Elias Amor Bravo – Page 7 – Translating Cuba

Cuba: A UMAP for ‘Social Transformation’ of People Who Do Not Study or Work?

A contemporaneous article about the UMAP force labor camps in Cuba. “A brilliant initiative of military cadres.”

14ymedio, Elías Amor Bravo, Economist, 27 October 2022 — A brief note in Cuba’s officials state newspaper Granma has set off the alarm. It’s getting ugly. During the council of ministers, which met yesterday, October 25th, they presented general directives for preventing and confronting crime, corruption, illegalities and lack of discipline. It was about time, but now the regime is willing to put an end to any behavior deemed illegal. No matter that, thanks to these activities, many Cuban families are able to put food on the table, after searching unsuccessfully in the state-owned bodegas. The note in Granma states that one of the ten points taken up during the council of ministers was directed at “combatting excessive prices and the resale of essential products.” To that end, they drafted a request to regime and party leaders at all levels, but especially in local government, “to not waiver in these situations, and not allow space for theft and diversion of resources.”

What does this mean? Well, nothing other than, as of now it will be more difficult to find food, and the weight of the repression will be unlimited against people who offer these services to their fellow citizens.

But the repressive actions, in fact, have already begun in some agricultural markets in the capital. Authorities issued fines to vendors who were reported for abusive price fixing and other illegalities. Specifically, last weekend operatives of the Municipal Inspection Directorate (DIM) in Playa, Havana, imposed fines of up to 8,000 pesos to six vendors in the supply and demand agricultural market at 19th and 42nd for price violations and other illegalities.

Two of those sanctioned were fined for abusively fixing the price of tomatoes, bell peppers, and carrots at 300 pesos per pound as well as limes (200 pesos per lb.), and pineapples (100 pesos per unit). Two others were fined 5,000 pesos for not including in their lists the product price or for “finding 999 nylon bags without a receipt, for which the responsible party was fined 1,500 pesos and the merchandise confiscated.” continue reading

These infractions are included in Decree Law 30 of 2021 which establishes the personal infractions, sanctions, measures and procedures to apply to violations of the norms dictated in the price and tariff policy. In summary, the repressive apparatus is already functional and investigations will continue, especially after those latest instructions of the council of ministers.

Leaders want to identify the sources of these products as well as the houses converted warehouses for sale on the illegal market, so that they can confront the illegalities and lack of social discipline. This will be followed by a crackdown against the sale of foodstuffs, hoarding, theft of merchandise from state-owned stores and abusive prices.

It’s the same old, same old. If instead of concentrating their effort on unproductive activities such as surveillance, snitching, inspections, and repression, the authorities would dedicate themselves to produce more, so an increase in supply would flood the market and contain prices, it would be another story. It is obvious that they are not going to do this, or worse, from a communist ideological perspective, repression is the motivator.

What the regime describes as “illegalities” is so astonishing and extensive that someone should begin to worry about those anomalies that only exist in Cuba. Not even in impoverished Haiti is it so easy to find such illegalities, for example the sale of propane tanks at bakeries and other stores, where Cuban communists confirm that there is “probable complicity of some employees in the theft of more than 1,000 tanks.”

Another, with respect to the sale of fuel at service centers, where the deficit or the delay in service is due to “problems in shipping, an increase in demand, and an increase in the time required for the purchase transaction at these establishments.” To say nothing of the electricity, less than 20% of the lights have come back on in the capital city, which remains dark. With housing, another, homes affected by the hurricane remain in the same situation (of 1,176 affected only 166 have been repaired). Another record.

But what truly worries authorities are the prices. Authorities want prices to adjust to the costs and reject the laws of the market, in both the state and non-state sectors. And, especially, they do not want to produce wealth, which is what sets apart the economic actors of the state political power. Bankruptcies and closures will follow. People can’t sell at a loss. There is no making heads or tails of this.

Conclusion. The regime takes the Doberman of fear out for a walk, and prepares for the worst. This time, as if a novelty, in the council of ministers they announced the traditional “strategies for the social transformation of people who neither study nor work, so they may contribute to society.” Social transformation? What the devil is that? Perhaps a new UMAP* is coming in the 21st century? Will the world remain impassive in the face of these communist practices in Cuba?

In the same ministerial meeting, Gil informed on the country’s economic performance as of the end of September this year, but nothing has changed. Perhaps he did this to justify the spending on that survey which claims to measure consumer satisfaction among Cubans. An absurdity. Granma says nothing in regard to this, only that during the council, the following matters will be discussed: the portfolio of opportunities for foreign investment (a failure from the start), the national hydraulic plan (impossible to implement without investment in hotels), the decree law on conflict mediation (after the family code, anything is possible), and the expected assignments for the 2023 graduates of higher education and mid-level technical schools (employment for all, even if they’re worthless). All very interesting, right now.

*Translator’s note: UMAAP = “The notorious Military Units to Aid Production (in Spanish: Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producción), internment and forced labor camps where the Cuban government imprisoned homosexuals, the religious, intellectuals, dissidents and any other “suspicious elements” between November 1965 and July 1968.” Source: Ernesto Hernandez Busto

Translated by: Silvia Suárez

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The Failure of the Cuban Communist Regime’s Employment Policy

Granma masthead, headline and illustration. (Granma)

14ymedio, Elías Amor Bravo, Economist, 23 October 2022– Cuba’s official State newspaper Granma describes the more than 152,000 people who have joined the workforce in the non-state sector of the economy as a success and linked it to the measures to diversify society’s economic actors implemented in the country over the last several years. Neither one, nor the other. Enough of the propaganda, let’s get to objective conclusions that can be obtained from these data.

The labor market in Cuba continues to be dominated by the communist economy, the increase in employment is insufficient and the new economic actors, estimated at 5,500, have not played as large a role as was expected in terms of creating jobs. The results lead, if you will, in a different direction.

It’s all the same, the official communist periodical celebrates as a success the 152,373 people who, by the end of August, had joined the country’s labor force; of those, 123,321 are not associated with an employer, according to data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MTSS).

The weight of the state sector on employment continues to be great and does not allow the private sector to close the gap. Even so, the job offers for those 44,619 were in public sector organizations; 107,754 in the non-state sector, of which 101,461 were self-employed, 4,491 in other forms of private business, while 1,802 benefitted from being allowed to use state-owned fallow land.

This increase in non-state employment, clearly insufficient, is purported to be associated with the measures to diversify society’s economic actors implemented in the country over the last several years. However, in reality, those data mask the requirement imposed on self-employed workers with more than three employees that they register as a ’mipyme’ (a microenterprise) if they want to continue operating legally. A good proportion of the employment created is related to the measures imposed by the regime to “whitewash” the data about the process of creating new actors. continue reading

Thus, highlights Granma, that of the people identified, 38% are people younger than 35 years of age and 31% women, while among those who are not employed, 44% are women and 29% young people.

A good example of the mediocre data presented by the ministry can be found in the comparison with the same period the previous year. If this is the case, the increase in those entering the labor force was only 16,117 people.

What do these data tell us? They quickly confirm that the communist regime’s employment policy is another failure, it continues without adequate linkages to the rest of the regime’s political and social economy. In essence, one policy aimed at padding the staff rosters of state-funded businesses and organizations, where there is underemployment, and low levels of productivity which are not commensurate with the salaries received. The labor market in Cuba is non-existent, and does not comply with technical functions to satisfy the staff qualifications needed by the companies, and it is much less socially useful to guarantee workers suitable career paths.

The most glaring example of this failure can be found in the non-compliance with the Communist constitution of 2018 and of the so-called labor code, Law 116/2013, which establishes fundamental labor principles, such as the rights and social duties of citizens, implemented through the Decent Work Program. But in practice they lead to this situation of state underemployment which tends to reproduce itself over time, without creating adequate space for private activity.

The failure of the employment policy at MTSS and the institutions that comprise it, in combined with the demands of the national economy, and the local development strategy of each territory is evident in the denouncement of the few foreign investors who venture to operate in the country: that they cannot find qualified personnel for the positions they have on offer.

Similarly, with slim offerings in the private sector, which attempts to carve out a path in the country, many high-level professionals (doctors and researchers) prefer the salary of a waiter or cook to those they get from the state-funded sector. That is an absolute communist mess; their employment priorities from “those graduating from regular day courses at several levels of education, those graduating from active military service and other people of interest to the state, especially women, people in vulnerable situations, and those who serve their [criminal] sentences or security measures while free,” do not satisfy those people who yearn to develop professional careers based on what they know how to do.

Proof of the failed employment policy can be measured alternatively taking into consideration that, of the total of 4,770,000 employed workers in the state sector as well as the private, the latter barely total 1,600,000 or 34%, which has remained stable since Raúl Castro, around 2011, authorized the reduction of padded state staff rosters. The largest employment sector in Cuba continues to be the communist state, reaching up to 66%, higher than any other country in the world, as a paradigm of inefficiency, low competition and wasted resources.

The fact that only 1,802 Cubans have applied to rent land, which is the only semi-private formula the communist regime will authorize in Cuba, it is a good example that private formulas in Cuba continue to be lower than their true potential, and that in this environment, like many others, one must work and hard.

The article in Granma also offered some indications of how the regime intends to continue promoting “modalities of telework and remote work as one form of employment that benefits the organization as well as the employee,” including that “diversification of the work force, in a way that is more flexible than the in-person modality.”

Nonetheless, at the same time, the article clarified that “this model is not applicable to all job vacancies as it depends primarily on the duties performed by each worker at their work place, the position they hold, among other things.

In summary, for the directors, telework and remote work depends “also on the employer creating the conditions, control mechanisms, and watching out for the security and health of the employee and guaranteeing that, in this way, neither the employee nor his/her work will be affected.” That is, that the regime doesn’t have a clear strategy for telework either and they are spinning their wheels. In reality, the limitiation lies in the area of information technology and the capacity of the networks to allow working from home. And then there are the blackouts. What productivity could they possibly be talking about for a teleworker who spends 12 hours a day without electricity?

The regime is not up to the task to provide for innovation in labor policies. Meanwhile, the communists entertain themselves embroiled in the labor framework and now they want the ministry to lead, through collective labor agreements, a registry of the posts, which by their nature, could be conducted in telework mode or working remotely; in this way there is collegiality among workers, the sindicate and each employer organization. Bureaucracy, paperwork and an even bigger mess. The Cuban communist regime’s labor policy is a total failure.

Translated by: Silvia Suárez

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Cuba’s Economy: Less Control, More Freedom

Cuban farmers have been hit hard by lack of inputs, fuel shortages and drought. (Flickr / Kuhnmi)

14ymedio, Elias Amor Bravo, Economist, October 22, 2022 — There is not a single country in the world whose leaders spend as much time, or consume as much energy, revising and perfecting systems for monitoring and controlling the economy as Cuba. If one were to add up all the hours dedicated to this task, they would surely set a world record for pointless activity.

The consequences are plain to see. The communist economic model, obsolete and exhausted, is one of chaos. The more power its leaders have to devise legal tools and implement action plans for involving themselves in the economy, the worse it gets. Things work better without so much tinkering, oversight and control.

But will the communists acknowledge the failure of their system after sixty-years? Not in your dreams. On the contrary, Granma recently published an article, “Stay on the Path That’s Been Approved,” in which it reports that Prime Minister Manuel Morrero met with the country’s governors and their managers in the Palace of the Revolution to “promote high-priority programs and step up efforts to combat illegal activity.” Granma says his remarks were “right on target” but we fear they will be of little use. Let’s look at why.

Marrero stated that, even when a provincial or municipal problem concerns the central government, it may not be best resolved at the national level. In many cases, he pointed out, the best solution is a local one that takes into account to the conditions of a particular region. What problems is Marrero talking about? The usual ones: “Illegalities and violations that undermine the institutional framework and undermine governmental management.” Therefore, he points out, “the irregularities which are being committed today with such impunity, which have such a direct impact on the public, cannot be tolerated.”

What kind of “irregularities” is Marrero worried about? The ones he is supposed to fix. For example, the recurring issue of accounts receivable and payable. According to the prime minister, this area has been a breeding ground for corruption and criminality. A series of ongoing defaults, in which goods and services are provided before they have been paid for, is an example of poor economic management. This kind of financial malpractice results from the collusion and improvisation endemic to a communist economy. continue reading

Another irregularity that keeps Marrero up at night is the issue of coleros,* which he discussed during a meeting dubbed “Operation Anti-Colero.” This initiative is supposed to put an end to the widespread climate of disorder and illegality caused by the serious economic crisis that the nation’s leaders are incapable of solving.

There was also talk during the meeting about the low productivity of farmland and its impact on the nation’s food supply. The 63 measures intended to encourage the agricultural sector have been a failure. This was confirmed by the National Office of Statistics and Information, which reported that agricultural output has fallen for three consecutive quarters. Marrero was in charge of promoting an alternate reality that nobody else in Cuba has experienced, claiming that hard-to-find produce and other agricultural products were making their way to Cubans’ tables. The truth is that no such data confirms this phenomenon. Food in Cuba is scarcer now than it was a year ago. And its price has skyrocketed, with food inflation twenty points higher than the CPI average.

The problems are the same as always and caused by the regime. Besides the 63 agricultural measures that have not worked, there have been delays in leasing idle land to farmers and delays in the planting of seasonal crops. More than 3,800 hectares have yet to be planted and acreages set aside for growing banana, sweet potato and malanga have been reduced. As long as food is not a priority, the situation will only get worse.

There was also talk about meat and milk not being delivered, how roughly 4,143 suppliers have not fulfilled their contracts with meat companies. National leaders called for local authorities to conduct a case-by-case investigation but we already know the reason for this. It has to do with the disconnect between supply and demand, which is caused by sweeping state interventionism.

The communists feel they need more control, not in general but at the municipal level. The reality, however, is there is already too much control, rigidity and interventionism. If producers had more freedom to produce and to trade with whomever they wanted, the situation would be very different. There are already plenty of tools for control at the municipal level in the Castro economy.

Unlike what was claimed at the meeting, the process by which the state contracts farmers to grow food is burdened by excessive government control and interference. What is really needed is what Vice President Valdes Mesa called spontaneity. He should know because he remembers what Cuba was like before 1959. At that time, there was one cow for every person and no one had trouble finding meat to eat or milk to drink. Not only was there spontaneity back then, there was freedom too.

The meeting also addressed the subject of housing, one of the most intractable problems facing the country. Concerted efforts have yet to made on the ground, leading to understandable public frustration. It was announced at the meeting that, as of late August, 15,790 homes had been completed. Of those, roughly half had been built by their owners and 1,985 were basic housing blocks. With fewer than 30,000 new units in 2022, it looks like another terrible year for housing. Meanwhile, some observers say the country needs another million new units.

Housing construction is still not keeping pace with the production of building materials such as stone, bricks, concrete blocks, roofing and flooring. But the problem goes beyond the materials themselves. What is needed are builders capable of handling large-scale construction and remodeling projects.

The Maternal and Child Care Program was discussed at the meeting also. As of October, 72,846 live births and 539 deaths were recorded, and an infant mortality rate of 7.4 per 1,000 live births. The most common causes of death were perinatal conditions related to prematurity, low birth weight and intrauterine growth retardation, followed by congenital deformities and sepsis.

The problems with the program, such as staff shortages, ineffective attempts to reduce premature births and prenatal diagnostic errors, require immediate attention. What also requires attention is the mortality rate — currently, no one knows what it is — along with the fertility rate, a measure of the number of births by women of childbearing age. Cuba’s fertility rate happens to be one of the lowest in the world, which does not bode well for long-term population growth.

Inflation was also a topic for those at the gathering but little or nothing was said beyond mentioning the need to combat the illegalities without clearly indicating how to do it. There was also talk of new “economic players,” such as small and medium-sized private business, which currently number more than 5,340. There are 59 such state-owned operations, 58 non-agricultural cooperatives and 126 affiliated companies. While the contribution of these private businesses in supplying the public with goods and services was acknowledged, some new measures were announced that will contradict an essential principle of the communist economic model: the socialist state-owned company is the lead player while other types of businesses exist to complement it. This is a bad idea.

Marrero announced that progress is being made in drafting rules that would regulate these new businesses, from the national level all the way down to the the municipal. The idea is to include them as part of local development strategies. This would involve incorporating them into local economic ecosystems by linking them to state-owned companies, governments, universities and banks, and encouraging their participation in social responsibility efforts.

Hadn’t we agreed that these new businesses were to be set up so that they would be free to consolidate within a network of private companies? So why this new attempt to control them and interfere in their operations? Has the law gone into reverse? Many of these businesses are going to shut down if they start feeling too much pressure from the regime, as has happened before. And then we’re back to square one.

Translator’s note: people who are paid by others to wait in line for them.

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Cuba: Embargo, Yes? Embargo No? Exposing the Eternal See-Saw

Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs Bruno Rodriguez

14ymedio, Elías Amor Bravo, Economist, October 21, 2022–It takes just a small step to go from the sublime to the ridiculous. Bruno Rodríguez, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Cuban communist regime, who just a day before publicly thanked the U.S. State Department for the $2 million in assistance for hurricane damages, the following day, in a speech widely covered by the state press, stated, “the world would be better without the blockade against Cuba.” I insist, from the sublime to the ridiculous.

With this blockade jargon, the Cuban communists have won the propaganda and misinformation battle. That there is no taro root in Cuba, is the embargo’s fault. That there is no electricity, the embargo’s fault. That tourists don’t go, the embargo’s. That financial markets do not lend Cuba money, the embargo’s fault. And so it is; every part of life in the nation are influenced by contentions with its neighbor to the north, the solution of which, on the other hand, is within reach of the communist regime. If it doesn’t do so, it must have its reasons.

And in reality, if there is no food in Cuba, one can observe serious shortages, stockouts, long queues, anxiety, among the population faced with difficulties to secure even the basic food basket, the only embago/blockade responsible for this situation is the internal one; the one imposed on the population by the regime and its economic model. Cuba can purchase food on the market of 192 countries around the world, and it also does in the United States. The problem is the availability of financial resources to make those purchases, which, due to non payment of its debts, are not easy to obtain. What deprives Cuba of access to financial markets is data on its failure to responsibly make payments on its debts. No one, under normal circumstances, is willing to lend to those who do not honor their commitments.

In any case, the blockade/embargo is one of the communications points the communist regime, devised by Fidel Castro, masterfully played in international fora, alarmingly obtaining alignment of countries with theses and arguments that do not fit within any basic economic analysis. continue reading

Such is the effort that a national report was promoted at the United Nations, under Resolution 75/289 of the U.N. General Assembly, titled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba” (August 2021-February 2022), to which the Cuban communists dedicate special attention each year. The referenced document will be discussed for the thirtieth time on November 2nd and 3rd. They are already campaigning.

Moreover, each year, the regime takes advantage of any external factor to dress up the content of the report with a dramatic tinge. This year, why not, it’s Ian’s passage through Pinar del Río. It aggravated the effects of the serious international economic crisis, which is already being felt on the Island though ECLAC barely touches on it in its most recent forecast. The regime’s partners are not in a position, for example, to give away money.

And, since one thing cannot occur without the other, in this year’s report, Rodríguez Parrilla went on to explain that the blockade has taken on new forms, more detrimental if that was possible, in its attempt to accentuate the impact on daily life. Although for that they need to revert back to historic dosuments from 1960, such as that Memorandum of Assistant Secretary Lestor Mallory, who 62 years later continues to give opportunities to the Cuban communists to attack. C’mon it was not that long ago.

To this point, and with history’s rancid analysis, arrives a new estimate of the losses caused by the blockade, which according to the regime, between August 2021 and February 2022 were 3.806 billion dollars, a historic record during a period of only six months. It is as if the Cuban economy depended solely on the economy of the United States, a sort of anexionist focus or something similar.

The regime does not spare any effort. In six decades, at current prices, the cummulative damages total 154 billion, 217 million dollars. At the current price of an ounce of gold, taking into consideration depreciation, the cummulative damages amount to 1 trillion, 391 billion 111 million dollars. And clearly, the political conclusion is always the same: imagine what Cuban could have done if it had had access to those resources. What Cuba would be like if the country had used those resources.

Well, nothing. And everything. An economy doesn’t function better just by having access to money. Just the opposite. The key is how the money is used and whether the resources are allocated in ways that are profitable. And it does not seem that the Island’s prevailing economic model would allow it to reach such profitability with the resources. The blockade/embargo only goes so far, and no further. Everything else is science fiction.

In reality, the United States is the second largest tourist market for Cuba, it sends over 8 billion dollars in remittances per year and allows commerce and imports of 200 million dollars per year. No one sees the embargo anywhere, except for those who have a political interest in it being so. Going from the quantitative calculations of losses, be they the 3.806 billion dollars mentioned or the 6.364 billion dollars of the Biden era, the estimates in terms of GDP is risky and sets a bad precedent.

There is something in the estimates of losses in the report that merits attention for its novelty. The regime maintains that the GDP growth could have been 4.5%, had the blockade/embargo not existed during the period between August 2021 and February 2022. One cannot make heads or tails of this 4.5% and it forces a reflection on the cummulative economic magnitude, how they were calculated and what they really mean.

To begin with, it is convenient to really know how much the Cuban economy has grown in the period mentioned. Data on GDP growth are provided by the ONEI by quarter. Given the dates, it covers from the third quarter of 2021 to the first quarter 2022.

According to data from ONEI, the 2021 inter-annual growth in GDP was -1.4% in the third quarter, then it reached 10.9% in the fourth quather and another 10.9% in the first quarter of 2022. A simple mathematical calculation suggests that, in this period, the GDP grew by 6.8%, clearly more than the 2021 median, which was 3.2%. Then, what is the regime talking about with that 4.5%, which they say could have been achieved without the embargo?

Beware of unfounded statements, and with the calculations that are not adequately justified. Now it so happens that, even with the embargo/blockade, the Cuban economy grew faster than the rate desired by the regime if this dispute did not exist. Who do you believe?

The regime blames the embargo for: the lack of fuel; the obstacles in acquiring replacement parts and other resources based on American technologies; and the difficulties with regard to financial banking matters; commercial, financial or investment transactions; in the direct persecution of producers, transporters, shipping companies, insurers and freight forwarders; problems with the electrical energy system; and medicine. But in reality much of these claims have to do with existing obstacles that prevent the economy from functioning freely. That’s the real embargo.

Translated by Silvia Suárez

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The Argument of the Embargo and the Ridiculousness of the Cuban Communist Regime

A Cuban farmer makes extra money turning the invasive marabou weed into charcoal for export. (14ymedio)

14ymedio, Elías Amor Bravo, Economist, October 16, 2022 — When a government ignores economic problems, it does so for two reasons. Either because of incompetence, or because there are substantive reasons that prevent the adoption of appropriate measures to meet social demands. Or it can happen as in communist Cuba, where the two converge. For example, incompetence and ideological pressure are the factors that condition the terrible results of Cuban agriculture, with declines in GDP in the second half of the year that are above the average of the economy as a whole.

In other words, neither the “63 measures” planned for agriculture, nor the “94 of sugar” have served to change the trend of the two fundamental sectors of the Cuban economy. And, as always, in these cases, the state press directs its accusations to the U.S. blockade, holding it responsible for alleged millions of losses in agriculture, which are added, of course, to those of the other sectors.

Strangely enough, Cubans have experienced this sequence of events since the earliest times of Fidel Castro. Blaming the blockade has always been present, and now, when people can’t take it anymore, Cuban communists shamelessly unleash the embargo/blockade doberman again. The point is that this excuse is no longer believed by anyone in Cuba or in the rest of the world.

In an amazing way, the anti-blockade argument changes over time. Interestingly, the regime now says that “the blockade is the main obstacle to the implementation of the 2030 Development Agenda.” A false complaint, which aims to reach the United Nations forums where these issues are addressed, like the Summit on Sustainable Development Goals, held in the context of the 74th session of the U.N. General Assembly two years ago, where such a statement still has force.

Foreign Minister Rodríguez, increasingly irrelevant in international forums, seeing that friends are fewer and fewer, pulls this new story of the embargo/blockade and the 2030 agenda out of a hat. If this aptitude for defining insubstantial paradigms were applied to food production, maybe things would go another way.

Cuban communists, seeing themselves isolated at the international level, have returned to the charge against the impact of the economic, commercial and financial blockade, insisting that it slows the country’s economy and considerably affects development in all sectors. They have now set their sights on agricultural production. And to that end, they have unloaded again a numerical figure that says the losses due to the blockade amounted to 270 million, 852 million, and 548 million dollars between August 2021 and February 2022, according to estimates by the Ministry of Agriculture. Almost nothing. continue reading

Where does that absurd figure come from? Specifically, it was the director of International Affairs of the Ministry of Agriculture, Orlando Díaz Rodríguez, who was in charge of making it known that the estimate, “summarizes the income not received by exports of goods and services, losses due to geographical relocation of trade, as well as from effects on production and services, monetary and financial ones and technological limitations.” Of course, optimistically, no one can beat them.

Income not received from exports is child’s play. The first thing would be to see if those exports have a demand or interest in the U.S., and they don’t seem to. The concept of “geographical relocation of trade” follows the same trend as always but is false. All countries look for the necessary goods and services wherever they are, and then transport them. As for the “allocations,” this is already known. The internal blockade of the regime is much more negative and has been so for 63 years.

The tireless Cuban communists accuse the 243 coercive measures adopted by the Donald Trump administration (2017-2021), still in force with the Biden administration, and say that “they put the brakes on the business system, which includes cooperatives and individual producers, making it impossible to position their products in the North American market.” False. There is nothing in the dispute that prevents independent producers from placing their sales in the U.S. market. The problem is the same as always: is there demand for those products? Cuban communists talk about tobacco, fresh fruit, honey and charcoal as the products affected by the embargo, but could more of them even be produced? We doubt it.

According to the communist leaders, Americans have been deprived of these Cuban products and cannot purchase them because of the blockade. In particular, in the health sector, he alluded to Vidatox-30 CH, a homeopathic drug developed by Labiofam used as a complementary therapy for the treatment of cancer, which, due to the “criminal policy,” cannot be commercialized in the northern nation. As if the pharmaceutical industry in the U.S. didn’t have similar drugs, validated by the World Health Organization.

Not satisfied with everything said, there was also talk of the interest of entrepreneurs, producers and other “representatives of the agricultural sector in denouncing the blockade, as well as the measures that intensify it, and they’ve expressed their interest in cooperation, investment and commercialization with the Island.”

Do you know when they’re going to collect if they sell on credit to Cuba? The U.S. chicken producers and farmers already market their products under the current conditions [i.e. payment in cash at time of sale]. What reason is there to sell if they can’t collect until later? In addition, agriculture in Cuba needs to import animal feed, inputs, technologies and raw materials for the sake of food production for the people. What are they going to pay for it with?

It’s the same old song. The embargo is guilty of everything. They fall into the most absolute ridiculousness. More opportunities will come for accusing the embargo/blockade of all the ills of the Cuban economy.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Exchange Market Analysis and State Intervention (II)

Cuban 20 peso note signed by Che Guevara.

14ymedio, Elías Amor Bravo, Economist, 17 October 2022 — When Cuban Minister of Economy and Planning Gil decided, unilaterally, two months ago, to create an exchange rate of 1×120 for the dollar relative to the peso in an attempt to counteract the trend in the informal market, it was soon observed that the limits imposed on the availability of currencies, the geographical scope and access to purchase, limited to natural persons, would cause more problems than solutions, since this process eliminated the basic principle of convertibility of the foreign exchange market.

The minister’s decision, far from redirecting the situation, alerted the informal market, which began an unprecedented escalation of the dollar to around 200 pesos. After all the failures, the authorities now intend to redirect the situation and position the foreign exchange market between the national currency and the foreign currencies, preventing the Cuban economy from being dollarized. It won’t be easy. A very valuable amount of time has been lost, and now the cost of the adjustment will be higher.

The minister is determined to control all the currencies that enter the economy to channel them into the state coffers, and as they are fewer and fewer, decisions are increasingly risky. We remember that the stores that only accept payment in MLC (freely convertible currency) were adopted as a temporary and necessary solution to maintain socialism, and they are still there after more than two years. Everything that is proposed for a while ends up becoming permanent. And that’s how it goes.

On the other hand, there is concern among Cubans about what may happen with the peso exchange rate in the coming months. Those who have stocks in this currency don’t know whether to change now, at 190-200 per dollar, or to wait and see. The uncertainty is great, because the functioning of the informal market deviates from the conventional schemes that explain the trends in the value of currencies, and there is no anchor for the analysis. In any case, it doesn’t seem that the leaders are going to change the conditions of the environment that have led to this situation, so things will continue in the same way. continue reading

So, in the face of the current exchange rate crisis of the peso, which the authorities are unable to reverse, there are messages in the official press regarding the fact that the Cuban peso should be the center of the financial system, including an inclusive price system for all economic actors and a market that works with a certain level of wholesale and retail offers. So, why don’t they succeed?

The foreign exchange market is considered one of the essential elements in the recovery of the convertibility of the national currency, but it’s much more than a nominal exchange of currencies. In fact, the official thesis points out that its absence was a great obstacle to the full use of productive capacities, limiting the country’s economic growth. The foreign exchange market is a reflection of other balances or imbalances that affect the relative value of the currencies. It’s not an isolated entity.

The directors of the Central Bank of Cuba rightly consider that the foreign exchange market involves the possibility of connecting the national currency with foreign currencies, through a well-founded exchange rate and that, in addition, this should be reflected in practice, in the relations that are established between economic agents, both state and private. The inconvertibility that occurred after the approval of the rate of 1×24 meant the emergence of alternative mechanisms to access foreign currencies, such as the dollarization of the economy in informal markets. The leaders want to set limits on this, since it opposes the objective of increasing the purchasing capacity of the national currency.

From this perspective, the official position assumes that the non-convertibility of the currency generates imbalances, because economic actors cannot meet their currency needs with the national currency at the current official exchange rate. When this process is carried out in a disorderly manner, it puts the economy in a complex situation, and an example of this is the current scenario of the dollarization and development of the informal market, which the authorities want to stop.

On this point, the official vision emphasizes the need to correct the sources of imbalance that gravitate on the foreign exchange market, mainly those associated with large national currency issues to support the fiscal deficit. So, they suggest that through an orderly and coherent intervention, using the economic policy instruments that the state has as a regulatory body, a foreign exchange market can be implemented that responds to the purposes of convertibility.

The directors conclude that macroeconomic stability is essential to be able to grow, and that growth is what allows the expansion of productive capacity, which enables the economic development of the country, and in that development lies the possibility of building socialism. To achieve this objective, a set of structural transformations that lead to the full convertibility of the national currency must be implemented on the fly. The question is the same as always: what structural transformations?

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuba’s Exchange Market Crisis and State Intervention (Part I)

A line outside a currency exchange (Cadeca) in Havana. (14ymedio)

14ymedio, Elías Amor Bravo, Economist, 17 October 2022 — The official voice of the party has finally spoken. Like Don Rafael del Junco in that radio serial of the great Félix B. Caignet that paralyzed the country for a long time, the official state newspaper Granma talked about the foreign exchange market in order to blame the informal market and inflation for everything bad. And it has done so with arguments that are more political than technical, with evidence that is more propaganda than scientific. Let’s take a look. What it has always done is nothing more and nothing less than what we could expect.

According to Granma’s official analysis, “in the nation’s current conditions, it’s essential to capture a greater number of currencies, formalizing their entry into the financial system, stabilizing the exchange rate and making it the only one, for both natural and legal persons.” [A ’natural person’ is an individual human being, while a ’legal person’ can be an entity.]

Wrong. A greater influx of foreign exchange doesn’t guarantee control of the financial system, nor will exchange rate stability be achieved. So what does Granma want? Let no one be mistaken: to fill the state coffers and then allocate these funds to the regime’s objectives, which, as we know, have little to do with ordinary Cubans.

This idea was what led Cuban Minister of Economy and Planning Gil two months ago, to improvise a new exchange rate for the purchase of foreign exchange by the State (1 USD per 120 CUP), as he said at that time, to establish an exchange market in the country aimed at “increasing foreign exchange income and gradually advancing in the recovery of the economy.” This is the first thing, of course. The second thing has already been seen. Quarterly GDP growth fell from 10.7% in the first quarter to 1.7% in the second, a full-fledged collapse of the economy, dragged down by the terrible results in agriculture, sugar and manufacturing. continue reading

The communists cannot understand, under such conditions, how in a very short time the official exchange rate collapsed compared to the informal market, which at one point reached 200 Cuban pesos/US dollar. There were many reasons for the failure, but it was clear that the simple sale of foreign exchange, limited in amount and only for natural persons, was not going to go very far, as in fact happened.

It is useless for Granma to launch all kinds of attacks against the informal market, which they describe as a “crooked and illegal” business. Although Granma doesn’t recognize it, the informal market has been the winner of this whole process, and unless the State represses or eliminates it, it will continue to be so. Basically because this market, unlike the state of Minister Gil, provides its services to the population without limits, regulations or ties. Granma says, belittling the agents of the informal market, that “it is the only exchange service that is now profitable and open at midnight outside the CADECA [the state exchange service], attending to the line and then selling places in line at 1,000 or 2,000 CUP, or even at dollars.”

The Cuban Economy is Without Direction and Internationally Isolated

The corner of Galiano and San Lázaro in Havana crumble away without restoration. (14ymedio)

14ymedio, Elías Amor Bravo Economist, 15 October 2022 — With the Cuban economy’s GDP in the second quarter practically stagnant, 1.7% compared to the same period of the previous year; with CPI inflation climbing to 32% also in a year-on-year rate in August; with the blackouts that don’t cease, the depreciation of the Cuban peso in informal markets, the difficulty with choosing a combination of economic policies that puts an end to the process of deterioration suffered by the Cuban economy, like sugar and manufacturing, and in the face of a new default on the tourism plan, the Cuban communist leaders remain unmoved, incapable of choosing a combination of economic policies that can put an end to the process of deterioration suffered by the Cuban economy.

The bad thing is that the worst is yet to come. While in other Latin American countries the pre-pandemic GDP levels have recovered, efforts are made by central banks to control the increase in inflation, and the depreciation of exchange rates and adjustment measures are adopted to face the new global competitive scenario, in Cuba no one does anything. The people live every day with the anguish of what to eat, and the regime remains stuck in its obsolete, failed communist model, unable to provide solutions to problems.

This is a differential element that Cubans who can travel abroad immediately see as soon as they get off the plane. Nobody understands what is happening on the Island, and therefore, the protests are increasing, the banging of pots and pans in protest is heard daily, louder and louder, and people have lost their fear of talking.

And instead of acting to eliminate daily anguish in the population, adopting economic policies that facilitate the take-off of productive forces, the regime is the same as always: take the doberman dogs for a walk and put fear into the population, from the rapid response brigades, to the Black Berets, through the prosecutor’s office. continue reading

Once again, the machinery of repression and communist control is put at the service of the single party to prevent Cubans from exercising their rights and freedoms. It’s the worst possible path, before the astonished gaze of the international community.

Consequence: fewer and fewer friends. The regime has looked for them and reacts clumsily and slowly, as when the other day it abstained, along with China, in the United Nations vote against Putin’s referendums in the conquered areas of Ukraine. With friends like that, anyone can go party.

With everything, the international allies of the Cuban communist regime are being diluted, and bank demands arise for unpaid debts, for which the communist organisation is not prepared and which will mean a real blow to the waterline when, perhaps soon, the sanctions are known.

What’s coming is not good, and it is necessary prepare. The friends of this aimless and futureless Cuba disappear. Unlike that honeymoon of Fidel Castro and Chávez that saved the regime after the Special Period, now no one appears willing to sustain an economic system without the capacity for indebtedness. There are only a few old communists left in Europe who are reluctant to recognize the failure of their dreams, if they ever had them, and when other countries visit the Island, their leaders are received by Raúl Castro, who, by the way, gives signs of life, as happened during the visit of of Vietnam’s minister of public security.

The Cuban economy is not here to play cat and mouse. Sooner rather than later it will have to face an internal and external agenda, for which the current leaders have no answer, nor do they want to offer one. Installed in defending the communist ideological model, they haven’t realized that the world is going any other way, and that any decision that has to be made, doesn’t allow for delay.

They should listen to their Vietnamese colleague. In five years that country overcame food famines and is now the number one exporter of rice in Asia, ahead of China. Cuban communists don’t want to believe it but reforms in property rights can change the direction of a country. Cuban communists don’t dare. For good reason.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Alternatives to Providing Cuba’s Communist Regime with Aid for Those Affected by Hurricane Ian

Damage such as this, from an earlier Hurricane Matthew, is ‘routine’ on the island. (EFE)

14ymedio, Elias Amor Bravo, Economist, 5 October 2022 — Attentive to the first measures announced by the regime for precariously addressing the effects of Hurricane Ian in Pinar del Rio. The leader has been the minister of Domestic Commerce, Betsy Díaz, who during the first edition of Mesa Redonda (Roundtable) on Cuban TV, announced a series of measures which I analyze in this blog entry.

Apparently, the hurricane delayed the regular supply of family food baskets as a result of the “slowdown of activities at the ports, and although there are other products which had already arrived in the country, they needed to halt operations and it was not possible to deliver these, as is customary, before the first of each month.”

We need to look at the unbelievable. The food baskets stuck at the ports due to the hurricane. Not even Mrs. Díaz herself believes that. She later said that “we are ending the coffee distribution, except on the Isle of Youth and Holguín; we are finalizing a substitution for the yogurt, which could not be produced; and we are finishing up the delivery of last month’s meat products throughout eight territories such as La Habana, Mayabeque, Pinar del Río, Sancti Spíritus, Matanzas, Ciego de Ávila, Holguín and Granma.”

Instead of forgetting about the food basket for once, they back themselves into a corner and proceed with the distribution of goods in dribs and drabs; such that the only reaction it elicits is popular indignation. The bureaucratic planners do not understand that every Cuban is different and that treating everyone the same is a big mistake. The precariousness of the measures seem insufficient for the 903 damaged facilities, of which 22 are warehouses, said the minister. Furthermore, 871 retail units were affected; of these 520 bodegas (ration stores], 429 in Pinar del Río. continue reading

With regard to the energy deficit caused by Ian as it passed through the westernmost provinces, the minister stated that they have begun distributing charcoal for cooking. That is, a return to a past long ago.

She also said that there is a delay in the distribution of domestic gas in the provinces of Holguín, Ciego de Ávila, Granma and Las Tunas, as well as delays in the distribution of salt as all operations are paralyzed. It is not strange that people protest in a situation such as this, absolutely not justified by the effects of the hurricane. The minister concluded by saying that all inputs for the food basket are in the country, for which she begged the population for calm in this matter.

She added that “as of October 6th, food modules for the affected provinces,” including the distribution in four provinces and the special municipality of Isle of Youth, [will contain] supplementary food, taking into consideration the damages to agriculture and the energy deficit.

Specifically, three additional pounds of rice for the entire population of the territories mentioned above. Similarly, preserved meat will be distributed depending on household size. “This measure will benefit more than 3,553,000 consumers,” according to the minister who also announced more potatoes, hygiene products, grains in Pinar del Río and Havana, and beginning on October 6th, food modules for all consumers. She even spoke of mattresses for those who have requested them. Dribs and drabs instead of liberalizing and freeing markets.

She references aid received from international organizations such as the World Food Programme, specifically tents, tarps, lanterns, mobile warehouses to protect foodstuffs, and kitchen kits, which will be controlled by the communist Defense Councils.

But of everything mentioned above, the most interesting has to do with the sale of construction materials, especially for the facilities and homes affected by the hurricane.

And the solution is subsidies. More spending. People affected may be assessed for subsidies, access to bank loans, or could pay cash if they have the financial means to do so; also, as a new feature, they are offering payment plans to sell these goods.

The discount is 50% of the price. This is the only thing being rolled out in a singular and generic manner; it is the same for a Cuban who earns 2,500 pesos per month and one who earns 5,000 per month. This is communist equality, that later ends up creating shameful distortions in society. Because, furthermore, it subsidizes 50% of the materials for someone who is without a home or business due to the hurricane, and someone who has some roof or wall damage which requires minor repairs.

Has no one thought of adjusting the percentage of the subsidy? It seems unreal that in a country with a centralized economy and planning, aid cannot be tailored to the personal circumstances of the applicant. Providing equal aid to everyone is pure communist demagogy and lack of motivation to work for the collective good. The minister still has time to change the aid formula and stop distributing products as if this were an old parroquial charity office. During catastrophic situations in communist Cuba, public administration leaves much to be desired.

Translated by: Silvia Suárez

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The Agricultural Development Development Fund Has Been a Failure

14ymedio, Elías Amor Bravo, Economist, 3 October 2022 — One of the most resounding failures of the 63 measures approved by the Cuban communist regime to increase agricultural production has been the so-called Agricultural Development Fund. One year after its creation, the balance sheet cannot be more demoralizing. The official state newspaper Granma explicitly recognizes it when it points out that “in Ciego de Ávila there could be more credits approved, because it’s a purely agricultural province,” but only 22 credits have been granted in the amount of about 230 million pesos. A trifle. For it to be useful,they have to keep in mind what they intend to do in Pinar del Río, selling construction materials at half the price to fight the destruction of Hurricane Ian. This type of measure doesn’t work.

But let’s go to the case in question. The 63 measures that sought to encourage the progress of agriculture and speed up food production haven’t worked a year later. It’s logical, since they are poorly designed and try to achieve objectives without first making structural transformations.

Far from attributing responsibilities for the failure to the banks of Credit and Commerce and Popular Savings, which are only transmission belts of a program, which, I emphasize, is poorly designed, the only ones who should respond to the failure is the regime, the ministry and even Díaz-Canel himself for relying on measures that are imprecise, poorly designed and of little social utility, such as this fund.

Why do we say that the design is incorrect? continue reading

Well, basically because of those who apply for and get the credits from the fund. These are state companies that will be supported by political and partisan criteria. Since this financial modality was launched, the banks have also approved reduced loans with a small amount, destined for state companies, such as Arnaldo Ramírez and Porcina.

Very few independent farmers benefited from the loans. Those who benefited from the Agricultural Development Credit have been state companies with a weight in food production, such as Agropecuaria La Cuba, Agroindustrial Ceballos, Agropecuaria Chambas, and integral Agropecuaria, and only three entities in the cooperative sector participated, which received 108 million pesos for the cultivation of bananas, guava, potatoes and the promotion of pasture for livestock.

On the other hand, Granma’s note reported that the Agricultural Development Bank approved 2.8 billion pesos for the planting of cane, in addition to other amounts for the production of pork, protected crops, the planting of cassava, corn, soybeans, sweet potatoes, rice, fruit trees and protein plants for animal feed. And yet, the sugar campaign was the worst since colonial times. Bandec is now in charge of managing the committed debt, but, as Granma says, the greatest responsibility lies with Agriculture and Azcuba, responsible for defining the natural and legal persons who meet the requirements to receive the loan and are in a position to increase production, as intended, and be able to repay it.

This is the question. What is the requirement to be met? It seems that we are talking about irrelevant issues, but efficient banking practice is clear about it. Property rights are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for an effective financial policy. If this relationship is not established transparently and with the utmost legal respect, things cannot go well. And so, after a year, as Granma says, the credits approved in a purely agricultural province are scarce, and it is recognized that, “even though all the scenarios have been used to divulge the advantage of the initiative, it’s never enough, because it doesn’t always go directly to the producers.” Once again, communication, and start blaming the complex situation of the economic and social environment for failure.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Reasons for the End: In Search of Lost Unity in Cuba

Hurricane Ian left nearby buildings standing in this location, but took down large trees, (14ymedio)

14ymedio, Elias Amor Bravo, 2 October 2022 — As of now, that unity has nothing to do with the necessary process of listening to society, interpreting their motivations, tending to their demands and resolving problems, making them participants of the reality. That process is not related to the “teachings of Fidel” nor to the accumulation of nonsense and interference by those in power whom Cubans have had to tolerate for 63 years. The people have said, “Enough,” and they want a new start, one in which a true democratic process of leadership and public management, which have never existed in Cuba, can be applied.

Therefore, to speak of unity to achieve a recovery is a recipe that will not work, it is useless. Cubans have every right to chose other formulas.

The people are fed up when, each time new problems emerge, for which the solution does not seem possible, such as the nationwide blackout due to the hurricane that crossed over the western region, the regime only offers unity, unity in work, solidarity and the public’s own participation. And similarly, in the official language, why not add the influence of the “nefarious monstrosity” of the United States blockade, just as the regime’s conversations requesting assistance from its northern neighbor became public.

Unity and falsehood. A description of the reality which aims to hide from Cubans the truth, which they do not want to change, in fact, they just want to continue at the helm of power. It is the same as insisting, time and again, that the Fatherland does not have “a road map other than the one created by the example of the historic generation of Fidel and Raúl.” Lies. The democratic road map is the one Cubans now want to decide on, to face the future on new foundations that mean progress for all, and not just for the few. continue reading

The official propaganda accuses the “enemy” of “attacking because it fears the continuity represented by the new generation at the helm of the country,” when the new generations do nothing but say they have no interest in leading anything, they simply want to leave the country. The 200,000 Cubans that have left the country en route to the United States this year, are mostly young people who do not want to see unity nor continuity of anything. The leaders no longer know how to interpret the signals and do not wish to do so, and this is another indicator of the end.

While the official press does not skimp on effort as it creates an alternative reality far from human reason when it says, “the enemies of Cuba never offer a solution that does not respond to the interests of subverting our socialist society; and it is in that eagerness that they take advantage — and even fabricate — the vicissitudes we are going through.” Let’s see if the true enemies of Cuba are the ones who insist on staying in power at any cost, waiting out their terms without stepping aside, as is needed. Perspective is very important, in any case.

Is it that perhaps the problems, unresolved for generations by Cubans, are not the responsibility of their government, or regime, which is the same? Of course, the hurricane has also wreaked havoc in the north, but there, very soon, it will be possible to see a return to normality.

In Pinar del Río, many of the destroyed houses had been destroyed by past hurricanes. Problems in Cuba are not fixed, they are frozen. The issue is to gain time. The worst enemy of the Cuban people is its regime or government, which in 63 years has not been able to create professional emergency units to deal with crisis situations and catastrophes, and which is incapable of providing a definitive solution to the problems of the people. It is not good to think about the “other,” without reviewing in depth what lies within.

And thus, the regime’s official propaganda, after trying to justify unity with fantastic and hilarious arguments, launches another much more alarming argument, “healing the damage from Hurricane Ian will not be an easy nor a short-term task.” It will be long term and no one can say they were fooled. Those affected should start looking for other areas or counting on the help of family or those living outside their areas. The recovery will be long and in many cases will not arrive.

Not even international solidarity has arrived well. The usual friends (Iran, North Korea, Russia, Venezuela, Mexico, Nicaragua) have their own problems and no one is giving away money during complex times like these. Here, also, the end seems near. The unity argument falls apart, but the Cuban communist regime does not want to acknowledge it. Loneliness is the worst consequence of not knowing how to do things well.

Translated by: Silvia Suárez

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Cuba: It Is the End of the Communist Dictatorship

Caption: Dwelling destroyed by Hurricane Ian in the municipality of San Juan y Martínez in Pinar del Río. (Tele Pinar/Facebook)

14ymedio, Elías Amor Bravo, Valencia, Spain, October, 1, 2022 — Reaching the limit and wanting to go further, for the sole vice of maintaining power. At any price. This is the selfish and suicidal lesson the communist regime wants to teach Cubans, so that tomorrow, the whole world will remember the tragic final venture (which in fact, is already here) of the 63 years of communist dictatorship.

The propaganda, repression, juggling games, measures to patch up economic functioning are no longer valid. The communists spoke of a foreign exchange system and have taken the peso to an unprecedented exchange rate of 195 to the dollar. Similarly, they demanded the adoption of an Ordering Task* that, poorly planned, arrived at the worst time, causing a serious collapse of the precarious internal and external balances.

They also talked about ’measures’, specifically, 69 measures for the agricultural sector and 95 measures for sugar, and the results are yet to be seen. They announced, with much fanfare, the launch of the MSMEs [small and medium size businesses] and non-agricultural cooperatives, as the beginning of a private business model, but which was later seen as a maneuver to convert the discontented self-employed workers into MSMEs, thus reinforcing control and intervention over them. Expenditures have risen to unacceptable limits at a time of falling incomes; and the deficit has been financed by monetary expansion without any control by the Central Bank. The balance sheet is certainly disastrous.

Nothing is worth anything anymore. All the partial attempts to get out of the vicious cycle have ended in absolute failure and Cubans suffer and, unlike times past, launch themselves into massive protests throughout the country. The information that arrives from the Island shows that people have taken to the streets, without fear, willing to lead their future, to clear from the political scene a regime that has come to an end and is paralyzed. continue reading

The sequence of events is clear. Cubans suffered an island-wide blackout, difficult to explain, when Hurricane Ian crossed the island at the western end. Inhabitants of the east, who did not feel the winds or the rain, must resign themselves to a lack of electricity supply that had already been affecting the entire country. There is no valid justification from the Union Electric. The arguments of managers on television are hesitant, doubtful, excessively technical, and difficult to understand by a population that has said enough is enough. It is the end, we may not see it clearly, but the nightmare comes to an end.

Díaz-Canel rushed to appear in Pinar del Río dressed in military garb and wearing a raincoat valued at 300 or 400 dollars, which many Cubans would like to have. And there, with the propaganda always attentive, he confirmed to the world what is already known. Unlike other less developed countries, the regime lacks emergency intervention mechanisms to coordinate and launch the processes to repair damages and return to normal life. You have to turn to the neighbors, the neighborhoods and the “communals” of doubtful interpretation. Incredible that, in a Marxist and Leninist state of the Caribbean, in any country, they have to improvise on the fly every time a cyclone hits.

It is the end. In the form of a tragedy in several acts, which can only end in one way: returning power and sovereignty to the Cuban people so that, exercising plural democracy, the course of the nation can be put back on course. The cyclone has come to accelerate the pace of transformation and, above all, to reveal the weakness and serious shortcomings of the political model devised by Fidel Castro 63 years ago. The end is near. With new leaders who know how to interpret the demands of the people and offer solutions to them, who can allocate resources to what is truly productive and beneficial for the people, and not for a particular party or ideology.

The economy can’t take anymore. Neither can Cuban society. We are witnessing a process of widespread loss of confidence in the national currency, of dissatisfaction with the services received from the State, which are paid and paid well, with the work of all Cubans. There is no longer a strategy, nor a vision, much less, a mission that justifies maintaining the status quo. The changes the nation needs do not allow for delay.

In reality, it could all be very easy. The communists should step aside and hand over power, calling free and democratic elections that promote a new National Assembly with constituent capacity and that will lead reforms. Decisions of this caliber can no longer wait, because the Cuban people can no longer bear it. The communists could try to save themselves, but with each passing minute, that horizon appears darker and more complex. It’s time to reset the button and restart. Cuba has already done it in the past and can do it again now.

*Translator’s note: *The “Ordering Task” [tarea ordenamiento] is a collection of measures that include eliminating the Cuban Convertible Peso (CUC), leaving the Cuban peso (CUP) as the only national currency, raising prices, raising salaries (but not as much as prices), opening stores that take payment only in hard currency, which must be in the form of specially issued pre-paid debit cards, and a broad range of other measures targeted to different elements of the Cuban economy.

Translated by: Silvia Suárez

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The Post-Hurricane Landscape

Justo García Hernández working in his tobacco field in a time before Hurricane Ian. (14ymedio)

14ymedio, Eliás Amor Bravo, 30 September 2022 — It is not clear that getting everyone to pitch in is what is needed, or the most efficient way to restore normalcy in the aftermath of a hurricane. Though there are more appropriate ways of dealing with natural disasters, Cuba’s communist regime still prefers to rely on what it calls “popular mobilization.” Let’s hope they don’t live to regret it.

The work of recovery is complicated and requires training, not to mention that not all disasters are created equal. Having self-employed workers and those in the private sector sign up to do collective labor hardly seems like the right solution either. The more time they spend doing this, the less time they have to get their businesses up and running.

This collectivist approach to disaster recovery is a trait that sets Cuba’s communist regime apart from all other countries in the world. It is unclear whether this is a result of totalitarian ideology, which informs all government decisions, or just one approach for getting things back to normal. The effects of previous hurricanes are well-known. The collectivist formula involves an uncertain future in which every effort, such as cleaning up the streets, must be carried out by work crews from different organizations and directed by means of ideological slogans rather than competent leadership.

Let’s start at the beginning. It does seem logical that Pinar del Rio, the most province most severely impacted by Hurricane Ian’s high winds, should receive direct aid in the form of resources from the central government. Other provinces are expected to get aid from international organizations, small and medium-sized companies and countries such as Mexico and Venezuela. Whatever it takes. But the temporary nature of recovery work and the improvisational nature of the process make this impossible. continue reading

Clearly, in these moments of uncertainty, President Diaz-Canel seems more comfortable with the “general mobilization” approach, having passed it along, according to the communist party newspaper Granma, to senior leaders of the western provinces and to the Isle of Youth special municipal district, which have been impacted to a somewhat greater degree by the tropical storm. The question is: What will he say when, in a month or two, things are no better? Most likely we will see this sooner rather than later, especially in housing.

In response, the minister of construction told Granma, “Trucks from different locations around the country are headed to Pinar del Rio with cement in bulk and in bags, different types of roofing, wood, wire rods and nails.” The aim is to speed up reconstruction. Let’s hope they get there. No doubt these materials are necessary but a house requires much more than nails and cement. And many of us fear that the level of organization and efficiency required for this task are not present in communist Cuba.

Though officials might be trying to speed up home reconstruction by getting materials where they are needed as soon as possible, things are often not so easy or straightforward. It takes time, especially when things are soaked by rain. Diaz-Canel is quoted in Granma as saying, “[Regarding] the subject of housing in Pinar del Rio, we have to work with urgency now, first because of the magnitude of the damage, and second because it is one of the provinces where we still have to restore houses damaged in previous hurricanes.” This is the issue. The current state of housing, ravaged by similar disasters in previous years, needs more than quick fixes. More will have to be done. Meanwhile, specialized manpower, small and medium-sized private businesses and self-employed workers are in short supply.

Some Pinar del Rio residents who lost everything in this latest storm have spent the last six hurricanes in makeshift structures, without ever being able to move into a decent home. In fact, officials acknowledge that “these temporary facilities are the first to collapse from high winds.” Then why are we building them and dedicating resources to something that does not work?

Granma also announced containers of food and cleaning supplies were being shipped to the province. Even the ration system has been streamlined to distribute scarce supplies of chicken, sausage, rice, dried beans, cooking oil, potatoes and other foods. It is yet to be seen how much of the nation’s food supply will be lost to electrical power outages, not only in the western parts of the country but throughout the island. So far, no figures have been made available.

The newspaper also reported the arrival of the first electrical work crews from Mexico, who have come to provide technical assistance. Are there no such professionals in Cuba? It seems the 72,000 meters of cable and 7,000 insulators to be used to restore the electrical system, which were damaged by Hurricane Ian’s strong winds, are of more interest to the regime than to the Mexican workers. The system is in free fall and, so far, there is no indication that a Venezuelan shipment of 300,000 bags of food, 52 electrical transformers or 22,500 square meters of roofing material have helped. One gets the impression that, given the magnitude of the damage, this is little more than a drop in the ocean.

In any case, Cuba continues to rely on “collective mass mobilization” for its recovery efforts. Though previous experience has shown this approach to be, on balance, a failure, the communist regime has not replaced it a specialized, professional organization to deal with disasters. This is long overdue. Storms will keep coming, and improvisation and populism are not good ways for dealing with them.

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Hurricane Ian in Cuba: Does Anyone Know What They’re Going to Do With the Donations?

A man showing his food that rotted after the power went out in all of Cuba. Alexandre Meneghini/Reuters

14ymedio, Elías Amor Bravo, Economist, 30 September 32022 — Analysts have been surprised that the Cuban communist regime has not openly asked for international aid to compensate for the disaster caused by Hurricane Ian. However, the regime has rushed to disclose information about the bank accounts authorized to receive emergency donations to Cuba that individuals want to make. They are always looking for fresh and anonymous money, and then they do with it what they like.

In addition, even in receiving help from abroad they are communists faithful to their ideological principles, and they put forward the failed economic rules of this doctrine, such as the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the only one authorized on the Island to publicize the information on the accounts for the sending of funds to the Island, which, I stress, are then processed in a generic way.

This exclusivity of the regime in the collection and receipt of money has already been seen on previous occasions and seeks to close the way to non-profit entities, which in these situations are usually especially active. Diversity is not accepted in Cuba. To receive donations for the affected people after the passage of Hurricane Ian, only the two Minrex emergency accounts are valid. Take it or leave it. continue reading

In case there’s any doubt about it, the first of the accounts, as reported by the official newspaper Granma, was opened by the Ministry of Foreign Trade at the International Financial Bank under the name Emergency Donations. The account number is 03000, and the Swift code is BFIC.

The second account is at the International Bank of Commerce under the name Donations-Cuba. Its number is 0407610, and the Swift code is BIDC.

Through these two accounts, the regime aspires to raise aid funds that, in any case, will then be allocated to other priorities. They did it before, and there is no reason for them not to do it again.

Three deaths and severe losses in tobacco, food crops, communication routes and housing are a disastrous balance, to which is added the lack of power at the national level. The problems are growing, but someone in the regime has decided not to ask the world for money, but to publish the account numbers in two banks so that generous and sensitive souls can send their donations to the Island. I doubt that the European communist parties and their publicly funded associations will turn over aid to the regime. As always, the money will mostly come from Miami.

The economic estimates of the damage aren’t yet known, and without having that figure, undoubtedly distressing, the regime has decided to open its hand to see who pays and how much. It thanked the offer of help from Mexican President López Obrador and Venezuelan President Maduro, the only ones who have said something so far. The private entities on the Island will not have the same luck. Self-employed workers or land tenants who have lost their small businesses will hardly be able to apply for aid funds. The regime will not allow it. And, of course, the associative movement of the Island, essential at this time, will be removed from any action to receive funds.

If the communist regime worked otherwise, it would have a golden opportunity to demonstrate its transparency, continuously reporting on the money obtained from donations and, above all, the destination. There would be people who wouldn’t believe what they say, but it would be a positive step in showing transparency and clarity. They won’t do it. No one demands that they do. We won’t know how much money is received, nor how it is used. The model doesn’t work.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuba: The Economic Consequences of Hurricane Ian (Part 2)

Tobacco harvested in Cuba, during the drying process. (Facebook)

14ymedio, Elias Amor Bravo, 29 October 2022 — Now the state press is describing in detail the “desolate panorama that the most violent meteorological phenomenon to hit Vueltabajo in the last 14 years has left in its wake.” That is, they even dare to grant the hurricane this honor by its strength and its devastating effect on human lives and material objects.

And just as on his previous visit to Vueltabajo, Díaz-Canel once again showed his concern about the damage caused to tobacco, the main exportable item of Cuban agriculture. Food production obviously takes a back seat, and although it’s not reported, it will be greatly affected, especially the seasonal harvests.

The alarming concern of the leaders for tobacco has brought in Marino Murillo, who after the failure of the Ordering Task,* was rewarded with the position of President of the Tabacuba business group. This man seems to be chasing disaster wherever he puts his nose. First, with the national economy in serious crisis since the Ordering Task, and now, with tobacco.

His message to Díaz-Canel has been worrying, and he said that “intensive work is being done to try to save the leaves from previous crops that were in the warehouses, selected and stripped [from the stems], and other deposits, and despite the measures taken for their protection, they got wet.” We are very afraid that all will be lost, millions of dollars in exports of a product that, in addition, has agreements with numerous international distributors who won’t be happy with the lack of merchandise. continue reading

As if that weren’t enough, Murillo said that “the situation of the natural and controlled curing warehouses** is also very serious,” and in one sentence he tried to summarize the effects on the essential infrastructure for the quality of tobacco in strategic municipalities such as Pinar del Río, San Juan y Martínez and San Luis. Specifically, he said, “We didn’t have a single warehouse left standing. Even the newest ones were taken away by the hurricane.”

What a panorama is now opening up for the leaders! As Murillo reported, “in the case of the controlled curing warehouses, work is being done on collecting equipment in order to reuse it, but construction is more complex and expensive and thus will take more time.” More time? How much? Six months, one year? And compliance with international contracts, huh? Where is tobacco going to come from? How can you manage things in such an irresponsible way? Who will pay for the defaults?

We are very afraid that everything will end up being lost, and they won’t say anything when the disaster happens. On the other hand, to meet the needs of the planting for the 2022-2023 campaign, which should begin October 20, Murillo reported that “about 6,000 controlled-curing warehouses will have to be rebuilt in a matter of a few months.” A task defined as “duly arduous for the province, because the many workers needed for the recovery of the tobacco also have damage to their homes.”

This lack of personnel to meet the needs will be be solved, according to Murillo, “by attracting brigades of carpenters from other territories.” And he took advantage of the situation, in passing, to recognize that “we need to look for more robust designs so that this type of construction is more durable and won’t have to be rebuilt every time we’re affected by a hurricane.” Oh, so just now he realizes it? They have had 63 years to do this, which should be enough. The question is always the same: What have they done in these 63 years?

Apart from the loss of tobacco stocks, the passage of the hurricane has caused damage to homes, infrastructure, crops, roads and water systems — nothing new when it comes to tropical hurricanes. However, on this occasion it caused a dreaded national blackout that continues to be the origin of social protests throughout the country, which have led the regime to bring out the “black wasps,” the elite repressive forces.

Cubans see with concern that after more than 48 hours without electricity, their scarce frozen food is lost, and they fear they won’t be able to find it again. The lack of electricity affects the daily lives of everyone — workers, companies, students, housewives, retirees. The whole country is in a general blackout, but the state press takes every opportunity to sell a message of illusion that exists only in the minds of the journalists who write the reports.

Cubans know that “we’re not going to get out of this easily.” At the moment, the damage assessments continue to give initial results, which are very tentative, as happened with the rescue of the raw material stored in a facility of the tobacco collective V-13-26, in San Luis.

The situation is more serious for families who have lost everything and know that they will have to line up to receive some accommodation, which will take time. The state of housing in Cuba is so alarming that these losses caused by hurricanes pile up, and people have no choice but to wait patiently. The first estimates indicate that in San Luis “about 85% of the housing stock has been affected by the hurricane.” It’s difficult to recover what was lost.

Meanwhile, the regime is preparing to receive foreign aid from its partners, Maduro and López Obrador. It’s strange that other countries such as Spain, France, England, and even some Caribbean neighbors, as on previous occasions, haven’t been equally generous. It doesn’t seem that any aid is going to arrive, so the Cuban communists have given instructions for support brigades from other parts of the Island to leave their territories and contribute to the recovery in different sectors, such as electricity and communications.

Instead of having efficient ways to handle emergency situations, as in other countries, which even create specialized army units to face these crises, Díaz-Canel’s solution, as a good communist, is “popular mobilization,” and on this occasion he has pronounced the word “revolution” more than previously, as if the umbilical cord that ties him to this process had been filled with blood.

It’s a sore subject, this revolution that Díaz Canel talks about and begs for help. It can do little for Cuba and the Cubans, because it’s exhausted, obsolete and, as we are seeing, unable to cope with the consequences of a hurricane. This revolution, as has already been proven, doesn’t serve to solve the two urgent problems at the moment: housing and food, or to generate electricity in a normal way.

In the end, as Granma recognizes, “Ian hasn’t been the most intense meteorological phenomenon that has ever crossed through Vueltabajo, but its slow-moving route over the most populated area of the province, along with its winds of more than 125 miles per hour, place it among the most destructive.” One firm opinion and the other soft, so as not to be wrong when the newspaper archives are revised.

The revolution won’t be able to erase the traces of this disaster, and Pinar del Río will have to rise by its own means. It will get little or no help from the regime.

Translator’s notes:

*The “Ordering Task” is a collection of measures that include eliminating the Cuban Convertible Peso (CUC), leaving the Cuban peso as the only national currency, raising prices, raising salaries (but not as much as prices), opening stores that take payment only in hard currency which must be in the form of specially issued pre-paid debit cards, and a broad range of other measures targeted to different elements of the Cuban economy.

**Tobacco leaves are “cured” or dried to define their color and quality. In Cuba, this is done by hanging the leaves in a “barn,” or warehouse, and can take four to eight weeks.

Translated by Regina Anavy
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