Translating Cuba – Page 39 – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

The Cuban Government Denies It Is Negotiating Maduro’s Departure With Washington

With these “blatant lies,” the “warmongering sectors” seek “pretexts to justify their aggression” against Venezuela, says the Foreign Ministry.

Nicolás Maduro surrounded by Venezuelan military personnel trained by members of Cuban intelligence. / VTV

14ymedio, Madrid, 9 December 2025 — The Cuban Foreign Ministry has described as “blatant lies” the information published by Reuters this weekend according to which the island’s regime is holding talks with the US to assess possible scenarios in the event of Nicolás Maduro’s departure from power in Venezuela. In a statement, the news is attributed to an attempt to “break the unity of the Venezuelan government and people against external aggression, as well as to involve Cuba in the construction of falsehoods and pretexts to justify its aggression”.

The text was published on Monday on the Foreign Ministry’s website under the title Statements by Deputy Foreign Minister Josefina Vidal Ferreiro, although according to the US news agency Associated Press, it is a response to its request for information regarding the Reuters report. The British agency cited two sources on the matter who said that “some members of the Cuban regime” discussed with their US counterparts what “a world without the Maduro regime” would look like.

“Cuba rejects as absurd and false the press reports claiming alleged contacts between Cuban officials and the United States Government to address internal matters that are solely the responsibility of the Venezuelan Government,” Josefina Vidal emphasises. According to her statements, these are “warmongering sectors” acting in the context of “aggression and threats of war” against continue reading

the “sister” Republic.

“Cuba rejects as absurd and false press reports alleging contacts between Cuban officials and the United States Government to discuss internal matters that are solely the responsibility of the Venezuelan Government.”

The statement also takes the opportunity to refute “attempts to tarnish its clean record of fighting for peace in Latin America and the Caribbean and against drug trafficking”. Without mentioning it, it is clear that it refers to the testimony of Hugo El Pollo Carvajal, the former head of Venezuelan intelligence currently imprisoned in the United States, who in a letter written last week accused the Cuban regime of being involved in a drug trafficking strategy against the United States.

“Specialised US agencies know first-hand how effective Cuba is in combating drug trafficking, as they benefited directly from this until Secretary of State Marco Rubio instructed them to unilaterally cut off dialogue and cooperation on migration and law enforcement,” argues Vidal.

Since Washington and Havana resumed bilateral relations in 2015 during the presidencies of Barack Obama and Raúl Castro, the parties began bilateral talks on drug trafficking, which continued during the first terms of Donald Trump and Joe Biden. This was preceded by the Coast Guard Liaison Office at the United States Interests Section in Havana in June 1999, when cooperation began. Despite disagreements and breakdowns in other areas, exchanges continued until just a year ago, in December 2024.

In his letter addressed to Donald Trump himself, Carvajal accused Chavismo of having organised, together with Havana, decades of narco-terrorism operations, cooperation with guerrilla groups and electoral manipulation, going so far as to claim that the plan “was suggested by the Cuban regime to Chávez in the mid-2000s”. He also claimed that Cuba was key in the creation of the so-called Soles cartel – whose existence Venezuela denies – and said that the island has provided strategic advice, including in the creation of criminal groups such as the Tren de Aragua.

Carvajal fled Venezuela in 2017 and spent several years in Spain, from where he was extradited to face justice in the United States, where he stands accused of four criminal charges that he has admitted to, including narco-terrorism.

As soon as the content of his accusations became known, officials from the Ministry of the Interior and Justice appeared at a press conference before the international media last Thursday to deny any involvement. “Cuba is not a producer or transit country for drugs,” they said, without referring to Carvajal’s letter.

Juan Carlos Poey, head of the Interior Ministry’s anti-drug agency, described the US military presence in the area as “a serious threat to Cuba’s security and sovereignty” and accused the neighbouring country of being responsible for “the synthetic drugs circulating today” on the island.

In a calmer tone, the deputy commander of the Border Guard recalled the years of cooperation between the governments on both sides of the strait. “We exchange information in real time with the US Coast Guard. We give them the position, course and characteristics of the drug-smuggling vessels,” he said.

In this case, the retired general adds nothing new about Cuba, merely stating that its intelligence services have trained Maduro and influenced his activities.

Now, another former Venezuelan military officer imprisoned in the US for drug trafficking, Cliver Antonio Alcalá Cordones, has written a second letter giving his version of events. In this case, the retired general adds nothing new about Cuba, merely stating that its intelligence services have trained Maduro and influenced his activities.

Alcalá Cordones, who in 2024 was sentenced to 260 months in prison for providing material support to the Colombian FARC guerrilla group in connection with arms trafficking and the protection of cocaine shipments, claims that siblings Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez, vice-president and president of the National Assembly, respectively, are the real masterminds behind the Soles cartel.

He adds that conversations and negotiations took place in Venezuelan prisons between senior officials of the regime and gang members, including those from the Tren de Aragua gang. Links with the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah, illegal mining to launder drug money, and electoral manipulation are also mentioned in the letter.

The Foreign Ministry’s statement now reinforces what was said at that press conference, which took place in a context of maximum pressure from Washington on Caracas. “Any attempt to use the current situation against the Bolivarian Revolution to cast doubt on the unwavering and firm support of our people and Government in these dangerous circumstances for Latin America and the Caribbean will be futile,” the text concludes.

Translated by GH

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Cuba’s Central Bank Sets the Floating Exchange Rate at 410 Pesos Per Dollar

In addition to the rates of 24 pesos to the dollar for state-owned enterprises and 120 for tourism, the Government creates a floating rate with the aim of capturing foreign currency from the informal market

On the same day as the official announcement, the independent media outlet ‘El Toque’ reported that its website had been blocked on the island following a cyberattack. / 14ymedio

The Cuban economy awoke this December 18th to a long-announced development, carefully wrapped in the language of “graduality”: the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) launched a third official exchange rate, a floating one, which began at 410 pesos per dollar and joins the existing rates of 24 pesos to the dollar for state-owned enterprises and 120 for tourism. The government presents the measure as the beginning of a transformation of the exchange market aimed at “organizing” the economy and moving toward future monetary unification. In practice, the country is entering an even more complex stage of exchange rate segmentation, amidst the worst economic crisis in recent decades

The president of the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC), Juana Lilia Delgado Portal, defended the decision in a special appearance broadcast on state television and reported by Cubadebate. She explained that the coexistence of multiple exchange rates has generated distortions, encouraged informality, and hindered banking and tax traceability. Recognizing a third segment, she admitted, responds to an objective reality that can no longer be ignored: the enormous gap between official rates and the real value of the dollar in an informal market that currently hovers around 440 pesos.

The government presents the measure as the beginning of a transformation of the foreign exchange market aimed at “bringing order” to the economy. / Cubadebate

The new system divides the foreign exchange market into three segments. The first, at 1×24, will remain reserved for centralized state allocations for goods and services considered essential, such as fuel, medicine, electricity, public transportation, and basic necessities. The second, at 1×120, will be maintained for certain entities with the capacity to generate foreign currency, particularly in the tourism sector. The third, which is new, introduces a floating rate that will be published daily by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) and will apply to individuals and non-state management entities.

The government insists that this is not improvisation, but a “responsible” strategy. An immediate unification, it argues, would cause a sharp devaluation of the peso, with even more severe inflationary effects than those currently being experienced and a further loss of purchasing power for wages. International experience, authorities reiterate, supports transitional schemes with multiple segments in economies continue reading

with accumulated imbalances.

Pedro Carbonell assured that the new floating rate will be based on “real transactions” and not on speculative expectations as, according to him, occurs in the informal market.

However, recent Cuban experience gives cause for skepticism. Since the failed Economic Reorganization Task [or as commonly known the Tarea Ordenamiento (“Ordering Task“)], launched in January 2021 with similar promises of rationality and stability, the Cuban peso has done nothing but lose value, while inflation has skyrocketed and real wages have plummeted. Four years later, the country has not only failed to achieve a currency that would “organize” the economy, but has also deepened partial dollarization and normalized an informal market that now sets the real price benchmarks.

The Director of Macroeconomic Policy at the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC), Ian Pedro Carbonell, asserted that the new floating exchange rate will be based on “real transactions” and not on speculative expectations, as he claims occurs in the informal market. The stated objective is to channel foreign currency flows through the financial system, provide a legal and transparent framework for buying and selling foreign currency, and reduce the risks currently faced by households and businesses.

On paper, the benefits seem clear. Exporters and foreign exchange earners will be able to sell part of their income at a more favorable rate than the one currently used in their accounting, obtaining more pesos to pay salaries, invest, and cover internal expenses. Non-state management entities will, for the first time, have legal access to purchasing foreign currency through their bank accounts, with a limit equivalent to 50% of their average gross income from the last quarter. And the public will be able to sell their dollars and euros at banks and Cadeca (exchange bureaus) at an “attractive” rate, without resorting to the informal market.

But the very design of the scheme reveals its limitations. The floating market will only sell the foreign currency it manages to buy. It will lack the backing of state reserves or a financial buffer to guarantee stability. In a country with a chronically insufficient supply of foreign currency, exports at historic lows, and tourism in freefall, the central question is not how will the rate be set, but how many dollars will actually be available.

On the same day as the official announcement, the independent media outlet El Toque reported that its website had been blocked on the island following a cyberattack.

The government admits that the informal market will not disappear immediately. In fact, the gap between the new rate and the street price will be the true measure of its effectiveness. If the floating rate falls far below the real value of the dollar, the incentive to operate outside the system will persist. If it gets too close, inflationary pressures will be inevitable.

Adding to this scenario is a revealing political context. On the same day as the official announcement, the independent media outlet El Toque reported that its website had been blocked on the island following a cyberattack. For weeks, official media and government officials have accused this project of “economic terrorism” for publishing the informal exchange rate. The government seems to be fighting the symptom—the inconvenient reference point—while being forced to acknowledge the disease: a national currency that lacks credibility.

The Central Bank of Cuba’s (BCC) strategy also includes a promise to stabilize and strengthen accounts in freely convertible currency (MLC), a dollar-based virtual currency that the state itself introduced and then effectively devalued. Restoring its functionality in businesses is now presented as part of the new exchange system, although for many Cubans, the MLC remains a stark reminder of inequality and exclusion.

Authorities speak of transparency and continuous information in the coming days. But recent history weighs heavily. Without profound structural reforms, without a real increase in production and exports, and without confidence in the rules of the game, no exchange rate—fixed or floating—can be sustained. The new exchange rate architecture attempts to bring order to a fractured system, but it does not solve the underlying problem: a Cuban peso that remains adrift in an exhausted economy.

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Pérez-Oliva, Fidel Castro’s Grandnephew, Is Already a Member of Parliament and Will Be Eligible To Run for the Presidency of the Republic

Rubén Remigio Ferro, president of the Supreme Court that tried former minister Alejandro Gil, is dismissed
“The outlook for the economy is one of decline,” says Manuel Marrero in his speech to Parliament.

Session of the National Assembly of People’s Power this Thursday. / Granma

14ymedio, Havana, December 18, 2025 –The main news from Thursday’s session of the National Assembly of People’s Power (ANPP) is the appointment of Óscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga, Raúl and Fidel Castro’s grandnephew, as a deputy, which makes him eligible to run for the Presidency of the Republic. The decision was to be expected, after the government announced his appointment as Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic on 18 October.

The announcement was made by Esteban Lazo, President of Parliament, as part of the election of vacant seats. He also reported the resignation requests of Homero Acosta, Secretary of the ANPP and the Council of State, and Ulises Guilarte, former Secretary General of the Cuban Workers’ Central Union. With the new deputies, there are now 464, leaving six vacant seats to be filled.

It was, moreover, President Miguel Díaz-Canel who announced the “release” of Rubén Remigio Ferro as president of the People’s Supreme Court, which recently tried former minister Alejandro Gil for espionage and corruption. He will be replaced by Oscar Manuel Silvera Martínez, Minister of Justice, who in turn will be replaced by the first deputy minister of that portfolio, Rosabel Gamón Verde.

Otherwise, the meeting, attended by Raúl Castro via videoconference, focused on the country’s serious systemic crisis, the plan to reverse it, and the difficult outlook for the coming year.

In his lengthy speech, Prime Minister Manuel Marrero reviewed all the measures taken to rectify the situation and made clear the “challenges” ahead. The main one is attracting foreign currency. “The outlook for the economy is one of decline,” continue reading

he acknowledged.

He repeatedly emphasised that the measures are being implemented “under adverse conditions: lack of foreign currency, energy instability, inflation and organisational constraints”.

Nothing he said was new, including the establishment of a new floating exchange rate on Wednesday night, the third to be implemented in the country, aimed at “transforming the foreign exchange market”. Marrero recalled that the government has set 106 “specific objectives” and that of the 90 “directions associated with the 10 general objectives, 51 have been achieved and the rest are in progress”.

He repeatedly emphasised that the measures are being implemented “under adverse conditions: lack of foreign currency, energy instability, inflation and organisational constraints”. And, of course, he framed his words in the global context of “moderate economic growth” and a “regional scenario marked by US policy, the Monroe Doctrine and actions against Venezuela”. The island faces, he excused with the same old argument, “the cumulative impact of US economic, trade and financial policy, with reinforced sanctions and extraterritorial effects”.

Although some indicators improved, such as the budget deficit, he said, “difficulties persist in stabilising the currency and purchasing power”. Inflation, for example, is still above 14.95%, and tourism, the country’s third largest source of income, remains in a “complex situation”.

His assessment was a little misleading. The Minister of Economy and Planning, Joaquín Alonso, when taking stock of the situation in the sector, said that the number of international travellers will be around 1.9 million people, almost 30% less than expected, as will the revenue that will be achieved: 917.4 million dollars. If confirmed, this number of travellers would be the worst annual record for the Cuban tourism sector since 2003, not counting the years corresponding to the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2018, the island attracted 4.7 million visitors.

Alonso also estimated “modest” economic growth of 1% for 2026, the same as was projected for this year and which will not be achieved. The country’s president, Miguel Díaz-Canel, acknowledged this weekend that in the first three quarters of the year the economy had contracted by more than 4%, although he did not provide further details.

Marrero asserted that, “amid complex financial conditions,” $1.15 billion has been invested in energy.

The modest improvement in the outlook is due, the minister argued, to a more optimistic forecast for the tourism and foreign sectors, led by sales of services abroad (mainly in the medical sector).

As for inflation, the minister indicated that the forecast is for a 10% rise in prices in the formal market (the informal market is experiencing higher increases), which would be about five percentage points below the year-on-year rate recorded in recent months.

The productive outlook is also dire, although no new data was provided. Agriculture, industry, and the sugar sector continue to be a mess. The only thing growing, albeit at a slow pace, is the number of small private enterprises. With 816 new MSMEs, there are now a total of 11,866 in the country.

Regarding another pillar of the serious crisis, energy, Marrero claimed that, “amid complex financial conditions,” 1.15 billion dollars have been invested in increasing electrical capacity. Among the “recovered” capacity are the 778 megawatts (MW) provided by the 41 photovoltaic solar parks synchronised to the system, “which manage to produce more than 30% of the country’s total generation during peak hours of irradiation”, i.e. only during the day.

The Prime Minister promised to end the year with an additional 1,000 MW of “renewable capacity”.

The Prime Minister promised to end the year with an additional 1,000 MW of “renewable capacity”, although he acknowledged the 2,000 MW deficit reached in recent weeks, “which is causing 24-hour service disruptions, exacerbating public discontent and damaging the economy”.

The regular end-of-year session, which normally brings together MPs in Havana for two or three days, is being held in a reduced format and by videoconference due to the deep crisis in which the island finds itself.

The country is in a “critical” situation, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel acknowledged on Saturday in his speech to the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC).

The Parliament’s agenda includes, first and foremost, a review of the implementation of the Government Programme to Correct Distortions and Revitalise the Economy, the Cuban Executive’s anti-crisis plan, consisting of budget cuts, reforms and measures to increase state foreign currency earnings.

In addition, the country’s macroeconomic performance will be reviewed, which between 2020 and 2024 lost 11% of its GDP and will also close this year in negative territory due to the collapse of agricultural and industrial production, the lack of supplies and prolonged daily power cuts of 20 or more hours in large areas of the country.

“Yes, there is a huge material shortage in Cuba,” Díaz-Canel acknowledged before the plenary session of the PCC Central Committee, where he recognised that despite the “fatigue”, “uncertainty” and “irritation in social sectors”, “there are no easy or quick solutions” to the multiple crises afflicting the country.

Translated by GH

Two Cubans Trying To Enter Brazil Die in a Traffic Accident

Seven migrants from the island were injured in the accident that occurred on Monday afternoon in the state of Roraima.

The police reported that the accident occurred in an attempted illegal immigration to Brazil. / Brazilian Federal Highway Police

14ymedio, Miami, December 17, 2025 — A serious traffic accident on Monday afternoon in the state of Roraima, in northern Brazil, left two Cuban migrants dead and seven injured, including children, as they tried to enter the South American country illegally, according to the Federal Highway Police (PRF).

It happened on the BR-401 highway, near the municipality of Bonfim, on the border with Guyana, when a PRF patrol detected a Chevrolet Prisma vehicle with ten occupants — nine Cubans and one Brazilian — heading towards Boa Vista. When he saw the police, the driver made a U-turn and drove off at high speed down the road.

According to the official report, the chase included dangerous manoeuvres and reckless overtaking, as well as driving along the hard shoulder of the road. The vehicle finally turned onto a dirt road, where it lost control and overturned, ending up on its roof. When the police arrived at the scene, they found two of the Cuban migrants dead and the others seriously injured, including two children aged 3 and 8, as well as one person with minor injuries.

The authorities have not revealed the identities of the people killed, but media reports indicate that they are a 26-year-old woman and a 16-year-old boy.

The authorities have not yet revealed the identities of the people killed, but local media reports indicate that they are a 26-year-old woman and a 16-year-old boy. Most of the injured were taken to nearby medical centres, where they are receiving treatment. One of the occupants told the PRF that each Cuban paid $500 to enter Brazilian territory illegally.

The police reported that the accident occurred in an attempted illegal immigration to Brazil. There have been more of these in recent years on the country’s northern border, especially in Roraima, with the increasing number of migrants from different countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Although historically the migration crisis in the region has been mainly to do with Venezuelan refugees, the COVID-19 pandemic, the closure of legal border crossings, and difficulties in obtaining documents have led migrants to attempt to enter via informal routes through trails near Bonfim and Pacaraima. Often they use clandestine transport networks, exposing themselves to dangerous conditions.

Many Cubans choose irregular routes in the hope of reaching other regions of the country in search of job opportunities and better living conditions.

Brazil does not have a formal programme for Cuban migrants, unlike its one for Venezuelan citizens, except for certain exceptional naturalisation or reception mechanisms, so many Cubans choose irregular routes in the hope of reaching other regions of the country in search of job opportunities and better living conditions.

Migrant and human rights organisations have highlighted the vulnerability of those who cross Brazilian borders without legal protection and the need for humanitarian mechanisms to reduce exposure to dangers such as the one that claimed the lives of the two Cubans on Monday.

Translated by GH

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Democratic Congressman Denounces Cuban Interference With Florida Radio Stations Using “Harmful Communist Propaganda”

Darren Soto introduces a bill to help those stations block signals coming from the island “for hours every night”

Congressman Darren Soto says many small stations lack the resources to block those signals / Facebook

14ymedio, Miami, December 16, 2025 — U.S. Congressman Darren Soto announced this Tuesday the introduction of a bill aimed at stopping signal interference coming from Cuba on Florida radio stations in order to “spread communist propaganda.”

The Democrat said that Cuba’s official radio “broadcasts communist propaganda for several hours every night and affects the transmission of local stations,” especially on the AM band.

The initiative was promoted by Congressman Soto, from central Florida, who warned about the alleged impact these interferences are having on stations with limited resources and—according to him—on the communities they serve.

A local radio station in central Florida regularly sees its signal interfered with by Cuban state radio

“At this moment, a local radio station in central Florida sees its signal regularly interfered with by Cuban state radio, which for hours every night broadcasts harmful communist propaganda to Floridians,” the lawmaker stated.

Soto also underscored the economic difficulties faced by the affected stations.

“Many small AM radio stations in Florida and Alaska do not have the financial resources necessary to block these signals,” he said.

The bill, called the Stop Communist Radio Act, seeks to instruct the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to establish a grant program to support stations suffering harmful interference from foreign signals originating in communist countries such as Cuba, Russia, and North Korea.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuba Disguised Aid for the Chikungunya Epidemic in a Request for Help With Hurricane Melissa

The order included mosquito repellent products during the peak of the crisis

The government has not formally declared any type of health emergency. / EFE

EFE (via 14ymedio), Havana, December 17, 2025 — The Cuban government included supplies to fight the chikungunya and dengue epidemic affecting the island in an international appeal for aid following the devastation of Hurricane Melissa, but without specifying its true purpose, according to documents obtained by EFE.

The Ministry of Public Health sent a list to some embassies and United Nations agencies on the island that included large quantities of chemicals to combat mosquitoes, the vector for the transmission of both diseases.

That list for Melissa is dated October 27 — right in the peak week of the epidemic, according to official statistics released weeks later — even though the Cuban government would take 17 more days to first classify the outbreak as an “epidemic.”

In fact, the government has not formally declared any kind of health emergency, despite the evident strain on the hospital system. The number of cases registered in the epidemic has already surpassed 70,000, and the death toll has reached continue reading

47—mostly minors—according to the Ministry of Public Health itself.

Most of the deaths have occurred among minors

The list, titled “Major Needs for the National Health Service’s Response to Hurricane Melissa,” is a four-page table that includes multiple health-related chapters.

Under the heading of “Hygiene and Epidemiology,” the Ministry listed 200 tons of the larvicide Abate at 1%, and 40 tons of the insecticide cypermethrin at 25%. Both chemicals are particularly effective in combating mosquito infestations.

Independent experts consulted by EFE – both Cuban and foreign, from the academic and business worlds – agree that these amounts are very high and seem more intended for a national campaign than to contain possible mosquito breeding grounds after a hurricane.

They point out that for indoor fumigation with bazookas, the most common method in Cuba, between 5 and 10 milliliters of cypermethrin are used per liter of diesel. Consequently, the requested amount would be enough for between 666,000 and 1,333,000 bazookas.

In the case of Abate, the usual dosages vary between 5 and 50 kilos per hectare depending on the depth and contamination of the water. At an average of 20 kilos per hectare, the requested amount would be enough to treat 100 square kilometers of relatively deep water with organic matter.

The government has acknowledged that the crisis the country is suffering has affected the fumigation campaigns.

The Cuban government has acknowledged in recent weeks that the crisis the country is suffering has affected traditional fumigation campaigns and that the country has had problems with supplies and personnel to carry them out.

EFE contacted the Cuban government to inquire about the list, but has not yet received a response. The media also requested an interview with an official from the Ministry of Public Health, but this request has also gone unanswered.

To date, no country or multilateral agency appears to have responded to the Cuban request on this specific point.

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Despite Epidemics and the Economic Crisis, Cuban Devotees of Saint Lazarus Flock to El Rincón.

From the sanctuary and dressed in purple, the head of the US Embassy, Mike Hammer, calls for the freedom of Cubans.

Residents of the La Jata neighborhood in Guanabacoa celebrated Saint Lazarus early on the eve of his feast day. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Dario Hernandez, Havana, December 17 2025 — As they have done every year since 2001, residents of the La Jata neighborhood in Guanabacoa celebrated Saint Lazarus early on the eve of his feast day. On Tuesday afternoon, neighbors gathered in the streets and walked, tapping their hands, until they reached the home of the legendary Enriquito, a renowned babalao (priest) who founded the Cuban Association of the Sons of Saint Lazarus in 1957 and led this tradition until his health failed him in 2016, shortly before his death.

Some of the faithful walked barefoot, and many others on their knees. / 14ymedio

A few hours later, at dawn on Wednesday, people of all ages began arriving at the El Rincón sanctuary. Some residents told 14ymedio that in previous years the pilgrimage was much larger. Despite the lack of public transportation, people were able to travel in shared taxis from Fraternity Park to the Cupet gas station in Santiago de las Vegas, from where a five-kilometer procession with hundreds of pilgrims began. Some of the faithful walked barefoot, and many others on their knees.

As always, and despite the deep crisis gripping the country, the road was lined with vendors selling religious images, flowers, and candles. Candle prices varied depending on size, ranging from 100 to 200 pesos, while flowers started at 500 pesos. As in previous years, the police presence was noticeable, with at least one officer on every corner. People were also seen drinking alcohol.

Thousands of Cubans flocked to the National Shrine of Saint Lazarus in El Rincón this Wednesday / 14ymedio

Once at the sanctuary, the Mass officiated by the Archbishop of Havana, Juan de la Caridad García, was considerably delayed. Every five minutes, people crawled in, mainly women, most of them barefoot mothers accompanied by dogs. Lighting candles was not permitted until the Mass had concluded.

“Every devotee of Saint Lazarus knows that promises must be kept,” Osmara told this newspaper, while, dressed in purple, she begged for coins from everyone who passed by.

After the Sanctuary of Our Lady of Charity of El Cobre, El Rincón is the second most important pilgrimage site in Cuba. Its church is dedicated to Saint Lazarus, a Catholic figure syncretized with Babalú Ayé, an orisha of the Yoruba pantheon to whom the healing of illnesses, particularly skin diseases, is attributed. This devotion has developed over time within Cuban popular religiosity.

The temple was founded over a spring of water considered to have healing properties. Even today, many worshippers bathe in this water or take away small blessed bottles as part of their vows. A few meters away is the former Royal Hospital of San Lázaro, which began as a leper colony and still functions today as a hospital specializing in dermatology.

After the Sanctuary of Our Lady of Charity of El Cobre, El Rincón is the second most important pilgrimage center in Cuba. / 14ymedio

The celebration of Saint Lazarus is undoubtedly part of Cuba’s deepest cultural and spiritual fabric, where Catholicism, Afro-Cuban religious practices, and expressions of popular faith coexist. For this reason, the head of mission of the United States Embassy, Mike Hammer, was present, never missing an opportunity to connect with Cubans on the street and share videos expressing his support for freedom: “On this significant day, I wanted to reiterate my call for freedom and respect for the fundamental rights of all Cubans.”

Beyond the island, among the diaspora, the tradition has also taken root. On the other side of the Gulf, in Hialeah, the large Cuban community has built its own shrine inspired by El Rincón. Every December, hundreds of emigrants flock there to give thanks for favors received and fulfill promises to the saint, replicating a tradition that, even far from Cuba, continues to define Cuban faith and identity.

In Miami, 66-year-old Lourdes sent candles and purple clothing in advance so her family, who live in San Miguel del Padrón, could make the pilgrimage to El Rincón. The migrant, who has been in the United States for three years, having arrived across the border, asked her relatives to pray for her before the image of Saint Lazarus. Her plea to the saint was brief and direct: “that they don’t deport me and that they finally grant me residency.”

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New Cases of Dengue and Chikungunya Fall by 20%, but Cuba Remains “In the Epidemic Zone”

The government has not released case numbers, although the EFE news agency estimates 1,480 new cases of dengue this week based on available data.

Problems carrying out effective fumigation have influenced the epidemic. / Girón

14ymedio (via EFE), Havana, December 16, 2025 –- The Cuban government said this Monday that the chikungunya and dengue outbreak in Cuba is moving “toward better control,” although “the curve” on the graph of new cases “is still in the epidemic zone.”

Deputy Minister of Public Health Carilda Peña made these statements on state television, where she noted—without providing absolute figures—that new cases of nonspecific febrile syndrome (high fever is the first symptom of both arboviral diseases) have been reduced by 21% compared to the previous week.

With regard to dengue, she acknowledged that the incidence rate last week rose to 15.25 infections per 100,000 inhabitants. This, over a total population of 9.7 million people—according to the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI)—would amount to 1,480 new infections.

With regard to dengue, she acknowledged that the incidence rate last week rose to 15.25 infections per 100,000 inhabitants

The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), which compiles official Cuban figures, indicated last week that from the beginning of the year through the end of November, the total number of infections in Cuba in 2025 from this disease had reached 25,995. continue reading

Regarding chikungunya, Peña also did not provide figures on new or total cases, but stated that the number of new infections has been reduced by 20%. On Friday, official figures spoke of 44,604 infections.

The deputy minister also made no reference to the number of deaths from the epidemic, which on Friday had risen to 47, according to official figures. Two-thirds of them were minors.

The Ministry of Public Health’s (Minsap) attention is focused on “newborns, infants, pregnant women, and young people,” Peña said.

The number of patients in intensive care fell to 42, of whom 12 are in critical condition (mostly minors). “The trend continues to be downward,” the deputy minister added.

EFE has contacted the Cuban government to gain access to more data on the epidemic, but so far has received no response.

EFE has contacted the Cuban government to gain access to more data on the epidemic, but so far has received no response

Health authorities have reiterated that the number of infected people is underreported, because many patients do not go to medical centers, mainly due to the deterioration of public services on the island.

The Cuban government first acknowledged on November 12 that the country was suffering an epidemic of chikungunya and dengue, despite the fact that the first cases were diagnosed in July and that infections had surged in September and October.

The epidemic has found fertile ground in Cuba due to the severe economic and energy crisis the country is experiencing, which has led to a notable deterioration of public services.

Control measures like mass fumigation against mosquitoes and systematic garbage collection limit prevention, and patient care is affected by the lack of tests to confirm the type of illness, medications and other medical supplies.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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In Cuba, Stealing 25 Liters of Gasoline Is More Serious Than Diverting Millions of Barrels of Oil

In the face of the U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean, five tankers from Russia’s shadow fleet turn around

The Boltaris—in the image under its former name—turned back while heading to Venezuela with Russian naphtha. / Ivan Zelepukhin

Madrid, December 16, 2025 –The commission of a minor crime has cost two workers at the Matanzas Fuel Trading Company a public humiliation that includes the dissemination of their faces and full names as if they were two dangerous criminals. That is just the appetizer, because the harsher punishment is still to come if, at the trial awaiting them, they are charged with sabotage—one of the most serious crimes in the penal code—carrying sentences of between four and ten years in prison.

The news was spread this Monday by the pro-government account Con todos la victoria [With all of us the victory], dedicated to showcasing small police “successes” in the province of Matanzas, which labeled the incident a “totally shameful act.” In the post—accompanied by photographs of the alleged thieves—it is reported that authorities surprised the shift supervisor and a security guard from the company “with their hands in the gasoline.”

The workers had siphoned from one of the tanks “25 liters of gasoline carefully packed in nylon bags, a product in high demand and in short supply among the population these days,” when “their mission was precisely to protect those resources destined for the economy and the well-being of the population.” For this reason, they say, “they earned themselves a judicial process.”

They were luckier than a driver for the state company Transcupet, who was caught “milking” fuel on the national highway near Jagüey Grande.

They were luckier than a driver for the state company Transcupet, who was caught “milking” fuel on the national highway near Jagüey Grande. In his case, although his first and last names were also released, there was no photo showing his face—despite the fact that he was extracting 100 liters of diesel continue reading

from the tank. The account once again seeks to teach a lesson: “The move, which seemed clever, ended in a setback, a lesson that makes it clear that, no matter what tricks are invented, what belongs to others remains off-limits.”

It cannot be denied, judging by the comments on both posts, that there are voices calling for a heavy hand against those who “steal from everyone,” but the staunch defense of the three individuals is the general tone. “In Cuba people live off theft in all the companies, because the salary is not worthy of any human being,” one comment said. References to unlivable wages are repeated ad nauseam, and there is no shortage of those who consider corruption inherent in everyday life in Cuba. “In Cuba everything is illegal; from the moment you get out of bed you’re thinking about how to survive.”

Fuel theft has battered the island for many years, and the authorities do not know how to put a stop to it: neither exemplary trials nor increasingly harsh sentences have managed to reduce the number of such thefts. A few months ago, on a program by Humberto López on Cuban Television devoted to this crime, it was stated that in the country there were perfectly oiled systems— involving operators, brigade chiefs, executives, and guards—through which “as much as 20,000 or 30,000 liters of fuel” were lost every day.

Under current conditions, when the Electric Union reports a daily deficit of about 1,000 megawatts due solely to the lack of distributed generation—most of it because of fuel shortages—pointing the finger at someone who takes 25 liters cannot hide the fact that the Cuban government itself diverts millions of barrels of oil sent by Venezuela to the Chinese market, instead of using them to produce electricity to reduce the 24-hour blackouts.

This Monday the island again experienced a scandalous generation deficit, with 2,007 MW at peak hour. Despite the fact that during the best hour of sun the photovoltaic parks delivered 523 MW, the morning’s generation was only 1,330 MW for a demand of 2,300 MW. Things logically worsened in the late afternoon and evening, when only 1,257 MW were being produced for a demand of 3,089 MW—more than 930 MW of the deficit due to lack of fuel.

The situation could become more complicated given the direction things are taking at the state oil company PDVSA. To the data made public this Monday about buyers demanding discounts—seeing that their purchases could be seized by the United States after what happened with the confiscation of the Skipper—new information is added. According to Reuters, an oil tanker carrying Russian naphtha—used to refine heavy Venezuelan crude—and four large tankers have turned around since that vessel was seized.

The first of these is the Boltaris, flying the flag of Benin, which was carrying some 300,000 barrels of Russian naphtha to Venezuela and turned back over the weekend.

The first of these is the Boltaris, flying the flag of Benin, which was carrying some 300,000 barrels of Russian naphtha to Venezuela and turned back over the weekend. It is now, the agency reports, heading to Europe without having unloaded. The other four vessels, scheduled to load in Venezuelan ports in the coming weeks, have also turned back, leaving many of the country’s exports paralyzed, with the exception of those shipped by Chevron, the U.S. company authorized to operate in Venezuela.

This Monday, the PDVSA stated that it had been the victim of a cyberattack that halted its administrative and operational systems, including oil deliveries.

The sanctions imposed on hydrocarbons during Donald Trump’s first term caused a 99% drop in foreign-currency revenues between 2014 and 2020, and the economy stopped generating $642 billion.

In January of this year, crude production surpassed one million barrels per day (bpd) for the first time since June 2019, with the pumping 1,031,000 bpd. The amount increased to 1,142,000 bpd in November, although in 1998—one year before Chavismo came to power—Venezuela produced 3.1 million bpd, according to a report by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Two years later, Chávez and Castro signed the agreement that ensured Cuba a stable supply, which sustained it for decades, even as production declined, especially since 2017, but now things are taking an even worse turn.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Recent Femicide in Cienfuegos Raises the Total Number of Gender-Based Murders in Cuba This Year to 19

Photo of Carrasco taken from social media./ Facebook

14ymedio, Havana, 27 July 2025 [delayed translation]- The independent platforms Yo Sí Te Creo in Cuba and Alas Tensas confirmed on Saturday a new femicide on the island, that of Yailín Carrasco, 29, who was murdered by her partner in the city of Cienfuegos this past July 22nd. With this case, the number of sexist killings in Cuba raises to 19 so far in 2025, according to the records of 14ymedio.

According to witnesses, the crime occurred “in front of at least one of her 3 surviving young girls.”

At the same time, the platforms revealed the identity of the woman that was recently murdered in Holguín whose details, due to the secrecy of the official outlets which reported the news, were not known. They concern Yailín Requejo, 41, who was murdered on July 13th on a public street in the capital city of Holguín province. The alleged attacker was detained on Tuesday, state media outlets confirmed, which described the victim as a “young wife” and added that the attack also resulted in serious injury to her youngest daughter.

“The citizen that killed his young wife with a knife in the middle of a public street, in the Cruce del Coco neighborhood of the province of Holguín, was captured thanks to a joint operation between the forces of the Ministry of the Interior of this territory, with the support of operators from Camagüey and the cooperation of the population,” Cubadebate explained.

Days earlier the femicide of Leysi Liettis Cascaret Casero, 22-year-old Medical Sciences student, was reported.

Days earlier the femicide of Leysi Liettis Cascaret Casero, 22-year-old Medical Sciences student, was reported, whose murder was confirmed recently in the observatory Alas Tensas. The young woman was attacked by her partner in the town of El Manguito, municipality of La Maya, in Santiago de Cuba.

According to recently released data by the state Observatory of Cuba on Gender Equality, in 2023 and 2024 the country tried a total number of 76 femicides, in which the victims were more than 15 years old.

In Cuba there is not yet a Comprehensive Law against gender violence and the information surrounding femicides is scarce in official sources. Nevertheless, recently the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of the Interior, the Supreme Court of the People and other institutions announced the creation of an official joint record to compile data about these crimes. However, they also clarified that the stated record will not be publicly accessible.

Translated by Logan Cates

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Rapper Nando OBDC Remains on Hunger Strike and Is in Solitary Confinement

Accused of “subversive activities,” the musician collaborated with Maykel ’Osorbo’ and coordinated a collective exhibition in support of political prisoners.

Almenares Rivera was detained December 31, 2024 in his home in the Havana municipality of La Lisa. / Facebook

14ymedio, Havana, 27 July 2025 (delayed translation) — The Cuban musician and activist Fernando Almenares Rivera, better known as Nando OBDC, remains on hunger strike in the Cuba Panama prison, located in Güines, Mayabeque. His mother, Eva Rivera, has publicly complained that she has not been able to communicate with the rapper nor has she received any trustworthy information by the authorities.

“She has no reason to believe in the pretexts they have given her for keeping her from seeing him,” wrote the journalist María Matienzo, who wrote about the case on social media. The artist, who is being held in a jail for those infected with AIDS/HIV in Güines, has stopped eating to demand the expedition of his legal process.

Almenares Rivera was detained on December 31, 2024 in his home in the Havana municipality of La Lisa and was accused of “propaganda against the constitutional order,” supposed “subversive activities” and ties to people that promote “terrorism against the Cuban state.”

On one of the visits his mother made to him in prison, the case manager told Rivera that they were processing her son for a crime related to “a fire that occurred in Lenin Park, the past December 30th,” but the family denies any involvement by the artist in this act.

For their part, the Attorney General has not presented any preliminary evidence nor brought any trial against him.

For their part, the Attorney General has not presented any preliminary evidence nor brought any trial against him, after more than seven months of incarceration. His arrest is classified as arbitrary and unjust by friends and organizations.

The prison authorities have alleged that “Nando is well and is not in a punishment cell,” but a fellow inmate contacted his family and confirmed that the activist remains in protest over his detention, which he considers unjust, a family member related to Martí Noticias. In addition to concerns about his legal situation, there are also fears of possible forced medical treatments, without prior diagnosis nor informed consent, stated the activist Kirenia Yalit Núñez Pérez, director of the Cuban Youth Unity Forum and Madrid resident.

This past January, the international organization Artículo 19 demanded the immediate release of Nando OBDC, after learning that he was transferred to the State Security headquarters in Havana, Villa Marista, and later to the Mayabeque prison. The same day of the arrest, regime agents burst into his home without a search warrant, confiscated personal objects and also took a Cuban flag, told his wife, Adriana María Machado.

The artistic and critical portfolio of Nando OBDC has been against the oppressive regime for years.

The artistic and critical portfolio of Nando OBDC has been against the oppressive regime for years. In December of 2024, he coordinated from Cuba the collective exposition Arte Prohibido: Desde Cuba, opened in Miami, with works by censored creators from the Island and in support of political prisoners.

He also has collaborated with artists like Maykel Osorbo, currently incarcerated, and David D Omni, and has been threatened in the past for his social media posts. In 2021, he was ordered to a police station where they warned him: “We are coming for you, you are going to have to move out of La Lisa,” the rapper Navy Pro remembered in a complaint on Facebook.

Currently, his family remains without verifiable news about his health status and demands that they let him receive visitors, adequate medical attention and that he has a fair trial. “He is in there unjustly,” reiterated a family member to Martí Noticias, while activists raised alarms about the risks of prolonged isolation and the physical deterioration of an artist that never should have been in prison.

Translated by Logan Cates

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In Holguín, Not All Roads Are Equal: The Ones the Government Uses Have Priority

“There are always cars belonging to civil servants who come here every day for meetings; they don’t achieve anything, but they never stop having meetings.”

On the way to the hospital, a series of potholes, puddles reflecting tired-looking buildings, crumbling kerbs. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Miguel García, Holguín, December 16 2025 –In the morning progressing along Valle road with an unforgiving rattle. Every pothole forces us to slow down, every puddle – thick, greenish – reminds us that last night’s rain found no drainage and no official concern. Electric tricycles, motorcycles, bicycles and private cars arrive here with the same destination: the Lucía Iñiguez Landín Surgical Hospital. People arrive with fevers, joint pains, and the exhaustion of those who have been waiting for days for their bodies to give way.

“This feels like a test before we even get to the doctor,” says a woman holding her sweaty son as she dodges the accumulated water. Arboviruses have once again put this road at the centre of daily life in Holguín: patients from Velasco, Gibara, Calixto García, Cacocum and the city itself cross this stretch of road, ravaged by neglect and lack of investment, in search of diagnosis and relief.

A few kilometres away, the scene changes in colour and texture. At the end of Frexes Street, opposite the Provincial Assembly of People’s Power, the asphalt looks almost perfect. There are no puddles, the cracks have been sealed, and the kerb has been freshly swept. “There are always cars here with officials who come to meetings every day; they don’t achieve anything, but they never stop having meetings,” complains the driver of an electric tricycle as he compares, without raising continue reading

his voice, the smooth pavement he has just left behind. The illusion hardly lasts 200 metres, from Bim Bom to a sugar-cane juice stall: just the stretch visible from the windows of the official building and the busy part for those entering and leaving the offices of power. Beyond that, the city returns to normal.

The photos show what is seen as normal: opposite the government building, a continuous, clean road surface with smooth traffic flow. / 14ymedio

The contrast is not only aesthetic; it is functional and symbolic. On the road to the hospital, puddles become traps for tyres and ankles; dust rises when the sun beats down and the rain stays away, and when the downpour falls, mud spreads. A cyclist slams on the brakes to avoid falling into a makeshift ditch; the driver of an old Lada calculates where to drive without losing half his suspension in the attempt. “No one comes here to inspect,” sums up a neighbour who sells coffee on the corner and sees the procession of sick people pass by every day. “If they did, this would already be fixed.”

The photos show what is seen as normal: in front of the government building, a smooth, clean road with flowing traffic; but on the way to the hospital, a series of potholes, puddles reflecting tired building façades, crumbling kerbs. On peak days for dengue or chikungunya, the road becomes a funnel for emergencies. The noise of engines mixes with coughing, the rubbing of wet sandals, and the hurried complaining of those who are late for an appointment or for the emergency room.

In Holguín, as in so many parts of the island, the roadway also votes. Where there is power, there is paint and tar; where there is pain, there is waiting and damage. The Valle highway does not ask for speeches or ribbon-cutting ceremonies: it asks for drainage, asphalt, maintenance. Meanwhile, the journey to hospital will continue to be an uncomfortable prelude to illness, and the government’s front line will remain a polished postcard for those looking down from above.

Translated by GH

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Cuba’s Matanzas Business Fair: Lots of Hype, Little Substance

The owner of a local MSME — micro, small, or medium-sized enterprise — laments the exclusion of the most dynamic private companies from an event dominated by bankrupt state-owned enterprises.

The stands, lined up in an apathetic uniformity, offered little more than poorly printed banners. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Julio César Contreras, Matanzas, Cuba, December 15, 2025 — The Business Fair opened its doors in Matanzas like almost all official events in Cuba are announced: with institutional enthusiasm, grandiose headlines and promises of productive chains that, at least on paper, seemed capable of boosting the local economy. For three days, the former Palace of Justice – now under the administration of the Office of the Conservator – became the venue for the third edition of a meeting that intended to showcase business muscle and modernity. However, you only had to cross the threshold for the story to begin to unravel.

In the wide corridors, the echo of footsteps was more eloquent than any slogan. The stands, lined up in apathetic uniformity, offered little more than poorly printed banners, bottles of rum placed listlessly on decorative barrels, and tables where representatives sat waiting for an audience that never arrived. The contrast between the official account and reality was difficult to ignore.

“They gave participation to their companies and a few private ones that respond to their interests,” Karel, owner of an MSME dedicated to furniture manufacturing, told 14ymedio. Since the middle of the year, he had tried unsuccessfully to obtain an exhibition space. He submitted documents, described his business purpose, and met every requirement. The final response was a bureaucratic phrase: all capacities were covered. Walking around the fair, however, it was difficult to understand what those capacities were.

The decoration included state-owned companies and entities that survive thanks to the official monopoly on certain sectors. / 14ymedio

The province has 137 state-owned companies, more than 600 micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, almost 300 local development projects and tens of thousands of self-employed workers. That diversity was not reflected in the event. “Who are you supposed to form alliances with here?” Karel asked as he pointed to an empty stand. “I can’t even hang a banner with basic information about my business. This isn’t a fair, it’s a stage set.” continue reading

The decoration included, of course, the state-owned companies and entities that survive thanks to the official monopoly on certain sectors. The Banco de Crédito y Comercio (Bandec) and the Banco Popular de Ahorro occupied visible spaces, although their presence was limited more to promoting digital platforms than to solving specific problems. “I came because I read that they were going to hand out magnetic cards,” says Ania, a resident of the historic centre. “All they do is install Transfermóvil and EnZona. I’ve had those for a long time. There was no need to set up a fair for that.”

The aesthetics did not help much either. The exhibition stands seemed improvised, with no clear visual line or minimal effort to communicate efficiency. “If they give design awards here, they can give them to anyone,” said a university professor who walked around the venue with a sceptical look on her face. The woman gave up on calling her son to get banking advice: “This is not the place to talk about a serious loan.”

The Banco de Crédito y Comercio (Bandec) and the Banco Popular de Ahorro occupied visible spaces, although their presence was limited more to the promotion of digital platforms. / 14ymedio

Initially scheduled for October, coinciding with the anniversary of the founding of the city of Matanzas, the Fair was suspended at least twice. This organisational back-and-forth left a trail of mistrust among those invited. Some gave up on participating; others attended more out of curiosity than real expectations. The result was an event where one could walk around comfortably, something unthinkable in any space that truly connects supply and demand.

Meanwhile, the “window dressing” was evident. State-owned companies with supply problems, financial deficits or impaired services presented themselves as efficient cogs in a moving economy. Not even this self-promotion could hide the fact that many are bankrupt and others survive because there are no alternatives. In key sectors – banking, commerce, paperwork – the customer does not choose: they accept.

At the close, provincial authorities described the Fair as a business success, but for those who walked those aisles, the assessment is different. There was no real variety of services, no effective interrelation between economic actors, and no signs of an expanding productive environment. There was, however, a staging designed for the photo and the report.

The slogan for this edition was “Matanzas, more productive every day.” The phrase hung in the air, without tangible backing. Outside the Fair, the city continued to grapple with power cuts, shortages and businesses that survive in spite of the system, not because of it.

Translated by GH

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Cuba’s Food Dependence on the US Grows With Purchases of $355 Million This Year

Imports of pork, sugar, coffee, grains and animal feed reach record highs

In 2025, Cuba imported pork worth $33.6 million / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, December 14, 2025 — Food sovereignty and the US embargo, mantras repeated daily by Cuban authorities, have been further undermined this year. During the first nine months of 2025, Cuba imported $355 million worth of agricultural products from the US, 15% more than during the same period last year, according to figures from the US Department of Agriculture.

One of the products that saw the largest price increase was pork. Between January and September, the island purchased $33.6 million worth of this commodity from its northern neighbor, more than double the amount spent during the same period in 2014, when it spent $16.3 million.

The increase in imports of this protein from the US comes amid a crisis in the island’s agricultural sector. Last year, the country produced only 9,000 tons, almost half of the 16,500 tons produced two years prior, and 95.5% less than in 2018, when the sector reached 200,000 tons. According to farmers, these poor figures are due, in part, to a lack of animal feed, as well as the difficulty in finding labor.

Sugar, of which the country was once the world’s leading producer, now comes from abroad.

Cuba’s dependence on the U.S. market is hitting hard for products that were once flagships of the country. Sugar, of which Cuba was once the world’s leading producer, is now imported. This year, the island spent $14.9 million on sugar from the U.S., while in 2024 it spent $11.1 million.

Traditionally, Cuba consumed 700,000 tons of sugar and exported the rest, but with current production levels, the situation has changed dramatically: now it is forced to import much of the sugar it needs for its population and is unable to fulfill its export contracts. And there is an even more serious symptom: since at least 2020, every sugar harvest on the island has been ranked as the worst in the last 100 years. continue reading

Coffee imports also increased, another sector in decline. Imports from the United States rose 32%, from $8.4 million in 2024 to $11 million in the first nine months of this year. This dependence on U.S. coffee is due to the collapse in domestic production, which, according to the National Bureau of Statistics and Information, has fallen 51% in the last five years.

As for the low production in the country, priority is given to selling it abroad, which has left Cubans helpless, since coffee does not reach the bodegas (ration stores). It is sold very expensively in the informal market or is of very poor quality if it can be acquired – with a bad mixture of equal parts coffee and chickpeas.

Tobacco also saw a considerable increase in imports from the United States. Cuba purchased $355,000 worth of tobacco, an 83% increase.

Tobacco imports from the United States also saw a considerable increase. Cuba purchased $355,000 worth of the leaves, an 83% increase compared to last year’s $194,000. This surge comes after the country experienced a record high in sales of premium tobacco on the international market, although domestic cigarette production is no longer sufficient to meet the demand on the island, unlike in the past.

Another category with increased imports from the United States was grains and animal feed. This year, the figure nearly quadrupled, rising from $6.8 million to $23.8 million. This increase is also a record for the last five years, as imports had fluctuated between $6 million and $9 million since 2020.

Today, Cuba relies on imports for more than 80% of its basic food needs. The country receives rice from Guyana, Vietnam, and China, pasta from Turkey, canned sardines from Venezuela, and grains from Portugal, among other things.

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“Zero Transparency”: Díaz-Canel’s Speech About His Former Friend Alejandro Gil

The president used quotes from Fidel Castro to denigrate the person who was his right-hand man in the government.

Why did they let him be showered with hugs and birthday wishes? They mocked him in front of the entire country. / Granma

14ymedio, Yunior García Aguilera, Madrid, December 14, 2025 — At the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee, Miguel Díaz-Canel had a privileged opportunity to offer explanations about one of the biggest political and judicial scandals of Castroism: the life sentence for espionage, in addition to a 20-year sentence for other crimes, that a court has just imposed on the former Minister of Economy, Alejandro Gil.

But instead of detailing facts, responsibilities, failed control mechanisms, or institutional lessons, the president chose a different path. With evident dyslexia, he read five paragraphs of moralizing rhetoric, quotes from Fidel Castro, and metaphors about traitors and patriots. The result was a speech laden with adjectives but devoid of concrete information about how and why one of the men he trusted most ended up becoming, in his view, a “great traitor.”

The close relationship between Díaz-Canel and Gil was also evident in the academic sphere. The president was the principal advisor for the then-Minister of Economy’s doctoral thesis. This endorsement implied a bond of trust and made Díaz-Canel the intellectual guarantor of Gil’s economic vision. That same thesis has been cited by critics and relatives of the former minister as a symbol of the extremely close relationship between the two.

For years, Gil was the public face of Díaz-Canel’s government’s economic policy and one of its most highly promoted figures. Even after his dismissal, the president showered him with praise and public embraces. However, he then agreed to serve as a prosecution witness during the closed-door trial against the former deputy prime minister. And now, in Congress, he presents him as the prototype of those who “sell out the nation.” This abrupt shift only holds up if the official narrative manages to isolate the case, transform it into an individual moral drama, and avoid continue reading

any difficult questions about the political responsibility of the inner circle that elevated him. This is where the phrases Díaz-Canel chose for his speech, and their underlying subtext, come into play.

Díaz-Canel, conscious of his limited authority, immediately invokes the late Fidel Castro

The president began to paint a picture of Gil without naming him: “There appear those who profit from needs and shortcomings, those who obstruct the path and delay progress, and others capable of selling out the nation that once elevated them to the highest offices.” Díaz-Canel is attempting to reinforce Gil’s image as an internal enemy, shifting the discussion from the technical-economic sphere to absolute morality. There is no talk of design flaws, but rather of “those who obstruct the path,” as if the system were a smooth highway and the problem were simply a fallen tree trunk.

Díaz-Canel, aware of his limited authority, immediately invokes the late Fidel Castro: “The enemy is well aware of the weaknesses of human beings in their search for spies and traitors.” On the surface, the message points to the enemy—more than external, “eternal” (the CIA)—but at the same time, it erases any personal responsibility by praising the “capacity for sacrifice and heroism” of the majority (among whom he seems to include himself). The system, he repeats, is not the problem; the problem is the rotten potatoes.

Fidel’s second quote is even worse, speaking to us of the Revolution as a great battle that teaches us who are “those who aren’t even good enough to fertilize their land with their blood and their lives.” We all witnessed how some Castroist radicals, including those on the program ” Con Filo,” campaigned for Gil’s eventual execution. And now Díaz-Canel insinuates that his former friend wasn’t even good enough to waste the bullets of a firing squad on.

Even so, Díaz-Canel didn’t hold back his verbal attacks against Gil, bluntly lumping him in with those “made of selfishness, ambition, disloyalty, betrayal, or cowardice.” While reciting this catalog of vices, the television cameras focused on Humberto López, a star propagandist and master of the stage, who was also close to the ousted former minister.

The third image of the late Castro completes the operation: “In a revolution, everyone has to take off their mask; in a revolution, the altars collapse. Those who have tried to live by deceiving others, those who have tried to live posing as virtuous or posing as decent people, or posing as patriots, or posing as brave. That is what the Revolution teaches us, it teaches us who the true patriots are, and where the great traitors come from.”

The lack of clarification in the plenary session demonstrates that, rather than “zero tolerance”, what abounds is “zero transparency.”

This clip is the closest thing I’ve ever seen to a fit of rage. Díaz-Canel is portraying himself as a cuckolded husband, ridiculed by all his colleagues. How could the powers that be have let him make a fool of himself for so long? If they already knew about Gil’s infidelities, why did they let him mentor him, thank him on Twitter for his efforts, promise him new tasks, shower him with hugs and birthday wishes? They mocked him in front of the entire country.

After this indulgence in Fidelista rhetoric, Díaz-Canel concludes: “I don’t think there are more accurate phrases to describe the actions of Alejandro Gil, from whose disgraceful case we must draw experiences and lessons, making it clear, first of all, that the Revolution has zero tolerance for such behavior.”

Here, finally, the former minister’s name appears, but only to fit into the already constructed category: traitor, selfish, ambitious, disloyal. Gil doesn’t exist as a political actor with concrete decisions, but rather as an abstract synthesis of all the vices enumerated.

What doesn’t appear in any of these paragraphs is what many “revolutionaries” were hoping to hear: how the alleged spy network was discovered, which structures were compromised, which control mechanisms failed, who was politically responsible for keeping him in office for so long, or what guarantees exist that there aren’t other “little altars” still standing. Díaz-Canel, like a priest on Sunday, turns the case into a moral lesson and a disciplinary warning to the apparatus.

The toxic relationship between Gil and Díaz-Canel, after this speech, takes on the air of a soap opera. The relentless persecution of the convicted man, the opacity surrounding the case, the attempt to isolate and silence the family, and the lack of clarification in the plenary session demonstrate that, more than “zero tolerance,” what abounds is “zero transparency.” Díaz-Canel’s speech was the typical lament of a cuckold. All that was missing was the stab in the back behind closed doors, without anyone noticing.

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