In the provinces, the official floating rate has been ignored and only the informal market is operating, with a rate of 440.
14ymedio, Havana/Holguín, Darío Hernández and Miguel García, December 20, 2025 — “Do you want to change two bucks?” asks a customer in a MSME in Alamar. “Nah,” replies the person behind the counter. “It’s pointless; the dollar is going down.” The scene, unremarkable, has been repeated in recent days at several points around the Island. It’s the immediate reaction to the uncertainty created by the official floating rate, which this Saturday fell to 408 pesos per dollar on the third day of its implementation (its launch rate was 410 on Thursday, December 18).
In its crusade against the informal market—and particularly against the daily publication of rates by the independent outlet El Toque—the Government seems determined to curb inflation the way Cuban mothers bring down a fever: with cold showers and “horse cures.” The paradox is that the rate announced by the Central Bank looks far too similar to the one that, until now, set the street thermometer—well above the official rate of 120 CUP supposedly in force at banks, where it had become impossible to obtain dollars or any other foreign currency.
The official gamble has generated a tense silence in the market. “Right now nobody is exchanging dollars—at least not those who usually do it. I myself am having trouble exchanging. Some say they don’t have cash; others say they’re going to wait,” a self-employed worker in Havana tells 14ymedio. Another source confirms the same atmosphere: “I have a colleague who wants to exchange dollars and says that in Havana nobody wants them. He’s been all over.” The response is almost unanimous: “Now is the time to lie low and wait.”
However, the effect threatens to be short-lived. The official discourse itself acknowledges—albeit in a much more sugar-coated tone—the limitations of the measure. In a lengthy analysis published by Cubadebate, it is admitted that implementing a floating-rate foreign-exchange market does not occur “at an ideal moment” for the Cuban economy. Low levels of production, falling exports, severe restrictions on external financing and a still-high fiscal deficit conspire against any attempt at rapid stabilization. According to the text, the Central Bank of Cuba enters the market as “just another competitor,” but with the administrative capacity to publish the rate daily, which will float according to supply and demand. The same official note acknowledges that, at the outset, the rate will have to remain “close to what currently prevails in the informal market” in order to avoid a greater inflationary shock.
On the street, that admission translates into pragmatism and, in many cases, resignation. At an MSME [Micro, Small, Medium Enterprise] near the Santa Fe bridge in Guanabacoa, a woman tried to exchange 40 dollars. “But at 408,” the clerk told her. “That’s fine by me,” the customer replied, “I don’t have money even to take a pedicab.” The scene illustrates well the dilemma between selling now—even at a rate that could change tomorrow—or holding on to dollars that few people want to buy today.
“In general, I think few people are selling their dollars at 408, but there are some, because right now it’s the only option,” explains another interviewee. In Old Havana, an MSME where foreign currency had previously been accepted decided to slam that door shut: “Yesterday I went to buy a couple of things and they weren’t accepting dollars—only national currency.” Nobody wants to get stuck with greenbacks in a market that is uncertain due to the official measure and the proximity of the Christmas festivities.
In Holguín, the scene is different. Far from Havana—where, predictably, most of the dollars available for the Central Bank’s operations are concentrated—the official floating rate has stirred more apathy than expectation. A self-employed worker who moves around the city daily tells 14ymedio that in the province “the measure has been ignored; here the dollar is still at 440.” Geographic distance once again translates into economic distance.
The official narrative insists that this new system will allow greater fiscal control, a gradual reduction of inflation and more resources for sectors such as health, education and culture. It also promises to stimulate exports, offer a “safe” channel for exchanging remittances and combat the distortions created by informality. All of that sounds good on paper. The problem is that Cuba has already experienced too many reforms that, in their initial phase, promised order and ended up multiplying the chaos.
The key lies in what is not said with sufficient clarity: the market will sell only what it buys. In other words, there is no foreign-currency backing that guarantees sufficient liquidity. The availability to buy dollars—and thus the credibility of the system—will depend on a “gradual process” of strengthening that, in an exhausted economy, may take too long or never arrive. In the meantime, informality retreats, watches and waits.
The floating rate may have caused a tactical pause in foreign-currency trading, but it has not resolved the structural causes of the problem, according to most economists—both from the opposition and from a critical sector close to the regime—who have spoken out about the new measures. Without a real increase in production, without sustained exports and without access to external financing, the Cuban peso will continue to be a weak currency, no matter how much a new official price is published every morning. The market, inside or outside the institutions, will ultimately adjust the figure in its own way.
Translated by Regina Anavy
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