Translating Cuba – Page 30 – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

Cuba’s Supreme Court Upholds Life Sentence for Former Vice Prime Minister Alejandro Gil

The ruling brings to an end two appeals in a case that combined economic crimes, leaks involving Venezuela, and espionage.

If Gil was a spy, he was one with inexplicable freedom. / Cubadebate

14ymedio, Havana January 24, 2026 – The Supreme People’s Court (TSP) ruled this Friday to uphold the two guilty verdicts against Alejandro Gil Fernández, former vice prime minister and former Minister of the Economy of Cuba, including life imprisonment for espionage. The decision, confirmed to 14ymedio by sources close to the case, definitively closed the avenue of appeal filed by the defense in both the espionage case and the case file grouping a dozen crimes linked to corruption.

According to the court’s notification to the parties, the appeals lodged against the sentences handed down after the trial held last November, in a double hearing, were not admitted. On December 8, the TSP itself had announced the verdicts: life imprisonment for espionage and 20 years in prison for crimes such as embezzlement, bribery, tax evasion, and money laundering.

Gil was removed from his posts in February 2024 and, barely a month later, authorities announced his arrest and the opening of a judicial investigation for “serious errors.” In November, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic formally charged him with eleven crimes, although it was the charge of espionage that marked a qualitative turning point in the case and elevated it to the level of “treason to the homeland.”

In an official statement, the TSP said that the former minister “deceived the leadership of the country and the people he represented, thereby causing damage to the economy,” and that he violated protocols for handling classified information, removed it, and made it “available to the enemy’s services.” For the judges, these acts justified a “severe criminal response,” as they constituted “the most serious of crimes.”

The case takes on a greater political dimension because of the mention of Venezuela in the indictment

Gil’s downfall has no recent precedent. A close figure to President Miguel Díaz-Canel and a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Cuba, until recently he was one of the most visible faces of the cabinet. His tenure was associated with the implementation of the Tarea Ordenamiento [Ordering Task], the 2021 monetary reform that eliminated the dual currency and ended up causing a sharp devaluation of the peso, runaway inflation, and the current de facto dollarization of the economy. He was also responsible for opening—within limits—space for small private businesses and for applying unpopular adjustment measures, such as raising fuel prices by up to 400%.

However, beyond the official narrative, the case takes on a greater political dimension because of the mention of Venezuela in the indictment. Information leaked to which this outlet had access reveals that the prosecution argued Gil had spied for U.S. intelligence services, delivering sensitive information that directly affected continue reading

the strategic relationship between Havana and Caracas.

The report, signed by Edward Roberts Campbell, chief prosecutor of the Directorate for Combating Corruption and Illegalities, states that the former minister allegedly provided classified data to “an unidentified agent, but presumably belonging to the CIA,” thereby compromising “Venezuelan national security.” The leaked information reportedly included bilateral economic transactions, oil agreements, financial triangulation schemes, the deployment of Cuban medical brigades, and even details of Cuban support in cybersecurity and counterintelligence to Nicolás Maduro’s regime.

The indictment goes even further, including alleged personal data on Maduro himself, his family, his residence, assets inside and outside Venezuela including in Cuba, and details of the security ring made up of Cuban military personnel from the Ministry of the Interior and the Revolutionary Armed Forces. All of this was presented as an operation intended to “undermine Venezuelan sovereignty and overthrow its legitimate president.”

The emphasis on Venezuela and on an alleged “internal traitor” aligns with the narrative of confrontation with Washington

Nevertheless, the very development of the case leaves gaps that are difficult to ignore. According to testimony consulted by 14ymedio, in August 2022 it was planned that Díaz-Canel himself would meet with Maduro, but State Security recommended that Gil go instead, due to the “high level of trust” placed in him. The meeting took place at the Miraflores Palace and was widely publicized by the official press of both countries.

The subsequent chronology is even more contradictory. If, as official programs maintain, Gil had been under investigation since at least 2020, it is hard to explain why in 2022 and 2023 he was authorized to travel at the highest level, accompanying Díaz-Canel on a tour of China, Algeria, Russia, and Turkey, and being designated Cuba’s sole representative to the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

A source with access to the prosecution’s case admits that they do not know whether the allegations related to Venezuela were proven with conclusive evidence during the trial. “I cannot say that it was demonstrated that Gil delivered sensitive information to the CIA, nor that those facts supported the life sentence,” the source notes.

The international context adds another layer of interpretation. The emphasis on Venezuela and on an alleged “internal traitor” coincides with the narrative of confrontation with Washington under the administration of Donald Trump, which has opted to tighten pressure on the allies of Caracas and Havana.

Thus, the trial of Alejandro Gil not only seals the downfall of the most powerful official purged in at least 15 years, but also exposes the internal tensions of a system that, in the face of economic collapse and international isolation, appears to need visible culprits. If Gil was a spy, he was one with inexplicable freedom; and if he was not, his sentence illustrates how far power can go when it decides to protect those who operate at the highest levels.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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U.S. Drones off Yucatán: A Warning to Mexico To Halt Its Oil Shipments to Cuba?

Reuters and Politico cite high-level sources on an imminent escalation of pressure from Washington to block any delivery of crude to the Island.

According to one of the sources cited by Politico, “energy is the key to killing the regime, and this will happen in 2026.” / X

14ymedio, Havana, January 24, 2026 – The possibility that Mexico may halt or reduce oil shipments to Cuba has ceased to be a diplomatic rumor and has become an internal debate within the government of Claudia Sheinbaum. According to a Reuters investigation, three high-level sources confirmed that the Mexican executive branch is assessing whether to maintain, reduce, or suspend crude supplies to the Island, amid fears of direct retaliation from the United States under President Donald Trump.

The U.S. outlet Politico goes even further, citing “three sources familiar with the plan” and asserting that the White House is considering invoking the Helms-Burton Act to “impose a total blockade on oil imports by Cuba.” According to one of the sources quoted by the outlet, “energy is the key to killing the regime, and this will happen in 2026, with a 100% probability.”

The interruption of Venezuelan shipments, following the forced immobilization of oil tankers in December and the capture of Nicolás Maduro, has left Mexico as the main fuel supplier to a country mired in prolonged blackouts and a deepening energy crisis. “Mexico has become the last lifeline,” one of the Reuters sources acknowledged, describing the impact any change in that country’s oil policy would have.

Beyond geopolitical calculations, the impact is already being felt on the streets of Havana. A private transport operator consulted by 14ymedio describes a scene repeated across different parts of the capital: “Yesterday, of all the gas stations I saw, the only one with a line was on Vía Blanca, because it’s the one assigned by the government. None of the three in Guanabacoa had fuel.”

Although President Sheinbaum has publicly defended the shipments as “humanitarian aid” and part of long-term contracts, concern is growing within her cabinet about the political cost continue reading

of that stance. “There is a real fear of antagonizing Trump just when Mexico needs room to negotiate with Washington,” another official told the agency.

The cost of defying Trump could be too high at a moment of maximum bilateral tension.

That room is crucial. Mexico is seeking to renegotiate aspects of the USMCA trade agreement with the United States and Canada, while also trying to convince Washington that it is acting decisively against drug cartels. In that context, the oil reaching Cuba has become an uncomfortable issue. Trump has been explicit: in a message posted on his Truth Social network on January 11, he said there would be “no more oil or money for Cuba.” For several members of the Mexican cabinet, those words are a direct warning.

According to Reuters, the issue was even raised during a recent phone call between Trump and Sheinbaum. Two sources indicated that the U.S. president asked directly about crude shipments and the presence of thousands of Cuban doctors in Mexico. Sheinbaum’s response was to insist on the humanitarian nature of the oil and the legality of the health agreement. Trump, the sources add, did not explicitly demand a suspension, but made his displeasure clear.

Officials consulted by Reuters expressed concern about the growing presence of U.S. Navy drones over the Gulf of Mexico. Flight-tracking data, circulated by local media, show at least a dozen Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton drone missions over the Bay of Campeche, following routes similar to those of tankers carrying Mexican fuel to Cuba. “It’s impossible not to read that as a message,” one source admitted.

At the same time, Trump has intensified his rhetoric against Mexico, claiming the country is “run by the cartels” and suggesting the possibility of ground attacks. Sheinbaum has offered greater judicial cooperation, including the extradition of nearly a hundred kingpins, but has also drawn a red line against any unilateral military action. “The fear is that a decision about Cuba could get mixed up with the security and sovereignty issue,” another official explained to Reuters.

Within the Mexican government, the debate is far from settled. Some voices argue that maintaining the supply is a moral obligation and an investment in regional stability. “Cutting off oil could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe in Cuba and trigger mass migration toward Mexico,” one source warned. Others, by contrast, caution that the cost of defying Trump could be too high at a moment of maximum bilateral tension.

The regime clings to its economic and political model while the White House insists that Cuba “is failing of its own volition.”

Data show that the volume sent to Cuba does not affect Mexico’s industry. Between January and September of last year, Pemex exported to the Island about 17,200 barrels per day of crude and 2,000 barrels of refined products, worth roughly $400 million. “It’s little oil for Mexico, but vital for Cuba,” Sheinbaum summarized this week in defending that solidarity, adding that it “does not have to disappear.”

The fuel shortage not only paralyzes private transport but has also dried up the informal market, a traditional pressure valve in times of crisis. “My neighbor sells gasoline. I just asked him and he says he doesn’t have any. I ask how much it costs and where I can get it. He tells me it’s pointless; there isn’t any even on the street,” the driver tells 14ymedio, resigned to a scarcity that no longer allows shortcuts.

The lack of electricity has turned bakeries with generators into some of the few regular food supply points. “You should see what the bakeries are like at night. It’s the only thing there is to eat, and only because they have generators,” he explains. Bread, often stale and rationed, has become the last guarantee against blackouts and shortages.

In Cuban neighborhoods, waiting is not measured in barrels or millions of dollars, but in hours spent in lines, nights without light, and increasingly empty tables. The regime clings to its economic and political model while the White House insists that Cuba “is falling by its own choice” and maintains that the country should “reach an agreement before it’s too late.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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A Liter of Gasoline Reaches 750 Pesos in Havana and Up to 1,200 in Holguín

The oil tanker Mia Grace, which was heading to Cuba from Africa, will instead go to the Dominican Republic
Pots and pans bang in Havana in protest against blackouts of up to 13 hours

A family cooking with kerosene on a Havana street. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, Darío Hernández, January 23, 2026 – Havana experienced a totally dark day this Thursday, Diana, a second-year veterinary student went the entire day without eating. There is no gas left in her home, where she lives with her elderly grandparents, she tells 14ymedio. “They say pots were banging. I didn’t have the strength to listen or to bang a pot myself though I certainly felt like it,” the young woman says. “To make matters worse, I had an exam today and was hungry, because there comes a point when bread doesn’t fill you up, and it’s not that cheap either. I don’t know where this is going, but I’m exhausted.”

Irma, a 40-year-old Facebook advertising promoter, recounts her ordeal: “The power goes out and the connection disappears. I caught a cold going out onto the balcony looking for a signal and hanging laundry at night, because the clothes pile up, and when the electricity comes back, it’s rush, wash, make rice, iron the kid’s uniform.” The woman says her sister, a seamstress, is pulling her hair out because she doesn’t have light to work. “They give her power for one hour during the whole day. If this keeps up, she’ll have to sleep during the day and work at night. And the worst part is that it seems like you-know-who doesn’t care.”

“Here people live however they can. Many skip meals and baths; they resign themselves,” says a resident of Guanabacoa. “Yesterday the pots were banging in several areas here, and really loud. We’ll see what happens when the heat arrives, and on top of all this is the lack of sleep.”

“Here people live however they can. Many skip meals and baths; they resign themselves.”

On the streets at night, cooking in doorways lit by candles or by the glow of a cigarette, there are neighbors who take it with as much humor as they can. “I have no electricity, I have no soap,” sings a young woman almost melodically, to the tune of Juan Gabriel, continuing: “I have no money and nothing to give.” continue reading

Several municipalities in the capital reported more than nine hours in the dark, such as Marianao, where the power was cut at 3:00 pm and by midnight they were still without electricity. In the La Güinera neighborhood of Arroyo Naranjo, residents reported up to 13 hours without power, and in La Lisa there were protests with pots and pans. “I just confirmed by a video call that they restored electricity a few minutes after the demonstration. So, a word to the wise is enough,” said journalist Mario Pentón.

Mercedes and Antonio, two retirees who live alone, couldn’t cook their peas on Tuesday until 11:00 pm, when the power finally came back after 14 hours. “It was enough to drive you crazy,” says the man, an accountant when he was working; his wife was a doctor. However, “on Wednesday the blackout was even worse.”

The fuel shortage is also evident at gas stations. Since January 10, the Ticket system has not provided the list of the 24 gas stations open in eastern Havana, which could indicate that they are all closed. The list for the western sector is still being issued; this Thursday, 5 of the 14 stations there remained open.

Several municipalities of the capital reported more than nine hours in the dark, such as Marianao, where power was cut at 3:00 pm and by midnight they were still without electricity. / 14ymedio

Meanwhile, on the informal market fuel prices are rising at a dizzying pace. In Holguín, local sources report that a liter of gasoline has reached 1,200 pesos and a can of kerosene up to 15,000. In Havana, some users say they can find gasoline on the black market for 1,000 pesos per liter, although in most places prices range between 700 and 750. In Sancti Spíritus, the product is cheaper: five liters of “kerosene for the stove,” a resident explains, cost between 1,850 and 1,900 pesos; that is, between 370 and 380 per liter.

The situation is not easing, and the ship on the horizon fades away. In a strange twist of events, the Mia Grace, the tanker that was heading to Cuba from Togo to deliver some 314,500 barrels of diesel or 280,500 of fuel oil, according to University of Texas expert Jorge Piñón, has changed course. Geolocation data that this week indicated its departure from the port of Lomé with an expected arrival in Havana on February 4 have been modified.

The vessel, flying the flag of the Marshall Islands, now appears off the coast of Guinea after having departed on January 13 from Takoradi (Ghana), with destination Río Haina (Dominican Republic), where it is due to arrive on February 2. It is unknown why the route detected last Monday by Piñón has changed. He was alerted to the tanker’s destination and told 14ymedio that it could be a “spot purchase” by the state company Cubametales, sanctioned by the United States, “through a European intermediary.”

The expert noted that “Togo does not refine oil, but it exports refined petroleum products and has extensive logistics and maritime transit infrastructure.” Now the origin points to a port in Ghana, located about 500 kilometers from Lomé.

Most significant is that as of this week the UNE has stopped reporting the deficit by type of energy.

Ghana’s oil industry has consolidated in recent years as one of the most flourishing, along with gold, although it is still a mid-level African crude power, especially compared to Libya, Nigeria, or Algeria. The latter country, which maintains excellent relations with Cuba, has contributed a small amount of oil to the Island, but only around two million barrels annually, the equivalent of 18 days of national consumption.

After nearly reaching a 2,000-megawatt (MW) deficit during peak hours on Thursday—well above the announced 1,775 MW—a similar shortfall is expected this Friday. Officially, the Electric Utility (UNE) has forecast 1,970 MW, but even during average hours the figures are staggering, with 1,200 MW affected. This is almost unheard of in a context where solar parks are operating correctly. This Thursday the 49 parks generated 3,186 MWh, with a maximum output of 711 MW. These figures are enough to imagine what would happen if they were not contributing at all.

The thermoelectric plants are constantly going in and out, as if they spent the day revolving through a turnstile. This Thursday, the electric company’s posts announcing shutdowns were so numerous that users could take no more. “All those shutdowns are aimed directly at the people. Thank you very much for your efficiency,” one responded bitterly. Announcements of “offline” and “back on the system” multiplied, prompting some darkly humorous comments amid the desperation. “Whoever runs the UNE’s profile must enjoy their job; they work more than anyone else at the company. Incredible incompetence,” someone remarked.

Most significant is that as of this week the UNE has stopped reporting the deficit by type of energy. This Friday’s breakdown indicates breakdowns at units 5 and 8 of the Mariel thermoelectric plant (CTE), unit 3 of the Carlos Manuel de Céspedes CTE, units 5 and 6 of Nuevitas, and unit 2 of the Felton CTE. Under maintenance are unit 2 of the Santa Cruz del Norte CTE and unit 4 of the Carlos Manuel de Céspedes CTE, totaling 466 MW out of service in thermal generation. But there is a complete absence of data on the shortfall due to fuel, a figure that has been reported for months and generally exceeds 1,000 MW.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Yohandy Morales: A Cuban Face Among Puerto Rican Baseball’s Champions

With the Cangrejeros, winners of the winter league, he was selected as the Most Valuable Player

Yohandy is the son of Cuban ballplayer Andy Morales, famous for his decisive home run against the Baltimore Orioles. / Screenshot / X

14ymedio, Matanzas, Andy Lans,January 23, 2026 – On January 20, the Cangrejeros de Santurce were crowned champions of Puerto Rican winter league baseball. Standing out on that team as Finals Most Valuable Player (MVP) was Yohandy Morales, son of Cuban ballplayer Andy Morales, renowned for his decisive home run against the Baltimore Orioles.

Had Andy Morales not hit that crucial home run to steer Team Cuba to victory over the Baltimore Orioles in a 1999 exhibition series, it might have been more difficult for him to sign with the New York Yankees in 2000 after escaping the island by boat. Had Andy Morales not taken to the sea in search of freedom, the life of his son Yohandy Morales, born in Miami in 2001, might have been different, and had Andy not had the opportunity to sign with Major League Baseball franchises in the United States, his experience might not have been the same in guiding Yohandy’s athletic path. Today, Yohandy is a Minor League player with the Washington Nationals.

So, in a way, if Andy Morales had not hit that home run against the Orioles, you might not be reading this article about his talented offspring.

Yohandy is trending in Puerto Rico after being crowned champion and named Finals MVP of the winter league. The lanky 24-year-old, capable of playing both first and third base, was a key piece in the Cangrejeros’ six-game victory over the Leones de Ponce in a best-of-nine championship series. Santurce thus captured its 17th title, while the Cuban American experienced a pivotal moment in honing his talent. continue reading

He posted an impressive .395 batting average in 44 official at-bats.

It is no small detail that MLB Pipeline has ranked Yohandy 21st on the Washington Nationals’ Top 50 Prospects list for 2025. Andy Morales’s son has climbed to the Triple-A level within the organization and has also received invitations to Spring Training.

But why dwell on what Morales Jr. accomplished in the Puerto Rican league? The right-handed slugger joined the team when the 2025–2026 regular season was already well underway and, even so, recorded an impressive .395 batting average in 44 official at-bats. He added eight extra-base hits, including a home run, and six runs batted in: outstanding numbers that confirmed his consistency as a contact hitter.

In the postseason, Santurce faced the Criollos de Caguas in the semifinals before being crowned champions against Ponce. Across both stages of the championship, Yohandy Morales led in hits, collecting 17 for a .386 batting average, paired with a .471 on-base percentage (OBP), eight RBIs, and six extra-base hits. Of his 12 games in the playoffs, the most memorable was Game 3 of the final, in which he went 2-for-3 with a home run, a double, three RBIs, and a hit-by-pitch.

The fact that Yohandy can perform in Caribbean baseball, where the game is played “hotter” and pressure is often greater than in the Minor Leagues, sets an encouraging precedent for his professional future.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Raúl Castro Warmly Welcomes Russia’s Interior Minister

Díaz-Canel highlighted the “enormous significance” of the visit due to “the timing.”

Castro sent warm greetings to Vladimir Putin. / Estudios Revolución

14ymedio/EFE, Havana, 21 January 2026 — Raúl Castro met on Tuesday with Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, who is also a police general. The official press published images of the meeting, in which the former Cuban leader “conveyed warm greetings to President Vladimir Putin.”

During the meeting, which was attended by General Lázaro Alberto Álvarez Casas and the Russian ambassador to Havana, Viktor Koronelli, there was talk of the “excellent bilateral relations” between the two countries.
The same idea was emphasised by President Miguel Díaz-Canel, who highlighted the “enormous significance” of the visit due to “the timing of it,” according to the Presidency.

The same idea was emphasised by President Miguel Díaz-Canel, who highlighted the “enormous significance” of the visit due to “the timing of it,” according to the Presidency.

In a meeting with the Russian minister, Díaz-Canel pointed out the “greater complexity” of this moment, as well as “a situation greatly impacted by the events of 3 January in Venezuela,” when the United States carried out a military attack on Caracas, resulting in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and the death of 32 Cuban soldiers.

The island’s leader recalled that during Kolokóltsev’s previous visit in November 2023, Cuba was “facing the intensification of the blockade, a widespread media smear campaign and the impact of its inclusion on the spurious list of countries allegedly sponsoring terrorism,” and stated that “all of that remains in place today.” continue reading

“This visit is yet another expression of the sensitivity of the Russian Federation, the party, the government, the armed forces and you yourself. There is sensitivity, understanding of our situation, and a willingness to help and cooperate,” Díaz-Canel stressed.

He also emphasised “the relevance” of this visit amid “the complex global situation”.

The Russian minister’s arrival on the island comes amid escalating tensions between Havana and Washington following the US military operation in Venezuela.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said last Thursday at the Kremlin that Moscow stands in solidarity with Cuba for “its determination to defend its sovereignty and independence”.

“I would like to emphasise that Russia and the Republic of Cuba enjoy truly strong and friendly relations. We have always provided assistance to our Cuban friends and continue to do so,” said the Russian leader.

‘I would like to emphasise that Russia and the Republic of Cuba enjoy truly strong and friendly relations. We have always provided assistance to our Cuban friends and continue to do so.”

At the start of his schedule in Havana on Tuesday, Kolokóltsev laid a wreath at the mausoleum dedicated to 69 young Soviets who died in Cuba between 1960 and 1964 during collaborative missions, according to reports by the island’s state media. He also paid tribute to the Cuban soldiers who recently died in Venezuela.

In March 2025, Havana and Moscow signed a military cooperation agreement that lays the groundwork for “facilitating the development and strengthening of military cooperation” between the two countries, as well as “providing the legal basis for defining the objectives, areas and modalities” of this bilateral collaboration.

Russia has been a political ally of Cuba since the Soviet era of the Cold War and is one of its main trading partners. Both sides have highlighted their ties as a “strategic partnership”.

The bilateral relationship has grown even closer in recent times as the island experiences its worst economic crisis in three decades, with shortages of basic goods and spiraling inflation, exacerbated by structural weaknesses in its production and recurring failures in its electricity system.
Russia also had a Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Venezuela, which, however, has not served to prompt Moscow to intervene in favour of Maduro other than to launch the occasional criticism of the US operation.

Translated by GH

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Trump Announces Agreement on Greenland With NATO and Withdraws Threat of Tariffs

The agreement opens a new era of strategic cooperation in the Arctic and regional defence matters.

Trump explained that he will not impose the tariffs that were scheduled to take effect on 1 February.

EFE (via 14ymedio), Davos, 21 January 2025 — US President Donald Trump announced on Wednesday an agreement with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Greenland, which will be “very good for the United States and all NATO countries,” and suspended the threat of tariffs from 1 February against eight European countries.

In a post on his social media platform Truth Social, Trump also announced “further discussions” on the “Golden Dome” missile defence system with regard to Greenland, adding that more information would be provided as the discussions progressed.

Following a very productive meeting with the Secretary General of NATO, we have established the framework for a future agreement regarding Greenland.”

“Following a very productive meeting with the NATO Secretary General, we have established the framework for a future agreement regarding Greenland and, in fact, the entire Arctic region. This solution, if implemented, will be very beneficial for the United States of America and for all NATO countries,” he said.

Trump explained that, “based on this understanding,” he will not impose the tariffs that were scheduled to take effect on 1 February, which he had threatened to impose on eight European countries, including Germany, France, and Denmark, that participated in military exercises on the Arctic island.

He also specified that Vice-President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, along with any other necessary individuals, “will be in charge of the negotiations” and will “report directly” to him.

Translated by GH

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In Cuba the Dollar Reaches 500 Pesos on the Informal Market in Holguín and Sancti Spíritus

Economist Pedro Monreal points to the failure of the floating exchange rate created by the government a month ago in its latest attempt to revalue the national currency

At the La Cuevita market in San Miguel del Padrón (Havana), the dollar was being bought at 480 CUP. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Holguín/Sancti Spíritus, Havana, Miguel García, Mercedes García, and Darío Hernández, January 22, 2026 – Just over a month after the official floating exchange rate went into effect, promising to revalue the national currency, the dollar has soared to 500 pesos in some parts of Cuba, such as Holguín. That is 10 CUP more per USD than the rate reported this Thursday by the independent platform El Toque (490) in its daily tracking of informal-market currency trading.

This was confirmed by a resident of Holguín who owns the electric tricycle he uses for work, whose electronic control box burned out. When he asked about prices, a private seller told him it cost $190. “I asked him what that was in pesos, because I didn’t have USD and had no way to get them, and after insisting that he preferred dollars, he told me the dollar was at 500 pesos.”

At the same time, mipymes [‘MSMEs’ — micro, small and medium-sized private enterprises] in the eastern city have raised prices for basic goods such as cooking oil, spaghetti, and chicken. “Starting this week, it’s going to be huge,” a Holguín resident laments ironically. Some merchants argue that inflation is precisely due to the new price of the dollar. “Due to the rise of the USD, there may be some price changes in certain products, but it’s nothing serious; we’re making an effort to keep prices as fair as possible,” they promise in a WhatsApp group.

“It’s not at all fair. They say they made the last purchase at one price for the dollar, but the next one will more expensive, so they’ll have to raise prices”

“Can you imagine? It’s not at all fair. They say they made the last purchase at one price for the dollar, but the next one will be more expensive, so they’ll have to raise prices,” the same woman says. continue reading

In Sancti Spíritus, most informal stalls are offering the dollar at the rate reported by El Toque, 490 CUP, but according to a source in the city, “there’s a mipyme that’s taking it at 500.” Meanwhile, in Havana, in most neighborhoods the dollar can be found at 490 pesos, but two days ago, at the La Cuevita market in San Miguel del Padrón, it was being bought at 480.

That same Tuesday, Cuban economist Pedro Monreal documented the failure of the most recent exchange-rate measures, comparing them to preparations for the “war of the whole people,” announced after the capture of Nicolás Maduro by the U. S. in Caracas and the death of 32 Cuban soldiers in the operation. “Exactly one month passed between the announcement of a new official floating exchange rate and the notification of the analysis and approval of plans and measures for the ‘transition to a State of War’ in Cuba,” tweeted the specialist, who lives in Spain. “So far, the floating rate is fighting a losing battle.”

For now, Monreal continued, the peso “has depreciated 3.9% against the USD under the floating rate, failing to meet the government’s expectation that the ‘new official foreign-exchange market’ would help restore the purchasing power of the national currency.”

In effect, when the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) launched without prior notice an official floating exchange rate on December 18, to be added to the other two operating in the country: one at 1×24 for centralized state allocations for goods and services deemed essential, and another at 1×120 for certain “entities with the capacity to generate foreign currency,” such as tourism. The government presented it as the start of a transformation of the foreign-exchange market aimed at “bringing order” to the economy and moving toward future monetary unification.

In practice, however, the Island entered an even more complex stage of exchange-rate segmentation amid the worst economic crisis in decades. It quickly became evident that the population was ignoring the official rate, which was paradoxically very close to El Toque’s, against which the government had waged a harsh propaganda campaign months earlier, and they continued exchanging dollars on the informal market.

The peso “has depreciated 3.9% against the USD under the floating rate, failing to meet the government’s expectations”

In the following weeks, it could be seen that at state-run currency exchange offices (Cadeca), where dollars are virtually nonexistent and where the dollar was theoretically selling this Thursday at 457.92 pesos, only elderly people came to collect their pensions.

On January 9, yet another policy was added to the already convoluted exchange-rate market. The BCC opened a banking channel allowing private mipymes to legally purchase foreign currency through banks, but under very strict rules.

Thus, purchases by these private entrepreneurs can only be made based on the new floating rate, only once a month, and without being able to choose the amount. The amount is calculated by the bank by taking the average of what the mipyme deposited into its tax account over the previous three months, using only half of that money and converting it at the floating exchange rate in effect at the time.

In practice, this means that if a mipyme has had low or irregular income, it will be able to buy very few dollars, even if it urgently needs them to import raw materials, pay for services, or fulfill contracts. And if the business is just starting and does not yet have an income history, it could simply be left out altogether.

The BCC also made it clear that the entire process would be “bankarized.” Cuban pesos must be debited from the tax account, and the purchased foreign currency can only be deposited into the economic actor’s own foreign-currency account. No cash, no informal transfers, and no room for maneuver. Before approving the transaction, the bank will review the client’s identity, accounts, and the origin of the funds, as part of the controls that currently weigh on any economic activity on the Island.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Cuban Government Blames Trump for Its Failure To Pay Its Paris Club Creditors

The countries acknowledge the Island’s efforts and highlight the importance of maintaining “the ties achieved”

The Cuban delegation met in the French capital with representatives of the Paris Club. / PL

14ymedio / EFE, Havana, January 22, 2026 – The Cuban government met with its main creditors in the Paris Club to take stock of the agreement signed a year earlier to restructure its debt payments.

According to a note in the official press, the delegation, headed by Vice Prime Minister Oscar Pérez-Oliva, met in Paris with representatives of more than a dozen countries that acknowledged the Island’s “efforts” to comply with its debt repayment commitments.

The Cuban side laid out the “complex” economic and financial situation facing the Island, which it attributed to six decades of U.S. sanctions, “a policy intensified to unprecedented levels since Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025.”

The Paris Club agreed with Cuba, the note says, on the importance of maintaining “the constructive ties achieved” over the past year.

In January 2025, the Cuban authorities and the Paris Club agreed to modify the terms of the 2021 and 2015 agreements in light of Cuba’s inability to meet its obligations. continue reading

The Cuban authorities and the Paris Club agreed in January 2025 to modify the terms of the 2021 and 2015 agreements in light of Cuba’s inability to meet its obligations

In a statement, the group of creditors indicated that the new pact offered Havana “more favorable conditions to address its economic and financial difficulties in the coming years,” as well as the possibility of “preserving” the financial relations between the parties.

In 2015, Cuba signed a historic agreement with the Paris Club, which forgave $8.5 billion of a total debt of $11 billion, with Havana committing to repay the remaining amount in installments through 2023.

However, following partial defaults in 2019 and 2020, the Island declared itself unable to make the corresponding payments and requested a two-year moratorium on a total of about $200 million in overdue payments. The Paris Club agreed only to delay the deadlines by one year, though with the possibility of renegotiation.

In mid-2021, the parties agreed on an additional extension for the commitments undertaken in 2015, but Cuba’s economy has only continued to deteriorate at a rapid pace.

The Paris Club includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

In addition, the Island has substantial debts with other states, as well as countless private companies from various countries.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The U.S. Prioritizes the Search for a “Traitor” in Cuba To Bring Down the Regime This Year

According to The Wall Street Journal, Washington is trying to replicate what was done in Venezuela with Delcy Rodríguez

Some analysts believe it will be very difficult to find someone on the Council of Ministers willing to break with the regime. / Presidency

14ymedio, Madrid, January 22, 2026 – The administration of Donald Trump is looking for its Cuban Delcy. As revealed exclusively by the New York–based Wall Street Journal (WSJ), White House sources say the U.S. government is seeking a high-ranking official on the Island capable of reaching an agreement with Washington before the end of the year. The move would replicate what happened in Venezuela, although several analysts believe that finding a “traitor” in Cuba could be very complicated.

“These guys are much tougher nuts to crack,” Ricardo Zúñiga, a former U.S. official who was key to the “thaw” and also worked with the Trump administration, told the newspaper. “No one would be tempted to collaborate with the United States.” The expert had already expressed a similar view to The New York Times in a report speculating about that option. In the same piece, Michael Bustamante, a professor of History at Florida International University, said: “Cuba is much more of a one-party state, something Venezuela never was.”

According to the WSJ, there is a sense of encouragement in Trump’s inner circle after managing to remove Maduro from power, which is spurring them to continue against the Cuban regime, weaker than ever after the loss of its preferred partner. “In meetings with Cuban exiles and civic groups in Miami and Washington, they have focused on identifying someone within the current government who realizes what is coming and is willing to reach an agreement,” a U.S. official told the New York daily.

“In meetings with Cuban exiles and civic groups in Miami and Washington, they have focused on identifying someone within the current government who realizes what is coming and is willing to reach an agreement”

These words align with the message Trump posted on his social network, Truth, on January 11, when he urged the Island’s regime continue reading

to reach an agreement “before it’s too late.” It was the same day he said there would be no more oil or money for Cuba and that talks with Havana were already under way. President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez categorically denied any dialogue and also reiterated through official media that this is U.S. propaganda aimed at sowing distrust.

The WSJ maintains that Trump is not in favor of “past regime-change strategies” and prefers any option other than a military one. “As in Venezuela, this could look like an escalation of pressure, while at the same time indicating that the White House is open to negotiating an exit,” said its source.

The U.S. has assessed the state of the Cuban economy as catastrophic, something that could worsen due to the lack of oil. The electricity deficit this Wednesday approached 2,000 megawatts, more than 60% of national demand, although this has not prevented Mexico from continuing to send crude to the Island. Among the theories most cited by analysts is that Pemex has been exporting sporadic amounts and not regular shipments like Caracas, so cutting that flow is not as indispensable. Moreover, a complete fuel shortage would cause the Island to collapse, with a possible mass exodus as a consequence, something Washington wants to avoid at all costs.

But beyond oil, the U.S. has set its sights on Cuban medical missions, the sector that still provides the regime with its largest revenues. Although the amount has fallen sharply since the cancellation of Mais Médicos in Brazil, there are still lucrative contracts abroad that Washington is trying to cancel by threatening to suspend visas for authorities who sign such agreements. The strategy has already succeeded in some Caribbean countries, such as Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Grenada.

“The rulers of Cuba are incompetent Marxists who have destroyed their country and have suffered a major setback with [the capture of] Maduro, whom they are responsible for supporting,” commented a White House official, who insisted on the idea of an agreement.

The State Department has also stressed that it is a matter of national security for the Island “to be governed by a democratic government and to refuse to host the military and intelligence services of our adversaries.”

The newspaper reviews some of the failed U.S. attempts to bring down the Castro regime, “including the CIA-backed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, to a severe embargo imposed in 1962, which became stricter over time,” although it has been eased by authorizing the export of all kinds of food to the Island.

“Cuba is a Stalinist one-party state that bans political opposition and where civil society barely exists, while Venezuela has an opposition movement, protests, and elections that used to be frequent”

The WSJ believes this reinforces the view that a negotiated exit is the only option, but it does not appear optimistic in that regard. “Cuba is a Stalinist one-party state that bans political opposition and where civil society barely exists, while Venezuela has an opposition movement, protests, and elections that used to be frequent,” the article notes.

The text also discusses how recent events in Venezuela have energized Cuban-American lawmakers, who dream of an immediate end to the regime and make no effort to hide it by posting memes on social media showing Marco Rubio himself driving a convertible through a renewed Havana.

Nevertheless, it insists that the Island’s government “has demonstrated great mastery in repressing dissent among an impoverished population” and recalls that there have been only two significant mobilizations in more than 60 years: the Maleconazo of 1994 and the Island-wide protests of 11 July 2021, known as ’11J’.

As for the warlike fervor displayed by the Island’s authorities, former Democratic congressman Joe García told the WSJ: “It’s theater. It’s a country that can’t collect its garbage and pretends it’s preparing for a conflict with the neighboring superpower.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuban Faces 2025: Inés María Chapman, The Engineer Who Wants To Bring Order to Chaos

In a cabinet dominated by men who tend to talk about what isn’t working as if they were detached commentators on the disaster, she embodies the rare case of someone who still seems to believe in order, management, and responsibility.

There has been no shortage of speculation mentioning Inés María Chapman as a possible successor to Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, especially since the economic, energy, and migration crises have accelerated Díaz-Canel’s decline in popularity. / Cubadebate

14ymedio, Havana, 26 December 2025 — In a country where inertia is state policy and improvisation an unwritten dogma, Inés María Chapman (Holguín, 1965) has built her public image around efficiency. A hydraulic engineer, methodical, and obsessive about spreadsheets and schedules, the deputy prime minister became one of the most visible—and most debated—faces of the Cuban government this year. In a cabinet dominated by men who tend to talk about what isn’t working as if they were detached commentators, Chapman embodies the rare case of someone who still appears to believe in order, management, and responsibility.

But that personal rigor has had to contend, time and again, with the apathy, arbitrariness, and institutional indolence that characterize the Cuban model. Her most talked-about episode in 2025 occurred in Manzanillo, where she went to oversee the grim reality of a city that barely manages to supply itself with water. There, before a crowd weary of promises, she was greeted with a cry that summed up more than six decades of frustration: “Lies!”

The video spread like wildfire. Chapman tried to maintain a composed demeanor, but public outrage cornered her. For some analysts, that moment marked a turning point in the public perception of the deputy prime minister: an official accustomed to “solving problems” from above faced the judgment of those below, live and on air. Her reputation as a ruthless administrator clashed with the reality of the country she helps to govern. Shortly afterward, she would be embroiled in another scandal when she shared a post criticizing the Cuban Art Factory for unveiling a star in honor of Celia Cruz on her centennial.

For some analysts, that moment marked a turning point in the public perception of the deputy prime minister: an official accustomed to “solving” from above faced live judgment from below

However, her inclusion among the Faces of 2025 cannot be explained solely by that incident. Within the small circle of power, Chapman has sparked interest for something scarce in the upper echelons of the Communist Party: technical expertise. A woman in a testosterone-fueled machine, disciplined in an environment that favors slogans, she has managed to build continue reading

a personal brand that, for some, places her among the potential presidential candidates. There has been no shortage of speculation mentioning her as a possible successor to Miguel Díaz-Canel, especially since the economic, energy, and migration crises have accelerated the president’s decline.

But Chapman faces a series of obstacles that, in Cuba, outweigh any résumé. She doesn’t belong to any of the historical families that control the country’s essential levers of power, a network of clans that distribute ministries, military enterprises, and embassies as if they were private inheritances. Moreover, on the island, where key decisions continue to be made by a handful of descendants of Europeans—white, with well-known surnames, and, in many cases, with light eyes—her race acts as a silent brake. Being a woman is another burden in a political elite designed by and for men who grew up under the iron grip of Castroism.

Furthermore, on the Island, key decisions continue to be made by a handful of descendants of Europeans.

Despite this, Chapman has learned to move with calculated precision. Quiet at times, expansive at others, she has known how to manage her silences, measure every gesture, and take advantage of every public appearance. In televised meetings, she usually stands out for her direct tone, for her apparent ability to say things bluntly, although never quite enough to openly challenge the power structure that sustains her.

Her presence in flooded neighborhoods, after burst pipes or at half-finished treatment plants, has made her the public servant who steps up when infrastructure collapses, which is almost always. The population, however, has learned that no inspection can undo decades of neglect. Hence, in Manzanillo, under the scorching sun and before a fed-up populace, her technical and methodical demeanor was met not with respect, but with the sharp cries of those who no longer trust anyone.

Even so, 2025 confirmed that Chapman remains a valuable asset to the government: disciplined, efficient, and reliable. A woman who doesn’t improvise — a rara avis — in a government that improvises daily.

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Cuban Faces 2025: Yosvany Rosell García, the Body as a Form of Denunciation

His case exposed the human cost of repression and the regime’s inability to offer answers other than punishment and silence.

García Caso was admitted to the Lucía Íñiguez Landín Clinical Surgical Hospital with signs of multiple organ failure and accelerated deterioration. / Facebook

14ymedio, 25 December 2025, Havana —Yosvany Rosell García Caso, one of the many names associated with the Island-wide protests of 11 July 2021, became one of the most visible faces of Cuban political prisoners in 2025. His prolonged hunger strike, the extreme deterioration of his health, and the opacity with which the authorities handled his case brought the situation of prisoners of conscience on the island back to the center of public debate. His body, pushed to its limits, exposed the human cost of repression and the regime’s inability to offer solutions other than punishment and silence.

García Caso, 37, was arrested in Holguín on July 15, 2021, just four days after participating in the demonstrations that shook almost the entire island. Like thousands of other protesters, his arrest lacked even the most basic due process guarantees. He was charged with “sedition,” a serious offense that resulted in a draconian 15-year prison sentence. These sentences have been denounced by family members, activists, and human rights organizations as part of the political criminalization of those who exercise their right to peaceful protest in Cuba. Until then, Yosvany Rosell was a young welder, a father of three, just one more among so many Cubans dissatisfied with the rapidly deteriorating conditions in their country.

The hunger strike marked a pivotal moment in his life and in the public conversation about political prisoners in Cuba.

During his years of imprisonment, García Caso endured prison conditions that his family and advocates describe as degrading: prolonged isolation, mistreatment, constant surveillance, medical neglect, and arbitrary restrictions on communication with the outside world. In November 2025, his situation reached a critical point when he began a 40-day hunger strike , demanding his freedom and that of other political prisoners, as well as improved prison conditions.

The hunger strike marked a pivotal moment in his life and in the public discourse surrounding political prisoners in Cuba. García Caso was admitted to the Lucía Íñiguez Landín Clinical Surgical Hospital with signs of multiple organ failure and continue reading

rapid deterioration, according to independent reports. His condition became a stark reminder of the extreme price of protesting in a system that does not fully recognize basic rights for dissidents.

His wife, Mailín Rodríguez Sánchez, has been one of the most visible voices denouncing not only the activist’s physical condition, but also the lack of transparency with which the authorities have handled his case. The family has stated that they were even denied access to his medical records and the results of tests performed during his hospitalization, which constitutes a violation of his right to health and personal security.

In the midst of the health crisis, García Caso wrote letters from his cell and from the hospital denouncing prison conditions and expressing that his protest was also a response to the injustice of the prison system and the lack of institutional channels for addressing citizens’ demands. His mobilization was not an isolated act of desperation, but a conscious decision in an environment that, for many political prisoners, offers no other avenues for being heard.

The hunger strike ended when authorities agreed to one of his main demands: transfer to solitary confinement, a disciplinary area within the prison that the activist had requested as a form of protest against the “continued imprisonment of all political prisoners.” Paradoxically, the concession came amidst a serious physical decline that left him on the brink of death.

After his release from the hospital, García Caso was returned to the Cuba Sí prison in El Yayal (Holguín), without prior notice to his family.

After his release from the hospital, García Caso was returned to the Cuba Sí prison in El Yayal (Holguín) without prior notice to his family. According to various reports, he continues to face adverse conditions, including poor nutrition, unsafe drinking water, and strict surveillance, which have negatively impacted his overall health.

His case has also resonated far beyond the island. Organizations such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty International, and several diplomatic missions have expressed concern about his condition and the general situation of Cuban political prisoners, emphasizing the need to respect fundamental rights. In exile and among sectors of international civil society, his name has been the subject of awareness campaigns and calls for action.

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Cuban Faces 2025: Exiled by the Cuban Regime

Releasing prisoners in exchange for their leaving the country functions as a mechanism to rid the country of critical voices.

Opposition leader José Daniel Ferrer on the day he was released from prison in January 2025. / X/@jdanielferrer

14ymedio, Havana, 24December 2025 — Ferrer and Robles arrived at their respective destinations in exile on the same day. The coincidence was not accidental; like so many Cuban dissidents in recent decades, both only regained their freedom after agreeing to leave the island. They, along with the Lady in White Aymara Nieto Muñoz, share a fate that has become a pattern in the official treatment of dissent: conditional release on forced exile, presented as “liberation,” but which in reality functions as a mechanism to rid the country of critical voices.

José Daniel Ferrer , a historic leader of the Patriotic Union of Cuba, UNPACU, was arrested on 11 July 2021, before he could participate in the popular protests on that day, and sentenced to four years and six months in prison. During his incarceration, he denounced isolation, beatings, torture, and extreme restrictions on communicating with his family, as well as constant pressure from State Security to abandon his dissent.

Ferrer was released from prison in January 2025, but his parole was revoked in April of the same year for alleged “breaches of obligations,” and he remained in pretrial detention for months. Finally, in October 2025, Ferrer was obliged to leave Cuba for the United States in forced exile. His departure was accompanied by his family and U.S. officials who oversaw his exit, while the Cuban regime issued an official statement presenting his departure as a voluntary act, without acknowledging the pressure and torture he had suffered.

Ferrer recounted in a letter from prison that he accepted exile “for the safety of his family” and because of the impossibility of continuing his activism on the island under constant surveillance.

Ferrer recounted in a letter from prison that he accepted exile “for the safety of his family” and because of the impossibility of continuing his activism within the Island under constant surveillance.

In the case of Luis Robles Elizastigui, known as “the young man with the placard,” his release in January 2025 also did not mean the possibility of staying in Cuba. After serving a five-year sentence imposed for holding a protest sign in 2020 in the middle of San Rafael Boulevard in Havana, and after enduring surveillance and sanctions within the prison, leaving Cuba, along with his mother —who went on a hunger strike to demand his release—and his son, was the only way for him to regain his personal freedom. continue reading

Also in 2025, Aymara Nieto Muñoz, a member of the Ladies in White and the target of multiple previous arrests, was forced to leave the island immediately after her release from prison. Convicted in 2018 of assault and property damage, she had spent years in various prisons, drastically complicating contact with her daughters. Her departure from prison directly to the airport, bound for the Dominican Republic and without being able to say goodbye to one of her daughters, was documented by international organizations as a case of forced exile resulting from political repression.

The exiles of Ferrer, Robles, and Nieto are part of a systematic pattern by the Cuban regime. Imprisonment is merely one stage in a broader process that culminates in the expulsion of dissidents from Cuba. International mediation has facilitated the transfer of those released to host countries and has thus helped justify the internal restrictions that prevent opposition members from remaining in the country. In this way, a significant portion of Cuban civic activism is forced off the island, becoming a diaspora by imposition rather than by choice.

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The Cuban Regime Has Ordered the Expulsion of Americans, According to the US Embassy

A diplomatic source expressed concern about the risk of nationals being imprisoned to be used in negotiations with Washington.

The US embassy recommended cooperating with customs authorities in the event of a search. / Cubadebate

14ymedio, Madrid, January 21, 2025 — The US Embassy in Cuba warned via its social media, on Tuesday, that it has received information about Americans being denied entry upon arrival on the island, as well as orders for nationals to “leave the country immediately under threat of detention.”

The diplomatic mission has not provided any examples to illustrate the situation and the alleged reasons, although a source close to the embassy has expressed “concern” about the risk of a repeat of what happened in Venezuela when the Chavista regime “imprisoned American citizens and used them as hostages to negotiate” with Washington.

The embassy points out that it cannot mediate in matters of entry and exit from Cuba, although it can provide consular assistance to US citizens who request it, and for this purpose reiterates its contact methods by phone and through social media.

The message has been classified as “routine” by the consular office, meaning it contains administrative and non-confidential information. It includes a list of rules to follow for those wishing to travel to the island, including obtaining a visa and subsequently checking for prohibited items at Customs, such as electronic cigarettes, satellite phones, and drones, among other devices. It also reminds travelers that the amount of cash that can be brought into Cuba without declaring it is set at $5,000 USD – or the same amount in Cuban pesos.

“Failure to comply with Cuban immigration and customs laws may result in confiscations, severe penalties, or continue reading

detention,” it emphasizes. It also urges travelers to cooperate fully with any police or immigration checks. “Remain calm and follow all instructions. Be courteous and professional,” it adds.

The message has not been linked to any known prior reports or complaints of Americans being denied entry or expelled from the country, although two shipments of US humanitarian aid recently arrived in eastern Cuba, specifically in Holguín and Santiago de Cuba. The kits contained primarily food, hygiene, and water packages for victims of Hurricane Melissa, which struck the island in November.

According to the parties involved, Caritas Cuba has been in charge of receiving and distributing the aid, although international organizations such as Catholic Relief Services and Caritas Germany have participated in both operations, supporting logistics and financing.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the shipment of aid, valued at three million dollars, on Tuesday the 13th, while the Cuban government – which said it accepted the donation, as it was funded by the contributing population – criticized the Trump administration for not officially announcing the shipment, which it said it learned about through the Catholic Church.

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Health Authorities Investigate a Possible Hepatitis Outbreak in Ciego De Ávila

So far there are no official data on the cases under study

For more than six months, the Island has been facing outbreaks of hepatitis and arboviruses. / Granma

14ymedio, Havana, January 21, 2026 – Health authorities in Ciego de Ávila reported this Tuesday, through official media, that they are investigating several suspected cases of hepatitis detected in different municipalities of the province.

The information was confirmed by Dr. José Luis López González, deputy director of Epidemiology at the Provincial Center for Hygiene, Epidemiology and Microbiology, who explained that after the first patients with symptoms compatible with the disease were detected, the protocols established by the health system were activated.

However, no official figures have been provided on how many people are under investigation or which areas may be the most affected. According to the official, samples are being taken and laboratory analyses conducted to identify the type of hepatitis involved and determine its possible origin.

At the same time, technical teams are carrying out investigations in the communities where the patients live, with the aim of identifying common risk factors. Among the hypotheses being considered are problems with the water supply or deficiencies in food handling, frequent causes continue reading

of digestive- transmission diseases on the Island.

No official figures have been provided on how many people are under investigation or which areas may be the most affected

For more than six months, the Island has been facing outbreaks of hepatitis and arboviruses; in 2025, the health situation has been the most critical since the time of Covid. This situation has overwhelmed the hospital and funeral systems. According to estimates by the Cuban Citizen Audit Observatory, the epidemic may have caused around 8,700 deaths, a figure far higher than that officially acknowledged. In light of this scenario, foreign governments, including Spain’s, recommended that their citizens not travel to the Island without prior vaccination.

The situation is well known in every corner of the Island: garbage piling up for days, dirty streets, constant failures in water and electricity supply, a poorly nourished population, and a general deterioration in living conditions. Amid the economic and social collapse the country is experiencing, this scenario has become the perfect breeding ground for the spread of disease.

As investigations into this possible outbreak continue, the Government called on the population to step up personal hygiene measures, such as frequent handwashing, drinking boiled or chlorinated water, and proper food preparation. It also recommends seeking medical attention if symptoms appear, such as yellowing of the skin and eyes, fever, nausea, or abdominal pain.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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China Sends Cuba $80 Million in Aid, Rice, and Aspirin

The Chinese ambassador says the business model for the photovoltaic parks donated by China is being developed and modified

The Chinese ambassador met this Tuesday with Miguel Díaz-Canel to convey information from his government. / Granma

14ymedio, Madrid, January 21, 2026 – There are no precise details about China’s new financial aid for Cuba, although the amount and its main destination are known. The package is valued at $80 million for “the acquisition of electrical equipment and other urgent needs.” The ambassador himself, Hua Xin, met with President Miguel Díaz-Canel to inform him that he had received “instructions from his government to convey this information to the Cuban side,” the official State newspaper Granma reports.

The diplomat explained that this proposal is the result of meetings held between authorities from both countries, especially Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez and China’s Special Envoy for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, Qiu Xiaoqi. He also cited Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment Óscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga, and the Minister of Energy and Mines, Vicente de la O Levy.

The parties agreed, said Hua Xin, to “designate an executive company” for this task, which explains the meetings with Pérez-Oliva.

What little the information reveals suggests that both were key to the aid, since China has decided to change the method under which projects are being carried out using the donations of 200 megawatts of photovoltaic capacity and 5,000 solar panels for homes in hard-to-reach areas. continue reading

The parties agreed, said Hua Xin, to “designate an executive company” for this task, the reason for the meetings with Pérez-Oliva.

In March 2025, the authorities announced that the Island planned to build 22 photovoltaic parks with a Chinese donation, seven of which already had “the initial endowment to begin construction,” although it was indicated they would contribute 120 MW. The project now under discussion is apparently independent of the 92 solar parks being built under contract with two Chinese companies. China has not specified, however, why it decided to “modify the method” for developing the projects.

In addition, after yesterday’s meeting with the Chinese ambassador, Díaz-Canel highlighted the “intense activity” being carried out by Hua Xin, making specific mention of the donation of 60,000 tons of rice that will arrive from China in the coming weeks. This Monday, Santiago de Cuba and Havana each received an initial delivery of 2,400 tons, with a ceremony held in Havana.

The Cuban leader also spoke of “Phase Four of the digital transformation program being carried out with Chinese support, everything that has been achieved in the high-definition television project and other technologies in which progress has been made.”

The last time Díaz-Canel was in China, in September 2025, few concrete agreements became public, unlike his previous trip in 2022, when he secured a donation of $100 million.

However, the president did bring back a biopharmaceutical collaboration for a new, 81-milligram aspirin, a drug used as a daily therapy to prevent heart disease and strokes. The medication would reach Cuba through “the transfer of technology from Medsol Laboratories to the Chinese company Hubei C&C, in Wuhan.”

Cuba received the first shipment on Tuesday; the boxes were shown but not the quantity. The drug is “intended to meet the demand of the Basic List of Medicines,” BioCubaFarma indicated.

“This mechanism,” the company adds, “uses part of the profits generated by sales of PPG [Cuban Polycosanol, a natural drug], the flagship product of the Cuban entity involved, to ensure the stability of the supply of this key medication for the prevention and treatment of cardiovascular diseases.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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