EFE/14ymedio, Miami/Havana, 1 November 2022 — In October, the Observatory of Cuban Conflict (OCC), based in Miami (U.S.), logged 589 public protests, diverse in nature, including 71 in the streets with cacerolazos (banging on pots and pans), marches, and barricades — almost double the 43 in September.
Of the 589 demonstrations that occurred in October, 263 were related to political and civil rights (45% of the total), while 326 began with demands for economic and social rights (55%).
According to OCC’s statement, “the Cuban government repeatedly reverted to blocking the internet in the areas where these demonstrations were reported to avoid ‘contagion’ and a national chain reaction.”
“Its only response to the growing demands of the population continues to be repression and judicial proceedings against the protesters it manages to identify, rather than lend itself to reverse the critical reality that produces these protests,” says the Observatory.
In its monthly analysis of governability in Cuba, the organization found that, in October, it reached its lowest point since 11J. continue reading
In Bejucal, a municipality in Mayabeque province, for example, Communist Party leaders had to endure shouts of “Freedom in Bejucal”, “A people united will never be divided” and “They must go,” during the nighttime protest on October 10th.
That same day in Caibarién, in Villa Clara province, a man yelled “The day of freedom could be today!” while barely filming the protesters marching with his mobile phone. Women, fathers carrying their children on their shoulders, elderly people, pedi-cab drivers and electric motorcycles traveled the streets of that municipality.
Little by little in the protests throughout the entire country the tone was raised and they not only included cacerolazos and marches, but also barricades in the streets along with expressions of rejection toward the repressive forces. In Havana, the mobilization of police operatives, undercover State Security agents, and military recruits armed with clubs to repress in areas such as Línea Street in El Vedado, caused a wave of indignation and denunciations.
Many of the protesters who took to the streets in October did so to demand a political change, but a large majority demanded something so simple as having the lights on in their homes or for the power not to be shut off every two or three hours. Despite this, about thirty arrests were made, according to several NGOs, and some of those arrested could end up serving time in prison.
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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“Vote for our ideas and our values.” On November 27th elections for Cuba’s municipal assemblies will be held, the first step in designating provincial governors and vice-governors. (EFE)
14ymedio, Ariel Hidalgo, Miami, 30 October 2022–The proposals by the internal opposition in Cuba, announced by the Council for a Democratic Transition as well as the newly created D Frente, to promote candidates to the municipal elections are not naïve as some critics have said. Rather, it could be said that those who believe so are more naïve. The proponents know perfectly well the barriers and risks they will face. Even if they were convinced of the impossibility that any of the candidates could reach any of the levels of that official institution, it is worth fighting for other reasons.
To understand this, it’s sufficient to review the experiences offered by the history of the dissident movement itself, such as that of the first Cuban who accepted this electoral challenge.
The first time an opposing candidate ran in an election in Cuba was 1989. Roberto Bahamonde Massot, an engineer and doctor of pedagogy, member of the Party for Human Rights in Cuba, which was one of the first dissident organizations, nominated himself as a candidate. However, his own group refused to support him, as they believed that it legitimized fraudulent elections.
Bahamonde was undaunted and decided to run in his personal capacity; he made several copies of his candidate program and distributed them in the neighborhood. On March 9th of that year, he arrived at the meeting for the candidates for delegate of District 2 in the area of La Fernanda, in San Miguel del Padrón. When it came time for nominations, he nominated himself, which caused a great stir in the asembly because he was someone who had been arrested four times by State Security and they refused his candidacy. But he did not give up and challenged the legality of the procedures. The commission agreed to repeat the meeting. He competed against the Minister of the Interior and lost with 31 votes in favor, 60 against and 59 abstentions, which was a great victory in the country of unanimity.
The fact that back then Bahamonde “lost” while obtaining over half as many votes as the officialist candidate, and that 59 people abstained despite the closed campaigning orchestrated by State Security against him, is very significant. It was clear that those who abstained did not want to vote for the officialist candidate, but did not have the courage to vote for the dissident. Were it not for that fear, Bahamonde would have flat out won with no fewer than 80 votes.
The question to ask now is: If that occurred in 1989, what would occur nowadays when almost no one is hopeful that this leadership and this model will improve the desperate conditions for the population that has launched into protests in the streets in almost every city in the country?
It does not mean they will win some seats now, because, for the same reasons, repression and fraud will be on levels greater than before. What matters is the political costs they will have to pay when they realize this, not only when facing the people, but also in international public opinion.
For those who think that these costs don’t matter to them, I want to remind you that faced with an economic situation so severe, they are in no condition to continue losing foreign aid, or deserters from among the skeletal base of popular support. Success depends, of course, on the one hand, on the opponents succeeding at reaching the population with their candidacy programs and those of the opposition in general. On the other hand, foreign lobbying is important so that any benefits the government negotiates with powerful institutions are conditioned upon allowing the presence of international impartial election observers.
The greatest support that exiles who fight for their country’s freedom can provide is not so much to exhort their compatriots on the archipelago to abstain from arguing that the elections would be fraudulent, nor to pressure governments to strictly deny any concessions to the Cuban government, but rather to exhort them to vote for opposition candidates and, better yet, aim for foreign governments to condition foreign aid on the acceptance of those observers. If the oppressors refuse, they not only lose that aid, but also what little credibility they still have.
The true battles will not really be at the polls, but rather, in the streets, in the population’s peaceful protests in defense of the rights of the people’s true candidates, all of which would further nourish the ranks of unsatisfied citizens. On the other hand, in the international arena, we’d gain allies while the oppressors get cornered further.
For my part, I’d view such a victory not only as a precursor to the final triumph of the libertarian ideals of so many Cuban fighters, but also the best way to honor the memory of that forerunner who, I know, died after being forgotten in exile.
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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The boat sank on Friday “after colliding with a surface unit of the Coast Guard Troops,” said the official report. (Twitter/Diario Artemisa)
14ymedio, 29 October 2022 — Five dead — one man, three women and a minor female child — as a result of the sinking of a boat carrying Cuban migrants north of Bahía Honda, in Artemisa province. The boat sank on Friday, “after colliding with a surface unit of the Coast Guard Troops while it was being identified,” according to a report from the Ministry of the Interior.
According to the government, 23 people were rescued by other units that joined the search and rescue.
The official statement accused the United States of encouraging illegal exits and points to the economic embargo as one of the “main incentives.”
“The United States Government does not contribute to guarantee safe, orderly and legal emigration, while at the same time it attempts to create socially destabilizing situations,” said the statement read on the television newscast.
Cuban authorities are investigating “this painful event” that “occurred as a result of hostile and cruel policies of the Government of the United States against Cuba,” the brief statement continued.
As the news spread, it has started to cause a stir on social media where many were reminded of the 13 de Marzo tugboat, a small boat, which sank in July 1994 resulting in the death of 41 Cubans who were trying to leave Cuba. The testimonies of survivors confirmed the government’s responsibility in the ramming and the use of water cannons against the vessel. continue reading
This year, the American Coast Guard has intercepted 6,182 Cubans who were trying to reach the country through maritime routes, seven times the number detained in 2021. So far this month, they have intercepted 921 rafters from the Island.
Last Thursday, the Chief Patrol Agent in Miami, Walter Slosar, who had documented the arrival of several of these rafters, announced the landing of 24 people, four of whom were children, in Marathon, Florida, on a boat named La Crema. After receiving medical attention, they were taken into custody.
One day earlier, Slosar had confirmed the arrival of 80 rafters who landed in the area of Marquesas Keys in Florida. Among them was Loisel De León Morales, a young man who recorded the trip with 21 friends. After turning themselves in, they were set free and reunited with family as they await to learn their future.
The Cubans who reach American soil have a greater chance of receiving asylum, while rafters intercepted in international waters must prove they are victims of harassment by the regime, otherwise they are returned to the Island.
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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A contemporaneous article about the UMAP force labor camps in Cuba. “A brilliant initiative of military cadres.”
14ymedio, Elías Amor Bravo, Economist, 27 October 2022 — A brief note in Cuba’s officials state newspaper Granma has set off the alarm. It’s getting ugly. During the council of ministers, which met yesterday, October 25th, they presented general directives for preventing and confronting crime, corruption, illegalities and lack of discipline. It was about time, but now the regime is willing to put an end to any behavior deemed illegal. No matter that, thanks to these activities, many Cuban families are able to put food on the table, after searching unsuccessfully in the state-owned bodegas. The note in Granma states that one of the ten points taken up during the council of ministers was directed at “combatting excessive prices and the resale of essential products.” To that end, they drafted a request to regime and party leaders at all levels, but especially in local government, “to not waiver in these situations, and not allow space for theft and diversion of resources.”
What does this mean? Well, nothing other than, as of now it will be more difficult to find food, and the weight of the repression will be unlimited against people who offer these services to their fellow citizens.
But the repressive actions, in fact, have already begun in some agricultural markets in the capital. Authorities issued fines to vendors who were reported for abusive price fixing and other illegalities. Specifically, last weekend operatives of the Municipal Inspection Directorate (DIM) in Playa, Havana, imposed fines of up to 8,000 pesos to six vendors in the supply and demand agricultural market at 19th and 42nd for price violations and other illegalities.
Two of those sanctioned were fined for abusively fixing the price of tomatoes, bell peppers, and carrots at 300 pesos per pound as well as limes (200 pesos per lb.), and pineapples (100 pesos per unit). Two others were fined 5,000 pesos for not including in their lists the product price or for “finding 999 nylon bags without a receipt, for which the responsible party was fined 1,500 pesos and the merchandise confiscated.” continue reading
These infractions are included in Decree Law 30 of 2021 which establishes the personal infractions, sanctions, measures and procedures to apply to violations of the norms dictated in the price and tariff policy. In summary, the repressive apparatus is already functional and investigations will continue, especially after those latest instructions of the council of ministers.
Leaders want to identify the sources of these products as well as the houses converted warehouses for sale on the illegal market, so that they can confront the illegalities and lack of social discipline. This will be followed by a crackdown against the sale of foodstuffs, hoarding, theft of merchandise from state-owned stores and abusive prices.
It’s the same old, same old. If instead of concentrating their effort on unproductive activities such as surveillance, snitching, inspections, and repression, the authorities would dedicate themselves to produce more, so an increase in supply would flood the market and contain prices, it would be another story. It is obvious that they are not going to do this, or worse, from a communist ideological perspective, repression is the motivator.
What the regime describes as “illegalities” is so astonishing and extensive that someone should begin to worry about those anomalies that only exist in Cuba. Not even in impoverished Haiti is it so easy to find such illegalities, for example the sale of propane tanks at bakeries and other stores, where Cuban communists confirm that there is “probable complicity of some employees in the theft of more than 1,000 tanks.”
Another, with respect to the sale of fuel at service centers, where the deficit or the delay in service is due to “problems in shipping, an increase in demand, and an increase in the time required for the purchase transaction at these establishments.” To say nothing of the electricity, less than 20% of the lights have come back on in the capital city, which remains dark. With housing, another, homes affected by the hurricane remain in the same situation (of 1,176 affected only 166 have been repaired). Another record.
But what truly worries authorities are the prices. Authorities want prices to adjust to the costs and reject the laws of the market, in both the state and non-state sectors. And, especially, they do not want to produce wealth, which is what sets apart the economic actors of the state political power. Bankruptcies and closures will follow. People can’t sell at a loss. There is no making heads or tails of this.
Conclusion. The regime takes the Doberman of fear out for a walk, and prepares for the worst. This time, as if a novelty, in the council of ministers they announced the traditional “strategies for the social transformation of people who neither study nor work, so they may contribute to society.” Social transformation? What the devil is that? Perhaps a new UMAP* is coming in the 21st century? Will the world remain impassive in the face of these communist practices in Cuba?
In the same ministerial meeting, Gil informed on the country’s economic performance as of the end of September this year, but nothing has changed. Perhaps he did this to justify the spending on that survey which claims to measure consumer satisfaction among Cubans. An absurdity. Granma says nothing in regard to this, only that during the council, the following matters will be discussed: the portfolio of opportunities for foreign investment (a failure from the start), the national hydraulic plan (impossible to implement without investment in hotels), the decree law on conflict mediation (after the family code, anything is possible), and the expected assignments for the 2023 graduates of higher education and mid-level technical schools (employment for all, even if they’re worthless). All very interesting, right now.
*Translator’s note: UMAAP = “The notorious Military Units to Aid Production (in Spanish: Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producción), internment and forced labor camps where the Cuban government imprisoned homosexuals, the religious, intellectuals, dissidents and any other “suspicious elements” between November 1965 and July 1968.” Source: Ernesto Hernandez Busto
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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With the promise of benefits and good sale prices, officials had attracted local producers. The situation, in practice, is very different. (14ymedio)
14ymedio, Yankiel Gutiérrez Faife, Camajuaní, 28 October 2022 — The cart towed by an old Soviet tractor left the rural area of Camajuaní in Villa Clara province headed to Remedios. It was loaded with seven pigs whose owners, five farmers who rented the transportation, had made the decision to sell to the state.
With the promise of benefits and good sale prices, the officials had attracted local producers who hoped to stock up on better, well-fed cattle and were able to make the sacrifice. The situation, in practice, was very different.
The agreement consisted of paying half the value of the hogs in cash and the other half in animal feed: maize, fodder and soy. The deal made sense to the producers, as they could use the money and at the same time, were guaranteed food for the other pigs they kept on their farms.
The tractor unloaded the hogs in Remedios and after a long line, the officials weighed and appraised them. They were good animals, well raised, and fattened and they received half of the agreed-upon price in cash. “We don’t have the rest yet, but soon you’ll receive a call to come pick up the feed,” they said.
“It’s been four years,” bemoaned Juan Domingo, “and to this day no one has contacted us.” Along with Ivis, Janiel, Daniel and Elier, he awaits payment for the 28,000 peso debt — in feed for the hogs — that the government continues to delay.
The man stated that since then, they’ve been through the pandemic, the Ordering Task* and different social and financial collapses on the Island. “We’ve insisted, of course, to know why the delay, but they don’t have a response.” continue reading
They’ve attempted to fill the gap in soy and maize imports with cassava and the palm nuts, historically used to fatten hogs. (14ymedio)
“I lost hope for recuperating that feed,” Ivis told 14ymedio. “They behave as if the hogs never existed, they speak to us with a secrecy when we ask for explanations,” said the woman who agrees with Juan Domingo that the selling hogs is not viable in Cuba.
Raising hogs requires resources and a lot of effort. In the yards of Cuban homes, there was always a bucket where each day, food scraps were deposited. That mix of leftovers was called sancocho, just like the local dish. However, the shortages and the food crisis means that, at the end of the week, there is very little to throw into the bucket.
The price for the “formal” feed for the animals is more absurd by the day. “The cassava, maize and soy are nowhere to be found,” complains Ivis. “A sack of soy could cost 5,500 pesos. The crop residues can be used to feed hogs, but they do not fatten them like the industrial fodder.” All this, says the farm woman, limits the weight of the animals and draws out the fattening process, indispensable for the slaughtering and consumption.
They’ve attempted to fill the gap in soy and maize imports with cassava and the palm nuts, historically used to fatten hogs.
The crisis, however, has resulted in a chain of failures: without imported feed, the government’s debts to producers have grown; neglecting the breeders compromised pig breeding at the provincial level and at one point, the effects were felt throughout the country. “We producers did not have a choice but to cancel our agreements with the state,” stated Juan Domingo. The feed shortages led most pork producers to abandon their work.
In another municipality of Villa Clara, Zulueta, farmer José Luis bites the bullet to keep his 23 hogs fed. “I had 40 hectares of land planted before the crisis,” he stated alluding to the pandemic and the collapse of the Island’s energy sector. “This food is exclusively for the animals and I’ve been preparing it for years.”
Meanwhile, the price of meat has reached abusive levels in any type of market, be it the informal market or the state-owned butcher. “350 pesos per pound is excessive,” calculates José Luis who bemoaned being unable to fatten his hogs enough for them to reach an acceptable weight by the time they are slaughtered.
“The current crisis didn’t begin with the coronavirus,” said the farmer, “but rather two or three years prior, when the Ministry of Agriculture began to promote the ’substitution’ of imported feed.” There was no such change, rather, the feed no longer entered the country, even though it was impossible to cover the gap with national production.
“The agreements with Porcino (the state-owned company that processes and distributes meat) establishes the amount of feed that must be obtained through our own means. They offer no more than 60% or 70% of the feed needed for the animals and it never arrives on time,” he said.
The feed shortages led most pork producers to abandon their work. (14ymedio)
The government’s debt to farm cooperatives mirrors, at a local level, its financial behavior at the international level–delays, extended payment periods or requests for debt forgiveness.
Despite all this, the official press continues to present the government as a “sponsor” of the self-employed that benefits certain lucky farmers. Several weeks ago Granma praised Yusdany Rojas, owner of a farm in Camajuaní, who maintains an unfathomable 800 hogs. And aspires to own 4,000 in a few months, if the bureaucrats give him “more land” and the bank provides enough credit.
Rojas received an official visit by Miguel Díaz-Canel and other officials in his private “slaughterhouse.” He owns, moreover, a tobacco field, sugar cane and other crops and a meat processing plant. The photographs of the successful farm were circulated on all official media.
The reality told by the state press does not mention the real difficulties faced by producers, the shortages and lack of resources faced by farmers. And as of now, neither do they dedicate space to explain when and how the Cuban government plans to honor its word and pay its debts.
*Translator’s Note: Tarea ordenamiento = the [so-called] ‘Ordering Task’ is a collection of measures that include eliminating the Cuban Convertible Peso (CUC), thus leaving the Cuban peso as the only national currency, raising prices, raising salaries (but not as much as prices), opening stores that take payment only in hard currency which must be in the form of specially issued pre-paid debit cards, and a broad range of other measures targeted to different elements of the Cuban economy.
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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Granma masthead, headline and illustration. (Granma)
14ymedio, Elías Amor Bravo, Economist, 23 October 2022– Cuba’s official State newspaper Granma describes the more than 152,000 people who have joined the workforce in the non-state sector of the economy as a success and linked it to the measures to diversify society’s economic actors implemented in the country over the last several years. Neither one, nor the other. Enough of the propaganda, let’s get to objective conclusions that can be obtained from these data.
The labor market in Cuba continues to be dominated by the communist economy, the increase in employment is insufficient and the new economic actors, estimated at 5,500, have not played as large a role as was expected in terms of creating jobs. The results lead, if you will, in a different direction.
It’s all the same, the official communist periodical celebrates as a success the 152,373 people who, by the end of August, had joined the country’s labor force; of those, 123,321 are not associated with an employer, according to data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MTSS).
The weight of the state sector on employment continues to be great and does not allow the private sector to close the gap. Even so, the job offers for those 44,619 were in public sector organizations; 107,754 in the non-state sector, of which 101,461 were self-employed, 4,491 in other forms of private business, while 1,802 benefitted from being allowed to use state-owned fallow land.
This increase in non-state employment, clearly insufficient, is purported to be associated with the measures to diversify society’s economic actors implemented in the country over the last several years. However, in reality, those data mask the requirement imposed on self-employed workers with more than three employees that they register as a ’mipyme’ (a microenterprise) if they want to continue operating legally. A good proportion of the employment created is related to the measures imposed by the regime to “whitewash” the data about the process of creating new actors. continue reading
Thus, highlights Granma, that of the people identified, 38% are people younger than 35 years of age and 31% women, while among those who are not employed, 44% are women and 29% young people.
A good example of the mediocre data presented by the ministry can be found in the comparison with the same period the previous year. If this is the case, the increase in those entering the labor force was only 16,117 people.
What do these data tell us? They quickly confirm that the communist regime’s employment policy is another failure, it continues without adequate linkages to the rest of the regime’s political and social economy. In essence, one policy aimed at padding the staff rosters of state-funded businesses and organizations, where there is underemployment, and low levels of productivity which are not commensurate with the salaries received. The labor market in Cuba is non-existent, and does not comply with technical functions to satisfy the staff qualifications needed by the companies, and it is much less socially useful to guarantee workers suitable career paths.
The most glaring example of this failure can be found in the non-compliance with the Communist constitution of 2018 and of the so-called labor code, Law 116/2013, which establishes fundamental labor principles, such as the rights and social duties of citizens, implemented through the Decent Work Program. But in practice they lead to this situation of state underemployment which tends to reproduce itself over time, without creating adequate space for private activity.
The failure of the employment policy at MTSS and the institutions that comprise it, in combined with the demands of the national economy, and the local development strategy of each territory is evident in the denouncement of the few foreign investors who venture to operate in the country: that they cannot find qualified personnel for the positions they have on offer.
Similarly, with slim offerings in the private sector, which attempts to carve out a path in the country, many high-level professionals (doctors and researchers) prefer the salary of a waiter or cook to those they get from the state-funded sector. That is an absolute communist mess; their employment priorities from “those graduating from regular day courses at several levels of education, those graduating from active military service and other people of interest to the state, especially women, people in vulnerable situations, and those who serve their [criminal] sentences or security measures while free,” do not satisfy those people who yearn to develop professional careers based on what they know how to do.
Proof of the failed employment policy can be measured alternatively taking into consideration that, of the total of 4,770,000 employed workers in the state sector as well as the private, the latter barely total 1,600,000 or 34%, which has remained stable since Raúl Castro, around 2011, authorized the reduction of padded state staff rosters. The largest employment sector in Cuba continues to be the communist state, reaching up to 66%, higher than any other country in the world, as a paradigm of inefficiency, low competition and wasted resources.
The fact that only 1,802 Cubans have applied to rent land, which is the only semi-private formula the communist regime will authorize in Cuba, it is a good example that private formulas in Cuba continue to be lower than their true potential, and that in this environment, like many others, one must work and hard.
The article in Granma also offered some indications of how the regime intends to continue promoting “modalities of telework and remote work as one form of employment that benefits the organization as well as the employee,” including that “diversification of the work force, in a way that is more flexible than the in-person modality.”
Nonetheless, at the same time, the article clarified that “this model is not applicable to all job vacancies as it depends primarily on the duties performed by each worker at their work place, the position they hold, among other things.
In summary, for the directors, telework and remote work depends “also on the employer creating the conditions, control mechanisms, and watching out for the security and health of the employee and guaranteeing that, in this way, neither the employee nor his/her work will be affected.” That is, that the regime doesn’t have a clear strategy for telework either and they are spinning their wheels. In reality, the limitiation lies in the area of information technology and the capacity of the networks to allow working from home. And then there are the blackouts. What productivity could they possibly be talking about for a teleworker who spends 12 hours a day without electricity?
The regime is not up to the task to provide for innovation in labor policies. Meanwhile, the communists entertain themselves embroiled in the labor framework and now they want the ministry to lead, through collective labor agreements, a registry of the posts, which by their nature, could be conducted in telework mode or working remotely; in this way there is collegiality among workers, the sindicate and each employer organization. Bureaucracy, paperwork and an even bigger mess. The Cuban communist regime’s labor policy is a total failure.
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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The Turiguanó Genetic Company made 1,330,000 pesos in profits, and sales reached 614,000 in freely convertible currency. (Invasor)
14ymedio, Havana, 23 October 2022 — In Ciego de Ávila there is one meat company that is functioning and will end the year with profits. In the ten months of this year, the Turiguanó Meat Company made 1,330,000 pesos in profits and sales reached 614,000 in freely convertible currency, a feat in the current context.
However, its success does not come close to the Cuban table; its meat has ended up for tourism and it is expected that, from now on, it will suffice to keep the hotels in the Jardines del Rey area fully stocked, completely replacing imports.
The company, founded in 1976 and located in Morón, has been an example for authorities in the area for several years. Just before the pandemic, in 2019, the state press dedicated a lot of attention to it. Miguel Díaz-Canel, shortly after being named president of the Republic, took a special interest in this plant. That year, around this time, the organization broke the historic record for total monthly sales, with 4,720,000 pesos, and a total of 42 million pesos for the year to date.
Its success was based on producing meat products from 132 cuts in their plant, 55 traditional, 62 special, 10 viscera, and five artistic. Sales to all the hotels allowed “the country to save four million dollars per year,” stated the Invasor daily newspaper at the time, imbued in the national logic that, everything is purchased outside the home and, as a result, whatever is produced domestically is “savings.” continue reading
Foreign investors have their eyes on Turiguanó Genetic, which this month signed a “letter of business intent” with German P.u.U, the details of which have not been announced, except that it has to do with pork and beef exports. Last year, it happens that they were negotiating with Treew Inc., a Canadien company established 15 years ago in Cuba and dedicated to international trade.
However, in the middle of the storm, even an apparently solid company is at risk. According to an article published on Saturday in the provincial press, Yoan Sarduy Alonzo, the president of the Ranchers’ Business Group (Gegan) visited the Turiguanó Genetic facilities during his trip to Ciego de Ávila and, at that moment, a power outage “once again put in check the industry where five freezers and two maintenance refrigerators preserve the meat.” Furthermore the company lacks a power generator.
The visitors pressed the company to directly import and do away with intermediaries, because they run the risk of losing profit. For example, according to the note, if the belts were functioning, 40 cattle would be slaughtered daily instead of 20.
In any case, the accounting could be less simple. The newspaper warned that the 4,200 heads of cattle owned by the company “are not guaranteed their feed for the year,” since the drought has wilted the pastures and, although they were able to fertilize the fields, there isn’t machinery to harvest the hay.
The number of animals has declined since 2019, despite predictions to the contrary. That report three years ago mentioned 5,300 Santa Gertrudis breed cattle, in which this company specializes, and predicted that the population would gradually reach up to 11,000 by 2030. To date, it has declined by 1,100.
In 2020, the zone where Turiguanó Genetic is located spent 74 days in quarantine due to COVID-19, although they met 98% of their target. Nonetheless, in 2021 the company also began working on diversifying and exporting charcoal.
Ranching authorities, in light of what they observed during their visit last weekend, urged “a transformation of reality, because protein must reach the table,” although the table, right now, does not belong to Cubans.
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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Yuri García was arrested by authorities and held for four days and was fired from the state trucking base where he worked as a technician. (Facebook)
14ymedio, Havana, 21 October 2022 — The United States returned to Havana a young Cuban, Yuri García, despite his request for asylum as a victim of harassment by the regime. García spent two weeks on an American Coast Guard vessel waiting for a response, but in the end he was returned, along with other migrants, on September 2nd, confirmedYucabyte in a note published on Thursday.
The young man stated that he had previously fantasized about migrating, but “never very seriously” until the attacks and harassment by the regime escalated. At the end of August 2022, García abandoned the Island along with other people in a rustic boat, an escape route hundreds of Cubans have used this year to flee the economic crisis, food shortages, and persecution.
On the second day at sea, when the motor had stopped working and they were left without GPS, they were rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard and were transferred to a vessel. There, the group of migrants requested asylum from officials who “listened to us but did not give us the opportunity.”
“I thought that at least they’d investigate, but now I believe it was just an act. I believe they did not give me the opportunity to show evidence that I am politically persecuted, that they did not take my case seriously,” he told Yucabyte.
García is one of the many persecuted by the regime after he held a sign with the phrase, “Martí Yes, Marx No” in front of the Communist Party building in Mayabeque province, as part of the failed Civic March for Change on November 15, 2021 (15N). continue reading
The 30-year-old Cuban was arrested by authorities and held for four days and was fired from the state trucking base where he worked as a technician. After months of pressure and from his co-workers, he was rehired in January 2022, however, García stated that the surveillance, the psychological harassment, and summons for interrogations did not let up.
The last meeting occurred on July 11, 2022 when authorities expected new demonstrations on the first anniversay of the massive July 11, 2021 (11J) protests. That interrogation was to “warn me that, if I went out to demonstrate, I could face three to six years in prision,” said García.
Desptie the danger, hundreds of Cubans have abandoned the Island this year on small rafts headed for Florida, while others migrate by air to Nicaragua, and then continue on their way to the United States. García stated that he could not afford to buy a ticket, so his only option was by sea.
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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14ymedio, Elías Amor Bravo, Economist, October 21, 2022–It takes just a small step to go from the sublime to the ridiculous. Bruno Rodríguez, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Cuban communist regime, who just a day before publicly thanked the U.S. State Department for the $2 million in assistance for hurricane damages, the following day, in a speech widely covered by the state press, stated, “the world would be better without the blockade against Cuba.” I insist, from the sublime to the ridiculous.
With this blockade jargon, the Cuban communists have won the propaganda and misinformation battle. That there is no taro root in Cuba, is the embargo’s fault. That there is no electricity, the embargo’s fault. That tourists don’t go, the embargo’s. That financial markets do not lend Cuba money, the embargo’s fault. And so it is; every part of life in the nation are influenced by contentions with its neighbor to the north, the solution of which, on the other hand, is within reach of the communist regime. If it doesn’t do so, it must have its reasons.
And in reality, if there is no food in Cuba, one can observe serious shortages, stockouts, long queues, anxiety, among the population faced with difficulties to secure even the basic food basket, the only embago/blockade responsible for this situation is the internal one; the one imposed on the population by the regime and its economic model. Cuba can purchase food on the market of 192 countries around the world, and it also does in the United States. The problem is the availability of financial resources to make those purchases, which, due to non payment of its debts, are not easy to obtain. What deprives Cuba of access to financial markets is data on its failure to responsibly make payments on its debts. No one, under normal circumstances, is willing to lend to those who do not honor their commitments.
In any case, the blockade/embargo is one of the communications points the communist regime, devised by Fidel Castro, masterfully played in international fora, alarmingly obtaining alignment of countries with theses and arguments that do not fit within any basic economic analysis. continue reading
Such is the effort that a national report was promoted at the United Nations, under Resolution 75/289 of the U.N. General Assembly, titled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba” (August 2021-February 2022), to which the Cuban communists dedicate special attention each year. The referenced document will be discussed for the thirtieth time on November 2nd and 3rd. They are already campaigning.
Moreover, each year, the regime takes advantage of any external factor to dress up the content of the report with a dramatic tinge. This year, why not, it’s Ian’s passage through Pinar del Río. It aggravated the effects of the serious international economic crisis, which is already being felt on the Island though ECLAC barely touches on it in its most recent forecast. The regime’s partners are not in a position, for example, to give away money.
And, since one thing cannot occur without the other, in this year’s report, Rodríguez Parrilla went on to explain that the blockade has taken on new forms, more detrimental if that was possible, in its attempt to accentuate the impact on daily life. Although for that they need to revert back to historic dosuments from 1960, such as that Memorandum of Assistant Secretary Lestor Mallory, who 62 years later continues to give opportunities to the Cuban communists to attack. C’mon it was not that long ago.
To this point, and with history’s rancid analysis, arrives a new estimate of the losses caused by the blockade, which according to the regime, between August 2021 and February 2022 were 3.806 billion dollars, a historic record during a period of only six months. It is as if the Cuban economy depended solely on the economy of the United States, a sort of anexionist focus or something similar.
The regime does not spare any effort. In six decades, at current prices, the cummulative damages total 154 billion, 217 million dollars. At the current price of an ounce of gold, taking into consideration depreciation, the cummulative damages amount to 1 trillion, 391 billion 111 million dollars. And clearly, the political conclusion is always the same: imagine what Cuban could have done if it had had access to those resources. What Cuba would be like if the country had used those resources.
Well, nothing. And everything. An economy doesn’t function better just by having access to money. Just the opposite. The key is how the money is used and whether the resources are allocated in ways that are profitable. And it does not seem that the Island’s prevailing economic model would allow it to reach such profitability with the resources. The blockade/embargo only goes so far, and no further. Everything else is science fiction.
In reality, the United States is the second largest tourist market for Cuba, it sends over 8 billion dollars in remittances per year and allows commerce and imports of 200 million dollars per year. No one sees the embargo anywhere, except for those who have a political interest in it being so. Going from the quantitative calculations of losses, be they the 3.806 billion dollars mentioned or the 6.364 billion dollars of the Biden era, the estimates in terms of GDP is risky and sets a bad precedent.
There is something in the estimates of losses in the report that merits attention for its novelty. The regime maintains that the GDP growth could have been 4.5%, had the blockade/embargo not existed during the period between August 2021 and February 2022. One cannot make heads or tails of this 4.5% and it forces a reflection on the cummulative economic magnitude, how they were calculated and what they really mean.
To begin with, it is convenient to really know how much the Cuban economy has grown in the period mentioned. Data on GDP growth are provided by the ONEI by quarter. Given the dates, it covers from the third quarter of 2021 to the first quarter 2022.
According to data from ONEI, the 2021 inter-annual growth in GDP was -1.4% in the third quarter, then it reached 10.9% in the fourth quather and another 10.9% in the first quarter of 2022. A simple mathematical calculation suggests that, in this period, the GDP grew by 6.8%, clearly more than the 2021 median, which was 3.2%. Then, what is the regime talking about with that 4.5%, which they say could have been achieved without the embargo?
Beware of unfounded statements, and with the calculations that are not adequately justified. Now it so happens that, even with the embargo/blockade, the Cuban economy grew faster than the rate desired by the regime if this dispute did not exist. Who do you believe?
The regime blames the embargo for: the lack of fuel; the obstacles in acquiring replacement parts and other resources based on American technologies; and the difficulties with regard to financial banking matters; commercial, financial or investment transactions; in the direct persecution of producers, transporters, shipping companies, insurers and freight forwarders; problems with the electrical energy system; and medicine. But in reality much of these claims have to do with existing obstacles that prevent the economy from functioning freely. That’s the real embargo.
Translated by Silvia Suárez
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A group of Bolivian health workers who graduated in Cuba. (UPEA)
14ymedio, Havana, 18 October 2022 — The 5,000 medical scholarships that Cuba touted in 2015 as a donation to Bolivia, cost Evo Morales’s government millions of dollars. The Island charged “registration for each student, annual tuition, room and board, transportation, health insurance and even for the students’ clothes,” a report from El Deber uncovered.
Annex IV of the confidential report, accessed by the Bolivian media outlet, indicates that the Island received $1.5 million as payment for the students’ room and board, as well as $17,000 dollars per person for tuition and another $1,000 for registration.
The information, which was corroborated by the Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, confirms that Morales’s government signed aggreements, but “not for donations received nor to benefit from the implementation of programs, but rather to provide economic assistance” to the Island.
The awarding of 5,000 scholarships was part of the 11 points signed by leaders Evo Morales and Fidel Castro on December 30, 2005.
A decade later, on September 6, 2015, Cuba’s ambassador to Bolivia at the time, Benigno Pérez Fernández, representing Minister of Public Health Roberto Moralez Ojeda, and former Bolivian Minister of Health, Ariana Campero Nava, classified the agreement as “confidential.” continue reading
Bolivia and Cuba committed to “not divulge, share or make public any information exchanged between them or to which they had access during the implementation of the agreement, so long as the information was not already in the public domain, required by law or through mutual agreements between them.”
The program came to light in 2012. The Executive Committee of Universidad Boliviana denounced that a portion of the group who received scholarships and “graduated” on the Island, which did not exceed 1,600 “did not even complete 70% of the core subjects required in the Bolivian academic system,” published Radio y Televisión Martí.
Universidad Boliviana confirmed that the graduates on the Island not only did not comply with the “minimum requirements to practice their profession” but also, despite that, the government of Evo Morales hired some of them.
The Bolivian Minister of Health at the time, Juan Carlos Calvimontes, argued that the posts filled by the health workers trained in Cuba were those that Bolivian doctors did not want to cover.
Calvimontes confirmed that of the 5,000 alumni who received scholarships since 2006, most spent six and a half years studying. Others, without saying how many, stayed an extra year of obligatory social service on the Island and six more months in Bolivia.
Bolivian doctors trained in Cuba. (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Bolivia)
The controversy has followed Bolivia’s relationship with Cuba. In January 2020, Bolivia’s attorney general arrested and accused Carlos de la Rocha, — who was acting national coordinator of the government’s health program under former president Evo Morales — of corruption for alleged anti-economic behavior, not fulfilling his duties, and aggravated robbery.
After the scandal, the Colegio Médico de Bolivia [Bolivian Medical School] requested an investigation into the funds earmarked by Morales’s government for contracting doctors from the Island. “We are discovering that state funds were squandered, deposited in individual bank accounts, supposedly, to pay Cubans when these resources should have been in a government account,” said the president of the Colegio Médico de La Paz [Medical School in La Paz], Luis Larrea.
After Evo Morales left power, Cuba withdrew more than 700 “cooperators” it had in that country. After their exit, data began to emerge: only 205 of the 702 Cubans that were on the medical mission in Bolivia had medical degrees, according to revelations by the Minister of Health of the Andean country, Aníbal Cruz. Most were technicians or drivers.
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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In Last Tunas, a crowd, which included older people and children, faced off with authorities Monday night. (Screen capture)
14ymedio, Havana, October 18, 2022–A total of 23 people remain in detention in Cuba for participating in the latest cazerolazos — protests featuring banging on pots and pans. According to estimates Justicia 11J on Tuesday, since September 29th 52 people have been arrested for protesting, primarily for the restoration of electricity during the scheduled power outages.
Since these demonstrations began, on June 14th, the number of detainees totaled 152; along with those of July 11th 2021, they reach “at least” 1,753 (counting those who have been released), said the justice organization.
Justicia 11J highlighted the cases of Ovidio Martín Luna, Milena González Martín and Sulaine Almenares Videau, arrested on Monday for protesting on Sunday night in the neighborhood of Vista Hermosa, in Santiago de Cuba.
Almenarez Videaux, an activist member of Cuba’s Patriotic Union (Unpacu) and mother of two children, aged six and three years, and a nine-month-old baby, was taken to a detention center with them, according to claims made by several activists on social media. continue reading
In Aguada de Pasajeros (Cienfuegos province), Justicia 11J also underscored that Carlos Rolando Gómez Rosell, arrested for demonstrating on October 12th, has been beaten by police and is on a hunger strike. According to his wife, whom the organization cites, “he is being investigated for possession of three pounds of meat from his own horse.”
Despite the repression, Cubans continue rebelling against the government. On Monday it was, for the second consecutive night, in Las Tunas, which until now had been one of the provinces least likely to protest.
In a video shared on social media, one can hear, in sheer darkness, the sounds of screams and banging on pots. The protest occurred, according to users, in the neighborhood of Buena Vista. In another, a crowd, which included older people and children, faced off verbally with authorities, to whom they complained for lack of power. “How long will they go on talking?” asked a resident who stated, “We’re demanding our rights — electricity, food, water.”
Through October 15th, Proyecto Inventario, an independent organization, had documented 200 protests since July 14th, when the daily blackouts began.
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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Photo of the protest in Caibarién, Villa Clara on Monday. (Capture)
14ymedio, Yunior García Aguilera, Madrid, 12 October 2022 — On August 23, 1973, in the Swedish city of Stockholm, Jan-Erik Olsson attempted to rob a bank. His four hostages, despite the violence and threats to their lives, ended up protecting their captor and demonstrating vehement empathy toward him. Upon seeing this strange reaction of the victims, psychiatrist Nils Bejerot coined the term “Stockholm syndrome.”
The letter signed by a group of artists and intellectuals, denying the repression and praising the administration of the worst government Cuba has experienced in all its history, seems written by the hostages of that bank. The signatories not only displayed a cynical attitude, but rather, a sick one.
How can they deny the repression in a country where the little dictator gave the combat order on national television? How can they close their eyes to what occurred on our streets, to the hordes armed with clubs exiting the trucks to beat protesters? How can they pretend that in Cuba there aren’t more than a thousand young people in jail for yelling that they have had enough of the darkness and misery? Don’t those who subscribed to that letter realize that their signature is as culpable as the blow of a henchman, or the bullet that entered Diubis Laurencio’s back?
It is not the first time something like this happens. In 2003, a group of well-recognized Cuban intellectuals signed a the Mensaje para los amigos que están lejos [A message to our friends who are far away], supporting the imprisonment of 75 dissidents and the execution of three young men. If that was called the Black Spring, this has been the Black Autumn, as somber as the blackouts, as dark as the present and future of an entire country. Some of those who placed their signature there have, with time, regretted it and have refused to make the same mistake. But others repeat it. And new names are added to the infamy. continue reading
I saw the signatures of certain people who I considered “my friends”. But in signing that letter they are backing all the terror my family suffered. It is as if they themselves were the ones who threw me onto the garbage truck on July 11th, the same ones who decapitated doves at my door, and threatened to put me in jail for 27 years, and surrounded my house on November 14th, the same ones who launched me into exile. They are not my friends. They are the courtiers of a despotic regime, the accomplices of those who hold on to power by force and have Cuba buried in disgrace.
I don’t know what they gain by “acting like Swedes.” I don’t know if, for them, it is worth smearing their names with mud forever to keep their positions, publish a little book, come out with an album or gain some sad privilege. By signing “the Stockholm Letter” they’ve reached the limit of subservience.
There were always people like this in Cuba, willing to applaud the horror. Today, almost no one dares to admit they supported the parameterization or that they were the architects of the Five Grey Years. But none of those horrible chapters would have happened without counting on the acolytes, slime balls, and applauders. Each sinister phase of history has its side kicks, fixers, co-authors. And the signers of that letter have made a pact with the mafia that gets fat at our expense.
Returning to Stockholm syndrome, there is an important detail that deserves attention. One year after the bank robbery which gave rise to that psychological reaction, another important event occurred. Patricia Hearst, the granddaughter of a magnate, was kidnapped in California by the Symbionese Liberation Army. Shortly thereafter, the victim herself joined the kidnappers and helped them rob a bank. Patricia, who had been sexually abused by her captors, changed her name to Tania, just like the guerrilla fighter who accompanied Che Guevara. The cameras at the bank recorded her holding a rifle and actively participating in the robbery. Although her lawyers tried to defend her, alleging she suffered from the syndrome, the jury convicted her anyway.
Don’t believe, signers of the infamous letter, that history will absolve you. Lately, you have experienced a massive rejection by most Cubans. And abroad, those hypocritical letters no longer have much of an effect. The world has already seen the repression in Cuba. And the world has seen you buckle, as shameless opportunists, under a perishing dictatorship.
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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The poster for “The Worst Generation, canceled by the Hermanos Saíz Association (AHS)
14ymedio, Havana, 11 October 2022 — The Hermanos Saíz Association (AHS), the radical youth arm of the Cuban Union of Writers and Artists, was not enthusiastic about La peor generación [The Worst Generation] conversation, an event where a group of novice writers were to debate literature, culture, politics, and society.
The debate, scheduled to take place in La Madriguera in Central Havana on October 15th was canceled on Tuesday under the pretense that several members had, on several occasions, repudiated AHS, its directors, and thus they did not see a reason for the “unworthy” to participate in its space.
Alejandro Mainegra, one of the organizers of La peor generación, told 14ymedio that the event would have served to introduce a book by the creators “who have a voice right now, they are writing and being read.”
“We naively thought we could all coexist one afternoon to talk about literature, within the AHS space, and it didn’t happen. It is very sad,” he added.
“La peor generación was conceived with the goal of bringing together in the same space some of the most notable names in cutting-edge literature of the current generation,” explained its coordinator, Raymar Aguado Hernández, in a Facebook message.
Mel Herrera, Julio Llópiz Casal, Alexander Hall, Lisbeth Moya, Jairo Aróstegui, Ricardo Acostarana, Hamed Toledo and Manuel de la Cruz were invited to the dialogue to be moderated by Aguado and Mainegra, among others. The group was characterized by its ideological diversity, rejection of political monolithism, and its customary collaboration with independent newspapers and magazines. continue reading
This heterogeneity is precisely what sparked the censorship and “brought down the verdict” of AHS, denounced Aguado. Its objective, which was to “generate debates around the Cuban literary panorama and achieve a closeness among the public, the authors, and the home of youth creators in the capital,” was curtailed by the association.
In his message, the coordinator of La peor generación attached his resignation from the position of Specialist in Visual Arts and Critique and Research of the Havana-based AHS, as well as his resignation as an employee of La Madriguera. He maintains, however, his membership in that organization.
In what he wishes to be a moderate position, Aguado argues that AHS should, “represent all the values of national culture and youth art and not political differences with creators, nor positions tangential to the institutional aspirations, nor episodes of misunderstanding.”
“I work for conviction, commitment with my generation, and with the culture of my country, as a result, I cannot continue on the margins of this episode of censorship,” lamented the young man.
With support from two initiatives — La Tertulia Literaria and Cubao — they chose La Madriguera for their meeting, as the venue represented “an example of artistic resistance” at the margins of the “terrible management of Cuban institutions.”
For her part, one of the invitees, Lisbeth Moya, alluded to the venue as a “free space” for “diverse voices.” The young lady, who collaborates on the Communist platform, made it clear that she would not abandon AHS despite the institutional pressure. “When you want to talk, I’ll be here,” she quipped.
Meanwhile, artist and critic Julio Llópiz Casal, in a comment on Aguado’s publication, explained that “many Cubans will continue to pay the enormous price of living in a country subjected to sadness and despair,” at the mercy of institutions such as AHS, “without autonomy or steadiness.”
With the censoring of La peor generación, the Island’s bureaucracy looks down upon an entire pool of recent and talented writers and, as it did after that hopeful November 27, 2020 encounter, shuts the door on a dialogue and a consensus through culture.
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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Mass protest on Sunday in Santa Cruz del Sur, Camagüey. (Capture)
14ymedio, Havana, October 10, 2022–Antonio Guiteras, a 280 megawatt power plant, could not contribute to the National Electric System (SEN) on Sunday as planned, nor will it be able to do so on Monday. Yesterday, the deficit reached 1.412 MW at the national level during peak hours at 11pm and people went out to the streets to protests in several areas of the Island.
The most watched and best documented protests, with videos shared on social media, were people banging on pots in Bejucal (Mayabeque province) and especially in Santa Cruz del Sur (Camagüey province), where residents threw themselves into the streets yelling, “Díaz-Canel motherfucker,” “Down with Díaz-Canel,” “Long live a free Cuba,” or “Down with the full bellies up there.”
“While restarting, the Antonio Guiteras power plant had a problem in its starter for which we are seeking a solution. We do not expect it to restart today,” informed the Cuban Electric Union (UNE) in its statement on Monday, which expected a maximum deficit of 41% for Monday.
According to the information, at 7 am, there were 1,676 MW generated and a demand of 2,553 MW; that is, a difference of 872 MW of which only 77 were due to the damages caused by Hurricane Ian. In addition, it is possible the maximum deficit will reach 1,000 MW. continue reading
On Sunday, the director of the main thermoelectric power plant in Cuba, Misbel Palmero Aguilar, stated in a declaration shared on Canal Caribe that “a fissure on the outside wall of the boiler, detected in the restarting process” on Saturday, has prevented the synchronization of the plant.
Furthermore, the official added that “this fissure has nothing to do with the breakdown that occurred a few days ago,” confirming that the solution for the failing Guiteras plant will be difficult. Palmero Aguilar said that while they were in the process of restarting on Saturday, as soon as it reached 70% and the pressure in the boiler increased, this fissure appeared in one of the tubes that supports a burner.
The director added that Guiteras has “mechanical defects caused by the expansion and contraction while starting and stopping the plant, which has been in use for 34 years,” and highlighted that the thermoelectric plant is subjected to continuous tension in its walls and starters “and that it was not possible detect this during the hydraulic test they conducted after the repairs they made to the boiler.”
Now they need to determine its caliber to fix the fissure, but it is evident that the power plant has been shut off more days than it has been functioning since the summer and that citizens continue without seeing the light at the end of the tunnel. Despite the jokes upon hearing the daily news on UNE, the desperation is evident.
“Stop trying to restart Guiteras, it no longer works. Stop wasting money on other things and invest in that. They don’t realize that’s the country’s main problem,” said one of the many comments on the news Monday. “Guiteras. Season 5. Episode 250. The New Cooling,” said another one ironically. “Guiteras has been out of service for more than ten days. Today it’s the starter, yesterday it was the leak, tomorrow surely another leak. Those who live in the provinces resisting and those who live in the capital just watch calmly. The problem is only for those who of us who live in the interior provinces,” adds another reader.
The blackouts in the provinces exceed, by a lot, any outages in the capital city. The 14ymedio correspondent in Holguín was without power for 12 hours on Sunday, from 6pm Sunday until 6am Monday.
Another Cubadebate reader who lives in that same province, in the Zayas neighborhood, stated that he’s been without water for a month and the blackouts last half the day. “Hundreds of calls to those who should provide water and no solution; explanations and justifications, thousands. We need leaders who move with more haste,” he reproached.
The information provided by UNE is repeated every day in the official daily and within minutes it becomes the most read and most commented news item of the day, even though it is a state-controlled media. The messages leave no room for doubt — people are reaching their limit.
“Only the truth can save us from this quagmire of poor governance in which we find ourselves. Nothing works — there is no electricity, terrible water service, basic food such as bread, milk and sugar, etc. in total deficit. Shortages of medicines and other products. Stores sell in MLC (freely convertible currency) at exorbitant prices for Cubans. We need to begin to recognize the problems, beginning with the newscast, and face the people. More critiques and real changes and stop with the slogans and social media. Urgent changes are needed and no more dressing it up.”
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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“The million dollar question is, ‘why and who authorized the FCB to enter into a contract for the uniforms with a foreign company?'” asked readers of Cubadebate. (EFE)
14ymedio, Havana, 7 October 2022 — There were doubts about the timing of the 1st Cuban Baseball’s Élite League, set to begin on Saturday, October 8, but its suspension, announced just 24 hours ahead of the games, came out of nowhere. The teams’ uniforms, imported as are so many things on the island, did not arrive in time so the National Baseball Commission (CNB) was forced to postpone the event.
“Amid sustained efforts we explored several alternatives; it seemed we would receive the shipment on Thursday, but in the end it was not possible due to inconveniences in the transportation sphere,” explained the organization in a statement shared by the official sports press.
The CNB shared that it has worked with the Teammate brand to produce the clothing, a company with which they point out they have been working for years. The company, based in San Marino in Europe, is an affiliate of the World Baseball Softball Confederation (WBSC) and provides uniforms, bats, gloves, and all kinds of equipment for baseball and softball.
On Friday, the Federation will host a meeting in Bayamo, the capital of Granma province, where the tournament was expected to be held, to finalize the team rosters and “other details related to the event,” for which a new date has not been decided. Furthermore, an awards gala will be held for the most recent National Series.
The Élite League had caused a stir, even among the official press. Its creation was announced in July, and at the time it was explained that the intention was for it to be an amateur tournament where the greatest talents of the National Series would be on display. As of now, there are six teams — Tabacaleros, Portuarios, Centrales, Ganaderos, Agricultores y Cafetaleros [Tobacco Companies, Dock Workers, Centrals, Ranchers, Farmers and Coffee Growers] — and according to the state press, not even their names are well received. continue reading
From its October start date, it should run through December 11, in a regular season to determine the semifinalists for games between December 17 and 27 and the finals which would take place from January 7th to the 17th next year. Each team should have 32 players and 13 managers.
Just this week, Joel García León, a sports journalist, deputy editorial director of the newspaper Trabajadores [Workers], and a professor at the José Martí International Journalism Institute in Havana published a column which was skeptical of the event. In his opinion, the idea was a good one, but its execution not so much, and the article titled Un batazo con algunas dudas (A swing with some doubts), concluded, “I am in favor of an Élite League in Cuba (…), but from the beginning this one has been associated with names that are not attractive to the teams and without a resolution for some of the issues presented here. I sense that we’ll start off on the wrong foot. And that costs money and the cost will be borne by the people.”
Yesterday, Thursday, before the delay had been announced, the Sancti Spíritus daily Escambray also published a column in which it raised doubts that a new tournament could generate enthusiasm among people who leave empty seats in the stands of the National Series. The author also expressed her uneasiness over Cuba’s capacity to retain players; a day without a player fleeing the country would be newsworthy.
“It is true that you can’t make a living just yearning, also because the equivalent of several teams have left us via the emigration ’volcanoes-route,’ including members who had already been announced for the event that is about to begin,” she alluded.
However, Cubans are less worried about the postponement of the tournament ,which didn’t appear to interest anyone, than about the fact that the uniforms had been contracted out to a foreign company, as reflected in the comments from Cubadebate readers, who do not seem to believe what they read.
“The million dollar question is why and who authorized the Cuban Baseball Federation (FCB) to contract foreign companies for the uniforms when we have micro, small, and medium enterprises and national entrepreneurs who could make them using better raw materials and better designs than those ’things’,” claimed one. “A league to be forgotten, with imported uniforms amid a crisis. What name shall we give it?” responded another user.
“Oh, because we are also incapable of making uniforms?” said another stupefied user. And others go further and request for heads to roll. “They should review this and if they did not solicit bids within the country, they should all be fired.”
Translated by: Silvia Suárez
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EFE/14ymedio, Miami/Havana, 1 November 2022 — In October, the Observatory of Cuban Conflict (OCC), based in Miami (U.S.), logged 589 public protests, diverse in nature, including 71 in the streets with cacerolazos (banging on pots and pans), marches, and barricades — almost double the 43 in September.
