To replace the crude oil given away by its ally, Havana would have to pay one million dollars a day in cash on the international market.
14ymedio, Madrid, 5 January 2025 — Is an operation similar to the one in Venezuela planned for Cuba? Asked this question from the press aboard Air Force One, which was taking him back to Washington from Florida, Donald Trump replied: “I don’t think we need to take any action,” because the Havana regime is going to fall on its own.
“Cuba looks like it’s about to collapse. I don’t know how they’re going to be able to stay afloat; they have no income. They received all their income from Venezuela, from Venezuelan oil,” the US president asserted. “Many Cuban-Americans are going to be very happy with us,” he added.
The potential damage to the Plaza of the Revolution caused by a possible oil shortage is evident, although the question remains whether alternatives will be found. The island’s oil needs are around 110,000 barrels per day (bpd), of which 40,000 are domestically produced, primarily for the thermoelectric and industrial sectors, according to Jorge Piñón, an expert from the University of Texas who reminded this newspaper.
The island’s oil needs are about 110,000 barrels per day (bpd), of which 40,000 are domestic production, mostly for the thermoelectric and industrial sector.
The specialist breaks down the demand using data from the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI) for 2023, although there may be changes during the next two years. According to these figures, 67% of the needs (around 74,000 bpd) are for crude oil and fuel oil, and 18% (20,000 bpd) for diesel. In addition, 5,000 bpd of gasoline and another 5% of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) are needed—5% of each—and 6,000 bpd of “other” fuels, bringing the total to 100%.
“We currently estimate a deficit of approximately 50,000 to 70,000 barrels per day,” explains Piñón, referring to 2025. “Diesel and LPG are the two critical fuels, not only because of their economic impact but also their social and political implications,” explains the specialist, specifying the uses of each. Diesel directly impacts distributed generation, transportation, agriculture, and hydroelectric power; while LPG is primarily used for cooking.
According to Piñón’s information, Venezuela sent approximately 35,000 barrels per day (bpd) to Cuba in the last quarter of 2025, compared to 5,500 bpd from Mexico and 7,500 bpd from Russia: for a total of 48,000 bpd. This amount forces Havana to purchase between 10,000 and 15,000 bpd of diesel and LPG from abroad, with the added burden of having to pay in cash and in advance, at a rate of one million dollars per day at current prices (87 dollars per barrel of diesel and 27 dollars per barrel of LPG).
Much more emphatically, Piñón told The New York Times: “It is a death sentence if Venezuela cuts off Cuba’s oil supply tomorrow.”
The Times consulted with other specialists about what might happen to Cuba under these circumstances. “There is a belief among Republicans such as [Secretary of State Marco] Rubio that once the supply of Venezuelan oil is cut off, the Cuban economy will collapse and trigger a popular uprising,” says Ricardo Zúñiga, a former U.S. official who played a key role in the thaw and who also worked with the Trump Administration, who questions this theory. “What we have seen in Cuba is that there seems to be no limit to the severity of the situation, as long as there isn’t an uprising.”
Another Times source, Michael Bustamante, doubts that action will be taken against Cuba for two reasons: it has no economic interest for the US, and its geographical proximity would lead thousands of people to enter the United Sttes in the event of a crisis. “If Rubio or others pursue a ‘Cuba is next’ approach, it will be more difficult for them to convince Trump,” he believes. Furthermore, and Piñón agrees, Washington may be too preoccupied with Venezuela to concern itself with Cuba, and there is no viable interlocutor on the island like there was in Caracas—referring to Delcy Rodríguez. “Cuba is much more of a one-party state, something Venezuela never was,” Bustamante emphasizes.
It is possible that Washington has too much work to do in Venezuela to concern itself with Cuba, and there isn’t a possible interlocutor on the island like there was in Caracas – referring to Delcy Rodríguez.
Carlos Alzugaray, a government critic, adds another point. “We don’t like being intimidated, and we don’t like it coming from people like Rubio. Most people here want change, but they want it here, not imposed from the outside,” said the former diplomat, who nevertheless hopes the regime will take note and “reform itself.”
The Argentine news channel Tele Noticias also spoke with Raudiel Peña, a lawyer with Cubalex, who warned of an “immediate impact” from Maduro’s fall: “It will be the loss of an ally.” “But we will have to see how the situation develops from now on. Maduro’s departure is one thing, the fall of the regime is another. The latter would indeed be a hard blow for Cuba in terms of losing an economic and political ally in the region. But Chavismo is still there, for now,” he said, adding that he believes Cuba will not be a “military” target.
Another player entering the fray is China, which received 90% of Venezuelan crude oil exports, including those from Cuba. Trump also addressed this. “We’re in the oil business. We’re going to sell it to them. We’re not going to say we won’t give it to them. (…) We’ll sell large quantities of oil to other countries, many of which are already using it,” he said yesterday.
Marco Rubio clarified that Washington does not want to allow “Venezuela’s oil industry to be controlled by adversaries of the United States” such as China, Russia, and Iran.
According to official data, direct purchases from PDVSA totaled approximately $729 million in 2024, compared to $94 million between January and November 2025. However, “Venezuelan oil accounts for less than 5% of China’s total imports,” notes Lin Boqiang, head of the Energy Policy Institute at Xiamen University, in statements reported by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post.
Those barrels are mostly destined for independent refineries in the eastern province of Shandong that import the heavy crude at discounted prices due to sanctions, and process it for applications such as asphalting.
“We do not believe that the events of this weekend will materially alter global oil markets and, consequently, global economic forecasts.”
Several experts consulted by the EFE news agency assert that Beijing had already anticipated eventualities like those that occurred and will not suffer if it is unable to import from Venezuela. “We do not believe that the events of this weekend will materially alter global oil markets and, consequently, will not effect global economic forecasts,” they point out.
The political level is different, since in Beijing it may not go down well that one of its biggest allies in Latin America is getting closer to the US, but experts refer to Chinese pragmatism.
“Beijing will condemn the US actions. But I doubt China will do much more than that,” predicts Bonnie Glaser, vice president of the US think tank German Marshall Fund of the United States, in statements to local media. “Venezuela is not among China’s priority interests, and there are far more drawbacks than advantages to taking actions that complicate Trump’s ability to secure a victory,” the analyst emphasizes.
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