In Cuba, Stealing 25 Liters of Gasoline Is More Serious Than Diverting Millions of Barrels of Oil

In the face of the U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean, five tankers from Russia’s shadow fleet turn around

The Boltaris—in the image under its former name—turned back while heading to Venezuela with Russian naphtha. / Ivan Zelepukhin

14ymedio biggerMadrid, December 16, 2025 –The commission of a minor crime has cost two workers at the Matanzas Fuel Trading Company a public humiliation that includes the dissemination of their faces and full names as if they were two dangerous criminals. That is just the appetizer, because the harsher punishment is still to come if, at the trial awaiting them, they are charged with sabotage—one of the most serious crimes in the penal code—carrying sentences of between four and ten years in prison.

The news was spread this Monday by the pro-government account Con todos la victoria [With all of us the victory], dedicated to showcasing small police “successes” in the province of Matanzas, which labeled the incident a “totally shameful act.” In the post—accompanied by photographs of the alleged thieves—it is reported that authorities surprised the shift supervisor and a security guard from the company “with their hands in the gasoline.”

The workers had siphoned from one of the tanks “25 liters of gasoline carefully packed in nylon bags, a product in high demand and in short supply among the population these days,” when “their mission was precisely to protect those resources destined for the economy and the well-being of the population.” For this reason, they say, “they earned themselves a judicial process.”

They were luckier than a driver for the state company Transcupet, who was caught “milking” fuel on the national highway near Jagüey Grande.

They were luckier than a driver for the state company Transcupet, who was caught “milking” fuel on the national highway near Jagüey Grande. In his case, although his first and last names were also released, there was no photo showing his face—despite the fact that he was extracting 100 liters of diesel continue reading

from the tank. The account once again seeks to teach a lesson: “The move, which seemed clever, ended in a setback, a lesson that makes it clear that, no matter what tricks are invented, what belongs to others remains off-limits.”

It cannot be denied, judging by the comments on both posts, that there are voices calling for a heavy hand against those who “steal from everyone,” but the staunch defense of the three individuals is the general tone. “In Cuba people live off theft in all the companies, because the salary is not worthy of any human being,” one comment said. References to unlivable wages are repeated ad nauseam, and there is no shortage of those who consider corruption inherent in everyday life in Cuba. “In Cuba everything is illegal; from the moment you get out of bed you’re thinking about how to survive.”

Fuel theft has battered the island for many years, and the authorities do not know how to put a stop to it: neither exemplary trials nor increasingly harsh sentences have managed to reduce the number of such thefts. A few months ago, on a program by Humberto López on Cuban Television devoted to this crime, it was stated that in the country there were perfectly oiled systems— involving operators, brigade chiefs, executives, and guards—through which “as much as 20,000 or 30,000 liters of fuel” were lost every day.

Under current conditions, when the Electric Union reports a daily deficit of about 1,000 megawatts due solely to the lack of distributed generation—most of it because of fuel shortages—pointing the finger at someone who takes 25 liters cannot hide the fact that the Cuban government itself diverts millions of barrels of oil sent by Venezuela to the Chinese market, instead of using them to produce electricity to reduce the 24-hour blackouts.

This Monday the island again experienced a scandalous generation deficit, with 2,007 MW at peak hour. Despite the fact that during the best hour of sun the photovoltaic parks delivered 523 MW, the morning’s generation was only 1,330 MW for a demand of 2,300 MW. Things logically worsened in the late afternoon and evening, when only 1,257 MW were being produced for a demand of 3,089 MW—more than 930 MW of the deficit due to lack of fuel.

The situation could become more complicated given the direction things are taking at the state oil company PDVSA. To the data made public this Monday about buyers demanding discounts—seeing that their purchases could be seized by the United States after what happened with the confiscation of the Skipper—new information is added. According to Reuters, an oil tanker carrying Russian naphtha—used to refine heavy Venezuelan crude—and four large tankers have turned around since that vessel was seized.

The first of these is the Boltaris, flying the flag of Benin, which was carrying some 300,000 barrels of Russian naphtha to Venezuela and turned back over the weekend.

The first of these is the Boltaris, flying the flag of Benin, which was carrying some 300,000 barrels of Russian naphtha to Venezuela and turned back over the weekend. It is now, the agency reports, heading to Europe without having unloaded. The other four vessels, scheduled to load in Venezuelan ports in the coming weeks, have also turned back, leaving many of the country’s exports paralyzed, with the exception of those shipped by Chevron, the U.S. company authorized to operate in Venezuela.

This Monday, the PDVSA stated that it had been the victim of a cyberattack that halted its administrative and operational systems, including oil deliveries.

The sanctions imposed on hydrocarbons during Donald Trump’s first term caused a 99% drop in foreign-currency revenues between 2014 and 2020, and the economy stopped generating $642 billion.

In January of this year, crude production surpassed one million barrels per day (bpd) for the first time since June 2019, with the pumping 1,031,000 bpd. The amount increased to 1,142,000 bpd in November, although in 1998—one year before Chavismo came to power—Venezuela produced 3.1 million bpd, according to a report by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Two years later, Chávez and Castro signed the agreement that ensured Cuba a stable supply, which sustained it for decades, even as production declined, especially since 2017, but now things are taking an even worse turn.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Recent Femicide in Cienfuegos Raises the Total Number of Gender-Based Murders in Cuba This Year to 19

Photo of Carrasco taken from social media./ Facebook

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, 27 July 2025 [delayed translation]- The independent platforms Yo Sí Te Creo in Cuba and Alas Tensas confirmed on Saturday a new femicide on the island, that of Yailín Carrasco, 29, who was murdered by her partner in the city of Cienfuegos this past July 22nd. With this case, the number of sexist killings in Cuba raises to 19 so far in 2025, according to the records of 14ymedio.

According to witnesses, the crime occurred “in front of at least one of her 3 surviving young girls.”

At the same time, the platforms revealed the identity of the woman that was recently murdered in Holguín whose details, due to the secrecy of the official outlets which reported the news, were not known. They concern Yailín Requejo, 41, who was murdered on July 13th on a public street in the capital city of Holguín province. The alleged attacker was detained on Tuesday, state media outlets confirmed, which described the victim as a “young wife” and added that the attack also resulted in serious injury to her youngest daughter.

“The citizen that killed his young wife with a knife in the middle of a public street, in the Cruce del Coco neighborhood of the province of Holguín, was captured thanks to a joint operation between the forces of the Ministry of the Interior of this territory, with the support of operators from Camagüey and the cooperation of the population,” Cubadebate explained.

Days earlier the femicide of Leysi Liettis Cascaret Casero, 22-year-old Medical Sciences student, was reported.

Days earlier the femicide of Leysi Liettis Cascaret Casero, 22-year-old Medical Sciences student, was reported, whose murder was confirmed recently in the observatory Alas Tensas. The young woman was attacked by her partner in the town of El Manguito, municipality of La Maya, in Santiago de Cuba.

According to recently released data by the state Observatory of Cuba on Gender Equality, in 2023 and 2024 the country tried a total number of 76 femicides, in which the victims were more than 15 years old.

In Cuba there is not yet a Comprehensive Law against gender violence and the information surrounding femicides is scarce in official sources. Nevertheless, recently the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of the Interior, the Supreme Court of the People and other institutions announced the creation of an official joint record to compile data about these crimes. However, they also clarified that the stated record will not be publicly accessible.

Translated by Logan Cates

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Rapper Nando OBDC Remains on Hunger Strike and Is in Solitary Confinement

Accused of “subversive activities,” the musician collaborated with Maykel ’Osorbo’ and coordinated a collective exhibition in support of political prisoners.

Almenares Rivera was detained December 31, 2024 in his home in the Havana municipality of La Lisa. / Facebook

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, 27 July 2025 (delayed translation) — The Cuban musician and activist Fernando Almenares Rivera, better known as Nando OBDC, remains on hunger strike in the Cuba Panama prison, located in Güines, Mayabeque. His mother, Eva Rivera, has publicly complained that she has not been able to communicate with the rapper nor has she received any trustworthy information by the authorities.

“She has no reason to believe in the pretexts they have given her for keeping her from seeing him,” wrote the journalist María Matienzo, who wrote about the case on social media. The artist, who is being held in a jail for those infected with AIDS/HIV in Güines, has stopped eating to demand the expedition of his legal process.

Almenares Rivera was detained on December 31, 2024 in his home in the Havana municipality of La Lisa and was accused of “propaganda against the constitutional order,” supposed “subversive activities” and ties to people that promote “terrorism against the Cuban state.”

On one of the visits his mother made to him in prison, the case manager told Rivera that they were processing her son for a crime related to “a fire that occurred in Lenin Park, the past December 30th,” but the family denies any involvement by the artist in this act.

For their part, the Attorney General has not presented any preliminary evidence nor brought any trial against him.

For their part, the Attorney General has not presented any preliminary evidence nor brought any trial against him, after more than seven months of incarceration. His arrest is classified as arbitrary and unjust by friends and organizations.

The prison authorities have alleged that “Nando is well and is not in a punishment cell,” but a fellow inmate contacted his family and confirmed that the activist remains in protest over his detention, which he considers unjust, a family member related to Martí Noticias. In addition to concerns about his legal situation, there are also fears of possible forced medical treatments, without prior diagnosis nor informed consent, stated the activist Kirenia Yalit Núñez Pérez, director of the Cuban Youth Unity Forum and Madrid resident.

This past January, the international organization Artículo 19 demanded the immediate release of Nando OBDC, after learning that he was transferred to the State Security headquarters in Havana, Villa Marista, and later to the Mayabeque prison. The same day of the arrest, regime agents burst into his home without a search warrant, confiscated personal objects and also took a Cuban flag, told his wife, Adriana María Machado.

The artistic and critical portfolio of Nando OBDC has been against the oppressive regime for years.

The artistic and critical portfolio of Nando OBDC has been against the oppressive regime for years. In December of 2024, he coordinated from Cuba the collective exposition Arte Prohibido: Desde Cuba, opened in Miami, with works by censored creators from the Island and in support of political prisoners.

He also has collaborated with artists like Maykel Osorbo, currently incarcerated, and David D Omni, and has been threatened in the past for his social media posts. In 2021, he was ordered to a police station where they warned him: “We are coming for you, you are going to have to move out of La Lisa,” the rapper Navy Pro remembered in a complaint on Facebook.

Currently, his family remains without verifiable news about his health status and demands that they let him receive visitors, adequate medical attention and that he has a fair trial. “He is in there unjustly,” reiterated a family member to Martí Noticias, while activists raised alarms about the risks of prolonged isolation and the physical deterioration of an artist that never should have been in prison.

Translated by Logan Cates

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In Holguín, Not All Roads Are Equal: The Ones the Government Uses Have Priority

“There are always cars belonging to civil servants who come here every day for meetings; they don’t achieve anything, but they never stop having meetings.”

On the way to the hospital, a series of potholes, puddles reflecting tired-looking buildings, crumbling kerbs. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Miguel García, Holguín, December 16 2025 –In the morning progressing along Valle road with an unforgiving rattle. Every pothole forces us to slow down, every puddle – thick, greenish – reminds us that last night’s rain found no drainage and no official concern. Electric tricycles, motorcycles, bicycles and private cars arrive here with the same destination: the Lucía Iñiguez Landín Surgical Hospital. People arrive with fevers, joint pains, and the exhaustion of those who have been waiting for days for their bodies to give way.

“This feels like a test before we even get to the doctor,” says a woman holding her sweaty son as she dodges the accumulated water. Arboviruses have once again put this road at the centre of daily life in Holguín: patients from Velasco, Gibara, Calixto García, Cacocum and the city itself cross this stretch of road, ravaged by neglect and lack of investment, in search of diagnosis and relief.

A few kilometres away, the scene changes in colour and texture. At the end of Frexes Street, opposite the Provincial Assembly of People’s Power, the asphalt looks almost perfect. There are no puddles, the cracks have been sealed, and the kerb has been freshly swept. “There are always cars here with officials who come to meetings every day; they don’t achieve anything, but they never stop having meetings,” complains the driver of an electric tricycle as he compares, without raising continue reading

his voice, the smooth pavement he has just left behind. The illusion hardly lasts 200 metres, from Bim Bom to a sugar-cane juice stall: just the stretch visible from the windows of the official building and the busy part for those entering and leaving the offices of power. Beyond that, the city returns to normal.

The photos show what is seen as normal: opposite the government building, a continuous, clean road surface with smooth traffic flow. / 14ymedio

The contrast is not only aesthetic; it is functional and symbolic. On the road to the hospital, puddles become traps for tyres and ankles; dust rises when the sun beats down and the rain stays away, and when the downpour falls, mud spreads. A cyclist slams on the brakes to avoid falling into a makeshift ditch; the driver of an old Lada calculates where to drive without losing half his suspension in the attempt. “No one comes here to inspect,” sums up a neighbour who sells coffee on the corner and sees the procession of sick people pass by every day. “If they did, this would already be fixed.”

The photos show what is seen as normal: in front of the government building, a smooth, clean road with flowing traffic; but on the way to the hospital, a series of potholes, puddles reflecting tired building façades, crumbling kerbs. On peak days for dengue or chikungunya, the road becomes a funnel for emergencies. The noise of engines mixes with coughing, the rubbing of wet sandals, and the hurried complaining of those who are late for an appointment or for the emergency room.

In Holguín, as in so many parts of the island, the roadway also votes. Where there is power, there is paint and tar; where there is pain, there is waiting and damage. The Valle highway does not ask for speeches or ribbon-cutting ceremonies: it asks for drainage, asphalt, maintenance. Meanwhile, the journey to hospital will continue to be an uncomfortable prelude to illness, and the government’s front line will remain a polished postcard for those looking down from above.

Translated by GH

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Cuba’s Matanzas Business Fair: Lots of Hype, Little Substance

The owner of a local MSME — micro, small, or medium-sized enterprise — laments the exclusion of the most dynamic private companies from an event dominated by bankrupt state-owned enterprises.

The stands, lined up in an apathetic uniformity, offered little more than poorly printed banners. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Julio César Contreras, Matanzas, Cuba, December 15, 2025 — The Business Fair opened its doors in Matanzas like almost all official events in Cuba are announced: with institutional enthusiasm, grandiose headlines and promises of productive chains that, at least on paper, seemed capable of boosting the local economy. For three days, the former Palace of Justice – now under the administration of the Office of the Conservator – became the venue for the third edition of a meeting that intended to showcase business muscle and modernity. However, you only had to cross the threshold for the story to begin to unravel.

In the wide corridors, the echo of footsteps was more eloquent than any slogan. The stands, lined up in apathetic uniformity, offered little more than poorly printed banners, bottles of rum placed listlessly on decorative barrels, and tables where representatives sat waiting for an audience that never arrived. The contrast between the official account and reality was difficult to ignore.

“They gave participation to their companies and a few private ones that respond to their interests,” Karel, owner of an MSME dedicated to furniture manufacturing, told 14ymedio. Since the middle of the year, he had tried unsuccessfully to obtain an exhibition space. He submitted documents, described his business purpose, and met every requirement. The final response was a bureaucratic phrase: all capacities were covered. Walking around the fair, however, it was difficult to understand what those capacities were.

The decoration included state-owned companies and entities that survive thanks to the official monopoly on certain sectors. / 14ymedio

The province has 137 state-owned companies, more than 600 micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, almost 300 local development projects and tens of thousands of self-employed workers. That diversity was not reflected in the event. “Who are you supposed to form alliances with here?” Karel asked as he pointed to an empty stand. “I can’t even hang a banner with basic information about my business. This isn’t a fair, it’s a stage set.” continue reading

The decoration included, of course, the state-owned companies and entities that survive thanks to the official monopoly on certain sectors. The Banco de Crédito y Comercio (Bandec) and the Banco Popular de Ahorro occupied visible spaces, although their presence was limited more to promoting digital platforms than to solving specific problems. “I came because I read that they were going to hand out magnetic cards,” says Ania, a resident of the historic centre. “All they do is install Transfermóvil and EnZona. I’ve had those for a long time. There was no need to set up a fair for that.”

The aesthetics did not help much either. The exhibition stands seemed improvised, with no clear visual line or minimal effort to communicate efficiency. “If they give design awards here, they can give them to anyone,” said a university professor who walked around the venue with a sceptical look on her face. The woman gave up on calling her son to get banking advice: “This is not the place to talk about a serious loan.”

The Banco de Crédito y Comercio (Bandec) and the Banco Popular de Ahorro occupied visible spaces, although their presence was limited more to the promotion of digital platforms. / 14ymedio

Initially scheduled for October, coinciding with the anniversary of the founding of the city of Matanzas, the Fair was suspended at least twice. This organisational back-and-forth left a trail of mistrust among those invited. Some gave up on participating; others attended more out of curiosity than real expectations. The result was an event where one could walk around comfortably, something unthinkable in any space that truly connects supply and demand.

Meanwhile, the “window dressing” was evident. State-owned companies with supply problems, financial deficits or impaired services presented themselves as efficient cogs in a moving economy. Not even this self-promotion could hide the fact that many are bankrupt and others survive because there are no alternatives. In key sectors – banking, commerce, paperwork – the customer does not choose: they accept.

At the close, provincial authorities described the Fair as a business success, but for those who walked those aisles, the assessment is different. There was no real variety of services, no effective interrelation between economic actors, and no signs of an expanding productive environment. There was, however, a staging designed for the photo and the report.

The slogan for this edition was “Matanzas, more productive every day.” The phrase hung in the air, without tangible backing. Outside the Fair, the city continued to grapple with power cuts, shortages and businesses that survive in spite of the system, not because of it.

Translated by GH

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Cuba’s Food Dependence on the US Grows With Purchases of $355 Million This Year

Imports of pork, sugar, coffee, grains and animal feed reach record highs

In 2025, Cuba imported pork worth $33.6 million / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, December 14, 2025 — Food sovereignty and the US embargo, mantras repeated daily by Cuban authorities, have been further undermined this year. During the first nine months of 2025, Cuba imported $355 million worth of agricultural products from the US, 15% more than during the same period last year, according to figures from the US Department of Agriculture.

One of the products that saw the largest price increase was pork. Between January and September, the island purchased $33.6 million worth of this commodity from its northern neighbor, more than double the amount spent during the same period in 2014, when it spent $16.3 million.

The increase in imports of this protein from the US comes amid a crisis in the island’s agricultural sector. Last year, the country produced only 9,000 tons, almost half of the 16,500 tons produced two years prior, and 95.5% less than in 2018, when the sector reached 200,000 tons. According to farmers, these poor figures are due, in part, to a lack of animal feed, as well as the difficulty in finding labor.

Sugar, of which the country was once the world’s leading producer, now comes from abroad.

Cuba’s dependence on the U.S. market is hitting hard for products that were once flagships of the country. Sugar, of which Cuba was once the world’s leading producer, is now imported. This year, the island spent $14.9 million on sugar from the U.S., while in 2024 it spent $11.1 million.

Traditionally, Cuba consumed 700,000 tons of sugar and exported the rest, but with current production levels, the situation has changed dramatically: now it is forced to import much of the sugar it needs for its population and is unable to fulfill its export contracts. And there is an even more serious symptom: since at least 2020, every sugar harvest on the island has been ranked as the worst in the last 100 years. continue reading

Coffee imports also increased, another sector in decline. Imports from the United States rose 32%, from $8.4 million in 2024 to $11 million in the first nine months of this year. This dependence on U.S. coffee is due to the collapse in domestic production, which, according to the National Bureau of Statistics and Information, has fallen 51% in the last five years.

As for the low production in the country, priority is given to selling it abroad, which has left Cubans helpless, since coffee does not reach the bodegas (ration stores). It is sold very expensively in the informal market or is of very poor quality if it can be acquired – with a bad mixture of equal parts coffee and chickpeas.

Tobacco also saw a considerable increase in imports from the United States. Cuba purchased $355,000 worth of tobacco, an 83% increase.

Tobacco imports from the United States also saw a considerable increase. Cuba purchased $355,000 worth of the leaves, an 83% increase compared to last year’s $194,000. This surge comes after the country experienced a record high in sales of premium tobacco on the international market, although domestic cigarette production is no longer sufficient to meet the demand on the island, unlike in the past.

Another category with increased imports from the United States was grains and animal feed. This year, the figure nearly quadrupled, rising from $6.8 million to $23.8 million. This increase is also a record for the last five years, as imports had fluctuated between $6 million and $9 million since 2020.

Today, Cuba relies on imports for more than 80% of its basic food needs. The country receives rice from Guyana, Vietnam, and China, pasta from Turkey, canned sardines from Venezuela, and grains from Portugal, among other things.

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“Zero Transparency”: Díaz-Canel’s Speech About His Former Friend Alejandro Gil

The president used quotes from Fidel Castro to denigrate the person who was his right-hand man in the government.

Why did they let him be showered with hugs and birthday wishes? They mocked him in front of the entire country. / Granma

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Yunior García Aguilera, Madrid, December 14, 2025 — At the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee, Miguel Díaz-Canel had a privileged opportunity to offer explanations about one of the biggest political and judicial scandals of Castroism: the life sentence for espionage, in addition to a 20-year sentence for other crimes, that a court has just imposed on the former Minister of Economy, Alejandro Gil.

But instead of detailing facts, responsibilities, failed control mechanisms, or institutional lessons, the president chose a different path. With evident dyslexia, he read five paragraphs of moralizing rhetoric, quotes from Fidel Castro, and metaphors about traitors and patriots. The result was a speech laden with adjectives but devoid of concrete information about how and why one of the men he trusted most ended up becoming, in his view, a “great traitor.”

The close relationship between Díaz-Canel and Gil was also evident in the academic sphere. The president was the principal advisor for the then-Minister of Economy’s doctoral thesis. This endorsement implied a bond of trust and made Díaz-Canel the intellectual guarantor of Gil’s economic vision. That same thesis has been cited by critics and relatives of the former minister as a symbol of the extremely close relationship between the two.

For years, Gil was the public face of Díaz-Canel’s government’s economic policy and one of its most highly promoted figures. Even after his dismissal, the president showered him with praise and public embraces. However, he then agreed to serve as a prosecution witness during the closed-door trial against the former deputy prime minister. And now, in Congress, he presents him as the prototype of those who “sell out the nation.” This abrupt shift only holds up if the official narrative manages to isolate the case, transform it into an individual moral drama, and avoid continue reading

any difficult questions about the political responsibility of the inner circle that elevated him. This is where the phrases Díaz-Canel chose for his speech, and their underlying subtext, come into play.

Díaz-Canel, conscious of his limited authority, immediately invokes the late Fidel Castro

The president began to paint a picture of Gil without naming him: “There appear those who profit from needs and shortcomings, those who obstruct the path and delay progress, and others capable of selling out the nation that once elevated them to the highest offices.” Díaz-Canel is attempting to reinforce Gil’s image as an internal enemy, shifting the discussion from the technical-economic sphere to absolute morality. There is no talk of design flaws, but rather of “those who obstruct the path,” as if the system were a smooth highway and the problem were simply a fallen tree trunk.

Díaz-Canel, aware of his limited authority, immediately invokes the late Fidel Castro: “The enemy is well aware of the weaknesses of human beings in their search for spies and traitors.” On the surface, the message points to the enemy—more than external, “eternal” (the CIA)—but at the same time, it erases any personal responsibility by praising the “capacity for sacrifice and heroism” of the majority (among whom he seems to include himself). The system, he repeats, is not the problem; the problem is the rotten potatoes.

Fidel’s second quote is even worse, speaking to us of the Revolution as a great battle that teaches us who are “those who aren’t even good enough to fertilize their land with their blood and their lives.” We all witnessed how some Castroist radicals, including those on the program ” Con Filo,” campaigned for Gil’s eventual execution. And now Díaz-Canel insinuates that his former friend wasn’t even good enough to waste the bullets of a firing squad on.

Even so, Díaz-Canel didn’t hold back his verbal attacks against Gil, bluntly lumping him in with those “made of selfishness, ambition, disloyalty, betrayal, or cowardice.” While reciting this catalog of vices, the television cameras focused on Humberto López, a star propagandist and master of the stage, who was also close to the ousted former minister.

The third image of the late Castro completes the operation: “In a revolution, everyone has to take off their mask; in a revolution, the altars collapse. Those who have tried to live by deceiving others, those who have tried to live posing as virtuous or posing as decent people, or posing as patriots, or posing as brave. That is what the Revolution teaches us, it teaches us who the true patriots are, and where the great traitors come from.”

The lack of clarification in the plenary session demonstrates that, rather than “zero tolerance”, what abounds is “zero transparency.”

This clip is the closest thing I’ve ever seen to a fit of rage. Díaz-Canel is portraying himself as a cuckolded husband, ridiculed by all his colleagues. How could the powers that be have let him make a fool of himself for so long? If they already knew about Gil’s infidelities, why did they let him mentor him, thank him on Twitter for his efforts, promise him new tasks, shower him with hugs and birthday wishes? They mocked him in front of the entire country.

After this indulgence in Fidelista rhetoric, Díaz-Canel concludes: “I don’t think there are more accurate phrases to describe the actions of Alejandro Gil, from whose disgraceful case we must draw experiences and lessons, making it clear, first of all, that the Revolution has zero tolerance for such behavior.”

Here, finally, the former minister’s name appears, but only to fit into the already constructed category: traitor, selfish, ambitious, disloyal. Gil doesn’t exist as a political actor with concrete decisions, but rather as an abstract synthesis of all the vices enumerated.

What doesn’t appear in any of these paragraphs is what many “revolutionaries” were hoping to hear: how the alleged spy network was discovered, which structures were compromised, which control mechanisms failed, who was politically responsible for keeping him in office for so long, or what guarantees exist that there aren’t other “little altars” still standing. Díaz-Canel, like a priest on Sunday, turns the case into a moral lesson and a disciplinary warning to the apparatus.

The toxic relationship between Gil and Díaz-Canel, after this speech, takes on the air of a soap opera. The relentless persecution of the convicted man, the opacity surrounding the case, the attempt to isolate and silence the family, and the lack of clarification in the plenary session demonstrate that, more than “zero tolerance,” what abounds is “zero transparency.” Díaz-Canel’s speech was the typical lament of a cuckold. All that was missing was the stab in the back behind closed doors, without anyone noticing.

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Fifteen Cuban Exile Organizations in Madrid Agree To Coordinate Their Actions

Among its objectives are supporting asylum seekers and the desire to “influence the diplomatic agenda”

Cuba a Pulso aims to have a physical space that will allow it to bring together these and other organizations. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, December 13, 2025 — A group of Cuban organizations in Spain held a meeting in Madrid this Friday, entitled “Cuba a Pulso” (Cuba at Full Speed), with the aim of working together towards greater coordination. The exiles seek to strengthen their shared physical space and bolster their political influence in Europe, according to a press release sent to the 14ymedio newsroom.

The meeting, which was supported by the Czech organization People in Need, included representatives from Alas Tensas and its Gender Observatory, Árbol Invertido, Museo V, Mesa de Diálogo de la Juventud Cubana, Disidencias en Movimiento, Democracia Cristiana, Otra Ola, ClickCuba, Forma Foco, CubaxCuba, 5 Minutos, Ciudadanía y Libertad, Red Femenina and El Toque, convened from Casa Palanca.

“The event stems from the hope and need to be together to be stronger,” the statement says, defining the meeting as “a first step” to build “a possible path to strengthen ourselves as exiles in Madrid and, who knows, in the rest of Europe.”

The event was born from the hope and the need to be together to be stronger

Cuba a Pulso aims to establish a physical space that can bring together these and other organizations, serving as a venue for meetings, consultations, and community activities. While the organizers acknowledge that having a headquarters “may not be immediately achievable,” they believe that moving toward this goal would be “a tangible first step” in consolidating their collaborative work.

Political influence in Spain was another key topic of discussion. According to the report, a strong network of Cubans in Madrid and Europe “can influence the diplomatic agenda,” as well as open spaces for dialogue with Spanish and European institutions to promote rights and opportunities for Cubans both continue reading

on and off the island.

The document also underscores the need to support Cuban asylum seekers, whose numbers are growing in Spain. Among the proposals discussed is the creation of a structured reception pathway, which would include guidance on asylum and documentation, job and housing searches, access to basic services, and support throughout the adaptation process.

The participants emphasized the idea of ​​”unity without uniformity.” / 14ymedio

The participants emphasized the idea of ​​”unity without uniformity,” stressing that the goal is not to impose a single vision, but to articulate differences under shared values ​​such as dignity, solidarity, and support for those who remain on the island. “Unity does not mean suppressing opinions,” the statement reads, “but rather recognizing what unites us.”

The meeting concluded with a commitment to continue the talks and translate them into concrete actions. “This meeting is not just talk; it was born from the desire to translate the conversations into action,” the statement affirms, describing the gathering as “the seed of a shared path” for the Cuban exile community in Madrid and Europe.

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More of the Same in Cuba at the Plenary Session of the PCC Central Committee: “Intensify the Ideological Battle”

At Raúl Castro’s request, it was decided to postpone the ninth Congress, hoping to “unite forces” and create “better conditions”. 

Díaz-Canel listed problems that the system itself generates and perpetuates. / Cubadebate

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, December 14, 2025 — The 11th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba concluded on Saturday, leaving behind many slogans, lengthy ideological discussions and an almost total absence of real self-criticism. Miguel Díaz-Canel, first secretary of the PCC and president of the Republic, repeated to the party elite the same recipe that the ruling party has been distributing for decades: unity, resistance, discipline and ideological battle.

All this in a country facing its worst economic deterioration since the 1990s, a health collapse in the midst of a viral epidemic and a civic disengagement of the people that neither the Party nor the Government has managed to reverse.

At the meeting, it was agreed to postpone the organisation’s 9th Congress, originally scheduled for April 2026. The proposal was presented by Raúl Castro and announced by Díaz-Canel in a letter read to the members of the Central Committee. In the letter, Raúl Castro acknowledged the importance of respecting the usual congress schedule – every five years – but considered that, given the current “circumstances of force majeure”, it was more appropriate to devote the next year to addressing economic and social problems and to concentrate resources and efforts on “national recovery”. The decision was approved, as always, unanimously, with the official justification that it would allow for “cohesion of forces” and create “better conditions” for a more fruitful congress in the future.

The president began his speech by announcing the need to “change everything that needs to be changed,” although he immediately returned to placing the nonagenarian Raúl Castro as his ideological compass. “If we want to move things forward, the first thing we have to achieve is to make the Party’s grassroots organisation strong in every place,” he said, in a message that shifts the focus to rank-and-file members and avoids attributing structural failures to the political leadership.

The plenary session devoted much of its time to reviewing compliance with the agreements of the 8th Congress of the PCC, held in 2021, and the accountability of the Political Bureau. According to Díaz-Canel, none of these debates would make sense without a profound change in the internal functioning of the single party. “We cannot allow bureaucracy, formalism and inertia to continue to be obstacles,” he reiterated, as if it were a newly discovered diagnosis and not a historical burden spanning six decades of continue reading

economic and political centralisation.

In the absence of concrete solutions to the economic crisis, the official discourse reinforced the ground where the PCC feels most comfortable: symbolic confrontation. The president insisted on the need to “intensify the ideological, cultural and communicational battle,” repeating the formula of “Cuba’s truth” in the face of “manipulation” and “media warfare.” According to him, each day of the system’s survival constitutes “a victory” against the “most powerful enemy,” even though the most pressing problems—blackouts, inflation, shortages, epidemics—have essentially domestic roots.

Those who were hoping for concrete explanations, verifiable data, or some light on the opacity surrounding the Gil case had to settle for adjectives.

Díaz-Canel dedicated five lengthy and rhetorical paragraphs to Alejandro Gil, recently sentenced to life imprisonment for espionage and other crimes. The president—who was close to the former Minister of Economy and even showered him with hugs and congratulations after his dismissal—stated: “Those who profit from needs and shortcomings appear, those who obstruct progress, those who delay advancement, and those capable of selling out the nation that once elevated them to the highest offices.” 

To support that assessment, he used several quotes from Fidel Castro about those who embody “selfishness, ambition, disloyalty, betrayal, or cowardice,” and about the revealing nature of every revolution, where “the altars collapse” and “the great traitors” are exposed.

Díaz-Canel maintained that there were no more accurate words to describe Gil’s “actions” and called his case a “disgraceful” one from which the country must learn lessons. He reiterated that the Revolution maintains “zero tolerance” for behaviors like those attributed to the former minister and asserted that episodes of this kind necessitate strengthening ethical and political oversight in all institutions. However, those who were hoping for concrete explanations, verifiable data, or some clarity on the opacity surrounding the case had to settle for adjectives.

References to the “US blockade” were constant. Díaz-Canel spoke of “enormous pressure” and media intoxication capable of distorting internal perception. But even when citing the health crisis caused by dengue and chikungunya, he again placed the blame on minor organisational issues, such as a lack of personnel to fumigate, monitoring problems and control deficiencies. Not a word was said about the obvious collapse of the hospital system and the mass exodus of health professionals.

Not a word was said about the obvious collapse of the hospital system and the mass exodus of health professionals.

The president called for acting “without improvisation,” promoting “collective leadership,” encouraging criticism and self-criticism, and “confronting corruption more decisively,” even though the country’s political structure continues to lack independent mechanisms for control, transparency, or citizen oversight. In what has become a customary exercise in PCC interventions, Díaz-Canel listed problems that the system itself generates and perpetuates, but without admitting the political origin of these dysfunctions.

The plenary session also addressed the country’s economic situation, which, according to Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz, is marked by a “war economy” scenario. The government’s programme to “correct distortions and revive the economy” includes 106 objectives, 342 actions and 264 indicators, a design that contrasts with the chronic lack of tangible results. The official narrative insists on the need to “prioritise tasks”, “integrate actors” and “mobilise reserves”, but the balance sheet presented confirms that the country is operating with fuel shortages, prolonged blackouts, low production levels and severe foreign exchange restrictions.

The Minister of Energy and Mines, Vicente de la O Levy, admitted that the last few weeks have been “extremely difficult,” marked by loss of generation and the inability to guarantee electrical stability. Not even the new photovoltaic solar parks, hailed as a strategic advance, compensate for the obsolete technology and lack of fuel that continue to cause blackouts of up to 18 hours in several provinces.

The message, identical to the one officialdom has repeated for decades, shifts attention from administrative failure to ideological loyalty.

Another critical issue addressed was the epidemiological crisis. Health Minister José Ángel Portal Miranda acknowledged that Cuba faces an “extraordinary” challenge, with dengue and chikungunya epidemics aggravated by a lack of supplies, fumigation equipment, laboratory reagents and basic medicines. He added that many areas have serious problems with disease-carrying mosquitoes, sanitation and water supply, a structural deterioration that the government has been unable to reverse for years. The official response, once again, insisted on “popular participation” as a solution in the absence of institutional resources.

Amid this panorama, the PCC once again placed “unity” as the cornerstone of the political project. Díaz-Canel stated that unity “is forged through participation” and that it is the guarantee that Cuba will remain “free, independent and sovereign.” The message, identical to the one the ruling party has repeated for decades, shifts attention from administrative failure to ideological loyalty. Participation, however, is limited to consultation mechanisms with no real decision-making power.

The plenary session closed with the confirmation of what had already been anticipated, namely that there will be no structural changes that alter the PCC’s political monopoly or the centralised planning that keeps the economy paralysed. Everything is focused on “correcting distortions” without touching the root of those distortions: the model itself. There is no political openness, no real economic liberalisation, no full business autonomy, and no respect for civil rights. The Party once again proclaims itself the absolute arbiter of the country’s future and the guardian of a unity that is demanded but not built on plurality.

The lack of commentary in official publications is striking, a sign of popular disinterest in this type of meeting. The system insists that the country’s problems will be solved “through our own efforts.” Cubans, who have been hearing the same thing for decades, already know the lyrics to that song, and they are fed up.

Translated by GH

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“The Treatment You Receive in Prison Is Dictated by State Security”

Luis Robles, “the young man with the placard,” recounts the mistreatment he suffered in prison and the persecution against his family, even after serving his five-year sentence.

Luis Robles Elizastigui, upon his arrival at Adolfo Suárez Madrid Airport on October 13 / 14ymedio

14ymedio biggerBefore becoming a political prisoner, Luis Robles was “just another young Cuban struggling to get ahead.” In December 2020, his life changed when he decided to stand on San Rafael Boulevard in Central Havana with a sign demanding an end to repression and the release of rapper Denis Solís, a gesture that landed him in prison. Five years later, in exile in Spain, he recounts for the first time the details of his imprisonment, the physical and psychological torture he suffered and witnessed, and the complete lack of guarantees within the Cuban prison system, in a lengthy interview published by the Cuba X Cuba platform.

Robles begins by explaining the motivations behind his peaceful protest. “When you become a father, you start to think a little differently, to look for better options to provide for your child.” That’s why he decided to go out with a sign. “I wanted to do something to show that I disagreed with the situation, with the repression, the persecution. I thought I would do it in the best way possible so they wouldn’t have grounds to charge me, a peaceful way, without disturbing the peace.” He never imagined everything that would come next.

Robles recounts that he was first held at the Combinado del Este prison, in pretrial detention with common criminals, in “cells with 20 people, in a space of three by four meters, locked up there all day in that small space.” They could only go out to the yard “once or twice a week, for an hour.”

“I wanted to do something to show that I disagreed with the situation, with the repression, the persecution, in a peaceful way, without disturbing the peace.”

He was then transferred to the large cells of the same prison, “spaces for 45 people, it was bunk beds, bunk beds, bunk beds.” There, common criminals awaiting trial lived alongside political prisoners, he recounts. Many who knew his story approached him and “were proud to know that I was the young man who had left” with the sign, he says.

With the guards, it was a different story. “The treatment you receive in prison is dictated by State Security; they treat you as State Security orders.” In his case, the treatment included constant surveillance. “They treated me quite roughly, searching continue reading

me at any time of day or night.” Although everything he possessed was authorized, “they did it to mess with me,” he adds. “I was documenting the abuses I began to witness in prison, the torture they inflicted on the inmates, the way they punished and instilled fear in the other prisoners, and they started harassing me for that.”

Among those tortures, he recalls “several prisoners who suffered brutal beatings” and “others who, as punishment, were kept handcuffed in front of the bars overnight.” Robles was among those who received the most punishment: “Sometimes they would find me to punish me for no reason. They would chain my hands and feet with special handcuffs they call Shakiras there, which are used more for dangerous prisoners, and they would keep me like that for three or four hours.” On occasion, they would leave him “handcuffed and facing the wall,” and once “from six in the morning until two in the afternoon.” He explains that “it was to hurt me, to torture me, and I discovered that those orders came directly from State Security.”

Part of the pressure stemmed from attempts to turn him into an informant. “The aim was to break you, to get you to submit, to use you as a snitch inside the prison.”

Without me having done anything, they chained my hands and feet with special handcuffs, and kept me like that for 3 or 4 hours, sometimes more, to torture me.

The prison authorities themselves encouraged violence by common criminals against political prisoners. On several occasions, he felt threatened or in danger, especially when he was transferred to a different cellblock, but the other prisoners would warn him: “They’d tell me, ‘Hey, be careful, they sent you here to do this to you.’” But publicly denouncing it offered him some protection. “I told my mom everything that happened to me, and we reported it on social media.” The other prisoners were offered “more food, more phone access… those are the perks in prison,” he says.

The material conditions were also part of the punishment. The food, he says, was “horrible, rotten, with a foul smell that made you want to vomit.” The hamburgers “were green, from lack of refrigeration.”

The medical care was “terrible, terrible, terrible… many times I wasn’t given any medical attention.” They only attended to him “when my mother went and complained… that day they wanted to see me.” The rest was neglect: “they told me there was no medicine, that I should wait there.”

From prison, Robles also witnessed firsthand the wave of repression following the protests of 11 July 2021: “I saw people come in with broken arms, people with gunshot wounds, an elderly man whose arms were broken, a friend whose jaw was dislocated from a beating.” Minors arrived: “17, 18-year-old boys… children, minors who shouldn’t have been in an adult prison.” Many had been arrested for “standing in their doorways” or “filming.”

The food was awful, it was rotten, with a bad smell that made you want to vomit.

Robles was one of those released last January, along with hundreds of other prisoners, as part of an agreement with the Joe Biden administration. He had not yet finished serving his sentence, so he remained under house arrest until last June. But then he discovered that his freedom was a sham: “I was forbidden from expressing any political opinions or speaking about what I experienced in prison.” He was warned that everything would be fine “as long as you don’t talk… you can’t talk about what you experienced in prison… otherwise, you’ll go back to jail,” he says. Throughout his time in Cuba, he endured visits and calls from State Security.

“They came to check on me, to find out how I was thinking.” “They even came into my room, even when I was sleeping, two or three times a month. They came in like they owned the house. Unbearable,” she says.

When the sanction ended, they made it clear to him that any movement he made, even within the country, had to be reported. “I didn’t remain calm: I remained intimidated and silenced until the very last day.”

The repression also reached his family. His brother was imprisoned: “A policeman assaulted him, and now my brother is the one they put in jail, a year there without trial.” For State Security, “my brother was a hostage, he is a hostage,” who remains imprisoned in Cuba, now for attempting to leave the country illegally. They kept telling him: “Remember you have a brother imprisoned there.” His mother, Yindra Elizastigui, who also participates in the interview, suffered pressure and veiled threats.

The feeling of social isolation ultimately drove him to exile. “I felt alone; on my block, the one watching me was my neighbor. Even if I had finished my sentence, I would always have been a prisoner.”

He arrived in Madrid on October 13, 2025, but acknowledges that the aftereffects persist, “that pressure of feeling that an enemy can appear anywhere, the mind is active all the time.”

Even so, Robles believes that “resentment does more harm to the one who carries it than to the one who receives it.” “What I want is for there to be justice in my country. For that criminal, dictatorial, and repressive government to be gone. But I don’t carry resentment,” he affirms.

He sees national reconciliation as difficult but not impossible. The system “first and foremost divided us,” and to rebuild the country, “Cubans have to learn to value themselves as human beings. When we regain the awareness of what it means to be master of oneself, then there will be reconciliation,” he states.

He sends a direct message to young people: “I wouldn’t want any young person to go through what I went through, to waste that time locked up watching their life and health deteriorate. But I do urge people to fight for what they deserve. Let’s start a change of mentality.”

And he concludes with a phrase that he says he will continue to repeat until it is fulfilled: “Freedom for Cuba, freedom for all political prisoners, and freedom for all innocent people.”

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Authorities Blame a Florida-Based Network for the Production and Sale of ‘El Químico’

Cuban police arrest 24 people and confiscate homes, vehicles and 11 million pesos

The police operation against el químico / Canal Caribe

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, December 13, 2025 –The Cuban authorities insist on accusing external forces of being behind the spread of drugs on the island. This time, they found the pretext in a police operation announced on Friday against an alleged network dedicated to producing and distributing el químico – the chemical – the synthetic cannabinoid that has become the drug of greatest impact among young Cubans.

According to official media, the criminal network is directed from Florida and employs residents on the island as distributors, a scheme that coincides with the recent official strategy of attributing the increase in consumption to “external influences.”

Arnaldo Ramos, section chief of the Specialized Criminal Investigation Unit of the Ministry of the Interior, stated on State television that the drugs, described as a cream-like mixture, entered Cuba through “illegal air parcel shipments” camouflaged in yogurt containers, gelatin, food supplements and medications. The official insisted that Havana has “accordingly” informed Washington about individuals in the US who allegedly try to promote trafficking on the island, although “there has been no response to these cases.”

According to official media, the alleged drug trafficking network is directed from Florida

The explanation exists in a context where the Government itself has had to recognize, for the first time in years, that consumption of synthetic drugs has diversified and expanded, particularly among adolescents and people in their twenties. The most recent reports speak of a growing market for variants of el químico made with imported substances and processed clandestinely in private homes, a phenomenon that authorities had kept silent about until continue reading

very recently.

In the operation publicized this week, the head of the Anti-Drug Unit, Yoan Saporta, reported the arrest of 24 people charged with offenses related to drug trafficking. In addition to the drugs, authorities seized syringes, gloves, trays, masks and acetone, the latter considered one of the basic inputs for producing el químico. Houses, vehicles and 11 million pesos were also confiscated, a sum equivalent to $91,600 at the official exchange rate but barely more than $25,000 on the informal market.

The operation is presented as part of the “zero tolerance policy” reiterated by senior government officials in early December, when they denied that Cuba is a producing or transit country for narcotics. The official speech coincides with the reinforced US military deployment in the Caribbean to combat drug trafficking, which Havana links to geopolitical pressures on allied governments, especially that of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.

As part of this hardline policy, the courts have multiplied the “show trials,” a practice that the official media has frequently publicized over the past year. In one of the most recent cases, a young man was sentenced to 15 years in prison for possession and sale of small quantities of illicit substances, a punishment that is contrary to international standards and reveals the punitive hardening supported by the new Penal Code, which establishes sentences ranging from 4 to 30 years, life imprisonment and even the death penalty.

Although authorities have belatedly acknowledged the rise in drug use, they do not hesitate to crack down on independent journalists who investigate cases outside official channels. The Ministry of the Interior insists on presenting each operation as a decisive blow against drug trafficking, while the expansion of synthetic drugs exposes a reality that is less controlled than official discourse admits.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuban Private Businesses Are Optimistic: They Will Survive in 2026 in a Country That Will Get Worse

The consulting firm Auge has published a report that compiles the opinions of 175 executives from private companies with up to 100 employees

Seventy-six per cent of the businesspeople surveyed say they feel optimistic about 2026, while 60 per cent predict that the national economy will be much worse./ 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, 13 December 2025 — The recently released First Business Climate Study for Cuban MSMEs*, conducted by the consulting firm Auge, reveals a contrast that sums up the current situation of the private sector on the island. The results of the study were presented on Friday during El Break, a meeting held at Nodo Habana.

According to the study, 76% of the business owners surveyed say they feel optimistic or very optimistic about 2026, while 60% predict that the national economy will be somewhat or much worse next year. The apparent contradiction, described in the report itself as a “marked divergence”, shows the disconnect between the individual performance of small firms and the perception of the economic environment in which they are forced to operate.

The study, the first of its kind to be conducted independently in Cuba, gathers the opinions of 175 executives from private companies with up to 100 employees, most of which have been in operation for more than three years. Auge warns that the selection of interviewees was not random and that the results should be taken as a qualitative approximation rather than a statistical generalisation of the country’s business universe. Even so, the consultancy firm highlights continue reading

that this initial map offers a valuable perspective on the experiences and concerns of a representative segment of the current MSME fabric.

One of the most striking elements of the analysis is the coexistence of marked optimism about their own performance with a deep mistrust of the country’s future. For the authors, this tension starkly highlights the lack of security in the regulatory and economic environment and explains why, despite the drive of the private sector, investment remains timid and innovation is geared more towards resistance than qualitative leaps. Although most respondents expect to increase their sales and profits in 2026, they are more cautious when it comes to forecasting increases in investment or staffing levels, a sign of the insecurity caused by regulatory volatility and macroeconomic unpredictability.

The consultancy recommends improving legal predictability, enabling transparent mechanisms for access to foreign currency, institutionalising dialogue between private actors and the government, and adopting firm measures to contain inflation.

Among the most optimistic companies are those engaged in information and communications technology, wholesale and retail trade, industrial and agricultural production, and food and accommodation businesses. These are sectors that, despite operating in adverse conditions, maintain a certain dynamism and adaptability.

However, current obstacles continue to erode their room for manoeuvre. This year, the most frequently cited problems were inflation (mentioned by 60 per cent), poor state infrastructure (43.4 per cent) and difficulty accessing foreign currency (38.9 per cent). Concerns for 2026 are growing in intensity, with 68% fearing greater economic instability, 56.6% anticipating new regulations that will further complicate private activity, and 48% expecting an additional increase in costs due to inflation.

The report sees this set of concerns as a map of systemic bottlenecks that are exacerbated by unstable conditions marked by rising tariffs, prolonged blackouts, persistent inflation, and the absence of a formal and stable mechanism for MSMEs to access foreign currency. Entrepreneurs were explicit in identifying what they consider to be the three priority areas for the authorities: ensuring regulatory stability, opening up real and autonomous access to foreign currency, and formally recognising the private sector’s contribution to the national economy. Without tangible progress in these areas, Auge argues, the country will remain trapped in a dynamic of low investment, low productivity and innovation reduced to survival strategies.

MSMEs have become one of the few actors with the capacity to adapt and generate a certain economic dynamism.

Based on the study’s conclusions, the consultancy recommends improving legal predictability, enabling transparent mechanisms for access to foreign currency, institutionalising dialogue between private actors and the government, and adopting firm measures to contain inflation. In Auge’s opinion, any attempt to boost the Cuban economy necessarily involves offering a more stable and less arbitrary framework for the activity of non-state enterprises.

Between 2020 and 2024, the country’s GDP has contracted by 11%, and no growth is expected in the current financial year. Although no official forecast has been released for 2026, there are no signs of a change in the trend. Failed domestic economic policies and the difficulties faced by the regime’s main allies have exacerbated structural problems that are reflected in food, fuel and medicine shortages, daily power cuts, rampant inflation, fiscal deficits, the deterioration of state services, bank decapitalisation, growing dollarisation and unabated mass migration.

In this turbulent landscape, MSMEs have become one of the few actors capable of adapting and generating some economic dynamism. But their optimism contrasts with the increasingly widespread certainty that the country is sliding into sustained decline.

*Translator’s note: Literally, “Micro, Small, Medium Enterprises.” The expectation is that it is also privately managed, but in Cuba this may include owners/managers who are connected to the government.

Translated by GH

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For Their Daily Fight Against Garbage, Havana’s Street Sweepers Earn About Ten Dollars a Month

“Regla is one of the cleanest municipalities,” boasts a municipal employee, broom and dustpan in hand.

The wages are uncompetitive with any informal alternative, the physical strain is enormous, and the lack of resources is humiliating. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Dario Hernandez, Havana, December 12, 2025 – On the streets of Havana, the filth no longer surprises anyone. What is truly shocking is looking closely at those who, despite everything, continue sweeping. This newspaper approached two street sweepers who, with broom and dustpan in hand, are keeping afloat—as best they can—a public service in ruins. Both are vulnerable men, physically worn down, for whom garbage has become a destiny, not a choice.

One of them, a worker from Regla, explains that he’s been in the job for “a little over a year,” working six days a week. His job consists of “keeping his area clean,” as he describes it. In practice, it’s a daily and unequal struggle against the accumulation of waste, the shortage of trucks, and institutional apathy. Despite everything, he maintains a certain pride in his town: “Regla is one of the cleanest municipalities,” he states. But his statement immediately crumbles: “People don’t want to work in the garbage.”

According to authorities, the worst-performing municipalities in Havana are Marianao, Centro Habana, and Plaza de la Revolución. Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz recently complained that garbage trucks weren’t making enough trips to the rubbish dumps and threatened to inspect them “truck by truck.” The head of government also “expressed interest,” according to the official newspaper Granma, in the salaries of “frontline workers,” some 900 street sweepers, but no raise was agreed upon at the meeting, although there were calls for greater demands.

The basic wage is 2,500 pesos, but it can go up “if you do extra jobs.” /14ymedio

The street sweeper in Regla bluntly details his salary to 14ymedio. The base pay is 2,500 pesos, but it can go up “if you do extra jobs.” However, he had hip surgery and can barely walk, even with the support of his broom. “I earn 4,000 a month (about nine dollars at the informal exchange rate),” he says, shrugging his shoulders. “You know how Cubans are; they make do with continue reading

very little. It’s not that it’s enough, it’s not enough for anything.”

According to reports, some workers received between 7,000 and 10,000 pesos in the last payment, amounts that—given the country’s rampant inflation—don’t cover basic needs. Truck drivers earn slightly more, but collection vehicles are even scarcer than the personnel.

A second street sweeper, this time from Guanabacoa, is deaf and mute and uses signs and gestures to communicate. He has been sweeping for twelve years because “he has no other choice.” When asked about his salary, he makes a face of disgust and lowers his thumb, an unmistakable sign that the pay is meager. His face, weathered by the sun and exhaustion, speaks volumes.

Both cases involve people with physical or social difficulties, trapped in jobs no one else wants. “And who are the ones who work in the garbage? People like me, who are getting on in years,” acknowledges the street sweeper from Regla. His testimony paints a picture of the country’s decline, with aging, sick workers, lacking job alternatives, and employed by an essential service that is falling apart.

In Regla, the worker explains, residents have to bring their waste “in a box or a sack” due to the lack of containers and trucks. In other areas of eastern Havana, small illegal dumpsites are growing at an accelerated rate.

The bureaucracy, gathered in pristine offices, says that Havana “is not giving up on comprehensive solutions to improve its services and cleanliness.” / 14ymedio

In stark contrast to this reality, the bureaucracy, gathered in pristine offices, claims that Havana “is not giving up on comprehensive solutions to improve its services and cleanliness.” This phrase, repeated periodically, comes with promises of repairs, reorganization, “gradual” implementations, and “intersectoral” strategies.

The data shows extremely poor results. Of an identified need for 126 rolling garbage containers the industry planned for 32 with “available resources,” and only 31 have been completed. As for the street sweeper carts , there is a plan to manufacture 1,000 units, but to date only 40 have been produced.

The gap between rhetoric and reality widens even further given the epidemiological risk posed by garbage accumulation. These reports acknowledge, between the lines, that the problem is not temporary but chronic. The deterioration of sanitation services in Havana is not solely due to a lack of equipment or funding. There is a decisive human factor at play, as no one wants to do the work. The wages are uncompetitive with any informal alternative, the physical strain is immense, and the lack of resources is humiliating. “There’s a shortage of personnel,” the street sweeper in Regla repeats, as he walks slowly and with difficulty, leaning on his work tool.

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Spain Recommends Against Traveling to Cuba “If You Are Not Vaccinated Against Chikungunya, Dengue and Hepatitis A”

The collapse of tourism in the last five years has led the Government to reduce its investments in that sector, which until now was a priority.

Canada—traditionally the main source market for tourists to Cuba—has also drastically reduced its presence on the island this year. / September 5

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, December 12, 2025 – The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a health alert this Friday stating that “Cuba is currently experiencing a serious epidemic, with simultaneous outbreaks of various mosquito-borne viral diseases.” Consequently, it recommends against traveling to the island if one is not vaccinated against chikungunya, dengue, and hepatitis A.

This warning comes at the worst possible time for the Cuban government, in the middle of the peak tourist season and at the end of a catastrophic year in which the number of international travelers will not even reach half of the four million registered in 2016.

The new guidelines from Madrid were released this Wednesday, after it was confirmed that the situation in Cuba has deteriorated significantly. The accumulation of garbage and the increasing number of hours without electricity—two factors that directly impact hygiene—explain the updated alert, according to sources consulted by Confidencial Digital.

According to the most recent data from the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI), between January and September 2025, 36,788 Spanish tourists traveled to Cuba, representing a 27.1% drop compared to the same period in 2024. Canada—traditionally the main source market for Cuba—has also drastically reduced its presence on the island this year. In the first continue reading

seven months of 2025, the number of Canadian tourists who traveled to Cuba totaled 478,388, a figure lower than the 622,204 registered in the same period of 2024.

The regime turned the tourism industry into its economic totem and its riskiest bet

The health emergency that is now keeping tourists away is a direct result of the neglect of basic services. And that neglect, in turn, stems from an investment policy that for years prioritized tourism over agriculture, energy, health, and infrastructure.

Over the past decade, the regime has turned the tourism industry into its economic totem and its riskiest gamble. The result in 2025 is empty luxury hotels in cities where water can take weeks to arrive, beach destinations with more rooms than food in the markets, and a healthcare system lacking staff, resources, and supplies.

Official investment figures up to 2024 confirm this. While agriculture received a mere 3% of the total and public health a meager 1.9%, hotels and restaurants absorbed 10.8%, and the so-called “business services, real estate and rental activities” – a category that includes a significant portion of hotel spending – accounted for a hefty 26.6%. In other words, more than a third of national investment was earmarked for building or renovating tourism infrastructure.

The paradox is that, just now that Spain is recommending vaccination before visiting the island and even bringing a complete first-aid kit because hospitals lack medicines, the Cuban government seems to have discovered – late, very late – that perhaps it should invest more in basic services.

Cuban authorities may prevent tourists from leaving the country if there are any outstanding medical bills.

Data from January to October 2025 show a shift. Funding for tourism falls to 5.2%, and the real estate and business sector drops to 17.1%, while the provision of essential services for the general population—electricity, gas, and water—jumps from 12.6% to 36.7%, becoming the main recipient of investment. Transportation—key to moving goods and people in a semi-paralyzed country—also grows, from 8.5% to 10.7%.

But the inevitable question is: will this change be enough at this point? Because the figures also reveal what the government continues to fail to prioritize. In 2025, investments in agriculture—the foundation of food security—represent a mere 2.1% of the total, compared to 2024. Education falls to 0.4%, science and innovation also to 0.4%, and public health to 1.3%, percentages that are barely enough to keep buildings standing, much less to modernize or supply them.

The Spanish government also warns travelers that, although Cuban healthcare personnel are generally competent, “medical facilities suffer from a severe lack of supplies” and fall far short of Spanish standards. Furthermore, it emphasizes that foreigners are required to pay for any medical treatment immediately and that Cuban authorities may prevent them from leaving the country if any medical bills remain unpaid. The alert also stresses the need to bring bottled water due to the risk of Hepatitis A.

Today, with several countries—including the United States, Russia, and Mexico—advising travelers to think twice before visiting Cuba, the regime is trying to correct its course. But investments are like economic cycles; their effects take years to materialize. What went unfunded in 2015 or 2018 is now exploding in the form of blackouts, epidemics, and shortages. And what begins to be funded in 2025 may come too late to prevent the island from continuing to lose—among many other things—one of its main sources of foreign currency.

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Without Fuel, Fertilizers, or Insecticides, They Intend To Plant 41,000 Hectares of Rice in Eastern Cuba

Yields have stalled between two and 2.5 tons per hectare, whereas in the past they reached up to five and the Vietnamese achieve up to seven in the rest of the Island

Vietnam has signed several agreements with Cuba to invest in rice cultivation. / Granma

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, December 12, 2025 –- “We’ve gone practically four years without having that technological package,” Odisnel Traba Ferrales, agricultural director of the Fernando Echenique Agroindustrial Company, told the official press. The manager refers to the kit the State used to distribute to producers—containing imported fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides—crucial for some crops, in this case rice, which is also considered a “very technical” crop.

The province of Granma, once among the elite of rice-producing regions, plans to plant 41,000 hectares of the country’s total 200,000, but the data is hardly encouraging. The manager himself admits, between the lines, that the estimate is far from realistic. “The total planting commitment in the province (30,000 hectares from the Fernando Echenique company and 11,000 from the José Manuel Capote Sosa company) is quite a tough goal in the current context,” he emphasizes.

No surprise there: the yield of these lands is far below what was achieved in the past and barely reaches two to 2.5 tons per hectare, compared with the five obtained previously. The figure looks ridiculous when compared with the success Vietnamese producers are achieving both in Pinar del Río—where the company Agri VMA, which has land in usufruct, exceeds 7.2 tons per hectare—and elsewhere on the Island.

No surprise: the yield of these lands is far below what was achieved in the past and barely reaches two to 2.5 tons per hectare, compared with the five obtained previously.

But even more striking are the results from Vietnam’s cooperation as a State actor. Within this program, yields are even higher, according to recent data published by the Cuban Institute for Seed Plant Research, which found yields of up to 9.14 tons per hectare in the winter season (7 in spring) for continue reading

one of the varieties they work with, Viva76. In Cuba there are four varieties, three belonging to the Mekong Delta Rice Institute (MEKO), with results that have impressed even the Asian country itself.

Another variety, Viba17, yields 8.28 tons per hectare in winter and 7.13 in spring, while Viba51 reaches 7.18 in winter and 5.5 in spring. “In the context of Cuba’s efforts to overcome food security challenges due to harsh climate, saline soil, and prolonged drought, the acceptance and testing of Vietnamese rice varieties is considered a strategic step,” Vietnamese media highlighted this week.

The three varieties—grown in Matanzas, Cienfuegos, and Mayabeque—stand out for their productivity and disease resistance, with yields between 20% and 30% higher than the local variety, triple on average. Among their advantages is very fast growth, which reduces costs: about 100 or 110 days of growth compared with 120 or 125 for Cuban rice, according to the Vietnamese institute.

“This is clear proof of the effectiveness of the Rice Cooperation Project in particular, and agricultural projects in Cuba in general,” said one of the engineers who was in the country supporting the program. Although the expert praised the “hospitality” of Cubans, there have been no shortage of Vietnamese reports complaining about local work methods, which have led to program cancellations in the past.

This, along with the shortage of technology, has brought production in Granma province to a bare minimum, heavily affected as well by the flooding caused by Hurricane Melissa when the Cauto River overflowed—the planting areas are concentrated in its basin: Río Cauto, with 23,121 hectares, and Yara, with 11,602.

A report from the official State newspaper Granma, which on Friday offers the first part of what is expected to be a broader piece, includes the experience of one of the workers, who describes the difficulties of managing water. “The first two months are key; you have to be here from sunup to sundown. Today you plant the rice and tomorrow, without fail, you have to drain the field, ‘pachanguearlo,’ so that puddles don’t form. That means removing all the water because the seed is pregerminated and, if it stays submerged, it drowns.”

His account is interrupted by a colleague who highlights another problem: “There are enough weeds to fill a cart. When I barely opened it, the rush of water almost swept me away,” he says—what Granma describes as “hydraulic sabotage.” The newspaper attributes serious issues to the “water war” in the area: farmers who block the canals—“in their desperation,” it excuses—to get a few minutes of irrigation, which ultimately deprives another farmer.

The newspaper attributes serious issues to the “water war” in the area: farmers blocking the canals—“in their desperation,” it excuses—to get a few minutes of irrigation that, in the end, they take from someone else.

“Before, when a seed field was planted, anyone who stole water was prosecuted; today nothing happens,” laments one interviewee. “Just last night, the producer of the field had to leave a man on guard at this gate because people open it to take the water. That fight is old in these fields. You have to stay alert because there’s always someone ready to take advantage of someone else’s water,” he says.

The report contains another devastating line: despite the harshness of the work, “after the sugar mill shut down, there is nothing else to do but plant rice.” One interviewee claims he earned half a million pesos by flooding three caballerías* two months ago, but it isn’t easy. “The mud, the mosquitoes, the sun, the thirst… it’s brutal,” he says.

The lack of fuel also complicates rice transport—the crop “gets diverted” when it cannot be moved— not to mention Gelma, the wholesale supplier of inputs, where “there is not a single product,” forcing people to resort to mipymes [small private enterprises]. The need to pay in cash—without the bank providing it—and the high prices in pesos because of the devaluation of the national currency complete the picture.

“The success of this campaign will not depend solely on the sweat poured into the furrows, but on the ability to untie those old knots that choke productive potential,” Granma concludes. The second chapter, however, remains to be read.

*caballería is a land measure equalling 194.2 acres

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.