Category: Translator: GH

“There will be no return ticket to Europe. I confirm that I have returned to Cuba to settle here permanently in my country”

Roberto Veiga returned to the island after nearly seven years in exile. His organization, the Cuba Próxima study center, reported at the time that Veiga had been detained upon his arrival at José Martí International Airport and subjected to interrogation by State Security, surveillance that, according to the organization itself, has not ceased since then.

Veiga, who was one of the central figures of the magazine Espacio Laical and later of the Cuba Possible project, returned to Cuba with the intention of promoting, from within the country, a political transition proposal titled La apertura acordada: una hoja de ruta para la reconstrucción nacional (The Agreed Opening: A Roadmap for National Reconstruction).

The plan, presented in April by Cuba Próxima, proposes a negotiated transition based on a “multi-actor sovereign dialogue,” with deep institutional reforms, the release of political prisoners, changes to the electoral system, and the restructuring of the Gaesa military conglomerate. It also includes proposals directed at the US, such as the lifting of economic restrictions and the removal of Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

The organization maintains that Veiga’s return is part of a commitment to “political action from within” at a time of national crisis. In recent statements to 14ymedio, Veiga himself defended his decision to return despite the risks: “No matter how much one works from outside, one remains a spectator. You have to work in here, because that is where things are going to happen.”

Translated by GH

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Escobar: Have any prohibitions been imposed on you? Have you had to make any commitments?

Veiga: So far no prohibitions have been imposed on me, nor have I made any commitments. Many people believe that to take a step like the one I’ve taken, it’s essential to feel safe, and that’s fatal. That’s precisely why this country hasn’t changed. If I had had to accept any conditions in the middle of a process being carried out by others, I wouldn’t have come. Returning had to be a personal decision. Unfortunately, we live in a society with a culture opposed to this kind of undertaking, one that assumes that if you do something, it’s because you’re someone else’s pawn, especially the government’s.

Many people believe that to take a step like the one I’ve taken, it’s essential to feel safe, and that’s fatal 

Escobar: What does it mean that Cuba Próxima has stopped being a study center and become a center for action?

Veiga: We’ve worked hard on analysis, on presenting proposals, we’ve tried to influence those who should take up these proposals both inside and outside Cuba. We already have that groundwork laid, but it’s action that turns ideas into history, and strategic action has been missing.

The paths for action have been closed off. But if we never take them, they will never open. We felt more comfortable doing analysis and proposals, which is part of the nature of most of us at Cuba Próxima. But to be consistent with what we’ve been doing, we had to move to action. The country is in ruins and it needs to be rebuilt, we have to take part in that reconstruction, and without organizing ourselves that’s not possible, nor would it be possible without a vision of what kind of country we want. We are determined to pay whatever price, whatever political cost, to help get this country out of the situation it’s in.

Escobar: This new way in which Cuba Próxima is presenting itself suggests it will end up becoming a political party seeking a share of power in a future Cuba.

Veiga: What that political undertaking needs is a programmatic project, a political vision with a clear strategy, functioning bodies, and above all a membership, which is the muscle, the vitality of a society willing to act along those lines. We call it a “platform.” A party is something very rigid, very vertical; a movement is something closer to what we want, given the horizontality involved, but for that horizontality to be large enough, the mechanisms for participation have to be expanded and the executive dimension reduced. The programmatic project has to be a minimal one, which is why we don’t want to be either a party or a movement. This dynamic we’re immersed in will tell us what bodies need to be created, what our relationship with the membership we need will look like, and what it will become. What’s beyond doubt is that it must be a political grouping committed to saving this country.

Cuba Próxima’s political position moves between democratic liberalism and social democracy, and that doesn’t make it an ambiguous position

Escobar: The program you’ve hinted at is far from the classic positions that end up being labeled radical left or far right. Where would you place it on that left-right spectrum? Is there room for centrism?

Veiga: To put it in familiar terms, Cuba Próxima’s political position moves between democratic liberalism and social democracy, and that doesn’t make it an ambiguous position. It’s a stance that integrates both of those outlooks, that opens horizons for both, but with very concrete, very direct proposals. Not to the center, nor to the right, nor to the left, but forward.

In the constitutional proposal we have, for the day when there is a constituent assembly here, a semi-parliamentary system is proposed. We aspire to work within that Parliament.

Escobar: You recently warned that Cuba’s rulers still had the opportunity to at least carry out economic reforms. Do you think the newly announced 176 measures could be that first step, one that would make the need for political reform even more evident?

Veiga: There’s always a tendency to doubt what they do, because so often what they decree goes unfulfilled, or they backtrack. As a matter of principle, one has to be skeptical, but the country is in a difficult situation, and for the first time, so are they. It gives the impression that they’re determined to carry these measures forward, even if they’re not convinced.

To implement the reforms, they are forced to simultaneously implement institutional and political reforms, because otherwise it won’t work

The problem is that this now hinges on a response from the United States. In practice, those measures can’t be implemented without a concession from the United States that opens the financial door, fuel, just a little. And if those in power can’t make this benefit them, not just the country but themselves, then they won’t expand the reforms. Why would they, if it’s not going to gain them anything except weakening the control they hold? To implement the reforms, they are forced to implement institutional and political reforms at the same time, not afterward, because otherwise it won’t work. And I’ll say more: they would have to replace 99% of the people currently in government.

Escobar: And do you believe the United States is willing to open those doors that would allow the announced reforms to move forward?

Veiga: I don’t think so. Trump has lost interest in Cuba, and if the Democrats were to regain Congress in the midterm elections coming up in November, they wouldn’t attempt anything bold either, because it costs them politically, because they have to focus heavily on defending their domestic role. They’ll use different language, but they won’t do anything. Back in 2019, when Obama’s thaw failed, the United States made the decision not to open up to Cuba again, but rather that it would be Cuba that would have to open up, and then they, whether Democrats or Republicans, would decide whether or not to come in.

Escobar: So it all comes down to pressure?

Veiga: They are subject to pressure from the United States and to internal pressure. When there’s that much pressure, there has to be an alternative way out, and that way out cannot be the project the rulers present, nor the steps they’re willing to take amid their own precariousness and fears. And that’s where a key player is missing from this equation: Cuban political actors who are not part of the government, who would need to present their own proposals for the country, or more than one, viable alternatives for everyone. Someone under pressure needs to be given an alternative to the pressure.

People can’t keep enduring this, or keep waiting for someone to find a way to fix it

Escobar: But those proposals do exist, even though they haven’t been able to be widely disseminated due to the lack of freedoms.

Veiga: Yes, but proposals can’t stop at what we want; they also have to explain the how. A proposal that fails to build trust with others, with society, is just a document, an idea put on paper. What’s been lacking is the effect of these proposals, because we don’t have the democratic space to achieve it.

Escobar: Everything seems to indicate that the dictatorship is just trying to buy time.

Veiga: Things have reached a point where, without deep change, there’s no way to fix any of what’s been destroyed in recent years. We’ve reached a point of no remedy. If the decision is to buy time in order to make the country disappear before the Americans get here, maybe they’ll manage it, but what they’re actually doing is wasting time. They are not going to restore the way they used to manage poverty and maintain acceptable levels of survival. They simply can’t. Not even the best of politicians could pull that off without changing the system. People can’t keep enduring this, or keep waiting for someone to find a way to fix it. It will be long and difficult, but the country has to be given back to the people, they have to be given back the possibility of having a purpose.

Escobar: Or else?

Veiga: It’s over for everyone. We’ll become a fourth-world country.

Escobar: A Haitianization?

Veiga: That would be the best-case scenario. It could also be a North Korean-style Haitianization.

Escobar: How much time do you estimate is left before the change of system happens?

Veiga: Time has run out, but I believe that before this year ends, the process that will make it possible to save Cuba should begin, one way or another.

Translated by GH.

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Saco watched with astonishment as Cuba belonged to a nation – Spain – that boasted of being free, while subjecting its overseas citizens to despotism

The most curious thing about this period — and the most revealing — is that the boot of despotism did not discriminate by place of birth. The bureaucratic and military yoke suffocated newly arrived peninsulares, hardworking island farmers, and Cuban-born criollos alike. All were subjects deprived of political voice. This orphanhood of rights was the true engine of reformism, one of the richest and most misunderstood currents of that century. Later nationalist historiography often blurred it, mistakenly dismissing it as lukewarm or accommodating. It was, in fact, the first great civic effort to establish political modernity on the island.

It is in this context that the figure of José Antonio Saco emerges, and it is hard to understand why Cuba has forgotten him so thoroughly. Born in Bayamo on May 7, 1797, a thinker of uncommon lucidity and a relentless polemicist, Saco is the great neglected prophet of Cuban politics. His liberal ideas cost him exile: the decision of Spanish politicians to stamp out any reformist current on the island led to his indefinite banishment, forcing him to write from Europe what he was not permitted to think on his own soil.

It was precisely from that Parisian exile that, in October 1851, he published through the E. Thunot printing house his essay The Political Situation of Cuba and Its Remedy (La situación política de Cuba y su remedio) — an argumentative political text addressed to enlightened public opinion, not a memorial to the Crown — in which he laid bare, with analytical precision, the contradictions of absolutism. His argument was not a separatist rallying cry; it was, above all, a civic demand: the claim of the ordinary individual’s right to the freedoms proper to the good exercise of his rights.

Saco watched with astonishment as Cuba belonged to a nation — Spain — that boasted of being free, while subjecting its overseas citizens to the despotism of an old military nobility and to the swings of a metropole that oscillated endlessly between recalcitrant absolutism and the convulsive outbursts of republicanism. With a sharp pen, he directly challenged Madrid’s hypocrisy:

“Is it just and political that, when Spain today prides itself on belonging to the number of free peoples, that same Spain strives to keep Cuba, its favorite daughter, among the number of slaves?”

By refusing to yield any space for civic participation out of fear and distrust, the colonial apparatus brought about its own ruin

The metropole’s excuse hid behind the island’s particular social structure: a society built on African slavery, it was argued, could not manage liberal institutions without risking a collapse similar to that of Haiti. Saco dismantled that fear with surgical precision:

“And since when has domestic slavery been an obstacle to free men enjoying political rights in the countries where it exists?”

The argument had a brutal honesty to it, and in it lies the key to reformism: it did not call for the abolition of slavery – Saco had his own contradictions on that front – but rather separated two problems that Madrid insisted on conflating in order to maintain control. The Creole bourgeoisie accumulated economic power but repeatedly ran up against the wall of its political marginalization. Saco further warned that Caribbean prosperity was not a gift from the Crown, but a local achievement won in spite of it:

“The enlightenment and wealth that Cuba has acquired, far from being the work of despotism, are conquests it has made by fighting against it. Is it not true that, had it been free, it would be incomparably more enlightened and wealthier than it is today?”

The political lesson he drew from all this was as simple as it was devastating. By refusing to yield any space for civic participation out of fear and distrust, the colonial apparatus brought about its own ruin. Madrid could send soldiers, but it could not buy legitimacy:

“A hundred thousand bayonets sent there by the government would not do as much to secure Spanish rule as the granting of political freedoms.”

No one listened. By closing off the path of reform, the empire left no other outlet but radicalization. As Saco himself declared, with a precision that still resonates today:

“…when despotism is the regime that prevails there, despotism, and despotism alone, is solely responsible for those misfortunes and for the greater ones yet to come.”

The passage of time and the crystallization of the republican project exposed a tectonic fault line in Cuban political thought: the confusion between the freedom of the country and the freedom of the citizen

That intransigence bred a point of no return. It was no longer enough to obtain civic freedoms within the Spanish framework. Economic power would inevitably and violently seek political power. The categorical necessity of “Viva Cuba Libre” then took hold.

And there begins, however, the second part of the problem – and the more enduring one.

The passage of time and the crystallization of the republican project exposed a tectonic fault line in Cuban political thought: the confusion between the freedom of the country and the freedom of the citizen. It was assumed, with almost religious faith, that the sovereignty of the State would transfer by osmosis to the individual. History proved that to be a fantasy. During the Republic, from its birth in 1902 until 1959, Cuba was a formally sovereign state: it was, on paper, a Free Cuba. And yet Cubans lost their most basic rights in successive and highly complex stages. The climax of that dissonance came in 1952, when a military coup suspended constitutional guarantees, brutally demonstrating that national sovereignty is no shield against internal dictatorship.

The dissonance reached even more dramatic proportions after 1959. The country gained – or believed it gained – an airtight sovereignty against outside powers. Individual freedoms, on the other hand, were subjected first to the whims of a caudillo, and later to the relentless orthodoxy of a party that confused loyalty with thought. The State swallowed the nation. The status of “sovereign state” became precisely the alibi for annulling the free citizen.

The line connecting the 19th century to the 21st in Cuba is, at bottom, the chronicle of a discontent that never quite resolves itself. From the annulment of the Constitution of Cádiz – the first constitution in history ever applied to the island – to the more than 176 reforms the Díaz-Canel administration is attempting to test, everything comes back to the same eternal clash: Cubans against the elites who hold de facto power. The ideological garb of those elites has changed several times: once they were Captains General shielded by omnimodous powers; then military coup leaders amid republican fragility; more recently, sectarian revolutionaries entrenched in bureaucracy and the monopoly on violence. The outcome for the ordinary citizen has been, in each case, alarmingly similar.

José Antonio Saco saw it all from Paris, a century and a half in advance. He died in Barcelona in 1879 without ever having lived again in the land he never stopped loving, and he asked that an epitaph be engraved on his tomb that stands as a summary of his entire life: “Here lies José Antonio Saco, who was not an annexationist because he was more Cuban than all the annexationists.” It was his way of saying that he loved Cuba too much to hand it over to anyone – not to Washington, not to Madrid, nor to any despotism disguised under a flag.

As a nation, Cubans have spent two centuries trying to find the formula that reconciles the existence of a truly free State with the construction of a legal framework in which the citizen can enjoy all the rights that are rightfully theirs. Saco’s echo still resounds across the Caribbean, uncomfortable and unanswered: despotism, no matter what flag it disguises itself under, remains solely responsible for present misfortunes. And for those yet to come, if that equation is not resolved once and for all.

Translated by GH

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“They have accumulated a body of operational knowledge and institutional relationships that North American corporations – which will want to establish themselves there – simply do not have”

Vasallo was there at the beginning. His article opens with that memory: in 1990 he was present for the opening of Meliá’s first hotel in Cuba, the Sol Palmeras. He had traveled to Cuba two years earlier and there he enlightened a Fidel Castro who was resistant to tourism, explaining what the sector had meant for Spain’s economic development in the 1960s and how it had helped open the country up. “Castro was reluctant, but the economic situation was forcing him to take measures he would not have taken under normal circumstances,” he recalls.

He also had dealings with Gabriel Escarrer Julia – predecessor and father of the current CEO of Meliá – who had reached an agreement with Cubanacán to bring the Sol chain to the island. The businessman calculated that he would recoup his investment in just two years and believed the risk was offset by extremely high returns. Vasallo gave him a favorable opinion, and the relationship began, paving the way for other Spanish companies. “The cumulative direct investment by these corporations stood at around 160 million euros, a third of the total invested by Spanish companies. During the first two decades, the return on these investments was extraordinary. The profits earned and repatriated far exceeded the initial capital outlay,” he explains.

The expert explains how that partnership worked – the arrangement under which around a hundred hotels were built: the Spanish side held a 49% stake in the joint venture, which became the owner of what was built for an agreed period of between 25 and 50 years. Once that period expired, ownership reverted to the State. “Under this model, the companies contributed the capital for investment in fixed assets, renovations and furnishings, taking on the operational management of the business,” while the land remained in the hands of the Cuban State.

Then came the military conglomerate GAESA which, he explains, had by that point accumulated “sufficient capital to begin building new hotels on its own account.” Gaviota was then created, with which the companies agreed a remuneration structure based on two components: “a fixed percentage for hotel management and a variable incentive linked to profits.”

Gaviota was then created, with which the companies agreed a remuneration structure based on two components: “a fixed percentage for hotel management and a variable incentive linked to profits”

The management-only model and the original joint-venture model coexisted and flourished for years, until the onset of Cuba’s economic difficulties, which were aggravated by the pandemic. After that came the current major crisis, with the accumulation of sanctions – some specifically targeting GAESA – that have forced the current withdrawal of the foreign hotel chains associated with Gaviota. In the specific case of Meliá, following the abandonment of the management of 14 hotels, it is left with just 19. Iberostar, also Spanish, relinquished 6 of 12, and other companies have reduced or eliminated their presence on the island entirely.

Vasallo is unequivocal. The overall balance has been positive, and now all that remains is to wait and see what happens. “The Cuban market has completed its cycle. Today it represents a latent asset managed under damage-limitation criteria, pending the inevitable bright tourism future of Cuba – which appears closer following the reforms set in motion by the regime, including the dismantling of GAESA and its replacement by public limited companies, planned devaluations of the peso, and the authorization of private banks, all of which amounts to a complete overhaul of the economic system.”

Translated by GH

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Just 24 days ago, the dollar reached what was then seen as an unthinkable record: 600 CUP. Looking back even further — though not that far — it is easy to confirm the relentless depreciation of the national currency. On May 2, one dollar was exchanging for 535 CUP.

US economist Steve Hanke, who frequently updates informal inflation rates and currency depreciation figures for various countries, placed the Cuban peso three days ago as the third most devalued currency in the world at present, having lost 45% of its value over the past year. Although the ranking is volatile — as recently as June 16, the CUP was in fourth place — a persistent presence in the top five has been maintained for some time. On that same day, the expert noted that inflation reached an annualized rate of 84.5%, the third highest rate of price increases in the world. “Socialism and Uncle Sam’s sanctions have proved to be a lethal cocktail,” the expert stated.

“Socialism and Uncle Sam’s sanctions have proved to be a lethal cocktail.”

The official market, meanwhile, continues to operate in its parallel world, today buying the dollar at 585 — a price at which few, if any, are willing to part with a currency that has become far too precious.

In December 2025, the Government launched a floating rate in an attempt to compete with the informal market rate, which had established itself through sheer economic reality among the population. After years of open war with El Toque for publishing an exchange rate far higher than the State’s, the official buying and selling price was set at 410 pesos to the dollar — in addition to the other existing rates of 24 pesos, for state enterprises, and 120, for entities capable of generating foreign currency. Beyond being an attempt to recapture the lost currency market, the regime was trying to contain inflation that continues to climb, albeit more slowly than in 2023 and 2024 — not because the economy has improved, but due to widespread poverty and the scarcity of goods at affordable prices.

At the time the initial rate was approved, the authorities noted that it was not going to please anyone, and so it proved — the US dollar was trading on the informal market for around 440 pesos, a far closer relationship than the current one. The regime’s efforts to contain monetary instability have proved futile, as economists had already warned. To achieve that, they noted, five factors difficult to bring about on the Island would need to be in place, starting with a better macroeconomic environment that today is much further away than it was just a year and a half ago.

Translated by GH.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Some of the reforms will begin to be implemented within the next 30 days. The timetable includes measures covering economic actors, the Central State Administration, the energy sector, agriculture, prices, wages, trade, catering, services, and the partial dollarization of the economy.

The program also envisages expanding private-sector participation in tourism, foreign trade, and the real estate sector, as well as facilitating foreign investment by Cubans living outside the island. Cooperatives will be permitted to import and sell fuel for their operations, seek external financing, and open bank accounts abroad.

The fine print will depend, however, on numerous regulations still pending. The Government has created a legal working group headed by Esteban Lazo, President of the National Assembly, and a separate “political and communications support” group led by the Party. While the former will be tasked with accelerating the drafting of implementing provisions, the latter will manage the public explanation of measures that may prove unpopular.

Perez-Oliva summed up the philosophy of the process as “unified direction with decentralization of responsibilities.” Havana will retain political command and strategic decision-making, while businesses, municipalities, and workers will be required to generate income and be held accountable for results.

The union, which represents 2,069,285 members, also aims to extend its presence into private-sector companies.

“The implementation of these reforms will not achieve the results we aspire to if our workers are not actively involved,” President Miguel Diaz-Canel told the delegates. The CTC will be expected to transform the government’s program into a political movement, explain it in workplaces, and accompany processes of “labor reorientation” – a term that may encompass layoffs, reassignments, workforce reductions, and the closure of unproductive entities.

The union, which represents 2,069,285 members, also aims to extend its presence into private-sector companies. The unionization of their employees was among the issues debated, alongside wages, productivity, support for retirees, and protection of workers’ rights. No explanation has been offered as to what capacity the CTC would have to stand up to a state or private employer, but it seems clear that workers will not be able to organize outside the Party-controlled federation.

The energy crisis even left its mark on the organization of the congress itself. Of the 759 delegates, 561 participated via videoconference and only 198 gathered in person at the Havana Convention Center. Nearly three in four union members were unable to attend in person the gathering convened to debate the country’s economic recovery.

Delegates also reviewed the draft new Labor Code, which will be submitted to the National Assembly in July. The Minister of Labor and Social Security, Jesus Otamendiz Campos, described the proposal as “revolutionary, novel, and suited to the present day.”

Monreal noted that the verb “to permit” appears 29 times in the document.

Among its new provisions are the exceptional admission to employment of adolescents aged 15 to 18, multiple job-holding, so-called “combined work,” and the possibility of setting workdays of less than eight hours with proportional pay. The authorities did not specify what types of work minors would be permitted to carry out, nor what safeguards would prevent poverty and family breakdown from pushing young people prematurely into the labor market.

Cuban economist Pedro Monreal questioned whether the list can be regarded as a coherent reform at all. The 176 measures are a “monster,” or “perhaps more of a misshapen hybrid,” he wrote on X. In his view, the Government is attempting to incorporate elements of a market economy without recognizing private property as a right protected against state power.

Monreal noted that the verb “to permit” appears 29 times in the document. “‘To permit’ is a permissive stance of power,” he observed, because it preserves the notion that private activity is a concession that the authorities can modify or withdraw.

“Nowhere in the 176 measures is it possible to identify any substantive recognition of the right to private property,” he added. Nor do any clear guarantees appear regarding commercial arbitration, claims, compensation, or dispute resolution.

The Government wants private actors to invest, generate wealth, and take on risks, but does not appear willing to legally limit the power that determines who may operate and under what conditions. The CTC will now be charged with bringing those entrepreneurs and workers into its ranks, while ensuring that the economic opening is not mistaken for a return to capitalism.

Translated by GH.

______________________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The lawmaker urged that a decision be made as soon as possible, and that if the doctors cannot complete their training on the Island, they should be given safe passage home through diplomatic channels, without any penalty to the recognition of their qualifications.

Although no further details have been provided about the doctors’ programs of study, they may be receiving their specialization at the Latin American School of Medicine, located in Havana and designed for the training of foreign students.

This institution is being given energy support through institutional and European aid from MediCuba Europa, a Switzerland-based network of around twenty organizations sympathetic to Castroism, which has raised funds for various projects. Just two weeks ago, the network announced that a new project is now operational, covering half of the school’s energy needs.

In any case, the Cuban healthcare system is under severe strain, complicating the daily lives of patients and, by extension, of medical professionals.

On Monday, Claudia Sheinbaum announced that her government is working to deliver fuel to Cuba through “private companies that hold the necessary permits.” The president noted that work has been underway for some time – since Cuba and the United States each authorized, on their respective sides, the opening of the fuel market to the private sector – and she hopes that trade “can resume on a commercial basis soon.” She also clarified, in order to deflect criticism within Mexico over the free supply of oil to the Island, that the matter “is not a humanitarian issue.”

Translated by GH.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.