Despite Sentences of More Than 10 Years in Prison, Dielectric Oil Thefts Spread Throughout the Country

The official press in Holguín, where 28 cases have been reported, calls these acts an “epidemic” and calls for a firm hand

Repair of a transformer following the theft of dielectric oil, in a file photo. / Granma

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, August 25, 2026 / However much the Cuban regime has toughened penalties for the theft of dielectric oil, the thefts have not let up. In Holguín alone, according to a note published this Monday in the official press, 28 cases have been reported so far, although it is not made clear since when. These incidents, laments ¡Ahora!, “have become a kind of epidemic spread across the entire country, with apparent impunity, given the slowness with which the judicial proceedings opened against those who commit these serious crimes unfold.”

The provincial newspaper cites the most recent cases as examples, which have taken place, for instance, in the town of Levisa (in Mayarí), in the Las Torres neighborhood of the municipality of Urbano Noris, in Moa, and at the Farallones substation, which supplies Cayo Grande. In Levisa, the theft of this oil – which functions as an insulator and coolant and prevents equipment from overheating – affected not only that community but also Nicaro and Cabonico, and in Las Torres, according to ¡Ahora!, it left 69 homes without power.

From a substation in Moa, 3,000 liters of oil were stolen, which harmed 2,000 people “unable to enjoy the mere three hours of electricity that the national electrical system (SEN) can guarantee, as a consequence of the energy siege imposed by the bad neighbor to the North,” the official newspaper stated, referring to the crisis worsened by the energy blockade that the US has been carrying out since the beginning of the year. continue reading

Moa is, precisely, where the most cases have been recorded (7), followed by Mayarí (6), Urbano Noris (4) and Cueto (4)

Moa is, precisely, where the most cases have been recorded (7), followed by Mayarí (6), Urbano Noris (4) and Cueto (4). “Generally the wrongdoers operate in areas far from the towns, which makes their misdeeds easier, but all the territories report this type of impact,” says the official newspaper’s note, which laments that the remedies put in place by the authorities are not producing results.

“Restoring damaged perimeter fences, installing padlocks where warranted, sealing transformer valves, and increasing patrols and inspections of substations are among the measures established by the National Electric Union to prevent these acts of vandalism, which warrant a greater and more coordinated popular rejection given their impact,” they proclaim.

The note recalls that the theft of dielectric oil is classified in the Penal Code as the crime of sabotage and can carry sentences of between 7 and 15 years in prison, and up to 30 years or life imprisonment “if the sabotage causes serious damage or accidents.” In fact, ¡Ahora! notes, citing figures from the Electric Union, “one hundred percent of those convicted of crimes against the SEN received sentences of more than 10 years in prison.”

“The slowness with which the proceedings against the accused unfold, due to adherence to regulations, creates the illusion of impunity”

However, even this is not enough, the Holguín newspaper also acknowledges, stating: “The slowness with which the proceedings against the accused unfold, due to adherence to regulations, creates the illusion of impunity, which encourages the criminal and causes a sense of powerlessness among the population and discredits the police and judicial institutions.”

Two of the trials that have come to light, indeed, show the lengthy sentences. Last May 23, the Prosecutor’s Office sought 12 years in prison against a 36-year-old man accused of stealing 70 liters from a substation in Cayajabos, Artemisa. In July, another sentence of 12 years became known for the theft of oil in Bungo 2 (Contramaestre, Santiago de Cuba), which caused about 48 hours of power outages. But neither the threat of lengthy sentences nor the calls by Prime Minister Manuel Marrero to apply a “firm hand” seem to stop the phenomenon.

In Santiago de Cuba, the theft of dielectric oil from a transformer supplying Molecular Medicine last week not only left the facility affected but also forced the transfer of samples all the way to Granma for a patient in serious condition who needed urgent tests.

It was the most recent incident in the long series of similar thefts that has affected the entire island in recent months. The product, which functions as an insulator and coolant and prevents equipment from overheating, can be used as fuel, in place of diesel, and as a lubricant, which is why it has become prized on the street.

Translated by GH.

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Botswana Pays Cuban Doctors One-Quarter of the Salary It Pays the Regime

The mission even prohibits specialists from buying or driving a vehicle.

Cuban pediatrician in Botswana, in an image published by the Island’s state press. / Cubadebate

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, August 25, 2026 – A Cuban doctor on a mission in Botswana receives only $1,000 a month out of the $4,000 that the country’s government pays Havana. That is, 24.4% of the total. The figures were revealed Tuesday in a report by the organization Prisoners Defenders (PD), which obtained access to the bilateral agreement.

According to this document, which, like others of its kind, is not publicly available, Botswana pays Cuba more than $4.2 million annually for 90 specialists. In addition, an internal document, signed just this past July 3, 2026, by the head of the brigade, Pablo Ricardo Betancourt Álvarez, confirms something that has also been documented in other missions: that Cuban healthcare workers are subject to restrictions on “travel, visits, friendships, overnight stays, use of vehicles, freedom of expression, and social life.”

“They live in a prison, and not in Cuba, but in Botswana,” said Javier Larrondo, president of Prisoners Defenders, who cites Betancourt Álvarez’s complete letter. It establishes “mandatory regulations for Cubans, despite their being residents of Botswana.” Among the provisions, the first is a restriction on the “collaborators” leaving their respective districts except for “professional or health matters, and always after prior consultation with the Head of the Cuban Medical Brigade in Botswana.”

Likewise, they are prohibited from “having people who are not part of the Cuban Medical Brigade present in their homes, whether visiting or intending to stay overnight”

Likewise, they are prohibited from “having people who are not part of the Cuban Medical Brigade present in their homes, whether visiting or intending to stay overnight, as well as brigade members staying overnight outside them,” a ban that extends to brigade members visiting the homes of Cuban residents outside the mission, and to activities other than those organized by the brigade.

Specialists on the mission are even prohibited from buying or driving a vehicle without express authorization. And so it goes, through ten regulations, all specifically detailed in the continue reading

Prisoners Defenders report, which adds that it has firsthand sources: professionals who were assigned to Botswana.

For the Madrid-based NGO, the Government of Botswana “cannot claim ignorance of the mechanism that takes away most of the remuneration from Cuban professionals,” because the agreement it signed with Havana “requires the Cuban side to issue a monthly invoice that expressly separates the amount intended for professionals from the amount transferred to Cuba.” Moreover, the African government itself informed its Parliament — on April 1, 2025, according to PD, as recorded in the parliamentary Hansard — of the contractual rate for each doctor: 3,500 euros per month, equivalent to $4,094.65 at the official exchange rate.

And not only that, but administrative documents from Princess Marina Hospital in Gaborone also record remuneration. The example cited by PD consists of reports dating from March 2020 onward, which allocate up to $800 for 18 specialist or coordination positions and were submitted to the Botswana Ministry of Finance.

“State complicity therefore cannot be attributed to ignorance of the payment mechanism”

“State complicity therefore cannot be attributed to ignorance of the payment mechanism,” Prisoners Defenders asserts, accusing Botswana of “acting in complicity with the exploitation, as it finances, controls, directs, and with full knowledge implements the Cuban slave system.”

The organization points out that the initial annual ceiling established in the Agreement, equivalent to $2,889,200, should correspond to 62 positions — 46 specialists and 16 auxiliary professionals — but, it continues, in 2025 the national coordinator of the brigade stated that the actual contingent consisted of 90 professionals. Based on this number, PD applies the contractual rates signed with the Cuban regime and concludes that the actual contingent represents an estimated cost of $350,500 per month; “that is, $4,206,000 annually: $1,316,800 above the initial ceiling.”

This deployment, the NGO observes, “therefore requires an addendum, a budget increase, or another financial instrument that the Government of Botswana has not made transparent to the public or to its Parliament, the Botswana Hansard.” What provision allowed this increase? PD asks in a series of questions that it says the Botswana state must answer.

These include questions such as “What did the Ministries of Health and Finance know about the withholding [of salaries], passport confiscation and the disciplinary regime?” “Did Botswana know about or authorize the July 3, 2026 order?” “How many professionals have requested to end their mission, been replaced, repatriated or declared deserters?”

“Why is there no independent, confidential reporting channel outside the control of the Cuban leadership?”

At the end of its report, the NGO calls on the Botswana government to “publish the complete agreement, all its addenda, budget authorizations, monthly invoices and payments made, protecting only legitimate personal data.” It also calls for each professional to be paid directly “the full amount corresponding to their work, subject only to ordinary and transparent taxes, and prohibiting forced salary transfers to third parties.”

Finally, it urges the government to “suspend and investigate” the implementation of the mission chief’s July 3 order, “which is incompatible with the Constitution and labor legislation of Botswana”

It also asks the Botswana government to interview the aid workers individually, “without the presence of Cuban coordinators,” and to guarantee that they retain their passports, contracts and all their freedoms. Finally, it urges the government to “suspend and investigate” the implementation of the mission chief’s July 3 order, “which is incompatible with the Constitution and labor legislation of Botswana.”

The publication of this report on Botswana comes one week after Prisoners Defenders launched a digital platform aimed at collecting data and information related to “the regulations, payments, and reported violations” involving Cuban medical missions around the world over more than six decades.

According to PD, it is “a verifiable country-by-country dossier,” containing historical data, contracts and regulations, and it “allows users to investigate, compare and download information about Cuban medical missions in 209 countries and territories.”

According to the NGO, it “distinguishes between active, inactive, canceled or pilot missions” and contains information related to approximately “1,185 protected testimonies and 217 public testimonies” from 60 countries, which have been examined by the United Nations, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and Human Rights Watch.

In recent months, and under pressure from the United States, Honduras, Guatemala, Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago suspended their medical cooperation with Cuba or revised the terms.

Before that came the cases of Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador and El Salvador, which ended their programs between 2018 and 2019. In Brazil, it was Cuba that decided to withdraw the mission after the government of Jair Bolsonaro demanded that doctors receive directly the entirety of the salaries paid by the country. More than 8,000 professionals then returned to the Island.

In 2019, the missions in Bolivia and Ecuador also ended, fmollowing political changes in both countries. El Salvador ended its medical cooperation with Cuba during that same period.

For Cuba, the hemorrhaging of its main source of income is significant. Prisoners Defenders, for example, estimates that medical missions generated nearly $5.976 billion in 2021, based on official Cuban statistics and international trade data.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

When Flirting Started To Be a Way To ‘Resolve’ Daily Life in Cuba

How the Revolution turned the Cuban art of flirting into a survival strategy

The Revolution can perhaps claim one last moral victory: it has reduced prostitution, not because it has redeemed the prostitutes, but because it has scared away the tourists. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, José A. Adrián Torres, Málaga, August 23, 2026 / For years I have resisted writing about Cuban jineterismo. Not out of decency or shame, nor because the subject was taboo, but for something almost worse for a columnist: because it seemed to have been written about too many times. Between the lubricated curiosity of the tourist, the revolutionary sermon, and the moral condemnation, the jinetera had been reduced to a prostitute and the jinetero to a hustler. Much was said about their bodies and very little about the society that had produced them.

It only interested me to revisit the topic if I could find a perspective that permitted me to understand it as a historical, sociocultural, and psychological phenomenon: as the transformation, under revolutionary necessity, of a much older repertoire of cunning, charm, sociability, and satire. Because jineterismo didn’t invent the Cuban art of charming; it made it a means of earning a living.

The word satería deserves a brief reappraisal. The Dictionary of Americanisms of the Association of Spanish Language Academies defines “sato” or “sata” as a person who is “flattering and excessive with those of the opposite sex.” In Cuba, however, the word possesses nuances that no dictionary can fully capture. Satería is not merely flirtation. It is the mixture of grace, effusiveness, theatricality, charm, and mischief with which someone can attract attention, obtain a favor, or disarm resistance without directly asking for anything. continue reading

‘Satear’ is to insinuate without committing, to promise without forming the promise, and to withdraw, leaving the other person with the impression of having been at the point of achieving something.

Satear is to insinuate without committing, to promise without forming the promise, and to withdraw, leaving the other person with the impression of having almost achieved something. It could be a self-serving practice, certainly, but also a social game, a small performance, and even a form of female power within a society organized by men. La satería didn’t promise surrender; it managed the possibility.

Although there were—and are—men perfectly capable of wielding it, Cuban culture ended up associating it primarily with a certain Havana woman: flattering, charming, quick-witted, aware of her influence, and not at all inclined to hide it. It wasn’t a genetic condition nor some tropical essence dissolved in the waters of the Almendares River. It was a historical persona learned and perfected over generations.

If we look for its distant relatives, we look first to the Spanish picaresque tradition. From Lazarillo de Tormes in the 16th century to the great rogues of the 17th, the character survives by reading others’ weaknesses, changing masters, feigning, exaggerating, and finding a way out where the straight path is reserved for others. The rogue doesn’t reform the social order: he learns to outwit it. He is, in a sense, a precocious expert at problem-solving 

It is no coincidence that some of that literature and that attitude toward life matured in southern Spain, around the diverse and theatrical port cities of Seville and Cádiz. Through them the riches of the Indies passed, but they didn’t always end up in the hands of those who loaded the ships. Visible abundance and real poverty are often excellent schools for mischief.

Between those ports and Havana, circulated goods, words, music, gestures, and forms of interacting. Andalusian and Canarian Spanish provided a good part of the Antillean linguistic base, but the satería language did not disembark already formed from a galleon. Cuba reworked it in its own unique blend: port life, the Afro-Creole experience, the tenement courtyard, music, the street, theater, and a sociability accustomed to turning any conversation into a performance.

They were not schools of prostitution, but living archives of gestures and attitudes that could later reappear in other contexts.

The Spanish cuplé, zarzuela, and sainete found in the island a kind of comic theater, guaracha music, and mockery. Later came the revue, the vedette, and the cabaret. In all of these, a stage femininity was perfected, capable of holding an audience’s gaze, timing a pause, and converting a swaying of the hips into social commentary. These were not schools of prostitution, but living archives of gestures and attitudes that could later reappear in other contexts.

La Macorina represents one of the most provocative forms of that autonomy. María Calvo Nodarse was not a prostitute before her time, but an exceptional courtesan within a society where prostitution was perfectly recognized, hierarchical, and localized. Legend later retouched her biography, but preserved the essential: this woman who drove cars, displayed jewelry, and smoked with an ease then reserved for men, transformed her beauty into money, independence, and a public personage.

It isn’t necessary to moralize her or whitewash her profession. Her importance is in having reversed, as far as possible, a power relationship: she didn’t appear as a chosen woman, but as a woman who made choices. Her case was extraordinary precisely because the majority of prostitutes of the era didn’t drive convertibles nor receive musical tributes. She worked in brothels, bars, and low-life dens, principally around the port and the red-light districts.

Rita Montaner embodied another side, very distinct and entirely artistic facet of cubanía. With a solid musical background, she moved from zarzuela to guaracha, from theater to radio, film, and cabaret, commanding a presence didn’t need to ask permission. In Rita, her grace was not submission or subservience, but stage presence. She knew how to charm without demeaning herself and how to make irreverence a form of authority. They called her La Única (The One and Only) because any other classification fell short of describing her.

La Macorina transformed the desires of others into a personal legend; Rita Montaner transformed talent and personality into national art. There is no need to confuse them or morally link them. Together, they serve as a reminder that, long before the rise of jineterismo, Cuba already possessed a feminine repertoire of defiance, sensuality, theatricality, and mastery of the male gaze.

La Macorina transformed the desires of others into a personal legend; Rita Montaner transformed talent and personality into national art. There is no need to confuse them or morally link them.

Nor  should we imagine the Republic as a succession of elegant couplets, red cars, and lavish cabarets. Prostitution was widespread and, in many cases, miserable. American sailors constituted a significant clientele, especially in the port areas, but not the only one: there were Cubans, merchants, tourists, gamblers, and travelers. Alongside a few high-class courtesans, there existed a mass of women exploited in disreputable establishments. Furthermore, the commercial sexualization of mulatto women predated 1959.

Castro’s propaganda has always been known how to employ a half-truth as if it were the whole truth. The existence of that reality doesn’t mean all of Havana was a brothel, but neither is it necessary to perfume the Republic to criticize what came after. The fundamental difference is not that there was artistic seduction before and prostitution after. It is that the former prostitution had designated spaces, intermediaries, and a recognizable professional identity, while revolutionary jineterismo ultimately decentralized and expanded the trade.

During the early 1960s, the new regime closed bordellos, prosecuted pimps, and subjected many prostitutes to rehabilitation and work programs. The regime presented the disappearance of red-light districts as the definitive end of the phenomenon. In a certain measure it succeeded in dismantling that visible circuit. But eliminating the geography of a practice does not eliminate the conditions that can reproduce it.

When Soviet subsidies collapsed and the so-called Special Period began, prostitution didn’t return to its old neighborhoods. It reappeared in a different, more dispersed, and far more ambiguous form. The dollar was legalized, tourism became the state’s lifeline, and foreigners began circulating on the island like walking currency exchanges with legs. A doctor, an engineer, or a teacher earned a salary in pesos that wasn’t enough to fill a refrigerator; any tip or gift from a tourist could acquire exorbitant value.

The Revolution proclaimed that it had redeemed Cuban women and ended up building an economy in which a smile paid for in dollars was worth more than a university degree.

The Revolution proclaimed that it had redeemed Cuban women and ended up building an economy in which a smile paid in dollars was worth more than a university degree paid in pesos.

That’s where jineterismo truly emerged as a revolutionary creature: not because the government decreed it, nor because sexual exchange didn’t exist before, but because the economic organization of Castroism produced that specific form. Prostitution was ancient; jineterismo, on the other hand, was a genuine child of the Revolution, not of its ideals, but of its failure.

A study by Charles Trumbull published in 201, based on fieldwork in Cuba and various sources from the 1990s, observed precisely this difference. A large network of brothels had not reappeared, nor was the traditional pimp predominant. Many relationships were established directly in hotels, discotheques, on beaches, in the streets, or through friendships. The jinetera might not consider herself a prostitute, nor might she work full-time: she could be a student, a technician, an employee, or a mother, and occasionally resort to a relationship with a foreigner to obtain what neither her salary nor the ration book could give her.

In that nocturnal economy, the boundaries between prostitution, hustling, and seduction with a migratory horizon were porous. Daliany Jerónimo Kersh notes that the expression jinetera-mambisa was already circulating in the 1980s … The jinetera became more associated with immediate or professional transactions, while the mambisa aspired to become involved with a foreigner and, if the “military campaign” prospered, to marry and leave the country. It was said of those mambisas, with the customary mockery, that they were “finishing off the Spaniards”; later, the enemy became multinational.

The boundaries, of course, remained fluid. There were Havana women who knew the ropes, girls from the provinces who circumvented residency restrictions to try their luck in the capital, and women who went out for a single night and ended up in show business. They weren’t distinct species or military ranks in a sexual taxonomy, but rather shifting positions within a continuum of necessity, curiosity, fun, ambition, and survival. Old-fashioned prostitution required entering a circuit; to hustle, all it took was finding a tourist and knowing how to please him.

The whole country was learning how to ‘resolve’, to get by: obtaining ‘on the left’ what couldn’t be obtained on the right, diverting resources, inventing family ties, feigning enthusiasm, and cultivating the right contacts.

Hustling wasn’t limited to sex, nor was it exclusively female. A hustler could sell counterfeit tobacco, find a room, act as a guide, fetch fuel, serve as an intermediary, or cultivate a self-serving friendship. There were also men who offered sexual services. The term encompassed much more than just the bed: it referred to any way of “riding” foreigners to overcome the scarcities.

That is why it came to be said that in Cuba anyone could hustle. It didn’t mean everyone was a prostitute, but rather that the logic of the transaction was no longer confined to a specific profession. The entire country learned how to ‘resolve’: obtaining ‘under the table’ means what couldn’t be obtained through legitimate means, diverting resources, inventing family ties, feigning enthusiasm, and cultivating the right contacts. The picaresque provided the method; satire, the style; the Revolution, the necessity.

The decisive transformation occurred in the meaning of the gesture. The ‘sata‘ turned another’s desire into triumph; the prostitute needed to turn it into income. One could enjoy leaving the admirer waiting; the other depended on that wait eventually paying for dinner, soap, perfume, or a passport. Perhaps the smile was the same, but the freedom from which it was offered had changed.

It was not, therefore, a natural evolution of Cuban street smarts into prostitution, but rather a repurposing of them under economic duress. Necessity requisitioned old social skills and put them to work. Sympathy became an investment, conversation a probing exercise, and romance a possibility through migration. There were sincere relationships, real affection, and marriages that cannot be reduced to a mere calculation. But therein lay the psychological complexity of the phenomenon: need, affection, and friendship could coexist without even those involved knowing where one ended and the other began.

Meanwhile, the State condemned the prostitute for doing on a retail basis what it practiced wholesale: selling a tropical fantasy to foreigners in exchange for currency. Tourist campaigns offered rum, music, sensuality, and smiling bodies, while the police watched over the Cuban woman who approached a visitor, trying to “smother” him. They called it “the siege of tourism.” She sold companionship; the State sold the island.

Havana could make fun of even that back room, but romanticizing jineterismo would be another way of misrepresenting it.

As it grew, this initially scattered activity also created its own rearguard. There wasn’t always a recognizable pimp: sometimes that role was played by the husband, the “little husband”—the informal partner—or even a brother who waited at home and participated in the takings; other times, it was the taxi driver who brought the tourist, the owner of a brothel who lent the room, or the policeman who took bribes to look the other way.

The girls who arrived from the provinces could rely on fellow countrymen and relatives to find lodging, protection, and a work area, or to move around certain nightclubs and bars. In some circles, there was even talk of groups identified by their province of origin, closer to networks of local ties, mutual aid, and territorial division than to organized crime groups. Among the newcomers, the old-fashioned solidarity of the eastern guajira and the good nature of many of those girls and women often outweighed any underworld discipline. The Revolution had closed the brothels; necessity rebuilt the supply chain.

Havana could make light of even that back room, but romanticizing prostitution would be another way of distorting it. There was exploitation, deception, violence, degradation, and a profound erosion of trust. When every kindness can conceal a price and every infatuation a visa application, sensitivity ends up defending itself through cynicism. The foreigner learns to interpret every smile as an offer; the Cuban, to see every foreigner as a possible way out of a problem. The moral damage lies not in the loss of a supposed purity or freshness of sex, but in the colonization of intimacy by survival.

The art of distance was also lost. The old satire thrived on insinuation, circumlocution, and what might never actually happen. Revolutionary urgency shortened the distance between a wink and the price, with brazenness as the only stop along the way. The so-called “flip-flop slap” or ” flip-flop-ification” wasn’t about poverty or footwear, but about the disappearance of ceremony, the ritual of courtship: when seduction ceased to be a game and became a mere formality.

Now that ecosystem is also dying out. According to official figures from the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI), during the first half of 2026 the number of international visitors received by Cuba was only 39.3% of that recorded in the same period of the previous year. Even the caricature of a tropical paradise is beginning to lose its audience.

In Cuba, meanwhile, the concern has become less erotic and more electric. Desire needs a certain confidence in tomorrow, some intimacy, and, if it’s not too much to ask, electricity. Before thinking about falling in love, seducing, or procreating, one has to find out what time the power comes back on.

The Revolution can perhaps claim one last moral victory: it has reduced prostitution, not because it has redeemed the prostitutes, but because it has scared away tourists and because many of them left to build their futures in other countries, far from the revolutionary “burundanga” that had driven them to seek work.

Today, the Cuban people, exhausted even from practicing that old art of catcalling, wait for someone or something to change their destiny. But no collective destiny changes simply by waiting, however much, ninety miles away, there may be those longing for a good excuse to act. In the Cuba where once people went out to meet tourists, today they wait for the tide to turn. And even flirting waits its turn to start its engine.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

“If You Don’t Live in Cuba, You Can’t Understand What the Blockade Is”

This is how Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel dodges the uncomfortable questions from a friendly journalist from Folha de S. Paulo.

Miguel Díaz-Canel during the interview with Mônica Bergamo of Folha de S.Paulo. / Screenshot/Folha de S.Paulo

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Rolando Gallardo, Madrid, August 24, 2026 – The interview, granted to Mônica Bergamo of Folha de S. Paulo and published on August 23, 2026, begins with a scene bordering on surrealism. Before the first question, Lis Cuesta, the first lady, uses saliva to smooth her husband’s gray strands, trying to tame unruly hair over a drawn, gaunt face. It is the image of power without filters. But as soon as he begins to speak, the fragility disappears: Díaz-Canel regains narrative control with figures, dates and metaphors already repeated in at least five previous interviews.

That control is the most revealing fact: not what Díaz-Canel says, but that he had already said it as a theatrical performance to NBC, Newsweek, RT en Español, Radio 750 and now Bergamo. The “multidimensional war” and the same dates as the origin of the “energy blockade” return with a fidelity that demonstrates the practice of a permanent memorization exercise: the emphasis always falls in the same place, the silences are repeated, and even the pauses come at the same point in each answer.

He constantly repeats the word “genocide.” But the term, as he uses it –and as he demands “international condemnations” for it– does not correspond to the legal standard he invokes. The 1948 Genocide Convention requires proof of the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group “as such.” Washington’s sanctions, however harsh and questionable they may be, are intended to pressure a government clinging to power, not to annihilate or depopulate the Cuban nation. It is a political accusation prepared for the headlines of the state-run press.

The journalist recounts that, while traveling around the Island, she heard an expression that did not come from the dissidents but from the streets, from ordinary people: “internal blockade.” Díaz-Canel denies it twice

The most interesting moment, however, lies in the crack that Bergamo manages to open. The journalist recounts that, while traveling around the Island, she heard an expression that did not come from the dissidents but from the streets, from ordinary people: “internal blockade.” Díaz-Canel denies it twice and reduces it to “dissatisfaction with bureaucracy and slowness,” ending with a categorical phrase: “even if we had done everything right, without defects, the main cause… is the blockade.” First he shrinks the problem; then he dismisses it.

The pattern is measurable. Over the course of the hour, words that shift blame to Washington – blockade, genocide, sanctions, imperialism, suffocation, pressure, crime – appear 79 times. An acknowledgment of his own failure appears only once and is neutralized continue reading

in the following sentence. Seventy-nine to one, it is clear that for Diaz-Canel the regime bears no blame.

That exclusive causality also does not withstand comparison with Cuba’s economic history. The deterioration of health, education and vaccination is not recent: it has been developing for nearly two decades and became more exposed during the pandemic, when the State allocated 45.5% of its investment to real estate services – the domain of Gaesa, the military conglomerate that controls tourism – compared with barely 0.8% for health, while hundreds of Cubans died from a lack of oxygen. Gaesa today controls between 40% and 70% of the Cuban economy, with revenues three times the State budget. Eight economists consulted by EFE in 2025 agreed that sanctions harm the country, but that the deeper problems come from the model: centralized planning is, according to Pedro Monreal, “the pillar that does not work.”

Before the first question, Lis Cuesta, the first lady, uses saliva to smooth her husband’s gray strands, trying to tame unruly hair over a drawn, gaunt face. / Screenshot/Folha de Sao Paulo

The figures Díaz-Canel gives on infant mortality are accurate: the rate, which historically hovered between 4 and 5 per thousand live births, ended 2025 at 9.9, according to the Ministry of Public Health itself, a figure confirmed by the UN. The deterioration is real. What is not true is to present it as sudden damage caused solely by this year’s energy blockade: the indicator had already been rising since 2018, the same years in which the country was building luxury hotels that today have occupancy below 30%.

There lies the real diagnosis, beyond any reading of his state of mind: a president managing real data from a country in collapse, and who, instead of using them to open a serious conversation about 20 years of bad decisions, reinserts them into the narrative already prepared to absolve himself of blame. When Bergamo takes him into territory he does not control, the response is not an argument but a shutdown: “If you don’t live in Cuba, you can’t understand what the blockade is.” A phrase that cancels the question, and the exact distance between the script and the real country that Bergamo found cooking with charcoal.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Jaimanitas Takes to the Streets Openly To Protest Power and Water Cuts in Cuba

Other demonstrations took place in Old Havana and Cienfuegos.

Por lo que puede apreciarse, a los manifestantes en Jaimanitas se enfrentaron partidarios del régimen. / Captura

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, August 24, 2026 – A new pot-banging protest shook Havana Sunday night. This time, it was in Jaimanitas, in the municipality of Playa. In images posted on his social media by rapper Eliexer Márquez (El Funky), a crowd can be seen in the middle of the street, shouting at one another as the banging of pots rings out.

In the midst of them, a police officer tries to calm the situation. Judging by what can be seen, regime supporters confronted the protesters. Although Jaimanitas has a social makeup of fishermen, workers, artists, and people involved in tourism, it borders neighborhoods reserved for Cuba’s political elite.

At one point, a car suddenly speeds into the middle of the crowd, which had to move aside to avoid being run over. “Jaimanitas in the streets, no electricity, no water, nothing!” El Funky, co-author of Patria y Vida and an exile in Miami, posted.

Over the weekend, there were again mobilizations, both in Havana and elsewhere on the Island. According to information from CubaNet, residents of a building in Old Havana blocked Villegas between Teniente Rey and Muralla on Saturday because of continuous blackouts and the authorities’ lack of attention.

“Jaimanitas in the streets, no electricity, no water, nothing!” El Funky, co-author of Patria y Vida and an exile in Miami, posted

“People are protesting because one phase always goes down, the power goes out, and they don’t come to fix it,” a source told the independent newspaper. “The breakers caught fire and nobody does anything, so the people in that building got fed up and closed the block.”

That same Saturday, in Cienfuegos, Martí Noticias reported, about twenty residents gathered outside the Provincial Government headquarters after being without electricity since Thursday morning. The complaint, according to activist continue reading

Raúl González González, coordinator of the Consenso Ciudadano movement, is that there are no service interruptions in the neighborhoods where the officials live. “They have protected circuits for entire weeks,” he told Martí Noticias.

Independent journalist Yoanni Limonta, who also lives in Cienfuegos, told the Cuban-American newspaper details of the demonstration: “Several mothers with sick children, children in their arms, went to the government, showed up there, and demanded answers regarding the excessive power cuts.”

For that day, the Electric Union had forecast a deficit of 2,240 megawatts (MW) during peak hours, against demand of 3,300 MW. That is, nearly 68% of the energy needed. The outages were compounded by the fact that the Lidio Ramón Pérez thermoelectric plant, known as Felton, was unable to resolve the breakdown that has left both of its units shut down.

“A crack in the upper area of the boiler, very close to the dome, increased water consumption in the preceding days and forced a reduction in power generation before the decision was made to shut down the unit,” Cubadebate explained in a report in which it warned that repairs to a leak in the boiler could not be completed Friday, as planned, because “they proved to be the most complex tasks on the critical path.”

Translated by Regina Anavy
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Price Controls and Fines Are Causing the Little Oil That Available in Cuba To Disappear From Stores

Authorities issue alert over the sale of adulterated oil in Mayabeque

A crowd gathered at the doors of the Perla del Caribe state-run store in Sancti Spíritus. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Mercedes García/Miguel García, Sancti Spíritus/Holguín, August 23, 2026 / The shortage of cooking oil has once again sparked riots at the few stores where it is available. In Sancti Spíritus, this occurred on two consecutive days, the first on Friday at the La Época store, where, according to eyewitnesses, “people started fighting.”

This Saturday, the state-run Perla de Cuba store offered a liter of at $2.85, with a limit of two bottles per person, and the police had to intervene to control the situation. A large crowd of people gathered in two lines, one on each side of the store’s entrance—which belongs to the Caribe corporation, part of the Gaesa military conglomerate—while two officers allowed people inside.

The product could be paid for with the Classic card or in cash, but many didn’t make it. “It’s a nightmare trying to get a number,” an elderly woman told 14ymedio as, in despair, she ended up leaving after a two-and-a-half-hour wait. Like her, there were many others, not without first complaining about everything.

“People suddenly arrive with three people and cut in front of me. I’ve been standing in the sun for hours and I’m starving, I’m going home,” explained one young man. “This country is a shithole,” another blurted out, before getting on his electric scooter and speeding off.

A retiree responded loudly to the entire rally: “That’s how it is, but it’s nothing new. This country has always been the same, no matter what anyone says. People say we lived better under the USSR, but we didn’t live better at all: there were shortages and it was awful, and they supported us.”

In Holguín, this past Saturday, they enforced a “forced sale” of cooking oil at 2,200 pesos per liter at the Correo del Pueblo Nuevo market. “The inspectors showed up unannounced and found everything in an uproar, with people selling bottles on the black market,” a private merchant told this newspaper, detailing the extent of the inspections. “They’re conducting large-scale raids in continue reading

several areas of Holguín.”

A crowd of people gathered in two lines, one on each side of the store entrance, while two officers allowed people inside. 

The result of the new monitoring, established in the last two weeks to try to curb inflation, especially of basic necessities such as oil or eggs, has only two types of effect for the moment: either higher prices in the informal market or, directly, the disappearance of the products from every establishment.

“You can’t even find an egg in this city, let alone cooking oil,” asserts a resident of the Havana neighborhood of Luyanó. From El Vedado, also in the capital, another resident recounts: “I just got a bottle of Brazilian cooking oil for 4,500 bolivars, and it was hidden like it was drugs.”

Even worse is the sale of adulterated oil, as shown in the alert issued this Saturday by the General Directorate of Public Health of Mayabeque. In a post disseminated by official media, it is reported that “you should not consume oil sold at the El Rodeo Fairgrounds” in the provincial capital, “since it was determined after testing that it is crude vegetable oil for animal consumption and not for human consumption.”

“People suddenly arrive with three people and cut in front of me. I’ve been standing in the sun for hours and I’m starving, I’m going home.” / 14ymedio

Several local residents have told 14ymedio about the offers of this “dark” oil. “It’s supposed to be for cooking, but it’s dark and thick,” says a woman from Mayabeque. “I wouldn’t buy that for anything; I’d rather boil everything in water.”

Since August 11, various provinces have implemented restrictive measures aimed at controlling prices, such as establishing a 30% profit margin for private businesses and increasing inspections and fines for those who violate the regulations. These measures represent a blatant step backward from the economic liberalization reforms announced by the government last June .

President Miguel Díaz-Canel himself declared at the time in a public appearance: “Price caps, in practice, failed to contain inflation: many times they caused the disappearance of products, diversions towards illegality, higher prices, less tax collection and an impossible race between real prices and administrative decisions that always arrived late.
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Two-Year-Old Twins, Who Were on a Boat of Cuban Rafters That Was Rescued in Mexico, Die

Relatives had said that at least 19 people were traveling, including 7 minors, but the Mexican Navy claimed to have rescued 16, including four children.

Images of the Cuban rafters rescued by the Mexican Navy. / Semar

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Mexico, August 23, 2026 / Twin boys Leosdel and Leosniel Oviedo Garrobo, who were traveling on the boat carrying Cuban rafters that was located on Thursday after being missing at sea for more than a week, died during the crossing. This was confirmed to Martí Noticias on Saturday via text message by Leobel Ricardo Oviedo, the father of the little boys who were only two-years-old.

Just a day earlier, he had told the Cuban-American media outlet, “I am very grateful because they have made a great effort to find them.” At that time, as evidenced by interviews he gave to other journalists,  he was certain his sons were in good health.

According to Martí Noticias,  Adacheli Sosa, Oviedo’s cousin, recounted that the father, who has lived in Cancún for almost a year, went to “the place where the migrants were staying”—the Yucatecan city of Progreso—to reunite with his family, originally from Vertientes (Camagüey), but upon arrival, only his wife, Yusimy Garrobo Leiva, 35, was there. “He met with his wife, and she confirmed that the two young children had died during the journey, apparently from dehydration,” Sosa told the news outlet.

According to statements from a relative of other rafters who were on board, they had to throw the bodies into the sea because the smell they gave off was attracting sharks.

According to statements made to Mario Vallejo by a relative of other rafters who were on board, they had to throw the bodies into the sea because the smell they gave off was attracting sharks. “The mother of the children was in very bad shape,” the relative told the reporter.

The Mexican Navy had released an image on Thursday of the boat, found 10 nautical miles from Chicxulub Puerto, in the state of Yucatán, by some fishermen, who helped the migrants and notified the authorities.

They had been missing since the boat departed for Mexico from Pinar del Río on August 11. The alert was raised by the rafters’ families, who were asking for help from the authorities or anyone who might know if they had been rescued by the coast guard, a recreational boat, or fishermen.

Journalist Mario Vallejo issued a plea on his social media accounts, posting images taken by the rafters themselves inside the vessel. According to initial reports, at least 19 people were on board, including 7 minors.

However, the Mexican Navy reported the rescue of 16 migrants, including four minors. All of them were taken to facilities of the Ninth Naval Zone in Progreso, from where personnel from the National Migration Institute (INM) were contacted “to determine their status and carry out the corresponding procedures,” official sources told 14ymedio.

So far, neither the authorities nor the families have provided any further details or explanations regarding the discrepancy in the figures.

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It Was Etecsa, Not Google, That Issued the False Earthquake Alert

The state-owned company acknowledges a “technical-human error,” as the scientific magazine ‘Juventud Técnica’ had anticipated

“We are aware of the concern and distress generated as a result of the error, and therefore we apologize to the population,” Etecsa admits. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, August 22, 2026 – Etecsa was finally forced to acknowledge that the error was its own. The false earthquake alert that caused thousands of Cubans to hurriedly leave their homes last Tuesday was generated by specialists from the company itself while they were conducting tests on the telecommunications network. The admission comes three days after the incident, when the authorities had blamed Google’s alert system and only after an investigation by the state-run magazine Juventud Técnica dismantled that explanation and followed the clues to the Island’s telecommunications monopoly.

“On the afternoon of August 18, users in several areas of the country received messages on their mobile phones with an earthquake alert,” begins the brief statement published by Etecsa. After assuring that it had launched an investigation, the company admits that “the messages were issued due to a technical-human error, generated by our specialists who were conducting tests on the telecommunications network.”

The company also says that “the corresponding analyses were carried out, measures were adopted with those responsible, and actions are being implemented to prevent similar incidents in the future.” It does not identify those responsible, specify what measures were taken, or explain how an internal test managed to become an earthquake alarm distributed to phones across much of the country. “We are aware of the concern and distress generated as a result of the error, and therefore we apologize to the population,” it concludes.

In a country where finding a foreign culprit is often considerably faster than finding a domestic solution, Google seemed to be carrying the blame for an earthquake that never existed

The episode began at around three in the afternoon on Tuesday. Thousands of Android phones suddenly emitted a shrill “earthquake alert” warning that recommended seeking shelter. In Havana, numerous residents left their homes, many of them in the middle of a blackout. Testimonies gathered at the time described elderly people going down stairs with walkers, people who came outside in their underwear, and neighbors trying to get their pets to safety. In a building in Luyanó, the pleas of an elderly woman asking not to be left to die alone could be heard.

The ground, however, had not moved. continue reading

Minutes later, Civil Defense reported that the National Center for Seismological Research (Cenais) had not recorded any seismic movement. Enrique Diego Arango Arias, head of the National Seismological Service, called the alarm “completely false.”

As questions mounted, initial suspicions circulated on social media about Etecsa and a possible failed drill. Cubadebate, however, was quick to dismiss that possibility and presented Google’s earthquake alert system for Android as a possible explanation, a system that uses the accelerometers in phones to detect vibrations. Suddenly, in a country where finding a foreign culprit is often considerably faster than finding a domestic solution, Google seemed to be carrying the blame for an earthquake that never existed.

When ‘Juventud Técnica’ approached Etecsa seeking answers, the company did not accept any responsibility at the time and referred the questions to Civil Defense

The version began to fall apart when Juventud Técnica asked the multinational company directly. “These claims are incorrect. The Android Earthquake Alerts System did not detect an earthquake or send alerts in Cuba,” a Google spokesperson responded.

The magazine went further. By analyzing the format of the messages and Android’s source code, it determined that the alert was compatible with the ETWS protocol, used to transmit earthquake and tsunami warnings through Cell Broadcast. Under that system, Google is not the entity that sends the message; the public mobile network does. In Cuba, that network belongs exclusively to Etecsa. Android even distinguishes between the code intended for an actual earthquake alert and the one reserved for a test.

When Juventud Técnica approached Etecsa seeking answers, the company did not accept any responsibility at the time and referred the questions to Civil Defense. That move now leaves an additional question. Amneris Santos Hernández, head of Civil Defense’s Preparation and Communication Department, acknowledged to the publication that the agency was “exploring the use of these alerts,” although she assured that they were not yet being implemented and that the incident was under investigation.

Arango Arias pointed to the greatest danger of all: that a false alarm could happen again and, when a real one arrives, the population might stop believing it

That statement and Etecsa’s subsequent confession leave unresolved what role Civil Defense played in the tests. There is currently no public evidence that would allow anyone to say that it ordered the test or participated directly in it, but it is significant that Etecsa initially referred questions about a test that it now acknowledges was its own to that agency, and that Civil Defense admitted that it was experimenting with precisely this technology.

The damage, in any case, was not limited to a computer error. Arango Arias warned after the incident that there were still “many unanswered questions” and pointed to the greatest danger of all: that a false alarm could happen again and, when a real one arrives, the population might stop believing it.

That is the most serious consequence of those minutes of panic. An early warning system depends on an immediate response, not on citizens first having to determine whether Etecsa is conducting tests. What remains to be learned is who ordered the test, for what purpose, and how the drill managed to go much farther than the explanation.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

A Plague of Bedbugs Forces the Closure of the Guanabacoa Civil Registry in Cuba

The insects have even settled into the old books that contain residents’ registrations.

“We are closed until further notice,” an employee explains from the entrance of the premises. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Darío Hernández, Havana, August 22, 2026 – Bedbugs have managed to accomplish in Guanabacoa what power outages, paper shortages, and staff shortages had already achieved many times by other means: close a public office. The Civil Registry of the Havana municipality remains out of service because of an invasion of these insects, workers at the office confirmed to several users this Friday.

“We are closed until further notice,” an employee explains from the entrance of the premises, located on San Francisco Street, at the corner of Máximo Gómez. The reason, she admits shortly afterward, is a “bedbug infestation.”

According to the employee, the closure could last “15 to 21 days,” although she did not specify when work to eliminate the insects began or what treatment is being applied inside the building.

“But there are almost only plastic chairs in there,” commented one of the users. / 14ymedio

The news has caused disbelief among some users, mainly because the office has very little furniture where, at first glance, the parasites could take refuge. “There are almost only plastic chairs in there,” one of them commented. But the answer appears to lie in an object that is much more abundant than the furniture: the books.

The Civil Registry’s old volumes, several of them cloth-bound and stored for decades, are reportedly infested, according to workers and users of the office. Bedbugs can hide in cracks and small crevices and can also take advantage of materials such as paper, cardboard, and fabric, meaning the historical archive offers more hiding places than the austerity of the furniture might suggest.

While the closure lasts, the employee says those affected can “go to any registry” in the capital to handle their affairs. But the solution turns out to be considerably simpler at the office entrance than in real life.

Very close to the Registry, the office responsible for identity cards was also not operating this Friday. / 14ymedio

Two people who went to the Regla Civil Registry after finding the Guanabacoa office closed were unable to resolve their paperwork there, they told 14ymedio. The possibility of processing certain certificates at other offices does exist, especially when registrations have been digitized, but not all procedures can be transferred from one office to another without difficulties.

The episode adds a bureaucratic twist to an infestation that has been spreading through Havana for weeks. At the end of July, this newspaper documented the proliferation of bedbugs in homes in different municipalities of the capital, where mattresses and sofas began ending up directly in garbage dumps because of the impossibility of getting rid of the insects. Power outages, accumulated waste, and, above all, the difficulty of obtaining effective fumigation products have made the situation continue reading

even more complicated.

In a city where almost everything ends up becoming part of the crisis archive, even the insects seem to have discovered the Civil Registry. / 14ymedio

Less than a month after those reports, the appearance of an infestation in a public building shows that the problem is no longer limited to bedrooms and household furniture. The insects have now reached a State archive, where they share space with documents that in some cases have been stored for decades.

Very close to the Registry, the office responsible for identity cards, located on Máximo Gómez at the corner of División, was also not operating this Friday. People who went there said that this office had also closed because of bedbugs. Users were told that it would possibly reopen on Monday.

The promise was met with caution. “That is not known for certain,” one of them said, accustomed to the office suspending services for other reasons, including a lack of materials to produce the documents. In a city where almost everything ends up becoming part of the crisis archive, even the insects seem to have discovered the Civil Registry.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The Train That Derailed in Camagüey, Cuba, Was Carrying Containers Reportedly Stranded in Jamaica

Fourteen of the 27 cars left the tracks, blocking the passage of a train carrying 873 passengers, who were taken to Havana by bus.

Among the containers, some belonging to the French shipping company CMA CGM could be seen. The company had suspended its shipments to Cuba in mid-May. / Ministry of Transportation

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, August 21, 2026 – The railway line between Havana and Santiago de Cuba has been interrupted since Thursday, when a freight train derailed near the town of Piedrecita, in Camagüey. The train was traveling from Artemisa to Holguín and, judging by images released by the authorities, was transporting goods from the Port of Mariel, the Island’s main commercial terminal.

Among them, in fact, were containers belonging to the French shipping company CMA CGM, which had suspended its shipments to the Island in mid-May because of the threat of sanctions posed by U.S. President Donald Trump’s Executive Order 14404, dated May 1. There is no public information indicating that the company has resumed its arrivals in Cuba, but the company’s search engine shows that since last July, three CMA CGM ships have arrived in Mariel from Kingston, Jamaica.

At that port, the authorities reported last month, five containers carrying medical supplies were stranded. It can be assumed that they arrived on one of the vessels that reached the Artemisa terminal: the Alexandria on July 27, the Ceara on July 28, or the Iremos on August 15.

As for the accident in Camagüey, according to a publication by Cuban Railways, 14 of the convoy’s 27 cars left the tracks. Of these, 25 were carrying containers, but the containers were not damaged. In that same post, it was reported that measures were being taken to assist passengers on another train that was traveling from Guantánamo to the capital at the time and whose journey was halted because the so-called Central Line was affected.

“Under very complex conditions due to the availability of fuel, arrangements have been made to transport all passengers to their respective destinations,” the agency said in a subsequent report. The 873 passengers on that convoy would be distributed among a total of 25 buses.

The largest number of them were headed to the capital. Between Camagüey and Havana, 15 vehicles were hired for 625 passengers, and two more continue reading

between Sancti Spíritus and Havana, for 81 passengers.

“In compliance with the established protocol, an investigative commission was created to clarify the causes and conditions that led to the occurrence of the incident”

“In compliance with the established protocol, an investigative commission was created to clarify the causes and conditions that led to the incident,” the institution also indicated, adding that officials from the Railway Transportation Administration, as well as police and Ministry of the Interior agents, went to the scene of the accident.

This type of accident has become more frequent in recent years on the Island. On June 2, a passenger train with 900 people on board, also traveling on the route between Santiago de Cuba and Havana, derailed in the vicinity of Las Tunas, with no injuries reported. Although authorities said at the time that they would investigate the causes, they have not commented on the matter since.

The previous railway incident occurred in November of last year, when a passenger train traveling the Havana-Sancti Spíritus route suffered an accident near the municipality of Placetas, in Villa Clara, with no injuries reported among passengers or crew.

Las Tunas, precisely, has recorded at least three of these incidents in less than two years. In addition to the aforementioned accident, another occurred in Jobabo in August 2024, when the Manzanillo-Havana train derailed without injuries or significant damage, and in Bartle, in October 2025, with 577 passengers on board. No injuries were reported in that incident either.

The deterioration of Cuba’s railway system, affected by a lack of maintenance, an aging locomotive fleet, and shortages of spare parts, has turned derailments into another symptom of the national transportation crisis. It is estimated that 67% of the tracks and 40% of the infrastructure require maintenance in the country.

In recent years, the Government has announced plans to modernize both the tracks and machinery with foreign investment—mainly from France and Russia—but the improvements have not materialized.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The U.S. Trial Against a Cuban Pilot Over the Downing of the Brothers to the Rescue Is Postponed

Luis Raúl González-Pardo is the only detained defendant among the six accused in a case that also includes Raúl Castro.

González-Pardo (center) had been detained since last November on a separate case related to immigration fraud. / Facebookk

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/EFE, Miami, August 21, 2026 – The trial in the United States against Cuban pilot Luis Raúl González-Pardo over the 1996 downing of two Brothers to the Rescue aircraft has been postponed until at least September. The proceedings, which were scheduled to begin next Monday in Miami, are part of a case in which former Cuban ruler Raúl Castro is also accused.

Court documents available this Friday indicate that federal Judge Darrin Gayles of the Southern District of Florida scheduled a status conference for September 2, a meeting between the defense and the prosecution to determine the next steps in the proceedings.

The trial was initially scheduled for Monday, August 24, but both sides requested that it be postponed because of the volume and complexity of the evidence. González-Pardo is the only detained defendant among the six Cubans indicted in May by the U.S. Department of Justice.

In addition to González-Pardo and Raúl Castro, the Department of Justice indicted four other Cubans on charges of conspiracy to kill U.S. citizens and murder

“The Government has informed the defense that this case involves a significant volume of evidence, including classified material, obsolete media storage and physical evidence from three decades ago, as well as reports that were not previously preserved in electronic format,” one of the court documents states.

The indictment is related to the February 24, 1996, downing of two Brothers to the Rescue aircraft by Cuban Air Force fighter jets. Carlos Costa, Armando Alejandre, Mario Manuel de la Peña and Pablo Morales were killed in the attack, three U.S. citizens and one legal U.S. resident, all of Cuban continue reading

origin.

Brothers to the Rescue conducted flights over the Florida Straits from Florida to locate and assist rafters leaving Cuba.

In addition to González-Pardo and Raúl Castro, the Department of Justice indicted four other Cubans on charges of conspiracy to kill U.S. citizens and murder.

The pilot arrived in the United States in April 2024 through the humanitarian parole program created during the Joe Biden administration 

González-Pardo had been detained since last November on a separate case related to immigration fraud. In May, he was sentenced to seven months in prison for providing U.S. authorities with false information about his career in the Cuban Armed Forces.

The pilot arrived in the United States in April 2024 through the humanitarian parole program created during the Joe Biden administration. According to the Department of Justice, he omitted or falsified information about his membership in the Cuban Air Force between 1980 and 2009 when he filed Form I-485 to apply for adjustment of his immigration status.

In the Brothers to the Rescue case, Judge Enjolique A. Lett ordered on June 23 that he remain in custody after the prosecution argued that there was “a serious risk” that he would not appear for trial.

The case was formally opened on May 20, when the Department of Justice announced the indictment of Raúl Castro and five other Cubans over the deaths of the four members of Brothers to the Rescue.

The charges could carry sentences of life imprisonment or even the death penalty. The indictment against 95-year-old Castro came amid Washington’s hardening policy toward Havana under the administration of Donald Trump.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Dominican Republic Expels Nine Cuban ‘Spies,’ but Ten ‘Heroes’ Show Up in Havana

With the exception of Vice Consul Odin Ysla Hernández, the regime does not identify its officials or state the posts they held at the Embassy in Santo Domingo

Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez and Deputy Minister Josefina Vidal (both at center) at the “welcome” ceremony for the diplomats expelled from the Dominican Republic / Minrex

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, August 20, 2026 / The Cuban regime has received its diplomats expelled by the Dominican Republic with grand words but very little information. And what little there is, is contradictory. The foreign ministry of the Caribbean country ordered the withdrawal, this past Thursday, of nine members of the Cuban legation, but in Havana, this Wednesday, ten showed up.

At the “welcome” ceremony, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez was present, but the official press conspicuously gave coverage not to his words but to those of Deputy Minister Josefina Vidal. “The Dominican authorities have not been able to present a single reason to justify such a decision, because none exists. It has therefore been made clear that they have done nothing more than bow to pressure from the United States government,” Vidal stated.

Rodríguez, to whom other official reports give precedence to the title of “member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party” over that of minister, expressed himself via X, as he usually does, reporting the “welcome to the Cuban diplomats and their families expelled for no reason whatsoever.” In the same vein as Vidal, he said: “We welcome them knowing that, adhering to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, they jealously upheld the principles of Revolutionary Diplomacy, as our officials do in any international setting and in the face of any imperialist pressure.”

Of the expelled officials, it has identified only one, as vice consul: Odin Ysla Hernández, but he does not appear on the Ministry’s official website

From the outset, the Dominican government claimed that the measure was adopted in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and that it would not offer further details, as this involved “diplomatic communications,” but neither has the Cuban regime provided any. Of the expelled officials, it has identified only one, as vice consul: Odin Ysla Hernández, but he does not appear on continue reading

the Ministry’s official website as accredited personnel in Santo Domingo.

On that site only three positions appear: Ángel Arzuaga Reyes, as “ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary”; Norberto Díaz Franco, as economic and commercial counselor; and Damila Hechavarría Argudín, as second secretary in charge of consular affairs. It is not clear whether they are among those expelled.

Ysla Hernández spoke at yesterday’s event “on behalf of the expelled officials,” lamenting that the notification from the Dominican foreign ministry arrived “only 48 hours before the centenary of the birth of Fidel Castro was to be commemorated” and calling the decision “unjustified” and “another imperialist ploy.” The diplomat went so far as to state: “My brothers and sisters and I, returning to the homeland, feel only pride in a duty fulfilled and immense joy at returning to our land. The expulsion, given the motives behind it, is a medal pinned to our chest.”

On August 13 itself, the date of the centenary of the leader of the Cuban Revolution and when the expulsion of the legation was made public, there was, he recounted, a “political-cultural gala” dedicated to Castro, “attended by more than a thousand friends of Cuba representing the Dominican people.” Likewise, he offered congratulations for the third-place finish by the Cuban delegation at the Central American and Caribbean Games recently held in Santo Domingo.

“The expulsion, given the motives behind it, is a medal pinned to our chest”

It is precisely at these Games that investigations by the Dominican press place the origin of the reason for the Cubans’ expulsion. According to Diario Libre, security agents from the island infiltrated sports facilities during the Games to watch over the athletes of the fatherland and prevent defections.

To gain access to the venues and approach the Cuban competitors without arousing suspicion, they went so far as to wear the uniforms of athletes from other countries. The operation, the report indicated, published on Tuesday, was detected by Dominican security agencies, which removed several of those involved from the facilities.

Infiltration by Cuban security intensified during the first part of the Games, by which point two defections had already occurred: Moisés David Torres Puig, on the very day the competition opened; and rower Leah Daniela Almeida, a bronze medalist.

This information matched the account obtained by 14ymedio from the circle of one of the five Cuban athletes who left the delegation during the Games. The source stated that the athlete had been warned that Cuban authorities were trying to locate him and was advised not to go on social media so as not to be found.

“I do believe 100% that it’s because of our case,” the athlete stated, according to the same source. “They wanted to kidnap us in a country where they have no right to do that.”

In total, five athletes left the national team: in addition to Torres Puig and Almeida, fencers Adán Núñez and Hershey Daniela de la Cruz, and center fielder Yasmani Álvarez of the softball team.

Translated by GH.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The Insufficiency of Sanctions

The CubanAmerican Voice, Julio M. Shiling, August 21, 2026 /The United States has correctly identified Castro-Communism as a persistent threat to its national security. The State Department’s July 20, 2026, report, Cuba: The Capital of 21st Century Communism, documents the regime’s decades-long campaign of subversion, ideological warfare, espionage, and support for radical movements both abroad and inside American territory. This assessment aligns with the broader strategic objectives set out in the November 2025 National Security Strategy, which prioritizes reclaiming influence in the Western Hemisphere and denying hostile external powers a foothold near U.S. shores. Overthrowing the Cuban communist system is therefore essential to those long-term goals. Cuban communism must end, and its comprehensive removal is both a moral good and a strategic necessity.

In service of that objective, the Trump administration has pursued a steady campaign of targeted sanctions. These measures have hit regime-owned state enterprises, Cuban Communist Party front organizations involved in domestic and international agitation, and individual members of the dictatorial elite and their families. The latest package, announced August 20 under the title “Imposing Sanctions on Cuban Regime Actors Associated with Marxist Subversive Networks and Corrupt Economic Dealings,” continues this calibrated pressure. Such sanctions are morally sustainable, ethically commendable, and tactically necessary. They deprive the regime of resources used to repress its own population, maintain an extensive surveillance apparatus, and project influence outward. They signal that the United States will no longer tolerate a hostile Marxist dictatorship ninety miles from its coast.

Yet sanctions alone will not cause the Castro-Communist dictatorship to fall. The regime has spent more than three decades refining methods to bypass American restrictions and the broader embargo. Through GAESA and lesser-known commercial entities, it has laundered proceeds from continue reading

its operations via banks and intermediaries in Panama and other jurisdictions. Loyal Cuban communist émigrés have established ostensibly legitimate businesses abroad that maintain a symbiotic relationship with the dictatorship, enjoying privileges in exchange for services rendered. These soft-power assets, valued in the billions, form an external ecosystem that allows the regime to weather financial pressure. Targeting GAESA’s holdings in Panamanian banks and similar offshore networks would be a logical next step, but even expanded economic measures will not be decisive by themselves.

The regime’s indifference to the suffering of ordinary Cubans further limits the coercive power of sanctions. The dictatorship has never treated the welfare of the Cuban people as a constraint on its survival. A society pushed to the brink of famine would not compel the leadership to relinquish power. The dictatorial elite has repeatedly demonstrated that it prioritizes its privileges and ideological projects over the basic needs of the population it rules. Economic hardship is always absorbed by the people, never by the decision-makers in Havana.

Political timing also appears to shape the current approach. With midterm elections approaching, the Trump administration may be exercising caution. The American communist movement, operating today primarily under the banner of the Democratic Socialists of America, is engaged in a determined effort to capture the Democratic Party. This effort represents a contemporary expression of the “march through the institutions” long advocated by Gramscian Marxists. Given the documented historical and ongoing ties between Cuban communism and elements of the U.S. radical left, the continued existence of a Marxist regime in Cuba is not merely a foreign-policy problem. This is an American domestic issue as well. Restraint before the midterms may reflect an effort to avoid providing political ammunition to these forces.

After the midterm elections, however, the United States must adopt a more resolute posture. Economic warfare, however rigorously applied, is insufficient. The Castro regime retains external assets and networks capable of sustaining it through a single presidential term. If the objective is genuine freedom for the Cuban people and the elimination of a hostile danger to the American republic, policymakers must recognize that nothing short of concrete military action will achieve the necessary systemic change. A palace revolution that merely rearranges personnel while leaving the communist structures intact would be cosmetic. Any authentic transition to a democratic order would have to criminalize Castro-Communism from the outset and dismantle its institutional foundations.

Sanctions remain a justified and useful instrument. They are morally defensible and can weaken the regime’s capacity to repress and project power. But they cannot, by themselves, produce the decisive outcome required. The external ecosystem of front businesses, offshore finance, and ideological allies provides the dictatorship with resilience that pure economic pressure cannot overcome. Once the domestic political calendar permits, the United States should move beyond calibrated financial measures and prepare the concrete tools necessary to end Cuban communism. Only then will the strategic goals articulated in 2025 and the moral imperative recognized in the July 2026 report be fully realized.

The CubanAmerican Voice. All rights reserved.

Dipyrone, Hydrocortisone or Ranitidine: Regla’s Private Pharmacy Alleviates Chronic Shortages in Cuba’s State Sector

The decree of July 28 regarding authorized activities stipulates that individuals may apply for a license to sell medicines

Shelves in a private pharmacy in the municipality of Regla, Havana. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Dario Hernandez, Havana, August 20, 2026 / What has spread like wildfire on social media as “the first private pharmacy” in Havana is, in reality, a private store in the Regla municipality that has been selling medicine for two years. The video shared by users and independent media, an employee told 14ymedio, has brought them “more problems than benefits.”

The establishment, located on Martí Street between Albuquerque and Agramonte, has a front room selling toiletries, makeup, and clothing, and a second room housing the pharmacy. It’s a small counter, but it displays well-stocked shelves. These shelves hold not only medications—such as dipyrone, hydrocortisone, and ranitidine—but also all kinds of medicinal remedies and vitamins. The store’s name is nowhere to be seen, and there is no way to know who owns it.

What has spread like wildfire on social media as “the first private pharmacy” in Havana is, in reality, a private store in the Regla municipality that has been selling medicine for two years. The video shared by users and independent media, an employee told 14ymedio, has brought them “more problems than benefits.”

Click here to view video above.

The flow of customers, as this newspaper observed, is high. In just a few minutes last Tuesday, a dozen customers entered. One of them was told to come back another day because they were “unpacking.” Indeed, from a gleaming car, imported in 2023 according to the sticker visible on the windshield, several workers were unloading box after box, which they were arranging in a sort of warehouse. There were at least fifty boxes.

As for the prices, they’re not for everyone. Vitamins cost 2,000 pesos, a tablet of pills 1,000, and a simple tea bag 100 pesos, to name a few examples. Customers, however, aren’t complaining. “They’re expensive, yes, but that’s how it is everywhere, on the side, on the street,” one shopper remarked this Thursday. “At least this is a store, and continue reading

it’s legal.”

There were at least fifty of them, which the workers stored in a sort of warehouse. / 14ymedio

Given that it has been operating for some time, however, it is unclear whether it has already obtained the necessary government license. Pharmacies, along with transportation and energy, are among the businesses reopened to private ownership as part of the measures announced in June to ease economic restrictions, but express authorization is required, according to the decree published in the Official Gazette on July 28.

In any case, it represents the formalization of an entire market that attempts to alleviate the chronic shortage in the state sector, which has its pharmacies without supplies and its patients without the appropriate treatments.

The store carries not only medications, but all kinds of medicinal remedies and vitamins. / 14ymedio

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

ECLAC Forecasts a 10.3% Drop in the Cuban Economy in 2026

In contrast, Venezuela will grow by 6.5% and Nicaragua by 4.5%, while the average for the Latin American continent will reach 2.2%.

A huge pile of garbage is accumulating next to Trillo Park, on Aramburu Street, in Havana. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, August 20, 2021 / The Cuban economy will contract by 10.3% in 2026, by far the worst result in Latin America and the Caribbean, according to new forecasts from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The organization reaffirmed its 2.2% growth estimate for Latin America on Thursday, a figure that further highlights the island’s isolated decline.  

In the face of Cuba’s collapse, Venezuela presents an uncomfortable comparison for Havana. In April, ECLAC raised its growth forecast for Caracas from 3% to 6.5%, amid greater openness to private investment, especially in the energy sector. Nicaragua, another close political ally of the Cuban regime, is also projected to grow at twice the Latin American average, at 4.5%.

Guyana, driven by the extraordinary expansion of its oil industry, far exceeds those figures. ECLAC’s latest forecast for the South American country placed its growth at 16.2%.

Haiti, despite the political chaos and violence of armed gangs that control large areas of the country, remains far from the Cuban collapse

The distance between Cuba and the rest of the region’s economies has widened considerably in just a few months. In April, ECLAC estimated that Cuba’s gross domestic product (GDP) would contract by 6.5% this year. Now it projects a decline 3.8 percentage points greater. This deterioration is even more worrisome when compared to the forecast made at the end of 2025, when the organization expected minimal growth of 0.1% for Cuba.

Haiti, despite the political chaos and violence perpetrated by armed gangs that control large swaths of the country, remains far from the Cuban collapse. ECLAC also forecasts a 1.9% contraction in its economy, but much less severe than Cuba’s. Jamaica is also projected to experience a negative economic outlook, although with a more moderate decline than Cuba’s.

The confirmation of the debacle comes just two months after the government presented with gret solemnity a package of 176 economic measures promising to transform a model that the authorities themselves admit no longer works. The proposals include continue reading

greater openness to foreign investment and the private sector, and changes to hiring practices, foreign trade, banking, agriculture, and the energy sector.

Although it promised to eliminate price caps across the board, the government has allowed several provinces to reimpose controls.

The measures were met with skepticism by numerous economists. The consulting firm Auge emphasized that the opening came “in the worst possible context” and would primarily benefit those who already have capital and connections.

Although it promised to eliminate price caps across the board, the government has allowed several provinces to reinstate controls, limits on profit margins, inspections, and fines in response to rising inflation. In Artemisa, Matanzas, and Holguín, for example, authorities have set a maximum profit margin of 30% on sales.

The energy crisis is another major obstacle to any recovery effort. Industrial production, commerce, and numerous services have been hampered for months by power outages that, in many provinces, exceed 20 hours a day.

The almost permanent breakdowns at thermoelectric plants are compounded by fuel shortages. The Antonio Guiteras plant, the country’s most important, had already accumulated 15 system outages by mid-June. In July, Cuba also suffered several nationwide collapses in just a few weeks, while protests over the lack of electricity and water spread to various localities.

The lack of energy also creates a vicious cycle that is particularly difficult to break.

For the coming months, the authorities have already warned of more blackouts, as they intend to take advantage of the seasonal reduction in demand to carry out maintenance, while acknowledging that breakdowns will continue to occur in aging thermoelectric plants.

The lack of energy also creates a vicious cycle that is particularly difficult to break. Without electricity, national production falls, industries and services are paralyzed, and the capacity to generate foreign currency diminishes; without foreign currency, the State faces increasing difficulties in purchasing fuel, spare parts, and raw materials necessary to restore power generation and productive activity.

ECLAC’s forecast thus turns the 176 reforms announced by the government into a race against a deterioration far more rapid than the authorities themselves seemed to anticipate. While almost the entire region is moving forward, albeit slowly, Cuba not only remains in recession, but its decline is accelerating.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.