Cuban Faces 2025: The Students Who Rose Up Against Etecsa Were Defeated

Those outraged by Etecsa’s rate hikes, many of them “the revolutionary vanguard,” gave the regime more than one headache this year.

But this revolt came at a price: State Security soon began harassing these young people. / EFE

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, 28 December 2025– The Cuban government has managed to end 2025 without being overwhelmed by a turbulent front that took its breath away mid-year: the student movement. Governments around the world have known for at least a century that there is no group more dangerous to them than angry university students, from Soviet Prague to Mao’s Beijing, by way of Franco’s Spain and the pacifists against the Vietnam War. Those outraged by the state telecommunications monopoly Etecsa’s rate hikes — dubbed el tarifazo — many of them “the revolutionary vanguard,” gave the regime more than one headache this year when they erupted against the  steep changes in the prices for internet access.

It all began on Friday, May 30th , because the Palace of the Revolution, sometimes, doesn’t do anything without a reason. With the weekend upon us and the end of the school year fast approaching, a piece of news broke the monotonous pattern of blackouts, inflation, and migration: the state telecommunications monopoly was updating its rates, and the increase was unprecedented, multiplying some prices by as much as thirteen. In short, top-ups in national currency were limited to 360 pesos per month, and packages purchased from abroad—that is, in foreign currency—were incentivized. A 7GB package, for example, cost more than the average monthly salary.

Not even a Friday could stem the tide of a tsunami that surged from the very heart of the Revolution. The Federation of University Students (FEU) at the Faculty of Mathematics and Computing of the University of Havana took less than half a day to issue its opinion: “It is a tremendous lack of respect for the Cuban people.” They were the ones initially most affected. Their need to access the internet was not just that of ordinary users—also terribly annoyed—as a means of communication or entertainment, but also that of a student who needs to find information, research, and continue reading

practice.

“We consider Etecsa’s attitude untimely and imprudent,” the organization stated, which soon gained supporters from the fringes of the ruling party.

“We consider Etecsa’s attitude untimely and imprudent,” the organization stated, quickly gaining support not only from the fringes of the officialdom—such as Mariana Camejo, director of La Joven Cuba —but also from one of the most combative pro-Castro voices on social media, El Necio. Etecsa executives soon had to come out and justify themselves, trying to calm the waters with the golden rule: the blockade necessitates sacrifices, and if we want to modernize the network, we have to pay. The effect was precisely the opposite of what they intended. Seeing that there was no correction, the discontent began to spread like wildfire, and one after another, faculties at various universities across the country called for strikes in protest.

But opening a rift within the ruling party is no laughing matter. This outburst was followed by an internal battle between those who believed it was essential to make the state monopoly reconsider a regulation that was unfair to the population and aimed at further widening the gap between those who had access to a relative abroad willing to finance the expense, and those who thought it was essential to close ranks with the government against any “media manipulation [and] attempts to disrupt the normalcy of university life.”

While some were promoting meetings with Etecsa executives to find solutions, others were calling for a complete halt to classes until their demands were met. Things escalated to such a degree that the dreaded graffiti appeared on a wall of the University of Sancti Spíritus: “Down with the dictatorship.”

The government tried to pull out all the stops, using various programs to explain why the drastic increase in calls to order was necessary for Roberto Morales Ojeda, a member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of Organization of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. But the playbook proved ineffective in the face of each new challenge, to the point that law students from the University of Holguín—the birthplace of the Castros—filed a lawsuit against Etecsa , an unprecedented move in the country’s history. The students argued that the rate hike was “exclusionary, classist, and contrary to the law,” basing their argument on the Constitution, the Penal Code, and other norms of Cuban law. In other words: within the law. “Every jurist, whether already trained or in training, has the duty to wage battle against three giants: fear, injustice, and ignorance,” proclaimed one aspiring lawyer.

“Every lawyer, whether already trained or in training, has the duty to wage battle against three giants: fear, injustice, and ignorance,” proclaimed a budding lawyer.
The first two weeks of June were filled with university debates, both in person and online, and the students garnered support from doctors , artists, prominent professors , parish priests , and even the world-famous Spanish singer-songwriter Alejandro Sanz , who didn’t hesitate to come to the defense of the rebellious students. But this revolt came at a price: State Security soon began to harass these young people who, even while convinced that the Communist Party was the best and only possible governing body for the island, felt it was necessary to rise up against a decision they believed was wrong.

As the weeks passed, the fear of punishment, meetings with Etecsa, and a few minor concessions from the company gradually eased the discontent, which disappeared by the end of July without further consequences. Summer arrived , and the government, in the end, did not get its Vietnam.

See also: Cuban Faces 2025: The 14 Faces That Marked the Pulse of Cuba in 2025

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Old Cold War MiG-15s Fly Over Sancti Spíritus, Cuba

Militias and civilians participate in drills across the island to “increase the capacity to respond to US interference and the real possibility of an attack against the country”

Hundreds of people participated in the exercises around the island / ACN

14ymedio bigger

14ymedio, Havana, January 11, 2026 — The Cuban government, showing signs of concern over a potential military aggression, used Territorial Defense Day this Saturday to flex its muscles. In addition to the rhetoric of defending “the Homeland” disseminated across all official media outlets, several provinces staged armed response drills involving militia members and civilians, many in street clothes.

In cases like Sancti Spíritus, the exercises generated fear among the population. Residents of the province told 14ymedio that the city “woke up frightened after the gunfire and bombs that were being dropped” from early morning. Adding to the unease, Soviet MiG-15 fighter jets from the Cold War era were seen flying over the area.

Faced with the anxiety and lack of information provided by the authorities, residents began asking what was happening via Facebook. Journalist Elsa Ramos, a columnist for the newspaper Escambray and a critical voice within the government, shed some light on the situation, stating on Radio Sancti Spíritus that combat exercises were being conducted near the city.

Deivy Pérez Martin, president of the Provincial Defense Council, highlighted the importance of these exercises “to achieve the best preparation of the Production and Defense Brigades, in order to have a well-trained people to stop and defeat any attempt by the enemy to continue reading

take over the nation,” according to Sancti Spíritus’ provincial newspaper.

There was “a compendium of comprehensive actions aimed at raising the preparedness of all components of the province in the face of risk situations”

Another province that carried out these actions was Matanzas. There was “a comprehensive set of actions aimed at increasing the preparedness of all components of the province in the face of situations of risk, threat, or aggression, within the framework of the doctrine of the Guerra de Todo el Pueblo [War of the Entire People],” Girón reported, in a text accompanied by photographs showing smoke after some detonations.

The exercises included combined classes in military units and tactical maneuvers with shooting exercises and practical cases of the air defense units.

In Havana, exercises were also carried out in all 15 of the capital’s municipalities. “During the day, drills, tactical training, and logistical and civil defense support actions were conducted.” Women in civilian clothes and shoes, as well as children, participated.

These scenes were replicated in the special municipality of Isla de la Juventud. There, according to the newspaper Victoria, with triumphalist language, the people demonstrated “their high level of preparedness, patriotism, and unwavering conviction in victory against the threats of the enemy.”

The medium called for “continuing to fight for the defense of the Homeland, sovereignty, solidarity and a better future where unity, equality and social justice prevail, using as a basis the values ​​instilled by our historical leaders,” accompanied by a large number of images showing land and sea exercises.

In Villa Clara, they carried out shooting practice with different weapons, including rifles and artillery.

In Villa Clara, they conducted shooting practice with various weapons, including rifles and artillery. Additionally, the Air Defense Brigade carried out various aircraft and drone detection exercises, “as well as combat drills against them.”

“Given the interference of the United States and the real possibility of an attack against the country, it is essential to increase our response capacity.” This was the prevailing sentiment in Cienfuegos, where they conducted shooting exercises, “field movements, and the testing of transportation and communication systems.” The premise, according to 5 de Septiembre, is that “the neighborhood must be a trench protecting the gains of the Revolution.”

From Holguín, with heavy artillery included in the exercises, they trained “to face situations of risk or threat to internal security, in a scenario of unconventional warfare and enemy invasion.”

The Ciego de Ávila newspaper Invasor reported that these maneuvers were carried out to “pay tribute to the 32 Cubans who lost their lives in the line of duty in recent events” in Venezuela and in response to “the threats and pressure exerted by the United States government against Cuba and other nations in the region.” From some of the trenches, several young men took up arms and practiced shooting.

Finally, in Santiago de Cuba, invoking Fidel Castro and with the slogan that “the best way to avoid war is by preparing ourselves,” it was mostly women who carried out the exercises, which aimed to be ready “for the fulfillment of missions in times of aggression.”

These exercises took place hours before a new threat from US President Donald Trump, who on Sunday issued an explicit warning to the Castro regime: Cuba must “reach a deal” with Washington or face the definitive severing of the economic ties that have sustained the island for decades. The Republican president stated on his social media account, Truth Social, that “there will be no more oil or money for Cuba: zero!”— a direct reference to the flow of crude oil and resources that Venezuela supplied to Havana for years.

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The Presence of a US Drone Deters the Cuban Ilyushin From Landing in Venezuela

Havana keeps this aircraft’s flights secret, using it for special missions.

The Cubana de Aviación IL-96-300 aircraft with registration number CU-T1250, in a file photo. / Flightaware/Gerry Barron

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, 8 January 2025 — The Ilyushin Il-96-300 with registration number CU-T1250, Cubana de Aviación’s only long-haul four-engine aircraft, returned to the island on Thursday after a failed attempt to land in Caracas. As analysts warned On the basis of movements recorded on flight tracking websites, analysts said the aircraft flew in circles for several minutes in the morning off the coast of Venezuela, probably waiting for permission to land, and then turned around, but towards the east of the island. It had departed from Havana, although the airport did not appear on satellite tracking, which is common for this aircraft.

According to Venezuelan media outlet La Patilla, an MQ-4C Triton reconnaissance drone had been flying over the same area where the Cuban aircraft decided to change course. The “unarmed stealth drone,” the outlet reports, took off from Jacksonville Naval Air Station in Florida and remained over the Caribbean Sea for hours.

Last Monday, the same IL-96-300 took off from Havana, also bound for Caracas, and did not appear on satellite websites. For these, it is often a “ghost plane” because it travels with its radar turned off.

A knowledgeable source revealed to 14ymedio that the flight was “full of military personnel” and assumed that “they are going to stay there.” The same person said that the flight was going to collect the bodies of the agents who died on the island during the US operation that resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, but this did not happen. According to Flightradar24, the Cubana four-engine aircraft also made a trip to Venezuela yesterday, although the reason for this is unknown. continue reading

The trajectory of the US MQ-4C Triton drone, in red, on the right, in the Caribbean, in front of the Cubana de Aviación IL-96-300. / Flightradar24

Normally used to transport senior regime officials, military personnel and important equipment, it may be being used to repatriate Cuban doctors scattered throughout Venezuelan territory. This Thursday, the Ministry of Health reported that “after a period of logistical disruption, the flow of health professionals providing services in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela returning to Cuba has been normalised”.

The note, published in the official press, attempts to “sell” the information as simply the start of a well-deserved holiday. It states that in the last months of 2025, travel was affected “by difficulties in air transport, a situation that was subsequently complicated by the closure of Venezuelan airspace and the consequent suspension of all commercial flights,” and that this led to a “temporary accumulation of employees who had completed their work commitments or were due for their rest period” and had been unable to return to Cuba.

Route taken on Thursday by Cubana de Aviación’s IL-96-300. / Flightradar24

This week, the text continues, “in an organised and progressive manner, flights have resumed, allowing these workers to return to their country,” since “with the re-establishment of international air operations to and from Venezuela, mechanisms were immediately activated to resolve the accumulated backlog.”

Apart from the fact that not all airlines have resumed flights to Venezuela, the article makes no mention of the main change that has taken place in the Caribbean country in recent days, in which the US government, after capturing Maduro, has forced the establishment of a “transitional government” headed by Delcy Rodríguez.

The new situation poses a serious threat not only to the island’s energy survival, which has depended on crude oil donated by Caracas for more than a quarter of a century, but also to the regime itself, which is deeply intertwined with the Chavista government, as demonstrated by the identities of the Cubans who died in the US operation and despite decades of denial by both sides of the presence of troops from the island in Venezuela. Belonging to Maduro’s circle of protection, most of them were senior Cuban intelligence officials.

Translated by GH

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

“There Will Be No More Oil or Money for Cuba: Zero!” Trump Threatens

Cuba’s foreign minister accuses the U.S. of behaving “like a criminal, out-of-control hegemon that threatens world peace and security”

“Cuba provided security services to the last two Venezuelan dictators. But no more!” Trump wrote. / EFE

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, January 11, 2026 — U.S. President Donald Trump issued an explicit warning to the Castro regime this Sunday: Cuba must “reach an agreement” with Washington or face the definitive rupture of the economic ties that have sustained the Island for decades. The Republican president stated on his social network Truth Social that “There will be no more oil or money for Cuba: zero!” in a direct reference to the flow of crude oil and resources that Venezuela supplied to Havana for years.

Shortly before, Trump shared on Truth Social a post by an X user suggesting that Secretary of State Marco Rubio could become “president of Cuba,” adding a comment that did not go unnoticed: “Sounds good to me!”

Trump expanded on his message: “For many years, Cuba lived off large amounts of oil and money from Venezuela. In return, Cuba provided security services to the last two Venezuelan dictators. But no more!” he wrote.

The U.S. president went even further when referring to the consequences of the recent military operation in Caracas. “Most of those Cubans are dead from the U.S. attack last week, and Venezuela no longer needs the protection of the thugs and extortionists who held it hostage for so many years,” he added, in one of the harshest statements to date against continue reading

the Cuban presence in Venezuela.

The bluntness of the message comes at a moment of maximum geopolitical tension in the region following the capture of Nicolás Maduro. The action has triggered a series of statements, warnings, and strategic realignments involving not only Washington and Caracas, but also Havana.

According to public records from Flightradar24, several U.S. military aircraft conducted flights near the northern coast of Cuba.

Since Saturday, January 3, Trump’s statements have oscillated between an emphasis on regional control and direct warnings to historic allies of Chavismo. In recent interviews, the president has said that the Cuban regime “is very close to falling” due to the loss of its main source of oil and financial backing, though he has avoided publicly committing to a direct military intervention on the Island.

Added to this verbal escalation in recent hours was an unusual movement in the regional airspace. According to public Flightradar24 records, several U.S. military aircraft, identified by their speed, altitude, and flight patterns, carried out flights near Cuba’s northern coast without entering Cuban airspace. The routes, visible in real time on the platform, showed paths parallel to the coastline and repeated turns off strategic points in the north of the Island, a deployment that analysts interpret as a signal of pressure and deterrence amid the hardening of Washington’s rhetoric. The aerial presence was widely discussed on social media and reinforced the perception that Trump’s warning to Havana is not limited to rhetoric alone.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has reinforced that message. Of Cuban-American origin and a long-time critic of the Havana regime, Rubio has repeatedly stated that Cuba played a key role in the survival of Chavismo and that Venezuela’s security structure was “basically full of Cubans.” In conferences and press briefings following the operation in Caracas, he emphasized that without that support, Maduro’s regime would have collapsed much earlier.

Official figures on casualties during Maduro’s capture vary by source, but dozens of Venezuelan security personnel and at least 32 Cuban soldiers and agents were officially reported as killed during the operation. The Cuban government ultimately acknowledged this figure after repeatedly denying any military presence in Venezuela.

The Cuban regime and its spokespeople respond with the usual repertoire of denial, victimization, and confrontation

This death toll comes amid a climate of sustained repression within Cuba, where hundreds of political prisoners continue to languish in the country’s jails for exercising basic rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, or peaceful protest.

Trump’s warning this Sunday also fits into a context of economic and social collapse that experts describe as unprecedented in the Island’s recent history. Cuba is experiencing an unparalleled crisis, marked by mass emigration, structural failures in essential services such as health care and education, and an exhausted economic model that no longer manages to cover the population’s basic needs.

The end of Venezuelan subsidies, which in 2025 supplied the Island with an average of some 27,000 barrels of oil per day, represents an additional blow to an economy already burdened by frequent blackouts, domestic production at historic lows, and chronic shortages of food and medicines.

The regime’s foreign minister, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, rejected Washington’s accusations on the social network X and denied any economic link to security services provided abroad. “Cuba does not receive nor has it ever received monetary or material compensation for the security services it has provided to any country,” he wrote.

In his message, Rodríguez contrasted that position with that of the United States, which he accused of “mercenarism, blackmail, and military coercion against other states,” and invoked the Island’s right to import fuel “from those markets willing to export it.” The foreign minister closed his statement with the customary rhetoric, calling the U.S. a “criminal, out-of-control hegemon” that threatens peace and security not only for Cuba and the hemisphere, but “for the entire world.”

Faced with pressure from the United States, the Cuban regime and its spokespeople respond with the usual repertoire of denial, victimization, and confrontation. But the clock, politicians and analysts warn, is rapidly running against Havana’s interests.

Translated by Regina Anavy

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

In Havana, Most Gas Stations Are No Longer Dispensing Fuel

Even refilling a lighter has become a difficult task in Cuba due to the fuel shortage

“Maduro abandoned us,” a Cupet worker tells a customer. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana/Holguín, Darío Hernández and Miguel García, January 11, 2026 — Under the uneven shade of a tree in a park in Holguín, Genaro waits for someone to approach with a lighter. The scene has repeated itself for more than a decade: a folding table, several gas sprays, screwdrivers, and pliers. For years, that small family business, refilling disposable lighters, allowed them to put food on the table. Today, however, the lack of fuel threatens to extinguish even that minimal flame. “Now it’s cheaper to buy a new one than to repair it because gas has become incredibly expensive,” he says, arranging his tools with a mechanical gesture.

Genaro charges 100 pesos for each lighter he refills and 50 more if the flint has to be replaced. Until recently, that fee guaranteed a steady trickle of customers. Today, the flow has dropped sharply. “This is no longer profitable, and if things get worse,” he warns, “I’ll have to find something else.” His occupation—salvaging what in other countries is thrown away—becomes unviable in a context where even the gas used to refill lighters has turned into a luxury.

The problem is not limited to his improvised table. At home, he explains, they cook with firewood and with liquefied gas “when it shows up.” The balita—the small gas cylinder that sustains the domestic life of thousands of families—now costs 50,000 Cuban pesos on the informal market in Holguín. “You almost never find it, and when someone does offer it to you, they can sit back and demand continue reading

whatever they want, because people are desperate.” At state-run sales points, the supply was suspended weeks ago, with no date for resumption.

The cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies, following the capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. troops, has further strained a daily life already marked by shortages. What happens in Caracas translates almost immediately into extinguished stoves, paralyzed businesses, and reduced transportation in Cuba. The Island’s energy dependence turns any shock in the South American country into a domestic tremor.

In Havana, the situation is reflected in empty gas stations and in the conversations repeated under the roofs of the state company Cupet. In Telegram groups where virtual lines are organized, discouragement is palpable. This Saturday, in East Havana only 11 gas stations were offering service; another 10 were completely out of fuel. In the west of the capital, seven service stations had closed on Friday. No one dares to predict an improvement in the short term.

The mechanism for buying gasoline has become a digital maze. To even aspire to a turn, one must register in the Ticket app, enter an ID number, vehicle registration details, and the license plate. With luck, confirmation arrives in two or three months. But even then, the result can be frustrating: on the scheduled day, there may only be motor or regular gasoline of lower octane, unusable for many vehicles.

A tour of several Havana service stations confirms the picture. The central station at G and 25, in El Vedado, opened without fuel. The same scene repeats at its neighbor on La Rampa. Only at the nearby Tángana station was there still some supply for those waiting with a Ticket appointment, and in the entire central area only the station at L and 17 continued dispensing with some regularity.

The majority of gas stations in Havana are not operating.

Under the red sign reading “Your friend 24 hours a day” at G and 25, three men talk. They begin by discussing gasoline, but the conversation soon drifts toward Caracas, Washington’s warnings, and Marco Rubio’s statements urging Havana to choose between “change and collapse.” International politics seep into their words as yet another explanation for the empty tank.

“The situation is tight; I’ve never seen it this bad,” says a motorcyclist who came to Cupet just to confirm the obvious. He has a generator at home and urgently needs fuel. “My mother is bedridden with a relapse of chikungunya,” he explains. “At home we’re preparing for the worst, because this is just the beginning.”

At the Cupet stations on Vía Blanca and La Coubre, dispensing was limited to state vehicles, as it was at the station at the La Shell roundabout in Guanabacoa. Rafael, a Spanish businessman temporarily based in Cuba, described his fruitless tour of several stations in the Playa municipality. “They have no idea when fuel will come in again. They look lost,” he said.

One worker was more direct and, in a mocking tone, summed it up in four words: “Maduro abandoned us.” A tremor in Caracas is an earthquake in Havana.

“With what happened in Venezuela, I don’t think this will be fixed quickly,” / 14ymedio

In El Cerro, two brothers in the moving business have halted all operations. Their truck sits immobile while requests pile up unanswered. “With what happened in Venezuela, I don’t think this will be fixed quickly,” they say.

Early Sunday, many woke up glued to their phones after Donald Trump posted a message urging the Cuban regime to reach “an agreement, before it’s too late,” warning: “There will be no more oil or money for Cuba: zero!” For many, that message sealed the certainty that the severe fuel shortage will not be temporary.

On Havana’s Malecón, some look out to sea hoping for the silhouette of a tanker. For a young man singing boleros and guarachas to tourists, the definitive collapse will come “when El Morro goes dark.” Perhaps it will not require a mass exodus—only the absence of fuel and a wait that stretches on, like Genaro’s under the tree, with an empty lighter in his hand.

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

‘Cold Feet’ by Milton Chanes

“It was a cold that seemed intent on freezing everything.”

“The story of Patas Frías was told for years. No one ever saw him again.” / Screenshot

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Milton Chanes, Berlin, January 11, 2026 — The snow began to fall near Dijon in France. It wasn’t a gentle snowfall. It didn’t cover the landscape—it erased it. The family was coming from the south of France, exhausted, the car packed, their minds already at home. They crossed the German border almost without noticing, but the cold changed abruptly. This was not the same cold.

It was a cold that seemed intent on freezing everything.

The A4 awaited them with its mountain stretch. After the first long tunnel, the asphalt vanished beneath a layer of dull ice. Along the sides, several abandoned cars slept at odd angles, buried up to their wheels. The trucks, by contrast, sped past at full speed, as if gravity did not apply to them.

“Can they brake?” the father thought.

Better not to find out.

The road grew slow and dangerous. But they had to get home. One always gets home… until one doesn’t.

About one hundred and fifty kilometers from Berlin, the GPS spoke in its neutral voice: Highway closed due to an accident. Recalculating route.

The new line pulled them off the A4 onto secondary roads. That meant passing through villages and forest.

What could go wrong?

Thinking about it now, when everything has already happened, the most logical choice would have been to stay on the Autobahn. As dangerous as it was, it remained the main route—the one someone would clear first, the one that made sense. But in that instant—when the GPS announces the closure, when the exit sign suddenly appears through the snow—survival instinct does not reason: it reacts.

Decisions are made quickly, almost reflexively, without logic or time to weigh consequences. And it is only afterward, as the car gently leans into the exit curve and the Autobahn is left behind, that the thought arrives, late and sharp: damn GPS.

What lies ahead is clearly worse.

“We have diesel for three hundred kilometers,” the mother said. There won’t be a problem.

But it was already past ten at night. It was Saturday. The stations that appeared on the map were closed. Dark. As if they had never existed. continue reading

The stations that appeared on the map were closed. Dark. As if they had never existed.

The GPS suggested saving waiting time by cutting through villages and forest. A lot of forest.

The houses were dark. No lights in the windows. No sound. The road was barely visible: a narrow strip between trees heavy with snow. Sometimes a guardrail emerged like a long bone. Or a bent sign, half buried.

The car moved slowly. Too slowly to feel safe. Too fast to stop.

After the last village, the forest closed in completely. Between the trunks, shadows. Perhaps animals. Perhaps something else. The father slowed even more.

Then it really began to snow.

Not flakes. Not a fall. A white wall. The world shrank to the reach of the headlights. Stopping was not an option. Leaving the road, neither. No one knew what lay at the sides.

And then it happened.

A movement. Several. A group of deer burst across the road out of nowhere. The flash of eyes. Instinct. The brake.

The car skidded as if someone had shoved it.

It wasn’t a sharp impact. It was a long, uncontrolled slide, until the world tilted and vanished. The car plunged into a deep ditch, invisible beneath the snow, and sank almost to the roof.

The parents were thrown forward. A crunch of metal. A muffled scream.

One of the animals passed over the car. The glass roof shattered. Hooves pierced the glass like brief spears, leaving marks, cracks, fear.

In the back seat, Aaron, four years old, did not scream. His eyes were open—too open.

In the distance, through the snowfall, he saw something.

A snowman.

He didn’t know why it was there. He didn’t know how he had seen it. It had a simple, almost childish shape. But it was standing there. Watching.

For an instant, Aaron stopped trembling. He was not alone.

The phone had no signal. Outside, the snow no longer allowed anything to be seen. Only white. Only muffled silence. Then he heard something.

A dragging sound.

Slow.

From the shattered glass roof, a branch pushed aside the accumulated snow. It didn’t fall like wind. It fell as if someone had moved it.

There it was.

Closer.

“Patas frías.”

Aaron would later swear that the snowman winked at him. No one believed him. Perhaps it was a reflection. Perhaps it was fear.

No one believed him. Perhaps it was a reflection. Perhaps it was fear.

“Patas frías” did not speak. It did not move the way living things move. But it was there. And that, in the middle of the forest, was enough.

He doesn’t know when he left the car.
Perhaps it wasn’t a decision. Perhaps it simply happened.

The cold struck him as he climbed out through the roof window, but something covered him immediately. It wasn’t a blanket. It was cold… but a different kind of cold. Ordered. Branch-arms wrapped around him. The snow of the snowman didn’t burn. It protected.

They walked.

Aaron doesn’t remember the time or the distance. Only the sound of his steps sinking, and another softer sound beside him. Every time he stumbled, something held him before he could fall. The forest seemed to open just enough to let them pass.

At the end, a light appeared. Just one. Yellow.

A village. It wasn’t clear how long it took to get there, and he couldn’t even be sure of the direction he had walked.

“Patas frías” stopped in front of a door. Aaron understood. He knocked.

The door opened. An older man. A woman with a thick shawl. The annoyance at the hour turned instantly into concern.

“A child?”

They let him in. Blanket. Warmth. Tea. Overlapping questions.

“How did you get here?” the man asked. —

“With my friend,” Aaron said, pointing to the door.

Outside there was only a motionless snowman, at the edge of the road. No one paid it any attention.

They called the police. Aaron drew “Patas frías.” It was not an ordinary child’s drawing. There was no sun, no houses. Only him: round, tall, with long arms and an expression they couldn’t tell was a smile… or waiting.

Following the boy’s directions, the officers entered the forest.

It wasn’t difficult.

First they found one snowman. Then another. And another. Always at the edge of the road. Always looking toward the forest. Different scarves. Mismatched buttons. Wool hats.

Too many.

Where the car should have been, there was a circle of snowmen, arranged as if pointing to an exact spot. Beneath them, the car.

The parents were injured. Frozen. But alive.

No one could explain how they had survived. Nor where all of that had come from. The official explanation was simple: a child’s imagination.

But at dawn, there wasn’t a single snowman left.
Only untouched snow.
And footprints that led nowhere.

The story of “Patas frías” was told for years. No one ever saw him again.

And Aaron, even as an adult, never knew how to answer whether Patas frías was good or evil.

He knew only one thing:
When it gets very cold… he appears.

Written by Milton Chanes

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The 14 Most Important Cuban Books of 2025

Novels, essay, and poetry in a year of memory, critique, and literary resistance

Read together, these books map out a complex cartography of Cuban literature in 2025. / Collage

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, January 10, 2026  — Cuban literature in 2025 once again demonstrated that, even in a context of editorial scarcity, censorship, and geographic dispersion, books remain one of the most effective tools for thinking about the country. From the Island and from exile, through major international imprints or independent publishers, Cuban authors released works that engaged with memory, power, intimacy, violence, and everyday survival. Throughout the year, 14ymedio reviewed these new publications, paying attention not only to literary quality but also to the texts’ ability to challenge and question the reality of the Island. From that ongoing coverage emerges this selection of the 14 most relevant Cuban books of 2025, read as a narrative and essayistic body that, taken together, offers a snapshot of the cultural moment.

Among the novels that achieved the greatest visibility is La viajera nocturna [The Night Traveler] (Ediciones B) by Armando Lucas Correa, a work that confirms the insertion of Cuban narrative into the international publishing circuit without losing historical depth or literary ambition. With effective prose and a narrative architecture designed for a broad readership, Correa once again demonstrates the power of telling stories of universal scope through an exploration of the traumas of the twentieth century and their present-day resonances.

In a completely different register, Juan Abreu returned with Debajo de la mesa [Under the Table] (Ladera Norte), an uncomfortable, ferocious, and deeply personal book. Abreu writes from memory not to idealize it, but to blow it apart. His prose, marked by exile, sexuality, and a break with any complacent canon, reminds us that an essential part of contemporary Cuban literature continues to be built from aesthetic and moral dissidence.

Psychological introspection also found a significant place in the novel Narcisos [Narcissus] (Editorial Huso) by Eduardo López Collazo. The lives of eight men are told through the gaze of Carmen, a psychologist who gradually discovers herself over the course of the narrative. The author, a renowned physician living in Spain, defines the novel as a search to understand “who we are when no one is looking at us, not even ourselves.” continue reading

The rawest fiction found one of its strongest exponents in Sórdida tropical (Sordid Tropics) by Carlos Lechuga.

In the realm of essay and political reflection, Entre Rusia y Cuba [Between Russia and Cuba] (Ladera Norte) by Jorge Ferrer offered one of the clearest views of a historical relationship that marked generations. Ferrer combines analysis, memory, and personal experience to dismantle both nostalgia and propaganda, proposing a critical reading of the ideological, economic, and human ties between the two countries.

That will to dismantle reaches one of its most forceful expressions in Del dicho al hecho. La leyenda de la sanidad en Cuba 1902–2024, (From Saying to Doing: The Legend of Health Care in Cuba, 1902–2024), self-published by Antonio Guedes. The book stands as one of the most necessary investigations of the moment, as it questions one of the pillars of the official narrative: the supposed excellence of the Cuban health care system. With data, historical context, and an accessible tone, Guedes dismantles myths and restores complexity to a debate hijacked for decades by propaganda.

The most unflinching fiction found in Sórdida tropical [Sordid Tropics] (Hypermedia) by Carlos Lechuga is one of its most solid examples. Also a filmmaker, Lechuga writes from disenchantment and rawness, without concessions to easy lyricism or revolutionary epic. His novel portrays a harsh Cuba, marked by symbolic and material violence, where characters survive in an environment that constantly expels them.

Poetry, for its part, found in Reina María Rodríguez one of its highest expressions with Mazorcas (Rialta). Considered one of the most important female voices in living Cuban poetry, Rodríguez delivers a mature collection in which the word functions as intimate archive, resistance, and reflection on time, the city, and loss. The volume confirms that poetry continues to be a privileged space for thinking the unsayable.

In the realm of internationally prominent narrative, Leonardo Padura once again occupied a central place with Morir en la arena (To Die in the Sand) (Tusquets). Far from repeating himself, Padura explores new layers of the crime genre to probe violence, memory, and moral decay, maintaining that unique ability to turn entertainment into a critical tool.

In Libertad vigilada: la poesía de Severo Sarduy (Guarded Freedom: The Poetry of Severo Sarduy) (Verbum), Joaquín Roses starts from a premise as simple as it is necessary: it is not possible to fully understand Sarduy’s writing without attending to his poetry, a claim the author himself made during his lifetime. This essay focuses on the twenty-one sonnets of Un testigo fugaz y disfrazado, 1985 (A Fleeting and Disguised Witness, 1985), a volume marked by the use of chromaticism and sonic geometry.

One of the year’s most ambitious editorial projects was José Lezama Lima: A Biography. Formative Years (1910–1939), by Ernesto Hernández Busto

The volume Bay of Pigs: The Two Sides of the Story (Ediciones Material) (published in English) by writer and journalist Miguel Ángel Sánchez Martínez opts for rigor, contrast, and shared memory. The book addresses the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 through meticulous, chronological research, drawing on declassified CIA documents and testimonies from both sides to dismantle opposing narratives and recover areas erased by official history.

One of the most ambitious publishing bets of the year was José Lezama Lima: una biografía. Años de formación, 1910–1939 (Editorial Pre-Textos) (José Lezama Lima: A Biography. Formative Years 1910-1939) (Editorial Pre-Textos), by Ernesto Hernández Busto. More than a traditional biography, the book reconstructs the cultural ecosystem in which Lezama was formed, offering a renewed reading of a central figure of the canon and engaging with the intellectual history of twentieth-century Cuba.

Meanwhile, the political thriller found a solid expression in El otro espía (The Other Spy) (Saturn Forlag), by Humberto López Guerra, a novel that uses espionage as a metaphor to explore loyalties, betrayals, and the exercise of power. Its narrative effectiveness and historical background made it one of the most talked-about reads of the year.

The editorial close of 2025 was marked by two milestones. First, the announcement of a new critical edition, revised and updated by Yoandy Cabrera, of the poetry of Delfín Prats, presented as a tribute on the poet’s birthday. The recovery of his work reaffirms the need to reread living classics with contemporary critical tools. Second, there is the publication of Cuba en mi memoria: república, castrismo, exilio, (El Ateje) (Cuba in My Memory: Republic, Castroism, Exile) by Manuel C. Díaz, a book of political memoirs that traverses three fundamental moments of national history and dialogues with the testimonial tradition of exile.

Read together, these books form a complex cartography of Cuban literature in 2025: a space shaped by memory, critique of power, intimate exploration, and the urgent need to narrate. For 14ymedio, highlighting these works has also been a way of affirming that, even in times of crisis, books remain one of the best ways to understand Cuba.

Translated by Regina Anavy

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Dollar Sales to Cuba’s Private Sector Are Authorized, but with Strict Limits

Private businesses in Cuba — MSMEs* — will be able to buy foreign currency once a month, according to a calculation made by the Central Bank based on each company’s income in previous months.

There are not enough dollars in the system, and the State rations them sparingly. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, January 10, 2026 — The announcement by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) about opening a banking channel that allows private MSMEs to purchase foreign currency adds another layer to the already tangled foreign exchange market. The information was shared by Banco Metropolitano on its social media accounts and is presented as part of the new “ordering” task. Put simply: the State says that, from now on, some private businesses will be able to buy dollars legally through banks, but under very strict rules.

According to the explanation, purchases will be made based on the new floating exchange rate, which currently stands at 413 pesos per dollar. Only one purchase per month will be allowed, and business owners will not be able to choose the amount, because the bank will calculate it by taking the average of what entered the company’s tax account over the last three months, using only half of that amount and converting it at the floating exchange rate in effect at the time.

In practice, this means that if an MSME has had low or irregular income, it will be able to buy very few dollars, even if it urgently needs them to import raw materials, pay for services, or meet contractual obligations. And if the business is just starting out and does not yet have an income history, it may simply be left out altogether.

The BCC also made it clear that the entire process will be “banked.” Cuban pesos will be withdrawn compulsorily from the tax account, and the purchased foreign currency will be deposited only into a foreign-currency account belonging to the same economic actor. There will be no cash, no informal transfers, and no room for maneuvering. Before continue reading

approving the transaction, the bank will review the customer’s profile, accounts, and the origin of the funds, as part of the controls that currently weigh on any economic activity on the Island.

In recent years, several “solutions” for private-sector access to foreign currency have been introduced, almost all with big headlines and very modest results.

Applications must be submitted online, through the online Metropolitano en Línea service. On paper, it sounds modern and organized. In real life, many business owners recall that State banking platforms often fail, collapse, or become inaccessible precisely when they are most needed, especially outside Havana.

Beyond the technical language, the question many business owners are asking is quite straightforward: is this enough to solve anything? The answer, at least for now, seems to be no. The main problem remains the scarcity of foreign currency. The State is not offering new dollars; it is only saying how and to whom it will sell a portion of the few dollars it has.

Moreover, the floating rate set by the Central Bank, although periodically adjusted, still falls far short of reflecting the real street price of the dollar (460 pesos per dollar this Saturday), where most transactions take place. As long as that gap exists, many business owners will continue to find it less cumbersome and more efficient to turn to the informal market rather than submit to a lengthy banking process to purchase a limited amount of foreign currency.

This is not the first time the government has announced mechanisms of this kind. In recent years, several “solutions” for private-sector access to foreign currency have been rolled out, almost all with major announcements and very discreet outcomes.

For some SMEs with stable income, good relations with their bank, and the patience to deal with bureaucracy, this channel may serve as a complement. For most, however, the underlying problem remains unchanged: there are not enough dollars in the system, and the State dispenses them by the drop.

*Translator’s note: MSME is “micro, small and medium enterprises”

Translated by Regina Anavy

________________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The “Espionage” Accusation Against Alejandro Gil Points to Damage to Venezuela

A document from the Cuban Prosecutor’s Office obtained by 14ymedio accuses the former minister of having revealed sensitive data to the CIA about cooperation between Caracas and Havana.

In August 2022, Gil met with Maduro at the Miraflores Palace, a meeting that was widely publicized by the official Cuban and Venezuelan press. / X / Nicolás Maduro

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana,January 10, 2026 — The recent capture of Nicolás Maduro has once again put the spotlight on the close and opaque relationship between Caracas and Havana. In that context, a source with access to the documents of the trial against Alejandro Gil Fernández, former vice prime minister and minister of economy of Cuba, has provided 14ymedio with details from the provisional conclusions of the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic (FGR), in which Gil was accused, among other crimes, of espionage on behalf of U.S. intelligence services, allegedly causing strategic damage to relations with Venezuela.

According to the report signed by Edward Roberts Campbell, chief prosecutor of the Directorate for Combating Corruption and Illegalities, Gil allegedly handed over classified information to “an unidentified agent, but presumably belonging to the CIA,” compromising “Venezuelan national security.” The document claims that the information involved sensitive data on political, economic, and military cooperation between Cuba and the Maduro regime.

Among the leaked information were economic transactions between Cuba and Venezuela, the location of financial reserves, commercial agreements linked to oil exchanges and the deployment of Cuban medical brigades, as well as schemes for triangulating financial operations and the names of foreign agencies involved in the final destination of Venezuelan crude.

The accusation also included details about Cuban government support in cybersecurity and counterintelligence for Venezuelan intelligence services, as well as personal data about Nicolás Maduro himself. According to the source, Gil allegedly provided information about the president’s family, his residence, his assets in Venezuela and abroad—including in Cuba—and highly sensitive details about the security ring protecting continue reading

the Chavista leader, composed of several dozen Cuban soldiers belonging to the Ministry of the Interior and the Revolutionary Armed Forces.

It was State Security that recommended Gil attend Maduro instead of Díaz-Canel in 2022. / X / Nicolás Maduro

“These acts are considered a betrayal of the trust placed in him by the Cuban government and, specifically, by State Security,” the indictment stated, characterizing the conduct as espionage in favor of U.S. intelligence services, with the aim of “undermining Venezuelan sovereignty and overthrowing its legitimate president through a coup d’état.”

However, the very development of the case reveals contradictions that are difficult to ignore. According to testimony accessed by 14ymedio, it was initially planned for Miguel Díaz-Canel to meet with Maduro in August 2022 as part of a presidential tour of several Latin American and Caribbean countries. Instead, it was State Security that recommended Gil attend in his place.

“It was argued that, because of his performance and the high level of trust placed in him as a cadre of the Revolution, he deserved that meeting,” the source explains, adding that the visit was also meant to be used for meetings with other high-ranking Venezuelan officials, including the minister of economy. The decision is striking, given that a meeting between heads of state is not usually delegated to a sectoral minister.

State Security had been investigating Gil for at least four years, placing the initial suspicions in 2020.

The source clarifies that they only had access to the prosecutor’s indictment and do not know whether the alleged espionage related to Venezuela was proven during the trial. “I cannot state whether these facts were brought to trial with conclusive evidence or whether it was proven that Gil delivered sensitive Venezuelan information to the CIA,” the source notes. Nor do they have details about the grounds for the life sentence handed down by the Supreme Court.

The timeline of the case reinforces the doubts. Pro-government programs such as Razones de Cuba have claimed that State Security had been investigating Gil for at least four years, placing the suspicions as early as 2020. Even so, in August 2022 Gil met with Maduro at the Miraflores Palace, a meeting widely publicized by the official Cuban and Venezuelan press and publicly celebrated by the Chavista leader himself on social media.

Months later, in November of that same year, Gil accompanied Díaz-Canel on a tour of China, Algeria, Russia, and Turkey. In July 2023, he was also authorized to travel to New York as Cuba’s sole representative to the United Nations General Assembly. “If there were solid indications of espionage, these decisions do not hold up from a counterintelligence standpoint,” the source points out.

Alejandro Gil’s trial, far from clarifying the facts, exposes a web in which Venezuela, Maduro, and Cuban security are intertwined in a narrative full of gaps. Today, after the capture of the Chavista leader, those gaps weigh more heavily than ever. Because if Gil was a spy, he was one with inexplicable freedom; and if he was not, his conviction reveals how far a system can go when it needs a visible culprit to protect those operating at the highest levels of power.

Translated by Regina Anavy

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Paying for Your Reservation in Dollars Does Not Guarantee Better Food at Hotels in Varadero Cuba

Customers complain that they have to give extra money to employees to access more food despite the “all-inclusive” offer

“To eat without so much hassle, you have to come as soon as the restaurant opens. Those who arrive late, with or without money, don’t get much.” / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Julio César Contreras, Matanzas, January 9, 2025 — In Varadero, paying for an “all-inclusive” hotel is no longer a guarantee of a hearty meal. Those who arrive on the Hicacos Peninsula seeking a few days free from domestic worries discover this, sometimes with bewilderment and other times with resignation. At the Barceló Solymar, one of the best-known hotels in the area, the price—$62 per night—doesn’t always translate into full plates

On the buffet trays, side dishes abound; the meats, on the other hand, seem like museum pieces, guarded by employees who react with surgical precision. “When I walked past the roast pork, the employee tossed me such tiny pieces that they were barely visible on the empty plate,” says Iván, a Cuban resident of Miami who returned to the island to give his family a worry-free New Year’s Eve.

The learning curve was quick. “With a 500-peso bill, the waiter will serve you whatever you want. There’s no need to hide giving him the money. It’s like an advance tip so you can eat without going hungry,” explains Iván, who hadn’t been to Cuba in seven years and had never stayed at this hotel. The shock of reality was twofold: even paying for the room in dollars doesn’t protect you from shortages, and the “all-inclusive” concept isn’t immune to the logic of the informal market that permeates daily life in the country today.

Before taking their first course, some diners hold a banknote in their hand to give them the impression of being at a buffet

The scene repeats itself table after table. Before taking their first course, some diners hold up a bill, hoping to give themselves the impression, at least for a little while, of being at a buffet. “The food here cost me more than if I’d gone to a restaurant on the street,” says Eddy, his desire for a variety of desserts unfulfilled. “The only thing you can eat as much as you want of without paying extra is the rice continue reading

and beans. Everything else is rationed or runs out quickly, like the chocolate ice cream that ran out and they didn’t replenish it. To eat without so much hassle, you have to come when the restaurant opens. Anyone who arrives late, with or without money, doesn’t get much.”

Among the guests, a Cuban accent predominates. Families residing on the island and emigrants who have returned to share vacations occupy most of the tables; a few Canadian tourists complete the scene. Emma, ​​one of them, isn’t willing to pay more. “For a four-star hotel, the buffet is very limited,” she says. “The main courses only have pork, ground beef, and fried chicken. It’s paltry for what you’d expect from a place like this.” She also finds no variety in salads or seasonal dishes, and she’s already considering leaving earlier than planned. “I’ve spent two nights eating boiled tomatoes and plantains. It’s not what I expected.”

Breakfast offers no respite. “In front of me, a Russian tourist was given an omelet with only one egg. I gave the cook 200 pesos and even then I had to demand he make mine with ham,” Eddy recounts. He came hoping for a variety of yogurts; lacking them, he ended up drinking milk. “It’s the same story as lunch and dinner. To get the best, you have to pay for it. If I had known I’d be eating bread and butter here, I would have stayed home.”

During meals, some vacationers also pay to ensure they get cold beer at the table. Tipping ceases to be a voluntary gesture and becomes a requirement to avoid being left watching other dishes go by. “My two children were so excited; I’d never been able to bring them to a hotel like this before,” says Eddy. “Thanks to my father-in-law, who made the reservation from abroad, we were able to come. He paid $496 so the four of us could spend two and a half days eating whatever we wanted, not being restricted like this.”

The contradiction becomes clear when a public relations representative approaches with a survey about the hotel’s operations. While the form asks about customer satisfaction, the table waits for the waiter to return with another round of drinks, previously “arranged.” In Varadero, even under the all-inclusive label, scarcity has found its way onto the table, reminding visitors that, even now, eating well in Cuba remains exorbitantly expensive, even on vacation.

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Venezuela Has Released Eleven of the Nearly 900 Political Prisoners in the Country

  • The first day ends with the release of Venezuelans Enrique Márquez, Biagio Pilieri, Alejandro Rebolledo, and Larry Osorio Chía, who join the five Spaniards about to land in Madrid
  • Activists and opposition figures demand a “total amnesty”
Enrique Márquez Biaggio embraces family members as he leaves El Helicoide prison in Caracas. / Screenshot

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, January 9, 2026 — The joy felt by the families of Venezuelan political prisoners following the announcement of releases by the president of Parliament, Jorge Rodríguez, has turned into tension due to the lack of concrete results. Of the nearly 900 people held in various prisons across the country, only nine had been released by nightfall: four Venezuelans and five Spaniards, who have already arrived in Spain.

The Venezuelans are Enrique Márquez, former presidential candidate  former presidential candidate; Biagio Pilieri, a politician and collaborator of María Corina Machado; the lawyer Alejandro Rebolledo; and military officer Larry Osorio Chía. All four had been held until now in the feared El Helicoide prison, the Caracas headquarters of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Sebin), and their releases were confirmed by the NGO Foro Penal and a report by Realidad Helicoide. Early Friday morning, two additional cases were added, whose identities are still unknown.

The release of Márquez and Pilieri was captured on cellphone cameras by people gathered outside the prison awaiting news of their relatives. Both were able to embrace their loved ones amid great anticipation. Márquez was detained on January 7, 2025, after taking part in the July 28, 2024 presidential election and questioning the victory attributed to Nicolás Maduro by the National Electoral Council.

After his arrest, Interior and Justice Minister Diosdado Cabello claimed that the former candidate had proposed holding an inauguration ceremony for Edmundo González Urrutia at a Venezuelan embassy abroad. His release had been demanded by countless activists and leaders, including Colombian President Gustavo Petro, who described him as a friend.

Pilieri had spent even longer in prison. He was pursued and arrested on August 28, 2024, after participating in a protest rejecting the ruling of the Supreme Court of Justice that validated Maduro’s reelection. The politician was coordinator of the opposition party continue reading

Convergencia and a former lawmaker, as well as mayor of Bruzual in Yaracuy. Along with leader Freddy Superlano and Machado collaborator Perkins Rocha, he was accused of disseminating the electoral tally sheets produced by the main opposition to prove González Urrutia’s victory.

Hours later, the release of Larry Osorio Chía was announced. He is a second master sergeant in the Venezuelan Army and the brother of Rubén Darío, a retired soldier who worked as a human rights activist with Fundaredes. According to several NGOs, the young man’s only “crime” was his family tie to a soldier who defected to support Juan Guaidó in 2019.

The last Venezuelan released last night was Alejandro Rebolledo, a former Supreme Court justice in exile, who had been imprisoned since returning to Venezuela in 2024 to regularize his legal status after being forced into exile in 2017 and was instead charged with treason and conspiracy against the political order.

In addition, a prominent political prisoner, lawyer and former lawmaker Juan Pablo Guanipa, one of María Corina Machado’s closest collaborators, detained in May 2025, is expected to be released in the coming hours.

In addition, a prominent political prisoner, lawyer and former lawmaker Juan Pablo Guanipa, one of María Corina Machado’s closest collaborators, detained in May 2025, is expected to be released in the coming hours. Cabello accused him of an alleged plot against regional and legislative elections. Although his family hoped he would be home Thursday night, by midnight they acknowledged they would have to wait a bit longer.

Along with the release of these Venezuelans os the release of five Spaniards who are currently flying to Madrid: José María Basoa, Andrés Martínez Adasme, Miguel Moreno Dapena, Ernesto Gorbe Cardona, and the Spanish-Venezuelan Rocío San Miguel, who landed in Madrid shortly after 1:00 p.m. local time.

News of their release was announced Thursday by Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, the European Union and Cooperation, José Manuel Albares, and celebrated by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez as “an act of justice.” In an early-morning interview, the foreign minister welcomed the “new stage opening in Venezuela” and expressed hope that the “new government continues along that path.”

Albares thanked the “positive step taken by the new acting president” and said he spoke Thursday with those released. “All of them, without exception, were somewhat in shock, because they were informed in real time that they were going to be released,” he said. “They woke up one day thinking they would remain there for an indefinite period, and a few hours later they were at the residence of the Spanish ambassador,” he added. The Spanish government is watching to see whether at least one more Spaniard “may be released in the coming hours or days,” he said, without naming names.

[Link here]

Expectations at Madrid-Barajas Airport were very high around midday, with dozens of Venezuelans and Spaniards waiting for relatives and friends. However, cameras were unable to capture the arrival of the five, who for now have “restrictions” on speaking. According to El País, Rocío San Miguel’s spokesperson said patience was needed regarding the evacuees’ emotional state and that their lawyers must also assess those restrictions.

Minutes later, it was announced that all were already on their way to their places of origin. The group includes two Basques, one Canary Islander, and one Valencian, in addition to San Miguel.

Beyond these specific cases, the remaining prisoners are still waiting. The Committee of Mothers in Defense of Truth said Thursday that “the release of our loved ones has not been carried out, nor do we see signs that progress is being made.” In an Instagram post, the committee urged authorities to “ensure that our loved ones are included within the announced release process.”

“Based on the information we have, we estimate that just over 200 people remain unjustly detained in the context of post-election mobilizations,” the committee said, calling for progress toward “a general amnesty.”

Justice, Encounter and Forgiveness issued a statement warning that, despite the wait, releases “have not yet been fully carried out” and that calm must be maintained in order to confirm cases. “We reiterate that no information, list, or name will be made public until each case has been fully confirmed; that is, until individuals have effectively left detention centers and are in contact with their families,” the group said on X.

The NGO Foro Penal estimates that there were 863 political prisoners, among them 86 foreigners of various nationalities in Venezuelan prisons as of December 29, most detained after the July 28, 2024 presidential election.

In remarks to the media, Rodríguez said Thursday that the releases are part of a “unilateral gesture” by the Venezuelan government, now led by acting president Delcy Rodríguez, his sister. At Christmas and New Year, the Venezuelan government had already announced the release of 99 and 88 detainees following the presidential election, respectively, although prisoner associations were able to verify only 61 of them.

For her part, María Corina Machado shared an audio message on her social media in which she described the releases as “an act of moral restitution.” The opposition leader recalled that although “nothing gives back the stolen years, this day matters” because it acknowledges what she always knew: “that injustice will not be eternal and that truth, even when deeply wounded, eventually finds its way.”

The former lawmaker said this “brings a measure of peace” to families, but sent a message looking ahead: “We will not rest until all prisoners are free and all of Venezuela can embrace in full democracy and freedom.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The US Adds Venezuela and Cuba to the List of 25 New Countries Requiring Bonds for Visa Applications

A deposit of up to $15,000 may be required to apply for entry into the United States, and the required visa document is not guaranteed.

The change will take place starting January 21st / 14ymedio

14ymedio biggerEFE (via 14ymedio), 7 January 2025 — The U.S. government has added Venezuela and Cuba to a list of 25 new countries whose citizens must post bonds of up to $15,000 to apply for entry into the United States, the State Department said this week.

The change will take place from January 21st and the expanded list includes nations such as Algeria, Angola, Gabon, Nepal, Senegal, Zimbabwe and Uganda.

Any citizen or person traveling with a passport issued by one of those countries and who is eligible for a B1 or B2 visa will be required to deposit a bond of $5,000, $10,000 or $15,000, an amount that will be determined at the time of the applicant’s interview.

The B1 visa allows travel for business purposes, and the B2 visa authorizes entry for tourism, personal, or medical reasons. In total, the list now includes 38 countries, most of them in Africa. continue reading

If someone pays the fee without the guidance of a consular worker, that money will not be refunded.

The State Department specified on Tuesday that the bond does not guarantee the issuance of the visa and noted that if someone pays the fee without the guidance of a consular worker, that money will not be refunded.

As a condition of the bond, those who have deposited it must enter and leave the country through Washington Dulles International Airport, New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport, or Boston’s Logan Airport.

Failure to comply with this requirement, it is noted, could result in the denial of entry or cause the departure to not be properly recorded.

The digital site Axios notes that the State Department has not specified whether the inclusion of Venezuela is related to the military operation that resulted in the capture of Nicolás Maduro.

The arrest of the deposed Venezuelan leader, who is now in a New York prison, took place on January 3 in Caracas along with his wife, Cilia Flores.

The formal indictment accuses Maduro, among other charges, of conspiracy to commit narco-terrorism.

The formal indictment accuses Maduro, among other charges, of conspiracy to commit narcoterrorism and conspiracy to import cocaine, to which he has pleaded not guilty.

Following the operation that led to his capture, US President Donald Trump stated that Cuba “has always survived thanks to Venezuela” and emphasized that now the island “is about to fall.”

The Executive has not justified the inclusion of any of the added countries.

Last week Washington had added seven to the list of nations whose passport holders must post bail – Bhutan, Botswana, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia and Turkmenistan – thus until this latest communication there were only 13 nations affected.

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Venezuelan Exiles Ask the U.S. to Intercede for Political Prisoners and Rein in Cabello’s Power

González Urrutia considers it an “act of revenge” that his son-in-law has been detained for a year

Trump described Maduro as a violent man who, he said, “tortured” people. / EFE

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/EFE, Washington, January 7, 2026 –The Organization of Venezuelans Persecuted Politically in Exile (Veppex) asked the U.S. government on Wednesday to intercede for the “unconditional” release of all political prisoners in Venezuela and to put an end to the influence of Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, following the capture of the ousted president, Nicolás Maduro.

“We respectfully request that the U.S. Government, within the framework of its policies toward Venezuela, prioritize and act decisively on these two points: the unconditional release of all political prisoners (and) effective measures to prevent Diosdado Cabello from continuing to wield de facto power to block democratic change,” the group said in a statement.

Veppex added that the situation “is complex,” but argued that these two requirements are “basic and urgent” to build confidence and move toward the country’s democratic normalization.

If Cabello, the second power in Chavismo, is not neutralized, the organization warned that “any transition will be extremely fragile and reversible.” It also accused Cabello of participating in “drug trafficking activities, corruption, and serious human rights violations.”

Over the weekend, the group of Venezuelans in exile had called for the arrest of several high-ranking officials of the Venezuelan regime in addition to Cabello, including Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, interim president Delcy Rodríguez, and the president of the National Assembly, Jorge Rodríguez. continue reading

“Right now what we want is to fix the oil, fix the country, bring it back, and have elections”

The issue of political prisoners in Venezuela has been sidelined, at least in public statements, in the new chapter that Caracas and Washington appear to have opened in their relations, marked by the interest of U.S. President Donald Trump in the South American country’s oil.

After the attacks on Venezuela and the capture of Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, Trump said that political prisoners are a secondary issue: “We haven’t gotten to that. Right now what we want is to fix the oil, fix the country, bring it back, and have elections,” the Republican said on Monday.

The president said on Tuesday that the Venezuelan government, now led by acting president Delcy Rodríguez, is willing to deliver between 30 and 50 million barrels of oil for sale on the U.S. market, and that he would control the proceeds from the sale “to ensure,” he said, “that it is used for the benefit of the Venezuelan people and the United States.”

Earlier, during a speech to Republican lawmakers at the Kennedy Center in Washington, Trump described Maduro as a violent man who, he said, “tortured” people.

“They have a torture chamber in downtown Caracas that is now being shut down, but it tortured people,” Trump said without giving further details. Although Trump did not name it explicitly, some Venezuelan NGOs assumed he was referring to El Helicoide, the Caracas headquarters of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, which has been identified as a torture center.

After Maduro’s capture, Trump said that political prisoners are a secondary issue.

However, this Tuesday there were no reports in Venezuela of releases or pardons. While Trump did not explicitly name it, some Venezuelan NGOs assumed he was referring to El Helicoide, the Caracas headquarters of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, which has been identified as a torture center.

The NGO Justice, Encounter and Forgiveness urged the Venezuelan government on Tuesday to release all detainees if the closure of that center is confirmed.

The organization Foro Penal, which leads the defense of political prisoners, counts 863 cases in the country, 86 of them involving people of another nationality.

On Christmas and New Year’s Day, Venezuelan authorities announced the release, under precautionary measures, of 99 and 88 political prisoners, respectively. However, local NGOs have not been able to verify all the cases.

So far, Maduro’s executive branch has claimed that the country is “free of political prisoners” and that those labeled as such are imprisoned for the “commission of terrible criminal acts.”

The International Criminal Court opened an investigation into Venezuela in 2018 for alleged crimes against humanity committed since 2017.

The government of Nicolás Maduro repeatedly attempted to halt the case, arguing that its judicial system was carrying out internal investigations, but the Court rejected that position in 2023 and authorized the resumption of the inquiry.

“I took it from the beginning for what it really is: pressure being put on me, and he is paying for being Edmundo González’s son-in-law”

Separately, opposition figure Edmundo González Urrutia said on Wednesday that it is an act of “revenge” against him that his son-in-law, Rafael Tudares, has been detained for exactly one year, a detention that occurred three days before Nicolás Maduro’s inauguration, after the latter was proclaimed reelected president in what the opposition and international observers say was a fraudulent process.

“This is more revenge than justice,” González Urrutia said on his X account. In this regard, he stated that the charges against him, stemming from an investigation and an arrest warrant in Venezuela, were “transferred” to Tudares, who was sentenced to 30 years in prison for the crimes of “forgery, conspiracy, terrorism, association, money laundering, and financing.”

“I took it from the beginning for what it really is: pressure being put on me, and he is paying for being the son-in-law of Edmundo González, the presidential candidate who won the election and whose victory this regime stole,” the opposition leader said, referring to the July 2024 presidential election.

He also reiterated that his son-in-law is in a situation of “enforced disappearance,” noting that his daughter, Mariana González, does not know his whereabouts or the place where Tudares has been held for the past year, a period González Urrutia described as “marked by the absence of information, legal guarantees, and justice.”

“Rafael has not been afforded respect for due process guarantees, access to private defense counsel, adequate medical care, dignified detention conditions, and effective judicial oversight, quite the opposite,” the opposition figure denounced.

He further argued that Tudares’s case “is not isolated,” but rather “part of a pattern that affects hundreds of people in Venezuela, including women and children, subjected to arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and systematic deprivation of rights.”

“As long as these practices persist, it will not be possible to speak of peace or democracy, or guarantees for anyone. Venezuela needs truth, justice, and freedom for all,” concluded the opposition leader, who claims the presidency from exile, asserting that he defeated Maduro in the 2024 presidential election.

Mariana González also said on Wednesday, in a message on X, that a year has passed without her husband: “One year without answers. I have no more words. Just truth, justice, and humanity. That is all we ask,” she said.

Tudares was detained on January 7 of last year, when human rights defender Carlos Correa, since released, and former opposition presidential candidate Enrique Márquez, who remains in prison, were also arrested.

Translated by Regina Anavy

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

María Corina Machado: ‘Nothing and No One Is Going To Prevent Venezuela From Being Free’

  • In statements to La Patilla, the opposition leader said that “there can be no transition until the political prisoners are released.”
  • She defends the U.S. military operation: “International law exists to protect people, not those who hold weapons and steal resources.”
María Corina Machado, whose whereabouts are currently unknown, gave her first interview in Spanish to La Patilla. / Screenshot

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid January 8, 2026 — María Corina Machado is convinced that Chavismo is at the beginning of a transition that must be “as short and as fast as possible.” She told the independent Venezuelan outlet La Patilla that “The regime is being instructed to dismantle itself,” she said.

Among the opposition leader’s priorities, she said, are the release of political prisoners, an essential condition for the start of that transition, along with the restoration of the rights to assembly, expression, and association. “There can be no transition until the political prisoners are released. That is the first thing that has to happen in the next few hours,” she maintained. Her remarks, however, clash with what U.S. President Donald Trump has said so far. On Monday, when asked by the press about the political prisoners, he said: “We haven’t gotten to that. Right now what we want is to fix the oil, fix the country, bring it back, and have elections.”

This is another point of disagreement. María Corina Machado told La Patilla that there is already an elected president, Edmundo González Urrutia, whose mandate must be respected. The former diplomat, now exiled in Spain, obtained around 70% of the vote in the July 28, 2024 election, according to the tally sheets the opposition managed to obtain and present, an obligation Maduro had undertaken with international observers but never fulfilled. Machado, who was to be the presidential candidate of the Democratic Unitary Platform but was barred, told the outlet that this electoral result “must be respected.”

María Corina Machado told La Patilla that there is already an elected president, Edmundo González Urrutia, whose mandate must be respected.

The U.S. recognized González as president of Venezuela in November 2024, under the presidency of Joe Biden. However, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has disqualified last year’s elections, arguing that they were illegitimate because Machado’s candidacy was barred. “María Corina was not on the ballot in the last election; Edmundo was, so it was an illegitimate election, and therefore he is not a legitimate president,” he told the press, and he ruled out holding new elections in the short term. “It is premature at this moment. There is a lot of work ahead,” he said.

In an interview last Tuesday with NBC, Trump also ruled out holding a vote in Venezuela within the 30-day timeframe provided for in the Constitution. “First we have to fix the country. Elections cannot be held. There is no way people can vote,” he said.

Translated by Regina Anavy

________________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The Release of “a Significant Number of Venezuelans and Foreigners” Has Begun

Rocío San Miguel and four other Spaniards are among those released, confirmed the Foreign Ministry of Spain

Screenshot from the official Instagram account of Venezuela’s executive vice president, Delcy Rodríguez (center), speaking at a meeting on Sunday in Caracas (Venezuela). / EFE/@delcyrodriguezv

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, January 8, 2026 — The president of the National Assembly and chief negotiator for Chavismo, Jorge Rodríguez, announced on Thursday that the regime “has begun the release of a significant number of Venezuelans and foreigners,” without specifying how many or whom the measure includes. It has been presented as a gesture to “consolidate peace and peaceful coexistence.”

The announcement avoids detailing criteria, timelines, or lists. Nor does it clarify whether the releases are definitive or whether they involve precautionary measures, a recurring practice in Venezuela that allows the state to maintain judicial and political control over those released. Human rights organizations warn that this type of announcement is often accompanied by new arrests, in a “revolving door” dynamic that does not reduce the total number of people imprisoned for political reasons. The decision reinforces U.S. President Donald Trump’s assertion that Delcy Rodríguez is cooperating with Washington, even as Chavismo continues to appeal publicly to rhetoric of sovereignty and external confrontation.

According to the most recent records from Foro Penal, 863 people considered political prisoners remain incarcerated in Venezuela, including 86 foreigners of various nationalities. Added to that figure are hundreds of citizens subject to restrictive measures such as periodic court appearances, bans on leaving the country, and house arrest. They are not counted as prisoners but live under judicial supervision. The tally includes military personnel and civilians, political leaders, activists, students, and citizens detained after protests or accused of conspiracy. continue reading

According to the most recent records from Foro Penal, 863 people considered political prisoners remain incarcerated in Venezuela.

Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares confirmed the identities of the five Spaniards released by Venezuela on Thursday: José María Basoa, Andrés Martínez Adasme, Miguel Moreno Dapena, Ernesto Gorbe Cardona, and the Spanish-Venezuelan Rocío San Miguel.

The main prisons and detention centers holding the largest number of prisoners of conscience are well known for reports of torture, incommunicado detention, and cruel treatment. Among them are El Helicoide and La Tumba, headquarters of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Sebin) in Caracas; the Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence; and prisons such as Tocorón and Rodeo I, as well as police commands and military holding cells throughout the country. Relatives and lawyers report systematic obstacles to visits, procedural delays, and fabricated case files.

From the United States, Senator Marco Rubio recently reiterated that the release of all political prisoners must be a central condition of any transition process or understanding with Caracas. Rubio has warned that selective or temporary releases do not amount to real change and has called for verifiable guarantees, access for international organizations, and an end to arbitrary detentions as minimum signs of respect for human rights.

In the same vein, opposition leader María Corina Machado has reiterated: “There can be no transition until the political prisoners are released. That is the first thing that has to happen in the next few hours.” The former lawmaker also believes that “the only thing that sustained Maduro and this weak criminal structure was fear. If terror is removed, nothing remains.”

The international community, for its part, has called for clarity. The European Union, the United Nations, and organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have demanded verifiable information on the scope of the releases and access to detention centers. The opacity of Rodríguez’s announcement, without figures, names, or a timetable, makes any independent assessment difficult.

Translated by Regina Anavy

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.