Translating Cuba

what’s going to happen.”

This nervousness contrasts sharply with the message conveyed by the Ministry of Public Health, which on Saturday asserted on social media that Cuban collaborators in Venezuela are “protected” following the US intervention. The Minister, José Ángel Portal, merely stated that the professionals are safe, without offering details about evacuation plans, relocation, or the continuation of their missions.

Beyond the official reassuring tone, the testimonies collected by this newspaper paint a different picture. A doctor stationed in Caracas recounted that, although her coordinators insist that “everything is fine” and that they must await instructions from Havana, the tension is evident. “The bosses are very nervous. Right now, we’re all waiting to hear what Trump says,” she explained in a phone conversation. “I’m about to finish my mission, and I’ve already bought my children’s clothes. Imagine if they move us and I can’t take anything with me.”

In other regions of the country, the situation seems less clear. From the state of Zulia, a Cuban collaborator commented that “yesterday they were telling us one thing, and today they’re telling us another,” although he acknowledges that there are sectors of the Venezuelan population who celebrated the fall of Chavismo on Saturday. “Whether it’s a yes or no, I already have everything ready to leave.”

The unease has also spread to Cuba. “My son called me saying they had taken Maduro away, and right then I started frantically calling my daughter who lives there,” explains a retired woman living in Alamar. “I was finally able to speak to her about three hours later because the phone lines were jammed, and she told me they were gathering them in one place.”

Following the news of the deaths of 32 Cubans during the operation to capture Maduro, the families of the doctors have expressed numerous expressions of concern.

Following the news of the deaths of 32 Cubans during the operation to capture Maduro, the doctors’ families have voiced numerous expressions of concern. “They aren’t soldiers; they deserve to be with their families,” one internet user wrote on the Ministry of Health’s Facebook page. Others questioned the lack of transparency: “Now they have the families going crazy here, and they aren’t giving us any information.”

A potential interruption of medical programs in Venezuela would have a direct impact on Cuba’s already fragile economy. For over two decades, these health missions have been the state’s main source of foreign currency, through bilateral agreements that generate billions of dollars annually. In a context of runaway inflation, food shortages, and prolonged blackouts, the loss of this revenue stream would exacerbate the internal crisis.

The presence of Cuban healthcare personnel in Venezuela, which began in the early 2000s, has been key both to the political relationship between the two governments and to the island’s financial support. However, independent organizations have been denouncing the working conditions of these missions for years: the withholding of salaries, political surveillance, restrictions on movement, and forced separation from families.

In a context marked by military intervention and regional uncertainty, these allegations take on an even more critical dimension. While Havana remains silent about concrete plans, thousands of Cuban doctors and nurses remain confined, awaiting a call that will tell them whether they can return home or if they will have to put their scrubs back on in a country whose immediate future remains unpredictable.

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that the Cubans present were simply civilian construction workers building an airport for tourism. However, these “workers” turned out to be trained and armed military engineers, some of whom resisted the U.S. troops. The propaganda then spoke of hundreds of dead and of sacrificed fighters clinging to the flag. The reality, revealed days later, was quite different: around 24 Cubans died, while the rest disobeyed orders to fight to the end. The regime decreed national mourning, repatriated the bodies , and buried the true version of events alongside them.

Angola represents the most elaborate case of historical justification. For 16 years, between 1975 and 1991, Cuba maintained a massive military presence in that African country under the pretext of “paying its historical debt to Africa” ​​and combating apartheid. The official narrative spoke of internationalism, solidarity, and epic struggle. The death toll, however, was treated with extreme secrecy. It wasn’t until the late 1980s that a list of 2,016 deaths in Angola was acknowledged, a figure later adjusted to 2,077 by Raúl Castro himself. Even today, doubts persist about the accuracy of these numbers, fueled by mass burials, lists lacking details, and decades of official silence. Heroism was extolled; the human cost, minimized.

Faced with reports that thousands of Cubans were fighting alongside Russian forces, Havana opted for a middle ground.

In Ukraine, the pattern mutates again, but it doesn’t disappear. Faced with reports that thousands of Cubans were fighting alongside Russian forces, Havana opted for a middle ground: admitting the presence of Cuban nationals in the conflict, but completely disassociating itself from them. According to the Foreign Ministry, Cuba “is not participating” in the war, and the Cubans involved had been recruited by organizations with no ties to the state or were acting “on their own.” A policy of “zero tolerance for mercenaries” was invoked, while acknowledging that many of those detained for attempting to travel to Russia had military training and links to the Armed Forces. Once again, the state washed its hands of the matter when the narrative of noble cooperation no longer held any credibility.

Venezuela completes the circle and exposes the contradiction in its starkest form. For years, the Cuban regime denied any military role in protecting Chavismo. Now, after Maduro’s capture, it acknowledges deaths, security missions, and direct combat, but avoids specifying roles, hierarchies, or responsibilities. The official version speaks of US “state terrorism” and heroic sacrifice, while US President Donald Trump describes a lightning operation with little effective resistance. The contrast between these two accounts is not only striking but also reveals Cuba’s military ineffectiveness in the face of Washington’s military and technological might.

In all these scenarios, the same sequence repeats itself. First, denial. Then, a disguising of the military presence under functional labels—construction workers, collaborators, technicians, or even doctors. Later, if the facts become clear, a disassociation from those involved or an envelopment in a defensive narrative that dilutes political responsibility. Mourning, tributes, and slogans come later, when it is no longer possible to maintain the initial fiction.

Many family members of those killed in foreign conflicts have chosen silence over these past six decades. Some out of conviction and affinity with the official narrative of self-immolation and sacrifice, others out of fear. However, with the deaths in Venezuela, the situation is very different from that surrounding the combatants in Angola or the “construction workers” in Grenada. Social media is now the channel through which names, photos, and other biographical details of the deceased are beginning to circulate.

What has changed is not the official method, but the internal context and the international reaction. In Angola, the Cold War offered a robust ideological alibi. In Grenada, the Caribbean was still a terrain of direct confrontation between blocs. In Ukraine and Venezuela, the world is different, more interconnected, more skeptical, and less willing to accept versions without evidence. But Havana insists on speaking to the present with the language of the past.

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from authorities regarding the location and transfer of the body. A family member recounted that they were first told the body was missing, then that it had been located and that they would be notified. According to this source, both Rodríguez Royo and his brother were allegedly linked to State Security structures.

Fernando Báez Hidalgo, a native of Río Cauto (Granma Province), linked to the Personal Security Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and identified as Maduro’s direct bodyguard, was mentioned in several concurring publications. The First Secretary of the Communist Party in Granma, Yudelkis Ortiz Barceló, herself acknowledged that six of the deceased were officers from that province, although she did not specify their identities.

Similarly, Yunior Estévez, listed as “Yunio” by La Joven Cuba, is also mentioned. He was born in Palenquito Gil, a rural hamlet in Yateras, Guantánamo. However, the publication removed the initial post , which stated that the young man was a father of three and a cryptography specialist, “at the family’s request.”

The deaths of Rubiel Díaz Cabrera, from Cauto Cristo, and Luis Manuel Jardines Castro, known as Jardinito , from Cueto, Holguín, who worked as a driver, have also been confirmed.

Other deaths had been reported under different names. For example, Erwin Rosabal Ávalos, from La Rinconada, Granma province, was referred to as “Erduin” in messages and publications as a member of the Venezuelan president’s inner circle of security. The same occurred with Orlando Osoria López, “Landy,” from Baire, Contramaestre, in Santiago de Cuba province, who was repeatedly described as a member of Cuban State Security and part of the team deployed in Caracas. Several publications place him among the deceased, even citing family addresses.

According to the US official, the assault in Caracas was a “furious gun battle” and the Cubans “suffered a massive number of casualties.”

Yorlenis Revé Cuza was also identified from Santiago as “Yordenis Marlonis.” According to various publications, he was part of the direct security detail for the Venezuelan president and his wife. He was the son of parents from the town of Dos Caminos and left behind his wife and young daughter in Cuba. Sources cited by La Tijera indicate that before his assignment in Venezuela, he had been a bodyguard for the former First Secretary of the Party in that province, Lázaro Expósito Canto, a fact that reinforces his affiliation with high-level security forces. Officials from the Ministry of the Interior reportedly informed his family of his death, although without providing specific details.

An agent who had been referred to as “Yandri” is likely Yandrys González Vega, whose death was announced by his cousin Moraima Rodríguez on social media. In her post, she expressed pride in his “duty fulfilled” protecting Maduro, a statement that, regardless of its tone, confirms the deceased’s role as a bodyguard.

Captain Yoel Pérez Tabares had been mistakenly identified on social media as “Caraballo.” A native of Consolación del Sur (Pinar del Río), his death was reportedly officially confirmed to his daughter by the Personal Security Directorate of the same ministry. His case was notable for being one of the few in which a direct and formal notification to a family member was mentioned.

On Monday, Stephen Miller, White House Deputy Chief of Staff, said in an interview with CNN that the number of Cubans killed as publicly reported by the regime is likely lower than the actual number. According to the US official, the assault in Caracas was a “furious gun battle” and the Cubans “suffered massive casualties.”

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, 67% of the needs (around 74,000 bpd) are for crude oil and fuel oil, and 18% (20,000 bpd) for diesel. In addition, 5,000 bpd of gasoline and another 5% of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) are needed—5% of each—and 6,000 bpd of “other” fuels, bringing the total to 100%.

“We currently estimate a deficit of approximately 50,000 to 70,000 barrels per day,” explains Piñón, referring to 2025. “Diesel and LPG are the two critical fuels, not only because of their economic impact but also their social and political implications,” explains the specialist, specifying the uses of each. Diesel directly impacts distributed generation, transportation, agriculture, and hydroelectric power; while LPG is primarily used for cooking.

According to Piñón’s information, Venezuela sent approximately 35,000 barrels per day (bpd) to Cuba in the last quarter of 2025, compared to 5,500 bpd from Mexico and 7,500 bpd from Russia: for a total of 48,000 bpd. This amount forces Havana to purchase between 10,000 and 15,000 bpd of diesel and LPG from abroad, with the added burden of having to pay in cash and in advance, at a rate of one million dollars per day at current prices (87 dollars per barrel of diesel and 27 dollars per barrel of LPG).

Much more emphatically, Piñón told The New York Times: “It is a death sentence if Venezuela cuts off Cuba’s oil supply tomorrow.”

The Times consulted with other specialists about what might happen to Cuba under these circumstances. “There is a belief among Republicans such as [Secretary of State Marco] Rubio that once the supply of Venezuelan oil is cut off, the Cuban economy will collapse and trigger a popular uprising,” says Ricardo Zúñiga, a former U.S. official who played a key role in the thaw and who also worked with the Trump Administration, who questions this theory. “What we have seen in Cuba is that there seems to be no limit to the severity of the situation, as long as there isn’t an uprising.”

Another Times source, Michael Bustamante, doubts that action will be taken against Cuba for two reasons: it has no economic interest for the US, and its geographical proximity would lead thousands of people to enter the United Sttes in the event of a crisis. “If Rubio or others pursue a ‘Cuba is next’ approach, it will be more difficult for them to convince Trump,” he believes. Furthermore, and Piñón agrees, Washington may be too preoccupied with Venezuela to concern itself with Cuba, and there is no viable interlocutor on the island like there was in Caracas—referring to Delcy Rodríguez. “Cuba is much more of a one-party state, something Venezuela never was,” Bustamante emphasizes.

It is possible that Washington has too much work to do in Venezuela to concern itself with Cuba, and there isn’t a possible interlocutor on the island like there was in Caracas – referring to Delcy Rodríguez.

Carlos Alzugaray, a government critic, adds another point. “We don’t like being intimidated, and we don’t like it coming from people like Rubio. Most people here want change, but they want it here, not imposed from the outside,” said the former diplomat, who nevertheless hopes the regime will take note and “reform itself.”

The Argentine news channel Tele Noticias also spoke with Raudiel Peña, a lawyer with Cubalex, who warned of an “immediate impact” from Maduro’s fall: “It will be the loss of an ally.” “But we will have to see how the situation develops from now on. Maduro’s departure is one thing, the fall of the regime is another. The latter would indeed be a hard blow for Cuba in terms of losing an economic and political ally in the region. But Chavismo is still there, for now,” he said, adding that he believes Cuba will not be a “military” target.

Another player entering the fray is China, which received 90% of Venezuelan crude oil exports, including those from Cuba. Trump also addressed this. “We’re in the oil business. We’re going to sell it to them. We’re not going to say we won’t give it to them. (…) We’ll sell large quantities of oil to other countries, many of which are already using it,” he said yesterday.

Marco Rubio clarified that Washington does not want to allow “Venezuela’s oil industry to be controlled by adversaries of the United States” such as China, Russia, and Iran.

According to official data, direct purchases from PDVSA totaled approximately $729 million in 2024, compared to $94 million between January and November 2025. However, “Venezuelan oil accounts for less than 5% of China’s total imports,” notes Lin Boqiang, head of the Energy Policy Institute at Xiamen University, in statements reported by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post.

Those barrels are mostly destined for independent refineries in the eastern province of Shandong that import the heavy crude at discounted prices due to sanctions, and process it for applications such as asphalting.

“We do not believe that the events of this weekend will materially alter global oil markets and, consequently, global economic forecasts.”

Several experts consulted by the EFE news agency assert that Beijing had already anticipated eventualities like those that occurred and will not suffer if it is unable to import from Venezuela. “We do not believe that the events of this weekend will materially alter global oil markets and, consequently, will not effect global economic forecasts,” they point out.

The political level is different, since in Beijing it may not go down well that one of its biggest allies in Latin America is getting closer to the US, but experts refer to Chinese pragmatism.

“Beijing will condemn the US actions. But I doubt China will do much more than that,” predicts Bonnie Glaser, vice president of the US think tank German Marshall Fund of the United States, in statements to local media. “Venezuela is not among China’s priority interests, and there are far more drawbacks than advantages to taking actions that complicate Trump’s ability to secure a victory,” the analyst emphasizes.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.