needed to present violence as exceptional justice. Raúl seemed comfortable with violence as a method of power.

“Let it end quickly. I have pain in my soul”

Time’s account does not absolve Batista. It describes with stark detail the corruption, torture, and police sadism of his regime. But that is precisely what makes the reading more disturbing. The magazine acknowledges the previous horrors and yet warns that the new government was nullifying the Constitution, holding summary trials, and turning revenge into a public spectacle. The dilemma was not whether Batista had been brutal, but whether the Revolution was prepared to establish the rule of law or a new dictatorship of terror.

Raúl Castro is placed firmly on that second path. Before becoming Minister of the Armed Forces, before formally inheriting power, before becoming the face of Castroist continuity, he was already there: in Santiago, beside the mass graves, in command of the rifles. The image contradicts the later narrative that sought to portray him as a pragmatic administrator, less charismatic but more rational than Fidel.

What Time saw in 1959 was something else: the birth of a political culture in which obedience was imposed at gunpoint and the law could be suspended “in the name of the people.” Raúl Castro was not merely an observer of that drift. He was one of its first visible enforcers, and the magazine portrayed him even then as a man who took pleasure in pulling the trigger and filling graves with corpses.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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but also the concerns of people like himself who do business. The more they earn, the more everything around them becomes more expensive. “And there are also the hard-currency stores, where shopping becomes more expensive too,” he adds.

Prices have risen significantly, and people are noticing. “The imported garlic bulbs that I bought a few weeks ago for 50 pesos are now 150. Cristal beer already costs 400 pesos in the neighborhood’s private markets, and all imported products are going up,” María told this newspaper.

In December 2025, the Government launched a floating exchange rate in an attempt to compete with the informal market rate, which had become the real benchmark among the population. After years of open warfare with El Toque for publishing an exchange rate far higher than the State’s, the official buying and selling price was set at 410 pesos per dollar—in addition to the other existing rates of 24 for state enterprises, and 120 for entities capable of generating foreign currency. Besides being an attempt to recapture the lost foreign-exchange market, the regime was also trying to contain inflation, which continues to climb, although less dramatically than in 2023 and 2024, not because of economic improvement, but because of generalized poverty.

The official exchange rate stands this Wednesday at 524 pesos per dollar. “Nobody sells to the State,” Roberto insists. “It’s like stealing from yourself,” he says mischievously. María agrees. “The other day I overheard an argument about that between a neighbor and a cousin who had just arrived from Europe and made the mistake of exchanging a few hundred dollars at the Havana airport when he landed. ‘Boy, you don’t do that, you lost out every way possible,’ the one who lives here in our building told him,” she recalls. “Any vendor at the farmers’ market will give you more pesos for that amount of dollars. Here people will come looking for you, carry your bags, and even shine your shoes if it means you’ll sell them your dollars,” she adds.

Private business owners sometimes use that trick to justify only a tiny portion of all the dollars they handle

Although it is not always easy. “You have to go to several places looking for someone who will pay a better price. Some small and medium-sized businesses want to take them 30 or 40 pesos below the El Toque rate, so you go from one business to another until you find a better deal,” Roberto explains.

“There’s a self-employed businessman here who buys dollars and always posts ‘five pesos below El Toque‘, so it’s still above the State’s rate. Serious guy, money neatly bundled in groups of 1,000 pesos, and a trusted clientele. No lines, and you don’t even have to show your ID card. So who would go to the State with that other offer?” the reseller argues.

For Laritza, some people do, but they are the minority. “The naïve, the newly arrived, or people who need a record of the transaction. Private business owners sometimes use that trick to justify only a tiny portion of all the dollars they handle. That way they have a receipt to show inspectors to justify purchases of certain goods in dollar stores,” she says.

The retiree, who resells to a “mule” who brings merchandise from Panama, speaks about the mixed blessings of these increases in the value of foreign currency. “She’s always chasing us around asking whether we have a Cabezón (the 100-dollar bill with Benjamin Franklin’s face on it). She’s told us she has had to raise the prices of all the products in her little shop because, with the current dollar exchange rate, the merchandise she brings in has become more expensive. As an added advantage—and we don’t know how she does it—she always pays in cash and with large bills, but other informal currency traders are having a very hard time obtaining enough cash to give their customers,” she notes.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Lidio Ramón Pérez thermoelectric plant in Felton, Holguín; major hydraulic projects such as the East-West and North-South water transfer systems; as well as polyclinics, family doctor offices, and schools.

The statement attempts to strongly counter accusations of opacity surrounding the company, though it falls short by merely asserting that its activities have been “systematically reported to the leadership of the Party, the State, and the Government” and have been subject to maximum oversight and auditing by authorities. However, Gaesa does not even publish a basic annual activity or financial report, as would be expected from a company seeking to rebut allegations of “opacity” or “secrecy,” both terms explicitly mentioned in the text.

The statement suggests that information is withheld in order to avoid what the regime has often described as persecution. “Thousands of men and women, over the last 30 years, have been discreet guardians of the country’s resources and deserve recognition. Although their work has not been told often enough, it speaks for itself and rises above the state-sponsored slander orchestrated from Washington,” the text adds.

The defense of the military conglomerate occupies the second half of the statement, while the opening paragraphs appear aimed more directly at Miami than Washington. The White House is not spared criticism, however, being accused of “acting with deliberate intent” to destroy the Revolution, including its historical and current leaders, and thereby confuse both domestic and international public opinion. But the true architects of this strategy, the statement claims, are “ideologues of the Cuban-American far right, who pride themselves on being creative and unpredictable.”

But the true architects of this strategy, the statement claims, are “ideologues of the Cuban-American far right, who pride themselves on being creative and unpredictable

The statement says that the May 1 executive order, which opens the door to sanctions against foreign companies cooperating with Gaesa, “constitutes the most intense, disproportionate, and dangerous escalation in the recent history of relations” between the two countries, because it seeks to “isolate the country diplomatically, commercially, financially, and energetically; undermine the nation’s sustainability; condition dialogue; and evaluate options for military aggression.”

Since the announcement of the measure, several international companies have severed ties with the military corporation in sectors ranging from logistics to tourism. This comes in addition to earlier actions, such as pressure to end Cuba’s international medical missions and restrictions on oil shipments, under which only two fuel tankers have arrived in Cuba so far this year: one from Mexico in early January and another from Russia in March, after the new order had already been issued.

“The GAE”—as the statement refers to the company, omitting the final initials corresponding to “Corporation” (Sociedad Anónima)—“is not the product of secrecy, nor of elites, much less a vehicle for the enrichment of a few,” the document states. In recent weeks, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has estimated Gaesa’s reserves at $18 billion, based on financial information published by the Miami Herald in August 2025. However, The Economist argued last March that the military conglomerate is on the verge of bankruptcy precisely because of its excessive investments in tourism. “Before the United States tightened restrictions, Gaesa barely had one billion dollars in reserves,” the publication said.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

been living in the country illegally for many years, since it applies to those who applied for asylum between June 1, 2014, and May 7, 2026. The DGME will verify on its own that the application was filed and that applicants do not hold any other valid immigration status or have any regularization process other than an asylum claim.

The category will authorize residence in Costa Rica for a period of two years, renewable indefinitely for additional periods of the same length. “However, before the document is renewed, the foreign national’s migration movements will be verified in accordance with Article 36 of the General Migration and Immigration Law,” the resolution states.

Beneficiaries of the measure will be able to enter and leave Costa Rica subject to the usual controls. However, if irregular travel movements are detected, the individual must provide documents and evidence explaining “the reasons why such movement does not appear in the records. If the reasons are not justified, renewal will not be authorized.”

The DGME also warned that this status may be revoked if it is determined that the person poses a threat to public security or fails to meet the requirements for renewal. It will also be lost if the individual has been convicted of a crime within the previous ten years.

Estimates by the Costa Rican press place the number of Cubans residing in the country at between 10,000 and 15,000

The resolution also establishes that anyone who fails to renew the document within three months after its expiration will automatically lose the immigration benefit without further proceedings.

Costa Rica has traditionally served as a transit country for Cubans traveling from South America to the United States. However, thousands have settled in the country, one of the most politically and economically stable in the region, with high levels of security and quality of life. Estimates by the Costa Rican press suggest that between 10,000 and 15,000 Cubans currently reside there.

The DGME reports approximately 7,300 pending asylum applications from Cubans, making them the second- or third-largest nationality group seeking asylum, behind Nicaraguans—whose pending applications numbered around 190,000 in the summer of 2025—and, at times, Venezuelans.

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.