Translating Cuba

If a second boat truly existed, why was it not displayed as evidence?

Colonel Víctor Álvarez Valle, deputy head of the specialized unit for crimes against State security, added another element: originally there were two vessels. One suffered mechanical problems and was left adrift; its crew and cargo were transferred to the boat that was ultimately intercepted.

According to a source close to the group, the boat they initially planned to use never left Florida. In fact, the source claims to have seen it still broken down in its usual location just a day before the television program aired. That circumstance would explain why they ended up taking another vessel to make the crossing.

The detail is relevant because on Razones de Cuba two boats were mentioned: one allegedly left adrift after mechanical failure and another carrying the 10 men who were intercepted. However, only one was shown during the broadcast. According to the consulted source, authorities were expecting a specific boat, based on prior information, and the story of an alleged transfer would be a way to adjust the official version to a vessel that does not match the one they supposedly had identified.

If a second boat really existed, why was it not presented as evidence, just like the weapons and the rest of the confiscated cargo?

The numerical and material imbalance also warrants scrutiny. The interceptor boat, with five combatants armed with three AKM rifles and one RPK machine gun, approached a vessel that, according to the official version, carried 10 men, 1.8 tons of cargo, and a 250-horsepower outboard motor. Nevertheless, Carballo himself admitted that the “offending” vessel was stopped and that some of its occupants were in the water when they were surprised. After noticing the presence of the border guards, they reboarded and headed west.

The exchange of gunfire at barely 20 meters initially left three dead and seven wounded on the boat with Florida registration. On the official vessel only the skipper, Captain Yosmany, was wounded, who, according to the account, was hit in the abdominal region and forearm but remained at the helm with “courage and conviction.” The exaggeratedly epic tone contrasts with the absence of any independent testimony about what occurred that Wednesday.

According to Álvarez Valle, the official boat received 13 bullet impacts and the vessel from Florida, 21. The figures are striking considering that, according to the television presentation, the 10 occupants carried three AK-type rifles of Soviet and Chinese origin; a dozen rifles based on the AR-15 platform that are very common on the U.S. civilian market; two higher-powered rifles typically used for precision shooting or big-game hunting; 11 semi-automatic pistols from various manufacturers, mostly 9 millimeter; and 12,846 rounds of ammunition. Altogether, it was a varied arsenal combining long and short firearms available on the legal U.S. market.

However, the source consulted by this newspaper states that in their practice sessions they only used semi-automatic rifles; that is, weapons that fire one projectile per trigger pull, and denies that they had automatic military-grade weapons. The arsenal, displayed in the studio, occupied several meters. If the crew was superior in number and weaponry and, as the Government claims, opened fire first, it is difficult to explain the disparity in damage and casualties.

Authorities emphasized the alleged leadership of Amijaíl Sánchez González, presented as a “terrorist” and linked to events in Cuba even when he already resided in the United States. People close to the group contacted by this newspaper deny, however, that Sánchez was the head of the expedition.

Even more striking is the attempt to present Maritza Lugo Fernández—former political prisoner and “plantada*,” residing in the United States—as the “intellectual author” of the events. The accusation not only broadens the case beyond the intercepted vessel but also shifts the focus toward the exile community.

By attributing criminal responsibility to an opposition figure living on U.S. territory, the regime appears to pursue several objectives simultaneously. On one hand, it internationalizes the case file and pressures agencies such as the FBI to open or reactivate investigations into exiled Cubans accused by Havana. On the other, it extends the political and judicial pressure on the diaspora, sending the message that any activism can be reinterpreted as support for violent actions.

Among the confiscated cargo, the program showed emblems of Autodefensa del Pueblo and the 30th of November Democratic Movement, as well as canteens, camouflage nets, Molotov cocktails, and other devices. In a revealing moment, Carballo stated: “If we had not responded as we did, the dead would have been on our side.” The phrase, far from closing the debate, revives the central question: who fired first and under what exact circumstances?

Prosecutor Edward Robert Campbell indicated that sentences could range from 10 years in prison to life imprisonment or even the death penalty. Humberto López intervened to note that, nevertheless, the procedural outcome “is obvious.”

For his part, military doctor Juan Antonio Rodríguez Aguilera reported that the skipper of the official boat is out of danger. He did not clarify, however, the circumstances in which the fourth officially reported fatality died. He did state that the detainees are receiving medical care “with all the resources they need.” When asked why resources are allocated to those who “invaded” the country, he replied that it is part of the Revolution’s ethics.

What the official discourse omits is that providing medical assistance to the wounded and to persons in custody is not an ideological concession but a basic obligation under international humanitarian law. Failing to comply with it would constitute a crime.

*Translator’s note: “Plantado/a’ — literally ’planted’ — is a term with a long history in Cuba and is used to describe a political prisoner who refuses to cooperate in any way with their incarceration. See also…

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Azcorra’s testimony introduced the first visible crack in the official version of the operation that took place near Cayo Falcones.

The official adds that “the Cuban Government is willing to engage with the U.S. Government” and assures that U.S. authorities “have shown willingness to cooperate in clarifying these regrettable events.”

In any case, Azcorra’s testimony introduced the first visible crack in the official account of the operation that occurred near Cayo Falcones, where the Border Guard Troops intercepted a speedboat coming from Florida. According to Havana, the occupants disobeyed the order to stop and opened fire, leading to a shootout that left four dead and six injured among the crew, as well as one wounded Cuban officer.

The doubts do not end there. The brother of the only fatal victim identified at first—Michel Ortega Casanova—told Martí Noticias that his relative, 54 years old, a member of the Republican Party of Cuba (PRC) and originally from Morón, had lived in the United States for more than two decades. “This is badly told,” he said, questioning how the Government has presented the events, portraying his brother as a “terrorist.” Ortega was also married and had his children living outside the country.

Miguel Díaz-Canel himself, in his appearance on February 5, foreshadowed the events.

Although several of the names have been linked to the PRC, its president, Ibrahim Bosch, distanced the organization from the armed incident, stating that the group “has nothing to do with this action.” Bosch reiterated that the organization does not promote armed actions nor control the individual decisions of its members. Although the group confirmed that one of the deceased, Ortega Casanova, belonged to its ranks, it said it was completely unaware of his alleged intentions and expressed condolences to the families, stressing that the case is still under investigation.

Questions also arise regarding the situation of Duniel Hernández Santos, identified by authorities as the alleged contact on land to receive the vessel. Although the Ministry of the Interior presents him as a key piece of the operation, it has so far provided little verifiable information about his specific role, background, or ties to the crew members. People who claim to know him maintain that he was deported to Cuba from the United States in 2024.

The political framing of the case has also fueled suspicions. It is noteworthy that the Cuban Government had been warning about alleged violent plans against the country, which has led to speculation about whether authorities knew in advance the details of the expedition, as well as the names of those involved. Miguel Díaz-Canel himself, in his February 5 appearance, stated: “Today we are aware of plans for terrorist acts that are being supported, financed, and prepared from the United States to attack Cuba.”

Rubio avoided speculating about responsibilities or possible responses until the facts are verified

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington is independently investigating the boat incident off the Cuban coast after being notified by Havana, and emphasized that most of the available information still comes from Cuban authorities.

Rubio avoided speculating about responsibilities or possible responses until the facts are verified, confirmed that it did not involve U.S. Government personnel, and noted that the Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Embassy in Havana are working to determine the identity of the occupants and obtain access to them if they are U.S. citizens or residents. At the same time, he insisted that the United States will not make decisions based solely on the Cuban Government’s official version and indicated that it will respond once the facts are established with certainty.

From Florida, several members of Congress also demanded an independent investigation and made clear their distrust of the Cuban regime’s official reports. Political pressure suggests the episode could escalate diplomatically if irregularities are confirmed.

The Cuban Government defends its right to protect its territorial waters and maintains that it acted in self-defense. However, past precedents invite skepticism. The lack of transparency, the still incomplete identities, and the denial from U.S. territory keep the case open.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Michel Ortega Casanova, 54, was the first confirmed fatality. Various sources place him in central Florida, between Lakeland and Tampa. His relatives say he had lived in the United States for more than two decades and worked as a truck driver. His brother, Misael Ortega, rejects the terrorism accusation and sums up the family’s perception with a phrase repeated in other cases: “They call anyone who goes against their ideology a terrorist.”

Pável Alling Peña, 45, originally from Camagüey, adds a particularly uncomfortable angle for the official narrative. He earned a degree in Art History from the University of Havana in 2004 and was presented years ago by state media as a creator involved in cultural projects. In 2022 he obtained U.S. citizenship and had been working in photography-related activities. On January 30 he posted a message on social media addressed to the regime’s armed forces: “Woe to the soldier who does not lower his weapons and, even worse, fires against the people, because the unleashed terror will be sublime in its crudest expression. Cuba will be free soon.”

The third fatality, Ledián Padrón Guevara, 25, appears in press reports as a young man whose life was divided between Houston and Miami. His social media places him as originally from the Camagüey municipality of Esmeralda and shows primarily artistic interests, with aspirations in the urban music genre. After the July 11, 2021 protests, he wrote: “Come on, Cuba. Stay strong, history is watching.” Those close to him insist he had no violent background.

Amijail Sánchez González, a 47-year-old tree trimmer known as El Guajiro, is described as “the most cheerful and jovial of the group.”

Regarding Héctor Duani Cruz Correa, there is a notable biographical void. What has emerged is the immediate family impact. A former partner told Telemundo 51: “I still don’t know how I will tell my 5-year-old son that daddy won’t be here anymore.” International reports also link him to the theft of the boat, which allegedly was used without the consent of the registered owner in Florida.

Among the six survivors, the name with the most prior accusations is Amijail Sánchez González, a 47-year-old tree trimmer. The Cuban Government includes him among two individuals already listed on its National List linked to investigations for “terrorism or violent acts.” In other words, before the shooting he was already marked as a high-priority target. However, the source consulted by this newspaper describes him very differently: “He is the noblest and most fun-loving of the group.” Among his acquaintances he was known as El Guajiro and “was compared, because of his jovial character, to Camilo Cienfuegos.”

According to his family’s account to The Washington Post, Sánchez informed his elderly parents on the Island just one day before leaving on the boat. During a one-hour call, his relatives begged him to give up the plan. The episode also occurs in a context of prior pressure, as at the end of 2024, authorities detained his parents—both suffering from cancer—for months to force him to return to Cuba and turn himself in.

The second name previously included on that National List is Leordán Enrique Cruz Gómez. Originally from Cienfuegos and born on November 6, 1978, his case has generated strong family reaction. His wife demands “proof of life” and asks why they are not allowed “to know that the person is well, that he is breathing.” His brother fears the worst-case scenario and points out contradictions in the official narrative. “I saw him working in Arizona,” he states, denying that he received any funding to carry out violent actions.

Conrado Galindo Sariol is 58 years old and, according to his circle, was a victim of repression. Telemundo 51 reports that he served seven years in prison in Cuba before emigrating and that his family heard direct threats: “Either you leave or we kill you.” His wife acknowledges his political opposition to the Government but rejects the terrorism label. Both she and his daughter recall that Galindo said goodbye saying: “I’m going to work.”

As for Cristian Ernesto Acosta Guevara and José Manuel Rodríguez Castelló, both listed among the injured, verifiable information remains scarce. Their names appear in the official list and in press reproductions, but without a full biographical profile that would allow assessment of their background or migration status.

Roberto Álvarez Ávila, 34, originally from Cienfuegos, was the last to be added to the list after the official correction that initially replaced his name with Roberto Azcorra Consuegra. Azcorra himself appeared in Miami to deny his involvement, a slip that damaged the credibility of the Ministry of the Interior’s statement. According to the source consulted by 14ymedio, Álvarez had no political aspirations and dreamed of “having a little house in Cienfuegos, near the beach, in colonial style.” He has at least one young daughter, and his family has avoided informing his father, who recently underwent heart surgery.

The mistaken inclusion of Azcorra Consuegra in the first official note was not a simple blunder. In a case involving deaths, injuries, and an armed incident in Cuban waters, the error reinforced doubts about the supposed chance encounter described in the government’s version. The subsequent correction, accompanied by new generic accusations about “violent trajectories,” also failed to close the gap of distrust.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

, according to another source, no specific agreement had yet been finalized.

Major U.S. media outlets featured on their pages this Friday analyses by various experts who differ in their hypotheses about what a U.S.-driven transition on the Island would look like.

Among them is an article by Michael Crowley, a reporter who often accompanies the Secretary of State on his trips, published in The New York Times, which presents the opinions of several observers of the situation. Most analysts believe that Trump and Rubio favor a gradual opening of the regime toward economic and political freedoms, more in line with the Venezuelan option after the capture of Nicolás Maduro, although one dissenting voice stands out: that of Jason Marczak.

An expert on Latin America at the Atlantic Council in Washington, Marczak believes the Trump Administration may be more willing to assume the risk of a chaotic transition, unlike what occurred in Venezuela. The key, he argues, lies in oil and the Island’s limited relevance.

Compared to the need for stability required to revive Venezuela’s oil industry, Cuba has nothing beyond an isolated economy with barely any goods to export. “Unrest there would have little economic impact beyond its shores,” he maintains.

As for Washington’s other major concern—a wave of migration—it could be mitigated with the same humanitarian aid already being sent in cooperation with the Catholic Church through Caritas, Marczak adds. In his view, the “Delcy option” shows no signs of succeeding: “Most Cubans have never lived under any regime other than the communist one.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

“We are not speaking of a temporary or circumstantial crisis, nor of external roots. These are the natural consequences of a planned economic model that concentrates most means of production in the hands of the State, provides no legal certainty, and suffocates economic and social freedom,” he stated.

These are the natural consequences of a planned economic model that concentrates most means of production in the hands of the State.

Representatives of other organizations also participated in the hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of Canada, including Carolina Barrero Ferrer, of Citizenship and Freedom; John Suárez, of the Center for a Free Cuba; and Kirenia Carbonell, of the Cuban-Canadian Coalition.

Carbonell, for her part, stated: “Canada must stand with the Cuban people, not by legitimizing a repressive status quo, but by aligning its policy with transparency, accountability, and human dignity.” Regarding humanitarian aid, she warned that it “cannot be effectively managed in a country where independent civil society is criminalized and distribution is monopolized by the same structures responsible for the crisis.

The inconsistency of Canada’s foreign policy has also recently been questioned by Democratic Spaces in collaboration with Human Rights Action Group, in an extensive report published by the Macdonald-Laurier Institute on February 24 and signed by Michael Lima, Isabelle Terranova, and Sarah Teich.

The report denounces that Canada’s foreign policy toward Cuba is inconsistent with its own democratic values and human rights advocacy, and it makes ten “concrete recommendations” for modifying its position regarding Cuba.

“It is time for Ottawa to align its policy toward Cuba with its stated commitment to human rights, democratic governance, and the rule of law,” the authors emphasize.

As the basis for their argument, they first analyze the Cuban State as an authoritarian regime, its alliance with other repressive regimes, and the implications of those alliances for global democracy.

They point out that Cuba is a single-party system with no real opposition, no independent press, and no autonomous civil society. Elections function as rituals of legitimization, and candidates not approved by the Communist Party are excluded or detained.

The authors denounce that economic power is concentrated in military conglomerates, such as Gaesa, which control strategic sectors and channel foreign investment toward institutions linked to the Armed Forces.

The authors denounce that economic power is concentrated in military conglomerates, such as Gaesa, which control strategic sectors and channel foreign investment toward institutions linked to the Armed Forces.

The report adds that the Cuban Penal Code criminalizes virtually all forms of dissent through ambiguous legal categories such as “false news” or “public disorder.” As a result, by the end of 2025, more than one thousand political prisoners were recorded, along with reports of torture, prolonged isolation, and deaths in custody. They also note that the State monopolizes internet infrastructure, uses Chinese technology for surveillance and control, and blocks access arbitrarily, as occurred during protests, especially on July 11, 2021.

In addition to the regime’s domestic policy, the report describes the Cuban Government as a central ally in an international authoritarian network, with strategic relations with Russia, Iran, North Korea, China, and Venezuela. In particular, it highlights the historic Cold War alliance with Russia, reactivated under Putin, and a serious aspect of this relationship: the systematic recruitment of thousands of Cubans for the war in Ukraine, under conditions resembling human trafficking.

For these reasons, the authors state, “Canada cannot afford to maintain its inconsistent approach toward Cuba while claiming to be a leader in human rights and democratic governance.”

Among their recommendations to Ottawa regarding its foreign policy, they indicate that the Canadian Government should create a regional policy in Latin America that recognizes Cuba’s role as a driver of authoritarianism.

They call for ending its pattern of voting against resolutions that seek to hold Cuba accountable for human rights abuses, and they recommend implementing targeted sanctions—under the Magnitsky Act or the Special Economic Measures Act—against Cuban officials responsible for torture, repression of protests, rigged trials, and campaigns of surveillance and intimidation.

They call for investigating the recruitment of Cubans for the war in Ukraine and publicly condemning these practices, assessing whether they constitute human trafficking, and promoting sanctions or legal action if confirmed.

The authors also state that Canada should demand the release of political prisoners and publicly call for the immediate release of the more than one thousand detainees held for political reasons.

They recommend requiring the Cuban Government to grant legal status to NGOs and autonomous groups so that humanitarian aid reaches the population directly.

On the economic front, they call for strengthening responsible business conduct and warning Canadian companies that investing in Cuba means operating with military conglomerates.

Regarding control and surveillance, they urge helping Cubans circumvent digital censorship and internet shutdowns by facilitating access to information and secure communication, and ensuring that the Canadian Embassy in Havana maintains real and regular contact with activists and independent organizations.

Finally, they recommend requiring the Cuban Government to grant legal status to non-governmental organizations and autonomous groups so that humanitarian aid reaches the population directly, without passing through the state apparatus.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

at once. It does not have to change overnight. Everyone here is mature and realistic,” he said this Wednesday during the Caricom summit of Caribbean countries. On the sidelines of that meeting, according to the Miami press—and treated by the NYT as a done deal—a meeting reportedly took place between the Secretary of State’s advisers and Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, grandson of Raúl Castro, known as El Cangrejo (the Crab).

“Trump does not want a sudden power vacuum in Havana,” declared a senior government official and Rubio collaborator. The article cites additional public statements by the Republican. “As for collateral effects, they are no more concerned than we are,” he said, referring to Caribbean countries. “We are 90 miles away, and the United States has experienced massive migration from Cuba in the past.”

Moreover, Rubio insisted that the priority of reforms is economic in nature: “If they want to carry out drastic reforms that open space for the economic—and, over time, political—freedom of the Cuban people, obviously the United States would love to see that,” he concluded.

El Cangrejo’s role as a suitable interlocutor remains to be seen, although he is most likely simply a messenger for Raúl Castro. The U.S. chargé d’affaires in Cuba, Mike Hammer, said in an interview with the Spanish newspaper ABC that “within the Cuban system there are individuals who realize that the project is coming to an end and who may be interested in making a change they see as necessary.”

However, other analysts believe it is impossible to find someone within the regime who would break party discipline. “The search for a Cuban Delcy Rodríguez is foolish,” William LeoGrande, a professor at American University specializing in Latin America, told the NYT. “If there is going to be an agreement, it will have to be between the United States and the current Cuban government, not with a branch of the current government.”

“If there is going to be an agreement, it will have to be between the United States and the current Cuban government, not with a branch of the current government.”

María José Espinosa, of Cuban origin and a member of the Center for International Policy, also does not see the opposition as a solution. “Everyone is either in prison or in exile,” she believes. Even so, the article says, “some Trump officials believe that Cuban leaders will be forced to make concessions to Trump,” because the alternative—“economic collapse and a possible violent uprising”—would be worse for them.

A declassified document warned that “U.S. interests would be threatened in complex and possibly unprecedented ways,” as it could lead to “substantial and possibly prolonged instability,” including violent reprisals, “large-scale emigration to the United States,” and “demands for U.S. involvement.”

The cited report also stated that there was “a greater likelihood that Fidel Castro’s government would fall in the coming years.” The bitter part is that the document was drafted 33 years ago, in 1993. The strongman has long since died, and nearly three million Cubans have left the Island since then.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

the words quoted by the U.S. newspaper.

The article also reports that Rodríguez Castro met with other leaders during his stay at the Coral Building, next to the Marriott hotel, the meeting site of Caricom.

When asked at the press conference after his participation in the summit, Rubio did not deny either the Herald’s report or that of Axios, which on February 18 had already revealed that the Secretary of State had been holding “secret talks” with El Cangrejo. In its publication, Axios said that Washington considered Raúl Castro the true head of the regime, and that the main objective of the Trump Administration is that “the regime has to go.”

“I am not going to comment on any of the conversations we have had,” Rubio stated. “Suffice it to say that the United States is always willing to speak with officials of any government who have information to share with us or viewpoints to share with the United States.”

“The reason things are so bad is because they have an economic model that does not exist, that does not work”

In his remarks to the media, he reiterated the main point of the Donald Trump Administration regarding changes on the Island: “The only way Cuba can have a better future is by adopting a different economic model.”

Rubio blamed the Cuban regime’s economic and political model for the crisis facing the population, arguing: “The reason things are so bad is because they have an economic model that does not exist, that does not work.”

When asked whether his country would intervene in any way in a possible transition, he stated: “If Cuba wants to make those drastic reforms that open space for both economic and ultimately political freedom for the Cuban people, obviously the United States would love to see that, and it would be helpful.”

The Secretary of State also explicitly criticized the Cuban medical export program, which for decades has been a key source of foreign currency for Havana. He described the scheme as a form of “human trafficking” and labor exploitation, arguing that participating doctors “work under conditions in which they receive very little compensation and have restrictions on their freedom of movement,” and that many countries that contract those services “are paying money to the Cuban regime that does not reach the professionals.”

Regarding the recent easing that allows exports of Venezuelan oil destined for Cuba’s private sector, he emphasized the strict condition that these exports must not benefit the regime. Again, he stressed that economic openness and political freedom are necessary conditions to alleviate the situation on the Island. As a warning, he stated that if it is confirmed that fuels covered by this measure reach state institutions, sanctions will be imposed immediately.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury published guidance this Wednesday indicating that licenses will be issued so that private companies can send Venezuelan-origin oil and its derivatives to Cuba for commercial and humanitarian use. The measure, part of the so-called SCP License Exception (Support for the Cuban People), is presented as a tool to alleviate the severe energy shortage on the Island.

The strict condition is that these new licenses will be granted only if the fuels are managed by entities and individuals from Cuba’s private sector for commercial or humanitarian purposes, and never for the benefit of the Armed Forces, intelligence services, or state institutions that sustain the Havana regime.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The claim of responsibility for the attack has been widespread. Casa Cuba of Tampa, linked to Ortega Casanova and Leordan Enrique Cruz Gómez, has declared three days of official mourning with flags at half-mast for the “anti-Castro fighters fallen in fulfillment of their sacred duty to the Homeland.” René Montes De Oca, vice president of the group, referred to the deceased as a “brother in ideas and a friend.”

“May God keep them in His Holy Love; our condolences to family and friends. Today the exile community wears mourning and Cuba is clothed in Glory with the redeeming blood of its finest sons,” he added.

Not all of the exile community has seen it the same way. Debates have been intense all night on social media, and many voices have considered this action a mistake. “Now it turns out that the dictatorship has its first victory, against an American invasion, which it defeated with resounding success, the narrative they were already pushing,” lamented a Cuban in Florida.

The Cuban Republican Party, for its part, made public a statement this Thursday distancing itself from the action, which it attributes to “individual decisions or actions that its members or supporters may undertake in a personal capacity.”

The organization acknowledges that Ortega Casanova was a party member but states that “the organization was completely unaware of his intentions, plans, or participation in said event,” which, on the other hand, it says it understands. “This tragic event is a sign of the level of desperation to which the Cuban people have been pushed after decades of repression, lack of freedoms, and systematic closure of civic avenues,” it adds, reiterating its “commitment to political struggle, responsibility, and respect for life.”

Meanwhile, in Florida, an independent investigation is underway with the participation of the FBI. Agents from the bureau went to a home in Miami Lakes linked to the incident, since the address appeared in the property records of the vessel involved, a “speedboat” registered in Florida as FL7726SH.

The White House, for its part, said it was monitoring the attack, according to U.S. Vice President JD Vance.

“Marco told me about it about 15 minutes ago, but we don’t know many details. It’s a situation we are monitoring. Hopefully it’s not as bad as we fear it could be,” he stated.

The Secretary of State, who was at the Caribbean Community (Caricom) summit in Saint Kitts and Nevis, where he spoke at length about Cuba, said: “I am not going to speculate or comment; I want to know what happened. We are going to find out exactly what happened and we will respond appropriately.”

“I am not going to speculate or comment; I want to know what happened. We are going to find out exactly what happened and we will respond appropriately,” he maintained

The head of U.S. diplomacy emphasized that, for now, all the information comes from Cuban authorities and that the Donald Trump Administration wants to verify it with “independent information,” although the explicit acknowledgment made from Florida seems to foreshadow the outcome.

The incident occurred this Wednesday morning, when a vessel approached within one nautical mile northeast of the El Pino Channel, in the Villa Clara key of Falcones. “As a surface unit of the Border Guard Troops of the Ministry of the Interior, with five personnel, approached for identification,” the ministry itself indicated in an initial statement, “fire was opened from the offending boat against the Cuban personnel, causing the commander of the Cuban vessel to be injured.”

In the operation, the Border Guard Troops seized “assault rifles, handguns, homemade explosive devices (Molotov cocktails), bulletproof vests, telescopic sights, and camouflage uniforms.”

The Government also announced that a Cuban resident on the Island had been detained, Duniel Hernández Santos, “sent from the United States to ensure the reception of the armed infiltration, who is currently confessing to his actions.” According to some reports, he had been deported from the United States in 2024.

Russia is the only country that has so far spoken on the matter. The Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, during his daily telephone press briefing, supported the actions of the Island’s agents.

“The Cuban border guards did what they had to do in a situation like this,” he stated, adding that “regarding the security situation around the Island, it is very important that all parties exercise restraint and not allow any kind of provocation.”

Peskov sought to downplay the matter and disconnect it from the deteriorated relations between Cuba and the United States, noting that “there is nothing to comment on. Havana reported that the Cuban citizens detained who attempted to enter national territory with weapons acknowledged that their aim was to carry out terrorist attacks.”

Earlier, and less restrained, the spokeswoman for Russia’s Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, had said: “This is an aggressive provocation by the United States, whose objective is to escalate the situation and unleash a conflict,” she told the TASS news agency.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

 

An employee of El Turquino, who asks not to be identified, explains that the lack of products is not due solely to the current fuel crisis. “This goes back years,” he says, leaning on the door. “It’s all poor management by the Commerce Company. They notify us when the truck is already parked. We unload whatever comes, and that lasts two or three hours at most.” In December, he recalls, sacks of donated rice arrived and were sold in a matter of minutes. “Sometimes a line forms just from the rumor that sugar or beans are coming in. Then it turns out to be false.”

The uncertainty also affects the workers. The market’s hours depend on whether there is anything to sell, and rumors of job reassignment circulate as lightly as those about incoming merchandise. “If they send us to another activity, I’ll ask to leave,” the employee says from inside a dimly lit shop where it is hard to distinguish the empty shelves.

A few meters from Aurelio, Alicia arranges her bags inside a large cloth purse. She is another retiree who survives by selling bags in front of the market. In her case, indignation weighs as heavily as exhaustion. “When they bring something out, the first to arrive are the resellers,” she says. “They find out from the same employees, and then each one leaves with their share. There’s a lot of shady dealing here.” Meanwhile, she is the one chased for selling small bags.

The drop in commercial supply not only empties the market shelves; it also leaves without sustenance those who depend on its activity. The elderly who sell bags depend on movement: on the line, on the bundles, on the rush to carry something home. Their age, their minimal pension, and the lack of alternatives force them to live day to day, watching a market that now sells almost nothing. The crisis in San José de las Lajas is also measured in bags that no one buys.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.