Translating Cuba – Page 3 – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

Cuba’s Private Businesses Await State Approval for 36 Pharmaceutical Projects

Authorities say there is still no private pharmacy, but they are streamlining regulations to increase the manufacture and sale of imported medicines

State pharmacies will continue their work, the official clarified. / EFE

14ymedio, Madrid, September 9, 2026 / A month has passed since the decree making pharmaceutical services a permitted activity for the private sector took effect, but no pharmacy of this kind yet exists on the island. According to the official press, the mechanism is moving forward, and there are already 36 projects – for the marketing and production of medicines – currently being evaluated, of which three are already being formally established and 14 have received approval to continue the process.

“To date, no pharmacy under this model has yet begun providing services to the public,” the official newspaper Granma reports, having spoken with Cristina Lara Bastanzuri, national director of Medicines and Medical Technologies at the Ministry of Public Health. The official notes that since the approval of the regulation, published on July 28 and in effect since August 4, “non-state forms of management will be able to run community pharmacies, provide pharmaceutical services, and market medicines and other health products.”

Lara Bastanzuri noted that the “state community pharmacies” will continue providing services at their current premises, which will not be leased out to these new establishments – which she stopped short of calling private, referring to them only as “community pharmacies.” Those run by the State, she stressed, will continue “providing the population with the services they are entitled to,” despite the fact that most suffer from chronic medicine shortages.

Lara Bastanzuri noted that the “state community pharmacies” will continue providing services at their current premises, which will not be leased out to these new establishments – which she stopped short of calling private, referring to them only as “community pharmacies”

Around 70% of the basic medicine list is not usually available, and BioCubaFarma reported this summer that of the 395 medicines the company supplies, 300 could not be delivered “due to the impact of the United States’ economic, commercial, and financial blockade and the escalation of measures against the national economy.”

The new private pharmacies need, Lara Bastanzuri noted, to meet the requirements for storing and dispensing medicines, as well as having trained professionals for this task. These establishments “will be able to build their portfolio of medicines and health products in accordance with the established regulations,” which exclude those for hospital use, those classified as drugs, or those on any national restriction list. continue reading

Furthermore, no medicine not registered with the Cuban regulator may be marketed.

In this regard, the official said that consideration is being given to using the “temporary health registration,” valid for two years, to evaluate a product’s performance and determine whether to apply for its permanent registration. The list has existed for almost 20 years, but the arrival of new economic actors, with the capacity to import medicines that until now lack certification from the Center for State Control of Medicines, Equipment, and Medical Devices (Cecmed), gives it new relevance.

Private businesses could manufacture – an activity now permitted in partnership with state industry – and also purchase products abroad thanks to this special authorization, which allows medicines to be marketed for a limited period, speeding up the timeline for permanent registration. While the temporary registration is expected to take around 30 days, the permanent one usually takes at least six months.

In any case, the official said that a guidance list has been drawn up of the products with the highest demand – and lowest supply – on the island, to “support those who develop this model,” that is, urging them to supply the population with what the State lacks the capacity to provide.

A guidance list has been drawn up of the products with the highest demand – and lowest supply – on the island, to “support those who develop this model,” that is, urging them to supply the population with what the State lacks the capacity to provide

That said, purchases made outside Cuba must go through the state channel. “All imports have to pass through the two importers we have, which are Medicuba, under the Ministry of Public Health, and Farmacuba, under the Cuban pharmaceutical industry.” Both are prepared, she added, “to support the new forms of management at the different stages of the process, including identifying suppliers and the procedures associated with importing.” The state-run Emcomed has also offered to collaborate.

Lara Bastanzuri stressed in the interview that the requirements and controls for this sector will receive special care, since they are linked to the health of the population.

Her account makes clear that the establishment marketed as “the first private pharmacy” in Havana is, as this newspaper has previously reported, a private shop in the municipality of Regla that has been selling medicines for two years. The establishment is located on Martí Street, between Albuquerque and Agramonte, with a first room offering toiletries, cosmetics, and clothing, and a second room where medicines are dispensed.

The volume dispensed is substantial, almost as much so as the prices. During a 14ymedio visit last August, one customer nonetheless expressed relief at not having to turn to the black market. “The prices are expensive, yes, but since they’re everywhere anyway, on the side, on the street. At least this is a store, and it’s legal,” she said. However, the official’s remarks make clear that this business is being conducted without the required authorization.

Translated by GH.
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The Five People Killed in the Vehicle Struck by an Amazon Plane in Miami Were All Cubans

They worked for a company responsible for cleaning aircraft interiors

The plane, after ramming the van, ended up crashing into an SUV in an airport parking lot. / EFE

14ymedio, Madrid, September 9, 2026 / The five people killed in Sunday’s cargo plane accident in Miami were Cuban. The victims worked for the company Professional Ocean Service Corporation and were identified this Tuesday by Miami-Dade authorities as Javierkys Reyes Quevedo, 47; Rolando Alemán León, 55; Julio C. Pineda, 75; Carlos Acosta Fajardo, 53; and Yoel Rodríguez Naranjo, 53.

The US newspaper The New York Times confirmed that the first three were Cuban migrants, but a coworker stated on social media that the remaining two were as well. “All five were Cuban. They worked with me, and not just because they’re gone now, but they were good, hardworking people. I can vouch for that,” wrote Eduardo Sangster.

“They fled Cuba to build a better life in the United States. A cargo plane cut their lives short,” reads the headline of the New York – based outlet, which describes what the victims’ daily lives were like. “They collected trash and cleaned airplane seats at Miami’s airport to support their families, both in Florida and on their native island.” The chair of the National Transportation Safety Board, Jennifer Homendy, elaborated on the tragedy. “This is certainly very tragic. You would never imagine something like this could happen while riding in a vehicle on your way to clean a plane. No one would think something like that could happen,” she said.

“They collected trash and cleaned airplane seats at Miami’s airport to support their families, both in Florida and on their native island”

Javierkys Reyes Quevedo arrived in Miami in 2019, coming from Guanabacoa, where he had worked tending horses. His job was essential for his family in Cuba, especially for his 69-year-old mother, who is hospitalized with hypertension and to whom he frequently sent medications and other basic necessities. The woman had already lost a son, 49, less than a year earlier. “She’s devastated,” Yusdany Pol Quevedo, the victim’s brother, told the NYT.

Reyes Quevedo had not returned to the island since he left eight years earlier, but he was about to make his first exception. He had saved up to attend his daughter’s fifteenth birthday this December. “It’s just so absurd,” his brother lamented.

Rolando Alemán León was also Cuban. He had spent a long time working at a hotel but decided to switch to plane cleaning because it paid better, according to Blanca Llauro, his former landlady, an elderly woman who had rented him a garage converted into an apartment in the north of Miami-Dade County, who spoke to the outlet. He had recently moved out of that home, and the plan was to settle down with his partner in a house they had bought in Tampa Bay.

María Pineda, Julio C. Pineda’s ex-wife, said he was a tireless worker. He arrived from Cuba in May 2001, and at 75 he was still hard at work to support his family. “He was always cheerful and always laughing,” she said in a text message to the NYT.

The outlet has not documented the origin of the two remaining victims, but several comments on social media confirm their Cuban nationality, including several accounts from close family of Carlos Acosta Fajardo, a resident of Havana. Police also revealed the identities of those hospitalized: Ridoel Averhoff Díaz, 32; Eugenio Corredor, 79; and Roosevelt Sebastian Perdomo Torres, 36. According to some outlets, the first of these, who is in critical condition, is also originally from Cuba, while the second is reported to be Colombian.

According to some media outlets, the first of these, who is in critical condition, is also originally from Cuba, while the second is reported to be Colombian

The pilots have been identified as Jaime Felipe Silva Molina, 37, born in Colombia, and Joseph Carol, 55. Both suffered only minor injuries and have already been released from the hospital.

The accident took place this past Sunday, when the Boeing 767-300 operated for Amazon by the company 21 Air was returning from San Juan, Puerto Rico. The aircraft ran off the runway at Miami International Airport, skidded across a grassy area, crossed a perimeter fence and a public road, and ended up crashing into the Professional Ocean Service Corporation van carrying the Cuban workers. The plane then came to a stop in a parking lot, also colliding with an SUV.

Janette Suárez, president of the company where the victims worked, wanted to pay tribute to the victims and to all employees who do work that goes “unnoticed and without due recognition.” “When you sit down on a plane, you don’t realize the work they do. They have lives. They are people: parents, grandparents, uncles and aunts.”

Translated by GH.

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Former Director of the Camagüey Folkloric Ballet Sentenced for Abuse of Minors

The proceedings against Reinaldo Echemendía were surrounded by allegations of the impunity granted to him by the privileges of his position.

Reinaldo Echemendía received multiple sexual harassment allegations that came to light in independent media and on social networks. / Cubaescena

14ymedio, Madrid, September 8, 2026 – This Monday, the trial of Reinaldo Ángel Echemendía Estrada, former director of the Camagüey Folkloric Ballet, was held. He was accused of sexual harassment and abuse of minors connected to the cultural institution. According to Camagüey journalist José Luis Tan Estrada, who is exiled in Mexico, Echemendía was sentenced to three years in prison and permanently removed from his positions.

The criminal proceedings against Echemendía began in June 2025, after multiple allegations of systematic sexual harassment came to light in independent media and on social networks. The accusations were made publicly by relatives of students, former dancers, and employees of the company that the accused headed for decades.

To date, the official press has not mentioned the case of the former director of the Folkloric Ballet or the final sentence. Secrecy is usually the norm when it comes to high-ranking officials or figures close to the authorities.

According to an investigation by the Observatory of Cultural Rights (ODC) published last November, Echemendía enjoyed impunity because of the privileged position he held in Camagüey’s cultural sphere. He was director of the province’s Folkloric Ballet and had been recognized as an “Illustrious Son of the City of Camagüey,” in addition to being a member of the Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba (Uneac) and an honorary member of the Camagüey branch of the Hermanos Saíz Association.

The woman told independent media that her daughter “suffered harassment and inappropriate insinuations from this teacher during her social service internship”

The first complaint to become public, according to the ODC text, was filed by the mother of a student at the Luis Casas Romero School of Art. The woman told independent media that her daughter “suffered harassment and inappropriate insinuations from this teacher during her social service internship.” She also reported that, despite having followed “the appropriate channels,” Echemendía had received only continue reading

a private reprimand.

In April 2024, when public allegations against Echemendía already existed, the Communist Party of Cuba’s official newspaper, Granma, was still praising the “Maestro” for his 50 year artistic career.

According to the same investigation, it was only after new accusations from victims emerged and the main complainant threatened to call a public protest that the then-culture official was dismissed and criminal proceedings were initiated against him in June 2025. Echemendía was then released on bail.

The recurrence of patterns of abuse is the best evidence of the normalization of perpetrators’ behavior, who are aware of the benefit of impunity”

The Observatory reports that Echemendía continued carrying out responsibilities associated with his former position and retained his level of influence within the Camagüey Folkloric Ballet. The organization also reports that when the accusations against Echemendía gained public attention, the former director offered financial incentives to victims to withdraw their complaints. The Observatory warned that this situation demonstrated the pressure and manipulation to which those who chose to report him could be subjected.

“The recurrence of patterns of abuse is the best evidence of the normalization of perpetrators’ behavior, who are aware of the benefit of impunity,” the Observatory states, warning that the Cuban state’s response and measures to counter these crimes can barely be documented because “there are no institutional statements.” The Observatory also identifies a method of cover-up consisting of relocating perpetrators to other jobs.

The report included as examples the cases of Enrique Rodríguez Toledo, director of the Amadeo Roldán Conservatory, and musicians José Luis Cortés and Fernando Bécquer. “It is not surprising that the Ministries of Education and Culture, the Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba, and the Hermanos Saíz Association, among others, distance themselves from this reality and impose laughable penalties that, rather than condemning, reinforce such behavior by standardizing impunity.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Spain’s Supreme Court Temporarily Suspends Voting Rights for Those Naturalized Under the ‘Grandchildren Law’

Applications will continue to be processed, but applicants will not be added to the electoral register while the underlying appeal is being resolved, unless the consulate expressly certifies their eligibility.

The court is urging consulates to certify that naturalizations are being carried out in accordance with the requirements of the law, rather than the instruction. / 14ymedio

EFE (via 14ymedio), Madrid, September 8, 2026 / Spain’s Supreme Court has suspended the addition to the Electoral Census of Absent Residents (CERA) of those registered as a result of the Grandchildren Law, until consulates certify that the newly naturalized citizens meet the requirement of being descendants of children or grandchildren of Spanish exiles.

The Administrative Litigation Chamber partially granted the precautionary measure requested by the Iustitia Europa and Vox political parties in appeals filed against a decision by the Central Electoral Board (JEC) on July 16. Among other matters, the JEC had stated that it could not order the rejection of postal voting from abroad because doing so exceeded its powers.

The Grandchildren Law, through a provision included in the Democratic Memory Law enacted on October 19, 2022, allows children and grandchildren of Spaniards by birth to apply for Spanish nationality, provided they meet the requirements of having been born outside Spain and that their father, mother, grandfather, or grandmother was originally Spanish and suffered exile for political, ideological, religious, or sexual-orientation reasons.

The Government approved an instruction stating that the status of exile would be “presumed” for all Spaniards who left the country between 1936 and 1955

However, a week later the Government approved an instruction stating that the status of exile would be “presumed” for all Spaniards who left the country between 1936 and 1955.

Now, the high court has suspended the electoral effects of registration in the CERA for subsequent electoral processes until its ruling is issued, except in cases where applicants can demonstrate that they are descendants of people persecuted by the Franco regime in accordance with the law, according to continue reading

the ruling announced by the court on Tuesday, pending formal notification of the order. The decision includes a dissenting opinion.

“The suspension shall not apply to persons for whom the officials responsible for the consular registers issue a certificate confirming that they were born outside Spain to a father or mother, grandfather or grandmother who was originally Spanish and who suffered exile for political, ideological, religious, or sexual-identity orientation reasons (…) without having applied the presumption established in the instruction.”

In other words, consulates must certify that the naturalizations are being carried out in accordance with the requirements of the law and not the instruction in order for applicants to be registered in the CERA. To this end, the court has ordered the JEC to require this “immediately” from the consulates.

It also ordered the Electoral Census Office to separate the electoral-registration applications resulting from the direct application of the exile provisions established by the law from those approved under the interpretation contained in the instruction.

Around 2.4 million descendants of people who were forced into exile following the Civil War (1936–1939) or because of Francoist persecution have applied for Spanish nationality through this avenue

The court also asked the JEC to press the Electoral Census Office to send it the complete report it requested on July 16 concerning the application of the so-called Grandchildren Law and postal voting by absent residents, as well as to prepare an instruction establishing precise criteria for determining the municipality in which voters should be registered.

Around 2.4 million descendants of people forced into exile following the Civil War (1936–1939) or because of Francoist persecution have applied for Spanish nationality through this route. Of these, 544,722 applications have been approved and 306,000 people are already registered as Spanish citizens, according to the latest official figures.

In Cuba, according to sources at Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited by 14ymedio, more than 600,000 Cubans had applied for or begun the process of obtaining Spanish nationality under the Democratic Memory Law at the Spanish Consulate in Havana. The figure includes both those who had formally submitted their applications and those who had requested an appointment before the deadline closed on October 22, 2025.

Government spokesperson Elma Saiz made clear that the Government does not agree with the decision adopted by the Supreme Court on Tuesday and referred to the Central Electoral Board’s previous position. The JEC includes eight judges from the Supreme Court itself.

“We do not agree with this decision, which runs contrary to the position of the Government and also that of the Central Electoral Board,” the minister responded to a question at the press conference following the Council of Ministers meeting, shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision became known.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Fernando Valdés, the Castro Spy Who Gained the Trust of Luis Posada Carriles

An investigation by the Miami Herald reveals how a spy for the Cuban regime infiltrated the Miami exile community.

Fernando Valdés, Cuban spy arrested last July. / ICE

14ymedio, Havana, September 7, 2026 / Fernando Armando Valdés Pérez, identified by US authorities as a Cuban intelligence agent and arrested last July, managed for years to infiltrate anti-Castro exile circles in Miami until becoming a person of maximum trust to Luis Posada Carriles, according to an investigation by The Miami Herald.

The investigation, titled Deception and Bloody Marys: How a Cuban spy in Miami became an anti-Castro militant and authored by journalist Nora Gámez Torres, reconstructs how Valdés maintained a close relationship with one of the most controversial figures in the Cuban exile community while, according to U.S. authorities, concealing his ties to Havana’s intelligence services.

According to the investigation, Valdés Pérez, 61, did not occupy a marginal place within those circles, but rather became a close person to Posada Carriles during his last years in Miami: he accompanied him to medical appointments, attended his activities, organized his celebrations, and was attentive to various everyday aspects of his life.

“Fernando was his representative, his support; he took him everywhere, like a nurse. He took care of his medications; he was a devoted son.”

Orlando González, director of Rescate Jurídico, a Hialeah-based organization dedicated to supporting Cuban political prisoners, and a close friend of Posada, recounted that “Fernando was his representative, his support; he took him everywhere, like a nurse. He took care of his medications; he was a devoted son.”

Valdés was arrested at Miami International Airport during a joint operation by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the FBI, and deported to Guatemala on August 7. According to authorities, he had concealed his ties to Cuban intelligence when applying for permanent residency in the United States.

The Miami Herald reports that ICE identified Valdés as an agent tasked with infiltrating Cuban exile organizations since at least the 1990s. It reconstructs that his connection with Posada Carriles began years continue reading

before his time in Miami, when the anti-Castro activist was detained in Panama after being accused of conspiring to assassinate Fidel Castro during a summit held in that country in 2000.

The investigation details how Valdés managed to project an image of approachability and trustworthiness within Miami’s Cuban community. Santiago Álvarez, a Miami real estate developer and former benefactor of Posada, described him as having an exceptional ability to connect with people: “Fernando was bold, a charismatic guy, made to be liked by everyone; he was almost too perfect,” and noted that “he was friends with everyone; he fixed everything.”

Abreu recalled that Valdés “appeared suddenly, saying he wanted to help” and that he went to the prison “as if it were his own”

The Herald‘s investigation also documents that Valdés gained access to Miami’s Cuban-American political circles through campaign donations. According to Federal Election Commission records cited by the newspaper, he contributed $2,900 to Representative María Elvira Salazar’s reelection campaign in 2022 and $1,000 in 2024, the latter contribution made through the company Sr. Valdes Cigars. He also donated $1,000 to Representative Mario Díaz-Balart’s campaign in 2018 and $2,000 in 2024.

Valdés then began visiting Posada frequently in the Panamanian prison, something that caught the attention of Ernesto Abreu, a close associate of Luis Posada Carriles. He and others wondered why Valdés, with no apparent prior connection to Posada, was visiting him so often and how he could afford these visits. Abreu recalled that Valdés “appeared suddenly, saying he wanted to help” and that he went to the prison “as if it were his own.”

According to Abreu and González, as reported in the Miami Herald , Valdés once encouraged Posada to escape from prison, telling him he had cut through the perimeter fence and could provide him with a weapon. The offer was interpreted by some close associates as an unusual occurrence within a relationship whose true nature they were still unaware of.

After Posada’s release in 2004, Valdés remained connected to him during his time in Central America. According to the Miami Herald investigation , when Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned Posada and released him from prison in August of that year, Orlando González flew him to Honduras on a flight chartered by Santiago Álvarez. According to Álvarez, the group received information that the Cuban government had hired paramilitaries to assassinate Posada, which is why he had to leave Honduras.

Posada then spent more than a year in hiding in Guatemala, where he was taken in by Valdés. According to the report, he lived a mere 200 meters from the Cuban consulate in Guatemala City.

During that period, the relationship between the two grew even closer. Abreu told the Miami Herald that Valdés took care of Posada in daily details: “In Guatemala, he would prepare his breakfast; at 11 in the morning he would make him a Bloody Mary, and by 1 in the afternoon he would give him his Scotch whisky.”

Years later he summed up that experience like this: “Sleeping with the enemy, that’s what happened.”

Doubts about Valdés also marked Posada’s subsequent transfer to the United States. Santiago Álvarez asked Ernesto Abreu not to take Valdés from Guatemala to Mexico, where he planned to pick up Posada on his shrimp boat.

“I was preparing a boat—the Santrina —to bring him here [to Miami] because his life was in danger,” Álvarez said. However, according to his testimony reported by the Miami Herald, Posada refused to continue without him: “Luis flatly refused to let Fernando Valdés stay in Guatemala; he said that if Valdés didn’t come, he wouldn’t go either.”

During that trip, Abreu became convinced that Valdés could be an agent of Cuban State Security. Years later, he summarized that experience this way: “Sleeping with the enemy, that’s what happened.”

The case of Fernando Armando Valdés Pérez is reminiscent of other episodes of Cuban intelligence infiltration in the United States, although U.S. authorities have not linked him to those networks. The most well-known precedent is the so-called Red Avispa [Wasp Network], a network of Cuban agents infiltrated into exile organizations in South Florida, which was uncovered by the FBI in 1998.

Among the members of the network were Gerardo Hernández Nordelo, Antonio Guerrero Rodríguez, Ramón Labañino Salazar, Fernando González Llort and René González Sehwerert, described by the propaganda of the Cuban regime as “The Five” or “The Five Heroes” [commonly referred to in as English, ‘The Five Spies’].

These spies were prosecuted in the United States on charges that included espionage, conspiracy, and acting as unregistered agents of a foreign government.

Other subsequent cases demonstrated the extent of Cuban intelligence operations within the United States. Víctor Manuel Rocha, a former U.S. ambassador to Bolivia and former State Department official, was sentenced in 2024 to 15 years in prison after admitting that he acted for decades as a secret agent for the Cuban government.

Before Rocha, Ana Belén Montes, an analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), was sentenced in 2002 to 25 years in prison for conspiracy to commit espionage after passing classified information to Havana for years. Montes was released in January 2023 after serving more than two decades of her sentence.

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A Teenage Girl Was Beaten to Death by Her 29-Year-Old Partner in Havana

Alas Tensas warns about the lack of protection for minors in relationships with adult men

The age difference between the aggressor and the victim highlights the vulnerability of teenage girls involved in relationships with adult men. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, September 7, 2026 / Camila González Arias, 17, was beaten to death by her partner, a 29-year-old man, on June 21. The crime occurred at the aggressor’s home in La Palma, in the Havana municipality of Arroyo Naranjo, according to information verified by the Alas Tensas Gender Observatory .

According to the independent platform’s account, the young woman had attended a pool party that day with her partner, Carlos René Alfonso Gorejuria. Hours later, they went to his home, where he beat the teenager to death.

Family sources cited by Alas Tensas report that the perpetrator’s mother tried to stop him and was also assaulted. She then called the police, but by the time officers arrived, Camila was already dead. The assailant was arrested by the authorities.

Camila González lived in the Havana neighborhood of Lawton with her grandmother and her 12-year-old sister. The teenager helped care for the family and kept her younger sister company, as their mother and grandmother were ill.

“The situation is quite worrying because there is a total crisis within the institutions: the institutional apparatus is not functioning.”

Yanelys Núñez, coordinator of Alas Tensas, told 14ymedio that she considers the number of femicides registered this year alarming – already exceeding those of 2025 – and pointed out the lack of response from Cuban institutions as especially worrying.

“The situation is quite worrying because there is a total crisis within the institutions: the institutional apparatus is not functioning,” the Cuban activist pointed out. Núñez questioned the silence of the state-run Federation of Cuban Women, despite having received funding from international cooperation, including resources from Canada, for awareness campaigns and training for police officers and other continue reading

officials.

Núñez also links the island’s energy crisis to increased vulnerability among women. The Observatory has documented communities where power outages disrupt telephone communications and make it difficult to contact the police or request an ambulance after an assault.

In addition she noted that Alas Tensas has more than 12 open cases of femicide that occurred this year, which are still pending verification, so the number of victims could increase. “The situation is terrible, especially because of the silence on the part of the authorities regarding the number of femicide cases. We have documented cases of victims as young as 17, but also of 81: the entire age range and in every province of the country.”

Camila’s murder thus adds to a year in which independent records already exceed the figures of previous years.

The case of Camila González was investigated for several weeks by Alas Tensas before being added to their registry. The organization notes that the young woman is the fifth minor murdered this year in circumstances that can be considered gender-based violence. Previously included in their registry were Katherine Cruz Aguilera, 14; Gabriela Herrera Rodríguez, 7; Camila Aguilera Peña, 12; and Merlin Noay, 17.

According to the Observatory, the age difference between the perpetrator and the victim highlights the lack of protection faced by adolescent girls involved in relationships with adult men. Cuban legislation established 18 as the minimum age for marriage in 2022. However, the Penal Code does not establish a general prohibition on sexual relations between adults and adolescents aged 12 to 17. Legal protection depends on circumstances such as the existence of violence, intimidation, deception, abuse of authority, or other power imbalances.

The Cuban Observatory on Gender Equality reported that Cuban courts tried a total of 49 cases in 2025 of women aged 15 and over murdered for gender-related reasons. This figure was presented as a reduction compared to the 76 cases tried in 2024 and the 60 in 2023. However, a legal expert consulted by IPS cautioned that these figures do not necessarily represent the femicides that occurred during those years, explaining that the cases tried in 2025 primarily correspond to events that took place in 2023 and 2024, due to delays in the judicial process.

Camila’s murder adds to a year in which independent records have already surpassed the figures from previous years. With this case, Alas Tensas raises its count of femicides in Cuba to 51 so far in 2026. This figure does not coincide with the count by 14ymedio, due to differences in the criteria used to classify some violent deaths of women.

The latest tally from this newspaper stood at 45 victims after the murder of Yadelaine Roque Torres , 25, who was attacked by her ex-partner in front of her home, in a rural area near El Cobre, in Santiago de Cuba.

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An Acquaintance Coordinated the Defections of Cuban Athletes Melissa Hurtado and Vanessa Godínez in France

The athlete says she left behind tobacco, kimonos and some belongings and boarded a train.

According to Hurtado, the plan was to slip away after participating in the Paris Grand Slam. / Facebook

14ymedio, Havana, September 7, 2026 — From the moment she boarded the flight that would take her to France, along with 14 other judokas as part of the training process, Melissa Hurtado knew it would be the last trip she would make with the Cuban team. “I already knew I wasn’t going to return,” the athlete says in videos posted to her Instagram account. More than three years after that January 21, she says that “this story was not easy.”

The woman maintains that the abandonment by Cuban athletes abroad is a story that “has no end.” In the first quarter of that year, 20 competitors took advantage of trips abroad to escape. Most significantly, among that group, led by Olympic medalist Idalis Ortiz and under the direction of Yordanis Arencibia, the judokas Vanessa Godínez (48 kilograms), Santa Virgen Romero (78 kg), Blanca Elena Torres (52 kg) and Lutmary García (63 kg) also defected in Paris.

According to Hurtado, the plan was to slip away after participating in the Paris Grand Slam. However, she learned that her teammate Vanessa Godínez also wanted to flee. They had to coordinate their plans and take advantage of their stay in Amiens, which was not easy.

“You couldn’t talk about that because you don’t know who is who, or whether someone is an informant who is going to tell the coach,” the judoka recounts. She had just won the gold medal after defeating continue reading

Switzerland’s Fabienne Kocher at the European Judo Open in Australia.

According to Hurtado, the plan was to slip away after participating in the Paris Grand Slam. However, she learned that her teammate Vanessa Godínez also wanted to flee

An acquaintance coordinated Hurtado and Godínez’s escape. According to her account, he warned her that if she did not do it, after her teammate left, everything “was going to get ugly.”

The woman recalls that on the day she defected, she left behind boxes of cigars that she had brought to sell and make some money on the Island, and later learned that “the coaches kept them.” The kimonos and some of her belongings “were divided up among the girls, and they did the right thing.”

She experienced tense moments on the day of the escape because her roommate, who knew nothing about it, would not fall asleep. “We left in the early morning,” she says, “without speaking French and without our suitcases.” Hurtado recalls that they walked for about 30 minutes to a train station. “There was a train leaving for Paris at 6:00 in the morning. It was bitterly cold.”

They boarded the train without knowing, “We didn’t even pay for the train. We didn’t know. If an inspector had caught us, they might even have fined us,” the athlete recounts.

The officials in charge of the training camp realized that the athletes had fled in the morning. “The FBI” (as she refers to the Cuban security agents) “broke down the door of the other girls who were left on the team.” They intimidated them “by saying that there was a group that had stayed” with them.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Four Months and an Endless Line To Get a Cuban Passport

Cuba’s energy crisis exacerbates delays in document preparation, and there are days when offices cannot serve a single applicant.

Identification, Immigration and Foreigners Office at 17th Street, in El Vedado (Havana). / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Natalia López Maya, Havana, September 7, 2026 – The day begins long before they open the doors of the Identification, Immigration and Foreigners Office on 17th Street in El Vedado. When dawn breaks, dozens of people are already waiting in the vicinity, and some have spent much of the morning there. Obtaining a Cuban passport has become another race of resistance within the crisis that the country is going through.

Waiting, moreover, does not guarantee that applicants can complete the procedure. If electricity does not arrive during the early hours of official business hours, the line may extend until mid-morning and end up dissolving without employees having attended to a single person.

To the problems of starting the process is added another, much more distressing: the preparation and delivery of passports currently involves about four months of delay, according to reports collected by 14ymedio. The situation particularly affects those who have planned trips, family reunions, or need to return abroad.

“I came to apply in mid-May and still nothing. Every time I ask what day the passports are being handed over, I realize that progress is very slow”

“I came to apply in mid-May and still nothing. Every time I ask what day the passports are being handed over, I realize that progress is very slow; there are weeks when the line doesn’t move a single day,” said a mother of two children who is continue reading

waiting for documents to travel to Brazil, where her husband is.

The problem is not new, though now deadlines have multiplied. In November 2022, this newspaper documented delays that were then around 30 business days, compared to the usual two weeks previously. An employee explained that the offices did not prepare the documents there and depended on their transfer in vehicles of Sepsa, a company then responsible for transporting them under custody and already suffering fuel shortages.

Four years later, the energy crisis has added new obstacles to an already deteriorating system. Power outages make it difficult to reach the public and add to the transportation and resource shortages affecting many state agencies.

“I came to Havana to visit my mother and my passport was damaged because we had some leaks in the house, so I requested it again and I have been waiting for more than three months for the new one and nothing”, a young Cuban naturalized Spanish and settled in Seville tells 14ymedio. His stay on the Island, which was supposed to be temporary, is prolonged while waiting for the document.

A few meters from the 17th Street office, a parking attendant in a red vest guards several cars and electric motorcycles while watching the crowd grow daily. “I counted more than 300 people here one morning. Since there is so much delay, the line is getting bigger and the people look more desperate,” he says.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Official Statistics on Femicides in Cuba “Reflect the Delay in Judicial Processes,” Expert Admits

Specialists warn that the 173 cases of sexual violence tried in 2025 are highly unrepresentative of reality

More than 12% of women aged 15 to 49 worldwide have been victims of physical or sexual violence by a partner or ex-partner in the past year. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Dariel Pradas (IPS Cuba), Havana, September 7, 2026 / Cuban courts closed 49 cases last year of women over 15 years of age “killed for reasons of gender,” representing a rate of 1.19 per 100,000 women and a decrease compared to the 76 trials in 2024 and the 60 in 2023, the island’s government reported in August.

“That statistic doesn’t give me any real triumphs in terms of a decrease in the problem, but rather a reflection of the delay in judicial processes. These are not the deaths of 2025,” Arlín Pérez, a law professor at the University of Havana with more than 30 years of experience in the courts, told IPS.

According to Pérez, the cases considered tried in 2025 are not about murders from that year, but mainly from 2023 and some from 2024.

“Given all the scarcities in Cuba, including the shortage of personnel in the police, the prosecutor’s office and the courts, as well as power cuts or the fact that people work four days a week (a cost-saving measure following the oil blockade in January), a criminal proceeding such as a woman’s death, which could technically take six months according to the Criminal Procedure Law, is taking two or three years,” she explained.

The figure is so unreal that if conditions in the legal apparatus were suddenly to improve in 2027 and the backlog from previous years were cleared, that year would show a record number of femicides, she added

The figure is so unreal that if conditions in the legal apparatus were suddenly to improve in 2027 and the backlog from previous years were cleared, that year would show a record number of femicides, she added.

Article 345.2 of the new Penal Code, approved in 2022, stipulates that a person who “causes the death of a woman as a result of gender-based violence” incurs sentences of 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment, life imprisonment, or death – the same sentences that would apply if continue reading

it were another type of murder.

According to Pérez, Cuba’s body of law does not literally use the term femicide – although she said she would prefer it – to refer to these cases, as happens in other Latin American countries, which have incorporated it as a crime in their penal codes or specific laws.

In Cuba, the reason for distinguishing gender-based motives in a murder is not because it constitutes an aggravating factor in sentencing – since such murders already carry the maximum penalties – but rather a matter of legal technique and, above all, of statistics.

The Cuban Observatory on Gender Equality (Ocig), a platform linked to the National Statistics and Information Office (Onei) and the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), updated some femicide indicators for the island on August 18.

Of those 49 women murdered, whose cases were tried in 2025, 47% died at the hands of an ex-partner, nearly 90% died in their own home, and 75.5% had no employment ties. Most were white and between 20 and 44 years old (38 cases).

The Ocig, which was created in 2023 and has since updated a set of gender-related indicators once a year, also recorded 33 cases in urban areas and 16 in rural areas, where the femicide rate reached 1.65 per 100,000 women.

While the declining figure for tried femicides reported by the Ocig is not, for now, a real gauge of violence against women, Pérez likewise does not venture to claim that the trend has been increasing.

For its part, the Alas Tensas Gender Observatory (Ogat) is another organization that has kept its own count since 2019, compiled from citizen reports, mainly through social media.

The Ogat has reported 47 women murdered so far this year, as of August 24, and has kept a case-by-case count of 350 femicide victims from 2019 through the first half of 2026.

“Although the Alas Tensas Observatory is politically committed (against the Cuban government), that doesn’t change the fact that it often posts on social media about the existence of real cases”

“Although the Alas Tensas Observatory is politically committed (against the Cuban government), that doesn’t change the fact that it often posts on social media about the existence of real cases,” said Pérez. For the jurist, the most reliable data comes from the courts, but it is not enough.

For example, the so-called Interoperable Registry – which is not public and to which only the Prosecutor’s Office, the police, criminal investigators and, soon, the courts have access – provides “very clear information about what happens in cases from the moment of the official complaint.”

In fact, several femicide cases have not been tried because the perpetrator later committed suicide, and this is data that is not processed nor reflected in the Ocig statistics, she said.

Another important figure released by the Ocig was that, in 2025, Cuban courts processed 173 cases of sexual violence against women aged 15 and older, of which 90 corresponded to the crime of sexual assault and 83 to other types of sexual violence.

Women aged 20 to 44 accounted for the majority of victims (73, or 5.33 per 100,000 women), but adolescents aged 15 to 17 were the most affected (49 victims, 31.52 per 100,000 women).

“Sexual assault came to include all attacks of greater severity against a person’s freedom and bodily integrity,” the jurist said.

Under Article 395 of the Penal Code, sexual assault is punishable by seven to 15 years’ imprisonment for anyone who, “using force, violence or intimidation, has carnal access to another person,” by whatever means or methods.

The sentence is 8 to 20 years if, for example, the crime results from gender-based or domestic violence, or from discriminatory motives.

Of lesser severity are other forms of sexual violence such as “sexual abuse” – unlike the previous crime, it does not involve “carnal access” – or “harassment and sexual outrage,” which includes forms of harassment carried out directly or through any means of communication. In both cases, the penalties are fines or prison terms of six months to two years.

The 173 cases of sexual violence tried in 2025 represent a sharp decrease compared to the 230 cases in 2024 and the 378 in 2023, to the point that the rate of such cases brought to justice fell from 8.62 per 100,000 women in 2023 to 4.19 in 2025. Of that total of 781 cases, 419 (53.6%) correspond to sexual assaults and 362 (46.4%) to other types of sexual violence.

“These figures are very unrepresentative of reality. A woman endures so much harassment every day for these numbers to mean anything. In any case, they speak to how poorly Cuban justice functions for these cases of sexual violence,” said Claris, a student at the Technological University of Havana who preferred to withhold her last name.

Many Cuban specialists and activists agree that the available statistics offer only a partial view of a problem that, according to independent feminist groups, faces significant underreporting.

The Ocig’s contribution is further limited by the fact that it provides data only on tried cases, rendering invisible sexual violence against girls under 15 and against boys.

“With sexual violence there is always a very large degree of underreporting. First, because of the victim’s silence, and second, because sexual violence crimes, by law, require that a complaint be filed: they require an official report from the victim or, if she is a minor, from her parents. These are crimes, as is classically said, crimes of solitude,” Pérez noted.

“With sexual violence there is always a very large degree of underreporting. First, because of the victim’s silence, and second, because sexual violence crimes, by law, require that a complaint be filed: they require an official report”

Despite legislative progress, studies confirm the persistence on a global scale of challenges for victims of sexual violence in accessing justice, such as shame and fear of reprisals; revictimization and a lack of awareness among judicial officials; a lack of support networks; and socioeconomic inequalities.

More than 12% of women aged 15 to 49 worldwide have been victims of physical or sexual violence by a partner or ex-partner in the past year, according to the Gender Snapshot (2025) from UN Women.

When it comes to reporting cases of sexual violence, there is also the length of time it takes for a criminal action to lapse, which in Cuba can range from 3 to 25 years depending on the sentence associated with a given crime, although femicide cases should not have a statute of limitations, since murder carries the maximum penalty.

To support victims through the process, in November 2025 Cuba inaugurated the Specialized Office for the Comprehensive Care of Victims of Gender-Based Violence, an initiative of the National Organization of Collective Law Firms, which already has 40 locations across the island.

Attorney Ana Isabel Zamora, who belongs to one of the offices in Havana, explained to IPS that the initiative’s role is to offer legal advice, procedural representation and support to victims of gender-based violence. But in its first few months, her office has handled only about 20 cases.

Zamora acknowledged that “it still isn’t as visible as we would like. Out of fear, shame, or stereotypes, victims fail to reach out to these places where they could be helped.”

Translated by GH.

Editor’s note: This text was published by IPS Cuba

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A Month of Rumors: Raúl Is Dying, Díaz-Canel Resigns, and the Americans Are on Their Way

The arrival of two American warships in Guantánamo capped off a particularly fertile month for rumors

Raúl Castro, flanked by Díaz-Canel and his grandson Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez, this weekend / Screen capture

14ymedio, Havana, September 7, 2026 – August ended in Cuba the way it began: with blackouts, uncertainty, and a collection of rumors that spread through the streets, social media, and instant messaging services. That universe of speculation had a bit of everything: changes at the top of the presidency, the disappearance of the Cuban peso, the resignation of Miguel Díaz-Canel, internet restrictions, and, to close out the month, an imminent US invasion.

The most persistent rumor once again starred Raúl Castro. Messages and posts claimed that the 95-year-old general was gravely ill after suffering a stroke, and some declared him outright dead. The story grew until it jumped from social media into some news outlets.

This is not the first time Fidel Castro’s younger brother has been buried ahead of schedule. With the general’s obituary “frozen” for years in numerous newsrooms, every piece of news about his health triggers a mix of anxiety, expectation, and speculation about the day after. In Cuba, where leaders’ medical bulletins tend to be state secrets, official silence also provides magnificent fertilizer for the imagination.

This is not the first time Fidel Castro’s younger brother has been buried ahead of schedule. With the general’s obituary “frozen” for years in numerous newsrooms

Another WhatsApp chain resolved the succession question more expeditiously. Inés María Chapman, the deputy prime minister, was supposedly “the Cuban Delcy Rodríguez,” on the verge of becoming “CUBA’S NEW PRESIDENT,” no less than with Washington’s backing. The sustained use of capital letters, indispensable in the diplomacy of hoax chain messages, stood in for continue reading

any source, document, or statement that might have backed up such a political turnaround.

A supposed Central Bank statement also circulated, announcing the “definitive elimination” of the Cuban peso as legal tender and the full dollarization of the economy. However, the national currency remains officially alive – even if its purchasing power looks more dead by the day.

Miguel Díaz-Canel was made to resign once again. A fake letter, circulated under the usual “Breaking News” label, opened with a solemn “Compatriots” and presented an unexpectedly self-critical president, willing to admit that he had underestimated the economic crisis, reacted too late to food and medicine shortages, and failed to keep his promises. Perhaps the element that most quickly gave away the hoax was precisely so much contrition in one place.

The state telecom monopoly Etecsa didn’t escape the rumor mill either. Another fake statement, carefully drafted in bureaucratic style, announced that starting September 1st Cubans would only be able to use mobile data for four hours a day, between ten at night and two in the morning. Given recent experience with rate hikes, restrictions, and connection troubles, many people didn’t even need much convincing to believe it. When reality has spent years training the public for the worst, rumor-mongers have much of their work already done for them.

But August saved its action movie for the very end. On the 31st, two US military ships, the USS Billings and the USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul, arrived at the Guantánamo Naval Base. The presence of both vessels is documented by the US Navy itself; the Billings arrived as part of a scheduled deployment, and the Minneapolis-Saint Paul had left Mayport, Florida, on August 27th to begin its own.

The two vessels were enough to dust off rumors of an American military intervention, further fueled by regional tensions

For some, however, it took only a few forwarded messages to leap from that to invasion. The two vessels were enough to dust off rumors of an American military intervention, further fueled by regional tensions. For certain influencers, the ships were definitive proof that “something big” was about to happen.

None of it happened. But the rumors thrived because each one touched a real anxiety: who will control the country after Raúl, how much further the national currency can deteriorate, how far the restrictions will go, and how a crisis that seems bottomless will end. In today’s Cuba, a rumor doesn’t need to be true. It’s enough for it to look too much like something that could happen.

Translated by GH.

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Emir Mesa Corona, the General Who Protects Raúl Castro from Assassination Attempts and Rumors About His Health

The man in charge of the security of Cuba’s leadership appears alongside the former head of state.

The man responsible for watching the backs of the leadership has stepped out, at least for a few minutes, into the spotlight. / Cubadebate

14ymedio, Havana, September 6, 2026 – Emir Mesa Corona has spent nearly three decades appearing just a few meters from power in Cuba, but until now his name has meant little outside the circles of the Ministry of the Interior. He has no known official biography, his place and date of birth are unknown, and it is not even clear when he attained the rank of general. However, this weekend he partially emerged from the shadows. Holding the rank of brigadier general, he was presented as head of the Directorate of Personal Security, one of the most opaque and sensitive organs of the Cuban apparatus.

Raúl Castro’s reappearance at the ceremony also carried added significance. In the preceding days, rumors had circulated about his death and an alleged serious deterioration in his health, after Diario de las Américas reported that the 95-year-old general had supposedly suffered a stroke and was being kept alive with life-support equipment. The information, attributed to unidentified sources, quickly spread through media outlets and social networks, while the Cuban Government remained silent. His presence at the event, applauded and surrounded precisely by the men responsible for protecting him, ultimately disproved at least the reports of his death. As if Personal Security had had to save the younger Castro not only from attacks and threats, but this time also from rumors about his own death.

It was Mesa Corona who presented the army general with a recognition for his status, alongside Fidel, as “founding chief” of Personal Security during Saturday’s ceremony marking the 65th anniversary of that structure. He also delivered the central remarks at a ceremony attended by Miguel Díaz-Canel and much of the country’s political and military leadership.

The appearance also makes it possible to put a face and a name to a military officer whose career can be traced through documents at least as far back as 1998

His speech offered a glimpse into the nature of an organization that goes far beyond placing bodyguards around the leaders. Mesa Corona spoke of coordination with the Armed Forces, Military Counterintelligence, and other structures of the Ministry of the Interior. He also stressed the need to anticipate threats and openly raised the question of what would happen in the event of an attempt to “kidnap or assassinate” any of the country’s top leaders.

The appearance also makes it possible to put a face and a name to a military officer whose career can be traced through documents at least as far back as 1998. In February of that year, the newspaper continue reading

Granma identified him as a captain and “head of the Military House Unit” when he took part in the presentation of the credentials of Bolivia’s then-ambassador. The Military House is precisely part of the apparatus associated with the care and protection of the top leadership.

Fifteen years later, he had made a considerable leap. During the Bastión 2013 military exercise, Raúl Castro visited the Command Post of the Organization for Security and Internal Order. There, then-Colonel Emir Mesa Corona, introduced as the “second head of the Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior,” briefed the ruler on the progress of the operations.

That information suggests that Mesa Corona joined the Ministry of the Interior no later than the early 1990s

In February 2018, he still held the rank of colonel. That year, the Council of State awarded him the Eliseo Reyes Medal, Second Class, along with other senior officers, including Ramón Romero Curbelo, now one of the most influential figures within Cuba’s intelligence apparatus. The decree justified the award on the basis of a career spanning more than 25 to more than 30 years within the Ministry of the Interior and the fulfillment of “important missions and tasks” related to state security and internal order.

That information suggests that Mesa Corona joined the Ministry of the Interior no later than the early 1990s, although there is no public information specifying the date.

By May 2023, he was already a general, and his position was much less ambiguous. An official publication of Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security included him in a Cuban delegation headed by Interior Minister Lázaro Alberto Álvarez Casas and identified him as the head or commander of the organization responsible for protecting senior leaders.

The delegation also included the Interior Ministry’s head of logistics, the head of International Relations and the director of Cimeq, the hospital traditionally reserved for the ruling elite. The trip establishes that Mesa Corona had held a position equivalent to head of Personal Security at least since 2023, although the resolution by which he was appointed has not been made public.

It is possible that Raúl’s grandson headed the structure for a period, that he was later replaced by Mesa Corona, or that his actual responsibility was always his grandfather’s direct security detail rather than command of the entire apparatus

A year later, he reappeared at a security meeting held in Managua with Nikolai Patrushev, then secretary of Russia’s Security Council and one of the most powerful men in Moscow’s security apparatus. Interior Minister Álvarez Casas was accompanied by Brigadier Generals Mesa Corona and Ramón Romero Curbelo. The meeting also brought together senior officials from Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Bolivia.

His current position, however, raises a question. Several media outlets assumed that the person who had taken over the Directorate General of Personal Security in 2016 was Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, El Cangrejo, Raúl Castro’s grandson and bodyguard. The initial information came from Juan Juan Almeida and said that Rodríguez Castro had replaced General Humberto Francis Pardo.

Francis Pardo is well documented as the former head of the organization. Granma still identified him as head of Personal Security in 2013, and when he died in 2021, Díaz-Canel himself recalled that he had led that “troop of loyal men” for 30 of his 56 years in the Ministry of the Interior.

The exact role of El Cangrejo is now less clear. This year he has again been described as responsible for his grandfather’s personal security and has acquired unprecedented political visibility, but he is not known to formally hold any position in the Government, the Party, or the Armed Forces. The official identification of Mesa Corona as head of the Directorate of Personal Security therefore requires qualifying the version that for a decade attributed that position to Rodríguez Castro. It is possible that Raúl’s grandson headed the structure for a period, that he was later replaced by Mesa Corona, or that his actual responsibility was always his grandfather’s direct security detail rather than command of the entire apparatus.

In an organization designed to keep safe those who rule Cuba’s destiny, discretion is part of the job

Mesa Corona also does not appear to limit himself to physically protecting Díaz-Canel and the Castros. In his speech on Saturday, he paid special tribute to the 32 Cuban soldiers killed in Venezuela and called for their example to guide the daily work of Personal Security. The presence of relatives of those who died at the ceremony reinforces the evidence of the link between that Directorate and the Cuban apparatus deployed around Venezuela’s leadership.

Much remains unknown. There is no known date of birth, academic résumé, family information or public record of his assignments. Nor is it known exactly when he was promoted to brigadier general or when he assumed the position he holds today.

The scarcity of information is not accidental. In an organization designed to keep safe those who rule Cuba’s destiny, discretion is part of the job. Mesa Corona has spent nearly 30 years rising through that world without becoming a public figure. Now, as the regime once again speaks openly of assassination attempts, kidnappings, and external enemies, the man responsible for watching the backs of the leadership has stepped out, at least for a few minutes, into the spotlight.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuba’s New Heroes and Founding Fathers of the Fatherland

EcoFlow, solar panels and solar-powered generators replace the old revolutionary epic in blackout-ridden Cuba

The national electricity system – SEN for short – has suffered so many outages that the word “national” is starting to sound like the most optimistic part of its name. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, José A. Adrián Torres, Málaga, September 6, 2026 / Perhaps one of the few things that isn’t scarce in Cuba is the sun. It rises every day without the Electric Union announcing its synchronization with the National Electric System (SEN), it doesn’t need fuel oil, it doesn’t wait for a spare part, and so far no breakdown has taken it offline. Nor does it depend on a friendly oil tanker docking or a Political Bureau meeting concluding. On the Island of Blackouts, the sun is the only energy provider that still doesn’t require foreign currency for its supply.

The Revolution and its leaders took almost seven decades to see the sun as a lifeline, even though it had always been right in front of their Fidel-style caps. Now the government is presenting photovoltaic energy as the path to energy sovereignty and claims that the more than 50 installed solar parks, with over 1,000 megawatts peak capacity, provide around 38% of the energy consumed during the day during peak sunlight hours. This is positive news, of course. At this point, arguing with the sun would be absurd, even for a system that has been arguing with the real economy for years.

The sun works for free, but storing its energy comes at a price: Cuba lacks sufficient battery banks and a stable grid capable of integrating them. The first storage systems serve primarily to regulate frequency, not to shift the midday to the nighttime peak. When the sun sets, the aging thermoelectric plants return, along with out-of-service units, high-sulfur Cuban crude, a shortage of spare parts, and generators without fuel. Demand hovers around 3,000 megawatts, and the deficits have left more than half the country simultaneously in darkness. The national electricity system—SEN to its ‘friends’—has suffered so many collapses that the word “national” is beginning to sound like the most optimistic part of its name.

The embargo did not age the thermoelectric plants, it did not deplete on its own the reserves of spare parts, nor did it impose decades of insufficient investment and misguided priorities.

The oil embargo imposed by Washington has aggravated the shortages to an extreme; to omit this would be to deceive. But the embargo did not age the thermoelectric plants, nor did it single-handedly deplete the reserves of spare parts, nor did it impose decades of insufficient investment and misguided priorities. External pressure explains much of the acceleration of the crisis; it does not absolve 67 years of energy policy. This is a renewed Special Period, without continue reading

a name: perhaps the authorities avoid calling it that because a temporary emergency that lasts for decades is beginning to resemble the system itself too closely.

In homes, physics has imposed a less solemn solution: a panel, a battery, and the meticulous management of every watt. This is how EcoFlow has ascended to the pantheon of Cuban household icons. EcoFlow is a Chinese brand of portable power stations, founded in 2017, but in Cuba, its name is beginning to function as a common noun, just as other brands have

An Old Cargo Truck Converted into a Water Tanker Makes Its Way Through the Streets of Havana

The tank fitted into the truck’s cargo compartment illustrates the precariousness of a city battered by blackouts and breakdowns.

Any truck that can still start may end up being converted into a water tanker, even as garbage piles up on street corners because there are not enough vehicles to collect it. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Juan Diego Rodríguez, Havana, September 5, 2026 – At first glance, it looks like an old cargo truck stopped alongside the curb. But a look at the back reveals the contraption. A cylindrical tank has been installed inside the vehicle’s cargo bed, and at one end an outlet allows the water to be discharged. The result is an improvised water tanker, one of those emergency solutions that in Havana eventually become part of the landscape as if they had always been there.

The vehicle, seen by 14ymedio on Reina Street in Centro Habana, retains virtually intact the structure of an old Soviet-made Kamaz. The tank has been fitted inside the compartment originally intended to transport cargo, far removed from the configuration of a truck specifically built to carry liquids. The adaptation is rudimentary, but apparently it does the job.

The scene would be little more than a mechanical curiosity if it did not appear amid the severe supply crisis affecting the capital. In recent months, dozens of neighborhoods have suffered prolonged interruptions caused by breaks in water mains, equipment being out of service, leaks, and above all, blackouts that leave pumping systems without electricity.

This summer, several Havana residents have reported prices of between 40,000 and 60,000 pesos for a water tanker

Recent breakdowns in systems such as Cuenca Sur and Oeste have affected densely populated municipalities, including Centro Habana, Cerro, Plaza de la Revolución, Diez de Octubre, Playa, and Boyeros. Aguas de La Habana reports almost daily on new interruptions caused by lack of electricity, breakdowns, and repair work. The problem of obtaining electricity thus adds another increasingly basic problem: turning on the tap and having water continue reading

come out.

When the network stops working, water tankers go from being an auxiliary service to becoming a lifeline. But even for that, resources are not plentiful. Vehicles in good condition, with spare parts and fuel, are also scarce, and the Government itself has acknowledged difficulties in meeting distribution schedules using tanker trucks.

The shortage has also created a lucrative informal market. This summer, several Havana residents have reported prices of between 40,000 and 60,000 pesos for a water tanker, with some cases reaching as high as 80,000, depending on the neighborhood and the buyer’s urgency. Just a few years ago, in 2021, getting a water tanker on the black market cost between 400 and 600 pesos.

A resident of Luyanó tells this newspaper that the supply crisis has fueled a growing informal business around water. “In areas where water never comes in, they have to buy it for 2,500 pesos per tank, a 20-liter bottle for 300 pesos, or spend 100 pesos for a frozen water cucumber [Mexican beverage made from cucumber, water, lime juice and sugar],” she explains.

One service plugs another’s hole and, meanwhile, the precariousness keeps going around in circles

The lack of water also drives residents into the streets. Protests by residents tired of going days without service have been recorded in several parts of Havana, some involving mothers with their children. At the end of August, Sady Campanioni, a Havana mother who had spent days reporting that no water was reaching her block and had publicly demanded a fairer distribution, was arrested. Her arrest showed the extent to which a supply crisis can lead to punitive actions by the authorities, when demanding a basic service ends up provoking surveillance, threats, or arrests.

The Kamaz truck on Reina Street sums up this chain of shortages. Faced with a lack of specialized equipment, a tank is installed on an old truck, extending a little further the useful life of a machine that arrived on the Island decades ago.

The same logic is repeated inside people’s homes. In houses, any bucket, bottle, cooking pot, or tank serves to store water when it finally appears. On the street, any truck that can still start may end up being converted into a water tanker, even as garbage piles up on street corners because there are not enough vehicles to collect it. One service plugs another’s hole and, meanwhile, the precariousness keeps going around in circles.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Police Deploy More Than a Dozen Patrol Cars To Break Up a Protest in Havana’s Fontanar Neighborhood

Residents report power cuts lasting more than 20 hours, while some housing developments with swimming pools never experience blackouts.
The assault on a truck loaded with cooking oil reflects the worsening social tensions in Cuba.

Residents of Fontanar organized to block Rancho Boyeros Avenue this Friday in protest against the blackouts. / Social media

14ymedio, Havana, September 5, 2026 – Despite the fines imposed on demonstrators, the police repression, and neighborhood surveillance, pot-banging demonstrations – cacerolazos – continue in different parts of the Island. These protests against daily blackouts that last more than 20 hours, problems with water supplies, and living conditions in general are now more organized.

This Saturday, in the community of Fontanar, in the Boyeros municipality of Havana, dozens of residents took to the streets banging pots and blocked Rancho Boyeros Avenue while chanting, “We want electricity!”

Videos circulated on social media show the residents’ determination as they stand in front of vehicles, preventing them from passing along the blocked road, while police patrol cars arrived to contain the demonstration. It was the second consecutive day that the same neighborhood had taken to the streets to protest the blackouts.

“More than 10 police patrol cars came. They beat a couple of people, took away two or three, and put an end to the action,” one of the participants told 14ymedio. “We are already thinking of doing it again, but more organized, so that more people will come.”

“More than 10 police patrol cars came. They beat a couple of people, took away two or three, and put an end to the action”

“They’ve been cutting our electricity for more than 24 hours for several days, and we have no water,” the resident added. “Meanwhile, there is electricity all around us, such as in the rental houses with swimming pools in the Río Cristal and Abel Santamaría housing developments. They never cut their power because they say they pay for it.” continue reading

According to witness accounts gathered by Martí Noticias, those detained were “a woman and a young man,” although their identities could not be confirmed. The same sources said that five patrol cars arrived at the scene, along with the so-called Black Berets and Red Berets, the feared special forces of the Ministry of the Interior and the Armed Forces, which specialize in suppressing disturbances and were recently sanctioned by the U.S. Government.

Cacerolazos have become an increasingly common response to the alarming energy crisis affecting the Island. In June, Cubalex recorded 253 protests in Cuba, the highest monthly figure since it began tracking such events in 2022.

With the summer heat, as Cuba faces its worst economic crisis since 1959, the fuel shortage has also worsened the healthcare situation and basic services. The country has recorded new outbreaks of mosquito-borne diseases and, amid the collapse of the healthcare system, deaths have been reported that could have been prevented under other circumstances.

“This city is like a madman’s house, which he keeps filling with garbage, excrement and junk”

Water supply problems, affecting more than half a million Havana residents, according to figures acknowledged by the authorities themselves, combined with the garbage collection crisis caused by the lack of fuel, have made the city a difficult place to get around. “There is a horrible stench in the streets; there is sewage water everywhere, garbage, the smell of excrement,” says a resident of Luyanó. “This city is like a madman’s house, which he keeps filling with garbage, excrement and junk.”

These problems are compounded by inflation and the steadily rising cost of basic products such as cooking oil, eggs, and powdered milk. The severity of the situation was exposed this Friday in the capital’s La Lisa municipality, where dozens of people stormed a truck loaded with cooking oil, in an incident that spread on social media.

According to information published by journalist Gilberto Dorrego, the vehicle was guarded by police officers, but residents rushed the truck to take bottles of oil. The video circulated shows a crowd of people trying to climb onto the truck and distribute the merchandise among themselves. Many children and mothers can be seen in the crowd, running to grab a bottle.

A liter of sunflower oil has reached prices of as much as 5,000 or even 6,000 pesos on the Island’s informal market, approximately the equivalent of $10 at the street exchange rate, nearly two monthly minimum wages in Cuba.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Paradox of US-Cuba Relations: Exports Grow as Sanctions Increase

The island increasingly depends on fuel, vehicles, and medicines sent by “the empire,” even as food purchases show a small decline

Between January and July, the accumulated value reached 674 million dollars, 61.8% more than in the same period of 2025. / ACN

14ymedio, Madrid, 4 September 2026 / U.S. exports to Cuba reached a monthly record of 148.9 million dollars in July, according to new data from the U.S. Census Bureau, which has tracked trade in goods between the two countries since 1992. The figure far exceeds June’s 117.6 million and is more than double the 73.2 million recorded a year earlier, in July 2025.

The jump in the latest month confirms the trend seen since January: U.S. sales to the island are growing rapidly even as Washington tightens sanctions against the Cuban regime. Between January and July, the accumulated value reached 674 million dollars, 61.8% more than in the same period of 2025.

The accumulated figure for this period already equals 83% of the 809.6 million dollars the U.S. exported to Cuba during all of last year. If the current pace continues, 2026 could become one of the years with the greatest exchange of goods between the two countries in recent decades.

Fuel has become one of the main drivers of the increase

Washington’s pressure campaign has led the island to depend on the U.S. to import food, fuel, and medicine. Axios went so far as to describe this situation as Cuba having become a de facto “renegade colony” of the United States.

Fuel has become one of the main drivers of the increase, after Washington authorized at the start of the year sales of petroleum derivatives to the Cuban private sector. In June, the figure reached a record 47,842,674 dollars, double the previous month’s total and half continue reading

of the accumulated total for 2026. Overall, U.S. exports of fuels and oils had reached 95.7 million dollars between January and June, according to records compiled by the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council.

By contrast, Cuban purchases of food from the United States have declined compared with the previous year. In the first six months of 2026, U.S. exports of agricultural and food products totaled 218.8 million dollars, 10% less than in the same period of 2025. Chicken remains the top product among Cuban purchases, but sales of other foods have fallen in recent months.

In the first half of the year, exports of automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, bicycles, and other vehicles had exceeded 41 million dollars

Vehicles are the other major component of the new trade pattern. In the first half of the year, exports of automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, bicycles, and other vehicles had exceeded 41 million dollars. The value of these sales has soared since 2022, when Washington began authorizing certain vehicle exports to Cuban citizens and private businesses. By 2025, vehicle sales had already reached about 149.4 million dollars.

The phenomenon reflects growing demand from the Cuban private sector, which turns to U.S. suppliers to obtain products that the Cuban state fails to import in sufficient quantities.

The increase is notable because it is occurring while Washington maintains its trade embargo on Cuba. But this framework does not amount to a total ban on U.S. exports. Commerce Department regulations permit certain transactions, including sales of agricultural products and – through licenses – medicines and medical devices. In addition, the exception for Support for the Cuban People, in the export regulations, authorizes certain goods intended to improve “living conditions” and support private economic activity.

The U.S. has sold 674 million dollars in merchandise to Cuba between January and July

The Census Bureau’s statistics account for the total value of merchandise exported and do not make it possible to determine what proportion corresponds directly to MSMEs, the Cuban state, or other buyers.

The trade relationship between the two countries also remains highly unbalanced: while the U.S. sold 674 million dollars in merchandise to Cuba between January and July, U.S. imports from the island reached barely about 500,000 dollars in that same period.

An analysis published in April by the consulting firm Auge noted that U.S. exports to Cuba grew 148% between 2021 and 2025, from 327 million to about 810 million dollars, in parallel with the expansion of MSMEs and the increase in remittances from the U.S. Auge estimated at the time that U.S. exports could reach as much as 1.3 billion dollars by 2028 if current conditions persist and trade opportunities expand.

Translated by GH.

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