Up to $15,000 must be deposited to apply for entry into the U.S., and the visa is not guaranteed.
The change will take effect starting January 21st / 14ymedio
EFE (via 14ymedio), January 7, 2026 — The U.S. government has added Venezuela and Cuba to a list of 25 new countries whose citizens must post bond of up to $15,000 in order to apply for entry into the U.S. the State Department specified this week.
The change will take effect on January 21; the expanded list includes Algeria, Angola, Gabon, Nepal, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and Uganda.
Any citizen or person traveling with a passport issued by one of those countries who is eligible for a B1 or B2 visa must post a bond of $5,000, $10,000, or $15,000. The amount will be determined at the time of the applicant’s interview.
The B1 visa allows travel for business purposes, and the B2 authorizes entry for tourism, personal, or medical reasons. In total, the list now includes 38 countries, most of them in Africa.
Paying without consular instruction will not be refunded
The State Department specified on Tuesday that the bond does not guarantee the issuance of a visa and warned that if someone pays the fee without being instructed to do so by a consular officer, the money will not be refunded.
As a condition of the bond, those who have posted it must continue reading
enter and leave the country through Washington Dulles International Airport, New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport, or Boston’s Logan Airport.
Failure to meet that requirement, it is warned, could result in denial of entry or cause the departure not to be properly recorded.
The digital outlet Axios notes that the State Department has not specified whether Venezuela’s inclusion is related to the military operation that resulted in the capture of Nicolás Maduro.
The arrest of the ousted Venezuelan leader, who is now being held in a New York prison, took place on January 3 in Caracas, along with the arrest his wife, Cilia Flores.
The formal indictment charges Maduro, among other offenses, with conspiracy to commit narco-terrorism
The formal indictment charges Maduro, among other offenses, with conspiracy to commit narco-terrorism and conspiracy to import cocaine, charges to which he has pleaded not guilty.
Following the operation that led to his capture, U.S. President Donald Trump stated that Cuba “has always survived thanks to Venezuela” and emphasized that the island is now “about to fall.”
The U.S. administration has not justified the inclusion of any of the newly added countries.
Last week, Washington added seven countries to the list of nations whose passport holders must post a bond: Bhutan, Botswana, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, and Turkmenistan. Before this announcement, 13 countries had been affected.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Celia Flores, as they are transferred to a New York court / EFE
EFE (via 14ymedio), Geneva, January 5, 2026 — The Swiss government announced this Monday that it has frozen the assets of Nicolás Maduro and his associates in the country with immediate effect “as a precautionary measure” and in view of the “volatile situation” created after the arrest of the Venezuelan leader by U.S. armed forces.
Swiss authorities stated in a communiqué that the asset freeze will not affect any member of the current Venezuelan government.
With this decision, which will remain in effect for four years, the government sought to ensure that no assets that may have been acquired illicitly are transferred out of Switzerland under the current circumstances.
The government sought to ensure that no assets have been acquired illicitly
Swiss authorities clarified that the reasons behind Maduro’s fall, or the question of whether it constituted a violation of international law, did not play a decisive role in the decision to block the funds.
“The decisive factor is that a collapse of power has occurred and that it is now possible for the country of origin to initiate judicial proceedings in relation to assets acquired illicitly,” the authorities continue reading
explained.
Switzerland invoked a federal law that provides for the freezing of assets belonging to “politically exposed” foreigners when there are reasons to assume they were acquired through corruption, criminal mismanagement, or other serious crimes.
Switzerland invoked a federal law that provides for the freezing of assets belonging to “politically exposed” foreigners.
If the latter is confirmed in future judicial proceedings, “Switzerland will strive to ensure that they benefit the Venezuelan people.”
Switzerland recalled that, following Maduro’s arrest, it has called for de-escalation, restraint, and compliance with international law, “including the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of respect for territorial integrity.”
The country has “repeatedly” offered its good offices to all parties to help find a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela, it noted.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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Most of Maduro’s bodyguards were linked to Cuban State Security and came from the east of the island, especially from Granma and Santiago.
Some of the 32 Cubans killed in Venezuela during the capture of Nicolás Maduro. / Collage
14ymedio, Havana, 5 January 2025 — Official information regarding the 32 Cubans killed in Venezuela during the US operation to capture Nicolás Maduro remains scarce, fragmented, and marked by silences. However, in recent hours, social media, private messages, and partial confirmations from local authorities have allowed for a preliminary reconstruction of who some of these men were and what kind of roles they played in Venezuela.
What has been emerging consistently points to personnel linked to Cuban State security organs and the Armed Forces, many of them integrated into rings of direct protection of the Chavista power, and mostly from the east of the Island, especially from the provinces of Granma and Santiago de Cuba.
The Cuban government declared a national day of mourning after acknowledging that the deceased were “carrying out missions on behalf of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior,” an admission that contrasts sharply with years of official denials regarding the presence of Cuban troops in Venezuela. However, no official lists with names, ranks, or roles have been published, nor have clear details been provided about the circumstances of each death, leaving fertile ground for speculation and secondhand accounts. continue reading
The first secretary of the Communist Party in Granma province, Yudelkis Ortiz Barceló, acknowledged that six of the deceased were officers from Granma.
One of the first confirmations with institutional backing came from Granma province. The First Secretary of the Communist Party in Granma, Yudelkis Ortiz Barceló, acknowledged that six of the deceased were officers from Granma, without specifying their identities. Subsequently, specific names began to circulate. Among these is Fernando Báez Hidalgo, 26, a native of Río Cauto (Granma), linked to the Personal Security Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and identified as a direct bodyguard of Maduro. His name has been mentioned in several concurring publications, although without official confirmation.
Also from Granma, Erduin Rosabal, a native of La Rinconada, has been identified, indicated in messages and publications as a member of the first security ring of the Venezuelan president.
Landy Osoria López, originally from Baire, Contramaestre, is from Santiago de Cuba. He has repeatedly been described as a member of Cuban State Security and part of the team deployed in Caracas. Several publications place him among the deceased, even citing family addresses, although this information has not been corroborated by a single official source.
Independent journalist Yosmany Mayeta Labrada reported the death of 33-year-old Alejandro Rodríguez, a resident of the Boniato neighborhood. According to testimonies gathered by the reporter, the family received conflicting accounts from authorities regarding the location and removal of the body. A relative recounted that they were initially told the body was missing, then that it had been located and they would be notified. According to this source, both Rodríguez Royo and his brother were allegedly linked to State Security structures.
Also from Santiago is Yordenis Marlonis, who was identified as a member of the Venezuelan president’s and his wife’s direct security detail. According to various publications, he was the son of parents from the town of Dos Caminos and leaves behind his wife and young daughter in Cuba. Sources cited by La Tijera indicate that prior to his assignment in Venezuela, he had been a bodyguard for Lázaro Expósito Canto, the former first secretary of the Communist Party in that province, a fact that reinforces his affiliation with high-level security forces. Officials from the Ministry of the Interior reportedly informed his family of his death, although without providing specific details.
These names are in addition to images and messages posted by profiles linked to veterans of special forces, such as the Black Wasps.
Other identities have emerged from Pinar del Río, including Yoel Caraballo, a native of Consolación del Sur, whose death was reportedly officially confirmed to his daughter by the Personal Security Directorate of that same ministry. His case stands out as one of the few so far in which a direct and formal notification to a family member is mentioned.
The case of Yandri, whose last name is still unknown, also falls within the family sphere. His death was announced by his cousin Moraima Rodríguez on social media. In her message, the woman expressed pride in his “duty fulfilled” protecting Maduro, a statement that, regardless of its tone, confirms the deceased’s role as a bodyguard.
These names are in addition to images and messages posted by profiles linked to special forces veterans, such as the Avispas Negras [Black Wasps], who have disseminated photographs of alleged unidentified fallen bodyguards, accompanied by slogans of loyalty and sacrifice. Although these types of posts have a strong propaganda slant, they all point to direct protection duties.
The absence of a complete official list, the opaque handling of information, and the reliance on leaks and private mourning reinforce the feeling that the truth about these 32 deaths is still incomplete and continues to trickle out, from the margins, rather than from institutions.
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From Havana and exile, voices from civil society warn about the implications for the Island of the ruler’s arrest
“When chemotherapy is required, chemotherapy must be applied. Anything else is pure hypocrisy or total complicity,” said Ferrer. / Wikimedia Commons
14ymedio, Havana, January 4, 2026 — Various voices from Cuban civil society have been reacting since Saturday to the capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. troops. Activists and independent journalists have welcomed the arrest of the leader and are calling for the process in Venezuela to lead to a real, peaceful, orderly, and verifiable democratic transition.
For opposition figure Ángel Moya, the capture of Nicolás Maduro is a positive step, and he recalls that the ruler “gave the order to murder and imprison hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans fighting for freedom, justice, and human rights.” The former prisoner of the 2003 Black Spring recommended that U.S. President Donald Trump “demand the immediate release of political prisoners” and guarantee “security for opposition members and for exiles who decide to return,” including María Corina Machado and Edmundo García.
For his part, dissident Manuel Cuesta Morúa, president of Cuba’s Council for the Democratic Transition, noted that the events reopen the debate over sovereignty, since chavismo, the historian also argues, usurped the popular will expressed at the ballot box in last July’s elections.
In Cuesta Morúa’s view, an opportunity has opened for the Venezuelan people to reclaim their democratic process, although he underscored the importance of respecting international law. The activist also warned that, for Cuba, Maduro’s fall would have serious implications: the loss of a key ally, an essential economic lifeline, and international backing for its authoritarian model.
“Cancer is not cured with paracetamol”
José Daniel Ferrer, leader of the Patriotic Union of Cuba and recently exiled to Miami, described the U.S. military action to capture and prosecute Maduro for drug-trafficking-related crimes as “necessary and positive.” Ferrer maintained that as long as the Cuban regime persists, freedom and human rights will continue to be at risk in the region. “Cancer is not cured with paracetamol. When chemotherapy is required, chemotherapy must be applied. Anything else is pure hypocrisy or total complicity,” he warned.
Academic Alina Bárbara Hernández opted for caution and announced on her Facebook account that she needs to reflect a bit more before commenting on what happened: “I’m taking a little time to publish my analysis of what’s going on.” Nonetheless, she shared a text by Cuban digital creator José Manuel González Rubines, who made it clear that after the U.S. operation, “Maduro is no longer in power and, in all likelihood, will be tried in the United States,” and that “his coterie of satraps handed him over and, with him, handed the country over to a foreign military intervention and a “supervised transition.’”
Meanwhile, writer Jorge Fernández Era called for caution in the face of propaganda and anticipated possible unexpected turns in the Venezuelan political landscape. For its part, the Cuban Observatory of Human Rights, based in Madrid, celebrated the arrest and demanded the immediate release of political prisoners and the restoration of democracy.
In a statement from the Independent Trade Union Association of Cuba, Secretary General Iván Hernández Carrillo emphasized that any legitimate outcome must lead, without ambiguity, to a transition with clear rules, a public timetable, and national and international verification, culminating in the installation of the government chosen by Venezuelans.
In this newspaper, Yoani Sánchez wrote on her blog: “What happens in the coming hours is crucial for both nations, but it is already clear that the boastful and arrogant Nicolás Maduro is a thing of the past. The Cuban dictatorship will be watching him closely in his next appearances, like someone looking in a mirror.”
Translated by Regina Anavy
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Military escalation casts doubt on the future of the medical brigades
Independent organizations have been denouncing the labor conditions of these missions for years. / Archives
14ymedio, Havana, January 3, 2026 — From the early hours of this Saturday, when news broke of the United States’ intervention in Venezuela, one of the questions that began circulating in Cuba was what would happen to the Cuban doctors who remain on mission in that country. The Ministry of Public Health assured, in a brief message circulated on social media, that all collaborators are safe. Nevertheless, beyond that official statement, the immediate future of one of the Cuban regime’s main sources of hard currency remains undefined.
After the military action took place, a retired nurse from Havana told this newspaper that a colleague in Venezuela assured her that “they have the Cubans on mission confined to barracks.”
In addition, a doctor stationed in Caracas told 14ymedio that, despite the messages of calm conveyed by their coordinators, nervousness is evident: “The bosses keep saying that everything is fine and that we have to wait for what Havana says, but they are very nervous.” At that moment, the U.S. president was about to begin a press conference from his residence in Mar-a-Lago, Florida. “I can’t talk much because we’re all trying to listen to Trump’s speech, but what I can tell you is that it makes me nervous that I’m about to finish my mission and I’ve already bought the kids’ clothes. Imagine if they move us somewhere else and I can’t take anything with me.” continue reading
“The bosses keep saying that everything is fine and that we have to wait for what Havana says, but they are very nervous”
Another Cuban collaborator, from Zulia, commented that “everything is calm in the streets, but there are people who are very happy.” Several Venezuelan reporters, who maintained a live broadcast on X for more than ten hours, also reported crowds forming at markets and gas stations to buy supplies, amid fears of business closures.
The unease has been strongly reflected on social media, especially in comments responding to the official call for a demonstration at the Anti-Imperialist Tribune in Havana. Meanwhile, on social media numerous users demanded that priority be given to the safety of medical personnel and their return to the Island. “They are not military; they deserve to be with their families,” wrote one participant. Other messages expressed anxiety and irritation over the lack of foresight. “Now they’ve got the families of those who are over there going crazy here,” another comment noted.
However, not all opinions agree. There are also messages defending the continued presence of the brigades in Venezuela and arguing that, in a context of crisis, the doctors’ work is even more necessary. “In this imminent war, Cuban health brigades in Venezuela will be more necessary than ever,” states one of the comments, appealing to the continuity of the mission as part of a political commitment built over many years.
Beyond the opposing views, a possible interruption of the medical missions in Venezuela would have direct consequences for Cuba’s already fragile economy. Amid inflation, shortages, and the deterioration of basic services, the loss of one of its main sources of hard-currency income would worsen the internal crisis.
A possible interruption of the medical missions in Venezuela would have direct consequences for Cuba’s already fragile economy
Although Cuban authorities say they are maintaining constant communication with the mission, so far no plans for relocation, shelter, or return to Cuba have been made public, nor has it been explained what would happen if the conflict intensifies.
The presence of Cuban healthcare personnel in Venezuela dates back more than two decades and has been central both to the political relationship between the two governments and to the Island’s economy. Through these agreements, the Cuban state receives significant income, while professionals work under state contracts that limit their pay and their personal lives.
Independent organizations have been denouncing the labor conditions of these missions for years, including the withholding of salaries, political control, and restrictions on personal freedom. In a scenario of military intervention and high regional tension, these complaints take on an even more critical dimension.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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U.S. special forces entered Caracas at dawn and removed the dictator without causing any fatalities
First photograph of Maduro after his arrest, shared by Trump. / Donald Trump Truth
EFE/14ymedio, Madrid, January 3, 2026 — U.S. President Donald Trump provided details this Saturday to Fox News about the capture of Nicolás Maduro in Caracas. In his first statements to the media, the president said that the Venezuelan leader “was in a house that was more like a fortress.” When U.S. troops arrived, “everything happened very fast and he didn’t manage to get to” the secure room.
According to Trump, Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, “have been indicted in New York. They were taken first to a ship, the Iwo Jima, and will continue on to New York. The helicopters took them. A good flight, I’m sure they loved it.” Although the president declined to reveal details ahead of a press conference scheduled for this morning, he indicated that it was a capture operation carried out “down to the last detail,” in which “everything was rehearsed.” They even “built a house identical to the one they went to,” with armor plating and reinforced security measures, as well as the hallways and stairways they needed to pass.
Trump’s remarks help complete the picture of what happened early Saturday morning, when Washington carried out bombings on Venezuelan territory. “We were going to carry out the attack four days ago, but the weather didn’t allow it,” Trump explained to Fox journalists. The president emphasized that U.S. special forces suffered no fatalities during the operation.
“I should say that two guys were injured but returned and should be fine. But no one was killed. We didn’t lose any aircraft; they all returned safely. There was one helicopter that went down, but continue reading
we brought it back to the United States,” Trump added. He is expected to provide more details in a broadcast scheduled for 11 a.m. Saturday from his residence at Mar-a-Lago in Florida.
The elite Delta Force pulled Maduro and Flores out of bed
According to U.S. media, the operation was carried out by a unit of the elite Delta Force, which pulled Maduro and Flores out of bed and took them to a helicopter.
Maduro was protected in a residence that “had steel doors and also what they call a ‘secure space’ made of solid steel.” However, the Venezuelan leader was unable to access that secure area within the house. For years, accounts have circulated about the presence of Cubans within Maduro’s closest protection circle, but so far Havana has not confirmed whether any Cuban military personnel were killed or injured.
As for what will happen next, Trump stated: “We are making that decision now. We can’t give someone else the opportunity to come out and take his place. So we’re making that decision now; we will be very involved in that.” Amid the surprise and confusion following the attack, Venezuela’s state media have entered a loop repeating recent statements by Vice President Delcy Rodríguez from Moscow and the brief remarks by Diosdado Cabello and Vladimir Padrino after the U.S. attack.
Fox News aired a segment of a press conference in which a reporter asked Trump whether it was true that “Maduro offered everything in his country, all the natural resources. He even recorded a message for you in English, offering mediation.” The president nodded and added: “He has offered everything, you’re right.”
Translated by Regina Anavy
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Granma Province runs out of liquefied gas due to lack of availability at the Santiago de Cuba plant
In Sancti Spíritus, neighbors asked one another for charcoal to cook. / 14ymedio
14ymedio, Madrid, December 30, 2025 — It was timely for the Granma Province television station to ask the population about their experience without propane. The local television station published a notice on its Facebook page, previously provided by the Provincial Territorial Fuel Marketing Division, warning that due to the lack of availability of propane canisters at the Santiago de Cuba plant, there would be no sales “until further notice.”
The report took note of the number of criticisms sparked by the entity’s announcement and decided to ask residents to share their experiences. “How is this situation affecting your community? We invite you to share your experience in the comments.” Few posts by the station have generated such a volume of responses – more than 100 so far – when most comments are usually about the daily power outage report, with about 24 replies. It is fair to note, however, that on December 26, a video of the “celebration” of the 67th Anniversary of the Revolutionary Victory in the municipality of Río Cauto drew more than 300 complaints, mostly critical: “Give that town some quality of life, they are dying while still alive. You should be ashamed of such a charade celebrating something that has not existed for many years,” one of many posts read.
The message about the lack of propane has accumulated countless complaints that reflect the state of affairs in the eastern province. “Our situation is truly sad. The end of the year arrives and people are under the same stress we have endured all year: no electricity, no water, no cash, scarce food, a basic ration basket that is completely out of sync (today the 29th, the six pounds of rice and three of sugar that were announced still haven’t reached the ration store). And an apparent normality that gives the impression that no one with decision-making power has any idea what the people are living through. They don’t even explain anymore. We only see apologies for the inconvenience caused. ‘Company management appreciates…’ Where is the understanding? No one understands,” wrote one user.
“At my distribution point, number 78 in Santiago de Cuba, located in San Félix, since distribution began they have only delivered twice,” argued another. “In my community this is affecting us a lot, because this area is one of those hardest hit by power outages. This is like a deserted mountain: all you hear is the sound of axes chopping firewood. Hopefully continue reading
it will be restored soon. Happy New Year,” said another comment, somewhat more optimistic. Quite the opposite was a reader who retained not even a trace of the holiday spirit expected at this time of year: “How sad our lives are. No water, no electricity, no propane to cook the little that can be obtained. What is there to celebrate this December 31? And life goes on and nobody seems to care.”
“This is like a deserted mountain: all you hear is the sound of axes chopping firewood. Hopefully it will be restored soon. Happy New Year.”
The situation is discouraging, and not only in the eastern region, where yesterday another moment of panic was experienced when a fault on the “110 kV Renté-Santiago Industrial line, which supplies much of Guantánamo province,” disconnected that province from the National Electric System. The issue was resolved in a matter of minutes, but it has become impossible to tell when the grid is or is not connected. The state company was forced to clarify that once the line was repaired, “the electricity deficit in the province is due to lack of generation.”
While waiting to find out if the Antonio Guiteras power plant in Matanzas manages to reconnect properly to the system, the Island faces another day of energy shortages. Despite forecasts of very low temperatures for the end of the year, not exceeding 18 degrees Celsius (64.4 F), demand remains very high relative to the limited generation available. Expected availability during peak hours is just 1,570 megawatts, less than half of the country’s required 3,300 MW, so an impact of 1,760 MW is anticipated for that time slot.
The rest of the day should theoretically be better. Demand is much lower, at 2,100 MW, and although production is also limited at 1,420 MW, the maximum impact will be 950 MW. Breakdowns at unit 5 of the Mariel thermoelectric plant, unit 2 of Felton, and unit 6 of Renté add to the maintenance work on unit 2 of Santa Cruz and unit 4 of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes in Cienfuegos.
Nevertheless, the problems come mainly from distributed generation, which has 93 plants offline, totaling 1,039 megawatts on New Year’s Eve.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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Imported foods, more expensive and better, have displaced domestic products, which are increasingly scarce
Imported pork loin began the year at 900 pesos per pound and closed December at 1,200 / 14ymedio
14ymedio, Havana, Natalia López Moya, December 30, 2025 –If there was one thing Cubans learned in 2025, it was to read agricultural markets the way one checks the weather report: not to know whether it will rain tomorrow, but to calculate how much food might make it into the house before money evaporates. It was a year without respite for prices, and with a novelty that has ceased to be anecdotal and become part of the landscape: the definitive consecration of imported products in sectors that, until recently, were domestically produced.
Rice, pork, citrus fruits, onions, garlic, and even sugar finished the year having changed their accent. They went from homegrown to speaking English, Portuguese, or peninsular Spanish. The United States, Mexico, Panama, Brazil, and Spain made their way onto the Cuban table not out of gastronomic preference but from sheer necessity. Domestic products became scarce, irregular, or unviable, and the market responded with the logic it knows best: bring goods from abroad to take advantage of a desperate demand for food.
One product that sums up the year was rice, that household thermometer that determines whether there is lunch or only a single meal at night. At the Plaza Boulevard market in Sancti Spíritus, a pound of domestic rice started January at 150 pesos. By July it had reached 280 and, after a slight “breather” forced by state intervention attempting to regulate its price, December found it at 250 pesos. The price did not go down due to a production miracle, but because many private vendors chose to hide it or replace it with imported rice, conveniently outside any regulation. The result was simple: less domestic rice in sight and more sacks with foreign labels.
A pound of domestic rice started January at 150 pesos. By July it had already reached 280
That dynamic repeated itself over and over. Price caps, announced with the tone of a final order, ran into three hard-to-breach walls: the constant devaluation of the Cuban peso, unmet demand, and the obstinacy of merchants, who know full well that selling below costs is not altruism, but ruin. Faced with the choice of losing money or pleasing the authorities, many chose a third path: pulling their merchandise and selling it on the side, where there are no inspectors or ministerial resolutions.
A carton of 30 eggs, in private shops in Holguín, went from 3,000 pesos at the beginning of the year to 3,200 in December / 14ymedio
Black beans, another staple of the national plate, offer a similar lesson. At the La Feria de Los Chinos market in Holguín, they began the year at 400 pesos per pound. In August, supply briefly improved and the price fell to 320. But the relief was short-lived. December brought it back to 420 pesos, confirming continue reading
that in Cuba discounts are usually a parenthesis, not a trend. Imported beans, meanwhile, entered without asking permission from price caps and found their niche among those who prefer to pay more rather than never eat them.
Pork, historically the queen of the Cuban table, definitively lost its crown in 2025. In the Youth Labor Army markets in Havana, managed by the Armed Forces but with most stalls run by private vendors, imported pork loin began the year at 900 pesos per pound. By July it was already at 1,000 and closed December at 1,200. Domestic pork, battered by the lack of feed, theft, and the impossible costs of raising pigs, became a rarity. When it did appear, it did not always respect official prices, and when it did, it disappeared the next day.
Pork, historically the queen of the Cuban table, definitively lost its crown in 2025
Something similar happened with products that define daily cooking. Onions, for example, behaved like a financial asset. At the market at 19th and B, ironically known as La Boutique, in Havana, a pound began January at 350 pesos. By July it was already at 500, and December found it at 600. The smell did not change, but the origin did: increasingly imported onions, better presented, more attractive, and, above all, free of price caps.
A carton of 30 eggs, many households’ protein lifeline, also jumped. In private shops in Holguín it went from 3,000 pesos at the beginning of the year to 3,200 in December. It is not a spectacular increase, but it is persistent, and it adds to a context in which the average salary does not go up, pensions shrink, and any increase, however small, ends up hurting.
The reappearance of mandarins in private markets this year has been scandalous, not so much for their flavor, always pleasant and fragrant, but for their price: around 1,300 pesos per pound, equivalent to nearly half of an average monthly pension on the Island. The citrus fruit arrived from Peru after years of absence and provoked a mix of amazement, nostalgia, and disenchantment. Many Cubans, especially older ones, confessed it had been more than five years since they had seen mandarins for sale.
The scene became iconic: alongside U.S. onions and Panamanian garlic, imported mandarins are sold at central points in Havana with labels recalling their origin, attracting those who see them as a piece of lost flavor. Yet the price turns them into a painful paradox: what should be a return to freshness ends up being an almost unattainable luxury for many pockets.
Alongside U.S. onions and Panamanian garlic, imported mandarins are sold at central points in Havana.
Behind these figures lies a clear logic. The policy of price caps, applied selectively, ended up incentivizing precisely the opposite of what it intended. By regulating domestic rice and leaving imported rice untouched, a clear message was sent to the market: bring in what is not regulated. The result was an accelerated shift toward imported products, more expensive but available.
With bitter irony, many consumers learned to distinguish foreign brands without ever having left the country. Not out of cosmopolitanism, but because Spanish onions, U.S. rice, and Brazilian pork were, paradoxically, more stable than their national equivalents. In 2025, Cuba’s agricultural market did not just sell food: it sold a daily lesson in basic economics. And most people forcibly approved it.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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Data from the Cuban Observatory of Citizen Auditing contrasts with the official tally, which counts only 55 deaths
The authorities have not provided separate data on infections. / Granma
14ymedio, Madrid, December 29, 2025 — Mortality from arboviral diseases in Cuba has reached 8,700 people according to statistical estimates by the Cuban Observatory of Citizen Auditing (OCAC) and Cuba Siglo 21, published this Monday in a report on the collapse of the island’s health system. The report includes data up to mid-December and states that its figure is 185 times higher than the data from the Ministry of Public Health, which at that time had announced 47 deaths. With current figures (55), the unofficial total is 158 times higher than the official one.
The document is based on official data to carry out the calculation. According to the island’s health authorities, around 30% of the population has been infected, which amounts to 2.9 million people affected in a population of 9.7 million inhabitants, the official figure from the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI). The lethality of chikungunya is low under normal conditions, at around one death per 1,000 cases. In this situation, which OCAC calls “Scenario A,” 2,900 Cubans would have died. However, this would be the course of the epidemic in countries with good health care.
The report considers two other scenarios. One would be moderate lethality (Scenario B), which is considered the most likely for the island. This corresponds to a health system with limited clinical care, hospital saturation and a high prevalence of co-morbidities. In such contexts, mortality can range from 0.3% to 0.5%, which would mean between 8,700 and 14,500 deaths, depending on severity.
The moderate-lethality scenario is the one considered most likely for the island, which would have a health system with limited clinical care, hospital saturation and a high prevalence of comorbidities
Finally, there would be a case of high lethality (Scenario C), rare and affecting very vulnerable subgroups or collapsed systems, in which mortality would reach 1% or 29,000 people in a population like Cuba’s. “This scenario represents a limit of high epidemiological severity, which may indicate not only the intrinsic lethality of the virus but also the limitations of the health system’s ability to respond to a large-scale continue reading
epidemic,” the document specifies.
OCAC believes the island is in Scenario B, which could put the figure at 8,700 deaths with the more moderate lethality. Nevertheless, the report notes that even if Cuba were in better condition than presumed (Scenario A), there would still have been 2,900 deaths, which is 61 times higher than the 47 recognized by the Ministry of Public Health at that time.
However, one of the report’s inaccuracies is that it does not separate the two diseases that are, in principle, causing the mortality. The estimate that 30% of the population has been infected was offered by the director of Epidemiology, Francisco Durán, who at the time referred to “nonspecific febrile syndromes” and also did not differentiate the type of virus. In that television appearance, the doctor assured that there was no “new” disease circulating on the island, and that these cases were dengue and chikungunya.
Currently, according to official data, there are 37 deaths from complications of the latter and 18 from dengue, a much more lethal disease to which the same calculations cannot be applied. Since Durán did not provide the percentage of those infected by each disease, it is impossible to make a precise calculation.
Among the criticisms appearing in the report is this one: the lack of transparency. The report attributes to this the long delay in informing the population about the seriousness of an issue that social media and the independent press had been warning about since the summer. Patients multiplied in a perfect breeding ground: power outages that prevented protection against mosquitoes, breeding sites due to water accumulation, lack of garbage collection and the absence of an anti-vector campaign due to limitations in supplies and human resources.
The report emphasizes that the current health crisis is a direct consequence of poor “political decisions sustained over years that have systematically weakened the State’s capacity to protect the life and health of its population.” Among these, it cites underinvestment in health care (approximately 2% of State expenditures) compared to the enormous percentage of State money going to tourism (around 36%), which is managed by the military conglomerate GAESA.
Among the poor decisions, it cites underinvestment in health care (approximately 2%) compared to the enormous percentage of State money going to tourism (around 36%)
This situation has reduced medical staff to a minimum: between 2021 and 2024, the system lost a staggering 30,767 professionals. In addition, since 2019 there have been 7,144 fewer hospital beds. The report also includes data from BioCubaFarma’s report on medication shortages up to January 2025, which noted the absence of 255 of the 395 drugs the company supplies to the national system. Furthermore, authorities stated last week that the basic formulary is made up of 651 medications, of which 62% are produced domestically and the remaining 38% are imported. Of the latter, at least 60% are not available.
“For the Cuban Observatory of Citizen Auditing, the collapse of the health system constitutes a form of structural violence exercised from power. Keeping millions of people in conditions of malnutrition, health defenselessness and permanent exposure to epidemiological risks is not an accident, but the consequence of a model of governance that has ceased to prioritize basic human well-being,” the document states, adding that profound structural changes and an independent assessment of the situation are needed.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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“We are not Asians, that is not a Cuban habit,” argues a Cuban official
On the program Cuadrando la Caja, they argued that in order to achieve food sovereignty, the best approach would be to change habits. / 14ymedio
14ymedio, Havana, December 26, 2025 — Thoroughly debunked, the cliché that the Chinese word for “crisis” means “opportunity” has been used by both politicians and motivational talk gurus, and this week national food officials have appealed to its spirit to call for a change in the Cuban diet. Seated with Marxlenin Pérez Valdés on her program Cuadrando la Caja, Roberto Caballero, a member of the National Executive Committee of Agricultural and Forestry Technicians, and José Carlos Cordobés, Director General of Industrial Policy at the Ministry of Food Industry, argued that to achieve food sovereignty the best course would be to change habits that clash with the reality of Cuban soils and to remove potatoes and rice from the regular diet.
“And once an Italian asked me, quite rightly: ‘Why do you spend so much money on potatoes when you have sweet potatoes, yucca, yams, malanga, and with the money you spend on potatoes they could flood the country with all those products?” said Caballero. The technician explained that potatoes have never adapted well to the territory, and although he did not give a reason – that potatoes thrive in temperate to cool climates, while the Island’s warm humidity favors pests – he specified the enormous investment that the country has made to plant them, keep them at suitable temperatures and curb the diseases that plague them.
It is an unprofitable product, he wanted to make clear, but he put it in such a way that host Pérez Valdés herself was taken aback, especially when he stressed that rice is not an easy food to grow in Cuba. “Roberto wants to take away even our rice! José Carlos, help me with this,” the presenter exclaimed in alarm when Caballero explained that this grain has been incorporated into the national culture, without being realistic. “We are not Asians, that is not a Cuban habit,” he stressed, before considering that, although it is already an established tradition, that too could change. “With the shortages that exist, anything you put out for people will sell,” he asserted.
That part of the conversation is what has generated the most ink among the population, although there were other, more interesting segments in the program, which dealt with the situation of food production. The officials reviewed the factors that have led to the current dire situation, while refraining from throwing continue reading
stones at the government. The energy situation, the passage of Hurricane Melissa, the shortage of inputs to produce and, of course, the US “blockade” were mentioned, but they also openly criticized a policy that has been widespread on the Island for decades: price caps.
“There are many things that could be solved but which have not been solved this year, and which in the long run will lead to totally insufficient levels of production”
“For farmers, production costs have skyrocketed enormously, which we then suddenly try to regulate by imposing price caps, and the only consequence is that they stop producing, because they cannot sell at a price lower than what it costs to produce,” said Cordobés, who also railed against the delays caused by bureaucratization.
“There is the whole problem of non-payments; there is the whole problem of delays in the procedures that farmers have to go through. In other words, there are many things that could be solved but which have not been solved this year and which in the long run lead to production levels that are totally insufficient,” he lamented.
Cordobés, however, also made some remarks that surprised viewers. “Today the country has an industrial infrastructure that, with a different dynamic in agriculture, improved financial flows for the country and the ability to import the raw materials needed, would allow industry to meet the demands of the population. I think that’s very important,” he said. In other words: if things worked properly in the country, there would be no problem. To put it bluntly.
The officials, satisfied that the industry “does not need investments but does not exploit them efficiently,” regretted that at present there is no foreign currency to import everything that would be needed, and they congratulated themselves because the “links” – the private enterprises – have contributed a lot and in a satisfactory way. “We should be closing at around 70,000 tons of product with those actors. Without them, we would not have incorporated that amount into our system. So somehow the industry has been able to take advantage of that scenario.”
“Well, I do organic farming. It’s less efficient, more expensive, but I sell the product at a higher price. So the person who has money eats healthy food and the others continue to be poisoned. I mean, that doesn’t fit in our system.”
Roberto Caballero has also analyzed Cuba’s conditions, with a tradition of small farms in most areas of agriculture – excepting sugar cane – for reasons which he attributed mainly to the climate and the saline soils. “There are those out there who have said that we cannot be self-sufficient in food, that Cuba doesn’t have the right conditions,” he noted, and he also admitted that in a globalized world, full sovereignty is not indispensable either, but that it is important to accept the circumstances of each country.
“The other day we were talking to some Koreans and they said that they practically don’t produce food. As they have many minerals and export a lot of technology, what they do with the money they earn is to buy food. Ah, okay, that’s a solution. But we don’t even consider that; it wouldn’t be valid for us, because they don’t have a blockade* and we do,” he emphasized.
The officials also spoke at length about sustainable agriculture and said that Cuba must strike a balance with this model because, while it is important, it may in some sense contradict the State’s principles of social justice. “For there this problem of the environment is very easily solved. Well, I do organic farming. It’s less efficient, more expensive, but I sell the product at a higher price. So the person who has money eats healthy food, while others continue to be poisoned. That doesn’t fit into our system,” they said. However, they do not deny that, in the long run, an improvement can be achieved.
The final segment was entirely devoted to theorizing about how to produce more, but, again, it all came down to the usual pie-in-the-sky story and how with foreign currency, exporting and generating income, things would get better. “It’s a big task we have for the year 2026, and things can be done in this scenario. Even with these complexities, things can be done,” they promised. One more year.
Translator’s note: There is, in fact, no US ‘blockade’ on Cuba, but this continues to be the term the Cuban government prefers to apply to the ongoing US embargo. During the Cuban Missile Crisis the US ordered a Naval blockade (which it called a ‘quarantine’) on Cuba in 1962, between 22 October and 20 November of that year. The blockade was lifted when Russia agreed to remove its nuclear missiles from the Island. The embargo had been imposed earlier in February of the same year, and although modified from time to time, it is still in force.
The complaint comes from the authorities themselves, who also admit a “significant decrease” in national production
It is estimated that pharmacy shortages reach 70% of products / Cubadebate
14ymedio, Havana, December 22, 2025 — Cuban health authorities pointed to a new culprit yesterday for the shortage of medications in Cuban pharmacies: the illegal market generated from within the public health system itself. “Prestigious institutions” are involved, as well as pharmacy workers “from other areas and other activities of the sector,” said Maylin Beltrán Delgado, head of the Department of Pharmacies and Optics of the Ministry of Public Health, on Monday.
The official pointed out on the television program Mesa Redonda that, in view of the “growing phenomenon of the illegal market,” a nationwide surveillance ”plan of measures” was implemented. “We have done more than 5,000 inspections this year, about 13 per day, on average,” said Beltrán Delgado. These joint operations, she added, made it possible to gauge “the severity of control problems in the network.”
By the end of October, “authorities had identified 33 extraordinarily serious incidents” in the pharmacy system. Of these, 18 were “forcible thefts committed by persons outside the health sector who broke into pharmacies to steal the scarce medications available.” She specified that of those thefts, “about 10 were related to controlled substances (drugs, narcotic drugs, psychotropic and substances with similar effects)” and reminded viewers that selling these products “is a drug trafficking offense.”
“Today, the industry has also stopped responding routinely to medication orders”
The shortage, which last year was already at 70% in pharmacies, is also due to the “significant decline in national drug production.” Today, the industry has also stopped responding routinely to medication orders,” admitted continue reading
Cristina Lara Bastanzuri, director of Medicines and Medical Technologies.
Regardless of the fact that China and India are by far the main producers of pharmaceutical raw materials, the official blamed the “US blockade” for difficulties in importing active and inactive ingredients and for the “technological obsolescence in some plants, interruptions in the energy supply and limitations on performing proper industrial maintenance.”
Poor domestic production has a major impact, given that the country’s basic list includes 651 medications, of which 62% – 403 products – correspond to medications that are supposed to be produced by the national pharmaceutical industry. The remaining 38% are imported, and at least 60% of these are unavailable.
The breaking point, said Lara Bastanzuri, was the rupture in 2019 with Brazil, which was ruled at that time by Jair Bolsonaro, resulting in the loss of an “important source of supplies, inputs and revenues for the sector.”
There is “an almost total shortage in pharmacies. It’s real, the drugs are not there”
This has led to “an almost total shortage of supplies in pharmacies. It is real, the drugs are not there,” acknowledged the official. She added that it is not even possible to guarantee the continuation of card-controlled medications, which are intended for patients with chronic diseases such as hypertension, diabetes mellitus and epilepsy. They constitute the highest priority within the outpatient care system.”
“Practically, the funding that goes to the industry is allocated to saving lives with drugs and serums,” she said, which sometimes leaves community pharmacies by the wayside, with several days of delay in receiving supplies.
The wait can be long, up to 60 days, when the original design of the supply system operated on a replenishment “every 12 to 15 days.” This delay has increased pressure on the organized sales system “and has inevitably intensified public dissatisfaction.”
Irregular distribution has also affected prescribing practices, “because people are practical and will take whatever medications are available.” Family doctors and specialists are “often forced to adapt their treatments to the momentary availability of drugs.”
Doctors are “often forced to adapt their treatments to the availability of drugs”
Without medicine and with a collapsed health system, Cuba is currently facing an “epidemic phase” due to viruses that plague the island, which have so far left 55 people dead.
However, despite the lack of supplies and electricity to operate certain medical equipment, the government announced with great fanfare that as of Monday it has been attending patients suffering from the sequelae of viral fever. According to Cubadebate, specialized consultations, “unprecedented in Cuba,” offer patients access to diagnostic tests such as CT scans and ultrasound.
“For those with severe pain, specialized anesthetic treatments will be available. In addition, personalized physiotherapy programs will be designed to promote rehabilitation and rapid reintegration into daily and work activities,” said the media. The consultations are being held at the Institute of Neurology and Neurosurgery.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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“We ourselves have doubts. The banks are collecting foreign currency only; they haven’t given us the order yet to sell”
In private businesses, it’s common for employees to accept US currency at the informal exchange rate and even purchase it. / 14ymedio
14ymedio, Havana, Darío Hernández, December 23, 2025 — Nearly a week after the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) announced the implementation of a floating rate for the foreign exchange market, in addition to other official exchange rates, the measure has yet to materialize for most Cubans. In Havana, the banks are not selling dollars to the population, despite the regulation being presented as a step to “organize” the exchange market and bring the official rate closer to the country’s economic reality.
In practice, the only thing that has begun to function is the purchase of foreign currency, and even that operation is surrounded by improvisation, administrative silence and confusion among bank employees themselves, as 14ymedio was able to confirm during visits to several bank branches in the Cuban capital.
“So far, I have no news that dollars are being sold to the population under the new rate; what they are doing is buying,” a Banco Metropolitano branch employee in El Vedado, who prefers to remain anonymous, explained to this newspaper on Monday. According to his account, US currency was being received that day at 401 pesos.
“If the customer hands over a large amount of dollars and the bank doesn’t have enough cash in national currency, part of the payment is made through electronic transfer. If the disbursement is made completely in cash, a 3% discount is applied as a tax,” the state worker specifies.
The new rate was announced by monetary authorities as a flexible mechanism, subject to adjustments based on supply and demand. The stated objective was to compete with the informal market and capture dollars currently circulating outside the state financial system. However, what is happening at the branches is very different from the official narrative. There are no clear protocols, and staff continue reading
are working without precise instructions on how to proceed.
There are no clear protocols and staff are working without instructions
This scheme, far from conveying confidence, feeds the perception of improvisation. “This entire process of the new floating dollar exchange rate has been implemented without notice or prior preparation of the bank staff,” the worker summarizes. “We haven’t received any guidance on how to sell the dollars, whether we’ll give it to them in cash or through electronic transfer. Even yesterday we had a meeting at our bank, and the topic of selling dollars didn’t even come up.”
The uncertainty repeats itself at other branches in the capital. At the bank located on the ground floor of the Focsa building, also in El Vedado, an employee confirms that the order for now is to buy only foreign currency. “We ourselves have doubts. Now all the banks are doing is collecting, buying dollars,” she explains. Although she says that selling will happen “at some point,” she recognizes that there still isn’t an official instruction allowing them to offer dollars to the public.
The worker also confirms that the rate of 401 pesos is already being used in other financial operations. “Those who have MLC [freely convertible currency] cards, now when you do a transfer from Transfermóvil to national currency, the exchange rate used is that one, and you gain cash that way.” If this detail is confirmed, then it would be a signal that the BCC is trying to consolidate the freely convertible currency again, as seems to be indicated by the rapid rise of that virtual financial instrument on the informal market exchange board published daily by the site El Toque. At the end of October; a dollar was worth barely 200 pesos and is now at 350.
The design of the sales mechanism, when finally activated, also raises questions. According to banking sources, MSMEs (micro, small and medium-sized enterprises) will receive dollars exclusively through electronic transfers, not in cash, which is in line with the chronic shortage of bills in state coffers. For individual customers, a combination of cash and transfers is expected, “when they approve it,” clarifies the Focsa employee. For now, the outlook is an asymmetric scheme: the bank buys dollars from the population but doesn’t sell them.
The BCC announced a new banking channel for the non-state sector to purchase foreign currency in the official market. “Requests will be made from commercial banks and through the fiscal account, without handling cash,” the brief informative note clarifies. “The limit will be up to 50% of the average gross income of the fiscal account in the last quarter,” the text adds.
For now, the outlook is an asymmetric scheme: the bank buys dollars from the population but doesn’t sell them. / 14ymedio
Regarding individuals, this note clarifies that the limit of 100 dollars per person will continue and that the cumbersome and ineffective system of turns through the Ticket app at the 41 sales offices will be maintained.
Outside the Focsa bank branch on Monday, however, the urgent concerns were different. The long line to collect pensions or attempt to withdraw cash from ATMs monopolized customers’ anxiety. Each time an employee poked their head out the main door, a shower of questions rained down on them. Doubts ranged from the establishment’s operating hours during the upcoming holidays to questions about when they will start selling dollars.
Informal currency exchangers, meanwhile, seem to be starting to react after days of paralysis and uncertainty following the official announcement. “The guy who buys dollars in my neighborhood went a week without accepting them but has started again and has set them at 420 pesos,” a young resident of the Guanabacoa municipality explains to this newspaper. In private businesses, it is common for employees to accept US currency at the informal exchange rate and even to purchase it.
El Toque reports that the dollar this Tuesday is at 440 pesos on the informal market, where the greenback continues to circulate with greater agility and without taxes or cumbersome procedures. For many Cubans, handing over their foreign currency to the bank and having to register personal data with no certainty of being able to buy it back doesn’t seem like an attractive option at the moment.
“I had 100 dollars saved for Christmas and I preferred to change them with an individual who has a cafeteria on my block,” recounts a neighbor from Cotorro. “He gave me 425 pesos for them and I came out better than I would have with the bank and didn’t have to show my ID card,” she adds. However, she will avoid selling the remaining US currency she has saved “until things settle down.”
Translated by Regina Anavy
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Darren Soto introduces a bill to help those stations block signals coming from the island “for hours every night”
Congressman Darren Soto says many small stations lack the resources to block those signals / Facebook
14ymedio, Miami, December 16, 2025 — U.S. Congressman Darren Soto announced this Tuesday the introduction of a bill aimed at stopping signal interference coming from Cuba on Florida radio stations in order to “spread communist propaganda.”
The Democrat said that Cuba’s official radio “broadcasts communist propaganda for several hours every night and affects the transmission of local stations,” especially on the AM band.
The initiative was promoted by Congressman Soto, from central Florida, who warned about the alleged impact these interferences are having on stations with limited resources and—according to him—on the communities they serve.
A local radio station in central Florida regularly sees its signal interfered with by Cuban state radio
“At this moment, a local radio station in central Florida sees its signal regularly interfered with by Cuban state radio, which for hours every night broadcasts harmful communist propaganda to Floridians,” the lawmaker stated.
Soto also underscored the economic difficulties faced by the affected stations.
“Many small AM radio stations in Florida and Alaska do not have the financial resources necessary to block these signals,” he said.
The bill, called the Stop Communist Radio Act, seeks to instruct the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to establish a grant program to support stations suffering harmful interference from foreign signals originating in communist countries such as Cuba, Russia, and North Korea.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.
While power remains in the hands of those who designed and sustain the disaster, the Island will continue on its path to extinction
Continuing to repeat that “next year will be better” is premeditated cruelty and a slap in the face of Cubans. / Instagram / Nicole Pankalla
14ymedio, Madrid, Yunior García Aguilera, December 21, 2025 — At the end of every year, Miguel Díaz-Canel repeats the same slogan: “next year will be better.” It doesn’t matter how grave the closing balance has been, nor how deep the accumulated wounds. Official optimism appeals each New Year’s Eve to rhetorical morphine for the grieving and to keeping the Revolution’s corpse in chloroform. Reality, however, behaves like an implacable forensic report. And the diagnosis leaves us with a country in a prolonged process of decomposition whose reversal is unviable while the same authors of the disaster remain in power.
The year 2025 was a clear confirmation of that trajectory with no light at the end of the tunnel. The price hike [‘tarifazo‘] from Etecsa, the national telecommunications monopoly, applied in a country where average salaries barely allow survival, provoked a university protest that was quelled with threats and pressure on the main leaders of the rebellion. Blackouts increased until they became the daily norm. Hurricane Melissa worsened structural damage and added to the list of victims with unresolved problems. The scandal of Alejandro Gil’s conviction once again exposed that the power’s method is punishment without transparency. The country faces a health crisis marked by outbreaks of chikungunya, dengue and other diseases, with dozens of deaths, medicine shortages, hospitals operating at capacity and collapsed cemeteries.
Closing the year, Parliament experienced a series of unusual resignations, including that of the Secretary of the Council of State, Homero Acosta, seen by some as part of the reformist bloc. His replacement by José Luis Toledo Santander—a staunch conservative—is an unequivocal signal that immobilism has won the internal fight and is calling the shots. Toledo Santander became sadly famous for his phrase that “the Communist Party is above the Constitution.”
The demographic dimension converts that sum of crises and bad omens into an even more serious problem. Cuba lost the balance between births and deaths long ago. In the last five years, the country registered—according to official data—a negative external migratory balance exceeding one million people. This is a systematic bleeding of population of working and reproductive age. And the result is a society that ages without accumulated wealth, without sufficient productive force and without generational replacement. In historical terms, Cuba has entered a phase never seen in the region for a country that is not at war. continue reading
Cuba offers blackouts, human decapitalization, chronic corruption, inflation and massive emigration
Comparison with other countries in the Caribbean environment is necessary to understand that the problem is not the geographical zone nor post-pandemic effects. The Dominican Republic, with a similar population, maintains sustained demographic growth: many more Dominicans are born than die. Additionally, it attracts investment, expands its tourism sector and sustains an imperfect but functional energy system. Cuba, in contrast, sees tourism income fall to levels so low they don’t even cover the most basic imports.
Energy explains much of that divergence. The Dominican Republic consumes and serves more than 22,000 GWh annually, with installed capacity exceeding 7,200 megawatts (MW), which allows it to sustain industry, services and urban life. Cuba, with similar capacity, though 50% inoperative, and with much lower consumption, cannot cover even half of daily demand. Blackouts are the logical result of decades without real investment, dependence on imported fuels and mismanagement. Without stable energy there is no productivity, and without productivity there is no possible improvement.
In this context, the insistence of some on applying the Chinese or Vietnamese models is unsustainable and absurd. China and Vietnam bet on deep reforms, large-scale opening, insertion into global value chains and a relatively stable framework of rules for capital. Cuba has done the opposite, with partial reforms, state control over strategic sectors, criminalization of private accumulation and an unpredictable regulatory climate. The Asian model requires abundant energy, sustained investment, fiscal discipline and an expanding workforce. Cuba offers blackouts, human decapitalization, chronic corruption, inflation and massive emigration. Asian culture, in contrast, is based on effort, competitiveness and ambition to grow. Cuban culture settles for “resolving” and “surviving,” accumulating social weariness from the permanent demand for sacrifice without reward.
The Cuban crisis is not reversible in the current political framework
The Island doesn’t have many allies left capable of artificially sustaining the system. Venezuela faces its own crisis and has reduced fuel shipments. Russia confronts a war economy with resources concentrated on another front. Mexico cooperates in limited fashion, while dealing with internal tensions and an increasingly critical young generation. At the same time, the regional political map has changed. Governments that for years offered ideological support have lost elections or face internal weaknesses. For the international left, Cuba has ceased to be an exportable symbol. It is, rather, an uncomfortable problem that cannot be mentioned without having an excuse manual nearby.
The health and education crisis completes the crime scene. The health system, for decades presented as a showcase, now functions with chronic shortages, professional exodus and rising negative indicators. Education also suffers abandonment, quality loss and teacher desertion. Human capital, the country’s main historical asset, deteriorates or emigrates, and is no longer capable of maintaining high standards in a world that prioritizes technology and the handling of new tools. The regime has repeated several times that it has Artificial Intelligence development on its agenda: how the hell is that achieved in a country without energy, aged, poorly connected and bankrupt?
Everything leads to an objective conclusion: the Cuban crisis is not reversible in the current political framework. Not because natural resources, talent or geographical possibilities are lacking, but because the system governing the Island is incompatible with recovery. Each passing year, the demographic base shrinks, infrastructure degrades, energy becomes scarcer and social trust erodes.
In official rhetoric, the entire disaster is justified with the expressions “intensified blockade” and “enemy campaigns.” The paradox is that, if the country’s clinical death has not yet been decreed, it is thanks to Miami and other capitals of exile. Without the oxygen of remittances and diaspora investment in the private sector, the Island would have long ago entered respiratory arrest.
Continuing to repeat that “next year will be better” is premeditated cruelty and a slap in the face of Cubans. The country needs a profound and urgent break with the model that brought it here. While power remains in the hands of those who designed and sustain the disaster, Cuba will continue on its path to extinction.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.
In the provinces, the official floating rate has been ignored and only the informal market is operating, with a rate of 440.
The official discourse itself acknowledges—though in a much more sugar-coated tone—the limitations of the measure. / 14ymedio
14ymedio, Havana/Holguín, Darío Hernández and Miguel García, December 20, 2025 — “Do you want to change two bucks?” asks a customer in a MSME in Alamar. “Nah,” replies the person behind the counter. “It’s pointless; the dollar is going down.” The scene, unremarkable, has been repeated in recent days at several points around the Island. It’s the immediate reaction to the uncertainty created by the official floating rate, which this Saturday fell to 408 pesos per dollar on the third day of its implementation (its launch rate was 410 on Thursday, December 18).
This Saturday it fell to 408 pesos per dollar on the third day of its implementation. / Cubadebate
In its crusade against the informal market—and particularly against the daily publication of rates by the independent outlet El Toque—the Government seems determined to curb inflation the way Cuban mothers bring down a fever: with cold showers and “horse cures.” The paradox is that the rate announced by the Central Bank looks far too similar to the one that, until now, set the street thermometer—well above the official rate of 120 CUP supposedly in force at banks, where it had become impossible to obtain dollars or any other foreign currency.
The official gamble has generated a tense silence in the market. “Right now nobody is exchanging dollars—at least not those who usually do it. I myself am having trouble exchanging. Some say they don’t have cash; others say they’re going to wait,” a self-employed worker in Havana tells 14ymedio. Another source confirms the same atmosphere: “I have a colleague who wants to exchange dollars and says that in Havana nobody wants them. He’s been all over.” The response is almost unanimous: “Now is the time to lie low and wait.”
However, the effect threatens to be short-lived. The official discourse itself acknowledges—albeit in a much more sugar-coated tone—the limitations of the measure. In a lengthy analysis published by Cubadebate, it is admitted that implementing a floating-rate foreign-exchange market does not occur “at an ideal moment” for the Cuban economy. Low levels of production, falling exports, severe restrictions on external financing and a still-high fiscal deficit conspire against any attempt at rapid stabilization. According to the text, the Central Bank of Cuba enters the market as “just another competitor,” but with the administrative capacity to publish the rate daily, which will float according to supply and demand. The same official note acknowledges that, at the outset, the rate will have to remain “close to what currently prevails in the informal market” in order to avoid a greater inflationary shock.
Nobody wants to get stuck holding greenbacks in a market that is uncertain. / 14ymedio
On the street, that admission translates into pragmatism and, in many cases, resignation. At an MSME [Micro, Small, Medium Enterprise] near the Santa Fe bridge in Guanabacoa, a woman tried to exchange 40 dollars. “But at 408,” the clerk told her. “That’s fine by me,” the customer replied, “I don’t have money even to continue reading
take a pedicab.” The scene illustrates well the dilemma between selling now—even at a rate that could change tomorrow—or holding on to dollars that few people want to buy today.
“In general, I think few people are selling their dollars at 408, but there are some, because right now it’s the only option,” explains another interviewee. In Old Havana, an MSME where foreign currency had previously been accepted decided to slam that door shut: “Yesterday I went to buy a couple of things and they weren’t accepting dollars—only national currency.” Nobody wants to get stuck with greenbacks in a market that is uncertain due to the official measure and the proximity of the Christmas festivities.
In Holguín, the scene is different. Far from Havana—where, predictably, most of the dollars available for the Central Bank’s operations are concentrated—the official floating rate has stirred more apathy than expectation. A self-employed worker who moves around the city daily tells 14ymedio that in the province “the measure has been ignored; here the dollar is still at 440.” Geographic distance once again translates into economic distance.
The Cuban peso will continue to be a weak currency, no matter how much a new official price is published every morning. / 14ymedio
The official narrative insists that this new system will allow greater fiscal control, a gradual reduction of inflation and more resources for sectors such as health, education and culture. It also promises to stimulate exports, offer a “safe” channel for exchanging remittances and combat the distortions created by informality. All of that sounds good on paper. The problem is that Cuba has already experienced too many reforms that, in their initial phase, promised order and ended up multiplying the chaos.
The key lies in what is not said with sufficient clarity: the market will sell only what it buys. In other words, there is no foreign-currency backing that guarantees sufficient liquidity. The availability to buy dollars—and thus the credibility of the system—will depend on a “gradual process” of strengthening that, in an exhausted economy, may take too long or never arrive. In the meantime, informality retreats, watches and waits.
The floating rate may have caused a tactical pause in foreign-currency trading, but it has not resolved the structural causes of the problem, according to most economists—both from the opposition and from a critical sector close to the regime—who have spoken out about the new measures. Without a real increase in production, without sustained exports and without access to external financing, the Cuban peso will continue to be a weak currency, no matter how much a new official price is published every morning. The market, inside or outside the institutions, will ultimately adjust the figure in its own way.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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EFE (via 14ymedio), January 7, 2026 — The U.S. government has added Venezuela and Cuba to a list of 25 new countries whose citizens must post bond of up to $15,000 in order to apply for entry into the U.S. the State Department specified this week.
