Cuban Faces 2025: The 14 Faces That Marked the Pulse of Cuba in 2025

Each one, from their own place, has influenced the public conversation or embodied a profound dimension of this turbulent year

Here, then, are the unwitting or chosen protagonists of a tough and crucial year. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, December 24, 2025 — Every December, 14ymedio presents the faces that have stood out in Cuba during the year. Some reflect the face of power, others that of exhaustion or hope. Between blackouts, trials, hurricanes, viruses, and exoduses, the country hasn’t changed much, but the protagonists are different. This year, 2025, was, more than ever, a mosaic of crises and reinventions: politics showed its most cynical side; the eastern part of the island, devastated by Hurricane Melissa, revealed the country’s most vulnerable image; and on the margins of daily life, journalists, migrants, and athletes once again gave these months their own unique character

The 14 faces we present here defy easy categorization. There are officials who rose rapidly through the ranks, political prisoners whose resistance sustained many, and migrants who, even from afar, shape the island’s reality with their remittances, phone calls, and calls to action. Each, from their own unique position, has influenced the public discourse or embodied a profound dimension of this turbulent year.

These are faces that speak of decay—the deterioration of institutions, basic services, and family economies—but also of ingenuity and adaptability. Looking at them together is like peering into a snapshot of the country: some appear because of their exercise of power; others, because of the cost of confronting it. Some became visible by contributing to the crisis; others, by being victims of Cuba’s collapse.

Choosing them was not an act of sympathy or condemnation. Rather, it is about recognizing how these figures—diverse, contradictory, and distant from one another—decisively influenced the emotional and political climate of 2025.

Choosing them was not an act of sympathy or condemnation. Rather, it is about recognizing how these figures—diverse, contradictory, and distant from one another—decisively influenced the emotional and political climate of 2025. Among them are those who tried to maintain the framework of the State despite the evident erosion of its structures; those who paid for their dissent with imprisonment or forced exile; and those who made their way in sports, civic engagement, or social media.

2025 was the year of visible fractures: healthcare, electricity, food, and morale. It was also the year in which some voices managed to cut through the noise, from those who predicted endless blackouts to those who denounced abuses, including those who challenged the official narrative from exile or from a mobile phone. These faces, more than a list, form a map. Each one contributes a fragment of truth, a facet of the country that cannot be narrated from a single perspective.

Here, then, are the unwitting or chosen protagonists of a difficult and crucial year. Some will remain at the center of the stage in 2026; others will conclude their cycle this December. But all of them, without exception, leave an unmistakable mark on Cuba’s recent memory. Through them, the complete story can be told: the story of those who rule and the story of those who resist.

The 14 faces of 2025

1. Repressors returned to Cuba, Melody González

2. Exiled by the Cuban regime

3. Laura Gil, the daughter of the minister who demanded transparency in her father’s trial

4. Yosvani Rossell García, the body as a form of denunciation

5. José Jasán Nieves, the totí [blackbird] of economic chaos

6. Inés María Chapman, the engineer who wants to bring order to chaos

7. Marta Elena Feito, the minister who denied poverty and ended up being devoured by it

8. Lázaro Guerra Hernández, the man of the blackouts

9. Tania Velázquez Rodríguez, president of Etecsa during the ‘tarifazo’ (price hike)

10. The students, who rose up against Etecsa were defeated

11. Leyanis Pérez, queen of the triple jump

12. Juan Reinaldo Pérez, the man who deepened the crisis of Cuban baseball

13. Generation Z in Cuba, neither silent nor submissive

14. Óscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga, the power of the Castro lineage

Cuban Faces 2025: Juan Reinaldo Pérez, the Man Who Deepened the Crisis in Cuban Baseball

If good results have been scarce during the 53-year-old official’s tenure, promises have been plentiful

Juan Reinaldo Pérez Pardo has been incorporated into the organizational structure of Cuban state sports in two ways. / Vanguardia

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, December 29, 2025 —  With a bit of luck and by chance, Juan Reinaldo Pérez Pardo found himself twice within the organizational structure of Cuban state sports. The man whose leadership of led Cuban baseball to its worst world ranking in history was appointed four years ago as head of the National Baseball Commission, following the death of Ernesto Reynoso from COVID-19. Months later he became president of the Cuban Baseball and Softball Federation (FCB), after the death of Higinio Vélez. This led him to assume two responsibilities that the National Institute of Sports, Physical Education and Recreation (INDER) had previously separated

Except for the fortuitous fourth-place finish achieved by the Cuban team in the last World Baseball Classic in 2023, the national team has suffered setbacks in the various international events in which it participated during the tenure of this official born in Villa Clara. In the Premier 12 tournament, which brings together the best teams in the world, Team Asere went from sixth place in 2015 to second-to-last place (11th), tied with Puerto Rico, in 2024.

The accumulation of bad results caused Cuba to drop to 12th place in the World Baseball Softball Confederation (WBSC) rankings in the middle of this year, the worst place showing for the Island since this system was invented in 2011, although in recent months it managed to gain some points to place itself in ninth place, only 41 points above eighth place, Panama, a place it has not been able to surpass in continue reading

the last two years.

He has unable to stem the the exodus of the country’s top talent, who seek a better life away from the island due to meager salaries.

At the local level, however, his mismanagement has been most evident. He has been unable to stem the exodus of the country’s top talent, who seek a better life away from the island due to the meager salaries (3,500 pesos for those playing in the National Series and 8,500 for those in the Elite League).

This year he has led to the country’s main sporting event, the National Series, being considered “the worst in history ,” a label that came not from an independent media outlet, but from public television on December 2nd. Almost during prime time, journalists from Tele Rebelde reviewed all the complications the season has faced, from thefts and teams not resting “because they didn’t have electricity the day before,” to umpires “not showing up,” players out “due to the virus,” and a lack of transportation, among other issues. At the end of the program, they said that “this has gone beyond what is acceptable” and issued a strong plea: “Baseball cannot be allowed to die in Cuba.”

While the 53-year-old official’s tenure has been marked by a scarcity of positive results, promises have been plentiful. Late last year, he outlined a four-year development program. He stated that the primary objective would be to reclaim the historical prominence Cuba once held in all levels of baseball. He also pledged to revitalize the talent development program, improve payment mechanisms for coaches and umpires, and implement a tiered salary structure for players. Furthermore, he maintained, priority would be given to developing talent at the youth levels.

However, those words came just months after he announced – for the second year in a row – the cancellation of the Under-23 Tournament . Pro-government journalists revealed at the time that in the country “there are several sports that cannot complete their competitions scheduled for the year due to logistical and budgetary difficulties.”

Official government journalists revealed at the time that in the country “there are several sports that cannot complete their competitions planned for the year due to logistical and budgetary difficulties”

A year earlier, in 2023 , neither the 9-10 year old national championship, the final stage of Baseball 5 nor the National Women’s Baseball Cup were held, and in addition the National Under-18 Championship, was left unfinished.

However, while these promising young players have been left without support, the president of the FCB will effectively control the careers of 16-year-old and Under-18 players by signing contracts. Just last December 8th, it was announced that the Federation will be the sole entity authorized to negotiate between these young prospects and foreign teams, which will bring up to $10 million into the state coffers to compensate for the athletes’ years of development.

Despite his shortcomings, he was reappointed to the position in April of this year. The criticism came from outsiders, but also from within the regime itself. Ernesto Amaya, a reporter for Radio Guamá and the Tele Pinar channel, said that Pérez Pardo’s “professional career has been marked by more missteps than achievements,” but that his reappointment “was not surprising” given the tendency to perpetuate lifetime appointments.

In a lengthy post, Amaya added that “the decision to reappoint Pérez Pardo reflects the lack of renewal and meritocracy in Cuban sports, as well as the complicity of those who voted for him.” He also said that “the reappointment is a reminder that, in Cuba, sports seem to be more linked to politics and personal connections than to merit and ability.”

See also: Cuban Faces 2025: The 14 Faces That Marked the Pulse of Cuba in 2025

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

About 8,700 Cubans Have Died From Chikungunya or Dengue in the Current Epidemic

Data from the Cuban Observatory of Citizen Auditing contrasts with the official tally, which counts only 55 deaths

The authorities have not provided separate data on infections. / Granma

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, December 29, 2025 — Mortality from arboviral diseases in Cuba has reached 8,700 people according to statistical estimates by the Cuban Observatory of Citizen Auditing (OCAC) and Cuba Siglo 21, published this Monday in a report on the collapse of the island’s health system. The report includes data up to mid-December and states that its figure is 185 times higher than the data from the Ministry of Public Health, which at that time had announced 47 deaths. With current figures (55), the unofficial total is 158 times higher than the official one.

The document is based on official data to carry out the calculation. According to the island’s health authorities, around 30% of the population has been infected, which amounts to 2.9 million people affected in a population of 9.7 million inhabitants, the official figure from the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI). The lethality of chikungunya is low under normal conditions, at around one death per 1,000 cases. In this situation, which OCAC calls “Scenario A,” 2,900 Cubans would have died. However, this would be the course of the epidemic in countries with good health care.

The report considers two other scenarios. One would be moderate lethality (Scenario B), which is considered the most likely for the island. This corresponds to a health system with limited clinical care, hospital saturation and a high prevalence of co-morbidities. In such contexts, mortality can range from 0.3% to 0.5%, which would mean between 8,700 and 14,500 deaths, depending on severity.

The moderate-lethality scenario is the one considered most likely for the island, which would have a health system with limited clinical care, hospital saturation and a high prevalence of comorbidities

Finally, there would be a case of high lethality (Scenario C), rare and affecting very vulnerable subgroups or collapsed systems, in which mortality would reach 1% or 29,000 people in a population like Cuba’s. “This scenario represents a limit of high epidemiological severity, which may indicate not only the intrinsic lethality of the virus but also the limitations of the health system’s ability to respond to a large-scale continue reading

epidemic,” the document specifies.

OCAC believes the island is in Scenario B, which could put the figure at 8,700 deaths with the more moderate lethality. Nevertheless, the report notes that even if Cuba were in better condition than presumed (Scenario A), there would still have been 2,900 deaths, which is 61 times higher than the 47 recognized by the Ministry of Public Health at that time.

However, one of the report’s inaccuracies is that it does not separate the two diseases that are, in principle, causing the mortality. The estimate that 30% of the population has been infected was offered by the director of Epidemiology, Francisco Durán, who at the time referred to “nonspecific febrile syndromes” and also did not differentiate the type of virus. In that television appearance, the doctor assured that there was no “new” disease circulating on the island, and that these cases were dengue and chikungunya.

Currently, according to official data, there are 37 deaths from complications of the latter and 18 from dengue, a much more lethal disease to which the same calculations cannot be applied. Since Durán did not provide the percentage of those infected by each disease, it is impossible to make a precise calculation.

Among the criticisms appearing in the report is this one: the lack of transparency. The report attributes to this the long delay in informing the population about the seriousness of an issue that social media and the independent press had been warning about since the summer. Patients multiplied in a perfect breeding ground: power outages that prevented protection against mosquitoes, breeding sites due to water accumulation, lack of garbage collection and the absence of an anti-vector campaign due to limitations in supplies and human resources.

The report emphasizes that the current health crisis is a direct consequence of poor “political decisions sustained over years that have systematically weakened the State’s capacity to protect the life and health of its population.” Among these, it cites underinvestment in health care (approximately 2% of State expenditures) compared to the enormous percentage of State money going to tourism (around 36%), which is managed by the military conglomerate GAESA.

Among the poor decisions, it cites underinvestment in health care (approximately 2%) compared to the enormous percentage of State money going to tourism (around 36%)

This situation has reduced medical staff to a minimum: between 2021 and 2024, the system lost a staggering 30,767 professionals. In addition, since 2019 there have been 7,144 fewer hospital beds. The report also includes data from BioCubaFarma’s report on medication shortages up to January 2025, which noted the absence of 255 of the 395 drugs the company supplies to the national system. Furthermore, authorities stated last week that the basic formulary is made up of 651 medications, of which 62% are produced domestically and the remaining 38% are imported. Of the latter, at least 60% are not available.

“For the Cuban Observatory of Citizen Auditing, the collapse of the health system constitutes a form of structural violence exercised from power. Keeping millions of people in conditions of malnutrition, health defenselessness and permanent exposure to epidemiological risks is not an accident, but the consequence of a model of governance that has ceased to prioritize basic human well-being,” the document states, adding that profound structural changes and an independent assessment of the situation are needed.

Translated by Regina Anavy

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Is There Anyone [in Cuba!] Who Can Exchange Currency?

In the queue at the Cadeca in San José de las Lajas, people just want to collect their meagre pensions in pesos and no one is interested in the new floating dollar exchange rate.

“We are now in a state of tremendous confusion because many businesses are applying an intermediate exchange rate, between the one published by ‘El Toque’ and the state rate.” / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Julio César Contreras, San José de las Lajas (Mayabeque). 28 December 2025 — In San José de las Lajas, the new floating dollar exchange rate does not feel like a change, but rather like a number – 410 pesos – that is alien to the real life of the population.

In front of the municipality’s Cadeca [currency exchange], the morning is progressing slowly, with the sun beating down on the pavement and a line where almost no one talks about currency, even though the signs and figures are there for all to see.

Gisela arrived early to collect her mother’s pension. With the recent change in the exchange rate, she wondered if there would be longer lines and if the collection of checks would be separated from foreign currency exchange transactions. She asked the guard at the door and the answer was simple: everyone waiting is there for their retirement. The last to arrive is an elderly man in worn clothes, unhurried and with no intention of exchanging dollars.

“As far as I’m concerned, the government can set the dollar at whatever price it wants,” says the retiree, adjusting his cap emblazoned with the letters USA. “With my pension of 4,000 pesos, the most I can hope for is to eat for a week,” he explains, referring to a payment that is not even equivalent to $10, according to the official exchange rate. “Everything is more expensive on the street,” the man says, without raising his voice.

They want to compete with the informal market, but they don’t do that well either. / 14ymedio

The assistant pokes his head out from time to time and asks the usual question: “Is there anyone here to exchange currency?” No one responds. All morning, no one has stopped in front of the doorway with the intention of selling dollars. “They want to compete with the informal market, but they’re not doing that well either,” says Gisela, leaning against the wall. Her experience is not theoretical. “I signed up in February to buy $60 through the digital queue, and I’m still waiting. So it’s obvious that you have to sort out your dollars on the street.” continue reading

In San José de las Lajas, as in much of the country, you only need to open Facebook or Telegram to see that informal trading continues unabated. Ads appear one after another, rates change several times a day, and transactions are carried out without paperwork or blackboards. “If my brother sends me a few dollars, I’m not going to sell them to the government at a lower price than what others are offering me,” says Gisela. “You don’t have to be an economist,” she points out. For her, the new rate is just another chapter in a series of broken promises, too similar to those of the Tarea Ordenamiento (Ordering Task*).

“To make matters worse, we now have tremendous confusion because many businesses are using an intermediate exchange rate, between the one published by El Toque and the one used by the government, which means that now you have to do a lot of mental calculations to be able to pay directly with dollars or when selling them,” the woman tells 14ymedio.

“All we do is stand here praying that the cash doesn’t run out before we get to the window.” / 14ymedio

The line of pensioners moves slowly. There are no faces of relief, no optimistic comments. The weariness of those who live counting every penny is pervasive. Mario, a retired agricultural engineer, observes the board with irony. “This is a joke,” complains the man who spent most of his professional life in a Cuba “where the dollar was prohibited or frowned upon.” It was in the early 2000s that he first came into contact with the US currency, during a time when he worked in Venezuela and managed to save some money.

Mario doesn’t believe the measure announced by the Central Bank of Cuba will benefit most people. “That’s for a small group, not for ordinary people,” he says, leaning against his old bicycle. “All we do is stand here praying that the cash doesn’t run out before we get to the teller window.” Around him, several elderly people nod in agreement as they try to take advantage of the shade under the doorway.

*Translator’s note: The “Ordering Task” was a collection of measures that include eliminating the Cuban Convertible Peso (CUC), leaving the Cuban peso as the only national currency, raising prices, raising salaries (but not as much as prices), opening stores that take payment only in hard currency which must be in the form of specially issued pre-paid debit cards, and a broad range of other measures targeted to different elements of the Cuban economy. 

Translated by GH

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Cuban Officials Propose Taking Advantage of the Shortage To Stop Eating Potatoes and Rice, Products Foreign to the National Culture

“We are not Asians, that is not a Cuban habit,” argues a Cuban official

On the program Cuadrando la Caja, they argued that in order to achieve food sovereignty, the best approach would be to change habits. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, December 26, 2025 — Thoroughly debunked, the cliché that the Chinese word for “crisis” means “opportunity” has been used by both politicians and motivational talk gurus, and this week national food officials have appealed to its spirit to call for a change in the Cuban diet. Seated with Marxlenin Pérez Valdés on her program Cuadrando la Caja, Roberto Caballero, a member of the National Executive Committee of Agricultural and Forestry Technicians, and José Carlos Cordobés, Director General of Industrial Policy at the Ministry of Food Industry, argued that to achieve food sovereignty the best course would be to change habits that clash with the reality of Cuban soils and to remove potatoes and rice from the regular diet.

“And once an Italian asked me, quite rightly: ‘Why do you spend so much money on potatoes when you have sweet potatoes, yucca, yams, malanga, and with the money you spend on potatoes they could flood the country with all those products?” said Caballero. The technician explained that potatoes have never adapted well to the territory, and although he did not give a reason – that potatoes thrive in temperate to cool climates, while the Island’s warm humidity favors pests – he specified the enormous investment that the country has made to plant them, keep them at suitable temperatures and curb the diseases that plague them.

It is an unprofitable product, he wanted to make clear, but he put it in such a way that host Pérez Valdés herself was taken aback, especially when he stressed that rice is not an easy food to grow in Cuba. “Roberto wants to take away even our rice! José Carlos, help me with this,” the presenter exclaimed in alarm when Caballero explained that this grain has been incorporated into the national culture, without being realistic. “We are not Asians, that is not a Cuban habit,” he stressed, before considering that, although it is already an established tradition, that too could change. “With the shortages that exist, anything you put out for people will sell,” he asserted.

That part of the conversation is what has generated the most ink among the population, although there were other, more interesting segments in the program, which dealt with the situation of food production. The officials reviewed the factors that have led to the current dire situation, while refraining from throwing continue reading

stones at the government. The energy situation, the passage of Hurricane Melissa, the shortage of inputs to produce and, of course, the US “blockade” were mentioned, but they also openly criticized a policy that has been widespread on the Island for decades: price caps.

“There are many things that could be solved but which have not been solved this year, and which in the long run will lead to totally insufficient levels of production”

“For farmers, production costs have skyrocketed enormously, which we then suddenly try to regulate by imposing price caps, and the only consequence is that they stop producing, because they cannot sell at a price lower than what it costs to produce,” said Cordobés, who also railed against the delays caused by bureaucratization.

“There is the whole problem of non-payments; there is the whole problem of delays in the procedures that farmers have to go through. In other words, there are many things that could be solved but which have not been solved this year and which in the long run lead to production levels that are totally insufficient,” he lamented.

Cordobés, however, also made some remarks that surprised viewers. “Today the country has an industrial infrastructure that, with a different dynamic in agriculture, improved financial flows for the country and the ability to import the raw materials needed, would allow industry to meet the demands of the population. I think that’s very important,” he said. In other words: if things worked properly in the country, there would be no problem. To put it bluntly.

The officials, satisfied that the industry “does not need investments but does not exploit them efficiently,” regretted that at present there is no foreign currency to import everything that would be needed, and they congratulated themselves because the “links” – the private enterprises – have contributed a lot and in a satisfactory way. “We should be closing at around 70,000 tons of product with those actors. Without them, we would not have incorporated that amount into our system. So somehow the industry has been able to take advantage of that scenario.”

“Well, I do organic farming. It’s less efficient, more expensive, but I sell the product at a higher price. So the person who has money eats healthy food and the others continue to be poisoned. I mean, that doesn’t fit in our system.”

Roberto Caballero has also analyzed Cuba’s conditions, with a tradition of small farms in most areas of agriculture – excepting sugar cane – for reasons which he attributed mainly to the climate and the saline soils. “There are those out there who have said that we cannot be self-sufficient in food, that Cuba doesn’t have the right conditions,” he noted, and he also admitted that in a globalized world, full sovereignty is not indispensable either, but that it is important to accept the circumstances of each country.

“The other day we were talking to some Koreans and they said that they practically don’t produce food. As they have many minerals and export a lot of technology, what they do with the money they earn is to buy food. Ah, okay, that’s a solution. But we don’t even consider that; it wouldn’t be valid for us, because they don’t have a blockade* and we do,” he emphasized.

The officials also spoke at length about sustainable agriculture and said that Cuba must strike a balance with this model because, while it is important, it may in some sense contradict the State’s principles of social justice. “For there this problem of the environment is very easily solved. Well, I do organic farming. It’s less efficient, more expensive, but I sell the product at a higher price. So the person who has money eats healthy food, while others continue to be poisoned. That doesn’t fit into our system,” they said. However, they do not deny that, in the long run, an improvement can be achieved.

The final segment was entirely devoted to theorizing about how to produce more, but, again, it all came down to the usual pie-in-the-sky story and how with foreign currency, exporting and generating income, things would get better. “It’s a big task we have for the year 2026, and things can be done in this scenario. Even with these complexities, things can be done,” they promised. One more year.

Translator’s note: There is, in fact, no US ‘blockade’ on Cuba, but this continues to be the term the Cuban government prefers to apply to the ongoing US embargo. During the Cuban Missile Crisis the US ordered a Naval blockade (which it called a ‘quarantine’) on Cuba in 1962, between 22 October and 20 November of that year. The blockade was lifted when Russia agreed to remove its nuclear missiles from the Island. The embargo had been imposed earlier in February of the same year, and although modified from time to time, it is still in force.

Translated by Regina Anavy

Cuban Doctors in Angola Spend Christmas Without Pay and With No Date Set for Their Vacations

Cuban doctors in Angola spend Christmas without pay and with no date set for their vacations

Late payments, delayed flights and silence from Antex mark the end of the year for health workers and teachers on official missions in the African country.

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Natalia López Moya, Havana, 25 December 2025 — Christmas once again finds hundreds of Cuban health professionals in Angola caught between family distance, job uncertainty and administrative silence. Hired by Antex, the state corporation that manages these official missions abroad, many doctors and teachers arrive at the end of December without having received their salary for this month and without minimum guarantees to organise a temporary return to the island. The scenario is not new, but it repeats itself with a regularity that erodes any institutional promise.

From Luanda, a Cuban doctor sums up present feelings among his colleagues: “This Christmas will be a little more painful.” In addition to being separated from their children, parents and partners, they cannot afford a dinner that is any different from their daily routine. “It is now usual for Antex to delay payments. Normally, salaries arrived around the 20th, but that’s just a memory now,” he complains, referring to the equivalent of $200 they should receive in Angola, while most of their salary is kept in a bank on the island.

Antex had announced that it would most likely only be able to pay half that amount, but as the days go by, the promise has been reduced to $50. “If that’s the case, they would have to guarantee us a New Year’s Eve dinner, at least, but I doubt they will,” says the doctor.

“If that’s the case, they would have to guarantee us a New Year’s Eve dinner, at least, but I doubt they will,” says the doctor.

In December, as in other months, payment has been delayed and questions remain unanswered: will there be a special end-of-year meal organised by the Cuban authorities, will the pattern of 2023 be repeated — when some went more than two months without being paid — or will we simply have to resign ourselves to another year-end in limbo?

This testimony coincides with other complaints received by 14ymedio in recent days, in which Cuban doctors in Angola report systematic delays in payments, unclear deductions and obstacles to accessing their statutory holidays. Not only does this situation persist, but it is worsening in a context of local inflation, rising food prices and declining purchasing power of wages.

Added to the economic uncertainty is the chronic delay in return trips for vacations in Cuba. Many professionals expected to return between August continue reading

and September, but that schedule was almost completely disrupted. “Antex has not even sent 10% of the teachers who should have travelled during that period,” explains the doctor. The domino effect is evident: mission time is accumulating, holidays for all staff are being postponed, and there are increasing numbers of colleagues who have been in Angola for 15 months with no clear return date. For some, the wait is even turning into a forced extension of their contract.

“There’s always a manager who manages to leave on the scheduled date,” he adds, adding to the perception of privilege.

The official explanation changes depending on the situation, according to those affected. When there are no TAAG Angola Airlines flights, the response is that there are no connections available and that chartering a flight would be too expensive. When there are flights, the argument is reversed: the airline has raised its prices and it would therefore be preferable to hire a charter flight. “But neither is true,” says the doctor. In practice, almost no one travels. “There’s always a manager who does leave on the scheduled date,” he adds, fueling the perception of privilege and arbitrariness.

The impact of these breaches goes beyond just economics. For many, the mission in Angola was presented as an opportunity to improve their income, help their families in Cuba and build up savings. However, wage arrears and travel restrictions have turned that expectation into frustration. Christmas, with its symbolic significance, accentuates the feeling of abandonment. With no money in hand and no certainty of return, even basic gestures—buying a gift, preparing a special meal, connecting with family—become difficult.

From a contractual point of view, professionals insist that the agreed conditions are not being met. Late payments, lack of information and “total silence”, as they describe it, contrast with the official rhetoric on international medical cooperation. Angola is one of the historical destinations for these missions and a significant source of income for the Cuban state, which acts as an intermediary and retains a substantial portion of the salaries. For workers, this intermediation should entail clear responsibilities: punctuality in payments, transparency and guarantees of rest.

Angola is one of the historical destinations for these missions and a significant source of income for the Cuban state.

The institutional response, however, remains elusive. There are no statements explaining the delays or public timetables for regularising salaries and flights. The lack of information fuels rumours and anxiety, especially on sensitive dates. “Will we not be able to have a New Year’s Eve dinner either?” some ask, no longer expecting a formal response.
In a context where medical missions are presented as one of the pillars of Cuban foreign policy, reports from Angola once again bring forward the human cost of the model. For professionals in Luanda, Christmas brings no respite: it arrives with unpaid bills, broken promises and the certainty that, once again, the the solutions are not keeping up wioth the problems

Translated by GH

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Due to a Lack of Teachers in Cuba, Recess Is Permanent at a School in San José De Las Lajas

Staff shortages turn afternoons into lost teaching hours at Camilo Cienfuegos Elementary School

A grandfather approaches on his bicycle and chats with his granddaughter. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Julio César Contreras, San José de las Lajas, 23 December 2025 –At four in the afternoon, the air on Avenida 40 is thick with smoke in front of the Camilo Cienfuegos Elementary School in San José de las Lajas. Under the dense shade of the flamboyant trees, parents gather in front of the fence that separates the street from the inner courtyard. They balance patience and frustration as they watch the children run haphazardly among loose stones, puddles, abandoned backpacks, and trees with roots protruding from the ground. It doesn’t seem like school time. There are no blackboards or notebooks, only impromptu races, wads of paper, games of hide-and-seek, and noise. Lots of noise

Among the parents stands Marlén, her son’s uniform folded over her arm, her face weary. “When he’s not covered in dirt, his shirt’s missing a button,” she says, her gaze fixed on the little boy playing at the edge of the fence. “They force him to come in the afternoon, supposedly because he has classes, but most of the time they spend those two hours playing in the playground, with no one to supervise them, much less teach them.” Since last year, her son hasn’t had a regular teacher. What used to be routine now seems like improvisation: a school without teaching, a schedule without content.

Since last year, her son hasn’t had a regular teacher. What used to be routine now seems like improvisation.

The surrounding scenes confirm it. A grandfather approaches on his bicycle and, through the fence, talks to his granddaughter, who shows him a crumpled folder. Further on, a mother leans against the metal fence and barely blinks as she watches her daughter run after a group that has turned the courtyard into a maze. Two children are throwing small stones, another is juggling a stick, and a teenager, her headscarf undone, kicks up dust with her shoes that are no longer so white. A few meters away, the only teaching assistant who should be keeping order is looking at her phone screen.

Through the fence, the old painting of the school mural can be seen, almost erased by the sun / 14ymedio

“Before, there were teachers in every classroom here,” recalls Marlén, who studied there in the 1990s. Now, every day is marked by absences: there’s a lack of teaching staff, a lack of teachers, a lack of classes. And, meanwhile, those children who should be learning their multiplication tables, spelling, or reading comprehension spend hours in the sun, during an extended recess continue reading

that no parent asked for.

The school celebrated its 70th anniversary this year. It received a Lifetime Achievement Award from the local government. But none of that changes the scene that repeats itself every afternoon: first-grade students with no activities, no proper supervision, and no security. The state institution, founded in 1956 as the Eliodoro García School, seems to be stuck in an indefinite limbo.

A few meters away, the only teaching assistant who should be in control is looking at the screen on her phone.

“In their eagerness to change everything and solve nothing, the government has even lost the educators,” says Marino, the grandfather of a fifth-grade student. He speaks while waiting, bicycle in hand, for the main gate to open. “My granddaughter has to come in the afternoons five days a week, and they don’t even give her physical education. If this continues, I won’t bring her after noon anymore.”

Many family members arrive before four o’clock. They line up in front of the metal fence waiting for the dismissal signal, which should theoretically come at 4:20. Although they can see and even talk to the children from the street, the gate remains locked. “They make the rules arbitrarily, because the Ministry of Education mandates it, even though not even the teachers agree,” Marino insists.

While they wait, street vendors appear with sweets and cookies. A mother takes the opportunity to briefly feed her daughter through the fence, who complains about the school lunch menu: “What they serve here isn’t even fit for pigs,” she says bluntly.

Her daughter’s teacher, she says, is 67 years old and by 11:00 in the morning “she can’t do any more”

At the far end of the courtyard rises the building’s facade: columns, open corridors, and peeling walls. The flag seems small compared to the magnitude of the problem. Where there should be books, there is disorder; where the dictation of a prayer should be heard, there are shouts. “They’re trying to cover the teaching with university students,” says Marisol, who now takes care of two nephews because her sister emigrated. “The few old teachers who are still left are teaching because they have no other choice.” Her daughter’s teacher, she says, is 67 years old and by 11:00 in the morning “she can’t go on anymore.”

Through the fence, the old paint of the school mural is visible, almost faded by the sun. “Every day they come with the story that the teachers are asking for the parents’ help,” Marisol sighs. “That means bringing brooms, floor mats, chalk, money for the Teacher’s Day party… everything.” But what weighs most heavily on her isn’t the list of supplies, but what she sees every afternoon from the street: “The children doing everything but studying. And in the end, there’s no one to complain to.”

When the gate finally opens, the parents are able to hug their children. The yard is left behind, full of dust kicked up by the running.

The state institution, founded in 1956 as the Eliodoro García school, seems trapped in an indefinite pause today / 14ymedio

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Cuba’s Telecommunications Company Etecsa Restarts Mobile Line Sales, Generating Long Lines in Havana

The shortage of SIM cards has further complicated Cubans’ access to telecommunications

For months, the shortage of SIM cards left numerous users without service. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Dario Hernandez, Havana, December 23, 2025 – This Monday, the offices of the State telecommunications company Etecsa in various parts of Havana were packed after the start of sales for new mobile lines and replacement SIM cards, a service that had been unavailable for months. The prolonged shortage made losing a phone a secondary problem compared to the impossibility of recovering the number, essential for communication, internet access, or carrying out basic tasks. The reopening of the service led to long lines, tension, and uneven organization in a context marked by the precariousness of telecommunications

Early on, 14ymedio visited several of these branches and confirmed how quickly the news had spread among customers. At the office located beneath the Focsa building in El Vedado, they attempted to maintain some control by issuing 100 tickets daily. The wait was long and the atmosphere tense, but relatively orderly. Similar stories were repeated among those waiting: stolen or lost phones and months of fruitless visits to Etecsa. “What hurts the most is losing the line,” several commented while they waited.

“What hurts the most is losing the line.”

In Regla, the lack of a clear queuing system led to constant arguments. Some, despite arriving late, tried to cut in line, an attitude that fueled the discontent among those who had arrived at the office early. The shouting and recriminations increased as rumors spread that supplies could run out at any moment, a possibility many considered certain after previous experiences of shortages and sudden sales suspensions.

For months, the shortage of SIM cards left many users without service. Some reported that the only alternative offered was to manage the line from abroad or pay in foreign currency, options beyond the reach of a large part of the population. This situation was compounded by frequent power outages and mobile service interruptions, which affected the quality of the connection.

This crisis is part of a broader scenario marked by Etecsa’s so-called “tarifazo” — a huge rate hike — which last May raised the cost of data and telephone services relative to salaries in pesos. The price increase, coupled with a shortage of lines and dependence on top-ups from abroad, has deepened inequality in access to communication. The lines this Monday reflect the cumulative impact of a commercial policy that has made connectivity an increasingly difficult commodity to obtain.

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Theft Within Cuba’s Public Health System Aggravates Drug Shortages

The complaint comes from the authorities themselves, who also admit a “significant decrease” in national production

It is estimated that pharmacy shortages reach 70% of products / Cubadebate

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, December 22, 2025 — Cuban health authorities pointed to a new culprit yesterday for the shortage of medications in Cuban pharmacies: the illegal market generated from within the public health system itself. “Prestigious institutions” are involved, as well as pharmacy workers “from other areas and other activities of the sector,” said Maylin Beltrán Delgado, head of the Department of Pharmacies and Optics of the Ministry of Public Health, on Monday.

The official pointed out on the television program Mesa Redonda that, in view of the “growing phenomenon of the illegal market,” a nationwide surveillance ”plan of measures” was implemented. “We have done more than 5,000 inspections this year, about 13 per day, on average,” said Beltrán Delgado. These joint operations, she added, made it possible to gauge “the severity of control problems in the network.”

By the end of October, “authorities had identified 33 extraordinarily serious incidents” in the pharmacy system. Of these, 18 were “forcible thefts committed by persons outside the health sector who broke into pharmacies to steal the scarce medications available.” She specified that of those thefts, “about 10 were related to controlled substances (drugs, narcotic drugs, psychotropic and substances with similar effects)” and reminded viewers that selling these products “is a drug trafficking offense.”

“Today, the industry has also stopped responding routinely to medication orders”

The shortage, which last year was already at 70% in pharmacies, is also due to the “significant decline in national drug production.” Today, the industry has also stopped responding routinely to medication orders,” admitted continue reading

Cristina Lara Bastanzuri, director of Medicines and Medical Technologies.

Regardless of the fact that China and India are by far the main producers of pharmaceutical raw materials, the official blamed the “US blockade” for difficulties in importing active and inactive ingredients and for the “technological obsolescence in some plants, interruptions in the energy supply and limitations on performing proper industrial maintenance.”

Poor domestic production has a major impact, given that the country’s basic list includes 651 medications, of which 62% – 403 products – correspond to medications that are supposed to be produced by the national pharmaceutical industry. The remaining 38% are imported, and at least 60% of these are unavailable.

The breaking point, said Lara Bastanzuri, was the rupture in 2019 with Brazil, which was ruled at that time by Jair Bolsonaro, resulting in the loss of an “important source of supplies, inputs and revenues for the sector.”

There is “an almost total shortage in pharmacies. It’s real, the drugs are not there”

This has led to “an almost total shortage of supplies in pharmacies. It is real, the drugs are not there,” acknowledged the official. She added that it is not even possible to guarantee the continuation of card-controlled medications, which are intended for patients with chronic diseases such as hypertension, diabetes mellitus and epilepsy. They constitute the highest priority within the outpatient care system.”

“Practically, the funding that goes to the industry is allocated to saving lives with drugs and serums,” she said, which sometimes leaves community pharmacies by the wayside, with several days of delay in receiving supplies.

The wait can be long, up to 60 days, when the original design of the supply system operated on a replenishment “every 12 to 15 days.” This delay has increased pressure on the organized sales system “and has inevitably intensified public dissatisfaction.”

Irregular distribution has also affected prescribing practices, “because people are practical and will take whatever medications are available.” Family doctors and specialists are “often forced to adapt their treatments to the momentary availability of drugs.”

Doctors are “often forced to adapt their treatments to the availability of drugs”

Without medicine and with a collapsed health system, Cuba is currently facing an “epidemic phase” due to viruses that plague the island, which have so far left 55 people dead.

However, despite the lack of supplies and electricity to operate certain medical equipment, the government announced with great fanfare that as of Monday it has been attending patients suffering from the sequelae of viral fever. According to Cubadebate, specialized consultations, “unprecedented in Cuba,” offer patients access to diagnostic tests such as CT scans and ultrasound.

“For those with severe pain, specialized anesthetic treatments will be available. In addition, personalized physiotherapy programs will be designed to promote rehabilitation and rapid reintegration into daily and work activities,” said the media. The consultations are being held at the Institute of Neurology and Neurosurgery.

Translated by Regina Anavy

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Cuban Bank Employees Are Still Awaiting ‘Guidance’ on Buying and Selling Dollars

“We ourselves have doubts. The banks are collecting foreign currency only; they haven’t given us the order yet to sell”

In private businesses, it’s common for employees to accept US currency at the informal exchange rate and even purchase it. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, Darío Hernández, December 23, 2025 — Nearly a week after the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) announced the implementation of a floating rate for the foreign exchange market, in addition to other official exchange rates, the measure has yet to materialize for most Cubans. In Havana, the banks are not selling dollars to the population, despite the regulation being presented as a step to “organize” the exchange market and bring the official rate closer to the country’s economic reality.

In practice, the only thing that has begun to function is the purchase of foreign currency, and even that operation is surrounded by improvisation, administrative silence and confusion among bank employees themselves, as 14ymedio was able to confirm during visits to several bank branches in the Cuban capital.

“So far, I have no news that dollars are being sold to the population under the new rate; what they are doing is buying,” a Banco Metropolitano branch employee in El Vedado, who prefers to remain anonymous, explained to this newspaper on Monday. According to his account, US currency was being received that day at 401 pesos.

“If the customer hands over a large amount of dollars and the bank doesn’t have enough cash in national currency, part of the payment is made through electronic transfer. If the disbursement is made completely in cash, a 3% discount is applied as a tax,” the state worker specifies.

The new rate was announced by monetary authorities as a flexible mechanism, subject to adjustments based on supply and demand. The stated objective was to compete with the informal market and capture dollars currently circulating outside the state financial system. However, what is happening at the branches is very different from the official narrative. There are no clear protocols, and staff continue reading

are working without precise instructions on how to proceed.

There are no clear protocols and staff are working without instructions

This scheme, far from conveying confidence, feeds the perception of improvisation. “This entire process of the new floating dollar exchange rate has been implemented without notice or prior preparation of the bank staff,” the worker summarizes. “We haven’t received any guidance on how to sell the dollars, whether we’ll give it to them in cash or through electronic transfer. Even yesterday we had a meeting at our bank, and the topic of selling dollars didn’t even come up.”

The uncertainty repeats itself at other branches in the capital. At the bank located on the ground floor of the Focsa building, also in El Vedado, an employee confirms that the order for now is to buy only foreign currency. “We ourselves have doubts. Now all the banks are doing is collecting, buying dollars,” she explains. Although she says that selling will happen “at some point,” she recognizes that there still isn’t an official instruction allowing them to offer dollars to the public.

The worker also confirms that the rate of 401 pesos is already being used in other financial operations. “Those who have MLC [freely convertible currency] cards, now when you do a transfer from Transfermóvil to national currency, the exchange rate used is that one, and you gain cash that way.” If this detail is confirmed, then it would be a signal that the BCC is trying to consolidate the freely convertible currency again, as seems to be indicated by the rapid rise of that virtual financial instrument on the informal market exchange board published daily by the site El Toque. At the end of October; a dollar was worth barely 200 pesos and is now at 350.

The design of the sales mechanism, when finally activated, also raises questions. According to banking sources, MSMEs (micro, small and medium-sized enterprises) will receive dollars exclusively through electronic transfers, not in cash, which is in line with the chronic shortage of bills in state coffers. For individual customers, a combination of cash and transfers is expected, “when they approve it,” clarifies the Focsa employee. For now, the outlook is an asymmetric scheme: the bank buys dollars from the population but doesn’t sell them.

The BCC announced a new banking channel for the non-state sector to purchase foreign currency in the official market. “Requests will be made from commercial banks and through the fiscal account, without handling cash,” the brief informative note clarifies. “The limit will be up to 50% of the average gross income of the fiscal account in the last quarter,” the text adds.

For now, the outlook is an asymmetric scheme: the bank buys dollars from the population but doesn’t sell them. / 14ymedio

Regarding individuals, this note clarifies that the limit of 100 dollars per person will continue and that the cumbersome and ineffective system of turns through the Ticket app at the 41 sales offices will be maintained.

Outside the Focsa bank branch on Monday, however, the urgent concerns were different. The long line to collect pensions or attempt to withdraw cash from ATMs monopolized customers’ anxiety. Each time an employee poked their head out the main door, a shower of questions rained down on them. Doubts ranged from the establishment’s operating hours during the upcoming holidays to questions about when they will start selling dollars.

Informal currency exchangers, meanwhile, seem to be starting to react after days of paralysis and uncertainty following the official announcement. “The guy who buys dollars in my neighborhood went a week without accepting them but has started again and has set them at 420 pesos,” a young resident of the Guanabacoa municipality explains to this newspaper. In private businesses, it is common for employees to accept US currency at the informal exchange rate and even to purchase it.

El Toque reports that the dollar this Tuesday is at 440 pesos on the informal market, where the greenback continues to circulate with greater agility and without taxes or cumbersome procedures. For many Cubans, handing over their foreign currency to the bank and having to register personal data with no certainty of being able to buy it back doesn’t seem like an attractive option at the moment.

“I had 100 dollars saved for Christmas and I preferred to change them with an individual who has a cafeteria on my block,” recounts a neighbor from Cotorro. “He gave me 425 pesos for them and I came out better than I would have with the bank and didn’t have to show my ID card,” she adds. However, she will avoid selling the remaining US currency she has saved “until things settle down.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Vargas Llosa According to Padura: A Literary Conversation in a Packed Room at the Ateneo de La Habana

The Cuban author acknowledged he is an admirer of Vargas Llosa’s work, especially ‘Conversation in the Cathedral’.

The dialogue also addressed Vargas Llosa’s relationship with the Cuban Revolution. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Dario Hernandez, Havana, 20 December 2025 — For just over an hour, Havana experienced one of those rare moments when literature manages to triumph over blackouts and hardship.

The Ateneo de La Habana was packed to overflowing to hear Leonardo Padura speak about Mario Vargas Llosa, in a conversation moderated by Rafael Grillo and organized by La Tertulia. The sustained attention and the diversity of the audience confirmed that literature continues to draw people in Cuba, despite the crisis, censorship, and fears surrounding certain topics.

The room, with its peeling walls and fans that barely offered any relief from the tropical winter chill, was packed long before it began. Readers of all ages filled every available chair; others sat on the floor, leaned against the walls, or remained standing throughout the entire event. Among the attendees were writers, editors, artists, university professors, and regular readers, all mingling without any apparent protocol or hierarchy.

The hall was packed long before it started. / 14ymedio

Rafael Grillo led the discussion with sobriety and precision, avoiding a laudatory tone and opting for questions that placed Vargas Llosa at the center of the literary debate, not in the realm of superficial political polemics. From the outset, it was clear that this was not an uncritical tribute, but rather a reasoned reading of a pivotal work of Spanish-language narrative. Padura knows that speaking about Vargas Llosa on the island entails acknowledging contradictions, areas of conflict, and an intellectual trajectory that cannot be reduced to slogans.

The Cuban author acknowledged his admiration for Vargas Llosa’s work, especially Conversation in the Cathedral, a novel he defined as one of the undisputed masterpieces of the 20th century. He detailed the Peruvian writer’s obsession with power, the mechanisms of domination, and the moral degradation produced by authoritarian structures. He also continue reading

emphasized the tension between Vargas Llosa’s liberal thought and a literature that, in many passages, seems written from a leftist perspective.

One of the most talked-about moments was when Padura recalled personal anecdotes from his first encounter with Vargas Llosa. The first time he approached him, as they were getting off a plane, he told him he was a close friend of Ambrosio Fornet, with whom the Peruvian had studied in Madrid during his youth. Then he confessed: “Maestro, I just wanted to tell you one thing so as not to bother you: every time I start writing a novel, I read Conversation in the Cathedral .”

Among those present were writers, editors, artists, university professors, and regular readers. / 14ymedio

The dialogue also addressed Vargas Llosa’s relationship with the Cuban Revolution. Padura recalled that the Peruvian writer’s initial enthusiasm was shared by much of the Latin American intelligentsia of the 1960s and that the break was not immediate. The definitive rupture came in 1971, after the Padilla case, when Vargas Llosa spearheaded the letter of protest against the Cuban poet’s arrest and forced self-criticism. From that moment on, he noted, the distance was irreversible, and the writer understood that the revolutionary project had betrayed basic principles of intellectual freedom.

The audience listened in silence, without interruptions or signs of impatience. The final questions confirmed the level of attention and the need for these spaces. They discussed literature and politics, censorship and the market, in a country where the price of a book in Europe is equivalent to two months’ salary for the average Cuban. There were also references to Donald Trump and the current regional context, where old stories that “Cubans heard in fourth grade” are resurfacing, such as the Monroe Doctrine and gunboats.

Padura insisted that his relationship with Vargas Llosa has always remained on the literary plane, without demands for alignment or concessions, as if literature were the last territory where it is still possible to converse without preconditions.

Leonardo Padura speaks about Mario Vargas Llosa in a packed Ateneo de La Habana.

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Cuba’s Council for the Transition Chooses a New Leadership After the Departure of José Daniel Ferrer

Manuel Cuesta Morúa assumes the presidency while Ferrer focuses on reorganizing the opposition from exile.

Manuel Cuesta Morúa assumes the presidency while Ferrer focuses on reorganizing the opposition from exile. / EFE

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/EFE, Havana, 22 December 2025 — The Council for Democratic Transition in Cuba (CTDC), one of the main platforms for articulating the Cuban opposition, announced this Monday the election of a new Executive for the period 2026-2028, in an internal process that marks the replacement of its historic president, José Daniel Ferrer, who went into exile in Miami last October.

The new leadership is headed by opposition leader Manuel Cuesta Morúa as president, accompanied by four vice presidents also residing in Cuba—Osvaldo Navarro, Juan Alberto de la Nuez, Marthadela Tamayo, and Félix Navarro, the latter currently imprisoned—and two vice presidents living abroad, Iris Ruiz and Elena Larrinaga. The leadership will formally assume its duties on January 10.

Ferrer confirmed to EFE that he will not be part of the new CTDC leadership, after having requested internal elections and submitted his resignation from all his positions within the organization. The opposition leader explained that his decision stems from the need to prevent his political activities from exile—which he defined as “non-violent in a broad sense”—from conflicting with the Council’s profile, which is primarily focused on legal and institutional proposals.

Although he is stepping down as president, Ferrer emphasized that he will remain a member of the organization and continue to support its initiatives. “We remain brothers and sisters, and I support the Council’s actions,” he stated, in an attempt to convey continuity and avoid any perception of a formal break with the platform he has led until now.

Ferrer also stated that his opposition activity is now focused on creating a census of dissidents on the Island and in exile.
In a statement released on Facebook, continue reading

the CTDC Electoral Commission highlighted that the elections were held between December 11 and 15, “under difficult communication conditions” and in a general environment that, from the regime’s perspective, does not favor “free citizen expression.” Of the 46 registered voters—including organizations and independent individuals—63% participated, a figure the Council described as an achievement given the circumstances under which the opposition operates on the island.

The statement emphasizes that the process was “organized, pluralistic, democratic and legitimate” and that it responds to one of the founding aspirations of the Council: to allow its members to express, through voting, diverse priorities and concerns within the same political space.

The change in leadership coincides with a new phase in the career of Ferrer, 54, who left Cuba for the United States more than two months ago after spending several years in prison for his opposition activities. During that time, he was considered a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International. From Miami, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU) affirmed that his priority would be to work for the unity of the Cuban opposition, both within and outside the country, a historically elusive goal marked by deep internal divisions.

Ferrer continues to lead Unpacu, one of the opposition groups with the most recognized track record in the country.

In his statements to EFE, Ferrer also affirmed that his opposition activity is now focused on “mobilizing political, social, and humanitarian activity” within Cuba, as well as on creating a “census” of dissidents on the island and in exile. This registry, he explained, would serve as the basis for attempting to organize opposition primaries and move toward forming a “common front.”

Ferrer’s departure from the presidency of the CTDC also highlights the difficulties faced by the Cuban opposition. Those operating from within the country are subjected to severe repression; and those operating from exile, with greater political leeway, tend to have less direct influence on daily life on the island.

Ferrer himself acknowledges this tension, justifying his resignation by citing the need to avoid interfering with the Council’s work, whose agenda includes projects such as a proposed amnesty law and the decriminalization of dissent, initiatives against violence, and the organization of citizen assemblies for political dialogue. The CTDC has also attempted, without visible results, to promote Vatican mediation in relations between Cuba and the United States.

Ferrer remains at the helm of UNPACU, one of the most established opposition groups in the country. It is worth remembering that in Cuba, the only legal political organization is the Communist Party of Cuba, which makes any attempt at an opposition coalition precarious, closely monitored, and constantly criminalized.

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Democratic Congressman Denounces Cuban Interference With Florida Radio Stations Using ‘Harmful Communist Propaganda’

Darren Soto introduces a bill to help those stations block signals coming from the island “for hours every night”

Congressman Darren Soto says many small stations lack the resources to block those signals / Facebook

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Miami, December 16, 2025 — U.S. Congressman Darren Soto announced this Tuesday the introduction of a bill aimed at stopping signal interference coming from Cuba on Florida radio stations in order to “spread communist propaganda.”

The Democrat said that Cuba’s official radio “broadcasts communist propaganda for several hours every night and affects the transmission of local stations,” especially on the AM band.

The initiative was promoted by Congressman Soto, from central Florida, who warned about the alleged impact these interferences are having on stations with limited resources and—according to him—on the communities they serve.

A local radio station in central Florida regularly sees its signal interfered with by Cuban state radio

“At this moment, a local radio station in central Florida sees its signal regularly interfered with by Cuban state radio, which for hours every night broadcasts harmful communist propaganda to Floridians,” the lawmaker stated.

Soto also underscored the economic difficulties faced by the affected stations.

“Many small AM radio stations in Florida and Alaska do not have the financial resources necessary to block these signals,” he said.

The bill, called the Stop Communist Radio Act, seeks to instruct the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to establish a grant program to support stations suffering harmful interference from foreign signals originating in communist countries such as Cuba, Russia, and North Korea.

Translated by Regina Anavy

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Brief Autopsy Report of a Corpse Called Cuba

While power remains in the hands of those who designed and sustain the disaster, the Island will continue on its path to extinction

Continuing to repeat that “next year will be better” is premeditated cruelty and a slap in the face of Cubans. / Instagram / Nicole Pankalla

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, Yunior García Aguilera, December 21, 2025 — At the end of every year, Miguel Díaz-Canel repeats the same slogan: “next year will be better.” It doesn’t matter how grave the closing balance has been, nor how deep the accumulated wounds. Official optimism appeals each New Year’s Eve to rhetorical morphine for the grieving and to keeping the Revolution’s corpse in chloroform. Reality, however, behaves like an implacable forensic report. And the diagnosis leaves us with a country in a prolonged process of decomposition whose reversal is unviable while the same authors of the disaster remain in power.

The year 2025 was a clear confirmation of that trajectory with no light at the end of the tunnel. The price hike [‘tarifazo‘] from Etecsa, the national telecommunications monopoly, applied in a country where average salaries barely allow survival, provoked a university protest that was quelled with threats and pressure on the main leaders of the rebellion. Blackouts increased until they became the daily norm. Hurricane Melissa worsened structural damage and added to the list of victims with unresolved problems. The scandal of Alejandro Gil’s conviction once again exposed that the power’s method is punishment without transparency. The country faces a health crisis marked by outbreaks of chikungunya, dengue and other diseases, with dozens of deaths, medicine shortages, hospitals operating at capacity and collapsed cemeteries.

Closing the year, Parliament experienced a series of unusual resignations, including that of the Secretary of the Council of State, Homero Acosta, seen by some as part of the reformist bloc. His replacement by José Luis Toledo Santander—a staunch conservative—is an unequivocal signal that immobilism has won the internal fight and is calling the shots. Toledo Santander became sadly famous for his phrase that “the Communist Party is above the Constitution.”

The demographic dimension converts that sum of crises and bad omens into an even more serious problem. Cuba lost the balance between births and deaths long ago. In the last five years, the country registered—according to official data—a negative external migratory balance exceeding one million people. This is a systematic bleeding of population of working and reproductive age. And the result is a society that ages without accumulated wealth, without sufficient productive force and without generational replacement. In historical terms, Cuba has entered a phase never seen in the region for a country that is not at war. continue reading

Cuba offers blackouts, human decapitalization, chronic corruption, inflation and massive emigration

Comparison with other countries in the Caribbean environment is necessary to understand that the problem is not the geographical zone nor post-pandemic effects. The Dominican Republic, with a similar population, maintains sustained demographic growth: many more Dominicans are born than die. Additionally, it attracts investment, expands its tourism sector and sustains an imperfect but functional energy system. Cuba, in contrast, sees tourism income fall to levels so low they don’t even cover the most basic imports.

Energy explains much of that divergence. The Dominican Republic consumes and serves more than 22,000 GWh annually, with installed capacity exceeding 7,200 megawatts (MW), which allows it to sustain industry, services and urban life. Cuba, with similar capacity, though 50% inoperative, and with much lower consumption, cannot cover even half of daily demand. Blackouts are the logical result of decades without real investment, dependence on imported fuels and mismanagement. Without stable energy there is no productivity, and without productivity there is no possible improvement.

In this context, the insistence of some on applying the Chinese or Vietnamese models is unsustainable and absurd. China and Vietnam bet on deep reforms, large-scale opening, insertion into global value chains and a relatively stable framework of rules for capital. Cuba has done the opposite, with partial reforms, state control over strategic sectors, criminalization of private accumulation and an unpredictable regulatory climate. The Asian model requires abundant energy, sustained investment, fiscal discipline and an expanding workforce. Cuba offers blackouts, human decapitalization, chronic corruption, inflation and massive emigration. Asian culture, in contrast, is based on effort, competitiveness and ambition to grow. Cuban culture settles for “resolving” and “surviving,” accumulating social weariness from the permanent demand for sacrifice without reward.

The Cuban crisis is not reversible in the current political framework

The Island doesn’t have many allies left capable of artificially sustaining the system. Venezuela faces its own crisis and has reduced fuel shipments. Russia confronts a war economy with resources concentrated on another front. Mexico cooperates in limited fashion, while dealing with internal tensions and an increasingly critical young generation. At the same time, the regional political map has changed. Governments that for years offered ideological support have lost elections or face internal weaknesses. For the international left, Cuba has ceased to be an exportable symbol. It is, rather, an uncomfortable problem that cannot be mentioned without having an excuse manual nearby.

The health and education crisis completes the crime scene. The health system, for decades presented as a showcase, now functions with chronic shortages, professional exodus and rising negative indicators. Education also suffers abandonment, quality loss and teacher desertion. Human capital, the country’s main historical asset, deteriorates or emigrates, and is no longer capable of maintaining high standards in a world that prioritizes technology and the handling of new tools. The regime has repeated several times that it has Artificial Intelligence development on its agenda: how the hell is that achieved in a country without energy, aged, poorly connected and bankrupt?

Everything leads to an objective conclusion: the Cuban crisis is not reversible in the current political framework. Not because natural resources, talent or geographical possibilities are lacking, but because the system governing the Island is incompatible with recovery. Each passing year, the demographic base shrinks, infrastructure degrades, energy becomes scarcer and social trust erodes.

In official rhetoric, the entire disaster is justified with the expressions “intensified blockade” and “enemy campaigns.” The paradox is that, if the country’s clinical death has not yet been decreed, it is thanks to Miami and other capitals of exile. Without the oxygen of remittances and diaspora investment in the private sector, the Island would have long ago entered respiratory arrest.

Continuing to repeat that “next year will be better” is premeditated cruelty and a slap in the face of Cubans. The country needs a profound and urgent break with the model that brought it here. While power remains in the hands of those who designed and sustain the disaster, Cuba will continue on its path to extinction.

Translated by Regina Anavy​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

‘Right Now Nobody Is Exchanging Dollars; Cubans Are Waiting To See What’s Going To Happen’

In the provinces, the official floating rate has been ignored and only the informal market is operating, with a rate of 440.

The official discourse itself acknowledges—though in a much more sugar-coated tone—the limitations of the measure. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana/Holguín, Darío Hernández and Miguel García, December 20, 2025 — “Do you want to change two bucks?” asks a customer in a MSME in Alamar. “Nah,” replies the person behind the counter. “It’s pointless; the dollar is going down.” The scene, unremarkable, has been repeated in recent days at several points around the Island. It’s the immediate reaction to the uncertainty created by the official floating rate, which this Saturday fell to 408 pesos per dollar on the third day of its implementation (its launch rate was 410 on Thursday, December 18).

This Saturday it fell to 408 pesos per dollar on the third day of its implementation. / Cubadebate

In its crusade against the informal market—and particularly against the daily publication of rates by the independent outlet El Toque—the Government seems determined to curb inflation the way Cuban mothers bring down a fever: with cold showers and “horse cures.” The paradox is that the rate announced by the Central Bank looks far too similar to the one that, until now, set the street thermometer—well above the official rate of 120 CUP supposedly in force at banks, where it had become impossible to obtain dollars or any other foreign currency.

The official gamble has generated a tense silence in the market. “Right now nobody is exchanging dollars—at least not those who usually do it. I myself am having trouble exchanging. Some say they don’t have cash; others say they’re going to wait,” a self-employed worker in Havana tells 14ymedio. Another source confirms the same atmosphere: “I have a colleague who wants to exchange dollars and says that in Havana nobody wants them. He’s been all over.” The response is almost unanimous: “Now is the time to lie low and wait.”

However, the effect threatens to be short-lived. The official discourse itself acknowledges—albeit in a much more sugar-coated tone—the limitations of the measure. In a lengthy analysis published by Cubadebate, it is admitted that implementing a floating-rate foreign-exchange market does not occur “at an ideal moment” for the Cuban economy. Low levels of production, falling exports, severe restrictions on external financing and a still-high fiscal deficit conspire against any attempt at rapid stabilization. According to the text, the Central Bank of Cuba enters the market as “just another competitor,” but with the administrative capacity to publish the rate daily, which will float according to supply and demand. The same official note acknowledges that, at the outset, the rate will have to remain “close to what currently prevails in the informal market” in order to avoid a greater inflationary shock.

Nobody wants to get stuck holding greenbacks in a market that is uncertain. / 14ymedio

On the street, that admission translates into pragmatism and, in many cases, resignation. At an MSME [Micro, Small, Medium Enterprise] near the Santa Fe bridge in Guanabacoa, a woman tried to exchange 40 dollars. “But at 408,” the clerk told her. “That’s fine by me,” the customer replied, “I don’t have money even to continue reading

take a pedicab.” The scene illustrates well the dilemma between selling now—even at a rate that could change tomorrow—or holding on to dollars that few people want to buy today.

“In general, I think few people are selling their dollars at 408, but there are some, because right now it’s the only option,” explains another interviewee. In Old Havana, an MSME where foreign currency had previously been accepted decided to slam that door shut: “Yesterday I went to buy a couple of things and they weren’t accepting dollars—only national currency.” Nobody wants to get stuck with greenbacks in a market that is uncertain due to the official measure and the proximity of the Christmas festivities.

In Holguín, the scene is different. Far from Havana—where, predictably, most of the dollars available for the Central Bank’s operations are concentrated—the official floating rate has stirred more apathy than expectation. A self-employed worker who moves around the city daily tells 14ymedio that in the province “the measure has been ignored; here the dollar is still at 440.” Geographic distance once again translates into economic distance.

The Cuban peso will continue to be a weak currency, no matter how much a new official price is published every morning. / 14ymedio

The official narrative insists that this new system will allow greater fiscal control, a gradual reduction of inflation and more resources for sectors such as health, education and culture. It also promises to stimulate exports, offer a “safe” channel for exchanging remittances and combat the distortions created by informality. All of that sounds good on paper. The problem is that Cuba has already experienced too many reforms that, in their initial phase, promised order and ended up multiplying the chaos.

The key lies in what is not said with sufficient clarity: the market will sell only what it buys. In other words, there is no foreign-currency backing that guarantees sufficient liquidity. The availability to buy dollars—and thus the credibility of the system—will depend on a “gradual process” of strengthening that, in an exhausted economy, may take too long or never arrive. In the meantime, informality retreats, watches and waits.

The floating rate may have caused a tactical pause in foreign-currency trading, but it has not resolved the structural causes of the problem, according to most economists—both from the opposition and from a critical sector close to the regime—who have spoken out about the new measures. Without a real increase in production, without sustained exports and without access to external financing, the Cuban peso will continue to be a weak currency, no matter how much a new official price is published every morning. The market, inside or outside the institutions, will ultimately adjust the figure in its own way.

Translated by Regina Anavy

____________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.