Translator: Regina Anavy – Page 3

Sentenced to 15 and 14 Years in Prison for Another Theft of Dielectric Oil in Moa

Seven people were sentenced for sabotage after stealing 1,248 liters of dielectric oil from a transformer that supplied 6,184 homes in Holguín.

One of the defendants received 15 years in prison, three others were sentenced to 14 years, and the remaining three to 12 years. / ¡Ahora!

14ymedio, Madrid, October 2, 2026 – The theft of 1,248 liters of dielectric oil from a transformer in Moa ended with seven people sentenced to between 12 and 15 years in prison for the crime of sabotage, in another exemplary trial publicized by Cuba’s official press. One of the defendants received 15 years in prison, three others were sentenced to 14 years, and the remaining three to 12 years, according to the Holguín newspaper ¡Ahora!

The case is the second of its kind held this year in Holguín province, after authorities toughened the criminal treatment of offenses affecting the national electrical system (SEN) and increased the publicizing of the sentences as a warning intended to stop a criminal practice that shows no signs of slowing. The Attorney General’s Office recalled that everyone tried in 2026 for crimes against the SEN has been convicted of sabotage, mostly receiving sentences of between nine and 20 years.

In addition to the prison sentences, the court confiscated a motorcycle, a refrigerator and 87,100 Cuban pesos, and seized five cell phones. The official report justifies the severity of the sanctions because of the damage caused amid the energy crisis and the “intensified economic and energy blockade” by the U.S. The official report even suggests that users on social media consider these sentences “lenient” given the damage caused to state property and the population. continue reading

According to the consequences described by the court’s legal representatives, the extraction caused the transformer to overheat, resulting in a short circuit and an explosion that put it out of service. The failure interrupted electricity service to 6,184 homes on circuits 4 and 11 and also affected the secondary power supply to the local hospital. The other transformer at the substation had to take on the entire load and also ended up damaged by the excessive workload. The value of the material losses was calculated by the Electric Company at 138,054 Cuban pesos, about 179 dollars at the informal exchange rate.

The failure interrupted electricity service to 6,184 homes on circuits 4 and 11 and also affected the secondary power supply to the local hospital

The criminal acts took place between the night of March 12 and the early morning of March 13 at the Moa Nueva substation, in an unpopulated area at the entrance to the Armando Mestre neighborhood. Four young men from the Punta Gorda neighborhood, in eastern Moa, stole the oil from the transformer, with the help of three other men from Sancti Spíritus who were passing through the municipality to sell agricultural products. The three men provided transportation and purchased part of the product.

The vehicle used for the theft was a state-owned truck, driven by another of the defendants. The driver paid 960,000 pesos to the alleged ringleader of the operation. The money was divided among the four young men from Moa, while the three men from Sancti Spíritus left with the remaining oil, which could not be recovered.

Fabián Vega Genicio, director of Distribution at the Holguín Electric Company, stressed to the official media outlet the increase in the theft of dielectric oil in the province. In total, the state company has recorded 65 incidents against the SEN this year, compared with 42 during the same period in 2025. Of the 36 involving oil, 12 occurred at high-voltage substations and 24 at distribution transformers, a type of theft that, according to the official, is new this year.

Vega Genicio attributes the increase in these crimes to the energy crisis, since dielectric oil can be used as fuel to start vehicles. However, the director overlooks other possible causes, such as rising inflation, the alarming devaluation of the Cuban peso, and the progressive deterioration of Cubans’ living conditions, which have contributed to pushing crime to record levels in the country.

The director overlooks other possible causes, such as rising inflation, the alarming devaluation of the Cuban peso, and the progressive deterioration of living conditions

According to the official, a subtransmission transformer can cost between $10,000 and $50,000, while a liter of dielectric oil costs around $13. On the other hand, “all of that has to be imported,” he insisted, since the dielectric oil manufactured in Cabaiguán cannot be used in equipment at that voltage level.

The official also points out that darkness during blackouts creates favorable conditions for these thefts. He acknowledges that in Holguín there are areas that can go more than 24 hours without electricity, and when failures occur in the SEN, the interruption can even exceed 40 hours. Under these conditions, it is difficult to maintain surveillance in all the areas through which the network extends, which, according to the director, has 13,100 distribution transformers and some 5,000 kilometers of lines, many of these pieces of equipment located in unpopulated areas.

The official described other recent cases in the province: three substations are affected by crimes, and more than 800 customers in the town of Frank País have been without service for more than a month because of damage following a theft at La Camaronera. The facilities at Farallones de Moa and Juan Paz, in Sagua de Tánamo, are also waiting for oil in order to return to the system.

In mid-September, also in Holguín, two other defendants received prison sentences of eight and ten years for stealing at least 440 liters of dielectric oil. The two buyers of the stolen product were convicted of receiving stolen goods and sentenced to prison terms and correctional labor.

Since May 2025, the Popular Supreme Court has considered acts involving the theft, damage or impairment of components of the SEN to constitute sabotage

This type of crime continues to spread throughout the country as the crisis worsens, despite the risk involved for those who commit these acts who have sometimes ended up injured or dead, the authorities’ “iron-fist” approach, with lengthy sentences imposed, and the consequences for the population.

This same Thursday, another exemplary trial took place in Havana in which four people were sentenced to between 15 and 20 years for stealing 140 liters of oil from a transformer that supplied the Dairy Complex.

The Attorney General’s Office of the Republic reported in August that between 2025 and the first half of 2026, more than 460 criminal investigations had been initiated in connection with crimes against the electrical system. More than 300 involved complaints of dielectric oil theft. Since May 2025, the Popular Supreme Court has considered acts involving the theft, damage or impairment of SEN components and other infrastructure considered critical to constitute sabotage. The Criminal Code provides prison sentences of between seven and 30 years for this offense, in addition to much harsher penalties in certain aggravated cases, including the death penalty.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Cuban Prosecutor’s Office Seeks Eight and Ten Years for the Creators of El4tico

The Provincial Court of Holguín orders the opening of an oral trial, which will be held within a minimum period of 10 days, although no date has been set.

Screenshot of one of the independent videos published by El4tico. / Facebook/El4tico

14ymedio, Madrid, October 2, 2026 – Ernesto Ricardo Medina and Kamil Zayas Pérez, members of the El4tico project, face prison sentences of eight and ten years for the crimes of propaganda against the constitutional order, defamation of institutions and organizations and of heroes and martyrs, and incitement to commit crimes. Martí Noticias gained access to the provisional conclusions of the Holguín Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, which has sent the request to the First Criminal Chamber of the Court. The latter, in turn, has ordered the opening of an oral trial, which will be held within a minimum period of 10 days, although no date has been set.

In statements to the Miami-based media outlet, Medina’s mother said she was convinced that there would be a guilty verdict. “Perhaps their sentences will be reduced somewhat, but there is not the slightest doubt in our minds that they will be convicted. We know that there is no rule of law in Cuba; we have no legal guarantees. Their opinion prevails, and they will condemn them because they exercised the right to freedom of expression. They are young people who have the right to say what they think, offering what, from their perspective, they believe would be good for our country,” she said.

Mileydis Medina Machín stated that State Security is, technically, the only thing that works well in a country where almost everything goes wrong. “It is the way to perpetuate themselves in power,” she argued. continue reading

Mileydis Medina Machín stated that State Security is, technically, the only thing that works well in a country where almost everything goes wrong. “It is the way to perpetuate themselves in power,” she argued.

In the document, the Prosecutor’s Office maintains that the defendants acted from November 7, 2025, to establish and implement the digital communications project known as El 4tico, for which they “set up a filming location in the residential property of Ricardo Medina, located in the Piedra Blanca neighborhood of the city of Holguín, from where they produced and disseminated content on social media.”

The text, Martí Noticias continues, cites examples of content in which criticism is made of the Communist Party of Cuba, mass organizations and the Ministry of the Interior, in addition to calling on agents of that agency and members of the Armed Forces to reject “the established legal order.”

To disseminate the content, they used technology purchased abroad, the Prosecutor’s Office maintains, including computers, telephones, microphones, cameras and other accessories. The Public Prosecutor’s Office links these purchases to conversations between the young men and exiled opponents in Spain, among them Yunior García Aguilera, Carolina Barrero and Amelia Calzadilla, whom they allegedly asked for advice, technical training and scripts.

“They are common devices. They are not advanced or sophisticated technology items. Of course, they did not seize weapons, propaganda, leaflets, posters,” emphasizes Medina Machín, who has also addressed the relationship with the exiles. “They are people who, at some point in history, have also expressed their disagreement with certain things that happen in this country, but that proves nothing. They talk about scripts that were indeed sent, edited abroad, and about people who greeted them at some point, but that does not mean that they edited any script,” she argued.

Medina and Zayas were arrested on February 6 of this year – they have therefore spent eight months in pretrial detention – following several home searches. The young men remain imprisoned at the Holguín Provisional Prison and have received support from organizations such as Cubalex, the Cuban Institute for Freedom of Expression and Press and Prisoners Defenders, as well as the international organizations Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

“They wanted to encourage critical thinking among people. We have become accustomed for many years to having a way of thinking imposed on us, but the new generations no longer accept that,” Medina maintained.

“They wanted to encourage critical thinking among people. We have become accustomed for many years to having a way of thinking imposed on us, but the new generations no longer accept that”

During his time in prison, Kamil Zayas wrote a letter affirming his convictions: “It has been worth it. Do not give up. Let us now build a people, one that is just and good. We are counting on you. Long live a Dignified Cuba.”

Ricardo Medina, for his part, released through his mother a handwritten letter in which he denounced that State Security was pressuring him to retract his statements through a video. The young man refused and stressed that repenting “would be a lie.”

The news came the same day that the sentence following the oral trial of Anna Sofía Benítez, known on social media as Anna Bensi, and her mother, Caridad Silvente, became known. For each of them, “two years of restriction of freedom” have been requested, although the Court’s ruling is still pending.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Freedom to Inform Requires No Permission

“Henry Constantín is not in pretrial detention. He is being held unjustly and illegitimately”

Henry Constantín, director of La Hora de Cuba and regional vice president of the Inter American Press Society (SIP). / Facebook/Henry Constatín

14ymedio, Havana, September 30, 2026 – No one should be imprisoned for expressing their ideas or for reporting on what those in power seek to conceal. Freedom of expression is a right, not a concession from the Government. The imprisonment of journalist Henry Constantín once again demonstrates that the Cuban regime treats freedom of expression as a privilege conditional on obedience.

Henry Constantín, director of La Hora de Cuba and regional vice president of the Inter American Press Society (SIP), was detained on September 16, 2026, in Camagüey. The authorities have ordered his transfer to Kilo 7 prison under pretrial detention. The official justification was his failure to appear for a summons from the Identification, Immigration and Foreigners Directorate. The formal charge: “disobedience.”

The offense is included in Article 189 of the Cuban Penal Code currently in force. But invoking a legal provision is not enough to make an imprisonment legitimate. Even less so when we are talking about a country like Cuba. continue reading

Constantín’s defense was unable to file a habeas corpus petition on Friday, September 18, because it was a day of “change of duties”

According to information released about the case, Constantín’s defense was unable to file a habeas corpus petition on Friday, September 18, because it was a day of “change of duties.” They had to wait until Monday the 21st. For that reason, the hearing to decide on the habeas corpus petition, which under Cuba’s Criminal Procedure Law should have taken place before Friday the 25th, did not take place either.

Cuban judges are formal judges from Monday through Thursday. On Fridays, they “change duties.” For that reason, the Provincial Court of Camagüey informed Henry’s relatives and defense that the essential habeas corpus hearing, which should have been held within 72 hours after the petition was filed, would take place four or five days later, if they decided to hold it.

The uncertainty is inadmissible. Habeas corpus exists to subject a deprivation of liberty to urgent judicial review. Its effectiveness depends on that review taking place as quickly as possible. Every delay prolongs the detention and the risk to a person who has been unjustly detained.

But in the same country that quickly invokes an article of the Penal Code to justify the imprisonment of a journalist, there is no urgency for a judge to assess the violation of his rights. It might seem like a euphemism, but it is not: Cuban judges changed duties many years ago. In many cases, they are mere legitimizers of a despotic power in which the law is not a limit on that same power, much less a guarantee for the citizen.

In a context like Cuba’s, the law serves to punish those who question those in power but rarely reaches those who serve or wield that power

The Penal Code used to charge Henry Constantín also provides for sanctions against officials who maliciously delay the processing of matters, unjustifiably fail to perform their duties, or issue rulings that violate the law. Despite the foregoing, none of the judges who have delayed the review of Henry’s imprisonment shares a cell with him. Because in a context like Cuba’s, the law serves to punish those who question those in power but rarely reaches those who serve or wield that power.

Faced with a context like that, only disobedience remains because disobeying is the only way to exercise rights.

Henry Constantín and the rest of the independent journalists, in the eyes of the Cuban regime, have been disobeying for years. To a power that demands absolute obedience, the simple act of reporting freely is insubordination. For that reason, anyone who wants to practice independent journalism in Cuba will have to disobey the regime that prevents it.

This is not our idea. Martin Luther King wrote it from a cell in 1963. In his Letter From Birmingham Jail, he said: “One has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.” And invoking Saint Augustine, he recalled that “an unjust law is no law at all.” Four decades earlier, while being tried for sedition before a British colonial court, Mahatma Gandhi had said something similar: “Non-cooperation with evil is as much a duty as cooperation with good.”

Both understood that unjust regimes relabel rights as crimes. What in a free society is called exercising freedom of expression, in the vocabulary of totalitarianism is called “disobedience.” It is the power’s “newspeak”: naming as a crime what in many democracies is a natural and universal right.

Likewise, the pretrial detention imposed on Henry Constantín marks a qualitative leap. It is no longer a matter of the few-hour detentions he has suffered so many times. The regime has decided that it will no longer tolerate his determination to continue exercising his rights. If it previously tried to silence him with cuts to electricity and Internet service and with detentions, it now resorts to the most absolute form of deprivation: the total loss of freedom. It does so, moreover, under the euphemism of “temporary” or “provisional.”

Pretrial detention is an exceptional precautionary measure that allows a person to be deprived of liberty before trial when there are concrete risks that justify it

Pretrial detention is an exceptional precautionary measure that allows a person to be deprived of liberty before trial when there are concrete risks that justify it, such as flight or obstruction of the investigation. It does not constitute an advance punishment nor does it eliminate the presumption of innocence.

However, in Cuba it is used for another purpose: to keep a person like Henry Constantín locked up without the need to bring him to trial and without exposing the regime that imprisons him to the public scrutiny that, for any political system, comes with putting a journalist in prison.

Henry Constantín is not in pretrial detention. He is being held unjustly and illegitimately.

We demand that pretrial detention not be used to prolong the repression of Henry Constantín for weeks or months. We demand that he be released immediately and unconditionally so that pretrial detention does not become the instrument that allows the Cuban regime to achieve what it has so far failed to achieve: breaking the journalist’s will and forcing him to choose between prison and exile.

Doing journalism should never be considered disobedience. Because reporting is not a crime.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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A Partial Collapse Puts More Than 300 Centro Habana Residents on Alert

Part of the fourth-floor ceiling of a former hotel at Águila and San Miguel collapsed without causing injuries.

On the top floor of the building, a large section of the ceiling collapsed and now allows the sky to be seen directly from inside. / Courtesy/14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, September 30, 2026 – Part of the ceiling of the fourth floor of a building located at Águila 368, on the corner of San Miguel, in Centro Habana, collapsed this Wednesday at around 6:10 in the morning. The collapse caused no injuries, but residents fear that it is a warning of a larger collapse in a building where more than 300 people live.

“Fortunately, there were no human losses and no one was injured,” Juan Goberna, director of the Cuban Network for People with Disabilities, who lives with his wife on the second floor, told 14ymedio. The activist warns, however, that the deterioration of the building and the lack of repairs leave residents under the threat of a total collapse.

On the top floor of the building, a large section of the ceiling collapsed and now allows the sky to be seen directly from inside. Below, pieces of concrete, dust and other debris cover the floor and accumulate near the metal railing of the staircase. Alongside the exposed and rusted reinforcing bars of the structure, damp stains spread across the sections of ceiling that are still standing. continue reading

“A neighbor began screaming and people jumped out of bed to see what was happening, but it wasn’t until it began to get light that we could see how serious what had happened was”

“I was already awake when I heard the crash and the whole building shook,” Goberna says. “A neighbor began screaming and people jumped out of bed to see what was happening, but it wasn’t until it began to get light that we could see how serious what had happened was. To make matters worse, it has been raining since early this morning, so water has been coming in through the opening.”

The activist explains that “there are neighbors who are on the street right now and don’t want to go into the building for fear that more fragments will continue falling.” Those in the worst situation, he continues, “are the people on the fourth floor, but the collapse also damaged part of the third-floor ceiling because of the weight of the debris that fell.”

Goberna clarifies that “this is the first partial collapse the building has suffered, but pieces had already fallen from the ceiling of the top floor, although until now they had been only superficial pieces.” An initiative to shore up the structure with wood failed because of the lack of fuel, which made it difficult to hire a truck to transport the beams.

From the street, the signs of prolonged deterioration are also evident. The art deco façade has windows without frames, open gaps and areas blackened by dampness. Built in 1936 and originally intended as a hotel, the building eventually became a huge collective residence, with numerous families spread among rooms and subdivided spaces.

Built in 1936 and originally intended as a hotel, the building eventually became a huge collective residence. /Courtesy/14ymedio

The building is located in the Colón Popular Council, one of the most densely populated areas of Centro Habana. There, former mansions, hotels and guesthouses transformed into tenements house several generations of the same family or numerous households under a single roof. Overcrowding and structural deterioration are part of the daily landscape of a municipality where it takes only a few blocks of walking to find structures shored up, closed-off balconies and façades on the verge of falling apart.

Wednesday’s partial collapse occurred just days after a fatal collapse in the capital. On September 22, two people died when the porch of their home collapsed in Lawton, in the municipality of Diez de Octubre. Neighbors told 14ymedio at the time that the home’s residents had repeatedly warned of the danger posed by the building, without obtaining a solution from the authorities.

Partial collapses also often become a long ordeal for those who remain inside. Many families continue living in buildings declared uninhabitable or at risk of collapse because they have nowhere to move, and State shelters do not provide an immediate solution either. Each rainy season increases the risk in a city with a very old housing stock and decades of inadequate maintenance.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuba’s Economy Minister Denies Contacts Between Trump Companies and the Cuban Government

Óscar Pérez-Oliva accuses the U.S. of maneuvering to displace foreign companies established on the Island and impose its own.

Cuban Vice Minister and great-nephew of Fidel Castro, Óscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga, in an archive image. / X/@CubaMINREX

14ymedio, Madrid, September 29, 2026 – Cuban Vice Prime Minister Óscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga denied in an interview with Reuters published Tuesday that businesspeople linked to U.S. President Donald Trump had met with Cuban officials this year seeking business opportunities on the Island.

“I am not aware of any company directly linked to President Trump having contacted Cuba,” said the vice prime minister, who is also Minister of Foreign Trade and Fidel Castro’s great-nephew. He emphasized that neither he nor any other Cuban official had met with representatives of companies connected to the U.S. president.

However, he insisted that they are open to negotiations with U.S. investors: “It is not our policy to prohibit U.S. companies from investing in Cuba, trading with Cuba or doing any kind of business with Cuba,” Pérez-Oliva maintained. “What prevents this possibility is the existence of the trade embargo.”

As the British news agency recalls, businesspeople linked to Trump have been associated with possible business opportunities in Cuba for years. Reuters specifically mentions meetings held in 2016 by people in the now-U.S. president’s circle that caused a stir at the time because of the possibility that they were violating embargo laws. continue reading

“It is not our policy to prohibit U.S. companies from investing in Cuba, trading with Cuba or doing any kind of business with Cuba”

The Guardian reported two weeks ago that several Trump Organization executives had traveled to Cuba in recent months and held meetings with Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, the grandson of Raúl Castro, known as El Cangrejo [The Crab] to “explore opportunities” amid the departure of Spanish hotel companies.

The British newspaper questioned the maneuvering by the U.S. president’s circle, seeking control of Cuban assets by taking advantage of the vacuum left by the withdrawal of major international companies, such as Spain’s Meliá and Iberostar and Canada’s Sherritt, which operated on the Island after being threatened with sanctions by the U.S. Government itself.

A similar idea was outlined by Pérez-Oliva on Tuesday in the interview: “On the one hand, international companies – Cuba’s traditional partners around the world – are being threatened and pressured to halt their economic and commercial relations with our country,” he said. “On the other, efforts are being made to promote the activities of U.S. companies.”

The minister was referring to the State Department policy that allows U.S. companies to export fuel to Cuba’s private sector, which he described as an attempt to return Cuba to a dependence on the U.S. reminiscent of the colonial era. “[That policy] is aimed at forcing Cuba’s economic dependence,” Pérez-Oliva said, and he insisted: “We will never again be a colony of any country.”

“In light of these sanctions, these companies are evaluating alternatives to determine how to continue their operations”

Those exports are conditioned on their being received by private small and medium-sized enterprises, although, as 14ymedio has documented, the State sector has managed to enter the business. The U.S. has become Havana’s main supplier, ahead of Spain and China, historic commercial partners of the Island.

Pérez-Oliva also told Reuters that the stalled dialogue between Washington and Havana has left international investors in a situation of uncertainty. The minister recalled the situation of Canadian mining company Sherritt International, which suspended its participation in the joint venture it maintained with the Cuban Government in May.

In recent months, U.S. businesspeople have shown interest in taking control of Sherritt. The eventual entry of U.S. capital would allow the company to obtain authorization from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to continue its operations in Cuba. One of the most lucrative offers comes from Texan Ray Washburne, a former Trump Administration official.

The Australian company Antilles Gold, which owns a copper and gold mine in Cuba, also suspended its participation in the operations of the joint venture with the Cuban state-owned company GeoMinera, after the U.S. State Department sanctioned the project.

“Neither Antilles Gold nor Sherritt has withdrawn,” Pérez-Oliva maintained. “In light of these sanctions, these companies are evaluating alternatives to determine how to continue their operations.”

Washington, for its part, maintains that these measures do not go far enough and has called for political changes with “free and fair” elections

Like Sherritt, Antilles Gold has proposed changes to the structure of the joint venture to the State Department that would allow U.S. entities to assume more than 50% control and, as a result, seek the lifting of the sanctions or an OFAC license to operate in Cuba.

Pérez-Oliva highlighted the economic reforms being implemented by his government and accused the U.S. of obstructing that process. Washington, for its part, maintains that these measures do not go far enough and has called for political changes with “free and fair” elections.

In response to a question from Reuters, the vice prime minister rejected rumors that he was being prepared as Cuba’s next president: “I have no aspirations in that regard,” Pérez-Oliva said. “I am simply a public servant and I will work wherever I am needed, without aspiring to any particular position.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Ángel Santiesteban is Elected New Sovereign Grand Commander of Cuban Freemasonry

José Ramón Viñas Alonso took over as lieutenant grand commander, equivalent to the vice presidency within the Order

Ángel Santiesteban, in an archive image shared by him on his social media. / Facebook/Ángel Santiesteban

14ymedio, Havana, September 28, 2026 – The writer, former political prisoner and Cuban opponent of the regime Ángel Santiesteban Prats was elected Sovereign Grand Commander of the Supreme Council of the 33rd Degree for the Republic of Cuba. According to CubaNet, the vote took place last Saturday, September 26, during an extraordinary session held in Havana, and ended with 19 votes in favor and one against.

Santiesteban replaces José Ramón Viñas Alonso, who had headed the Supreme Council since 2015. Following the election, Viñas took over as lieutenant grand commander, a position equivalent to the vice presidency within the Order, and was also declared “sovereign grand commander ad vitam of honor and dignity,” according to CubaNet.

Less than two months ago, Santiesteban was at the center of the dispute with the Ministry of Justice over Viñas’s continued tenure. As grand chancellor of the Supreme Council, he was the one who reported on August 6 that an official from the agency intended to impose a replacement decided by the authorities and called on Freemasons to appear the following day at the headquarters in Centro Habana.

Less than two months ago, Santiesteban was at the center of the dispute with the Ministry of Justice over Viñas’s continued tenure

About a hundred people went to the headquarters of the Supreme Council of the 33rd Degree in Centro Habana to support Viñas, and the replacement was never carried out. “For the authorities I am not the Sovereign; for my brothers I am,” the leader responded to the Justice official at the time. State Security agents remained in the vicinity of the building.

The confrontation escalated on August 19, when Viñas was summoned to a police station in Havana on charges of “disobedience.” He had refused to hand over the keys to his office and maintained that his position depended exclusively on internal elections. A source close to him told 14ymedio that the police tried to have him detained, although his lawyer managed to prevent it. continue reading

The offensive against Viñas dated back to 2025. In May of that year, the Ministry of Justice attempted to recognize Lázaro Cuesta Valdés as head of the Supreme Council and threatened to freeze the institution’s bank accounts if it did not accept the decision. Santiesteban attributed the maneuver to State Security at the time.

In April 2025, Santiesteban was expelled from the symbolic degrees of the Order, but retained degrees 4 through 33, the highest rank of the Scottish Rite. This allowed him to remain within the Supreme Council, from where he continued to denounce the infiltration of State Security into the fraternity.

The clash between Viñas and the regime also has a political precedent. Following the Island-wide 11 July 2021 protests, Viñas endorsed a letter addressed to Miguel Díaz-Canel in which the Supreme Council rejected the “combat order” issued by the president to repress the demonstrators. Since then, members of the Supreme Council have denounced pressure and interrogations against Viñas, as well as attempts to remove him from the institution’s leadership.

Santiesteban, a persistent critic of the Cuban regime, wrote the screenplay for the film Plantados, an approach to the situation of political prisoners following Fidel Castro’s rise to power in January 1959. He has also received the Václav Havel Foundation Award for Creative Dissent.

Translated by Regina Anavy

See also Santiesteban’s blog: https://blogloshijosquenadiequiso.wordpress.com/

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The Cuban Regime Continues Its Effort to Reform the Economy Without Making Political Changes

Pedro Monreal maintains that liberalization will remain limited as long as the State maintains control over the rules governing access and decision-making.

Cuba’s President, Miguel Díaz-Canel (left), applauds alongside Prime Minister Manuel Marrero in an archival photograph. / EFE/Ernesto Mastrascusa

EFE/14ymedio, Havana, September 28, 2026 – Cuba’s Prime Minister, Manuel Marrero, reported that, of the package of 176 economic and social reforms approved by the Government in June, 89% (158) are currently being implemented, with 197 supporting legal regulations, according to reports by Cuba’s official media on Sunday.

These measures seek to liberalize and decentralize the Cuban economy amid the profound polycrisis the Island has experienced for decades, attributed to both internal and external factors. The package of reforms has been criticized by independent economists, including Spain-based expert Pedro Monreal, who maintains that without political reforms, the economic ones are unlikely to be effective.

“The 176 measures start from a State-based foundation that remains essentially intact,” Monreal has pointed out. “If it retains control over licenses, foreign currency, and inputs, the State enterprise does not compete: it rations. The non-state sector may be authorized and still remain subordinate. Handing over the management of public assets without modifying the ownership structure, the residual capacity for decision-making, or the rules governing access does not create parity either, but rather guardianship over State assets.” continue reading

“If it retains control over licenses, foreign currency, and inputs, the State enterprise does not compete: it rations”

This Sunday, at the conclusion of a training session on the reforms with the presidents of state Business Groups and Boards of Directors, the Cuban prime minister declared that “changes that will boost productive capacities are already becoming apparent, and with this there will be greater supply, which going forward should contribute to a gradual reduction in prices and to containing inflation, which causes so much damage.”

Regarding the reforms, Marrero stressed that their objective is for the State enterprise to be “more agile, efficient, and coordinated” with the rest of the economy and insisted on “taking advantage of the opportunities” contained in Decree Law 114, which regulates associations between State and non-state business entities, with the aim of “increasing the production of goods and services, replacing imports, making use of available productive capacities, increasing business competitiveness, and generating jobs.”

The head of government also pointed out that transforming the State enterprise into a commercial company “through shares or ownership interests is not synonymous with privatization.” In this regard, he indicated that the aim is to “separate ownership and management, attract private, national, and foreign capital, and improve efficiency, competitiveness, and exports.”

The package of 176 economic and social reforms now underway, grouped into 23 thematic areas, focuses, among other aspects, on decentralizing to the municipal level a series of responsibilities, including administrative, human resources, budgetary, financial, local tax, environmental, and climate-change management, as well as project management, knowledge, and training. It also contemplates changes intended to stimulate agriculture, foreign trade, private and foreign investment, and the real estate sector, in addition to decentralizing decision-making, granting greater “autonomy” to State enterprises, and authorizing private capital to participate in financial activities.

“Coordinating an economy does not mean authorizing coexistence, but creating interdependence among actors under common rules governing access, contracting, risk, and decision-making”

Monreal’s criticisms, for their part, focus on the need for an economic model that coordinates, rather than merely “allows.” “Coordinating an economy does not mean authorizing coexistence, but creating interdependence among actors under common rules governing access, contracting, risk, and decision-making. That is where the main flaw lies. Easing an annex of permitted activities or granting permits unilaterally facilitates entry but does not create linkages,” the economist says.

The expert has also focused his criticism on the aforementioned Point 17, in which he sees “the ‘crony capitalism’ of the Russian transition.” “With the rule of law nonexistent, the accelerated privatization of State enterprises without robust legal safeguards usually ends with State assets being captured by insiders well connected to those in power. One thing leads to another without intermediate steps.”

These reforms have arrived at a time when Cuba is mired in a serious crisis that has lasted six years, during which the Island’s Gross Domestic Product has contracted by 15%, according to official figures. The situation has worsened since January, when the U.S. began applying a policy of “maximum pressure” on Cuba with an oil blockade and a series of additional sanctions aimed at bringing about political and economic changes by the regime.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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A Neighborhood Market with “Better” Prices

The Ayestarán location awaits its official opening this Monday while customers protest an offering they consider expensive and limited.

Inside the Ayestarán Neighborhood Market, employees were finishing placing the products because, they said, today is the opening and “Government people” are coming. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Juan Diego Rodríguez, Havana, September 28, 2026 – At the doors of the brand-new Neighborhood Market on Ayestarán Street, in Havana, customers crowded together Monday morning. Several women approached the glass, shaded their eyes with their hands to overcome the reflections and inspected the shelves, which were still only half full. The door was closed. Inside, employees were finishing placing the products because, as one of them explained to 14ymedio, today is the opening and “Government people” are coming.

The establishment, located at 207 Ayestarán, between Néstor Sardiñas and Perfecto Lacoste, in the municipality of Cerro, is part of the Neighborhood Market project, an initiative that the Ministry of Domestic Trade has promoted as a formula for recovering state-owned premises and stabilizing the retail sale of basic products. According to the regulations, state-owned establishments are awarded through bidding for management by mipymes [small and medium-sized enterprises – SMSE in English], cooperatives, self-employed workers and other economic actors.

In Ayestarán, the newly painted blue-and-white premises certainly looks more presentable than many state-run stores in the capital and is light-years away from looking like the dilapidated ration-market bodegas. On the windows, Neighborhood Market signs alternate with the name Doña Luisa and the logo of DV Alimentos Sanos Super Deliverde. Inside there are new display cases, a refrigerator and shelves that this Monday still showed large empty spaces. continue reading

The 900-milliliter bottle of oil costs 2,600 pesos; a kilogram of powdered milk, 4,500; rice, 800, and black beans, 600. / 14ymedio

The anticipation, however, began to diminish when curious customers discovered the price list. The 900-milliliter bottle of oil costs 2,600 pesos; a kilogram of powdered milk, 4,500; rice, 800, and black beans, 600. Each egg costs 130 pesos, or 3,900 per carton. A can of tomato paste costs 1,000 pesos and a can of Spam, 1,100. The 500-gram package of luncheon meat sells for 900 pesos, while soap costs 380 and each roll of toilet paper, 190.

“I don’t see many products either,” said a woman leaning on a cane as she looked through the glass. The prices, she maintained, can also be found at some mipymes. Los Mercados de Barrio [Neighborhood Markets], according to what the authorities have announced, have a limited catalog that includes products such as vegetable oil, powdered milk, chicken, ground meat, rice, sugar and coffee, as well as cleaning supplies such as detergent, soap and toilet paper.

“This isn’t a Neighborhood Market, this is just any old mipyme,” another woman shouted toward the inside so the workers could hear her. “The milk is just as expensive as elsewhere, and the toilet paper is even more expensive,” she protested.

The reaction contrasts with the project’s official presentation. Just a few hours earlier, Minister of Domestic Trade Betsy Díaz Velázquez had inaugurated another Neighborhood Market in the Sierra Maestra housing development, in Boyeros. The official station Radio Rebelde said that these establishments seek to offer food and cleaning products at prices between 10% and 15% lower than those at other stores. The Government also grants incentives to private operators, including a tax rebate and exemption from rent during the first two years.

“I don’t see many products either,” said a woman leaning on a cane as she looked through the glass. / 14ymedio

The Cuban News Agency itself joined in the enthusiasm and said that there are already 24 establishments throughout the country operating through a “service administration and commercialization contract” between the selected economic actor and the state-owned company that owns the property. The official press presents the initiative as a possibility for reducing costs and prices thanks, among other advantages, to a 5% sales tax.

None of that tax framework consoled those doing the math in front of the Ayestarán door this Monday.

“Why are they going to open this if it’s the same thing the mipymes already have?” another woman asked. A passing man intervened to point out that, at least, the oil was cheaper than at other establishments. The response came immediately, almost like a chorus: “That oil isn’t cheap for anyone.”

In Ayestarán, the newly painted blue-and-white premises certainly looks more presentable than many state-run stores. / 14ymedio

“We settle for everything; this is really a scam,” another woman insisted. Around her, the others nodded as they continued mentally comparing the prices with salaries, pensions and what they had seen in other stores.

The scene summed up the challenge facing the commercial experiment. Since this is not a subsidized bodega, and no matter how many tax benefits they receive, prices will respond to the law of supply and demand.

“This is disrespectful,” one of the women concluded before walking away from the still-closed door. “They are making fun of us to our faces every day and we allow them to do it.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Jibacoa Campgrounds, Between Shortages and Abandonment

Only some rooms at Los Cocos and a few cabins at Las Caletas remain in use amid overgrowth, ruins, and lack of fuel.

The pool at Los Cocos, one of the few areas still usable, also shows the general deterioration. / 14ymedio

Darío Hernández, Mayabeque, September 27, 2026 – What for years was one of the most affordable options for taking a family vacation in Cuba now survives amid overgrowth, dismantled cabins, and recreational areas in ruins. A tour of the popular campgrounds near Jibacoa Beach –Los Cocos, Las Caletas, El Abra, and La Laguna– reveals the deterioration of facilities that once had to be reserved at least a week in advance and now show clear signs of abandonment.

According to what 14ymedio was able to observe on site, in Santa Cruz del Norte, Mayabeque, only the rooms and the pool at Los Cocos were operating, along with a few cabins at Las Caletas. The rest of the facilities were in very poor condition: structures surrounded by brush, common areas without maintenance, and recreational areas that barely retain traces of their former use.

The Jibacoa campgrounds, between shortages and abandonment. /14ymedio

A worker in the area explained to this newspaper that one of the main problems is the inability to cover the cost of some services. “It is becoming very difficult to maintain them, especially because of the brush cutting,” he commented. Because these are large areas, clearing the overgrowth depends on brush cutters that operate with fuel, an increasingly scarce and expensive resource on the Island. According to his testimony, the last time the work was done it cost 25,000 pesos, an amount that is now almost impossible to afford. continue reading

The lack of clearing is visible at a glance. Around many of the cabins, grass grows unchecked and reaches the entrances. Some structures have lost their doors and windows, while others retain little more than their framework. The deterioration of the accommodations is compounded by the condition of the communal spaces. Play areas, cafeterias, open-air structures, and other recreational facilities show obvious deterioration and give the impression of having gone a long time without repairs or attention.

Where there were once spaces designed for leisure and rest, abandonment and lack of maintenance now predominate. / 14ymedio

In several areas, the pavement appears cracked, dirty, or overrun by vegetation. Where there were once spaces designed for leisure and rest, abandonment and lack of maintenance now predominate. The scene contrasts with the natural beauty of the Jibacoa surroundings, one of the best-known beach destinations in the western part of the country.

The pool at Los Cocos, one of the few areas still usable, also shows the general deterioration. Although it remains open, part of the facility is out of service and dirty, confirming the campground’s partial operating condition. Even in the best-preserved complex in the area, the abandonment is evident.

The difference from previous years is notable. According to testimonies gathered in the area, at this time of year it was customary for the cabins to be in high demand, even though conditions were already poor back then. Now, however, demand appears to have collapsed at the same pace as the condition of the facilities. “Except for the first cabins at Los Cocos, this looks like a Resident Evil movie,” one camper says during the tour.

The scene contrasts with the natural beauty of the Jibacoa surroundings, one of the best-known beach destinations in the western part of the country. / 14ymedio

Beyond the extreme appearance of some areas, the underlying problem is the same one affecting almost all services in Cuba: lack of resources, fuel shortages, and accumulated deterioration. In the case of the campgrounds, this deterioration also has symbolic value. For many years, popular camping was presented by the Young Communist League as an affordable leisure alternative for Cubans, especially students and working families who could not aspire to hotels or more expensive destinations.

Today, in many of these enclaves, the official promise has been reduced to a handful of rooms in use and facilities that are barely holding together. The case of the Jibacoa campgrounds also illustrates a deterioration that does not appear to be temporary. It is not merely a lack of paint or an isolated breakdown, but a deep deterioration of the infrastructure and basic maintenance services. It is no longer only food, transportation, or electricity that is in short supply: the few places where generations of Cubans could afford a modest vacation near the sea are also falling apart.

Some structures have lost their doors and windows, while others retain little more than their framework. / 14ymedio

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Public Health Acknowledges Deterioration of the Epidemiological Situation in Cuba

The vice minister links the increase in infections to problems with sanitation, water treatment, and waste collection.

Mientras continúan las dificultades para garantizar el agua, el saneamiento y la recogida de residuos, el deterioro de los servicios sanitarios tampoco ayuda a contener las enfermedades. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, September 27, 2026 / The Ministry of Public Health acknowledged concerns surrounding the epidemiological situation in Cuba and pointed to an increase in cases of various diseases, which it attributed to deficiencies in sanitation, water treatment, and waste collection, amid the serious water and health crisis affecting the Island.

Deputy Minister of Public Health Carilda Peña García admitted this Friday on Cuban television that there has been an increase in acute respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases, and hepatitis, as well as a notable rise in arboviruses, including dengue and chikungunya. She also acknowledged the relationship between the deterioration of sanitary conditions and the increase in diseases, linking it to poor hygienic conditions and problems with water supply and treatment.

Regarding respiratory diseases, the official explained that endemic coronaviruses are circulating in the country, in addition to SARS-CoV-2 –with a predominance of Omicron subvariants–, as well as the influenza virus and other agents. The vice minister noted, however, that no severity comparable to that of the COVID-19 pandemic is being observed, although she also did not provide precise figures.

Endemic coronaviruses are circulating in the country, in addition to SARS-CoV-2 –with a predominance of Omicron subvariants–, as well as the influenza virus and other agents

The greatest cause for alarm, however, is arboviruses. Peña García confirmed the circulation of chikungunya, although she rejected the idea that there is an “excessive” increase in the disease and specifically denied the unofficial reports circulating on social media, again without providing precise data to contradict them. According to the vice minister, cases are concentrated mainly in territories where the incidence of the disease was lower during the previous period, while those who became ill then now have lower susceptibility. continue reading

Regarding dengue, the vice minister confirmed that all four serotypes of the virus are circulating, with serotype 2 predominating. She attributed the increase in the vector population to “high temperatures, rainfall, and humidity,” but acknowledged that these factors are joined by “other avoidable and controllable factors, fundamentally linked to existing conditions inside and around homes.”

Peña García said that the increase in dengue cases “corresponds to the seasonal rise also being recorded in other countries in the region,” but the Ministry of Public Health has not publicly updated its data on the disease since June. At that time, it had reported 298 cases, while the Global Dengue Observatory estimated 2,173 infections in July and 3,214 in August.

The organization, which gathers information from government sources and international health organizations, estimated that as of September 18 there had been 7,133 cumulative cases in Cuba, about 7.4 times more than expected for this date, thus placing the Island among the countries in the region with the highest relative incidence. The figure is concerning because October is usually the month with the highest incidence of dengue in Cuba.

The situation is occurring in a “context marked by limitations in environmental sanitation systems, water treatment, and wastewater collection”

Another concern acknowledged by the Ministry of Public Health is the increase in acute diarrheal diseases and hepatitis. “Various microorganisms associated with these conditions are circulating, including viruses and bacteria,” said the vice minister, who added that the situation is occurring in a “context marked by limitations in environmental sanitation systems, water treatment, and wastewater collection.”

At the beginning of September, the U.S. Embassy in Havana issued a health alert over the increase in diarrheal diseases and recommended taking extra precautions with water, food, and ice.

The Spanish Government also currently maintains a health warning for Cuba and notes that outbreaks of hepatitis A are occurring on the Island.

A report published this week by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention added another warning sign: between June 2024 and February 2026, 249 cases of hepatitis A were recorded in Florida, 76 of which were associated with recent travel to Cuba. Among the cases genetically studied, 15 of 18 shared the same strain, consistent with a common origin.

In May, the Ministry of Public Health had ruled out the existence of an epidemic of this disease, but acknowledged a “very complex” health situation and cases in several provinces.

While difficulties in guaranteeing water, sanitation, and waste collection persist, the deterioration of health services is also doing little to contain the diseases. According to testimonies collected by 14ymedio, some Havana residents with suspicious symptoms have chosen not to go to health centers and instead self-medicate with drugs purchased on the informal market, making it even more difficult to record official figures.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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“The ‘Guajiro’ Who Doesn’t Have a Three-Wheeled Vehicle or a Mare Loses His Food in the Countryside”

The lack of fuel and state transportation affects passengers, students, and farmers in Guantánamo alike.

“People depend on this because state buses no longer leave from here to get to those little towns.” / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Dayamí Rojas, Guantánamo, September 26, 2026 – Outside the Guantánamo bus terminal, where travelers once looked for a bus route that would take them closer to their municipality, they now wait for an electric three-wheeler, a private car, a motorcycle, or, if the destination and distance allow, even a horse-drawn carriage. There are passengers asking questions, drivers negotiating, and small vehicles where every seat counts.

“The price of a liter of gasoline here is above 2,500 pesos and diesel is 1,900, so that drives up all the prices for these vehicles,” a driver of an old Ford that travels from the station to other towns in the province explains to 14ymedio. “People depend on this because state buses no longer leave from here to get to those little towns.”

The transportation crisis, severe within the city of Guantánamo, takes on another dimension when one looks toward the municipalities and rural communities. There, it is not simply a matter of arriving late to work or walking several stops: the lack of vehicles affects school attendance, a medical appointment, and even the possibility of getting a harvest out of the countryside before it spoils.

“There is no pocket that can withstand it”: the daily ordeal of getting around Guantánamo.

Juan Carlos, 59, has been doing the math for days. His daughter is hospitalized in a hospital in the provincial capital and he needs to visit her every day. “A three-wheeler costs you 500 or 600 pesos,” he laments. In addition to visiting her, he has to bring her food. “Every day you have to bring her food, so that’s 500 pesos there and 500 pesos back; there is no pocket that can withstand that.” continue reading

On the streets of Guantánamo, electric three-wheelers have become an essential means of transportation. Some are blue, some black, with canopies to protect passengers from the sun and modifications made on the fly. Small groups gather around them, waiting for a seat or asking the price before getting in. The scene is repeated as state bus routes have practically disappeared and mobility has been left in the hands of private transport operators.

For those who live outside the city, the problem begins much earlier. Ramona lives in Cuneira, a rural community in the municipality of El Salvador located 23 kilometers from Guantánamo, and she must regularly travel to the provincial capital to receive treatment related to her diabetes. Each trip has become an operation requiring money, time, and luck.

“I have a horse-drawn carriage with a mare and I pick up passengers, but I also transport root vegetables and fruit to Guantánamo, where my brother has a pushcart for selling them”

“We used to have the train, but now not even that; we depend on the three-wheelers all the time,” she says. For students in those areas, especially those who must travel to schools far from their homes, the transportation shortage also turns the school day into an obstacle course. Getting to the classroom often depends on finding a vehicle, having money to pay for it, or walking part of the way.

But the crisis does not only affect the transportation of people. It also leaves products stranded in the fields that should end up in the city’s markets.

“I have a horse-drawn carriage with a mare and I pick up passengers, but I also transport root vegetables and fruit to Guantánamo, where my brother has a pushcart for selling them,” explains a resident of El Salvador. The animal-drawn vehicle, associated for decades with short trips and rural areas, is once again gaining prominence because of the lack of fuel.

“The guajiro who doesn’t have something like this or hasn’t bought an electric three-wheeler has his food rotting in the field because there is no fuel to get it out,” he sums up.

The consequence ultimately reaches the consumer as well. If transporting a sack of produce costs more, that expense ends up incorporated into the selling price. Expensive fuel, the lack of state transportation, and the need to resort to private alternatives form a chain that begins in the furrow and ends in the consumer’s pocket.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Cuban Regime Complains That U.S. Sanctions Are Hindering Economic Reforms on the Island

Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío rejects the possibility that Cuba could cede its mineral wealth to the United States, as Venezuela did with its oil.

The Cuban deputy foreign minister ruled out the possibility that economic pressure alone could bring down the Government and advocated a negotiated solution. / Granma / Dunia Álvarez Palacios

14ymedio, Havana, September 26, 2026 – The Cuban Government now maintains that U.S. sanctions are preventing the economic reforms it is attempting to implement from succeeding, reforms intended to give greater space to the private sector and the market. Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío made the statement in an interview with Bloomberg This Weekend (Bloomberg) , in which he also rejected the possibility that Havana could offer Washington access to its mineral resources by following the path taken by Delcy Rodríguez’s Venezuela.

“If the United States reduces the pressure, those transformations in Cuba can advance significantly and become truly irreversible, which is our objective and, in theory, what the United States wants to happen,” the diplomat said in a conversation with journalist David Gura of Bloomberg.

De Cossío was referring to the package of 176 measures with which the Government intends to modify some of the pillars of an economy that has been in crisis for years, giving more space to the private sector, decentralizing some decisions, and expanding certain foreign-currency operations. The deputy foreign minister himself had admitted days earlier that Havana does not know what the outcome of those transformations will be. “We cannot know what the final outcome will be, but we must do something to change the current reality,” he said at the time.

“Cuba’s resources belong to the people,” he said. “Our Government has no right to deprive them of those resources and hand them over to another country”

On this occasion, however, he blamed Washington for making the process more difficult. According to De Cossío, the reforms cannot reach their full potential while the United States maintains what he described as a policy of “oppression and suffocation” against the Cuban population.

The deputy foreign minister also responded to Donald Trump, who this week described Cuba as a “failed state” during his address to the United Nations. “He said that Cuba is a totally failed state, but in the same sentence he says that the United States is exerting more pressure than ever. In other words, he acknowledges that U.S. pressure is the cause of the failure,” De Cossío replied. continue reading

One of the most significant moments of the interview came when Bloomberg asked the official about the possibility that Cuba could follow the Venezuelan model and offer the U.S. privileged access to its natural resources. De Cossío flatly ruled out a similar formula for Cuban deposits. “Cuba’s resources belong to the people,” he said. “Our Government has no right to deprive them of those resources and hand them over to another country.”

“Ally is too strong a word”

The statement comes at a particularly sensitive moment for Cuban mining. Canadian company Sherritt International suspended its direct participation in its nickel and cobalt joint ventures on the Island in May and is currently negotiating a recapitalization with U.S. firm Gillon Capital, which could end up controlling 55% of the company. The transaction remains subject to regulatory approvals and to longstanding claims involving properties nationalized after 1959.

The diplomat also distanced himself from Venezuela, for decades Havana’s main political and energy partner. Asked by Bloomberg whether Cuba still considers the South American country an ally, he replied: “Ally is too strong a word.”

De Cossío also expressed misgivings about another apparently contradictory phenomenon: while Washington is tightening sanctions against the Cuban Government, U.S. shipments destined primarily for the Island’s emerging private sector have increased.

Havana, the deputy foreign minister said, welcomes those goods, although it considers their volume insufficient to meet demand. He then attributed a political intention to the trade. “It is evident that the United States seeks to create a situation of dependency,” he said. “We do not want to be dominated by any other country.”

The statements coincide with a notable increase in commercial traffic from U.S. ports to Cuba. Some 45 vessels have made more than 200 trips to the Island during 2026, carrying nearly 327,000 tons of goods through the end of August. Between January and July, U.S. exports to Cuba reached approximately $674 million, 61.8% more than during the same period in 2025.

“We want to reach a solution with the United States as soon as possible”

Despite the deterioration in relations, De Cossío said that Havana does not want to wait for a possible change in the U.S. political balance after the November midterm elections to alter policy toward the Island. Some Cubans, he acknowledged, hope that a Democratic victory in Congress will reduce pressure from the Trump Administration, but he described that possibility as an “illusion.”

“We cannot sit idly by,” he said. “We want to reach a solution with the United States as soon as possible. And what happens internally in the United States will not have a real impact on Cuba.”

Talks between the two governments are, according to the deputy foreign minister, virtually at a standstill. Even so, he ruled out the possibility that economic pressure alone could bring down the Cuban Government and advocated a negotiated way out.

“We would welcome a solution,” he said. And he acknowledged that such a formula could be “far from what we want, but less than what some people in the United States might expect.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuba’s Etecsa Users Ask Where the Millions of Dollars from the ‘Tarifazo’ Have Gone

Customers complain about “paying for a service they cannot use” because of the blackouts and because the monopoly has not modernized its infrastructure.

Etecsa has accumulated around 77,000 reports of interrupted fixed-line services. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, September 25, 2026 – On July 15, 2025, Prime Minister Manuel Marrero reported before the National Assembly that the new measures generated by Etecsa — Cuba’s State Telecommunications Company — had generated $24,839,000 in just 46 days, about $540,000 a day, compared with approximately $10,000 it had previously taken in. The head of government said at the time that those resources would be allocated to infrastructure recovery, new investments, and the expansion and development of services using new technologies.

Fourteen months later, Etecsa acknowledges that it cannot guarantee the stability of a large portion of those services and that it has had to reorganize its investments in an attempt to keep the infrastructure it already has operating. The explanation, published Thursday by Cubadebate, triggered a cascade of comments from customers who returned to a question Etecsa did not answer: what is happening to the money of those who pay for a service they cannot use?

The state monopoly acknowledged that during the latest nationwide blackout, more than 80% of radio base station sites and nearly 70% of the cabinets – telecommunications equipment installed at various points throughout the network – were out of operation. Internet traffic plunged by as much as 58%. In addition, Etecsa has accumulated around 77,000 reports of interrupted fixed-line services, which it attributes both to the shortage of resources and to the high cost of maintaining technology that the company itself describes as obsolete. continue reading

Although the infrastructure that makes it possible to use data plans remains out of service, the package clock keeps running

“We are paying for a service we cannot use. Money the customer loses,” summarized Omar Peña Ávila among the comments published by Cubadebate. The user recognizes the severity of the crisis facing the country, but points out that both fixed-line and mobile telephone services remain affected while subscribers must continue paying to keep their lines. “It isn’t reasonable,” he protests.

Leonardo Ruz Revilla raises the same problem with data packages. The customer says that the previous month he stopped using more than one gigabyte because of the lack of access to the network and that, despite this, the package expired when it reached its expiration date. “I am paying for a service I am not fully receiving,” he wrote, before asking that megabytes not used because of interruptions be allowed to accumulate.

The additional data plans established by Etecsa are valid for 35 days. The contradiction is particularly evident during prolonged blackouts, because although the infrastructure that makes it possible to use them remains out of service, the package clock keeps running.

The company, however, does provide adjustments when other services are interrupted. Last February, Etecsa’s Consumer Protection Department acknowledged the case of a customer who had been without fixed-line telephone service and Nauta Hogar since November 2024. After verifying that she had generated no traffic for six months, the company credited her 1,800 pesos for the internet service she had not received.

In addition, the Nauta Hogar postpaid option introduced in December 2025 allows up to 1,080 unused hours to accumulate and provides for adjustments to the bill when service interruptions occur. Etecsa therefore has compensation mechanisms for some products, while users of mobile packages are demanding that a similar principle be applied when blackouts prevent them from connecting.

The complaints published by Cubadebate also show that the problem predates the latest electrical collapse. A resident of Marianao says she has been without a fixed-line telephone for nearly a year, despite having to continue paying and keeping Nauta Hogar active. Another customer responds that he has also gone more than three years without fixed-line telephone service and must continue paying for the service so as not to lose the line.

The company maintains that it is not viable to continue expanding the access network – radio base stations, cabinets, and Wi-Fi zones – without first guaranteeing electrical backup for that infrastructure

Even more serious is the testimony of a reader from Entronque de Herradura, in Consolación del Sur, Pinar del Río. According to his account, following a traffic accident two weeks earlier in which a driver was in critical condition, there were no communications available to request an ambulance. A neighbor had to drive to the municipal center to request one in person. The commenter wondered what would happen in similar circumstances in the event of a heart attack or a fire.

In response to the deterioration, Etecsa has decided to change its priorities. The company maintains that it is not viable to continue expanding the access network – radio base stations, cabinets, and Wi-Fi zones – without first guaranteeing electrical backup for that infrastructure. So far, it has equipped the main centers in 64 municipal capitals with photovoltaic systems, although it admits that the installed capacity does not always allow services to be maintained around the clock. Some generators have had to operate for more than 20 consecutive hours.

Etecsa also says that the recovery of its revenues since the second half of 2025 has allowed it to pay part of its overdue debts and international services, install more than 140 radio base stations, expand frequencies to enable 4G in more than a hundred locations, and acquire licenses to increase the capacity of another 300.

Customers, however, remember the promise made when the new rates were imposed. From San José de las Lajas, one reader says that during the day mobile data speeds do not reach 500 kbps and asks what portion of those millions reached his municipality.

One final comment recalls that the increase in revenue was presented precisely as the means to purchase radio base stations, batteries, and other parts. After now reading that some of the money was used to pay accumulated debts and that the network still cannot be expanded, he leaves Etecsa with a simple warning: “Do the math, because the people are doing their own.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

*See also articles reporting on the “tarifazo” — huge price increases for telecommunications services.

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Henry Constantín Enters Kilo 7 Prison in a Process Marked by Lack of Information

Authorities postpone the habeas corpus hearing, which was supposed to be held this Friday.

Henry Constantín said that he was calm and firm last Wednesday during a visit by his partner to Villa María Luisa. / La Hora de Cuba

14ymedio, Madrid, September 25, 2026 – Independent journalist Henry Constantín, director of La Hora de Cuba and vice president of the Inter American Press Association (IAPA) in the region, entered Kilo 7 prison in Camagüey this Thursday. The information, confirmed by him personally in a call to his partner, journalist Alejandra García, contradicts the measure issued during the investigation, which indicated that he would be transferred to Cerámica prison, in the same province.

The alert began Thursday morning, when the journalist’s lawyer reported that Constantín had been transferred from Villa María Luisa, the State Security operations and interrogation headquarters in the Garrido neighborhood of Camagüey, without the family’s knowledge. The news spread on the assumption that the journalist had been taken to the place stated in the official record.

The news spread on the assumption that the journalist had been taken to the place stated in the official record

Constantín, who was subject to a precautionary measure of preventive detention amid an investigation for “disobedience,” had told those close to him last Tuesday that there were rumors that he would be transferred. However, in the end, it was other prisoners who left the facility. On Wednesday, when his family went to visit him, they received no notice of the transfer, which ultimately took place unexpectedly on Thursday.

La Hora de Cuba has denounced the accumulation of illegalities, since the lack of news was followed by false information, given that the precautionary measure indicated that the preventive detention was to be served in Cerámica. Added to all this is the postponement of the habeas corpus hearing filed Monday, which was supposed to take place this Friday. continue reading

The Provincial Popular Court, where Constantín’s family went to inquire about the situation, indicated that although the hearing was scheduled for September 25, “due to work changes” in the country, “it is perhaps postponed until Monday,” although, the publication adds, “most likely it will be next Tuesday the 29th.”

The family has denounced a violation of the Criminal Procedure Law, which establishes that the court has 72 hours from the time it admits the habeas corpus to hold the hearing. “A ruling cannot contradict what the procedural law says; that violates the law of a legal process of the hierarchy,” said law graduate Luis Orlando Bermúdez.

However, the subsequent article specifies that this must be complied with “unless there are justified causes that prevent it,” which would allow for a legal loophole on which to rely. Bermúdez, in any case, considers that the cause is not justified. “I think that if there is a habeas corpus there should be a judge, during the rotation due to the change of work. It cannot be that my procedural guarantees are violated because you have a change of work; that is crazy. You cannot arrange for there to be a change of work on Friday when there is a labor code that says Friday is a work day,” he maintains.

Henry Constantín is accused of a crime of disobedience for failing to appear for a summons issued for last September 9

Henry Constantín is accused of a crime of disobedience for failing to appear for a summons issued for last September 9 at the Directorate of Identification, Immigration and Foreigners, in the Vista Hermosa neighborhood. Shortly afterward, on the 16th, the journalist received another communication instructing him to appear at the Second Unit of the Revolutionary National Police, located on Carretera Central, where he was arrested, supposedly, for the events that occurred the previous week.

Since then, his lawyer has complained about the misinformation that obstructs his right to a defense, beginning with the lack of access to the case file, without which she cannot appeal any of the measures adopted.

Last Wednesday, during a visit of about 20 minutes, Constantín assured his partner that he is facing his current situation with determination. “I am calm and I remain firm,” he said.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Uruguay Will Pay Cuban Doctors Directly, Says Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin

The U.S. and Cuba agree on this new method of remuneration, the diplomat told journalist Gabriel Pereyra.

Lubetkin told Pereyra that a solution is being found to “a technical problem, which is changing the method of payment to these doctors.” / Video screenshot/Presidency of Uruguay

14ymedio, Havana, September 24, 2026 – “Uruguay reached an agreement with both the Government of the United States and that of Cuba to resolve the case of Cuban doctors.” This was confirmed by Uruguay’s Foreign Minister, Mario Lubetkin, to Radio Sarandí journalist Gabriel Pereyra. The Government of Yamandú Orsi offered to “pay the professionals from the Island directly,” the journalist emphasized.

The Uruguayan diplomat was approached by the journalist in New York, and he confirmed that Cuba had accepted the new method of payment to professionals working in the country, including 21 Cuban ophthalmologists, anesthesiologists, nurses, and technicians who are currently at the José Martí Eye Hospital. However, Lubetkin clarified that “Uruguay cannot interfere in other possible movements, such as, for example, the doctors being forced to transfer that money to Cuba.”

At the beginning of September, Washington threatened the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense with including Uruguay on a “blacklist” of countries using slave labor for maintaining the agreement with Cuba. This would mean, Pereyra indicated, no longer receiving military aid from the U.S.

Lubetkin told Pereyra that a solution is being found to “a technical problem, which is changing the method of payment to these doctors.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working together with the Ministry of Public Health, the State Health Services Administration, and the Social Security Bank to implement changes to the program and formalize the new agreement.

The healthcare relationship between Uruguay and Cuba dates back to 2005, when Operation Miracle began, the ophthalmology program promoted for low-income patients and initially financed by Venezuela as part of the regional integration project Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). continue reading

Cuban ophthalmologists traveled to Uruguay to select patients who were then transported to the Island for eye surgeries. Between 2005 and 2007, some thirty flights carrying 2,037 Uruguayans were recorded, according to data from the Cuban Foreign Ministry.

The president of Uruguay’s Social Security Bank (BPS), Jimena Pardo, confirmed in mid-September the disbursement of $250,000 annually from the institution’s budget to Operation Miracle. The official clarified that the money does not correspond to the salaries of the 21 Cuban professionals currently working at the José Martí Eye Hospital, which is part of the Gustavo Saint Bois Hospital Center and under state administration, but rather “is a stipend, a reimbursement of expenses.”

A total of 21 Cuban ophthalmologists, anesthesiologists, nurses, and technicians currently work at the José Martí Eye Hospital in Uruguay. / Video screenshot/Presidency of Uruguay

Pardo emphasized that payment of the doctors’ salaries is the responsibility of Havana. The BPS transfers the funds to an account belonging to the brigade established by the Ministry of Public Health. She also indicated that it is stipulated that they remain in Uruguay for three-year periods.

There is no official information on the salaries received by these specialists. In May 2020, Uruguay’s Ministry of Public Health refused to disclose the remuneration and number of Cuban professionals collaborating at the José Martí Eye Hospital due to the “nonexistence of data held by this State Secretariat.”

In 2015, Uruguay’s Senate forgave a debt of $31.5 million plus interest ($55 million in total) that Cuba had incurred in 1986. The decision, they argued, was made in consideration of the “numerous instances of cooperation” that Montevideo had received from the Island “in different areas.”

Between 2008 and 2022, the presence of seven brigades in the South American nation was recorded, with around 160 professionals.

Honduras, Guatemala, and Antigua and Barbuda, as well as Guyana, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, have ended their medical cooperation projects with Cuba following pressure exerted by Washington.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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