Condition of both vehicles after the collision. / Cubadebate
14ymedio, Madrid, 13 January 2025 — The collision between a van and a tricycle claimed the lives of six people on Monday in Moa, in the province of Holguín. Five of them died at the scene of the accident and another died at Dr. Guillermo Luis Fernández Hernández-Baquero Hospital, where the injured were taken.
The crash occurred around 4 p.m. on the Baracoa road, on a stretch leading to the Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara factory. At this time, it is unknown what conditions led to the collision, but the consequences were fatal, as can be seen—in addition to the numerous victims—in the images showing the condition of the vehicles.
The official press has released the identities of the deceased. They are Andys William Mendoza Ferrer, 41, a resident of Reparto Aeropuerto, Frank País; Enoelio Borges Reyes, 50, a native of Moa, Cayo Grande de Yamanigüey; Maria Carla Noguera Despaigne, 19, from Avenida Lenin, Reparto 26 de Julio; Emmanuel Rodríguez Igarza, 23, and Eloina Reyes González, 69, both residents of Punta Gorda Arriba; and Liolvis Lofforte Alpajón, 33, from Cayo Grande de Yamanigüey.
In addition, six people were injured, including the two drivers. They are Sandro Medina Oliveros, 52, a resident of Reparto Miraflores, reported to be in serious but stable condition; Yanet Rodríguez Reyes, 49, from Punta Gorda Arriba, with a head injury but in stable condition; Omar Breff Blanco, 58, a resident of Reparto Armando Mestre, who was the driver of the tricycle and is in serious condition; Liset Suárez Lovaina, 29, a resident of Quemado del Negro, stable with non-serious injuries; and Eroeldis Borges Alpajón, 23, from Cayó Grande de Yamanigüey, in serious but stable condition. continue reading
At present, it is unclear what conditions led to the collision, but the consequences were fatal, as can be seen in the images showing the condition of the vehicles.
In addition to the emergency services, rescue and salvage teams from the nickel industry attended the scene to treat the injured and identify and remove the deceased.
The causes of the accident, which is the second major accident so far this year, are currently under investigation. The first occurred on Wednesday, 7 January, in Camagüey, when two of the 38 passengers on a bus died after the vehicle, which was transporting workers from the Mariel Special Development Zone, veered off the road.
Between January and August 2025, there were 502 transportation-related fatalities on the island. Although the total for that year is still unknown, at that point alone the number had already risen to 80% of the total for 2024. By comparison, last year 1,119 people died on Spanish roads, just over twice as many as on the island in only eight months, with a population six times larger.
The poor condition of roads and vehicles contributes to any distraction, recklessness or speeding – the causes attributed to most crashes – having fatal consequences. In addition, the shortage of transport in good condition forces a large part of the population to travel in precarious conditions that lack any safety measures.
Translated by GH
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In a statement allegedly from the Presidency that went viral on social media, it was said that these measures were being adopted “in light of the escalation of hostile actions by the United States”
Before the arrest of Nicolás Maduro and the pause in the flow of Venezuelan oil to the Island, fuel shortages were already a constant / 14ymedio
14ymedio, Havana, January 12, 2026 — The Government denied this Sunday rumors about the suspension of all labor and social activities starting this Monday on the Island. In a brief informational note, the Presidency stated that the information attributed to it, which had spread like wildfire on social media hours earlier, was not true and urged people to inform themselves “through official channels.”
The disavowed communication, which was headed with the phrase “Presidency of Cuba, official statement,” claimed that “all activities not considered of national priority are suspended.” The text added that state entities and companies would operate “only with indispensable personnel to guarantee essential services and the continuity of strategic activities.”
It further stated that there would also be no classes “at all educational levels (primary, secondary, pre-university, universities, and technical training) until further notice.”
Using language close to the tone of official communications, the supposed statement from the Presidency asserted that these measures were being adopted “in light of the escalation of hostile actions by the government of the United States” and urged Cubans to “remain calm and united.” continue reading
The alleged information from the Presidency claimed that these measures were being adopted “in light of the escalation of hostile actions by the United States”
In addition to the Presidency’s denial, some ministries, such as Labor and Education, also joined in the rebuttal, and dissemination relied on the full apparatus of state media, both on websites and on social media.
On Cubadebate, many readers responded to the note and pointed out that there was anxiety within the Cuban community abroad due to that statement. Nevertheless, the forum was also used by some to ask when information would be provided about the distribution of liquefied gas cylinders at points of sale. “Electricity continues to be heavily affected in the provinces,” wrote a user named El avileño.
This false statement surfaced amid a new threat by U.S. President Donald Trump toward the Castro regime. The Republican leader said this Sunday that Cuba must “reach an agreement” with Washington or face the definitive rupture of the economic ties that have sustained the Island for decades. Through his social network Truth Social, he added that “there will be no more oil or money for Cuba: zero!” in direct reference to the flow of crude oil and resources that Venezuela had supplied to Havana for years.
“There will be no more oil or money for Cuba: zero!” in direct reference to the flow of crude oil
Despite everything, the fuel shortage is beginning to be felt not only in the electricity generation deficit. Most gas stations in Havana are no longer dispensing fuel, as 14ymedio reported this Sunday. In East Havana, only 11 gas stations were offering service; another 10 were completely out of fuel. In the west of the capital, seven service stations had closed on Friday.
Uncertainty over Venezuelan oil shipments following the capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. troops on January 3 has further strained daily life, which was already marked by scarcity.
Another consequence of the lack of fuel was also felt in the capital last week. Hundreds of Havana residents were affected after almost all GAZelle minibuses operating in the city were taken out of service. Authorities reported last Wednesday that “only a small group” of these minibuses was operating and that “the few that are operational will not be able to carry out all planned trips.” Uncertainty was total, as the statement added that the lack of transportation would continue “until fuel allows it.”
Translated by Regina Anavy
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Young players Francesco Coppola and Brando Bettazzi, both born in Italy to Cuban mothers, have received several call-ups this season for the cup and the league.
Francesco Coppola is a 20-year-old center back, 6’5″ tall / Instagram
14ymedio, Matanzas, Andy Lans, January 12, 2026 — Players Francesco Coppola and Brando Bettazzi, both born in Italy to Cuban mothers, have received several call-ups to Pisa SC’s first team for the Coppa Italia and the current edition of Serie A, the top level of Italian football [soccer].
Pisa SC’s season has not been one for fireworks. After earning a commendable promotion in the previous campaign, the team currently finds itself in the relegation zone this season.
The squad includes well-known veterans such as Colombian international Juan Cuadrado and former Real Madrid player Raúl Albiol. However, a wave of injuries has also allowed head coach Alberto Gilardino, former AC Milan striker and member of Italy’s 2006 World Cup winning team, to add a Cuban flavor to the pitch.
In Francesco Coppola’s case, he comes from a very sports-oriented family. His older brothers, Domenico and Alessandro, have also been involved in football. Francesco played in Juventus’s youth system between 2019 and 2022, arriving from Torino. Nevertheless, it is in Pisa SC’s youth ranks that the now 20-year-old, 6’5″ tall center back has made his greatest progress. continue reading
It is in Pisa SC’s youth system where the now 20-year-old, 16’5″-tall center back has made his greatest progress.
In the 2023–2024 season, the young player became indispensable to the Under-19 squad, and in 2024–2025 he was sent on loan to Vis Pesaro of Serie C to gain experience at senior level. He started 35 matches in Italy’s third division and scored three goals, proving he was ready for more demanding professional challenges. Pisa had called him up for several Serie B and Serie A matches before, but his debut in Italy’s top flight did not come until the past week. On January 6, Coppola started and played the full 90 minutes in a 0–3 loss to Como, and on Saturday the 10th he came on at 90+4’ in the 2–2 draw against Udinese. Without a doubt, very important steps in his career.
Meanwhile, Brando Bettazzi is an 18-year-old left-footed attacking midfielder, physically strong, with a mother from Havana. His résumé includes six years in Empoli’s youth system. Later, in 2021, he began with the amateur club Margine Coperta, until in 2023 Pisa signed him for its Under-17 team. From 2024 to the present, he has played 38 matches with his current club’s Under-19 team in Primavera 2, scoring five goals and earning consideration for the first team. Gilardino has not yet given him his Serie A debut. In league play, he has had to watch matches from the bench. However, he was given nine minutes with the senior side on September 25 in the Coppa Italia, in a 0–1 loss to Torino.
Coppola and Bettazzi are eligible to represent the Cuban national team because their mothers were born on Cuban soil, as established by current world football regulations. Cuba, as has been reported, has relaxed its policies on calling up players born abroad to the senior national team. Nevertheless, in the cases of Francesco and Brando, early exposure to top-level football may further fuel their dream of representing their motherland.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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The island is experiencing a combination of gross domestic product contraction and rising prices, which is affecting food in particular.
Inflation has tripled prices on the island in the last five years. / 14ymedio
14ymedio, Havana, 10 January 2026 — Cuba closed the last month of 2025 with year-on-year inflation of 14.07% in the formal market, according to data published by the National Office of Statistics and Information (Onei). The figure, presented as a sign of a “slowdown,” is 10 percentage points below that recorded in December 2024, when the consumer price index (CPI) grew by 24.88%. However, for most economists and for most people’s pockets that number does not reflect everyday reality.
The official methodology itself excludes the informal market, which is now larger and better stocked than the state market. By incorporating these prices, real inflation in 2025 would be “around 70%,” according to estimates by Cuban economist Pavel Vidal. The gap between the two measurements is the chasm that separates the state’s statistics from the daily experience of millions of Cubans.
According to ONEI, the monthly variation in December was 0.88% compared to the previous month, and the cumulative inflation for the year coincided with the year-on-year figure (14.07%). By category, the largest increase was recorded in Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (69.82%), followed by Restaurants and Hotels (21.46%), Education (17.22%), Housing Services (14.47%) and Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages (13.9%). Communications (0.46%) remained the least inflationary item, despite the sharp increase in web browsing rates applied on 30 May, which sparked protests over the rise in mobile phone top-ups.
The contrast between official data and real life becomes more evident when looking at the entire period since 2020. The government’s own statistics acknowledge that inflation has tripled prices on the island continue reading
in five years: 77% in 2021, 39.07% in 2022, 31.34% in 2023, 24.88% in 2024 and now 14.07% in 2025. The sequence suggests a slowdown, but the cumulative level remains very high, especially in an economy that is not growing.
In fact, Cuba is experiencing simultaneous stagnation and inflation. Economist Pedro Monreal warns that 2025 was “the worst year of stagflation since 2020,” a combination of gross domestic product (GDP) contraction and high inflation. The economy contracted by 1.1% in 2024 and has accumulated an 11% decline over the last five years, according to official figures. ECLAC also forecasts that GDP will return to negative growth.
Economist Pedro Monreal warns that 2025 was “the worst year of stagflation since 2020”.
Monreal stresses that the government has used the “delay” in wages and pensions compared to inflation as an anti-inflationary tool. In practice, this strategy reduces purchasing power, cools demand and has a recessionary effect that ultimately deepens the crisis. For the economist, the problem is not only the pace of prices, but also the “questionable reliability” of their official measurement, which tends to underestimate inflation by excluding the markets where the population actually shops.
Food prices illustrate this gap well. Between May and December 2025, rising food prices accounted for an average of 58.1% of the increase in overall inflation. In seven of the eight months of that period, the food price index grew more than the total CPI. And it is not just imported products: in December, there were notable increases in foods that can be produced domestically, a sign of structural problems in the national supply.
The crisis that has been dragging on for more than five years is evident in the shortage of basic goods – food, medicine, fuel – in the growing dollarisation, in the prolonged power cuts and in the sustained loss of purchasing power. Added to this picture are the effects of the pandemic, the tightening of US sanctions since Donald Trump’s first administration, and a series of failed economic and monetary policies that have been unable to stabilise prices or revive production.
The result is profound social unrest. Protests, which had been rare for decades, have become commonplace in recent years, and mass migration – unprecedented in its scale and duration – has become an escape valve for those who see no other way out. In this context, talking about 14% inflation may sound like statistical relief, but it does not explain why wages evaporate within days of being paid.
Translated by GH
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Venezuela expresses its support for the island in a statement that conspicuously lacks any mention of oil.
The US president suggests he will keep ExxonMobil “out” of Venezuela after a comment by its CEO that displeased him.
Collage / 14ymedio
14ymedio/EFE, Madrid, January 12, 2026 — Confusion reigns regarding the situation in Cuba hours after US President Donald Trump declared that the island would no longer receive money or oil from Venezuela. In brief remarks aboard Air Force One, the president stated he was in contact with Cuban authorities and maintained that news would be forthcoming, information that the regime denied on Monday.
“We are talking with Cuba, and you will know very soon. One of the things I want to take care of, one of the groups I want to protect, are the people who came from Cuba, who were forced to leave under coercion, and today are great citizens of the United States. We have many people who were unjustly expelled from Cuba, so we are going to preserve what is most important right now, which is the people who came from Cuba, who are U.S. citizens or are in our country,” he said.
Trump didn’t mention anything concrete, neither dates nor people involved in the alleged talks, nor any timeframes; but the island’s official press has reported the news as mere speculation. Furthermore, Cubadebate presents the information not as its own, but with Alma Plus TV—a channel linked to the Latin American left—as its source, and it also fails to offer a denial or an alternative version from the regime, as one might expect from a state-run media outlet.
It wasn’t until Monday morning that the Cuban regime’s position became known, and they denied the existence of any such contact. “There are no talks with the US government, except for technical contacts in the area of migration,” Miguel Díaz-Canel wrote in X.
“We have always been willing to hold a serious and responsible dialogue with the various US governments, including the current one, on the basis of sovereign equality, mutual respect, principles of International Law, reciprocal benefit, without interference in internal affairs and with full respect for our independence,” he added.
President Díaz-Canel attributed the excessive migration, which has serious consequences, to the “extreme tightening of the embargo” and the “privileges of the Cuban Adjustment Act.” “They are now victims of the change in policies toward migrants and the betrayal of Miami continue reading
politicians. There are bilateral migration agreements in force that Cuba scrupulously adheres to. As history demonstrates, for relations between the U.S. and Cuba to move forward, they must be based on international law instead of hostility, threats, and economic coercion,” he concluded.
Meanwhile, the mystery remains about what economic relations with the government of Delcy Rodríguez will be like from now on, which on Sunday released a statement of support for the island but without any practical commitments.
“The relationship between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela with the Caribbean and the Republic of Cuba has historically been based on brotherhood, solidarity, cooperation and complementarity,” the text states.
Caracas reaffirms its “historical position within the framework of relations with the Republic of Cuba, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, regarding the free exercise of self-determination and national sovereignty.”
Furthermore, it concludes by saying: “Venezuela reaffirms that international relations must be governed by the principles of international law, non-intervention, the sovereign equality of States, and the self-determination of peoples. We reiterate that political and diplomatic dialogue is the only way to peacefully resolve controversies of any nature.”
Beyond politics and diplomacy, the statement omits any reference to the closest link between the two countries and the one at the heart of the controversy: oil.
The government of Delcy Rodríguez has spent the entire week moving in an ambiguity that combines political gestures – from demands for the release of the one she publicly considers the legitimate ruler, Nicolás Maduro, to acts such as the awarding of medals to the Cubans who died defending Maduro – with facts, such as the meeting she will hold with Trump, as confirmed this Sunday by the president.
“We are working very well with the leadership, and we’ll see how it all turns out,” Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One, adding that Rodriguez offered the United States “50 million barrels of oil” that are on their way to the country.
At the moment, it is unknown whether there will be any kind of agreement between the three parties to allow oil to reach Cuba, after Trump said that the island has been “living for years” thanks to Venezuelan money and crude in exchange for “security services” for the “last two dictators (Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro).”
“BUT NO MORE!” Trump exclaimed on his Truth Social network, where he stressed that “most of those Cubans are DEAD from the latest US attack” and Venezuela now has the “most powerful” army in the world, that of the United States, to protect itself.
Cuban authorities responded by asserting that they “do not receive and have never received” monetary or material compensation for security services provided to any country and insisted on demanding that Washington end the “brutal kidnapping” of Maduro and Flores, which they labeled “illegal” and a “judicial and media farce”.
Cuban authorities responded by stating that they “do not receive and have never received” monetary or material compensation for security services provided to any country.
Furthermore, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez asserted Cuba’s right to import fuel from markets “willing to export it,” as well as its right to develop its trade relations “without interference or subordination to unilateral coercive measures by the United States.” “Law and justice are on Cuba’s side,” he declared.
What is known is that the US oil companies Chevron and Shell, the Spanish company Repsol and the Italian company ENI will “immediately increase” their investment in Venezuela, according to US Energy Secretary Chris Wright.
“We had Chevron, Shell, Repsol, and ENI—four of the world’s largest oil companies—saying, ‘We will immediately begin to increase our investments and grow our production.’ I have a team of American oil prospectors who say they’re going there this week,” he told Fox News.
Wright’s remarks come after Friday’s meeting between Trump and oil executives at the White House, where the president asserted that there will be an investment of “at least $100 billion of their own capital, not government money,” to revitalize Venezuela’s infrastructure.
However, Exxon CEO Darren Woods opined that the South American country “is uninvestable today,” something that has earned him threats from Trump.
“I didn’t like Exxon’s response. We have many who want it. I would probably be inclined to leave Exxon out. I didn’t like their response. They’re trying to be clever,” said the US president.
Wright, for his part, asserted that Exxon’s opinion is “atypical,” stating that there are “at least a dozen” companies ready to return to Venezuela. This includes “five large” companies that are already “there and will quickly increase their production, and probably between six and a dozen others” that are “ready to enter.”
“I didn’t like Exxon’s response. We have many who want it. I’d probably lean towards leaving Exxon out. I didn’t like their response. They’re trying to be clever.”
“So the speed at which we will see investment and change in the trajectory of Venezuela’s production is impressive,” the secretary said.
Energy analysts have expressed skepticism about Trump’s plan for Venezuela, which apparently has the world’s largest reserves, equivalent to 364 billion barrels or 17% of the total, but production that only represents 1% globally, according to data from Standard & Poor’s (S&P).
Among the reservations cited were the obsolescence of Venezuela’s infrastructure and political uncertainty. In this context, Trump declared a “national emergency” this Saturday to protect Venezuelan oil revenues held in U.S. Treasury accounts, preventing Venezuelan creditors from claiming the funds.
Following the oil expropriation, there have been nearly 60 arbitrations against Venezuela since 2000 for an estimated total value of $30 billion, almost 15% of its international debt, according to data from the Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) at Columbia University.
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Nonviolent resistance in Cuba, while morally admirable and politically necessary, has never brought about the collapse of the regime.
Los cubanos, tanto dentro como fuera de la Isla, que anhelan la libertad, darían la bienvenida a los libertadores / 14ymedio
14ymedio, Julio M. Shiling, Miami, January 11, 2026 — For more than six decades, U.S. policy toward Cuba has generally oscillated between containment, engagement, sanctions, and rhetorical support for democratic aspirations. What has remained largely unchanged is the assumption—shared by many well-intentioned observers—that peaceful civic resistance, international pressure, and gradual liberalization could ultimately bring about regime change. History has shown otherwise. In totalitarian systems, particularly Marxist–Leninist regimes modeled on Cuban state doctrine, non-violent strategies alone do not dismantle power. They merely coexist with it.
The Trump administration’s renewed emphasis on reversing communist gains in Latin America reflects a strategic recalibration long overdue. The naval presence in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean, combined with decisive action against socialist strongholds in Venezuela and potentially elsewhere in the hemisphere, signals a recognition of a fundamental reality. Force, when legitimate and intelligently applied, remains the only proven mechanism for overthrowing entrenched totalitarian regimes.
Pacifist regime-change strategies have succeeded primarily in democratic or semi-democratic systems. These are states where power holders are constrained by law, public opinion, or institutional accountability. Non-violent movements can compel concessions in such environments because governments fear electoral loss, reputational damage, or judicial consequences. Totalitarian regimes fear none of these. They are afraid only of the loss of coercive control.
Cuba is not an authoritarian system in transition; it is a mature totalitarian state.
Cuba is not an authoritarian system in transition; it is a mature totalitarian state. Its intelligence services, internal security forces, military hierarchy, and political institutions are unified under a single party whose legitimacy rests not on consent but on ideological continue reading
permanence and repression. The regime survived the collapse of the Soviet Union, decades of economic isolation, mass emigration, and recurring social unrest precisely because it is structurally immune to civic pressure. The use of alternate schemes for financing its operations upon the fall of the USSR, such as Venezuelan oil, drug-trafficking income, neo-slave labor leasing, and intelligence information trafficking, has shown that Castro-Communism can be resourceful when it comes to pillaging for survival’s sake.
This is why nonviolent resistance in Cuba, while morally admirable and politically necessary, has never produced regime collapse. Protest movements—from dissident intellectuals to the island-wide demonstrations of July 2021—have exposed the regime’s fragility and brutality, but they have not dislodged it. Instead, they have been met with arrests, exile, amplified surveillance, and expanded repression. In totalitarian contexts, grievance campaigns do not force concessions. They merely test repression thresholds.
That does not render nonviolent action useless. On the contrary, it plays a critical preparatory role. Civic resistance delegitimizes the regime, fractures elite consensus, weakens ideological cohesion, and signals popular willingness for change. But these effects only become decisive when paired with a coercive catalyst—either internal military defection or external force. No communist dictatorship has fallen solely because citizens protested peacefully.
Historical precedent confirms this. From Eastern Europe to Central America, totalitarian systems collapse when force—explicit or implicit—enters the equation. The Reagan Doctrine aggressively challenged Soviet communism. Military action against global Marxism was fought hard and with determination. The fall of the Berlin Wall was no accident. U.S. military interventions in Grenada and Panama dismantled Marxist and kleptocratic regimes that diplomacy could not. In each case, civic resistance mattered—but it was not the ultimate deciding factor.
Cuba today presents conditions uniquely favorable to a limited, intelligence-driven U.S. operation.
Cuba today presents conditions uniquely favorable to a limited, intelligence-driven U.S. operation. The regime faces severe economic exhaustion, demographic decline, energy shortages, and waning ideological loyalty among younger generations. Its international patrons are stretched, distracted, or unreliable. Unlike during the Cold War, Havana no longer enjoys a superpower security guarantee. What remains is a brittle, coercive apparatus holding together a collapsing state.
Crucially, modern military operations need not resemble Cold War invasions or prolonged occupations. Advances in intelligence gathering, cyber capabilities, precision force, and information warfare allow for targeted interventions aimed at decapitating regime leadership, neutralizing security command structures, and enabling a rapid internal transition. The objective is not occupation but disruption, creating a power vacuum that domestic democratic forces, previously suppressed, can fill. In other words, the stage is set for Cuba’s liberation.
With U.S. naval assets already positioned in the Gulf, a precision incursion—targeting key leaders like Miguel Díaz-Canel—would exploit internal fractures. Cubans, both inside and outside the island, long yearning for freedom, would welcome liberators. Intelligence reveals regime vulnerabilities: economic collapse, youth disillusionment, and military defections. Technology ensures low-risk execution—cyber hacks to paralyze defenses, special ops to secure Havana. Cuba is the real measure of the success of the Trump Doctrine.
Opponents of such action argue that military intervention risks instability or backlash. Yet instability already defines Cuba’s trajectory. Managed disruption, followed by an internationally supported transition framework, is less dangerous than indefinite stagnation under a collapsing totalitarian state. Moreover, there is substantial evidence that a decisive intervention would be welcomed by large segments of the Cuban population, including elements within the military whose loyalty is transactional rather than ideological.
There is substantial evidence that a decisive intervention would be welcomed by large segments of the Cuban population.
A U.S. operation against the Cuban communist regime would not be an act of imperialism but a strategic intervention aligned with hemispheric stability and democratic norms. It would signal that totalitarian entrenchment in the Americas is no longer tolerated, and that regimes sustained by repression, not consent, cannot rely indefinitely on diplomatic paralysis. The successful arrest of communist Cuba’s puppet dictator, Nicolas Maduro, and the apparent takeover of the Chavista regime affirm the viability of affirmative U.S. action.
The lesson is clear: pacifism alone does not overthrow communism. It prepares the ground, exposes injustice, and mobilizes conscience. However, the final breach of totalitarian power requires force. If the United States is serious about reversing socialist rule in the Western Hemisphere, neutralizing a key ally of American domestic terrorism, and promoting peace in the region, Castro-Communism must go. Cuba must not be the exception and remain untouched by this bold U.S. foreign and moral policy initiative. Cuba is the paradigmatic test case.
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Those outraged by Etecsa’s rate hikes, many of them “the revolutionary vanguard,” gave the regime more than one headache this year.
But this revolt came at a price: State Security soon began harassing these young people. / EFE
14ymedio, Havana, 28 December 2025– The Cuban government has managed to end 2025 without being overwhelmed by a turbulent front that took its breath away mid-year: the student movement. Governments around the world have known for at least a century that there is no group more dangerous to them than angry university students, from Soviet Prague to Mao’s Beijing, by way of Franco’s Spain and the pacifists against the Vietnam War. Those outraged by the state telecommunications monopoly Etecsa’s rate hikes — dubbed el tarifazo — many of them “the revolutionary vanguard,” gave the regime more than one headache this year when they erupted against the steep changes in the prices for internet access.
It all began on Friday, May 30th , because the Palace of the Revolution, sometimes, doesn’t do anything without a reason. With the weekend upon us and the end of the school year fast approaching, a piece of news broke the monotonous pattern of blackouts, inflation, and migration: the state telecommunications monopoly was updating its rates, and the increase was unprecedented, multiplying some prices by as much as thirteen. In short, top-ups in national currency were limited to 360 pesos per month, and packages purchased from abroad—that is, in foreign currency—were incentivized. A 7GB package, for example, cost more than the average monthly salary.
Not even a Friday could stem the tide of a tsunami that surged from the very heart of the Revolution. The Federation of University Students (FEU) at the Faculty of Mathematics and Computing of the University of Havana took less than half a day to issue its opinion: “It is a tremendous lack of respect for the Cuban people.” They were the ones initially most affected. Their need to access the internet was not just that of ordinary users—also terribly annoyed—as a means of communication or entertainment, but also that of a student who needs to find information, research, and continue reading
practice.
“We consider Etecsa’s attitude untimely and imprudent,” the organization stated, which soon gained supporters from the fringes of the ruling party.
“We consider Etecsa’s attitude untimely and imprudent,” the organization stated, quickly gaining support not only from the fringes of the officialdom—such as Mariana Camejo, director of La Joven Cuba —but also from one of the most combative pro-Castro voices on social media, El Necio. Etecsa executives soon had to come out and justify themselves, trying to calm the waters with the golden rule: the blockade necessitates sacrifices, and if we want to modernize the network, we have to pay. The effect was precisely the opposite of what they intended. Seeing that there was no correction, the discontent began to spread like wildfire, and one after another, faculties at various universities across the country called for strikes in protest.
But opening a rift within the ruling party is no laughing matter. This outburst was followed by an internal battle between those who believed it was essential to make the state monopoly reconsider a regulation that was unfair to the population and aimed at further widening the gap between those who had access to a relative abroad willing to finance the expense, and those who thought it was essential to close ranks with the government against any “media manipulation [and] attempts to disrupt the normalcy of university life.”
While some were promoting meetings with Etecsa executives to find solutions, others were calling for a complete halt to classes until their demands were met. Things escalated to such a degree that the dreaded graffiti appeared on a wall of the University of Sancti Spíritus: “Down with the dictatorship.”
The government tried to pull out all the stops, using various programs to explain why the drastic increase in calls to order was necessary for Roberto Morales Ojeda, a member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of Organization of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. But the playbook proved ineffective in the face of each new challenge, to the point that law students from the University of Holguín—the birthplace of the Castros—filed a lawsuit against Etecsa , an unprecedented move in the country’s history. The students argued that the rate hike was “exclusionary, classist, and contrary to the law,” basing their argument on the Constitution, the Penal Code, and other norms of Cuban law. In other words: within the law. “Every jurist, whether already trained or in training, has the duty to wage battle against three giants: fear, injustice, and ignorance,” proclaimed one aspiring lawyer.
“Every lawyer, whether already trained or in training, has the duty to wage battle against three giants: fear, injustice, and ignorance,” proclaimed a budding lawyer.
The first two weeks of June were filled with university debates, both in person and online, and the students garnered support from doctors , artists, prominent professors , parish priests , and even the world-famous Spanish singer-songwriter Alejandro Sanz , who didn’t hesitate to come to the defense of the rebellious students. But this revolt came at a price: State Security soon began to harass these young people who, even while convinced that the Communist Party was the best and only possible governing body for the island, felt it was necessary to rise up against a decision they believed was wrong.
As the weeks passed, the fear of punishment, meetings with Etecsa, and a few minor concessions from the company gradually eased the discontent, which disappeared by the end of July without further consequences. Summer arrived , and the government, in the end, did not get its Vietnam.
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Militias and civilians participate in drills across the island to “increase the capacity to respond to US interference and the real possibility of an attack against the country”
Hundreds of people participated in the exercises around the island / ACN
14ymedio, Havana, January 11, 2026 — The Cuban government, showing signs of concern over a potential military aggression, used Territorial Defense Day this Saturday to flex its muscles. In addition to the rhetoric of defending “the Homeland” disseminated across all official media outlets, several provinces staged armed response drills involving militia members and civilians, many in street clothes.
In cases like Sancti Spíritus, the exercises generated fear among the population. Residents of the province told 14ymedio that the city “woke up frightened after the gunfire and bombs that were being dropped” from early morning. Adding to the unease, Soviet MiG-15 fighter jets from the Cold War era were seen flying over the area.
Faced with the anxiety and lack of information provided by the authorities, residents began asking what was happening via Facebook. Journalist Elsa Ramos, a columnist for the newspaper Escambray and a critical voice within the government, shed some light on the situation, stating on Radio Sancti Spíritus that combat exercises were being conducted near the city.
Deivy Pérez Martin, president of the Provincial Defense Council, highlighted the importance of these exercises “to achieve the best preparation of the Production and Defense Brigades, in order to have a well-trained people to stop and defeat any attempt by the enemy to continue reading
take over the nation,” according to Sancti Spíritus’ provincial newspaper.
There was “a compendium of comprehensive actions aimed at raising the preparedness of all components of the province in the face of risk situations”
Another province that carried out these actions was Matanzas. There was “a comprehensive set of actions aimed at increasing the preparedness of all components of the province in the face of situations of risk, threat, or aggression, within the framework of the doctrine of the Guerra de Todo el Pueblo [War of the Entire People],” Girón reported, in a text accompanied by photographs showing smoke after some detonations.
The exercises included combined classes in military units and tactical maneuvers with shooting exercises and practical cases of the air defense units.
In Havana, exercises were also carried out in all 15 of the capital’s municipalities. “During the day, drills, tactical training, and logistical and civil defense support actions were conducted.” Women in civilian clothes and shoes, as well as children, participated.
These scenes were replicated in the special municipality of Isla de la Juventud. There, according to the newspaper Victoria, with triumphalist language, the people demonstrated “their high level of preparedness, patriotism, and unwavering conviction in victory against the threats of the enemy.”
The medium called for “continuing to fight for the defense of the Homeland, sovereignty, solidarity and a better future where unity, equality and social justice prevail, using as a basis the values instilled by our historical leaders,” accompanied by a large number of images showing land and sea exercises.
In Villa Clara, they carried out shooting practice with different weapons, including rifles and artillery.
In Villa Clara, they conducted shooting practice with various weapons, including rifles and artillery. Additionally, the Air Defense Brigade carried out various aircraft and drone detection exercises, “as well as combat drills against them.”
“Given the interference of the United States and the real possibility of an attack against the country, it is essential to increase our response capacity.” This was the prevailing sentiment in Cienfuegos, where they conducted shooting exercises, “field movements, and the testing of transportation and communication systems.” The premise, according to 5 de Septiembre, is that “the neighborhood must be a trench protecting the gains of the Revolution.”
From Holguín, with heavy artillery included in the exercises, they trained “to face situations of risk or threat to internal security, in a scenario of unconventional warfare and enemy invasion.”
The Ciego de Ávila newspaper Invasor reported that these maneuvers were carried out to “pay tribute to the 32 Cubans who lost their lives in the line of duty in recent events” in Venezuela and in response to “the threats and pressure exerted by the United States government against Cuba and other nations in the region.” From some of the trenches, several young men took up arms and practiced shooting.
Finally, in Santiago de Cuba, invoking Fidel Castro and with the slogan that “the best way to avoid war is by preparing ourselves,” it was mostly women who carried out the exercises, which aimed to be ready “for the fulfillment of missions in times of aggression.”
These exercises took place hours before a new threat from US President Donald Trump, who on Sunday issued an explicit warning to the Castro regime: Cuba must “reach a deal” with Washington or face the definitive severing of the economic ties that have sustained the island for decades. The Republican president stated on his social media account, Truth Social, that “there will be no more oil or money for Cuba: zero!”— a direct reference to the flow of crude oil and resources that Venezuela supplied to Havana for years.
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Havana keeps this aircraft’s flights secret, using it for special missions.
The Cubana de Aviación IL-96-300 aircraft with registration number CU-T1250, in a file photo. / Flightaware/Gerry Barron
14ymedio, Havana, 8 January 2025 — The Ilyushin Il-96-300 with registration number CU-T1250, Cubana de Aviación’s only long-haul four-engine aircraft, returned to the island on Thursday after a failed attempt to land in Caracas. As analysts warned On the basis of movements recorded on flight tracking websites, analysts said the aircraft flew in circles for several minutes in the morning off the coast of Venezuela, probably waiting for permission to land, and then turned around, but towards the east of the island. It had departed from Havana, although the airport did not appear on satellite tracking, which is common for this aircraft.
According to Venezuelan media outlet La Patilla, an MQ-4C Triton reconnaissance drone had been flying over the same area where the Cuban aircraft decided to change course. The “unarmed stealth drone,” the outlet reports, took off from Jacksonville Naval Air Station in Florida and remained over the Caribbean Sea for hours.
Last Monday, the same IL-96-300 took off from Havana, also bound for Caracas, and did not appear on satellite websites. For these, it is often a “ghost plane” because it travels with its radar turned off.
A knowledgeable source revealed to 14ymedio that the flight was “full of military personnel” and assumed that “they are going to stay there.” The same person said that the flight was going to collect the bodies of the agents who died on the island during the US operation that resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, but this did not happen. According to Flightradar24, the Cubana four-engine aircraft also made a trip to Venezuela yesterday, although the reason for this is unknown. continue reading
The trajectory of the US MQ-4C Triton drone, in red, on the right, in the Caribbean, in front of the Cubana de Aviación IL-96-300. / Flightradar24
Normally used to transport senior regime officials, military personnel and important equipment, it may be being used to repatriate Cuban doctors scattered throughout Venezuelan territory. This Thursday, the Ministry of Health reported that “after a period of logistical disruption, the flow of health professionals providing services in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela returning to Cuba has been normalised”.
The note, published in the official press, attempts to “sell” the information as simply the start of a well-deserved holiday. It states that in the last months of 2025, travel was affected “by difficulties in air transport, a situation that was subsequently complicated by the closure of Venezuelan airspace and the consequent suspension of all commercial flights,” and that this led to a “temporary accumulation of employees who had completed their work commitments or were due for their rest period” and had been unable to return to Cuba.
Route taken on Thursday by Cubana de Aviación’s IL-96-300. / Flightradar24
This week, the text continues, “in an organised and progressive manner, flights have resumed, allowing these workers to return to their country,” since “with the re-establishment of international air operations to and from Venezuela, mechanisms were immediately activated to resolve the accumulated backlog.”
Apart from the fact that not all airlines have resumed flights to Venezuela, the article makes no mention of the main change that has taken place in the Caribbean country in recent days, in which the US government, after capturing Maduro, has forced the establishment of a “transitional government” headed by Delcy Rodríguez.
The new situation poses a serious threat not only to the island’s energy survival, which has depended on crude oil donated by Caracas for more than a quarter of a century, but also to the regime itself, which is deeply intertwined with the Chavista government, as demonstrated by the identities of the Cubans who died in the US operation and despite decades of denial by both sides of the presence of troops from the island in Venezuela. Belonging to Maduro’s circle of protection, most of them were senior Cuban intelligence officials.
Translated by GH
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Cuba’s foreign minister accuses the U.S. of behaving “like a criminal, out-of-control hegemon that threatens world peace and security”
“Cuba provided security services to the last two Venezuelan dictators. But no more!” Trump wrote. / EFE
14ymedio, Havana, January 11, 2026 — U.S. President Donald Trump issued an explicit warning to the Castro regime this Sunday: Cuba must “reach an agreement” with Washington or face the definitive rupture of the economic ties that have sustained the Island for decades. The Republican president stated on his social network Truth Social that “There will be no more oil or money for Cuba: zero!” in a direct reference to the flow of crude oil and resources that Venezuela supplied to Havana for years.
Shortly before, Trump shared on Truth Social a post by an X user suggesting that Secretary of State Marco Rubio could become “president of Cuba,” adding a comment that did not go unnoticed: “Sounds good to me!”
Trump expanded on his message: “For many years, Cuba lived off large amounts of oil and money from Venezuela. In return, Cuba provided security services to the last two Venezuelan dictators. But no more!” he wrote.
The U.S. president went even further when referring to the consequences of the recent military operation in Caracas. “Most of those Cubans are dead from the U.S. attack last week, and Venezuela no longer needs the protection of the thugs and extortionists who held it hostage for so many years,” he added, in one of the harshest statements to date against continue reading
the Cuban presence in Venezuela.
The bluntness of the message comes at a moment of maximum geopolitical tension in the region following the capture of Nicolás Maduro. The action has triggered a series of statements, warnings, and strategic realignments involving not only Washington and Caracas, but also Havana.
According to public records from Flightradar24, several U.S. military aircraft conducted flights near the northern coast of Cuba.
Since Saturday, January 3, Trump’s statements have oscillated between an emphasis on regional control and direct warnings to historic allies of Chavismo. In recent interviews, the president has said that the Cuban regime “is very close to falling” due to the loss of its main source of oil and financial backing, though he has avoided publicly committing to a direct military intervention on the Island.
Added to this verbal escalation in recent hours was an unusual movement in the regional airspace. According to public Flightradar24 records, several U.S. military aircraft, identified by their speed, altitude, and flight patterns, carried out flights near Cuba’s northern coast without entering Cuban airspace. The routes, visible in real time on the platform, showed paths parallel to the coastline and repeated turns off strategic points in the north of the Island, a deployment that analysts interpret as a signal of pressure and deterrence amid the hardening of Washington’s rhetoric. The aerial presence was widely discussed on social media and reinforced the perception that Trump’s warning to Havana is not limited to rhetoric alone.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has reinforced that message. Of Cuban-American origin and a long-time critic of the Havana regime, Rubio has repeatedly stated that Cuba played a key role in the survival of Chavismo and that Venezuela’s security structure was “basically full of Cubans.” In conferences and press briefings following the operation in Caracas, he emphasized that without that support, Maduro’s regime would have collapsed much earlier.
Official figures on casualties during Maduro’s capture vary by source, but dozens of Venezuelan security personnel and at least 32 Cuban soldiers and agents were officially reported as killed during the operation. The Cuban government ultimately acknowledged this figure after repeatedly denying any military presence in Venezuela.
The Cuban regime and its spokespeople respond with the usual repertoire of denial, victimization, and confrontation
This death toll comes amid a climate of sustained repression within Cuba, where hundreds of political prisoners continue to languish in the country’s jails for exercising basic rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, or peaceful protest.
Trump’s warning this Sunday also fits into a context of economic and social collapse that experts describe as unprecedented in the Island’s recent history. Cuba is experiencing an unparalleled crisis, marked by mass emigration, structural failures in essential services such as health care and education, and an exhausted economic model that no longer manages to cover the population’s basic needs.
The end of Venezuelan subsidies, which in 2025 supplied the Island with an average of some 27,000 barrels of oil per day, represents an additional blow to an economy already burdened by frequent blackouts, domestic production at historic lows, and chronic shortages of food and medicines.
The regime’s foreign minister, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, rejected Washington’s accusations on the social network X and denied any economic link to security services provided abroad. “Cuba does not receive nor has it ever received monetary or material compensation for the security services it has provided to any country,” he wrote.
In his message, Rodríguez contrasted that position with that of the United States, which he accused of “mercenarism, blackmail, and military coercion against other states,” and invoked the Island’s right to import fuel “from those markets willing to export it.” The foreign minister closed his statement with the customary rhetoric, calling the U.S. a “criminal, out-of-control hegemon” that threatens peace and security not only for Cuba and the hemisphere, but “for the entire world.”
Faced with pressure from the United States, the Cuban regime and its spokespeople respond with the usual repertoire of denial, victimization, and confrontation. But the clock, politicians and analysts warn, is rapidly running against Havana’s interests.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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Even refilling a lighter has become a difficult task in Cuba due to the fuel shortage
“Maduro abandoned us,” a Cupet worker tells a customer. / 14ymedio
14ymedio, Havana/Holguín, Darío Hernández and Miguel García, January 11, 2026 — Under the uneven shade of a tree in a park in Holguín, Genaro waits for someone to approach with a lighter. The scene has repeated itself for more than a decade: a folding table, several gas sprays, screwdrivers, and pliers. For years, that small family business, refilling disposable lighters, allowed them to put food on the table. Today, however, the lack of fuel threatens to extinguish even that minimal flame. “Now it’s cheaper to buy a new one than to repair it because gas has become incredibly expensive,” he says, arranging his tools with a mechanical gesture.
Genaro charges 100 pesos for each lighter he refills and 50 more if the flint has to be replaced. Until recently, that fee guaranteed a steady trickle of customers. Today, the flow has dropped sharply. “This is no longer profitable, and if things get worse,” he warns, “I’ll have to find something else.” His occupation—salvaging what in other countries is thrown away—becomes unviable in a context where even the gas used to refill lighters has turned into a luxury.
The problem is not limited to his improvised table. At home, he explains, they cook with firewood and with liquefied gas “when it shows up.” The balita—the small gas cylinder that sustains the domestic life of thousands of families—now costs 50,000 Cuban pesos on the informal market in Holguín. “You almost never find it, and when someone does offer it to you, they can sit back and demand continue reading
whatever they want, because people are desperate.” At state-run sales points, the supply was suspended weeks ago, with no date for resumption.
The cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies, following the capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. troops, has further strained a daily life already marked by shortages. What happens in Caracas translates almost immediately into extinguished stoves, paralyzed businesses, and reduced transportation in Cuba. The Island’s energy dependence turns any shock in the South American country into a domestic tremor.
In Havana, the situation is reflected in empty gas stations and in the conversations repeated under the roofs of the state company Cupet. In Telegram groups where virtual lines are organized, discouragement is palpable. This Saturday, in East Havana only 11 gas stations were offering service; another 10 were completely out of fuel. In the west of the capital, seven service stations had closed on Friday. No one dares to predict an improvement in the short term.
The mechanism for buying gasoline has become a digital maze. To even aspire to a turn, one must register in the Ticket app, enter an ID number, vehicle registration details, and the license plate. With luck, confirmation arrives in two or three months. But even then, the result can be frustrating: on the scheduled day, there may only be motor or regular gasoline of lower octane, unusable for many vehicles.
A tour of several Havana service stations confirms the picture. The central station at G and 25, in El Vedado, opened without fuel. The same scene repeats at its neighbor on La Rampa. Only at the nearby Tángana station was there still some supply for those waiting with a Ticket appointment, and in the entire central area only the station at L and 17 continued dispensing with some regularity.
The majority of gas stations in Havana are not operating.
Under the red sign reading “Your friend 24 hours a day” at G and 25, three men talk. They begin by discussing gasoline, but the conversation soon drifts toward Caracas, Washington’s warnings, and Marco Rubio’s statements urging Havana to choose between “change and collapse.” International politics seep into their words as yet another explanation for the empty tank.
“The situation is tight; I’ve never seen it this bad,” says a motorcyclist who came to Cupet just to confirm the obvious. He has a generator at home and urgently needs fuel. “My mother is bedridden with a relapse of chikungunya,” he explains. “At home we’re preparing for the worst, because this is just the beginning.”
At the Cupet stations on Vía Blanca and La Coubre, dispensing was limited to state vehicles, as it was at the station at the La Shell roundabout in Guanabacoa. Rafael, a Spanish businessman temporarily based in Cuba, described his fruitless tour of several stations in the Playa municipality. “They have no idea when fuel will come in again. They look lost,” he said.
One worker was more direct and, in a mocking tone, summed it up in four words: “Maduro abandoned us.” A tremor in Caracas is an earthquake in Havana.
“With what happened in Venezuela, I don’t think this will be fixed quickly,” / 14ymedio
In El Cerro, two brothers in the moving business have halted all operations. Their truck sits immobile while requests pile up unanswered. “With what happened in Venezuela, I don’t think this will be fixed quickly,” they say.
Early Sunday, many woke up glued to their phones after Donald Trump posted a message urging the Cuban regime to reach “an agreement, before it’s too late,” warning: “There will be no more oil or money for Cuba: zero!” For many, that message sealed the certainty that the severe fuel shortage will not be temporary.
On Havana’s Malecón, some look out to sea hoping for the silhouette of a tanker. For a young man singing boleros and guarachas to tourists, the definitive collapse will come “when El Morro goes dark.” Perhaps it will not require a mass exodus—only the absence of fuel and a wait that stretches on, like Genaro’s under the tree, with an empty lighter in his hand.
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“It was a cold that seemed intent on freezing everything.”
“The story of Patas Frías was told for years. No one ever saw him again.” / Screenshot
14ymedio, Milton Chanes, Berlin, January 11, 2026 — The snow began to fall near Dijon in France. It wasn’t a gentle snowfall. It didn’t cover the landscape—it erased it. The family was coming from the south of France, exhausted, the car packed, their minds already at home. They crossed the German border almost without noticing, but the cold changed abruptly. This was not the same cold.
It was a cold that seemed intent on freezing everything.
The A4 awaited them with its mountain stretch. After the first long tunnel, the asphalt vanished beneath a layer of dull ice. Along the sides, several abandoned cars slept at odd angles, buried up to their wheels. The trucks, by contrast, sped past at full speed, as if gravity did not apply to them.
“Can they brake?” the father thought.
Better not to find out.
The road grew slow and dangerous. But they had to get home. One always gets home… until one doesn’t.
About one hundred and fifty kilometers from Berlin, the GPS spoke in its neutral voice: Highway closed due to an accident. Recalculating route.
The new line pulled them off the A4 onto secondary roads. That meant passing through villages and forest.
What could go wrong?
Thinking about it now, when everything has already happened, the most logical choice would have been to stay on the Autobahn. As dangerous as it was, it remained the main route—the one someone would clear first, the one that made sense. But in that instant—when the GPS announces the closure, when the exit sign suddenly appears through the snow—survival instinct does not reason: it reacts.
Decisions are made quickly, almost reflexively, without logic or time to weigh consequences. And it is only afterward, as the car gently leans into the exit curve and the Autobahn is left behind, that the thought arrives, late and sharp: damn GPS.
What lies ahead is clearly worse.
“We have diesel for three hundred kilometers,” the mother said. There won’t be a problem.
But it was already past ten at night. It was Saturday. The stations that appeared on the map were closed. Dark. As if they had never existed. continue reading
The stations that appeared on the map were closed. Dark. As if they had never existed.
The GPS suggested saving waiting time by cutting through villages and forest. A lot of forest.
The houses were dark. No lights in the windows. No sound. The road was barely visible: a narrow strip between trees heavy with snow. Sometimes a guardrail emerged like a long bone. Or a bent sign, half buried.
The car moved slowly. Too slowly to feel safe. Too fast to stop.
After the last village, the forest closed in completely. Between the trunks, shadows. Perhaps animals. Perhaps something else. The father slowed even more.
Then it really began to snow.
Not flakes. Not a fall. A white wall. The world shrank to the reach of the headlights. Stopping was not an option. Leaving the road, neither. No one knew what lay at the sides.
And then it happened.
A movement. Several. A group of deer burst across the road out of nowhere. The flash of eyes. Instinct. The brake.
The car skidded as if someone had shoved it.
It wasn’t a sharp impact. It was a long, uncontrolled slide, until the world tilted and vanished. The car plunged into a deep ditch, invisible beneath the snow, and sank almost to the roof.
The parents were thrown forward. A crunch of metal. A muffled scream.
One of the animals passed over the car. The glass roof shattered. Hooves pierced the glass like brief spears, leaving marks, cracks, fear.
In the back seat, Aaron, four years old, did not scream. His eyes were open—too open.
In the distance, through the snowfall, he saw something.
A snowman.
He didn’t know why it was there. He didn’t know how he had seen it. It had a simple, almost childish shape. But it was standing there. Watching.
For an instant, Aaron stopped trembling. He was not alone.
The phone had no signal. Outside, the snow no longer allowed anything to be seen. Only white. Only muffled silence. Then he heard something.
A dragging sound.
Slow.
From the shattered glass roof, a branch pushed aside the accumulated snow. It didn’t fall like wind. It fell as if someone had moved it.
There it was.
Closer.
“Patas frías.”
Aaron would later swear that the snowman winked at him. No one believed him. Perhaps it was a reflection. Perhaps it was fear.
No one believed him. Perhaps it was a reflection. Perhaps it was fear.
“Patas frías” did not speak. It did not move the way living things move. But it was there. And that, in the middle of the forest, was enough.
He doesn’t know when he left the car.
Perhaps it wasn’t a decision. Perhaps it simply happened.
The cold struck him as he climbed out through the roof window, but something covered him immediately. It wasn’t a blanket. It was cold… but a different kind of cold. Ordered. Branch-arms wrapped around him. The snow of the snowman didn’t burn. It protected.
They walked.
Aaron doesn’t remember the time or the distance. Only the sound of his steps sinking, and another softer sound beside him. Every time he stumbled, something held him before he could fall. The forest seemed to open just enough to let them pass.
At the end, a light appeared. Just one. Yellow.
A village. It wasn’t clear how long it took to get there, and he couldn’t even be sure of the direction he had walked.
“Patas frías” stopped in front of a door. Aaron understood. He knocked.
The door opened. An older man. A woman with a thick shawl. The annoyance at the hour turned instantly into concern.
“A child?”
They let him in. Blanket. Warmth. Tea. Overlapping questions.
“How did you get here?” the man asked. —
“With my friend,” Aaron said, pointing to the door.
Outside there was only a motionless snowman, at the edge of the road. No one paid it any attention.
They called the police. Aaron drew “Patas frías.” It was not an ordinary child’s drawing. There was no sun, no houses. Only him: round, tall, with long arms and an expression they couldn’t tell was a smile… or waiting.
Following the boy’s directions, the officers entered the forest.
It wasn’t difficult.
First they found one snowman. Then another. And another. Always at the edge of the road. Always looking toward the forest. Different scarves. Mismatched buttons. Wool hats.
Too many.
Where the car should have been, there was a circle of snowmen, arranged as if pointing to an exact spot. Beneath them, the car.
The parents were injured. Frozen. But alive.
No one could explain how they had survived. Nor where all of that had come from. The official explanation was simple: a child’s imagination.
But at dawn, there wasn’t a single snowman left.
Only untouched snow.
And footprints that led nowhere.
The story of “Patas frías” was told for years. No one ever saw him again.
And Aaron, even as an adult, never knew how to answer whether Patas frías was good or evil.
He knew only one thing:
When it gets very cold… he appears.
Written by Milton Chanes
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Novels, essay, and poetry in a year of memory, critique, and literary resistance
Read together, these books map out a complex cartography of Cuban literature in 2025. / Collage
14ymedio, Havana, January 10, 2026 — Cuban literature in 2025 once again demonstrated that, even in a context of editorial scarcity, censorship, and geographic dispersion, books remain one of the most effective tools for thinking about the country. From the Island and from exile, through major international imprints or independent publishers, Cuban authors released works that engaged with memory, power, intimacy, violence, and everyday survival. Throughout the year, 14ymedio reviewed these new publications, paying attention not only to literary quality but also to the texts’ ability to challenge and question the reality of the Island. From that ongoing coverage emerges this selection of the 14 most relevant Cuban books of 2025, read as a narrative and essayistic body that, taken together, offers a snapshot of the cultural moment.
Among the novels that achieved the greatest visibility is La viajera nocturna [The Night Traveler] (Ediciones B) by Armando Lucas Correa, a work that confirms the insertion of Cuban narrative into the international publishing circuit without losing historical depth or literary ambition. With effective prose and a narrative architecture designed for a broad readership, Correa once again demonstrates the power of telling stories of universal scope through an exploration of the traumas of the twentieth century and their present-day resonances.
In a completely different register, Juan Abreu returned with Debajo de la mesa [Under the Table] (Ladera Norte), an uncomfortable, ferocious, and deeply personal book. Abreu writes from memory not to idealize it, but to blow it apart. His prose, marked by exile, sexuality, and a break with any complacent canon, reminds us that an essential part of contemporary Cuban literature continues to be built from aesthetic and moral dissidence.
Psychological introspection also found a significant place in the novel Narcisos [Narcissus] (Editorial Huso) by Eduardo López Collazo. The lives of eight men are told through the gaze of Carmen, a psychologist who gradually discovers herself over the course of the narrative. The author, a renowned physician living in Spain, defines the novel as a search to understand “who we are when no one is looking at us, not even ourselves.” continue reading
The rawest fiction found one of its strongest exponents in Sórdida tropical (Sordid Tropics) by Carlos Lechuga.
In the realm of essay and political reflection, Entre Rusia y Cuba [Between Russia and Cuba] (Ladera Norte) by Jorge Ferrer offered one of the clearest views of a historical relationship that marked generations. Ferrer combines analysis, memory, and personal experience to dismantle both nostalgia and propaganda, proposing a critical reading of the ideological, economic, and human ties between the two countries.
That will to dismantle reaches one of its most forceful expressions in Del dicho al hecho. La leyenda de la sanidad en Cuba 1902–2024, (From Saying to Doing: The Legend of Health Care in Cuba, 1902–2024), self-published by Antonio Guedes. The book stands as one of the most necessary investigations of the moment, as it questions one of the pillars of the official narrative: the supposed excellence of the Cuban health care system. With data, historical context, and an accessible tone, Guedes dismantles myths and restores complexity to a debate hijacked for decades by propaganda.
The most unflinching fiction found in Sórdida tropical [Sordid Tropics] (Hypermedia) by Carlos Lechuga is one of its most solid examples. Also a filmmaker, Lechuga writes from disenchantment and rawness, without concessions to easy lyricism or revolutionary epic. His novel portrays a harsh Cuba, marked by symbolic and material violence, where characters survive in an environment that constantly expels them.
Poetry, for its part, found in Reina María Rodríguez one of its highest expressions with Mazorcas (Rialta). Considered one of the most important female voices in living Cuban poetry, Rodríguez delivers a mature collection in which the word functions as intimate archive, resistance, and reflection on time, the city, and loss. The volume confirms that poetry continues to be a privileged space for thinking the unsayable.
In the realm of internationally prominent narrative, Leonardo Padura once again occupied a central place with Morir en la arena (To Die in the Sand) (Tusquets). Far from repeating himself, Padura explores new layers of the crime genre to probe violence, memory, and moral decay, maintaining that unique ability to turn entertainment into a critical tool.
In Libertad vigilada: la poesía de Severo Sarduy (Guarded Freedom: The Poetry of Severo Sarduy) (Verbum), Joaquín Roses starts from a premise as simple as it is necessary: it is not possible to fully understand Sarduy’s writing without attending to his poetry, a claim the author himself made during his lifetime. This essay focuses on the twenty-one sonnets of Un testigo fugaz y disfrazado, 1985 (A Fleeting and Disguised Witness, 1985), a volume marked by the use of chromaticism and sonic geometry.
One of the year’s most ambitious editorial projects was José Lezama Lima: A Biography. Formative Years (1910–1939), by Ernesto Hernández Busto
The volume Bay of Pigs: The Two Sides of the Story (Ediciones Material) (published in English) by writer and journalist Miguel Ángel Sánchez Martínez opts for rigor, contrast, and shared memory. The book addresses the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 through meticulous, chronological research, drawing on declassified CIA documents and testimonies from both sides to dismantle opposing narratives and recover areas erased by official history.
One of the most ambitious publishing bets of the year was José Lezama Lima: una biografía. Años de formación, 1910–1939 (Editorial Pre-Textos) (José Lezama Lima: A Biography. Formative Years 1910-1939) (Editorial Pre-Textos), by Ernesto Hernández Busto. More than a traditional biography, the book reconstructs the cultural ecosystem in which Lezama was formed, offering a renewed reading of a central figure of the canon and engaging with the intellectual history of twentieth-century Cuba.
Meanwhile, the political thriller found a solid expression in El otro espía (The Other Spy) (Saturn Forlag), by Humberto López Guerra, a novel that uses espionage as a metaphor to explore loyalties, betrayals, and the exercise of power. Its narrative effectiveness and historical background made it one of the most talked-about reads of the year.
The editorial close of 2025 was marked by two milestones. First, the announcement of a new critical edition, revised and updated by Yoandy Cabrera, of the poetry of Delfín Prats, presented as a tribute on the poet’s birthday. The recovery of his work reaffirms the need to reread living classics with contemporary critical tools. Second, there is the publication of Cuba en mi memoria: república, castrismo, exilio, (El Ateje) (Cuba in My Memory: Republic, Castroism, Exile) by Manuel C. Díaz, a book of political memoirs that traverses three fundamental moments of national history and dialogues with the testimonial tradition of exile.
Read together, these books form a complex cartography of Cuban literature in 2025: a space shaped by memory, critique of power, intimate exploration, and the urgent need to narrate. For 14ymedio, highlighting these works has also been a way of affirming that, even in times of crisis, books remain one of the best ways to understand Cuba.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.
Private businesses in Cuba — MSMEs* — will be able to buy foreign currency once a month, according to a calculation made by the Central Bank based on each company’s income in previous months.
There are not enough dollars in the system, and the State rations them sparingly. / 14ymedio
14ymedio, Havana, January 10, 2026 — The announcement by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) about opening a banking channel that allows private MSMEs to purchase foreign currency adds another layer to the already tangled foreign exchange market. The information was shared by Banco Metropolitano on its social media accounts and is presented as part of the new “ordering” task. Put simply: the State says that, from now on, some private businesses will be able to buy dollars legally through banks, but under very strict rules.
According to the explanation, purchases will be made based on the new floating exchange rate, which currently stands at 413 pesos per dollar. Only one purchase per month will be allowed, and business owners will not be able to choose the amount, because the bank will calculate it by taking the average of what entered the company’s tax account over the last three months, using only half of that amount and converting it at the floating exchange rate in effect at the time.
In practice, this means that if an MSME has had low or irregular income, it will be able to buy very few dollars, even if it urgently needs them to import raw materials, pay for services, or meet contractual obligations. And if the business is just starting out and does not yet have an income history, it may simply be left out altogether.
The BCC also made it clear that the entire process will be “banked.” Cuban pesos will be withdrawn compulsorily from the tax account, and the purchased foreign currency will be deposited only into a foreign-currency account belonging to the same economic actor. There will be no cash, no informal transfers, and no room for maneuvering. Before continue reading
approving the transaction, the bank will review the customer’s profile, accounts, and the origin of the funds, as part of the controls that currently weigh on any economic activity on the Island.
In recent years, several “solutions” for private-sector access to foreign currency have been introduced, almost all with big headlines and very modest results.
Applications must be submitted online, through the online Metropolitano en Línea service. On paper, it sounds modern and organized. In real life, many business owners recall that State banking platforms often fail, collapse, or become inaccessible precisely when they are most needed, especially outside Havana.
Beyond the technical language, the question many business owners are asking is quite straightforward: is this enough to solve anything? The answer, at least for now, seems to be no. The main problem remains the scarcity of foreign currency. The State is not offering new dollars; it is only saying how and to whom it will sell a portion of the few dollars it has.
Moreover, the floating rate set by the Central Bank, although periodically adjusted, still falls far short of reflecting the real street price of the dollar (460 pesos per dollar this Saturday), where most transactions take place. As long as that gap exists, many business owners will continue to find it less cumbersome and more efficient to turn to the informal market rather than submit to a lengthy banking process to purchase a limited amount of foreign currency.
This is not the first time the government has announced mechanisms of this kind. In recent years, several “solutions” for private-sector access to foreign currency have been rolled out, almost all with major announcements and very discreet outcomes.
For some SMEs with stable income, good relations with their bank, and the patience to deal with bureaucracy, this channel may serve as a complement. For most, however, the underlying problem remains unchanged: there are not enough dollars in the system, and the State dispenses them by the drop.
*Translator’s note: MSME is “micro, small and medium enterprises”
Translated by Regina Anavy
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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.
A document from the Cuban Prosecutor’s Office obtained by 14ymedio accuses the former minister of having revealed sensitive data to the CIA about cooperation between Caracas and Havana.
In August 2022, Gil met with Maduro at the Miraflores Palace, a meeting that was widely publicized by the official Cuban and Venezuelan press. / X / Nicolás Maduro
14ymedio, Havana,January 10, 2026 — The recent capture of Nicolás Maduro has once again put the spotlight on the close and opaque relationship between Caracas and Havana. In that context, a source with access to the documents of the trial against Alejandro Gil Fernández, former vice prime minister and minister of economy of Cuba, has provided 14ymedio with details from the provisional conclusions of the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic (FGR), in which Gil was accused, among other crimes, of espionage on behalf of U.S. intelligence services, allegedly causing strategic damage to relations with Venezuela.
According to the report signed by Edward Roberts Campbell, chief prosecutor of the Directorate for Combating Corruption and Illegalities, Gil allegedly handed over classified information to “an unidentified agent, but presumably belonging to the CIA,” compromising “Venezuelan national security.” The document claims that the information involved sensitive data on political, economic, and military cooperation between Cuba and the Maduro regime.
Among the leaked information were economic transactions between Cuba and Venezuela, the location of financial reserves, commercial agreements linked to oil exchanges and the deployment of Cuban medical brigades, as well as schemes for triangulating financial operations and the names of foreign agencies involved in the final destination of Venezuelan crude.
The accusation also included details about Cuban government support in cybersecurity and counterintelligence for Venezuelan intelligence services, as well as personal data about Nicolás Maduro himself. According to the source, Gil allegedly provided information about the president’s family, his residence, his assets in Venezuela and abroad—including in Cuba—and highly sensitive details about the security ring protecting continue reading
the Chavista leader, composed of several dozen Cuban soldiers belonging to the Ministry of the Interior and the Revolutionary Armed Forces.
It was State Security that recommended Gil attend Maduro instead of Díaz-Canel in 2022. / X / Nicolás Maduro
“These acts are considered a betrayal of the trust placed in him by the Cuban government and, specifically, by State Security,” the indictment stated, characterizing the conduct as espionage in favor of U.S. intelligence services, with the aim of “undermining Venezuelan sovereignty and overthrowing its legitimate president through a coup d’état.”
However, the very development of the case reveals contradictions that are difficult to ignore. According to testimony accessed by 14ymedio, it was initially planned for Miguel Díaz-Canel to meet with Maduro in August 2022 as part of a presidential tour of several Latin American and Caribbean countries. Instead, it was State Security that recommended Gil attend in his place.
“It was argued that, because of his performance and the high level of trust placed in him as a cadre of the Revolution, he deserved that meeting,” the source explains, adding that the visit was also meant to be used for meetings with other high-ranking Venezuelan officials, including the minister of economy. The decision is striking, given that a meeting between heads of state is not usually delegated to a sectoral minister.
State Security had been investigating Gil for at least four years, placing the initial suspicions in 2020.
The source clarifies that they only had access to the prosecutor’s indictment and do not know whether the alleged espionage related to Venezuela was proven during the trial. “I cannot state whether these facts were brought to trial with conclusive evidence or whether it was proven that Gil delivered sensitive Venezuelan information to the CIA,” the source notes. Nor do they have details about the grounds for the life sentence handed down by the Supreme Court.
The timeline of the case reinforces the doubts. Pro-government programs such as Razones de Cuba have claimed that State Security had been investigating Gil for at least four years, placing the suspicions as early as 2020. Even so, in August 2022 Gil met with Maduro at the Miraflores Palace, a meeting widely publicized by the official Cuban and Venezuelan press and publicly celebrated by the Chavista leader himself on social media.
Months later, in November of that same year, Gil accompanied Díaz-Canel on a tour of China, Algeria, Russia, and Turkey. In July 2023, he was also authorized to travel to New York as Cuba’s sole representative to the United Nations General Assembly. “If there were solid indications of espionage, these decisions do not hold up from a counterintelligence standpoint,” the source points out.
Alejandro Gil’s trial, far from clarifying the facts, exposes a web in which Venezuela, Maduro, and Cuban security are intertwined in a narrative full of gaps. Today, after the capture of the Chavista leader, those gaps weigh more heavily than ever. Because if Gil was a spy, he was one with inexplicable freedom; and if he was not, his conviction reveals how far a system can go when it needs a visible culprit to protect those operating at the highest levels of power.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.
14ymedio, Madrid, 13 January 2025 — The collision between a van and a tricycle claimed the lives of six people on Monday in Moa, in the province of Holguín. Five of them died at the scene of the accident and another died at Dr. Guillermo Luis Fernández Hernández-Baquero Hospital, where the injured were taken.
