In ‘La Joven Cuba’, Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, Ricardo González Águila, Carlos Enrique González and Arturo López-Levy fear the failure of foreign-exchange market regulations

14ymedio, Havana, December 19, 2025 — Confusion has been a constant on the first day of life of the floating exchange rate for the Cuban peso. “The banks in Regla are without power, so they’re closed. But they did tell me they’re already buying dollars,” says Alfredo, a Havana resident who had gone -unsuccessfully- to inquire about the service at Cadeca, a currency exchange house. For now, the exchange offices are not buying foreign currencies, and bank branches are the only option for selling US dollars, which in its first two days is at 410 pesos per dollar.
“In the morning it was packed, but that was just to withdraw the 3,000 pesos a day allowed on the card,” says Alfredo. He had to keep walking in search of an official dollar buyer.
It was to be expected that the value of the new rate would initially be set at a high level, though perhaps not so close to that of El Toque, after its demonization by the official press. It stands at 440 both yesterday and this Friday, only 7% more than the exchange rate of the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC).
“We recognize that the new rate announced will not be low; perhaps it is not what many expected, but it is the one that will allow the exchange market to work”
“We recognize that the new rate announced will not be low; perhaps it is not what many expected, but it is the one that will allow the exchange market to work,” the BCC’s macroeconomic policy director, Ian Pedro, told the press, echoing comments made weeks earlier by officials. Although they have endeavored to explain the many benefits the new rate will bring — for the population, the private sector and, ultimately, for the State — few economists agree. continue reading
There is no need to turn to the most critical voices, such as Pedro Monreal, Mauricio de Miranda Parrondo or Pavel Vidal, who have already left eloquent analyses. Criticism comes from closer quarters as well, beginning with Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, who has commented in La Joven Cuba with unusual force. “The existence of multiple rates is a very serious error in economic policy, because segmented markets will persist, and that is the same distortion that is intended to be eliminated. It has been announced that it is gradual, but in Cuba this term is terrifying, because prior experiences have not been successful,” he argues.
One problem, he notes, is linked to the $100-per-person purchase cap, “which will necessarily keep the informal market alive and likely push the rate higher.” Pérez Villanueva, who laments the lack of transparency on how 410 pesos per dollar was reached as a starting point, is categorical: “The real economy will prove that those intentions of a third rate will not lead to the results expected by the Government. The measures that are missing should focus on removing obstacles to the production of goods and services, and especially on resolving the issue of food production.”
It is something “extremely complicated in a declining economy with important macroeconomic imbalances”
Carlos Enrique González expands on the idea and underlines that this implementation is “extremely complicated in a declining economy with important macroeconomic imbalances.” He says setting it below the informal rate is a defect. “It is, at the very least, reckless, and it limits the ability to capture those fluctuations.”
Another element introduced by the expert is the low confidence that Cubans have in the BCC, although he does see something positive: “the possibility that exporting companies sell part of the foreign currencies they retain under closed financing schemes at the new exchange rate. It is very beneficial for them, and one can start talking about import substitution as a serious possibility rather than an exhortation.”
Ricardo González Águila, who also spoke to media close to officialdom but slightly critical, considers that allowing exporters to sell foreign currency at a higher exchange rate is “bold and necessary” although it has major risks. Among them is the BCC buying expensive dollars and selling them cheaply to State-owned enterprises, “with implications for macroeconomic balances.” The expert believes that if this announcement is not accompanied by a micro-economic reform that gives companies autonomy to set prices, wages and investments, the failure will continue.
Arturo López-Levy, for his part, welcomes the long-overdue recognition of the real value of foreign currency compared to the “administrative fiction” maintained until now, but he believes that a floating rate requires productive capacity and reserves that Cuba does not currently have. “Without a truly mixed economy, where the private and State sectors are integrated; without clear property rights; without a modern, redistributive, regulatory and developmental State; without orderly privatizations and credible competitive rules, Cuba will remain trapped in precariousness,” he notes.
The list includes the coexistence of multiple exchange rates, which creates a lack of transparency and makes it difficult to measure the real profitability of companies
These considerations do not differ much from those made by Pavel Vidal, who authors a new article for the Cuban Monetary and Financial Observatory (OMFi), in which he draws attention to how close the BCC rate is to what his team of experts has calculated. There are positive assessments in the article, notably the inclusion of private actors and individuals in this new market, the exclusion of State-owned companies — which limits the risk of imbalances — and the application of the rate to current accounts and not just cash.
However, it also contains many criticisms. The list includes the coexistence of multiple exchange rates, which creates a lack of transparency and makes it difficult to measure the real profitability of companies. In addition, the BCC recognizes a “managed float” based on discretionary criteria rather than supply and demand — an issue complicated by the fact that the military conglomerate Gaesa holds international reserves in secret accounts outside the country. Operational limits, coupled with the inability of branches to operate well due to technical and energy problems and the lack of confidence in the banking system do not help either.
“To the extent that the population and the private sector fail to fully satisfy their demand for foreign currency in the official floating market, a willingness to pay a spread or premium may be observed in the informal market in exchange for immediate and unrestricted access to foreign currency. As a result, it is expected that the informal market exchange rate will remain above the official floating rate, at least during the initial phase,” concludes the article.
Mauricio De Miranda Parrondo, for his part, has exploded on social networks with a long, hypercritical post about the measure, which, in short, he calls “new nonsense. The most sensible decision — and I will repeat it ad nauseum — is a unified exchange rate, starting from defining which exchange rate regime will be used. Do you peg the national currency to the dollar? to the euro? to a basket of currencies?” he asks. He insists that partial dollarization “will not improve living conditions and will deepen social differences.”
Translated by Regina Anavy
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