Category: Translator: Regina Anavy

situation.

Solidaridad Sin Fronteras is a nonprofit organization founded in Florida in 2004. Its regular activities have focused on training, certification, and workforce reintegration of healthcare professionals who have arrived in the United States, as well as aid campaigns and advocacy for Cuban doctors who left official overseas missions in third countries.

Cruz Verde would be responsible for the logistics of medicines and first-aid supplies. Taimy Alfonso told El Nuevo Herald that the organization has spent years sending healthcare products to the Island, some donated by U.S. pharmaceutical companies, but that its network has lost capacity because volunteers have been targeted by State Security. The organization describes itself as a humanitarian entity founded by medical professionals in 2013 and dedicated to providing healthcare assistance in vulnerable communities.

The most tangible business support comes from La Colonia Medical Center, directed by Cuban physician Jorge Acevedo. The company operates 12 healthcare centers in Miami-Dade and Broward counties, from Pompano Beach to Homestead, and provides primary care, diagnostic services, pharmacy services, medical specialties, and patient transportation. La Colonia therefore has clinics, healthcare personnel, and experience managing medical services.

The company operates 12 healthcare centers in Miami-Dade and Broward counties, from Pompano Beach to Homestead, and provides primary care, diagnostic services, pharmacy services, medical specialties, and patient transportation

Miami Medical Team Foundation, led by orthopedic surgeon Manuel Alzugaray, has also joined the effort. The organization, registered in Florida since 1989, has participated for decades in medical and humanitarian missions throughout Latin America and other countries affected by disasters or crises.

Alfonso suggested that a potential emergency operation could include field hospitals and U.S. hospital ships such as the USNSComfort, on which he worked after the 2010 Haiti earthquake.

“These ships have burn units and facilities for patients with respiratory conditions, as well as ambulances and helicopters,” he explained.

The second phase of the project calls for evaluating healthcare facilities, rebuilding hospitals, and establishing a private healthcare system for those who can afford it, alongside care subsidized by a future government for vulnerable sectors of the population.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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released a few hours later.

The release comes after an intense international campaign on behalf of the teenager, whose health and safety had generated concern

The teenager, who was then 16 years old, was later transferred to Canaleta, an adult prison in Ciego de Ávila, where he remained in pretrial detention. He was being prosecuted for sabotage, a criminal offense that can carry lengthy prison sentences.

The release comes after an intense international campaign in favor of the teenager, whose health and safety had raised concerns among family members, human rights organizations, and foreign officials. Amnesty International called for his immediate release in May and denounced the fact that he was being held with adults.

The organization recalled that the deprivation of liberty of minors should be used only as a last resort and for the shortest possible period. It also demanded that, while he remained detained, Jonathan be protected from violence, receive medical care, and have regular access to his family and a lawyer of his choice.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights granted precautionary measures in favor of the teenager on April 24, considering that his life, personal integrity, and health were at risk of suffering irreparable harm while in the custody of the Cuban State.

Jonathan was not the only minor detained after the protests in Morón

The family repeatedly reported that Jonathan suffered from dermatological and immunological problems, as well as episodes of weakness that required treatment. After a visit in May, his father said he found him very weak, without the necessary medication, and deeply affected by confinement.

Prisoners Defenders later reported that Muir Burgos slept on mattresses infested with bedbugs, suffered from hypoglycemia, and did not receive adequate medical care. The organization also stated that the minor had been assaulted and harassed inside the prison.

Jonathan turned 17 on May 28 at Canaleta. In the weeks before his release, his case received renewed attention from the United States. The U.S. Embassy in Havana noted on June 16 that the young man had been imprisoned for three months, while Cuban-American Congressman Mario Díaz-Balart demanded his immediate release this Wednesday.

Jonathan was not the only minor detained after the protests in Morón. The imprisonment at Canaleta of 16-year-old Christian de Jesús Crespo Álvarez, also accused of sabotage, has likewise been documented. Human rights organizations maintain that both youths were prosecuted without the special safeguards required for minors. Muir Burgos’s release brings an end, for now, to his stay in an adult prison, but it does not remove the uncertainty surrounding his legal future.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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the most recent one. “If you support foreign investment, it makes no sense not to support investment by your own nationals in any of its forms.”

“If you support foreign investment, it makes no sense not to support investment by your own nationals in any of its forms”

Díaz-Canel also raised a fundamental issue. The approved measures may run into limitations imposed by the United States, a point also highlighted by independent economist Pavel Vidal in his latest analysis for the Observatory of Currencies and Finance (OMFi). “The second executive order of May 1 restricts companies from trading with Cuba or doing business with Cuba. And that part is never discussed,” he pointed out.

Cavada further pursued the issue of Washington and reminded the president that only days ago Donald Trump’s vice president, JD Vance, indicated that there were conversations with the Cuban regime. “If they make smart decisions, we’ll have a much better relationship,” Vance said. Díaz-Canel cast doubt on the possibility of improved understanding because, in his view, “they will never understand what we do nor accept what we do because what they aspire to is a different Cuba. They aspire to a Cuba that is completely dependent on the U.S. and completely privatized.”

Nevertheless, he again acknowledged that conversations are taking place and that a communication channel remains open, without providing new details, but he insisted that there can be no pressure and that if Cuba yielded to it, the demands would never end. “There is room for U.S. entities and entrepreneurs to invest. There is every possibility of working together on issues of common interest in terms of cooperation,” he said.

Díaz-Canel did not appear to view an invasion as the most likely scenario, but he admitted it was entirely possible and cited two recent precedents, close both in time and political distance: Venezuela, where the United States interrupted talks in an attempt to capture Nicolás Maduro, and Iran, where negotiations were halted by a bombing campaign. “There is a whole combination of media warfare and psychological warfare aimed at intimidating us,” he argued, adding that Cuba is preparing not to attack, he emphasized, but to defend itself. He also left a message: his rhetoric is not threatening but intended “to ensure we are respected and that they understand the cost of a military adventure.”

Another large portion of the interview focused on the daily drama of the energy crisis. Díaz-Canel tried to dispel what he called the “myth” of subsidies. “They have said that we refused to pay for fuel and that we went around begging for fuel. That is not true,” he began, explaining the barter mechanisms Cuba used with the Soviet Union—sugar in exchange for fuel—and with Venezuela, through medical services. Later, because of sanctions on Caracas, Cuba had to “go out into the international market.”

“And nobody gave us fuel for free,” he repeated three times. Now, he complained, those who used to sell fuel to Cuba are prohibited from doing so. He added that there have even been ships headed to Cuba that were prevented from arriving.

Even so, he defended his administration’s work on renewable energy. “If that were not in place, we would be living from one blackout to another because the system would be completely unstable, and during daylight hours it would not be capable of supplying electricity to even 20% of the population,” he argued. This despite the fact that solar parks remain underutilized, largely because the thermoelectric plants are so fragile that photovoltaic output must be restricted to avoid destabilizing the grid, as Cuban authorities themselves have explained.

Particularly striking was his reference to withholding data on domestic oil production, framing it almost as a matter of national security. “I’m not going to give figures because I don’t want anyone calculating our needs or determining how far we can or cannot go. But it is crude that is being produced. It has always been said that it is heavy crude with a high sulfur content, but during the Special Period our thermoelectric plants were adapted to process it,” he said when asked about production levels.

Díaz-Canel admitted that the companies working to drill wells and increase crude oil and natural gas production have had to leave because of sanctions, referring to the Canadian company Sherritt and the Australian company Melbana

He also insisted that scientific advances have made it possible to refine Cuba’s extra-heavy crude and that it is being used, although production volumes remain limited. Regarding fuel imported by private actors, he said that no more than 40,000 tons have entered through that route, equivalent to “one ship out of the many ships Cuba needs in a single month.”

Another reference to the U.S. arose in the context of humanitarian aid. Here the president did provide some concrete figures, stating that of the initial $3 million announced by Marco Rubio after Hurricane Melissa and distributed through Caritas, between $2.6 million and $2.8 million has been spent so far, reaching about 8,000 families. “Then they announced an additional $6 million in aid that is only now beginning to be implemented,” he added.

As for the subsequent $100 million package, Díaz-Canel questioned the State Department’s plan to begin distributing it after September. “Why? We don’t know,” he said. He also noted that food and medicine would not be included. “Then what is the aid for? We’ll have to see, because they haven’t defined it, they haven’t clearly said what it’s for,” he protested, while also insisting that the cooperation is appreciated and accepted, though he still described it as “hypocritical.”

“It means nothing compared to the damage the embargo has caused Cuba,” he reproached.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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In contrast, all officials subordinate to the Foreign Ministry joined the narrative. “The anti-Cuban mafia has assigned him the task of executioner of the Cuban people. The Secretary of State is anxious because he has failed to achieve the surrender he promised. That is how political corruption works in the U.S., with not the slightest respect for the human condition,” said Carlos Fernández de Cossío. Embassies and their chiefs also posted messages condemning the decision and attacking Rubio, whom they regard as the spokesman and executor of pressure from the exile community in Miami.

Among the most visible Foreign Ministry figures, only Deputy Foreign Minister Josefina Vidal, who is beginning to be mentioned in some circles as the possible Cuban counterpart to Delcy Rodríguez sought by Washington under the model applied in Venezuela, remained on the sidelines and shared on social media the interview she granted to the Mexican newspaper La Jornada, in which she discussed talks with the U.S., without specifying who the interlocutors are on either side. “There is a channel, there have been meetings, there have been exchanges, but there has not been significant progress,” she said. In that conversation, the diplomat mentioned a dynamic that summarized exactly what was about to happen. “There have been occasions when we sit down to talk and, a few days later, a new sanction arrives.”

A few hours later, new measures indeed arrived, affecting financial, logistics, mining and steel companies, and threatening third parties that maintain relations with them. One of the most notable cases is the International Financial Bank (BFI), used, among other things, to channel payments for the Cuban doctors that the regime still exports, mainly to Mexico, Calabria (Italy), and somePersian Gulf countries. Several Cuban economic analysts have offered their views on the latest measures.

Several Cuban economic analysts have offered their views on the latest measures

Ricardo Herrero, executive director of the Cuba Study Group, noted that “the domino game is blocked” in reference to the talks between Havana and Washington and that the only thing that can break the deadlock is “sufficient political concessions that Trump and Rubio can sell as a victory in Florida.” The expert, known for his opposition to the embargo and sanctions, makes clear that Trump will decide what is sufficient, but he believes Rubio is advocating for a “social explosion that changes the calculation in Washington in favor of military intervention,” because so far the regime has not moved enough. “Meanwhile, repression, control, and sanctions continue using the Cuban people as cannon fodder. And their suffering continues without end,” he argued.

For his part, Cuban-American historian Michael Bustamante considered that the measures announced yesterday represent a rebuff to Havana’s economic proposals but, although he supports the end of GAESA, the regime’s military conglomerate, he doubts they will be useful because they are discouraging any exit strategy. He does, however, see two possibilities: that the intention is to provoke “impoverishment in order to trigger a social explosion and a military operation,” or alternatively “to devalue the assets of the Cuban state to such an extent that Havana agrees to dismantle GAESA and sell off parts of it for next to nothing to U.S. bidders, ironically something that the new reforms announced last week could facilitate.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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than he is.

State television announced on Monday that “in fulfillment of Valdés’s final wish, to rest alongside his comrades in struggle and near the Heroic Guerrilla Fighter (Ernesto Che Guevara),” his remains “will be interred on the morning of Thursday, June 25, in a ceremony with military honors at the Mausoleum of the Las Villas Front, in the city of Santa Clara.” At the same time, tribute ceremonies will be held in all provincial capitals and in the special municipality of Isla de la Juventud.

State television announced on Monday that “in fulfillment of Valdés’s final wish, to rest alongside his comrades in struggle and near the Heroic Guerrilla Fighter”

State media have lavishly praised Valdés and the missions he carried out, including “the search, location, exhumation, and transfer to Cuba of the remains of Ernesto Che Guevara and his fellow guerrillas from Bolivia.” However, the claim that the Santa Clara mausoleum houses the Argentine guerrilla’s bones has been challenged on numerous occasions, to the point that physician Moisés Abraham Baptista, who performed his autopsy, once challenged the Cuban regime to conduct a DNA test on the remains to prove their authenticity.

Numerous accounts in books and journalistic articles maintain that Guevara was secretly cremated by the Bolivian army and that his ashes were scattered in the jungle precisely to prevent his grave from becoming a site of ideological pilgrimage. Castroism, however, succeeded in creating an alternative narrative and, consequently, the symbolic site that the mausoleum has become today. There, Valdés will rest beside, if anything, Guevara’s hands, the only remains that could have been taken to Cuba according to the account of Cuban-American Félix Rodríguez, the CIA agent who directed the operation in Bolivia.

Valdés’s death further reduces the small group of historic leaders who still maintain a public or institutional presence, among them Raúl Castro, José Ramón Machado Ventura, Guillermo García Frías, and Ramón Pardo Guerra. The rest of the members of the regime’s original leadership have either died or disappeared from political life.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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easier for the case to return to lower courts so that the substantive issues can be examined.

The ruling was one of the most anticipated following the other major case of this kind, resolved last May, when the same court sided with Havana Docks Corporation in its claim against Royal Caribbean Cruises, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises. The four companies had been ordered in 2022 to pay more than $400 million for profiting from properties confiscated in the 1960s, but an appeals court also blocked that judgment on technical grounds. In that case, the judges held that Havana Docks Corporation’s rights—since it was a lessee rather than the owner of the docks—had expired before the four cruise companies began using them.

The Supreme Court overturned that ruling a month ago, sending the case back to the lower courts for a final decision.

Exxon’s appeal had the support of the Trump administration, and this was reflected in the votes of the justices, as the six conservative members backed the American company. The decision, set out in a 35-page opinion, states that foreign governments, including their companies, enjoy a presumption of immunity from lawsuits in U.S. courts except under certain exceptions. However, in the case of the Helms-Burton Act, that immunity does not apply nor are plaintiffs required to prove that they meet the criteria for an exemption.

Several companies have filed lawsuits under the Helms-Burton Act against other businesses that have profited from confiscated properties, in addition to the cruise lines already mentioned. Among them are Expedia and Airbnb.

But the Supreme Court’s decision has broader implications because it opens the way to suing the Cuban state directly by holding that it cannot invoke sovereign immunity. In practice, this creates the possibility of recovering money—if the courts ultimately rule in favor of the claimant—by seizing assets abroad.

Even so, collecting any judgment will remain difficult, as demonstrated by a very different case: compensation for the prison killing of Rafael del Pino. Twenty-eight years ago, U.S. courts ruled that the Cuban state was responsible for paying damages for the death of the former pilot—and former friend of Fidel Castro—who was also a U.S. citizen and died in one of Cuba’s prisons. However, there are not enough attachable assets in the United States to satisfy the judgment, so his heirs have sought alternative avenues, including in Spain, where they have encountered bureaucratic obstacles for years.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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in private small and medium-sized businesses (mipymes) for 1,600 pesos and reaches 1,850 pesos at the Correo de Pueblo Nuevo market fair in Holguín, and 1,900 pesos at the Delio Luna Echemendía fairgrounds in Sancti Spíritus, nearly double the former maximum.

A kilogram of powdered milk costs 3,200 pesos in the mipymes and reaches 3,700 pesos at the Holguín fair, more than double the limit established in 2024. A pound of chicken, meanwhile, sells for 550 pesos in that same market and for 650 pesos at the Sancti Spíritus fairgrounds. Converted to kilograms, those prices are approximately 1,213 and 1,433 pesos, respectively, far above the 680 pesos authorized until this Saturday.

The failure of the price-cap policy was acknowledged this week by Díaz-Canel during the closing session of the Extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. “Price caps, in practice, failed to contain inflation,” the ruler admitted. According to his assessment, those measures “often caused products to disappear, encouraged diversion into illegality, led to higher prices, reduced tax revenues, and created an impossible race between real prices and administrative decisions that always arrived too late.”

Díaz-Canel also acknowledged that the limits remained “unchanged despite a changing economic reality” and that they hindered those trying to carry out economic activity legally. “Therefore, we are not going to continue imposing general price caps, as the prime minister explained,” he concluded.

Many economists had been calling for years for the end of price caps, which were incapable of containing inflation and were often responsible for emptying markets

The president added that the Government must correct “distortions in the tax system” that make production chains more expensive and ultimately get passed on to final prices. He also linked the abandonment of price caps to the announced transition from subsidizing products to subsidizing people, a long-standing promise of the government that has still not been broadly implemented.

The text of the Gazette stipulates that imports of cut chicken, edible oils—except olive oil—powdered milk, pasta, and sausages are exempt from customs duties, in accordance with the tariff subcategories included in the annex.

In the case of chicken, the exemption covers frozen chicken pieces and offal. For oils, the regulation lists soybean, palm, sunflower, safflower, and cottonseed oils. The list also includes different types of powdered milk and cream, pasta products, and various meat preparations.

One of the notable changes is the exclusion of powdered detergent. This product had been part of the package of six goods benefiting from the exemption in 2024, but it does not appear among the imports exempted by Resolution 150. The preamble itself specifies that the previous exemption remains in effect, “except for powdered detergent.”

Many economists had been calling for years for the end of price caps, which were incapable of containing inflation and were often responsible for emptying markets. But lifting them in the midst of the current crisis, without a recovery in supply, real wages, or the value of the peso, has fueled fears among many Cubans that prices could soar to levels that are difficult to imagine today.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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a public or institutional presence is reduced even further, including Raúl Castro, José Ramón Machado Ventura, Guillermo García Frías, and Ramón Pardo Guerra. The rest of that first leadership circle has either died or disappeared from political life.

His supporters affectionately called him Ramirito, just as some referred to Machado Ventura as Machadito. When he headed the Ministry of Information Technology and Communications, he was credited with the phrase, “We must tame the wild colt of the internet.” He also described himself as a “Cerberus of the Revolution,” an expression that summarized the role of ideological watchdog that he played for decades.

In recent months, Valdés had disappeared from public view. His absence was especially noticeable during the funeral ceremonies for the 32 Cuban military personnel who died in Venezuela on January 3. At those ceremonies, the regime deliberately displayed almost all of its historic leadership. Valdés, however, was absent from the reception of the remains at José Martí International Airport, did not appear in the honor guard at the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and also failed to attend the burial ceremonies and events related to the national tribute.

Nor did he participate in the Council of Ministers meetings held between October and December 2025, according to official broadcasts, in which his seat remained empty. One of his last verifiable public appearances took place on October 3, 2025, during the ceremony commemorating the 60th anniversary of the first Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. A month earlier, he had been seen at the inauguration of a solar park in Sancti Spíritus.

From then on, the silence was almost total. He also missed the December session of the National Assembly, a forum traditionally attended by the historic figures of Castroism. His absence was equally striking on June 5 during the ceremony marking the 65th anniversary of the Ministry of the Interior, the institution he founded and first led.

That void fueled persistent rumors about his health. Some versions spoke of a prolonged hospitalization and severe physical deterioration. As is customary in Cuba, official secrecy replaced public information. Valdés’s death confirms that those absences were not accidental but rather the prelude to an ending managed in silence.

Valdés was born on April 28, 1932, in the Artemisa neighborhood of La Matilde, from which a significant number of the young people who participated in the assault on the Moncada Barracks emerged, despite it being located on the opposite end of the country. His mother had sworn that none of her five children would become a stepping stone for any politician, but she could not prevent the second-youngest son from serving as a rung in elevating Fidel Castro’s figure.

Valdés was, according to multiple consistent testimonies, an enforcer convinced that terror was an effective instrument for maintaining power

Coming from a very poor family, with little education and no established trade, he decided to follow Castro to Moncada, prison, exile, and later the Granma yacht. In the Sierra Maestra he became one of Guevara’s trusted men and ended the war as second-in-command of the invading column led by the Argentine revolutionary.

After 1959, he occupied decisive positions in the architecture of control of the new State. He served twice as Minister of the Interior and, from those posts, directed the apparatus responsible for State Security, intelligence, the police, and the prison system.

Under his authority, practices documented for decades by human rights organizations, former political prisoners, and former regime officials became entrenched: arbitrary detentions, violent interrogations, summary trials, prolonged imprisonment for ideological reasons, and a prison system designed as a tool of intimidation.

Valdés was, according to multiple consistent testimonies, an enforcer convinced that terror was an effective instrument for maintaining power. During his first period at the head of the Ministry of the Interior, the State Security organs that would pursue opponents, dissidents, religious believers, intellectuals, and former revolutionaries opposed to Fidel Castro were organized and structured.

In interviews and public statements given at different points in his life, Valdés defended methods of violent struggle. In testimony collected by pro-government journalists, he boasted of having participated in the placement of explosive devices in public spaces during the insurgent period and presented those actions as heroic and necessary. He never expressed regret. On the contrary, he defended violence as a political and moral principle.

His career was marked by at least two moments when he was removed from power. The first occurred in July 1968, when he was removed from the Ministry of the Interior amid internal adjustments within the security apparatus. After several years away from the political forefront, he returned to important positions during the following decade.

The second documented removal occurred in December 1985, when he was again dismissed as Minister of the Interior without any public explanation. Although he lost positions and was assigned other responsibilities, he never suffered a definitive downfall like other historic leaders subjected to purges.

That ability to survive politically was one of the most notable traits of his career. Valdés was displaced, rehabilitated, and reassigned on several occasions, but he always retained the fundamental trust of the Castro brothers.

In 2009, he returned to the visible core of power as vice president of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. Later, he remained linked to the telecommunications, energy, and strategic investment sectors. Since the entry into force of the 2019 Constitution, he had served as Deputy Prime Minister.

The legacy of Ramiro Valdés Menéndez is another: that of a leader who decisively contributed to turning repression into State policy and fear into a form of government

On a personal level, Valdés leaves behind descendants whose circumstances illustrate one of the regime’s most persistent contradictions. Several of his children live outside the Island, established in countries where they enjoy civil liberties, mobility, and material conditions denied to most Cubans.

That reality, known and discussed for years in opposition and exile circles, contrasted sharply with the official discourse that Valdés defended until the end. While he was one of the principal architects of migration control, ideological surveillance, and punishment of dissent, part of his family chose to live outside the model he helped impose.

During the Island-wide protests of 11 July 2021 [’11J’], Valdés was involved in one of the most uncomfortable episodes of his long political career when he was booed in Palma Soriano. Amid social tensions and the deployment of repressive forces, his presence in the streets, intended by the government to project control and authority, provoked hostile reactions from citizens.

Far from being welcomed as a historic figure, some demonstrators responded with shouts, insults, and open rejection. The episode, quickly silenced by the official press, was significant not only because it reflected the loss of fear in public spaces, but also because it showed one of the regime’s most feared men confronting, face to face and without intermediaries, the popular discontent that he himself had helped suppress for decades.

Official propaganda will now seek to cement the image of an “exemplary fighter,” a man of “absolute loyalty,” and a “defender of sovereignty.” Outside that epic narrative, the legacy of Ramiro Valdés Menéndez is another: that of a leader who decisively contributed to turning repression into State policy and fear into a form of government.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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during a public health crisis.

“One out of every three institutions in Colombia entered into some type of agreement with some type of Cuban institution,” Ángel stated, describing the figure as “alarming” when compared with previous governments and after analyzing the content of the collaborations.

The researcher noted that the rapprochement between Bogotá and Havana was less visible than in other countries in the region because Colombia did not receive the usual Cuban medical missions during these four years. Nevertheless, ties developed through other programs and institutional agreements.

One of the most significant findings concerns the 2,000 yellow fever vaccines that the Cuban regime announced it would donate to Colombia during a public health crisis. The offer was publicized by the Cuban Embassy and publicly celebrated by Colombia’s then-Foreign Minister, Laura Sarabia.

However, a response from the Ministry of Health obtained by the researchers confirmed that the vaccines never arrived. The Cuban Embassy also provided no explanation when questioned by the newspaper El Espectador, according to Ángel.

For the director of the Cuba Program, the announcement allowed Havana to project an image of solidarity and create the appearance of reciprocal cooperation, even though the aid never materialized.

“What matters is not sending the vaccines, but demonstrating that they have a cooperative relationship,” Ángel said. In his view, such announcements serve to justify the subsequent transfer of Colombian resources to the Island.

The investigation also examined an alleged export of 300 tons of Colombian rice to Cuba

Colombia shipped a 100-ton cargo of humanitarian aid from Cartagena containing non-perishable food, medicines, hospital supplies, solar panels, electrical materials, and household goods. The operation was managed by the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation.

“There is no reciprocity in this type of relationship,” Ángel argued, maintaining that the Cuban regime obtains resources, diplomatic support, and political legitimacy in exchange for contributions that, in some cases, amount only to propaganda announcements.

The investigation also examined an alleged export of 300 tons of Colombian rice to Cuba. The Rural Development Agency promoted the operation on its social media accounts and presented it as a commercial opportunity for producers in the Meta department.

However, an official response indicated that the Cuban importer was never authorized, meaning the export never actually took place. Despite this, according to Ángel, the Colombian producers received the corresponding payment.

“Who paid for that rice?” the researcher asked. According to the study, the funds may have come from the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation, which is attached to the Presidency.

The publication coincides with the second round of Colombia’s presidential election taking place this Sunday

The case, he added, suggests that an operation presented as a commercial export may have ended up diverting Colombian public funds for unknown purposes, while the Cuban regime obtained propaganda benefits without bearing the cost of the purchase.

Another agreement examined involves Cuban participation in CampeSENA, a program of the National Learning Service aimed at farmers and rural workers. Ángel questioned why Cuba, a country that imports most of the food it consumes and is experiencing a severe agricultural crisis, is being presented as an “agro-industrial reference” for Colombia.

The study also identifies collaborations in education and culture, although details will be included in the third installment. The researchers state that several government agencies responded incompletely and that they had to file additional requests and legal actions to obtain the information.

Ángel argues that Petro’s government represented only the first stage of Cuba’s strategy in Colombia. According to his analysis, Havana seeks to reproduce a model of influence already implemented in Venezuela and Mexico, based on political alliances, state agreements, and economic assistance.

The publication coincides with the second round of Colombia’s presidential election taking place this Sunday. More than 41 million citizens have been called to choose Gustavo Petro’s successor between left-wing candidate Iván Cepeda, who represents continuity with the current administration, and right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella. According to the study’s authors, the outcome will also determine whether the agreements established with Havana during the past four years are maintained or reviewed.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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state planning.

Sheinbaum offered her support to Havana, although Mexico has complied with Washington’s demand not to send fuel to Cuba.

Among the proposals are the entry of private banks, direct investment in Cuban businesses by citizens living abroad, the possibility for a single owner to manage more than one company, and the elimination of the current limit of 100 employees for small and medium-sized private enterprises (mipymes).

The package also opens the door to the sale of state-owned properties to individuals and legal entities, domestic or foreign, and to the transformation of some public enterprises into commercial corporations with capital participation. However, the timelines, legal mechanisms, and specific conditions for implementing many of these measures remain unknown. Their similarity to Russia’s transition has raised concerns about a concealed appropriation of state assets by members of the current regime’s leadership.

Prime Minister Manuel Marrero stated during the extraordinary session of the National Assembly that the market will be recognized as “an instrument for the efficient allocation of resources,” an unusual formulation in official Cuban discourse. Meanwhile, Miguel Díaz-Canel made clear that the changes do not represent a break with the political model. “We are not renouncing socialism,” the ruler said before lawmakers unanimously approved the program.

While Washington received the measures with skepticism, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum praised the regime’s decision on Friday. “It is an important change in a decision that Cubans themselves are making to open their economy,” the president said during her daily press conference.

Sheinbaum particularly highlighted the possibility of attracting private capital and resources from emigrants. “They are doing it for investment, even calling on Cubans who left the Island long ago to invest in Cuba,” she noted.

The Mexican president also offered her government’s support to Mexican companies interested in participating in the opening. Her reaction maintains the line of political and economic support that Mexico has extended to Havana despite increased pressure from the United States, although it has complied with Washington’s demand not to send fuel to Cuba.

The former ambassador recalled that previous partial-opening processes ended up being halted by the official structures themselves.

A very different view was expressed by Ricardo Pascoe Pierce, who served as Mexico’s ambassador to Cuba between 2000 and 2002. The diplomat acknowledged that the measures could represent “a very radical transformation of the Cuban economy” and pave the way toward a market economy, but he doubted that the state apparatus would allow genuine competition.

“The real test is whether state enterprises will truly accept the existence of competition, a genuinely open market,” Pascoe said in an interview with W Radio.

The former ambassador recalled that previous partial liberalization processes were ultimately blocked by the official structures themselves. “The companies that have been created have always been successful, and the reaction of state enterprises is to prevent their continuation,” he explained.

Pascoe said that any real change will depend on whether Havana fulfills its promises and grants autonomy to businesses. He also questioned the possibility of attracting the necessary capital while the current political and legal system remains unchanged. “Who is going to invest under those conditions when there is no legal certainty?” he asked.

The U.S. response confirms that Havana’s economic concessions alone will not be sufficient to bring about a thaw with the Trump administration. Washington is demanding not only greater market liberalization but also political transformations that the Cuban regime has not included in its program.

For that reason, Trump recalled in an interview one day after the announcement of the reform package that he still considered “possible” a U.S. intervention in Cuba similar to the one that led to the capture, on January 3, of then-president Nicolás Maduro.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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