Venezuela’s “De-Cubanization” After Maduro’s Fall Leaves Thousands of Cubans in Limbo

“They say we’re all going to leave in the coming months because the cooperation agreement won’t be renewed”

The Venezuelan opposition has repeatedly denounced this cooperation as a form of interference and loss of sovereignty. / Cubadebate

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, February 8, 2026 – Cuba’s presence in Venezuela is going through one of its most uncertain moments since, more than two decades ago, both countries sealed a strategic alliance based on exchanging oil for professional services. The capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. troops on January 3 accelerated a process that sources consulted in Caracas describe as a progressive de-Cubanization of the country, visible both in official discourse and in everyday life.

“I’m careful when I go out not to speak so they don’t notice my accent, because Cubans are no longer welcome here,” Mariana, a 32-year-old Cuban doctor on official mission in Caracas, tells 14ymedio. The physician, who asks that her real identity not be revealed, says that for weeks her clinical work has dropped sharply. “Since the 3rd, if I’ve seen one patient, that’s a lot,” she explains. According to her account, Cuban doctors are in a state of virtual “barracking,” without clear guidance about whether they will remain or return to the Island.

“I have several colleagues who have already gone back, but so far they’re doctors who had already finished their mission and were waiting for their return flight to be arranged,” she says. “In any case, what’s being said is that we’re all going to leave in the coming months because the cooperation agreement won’t be renewed.” Another sign reinforcing that imminent departure is the poor supply of materials: “We’ve practically not been given the resources we need for consultations and procedures; right now we don’t know what we’ll have to keep working.”

The doctor adds that, unlike other years, the usual meetings at which the annual plans for Cuban missions in Venezuela are communicated were not held in January 2026. “Normally those guidelines are given by the end of January, but this year there’s been nothing,” she says. The absence of instructions reinforces a sense of provisionality among the Cubans, in a political context marked by the redefinition of alliances and the growing presence of the U.S. in Venezuelan reality.

An estimated 30,000 Cuban professionals work in Venezuela

Although the real figure is unknown, it is estimated that nearly 30,000 Cuban professionals—doctors, sports trainers, technical advisers, and personnel linked to intelligence and security services—currently work in Venezuela as part of agreements signed during the governments of Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez. The Venezuelan opposition has repeatedly denounced this cooperation as a form of interference and loss of sovereignty, arguing that key sectors of the State were left under Cuban influence.

For years, the most critical voices have spoken of a “Cubanization” that permeated not only surveillance and social-control schemes but also public discourse and ways of working in ministries and official institutions, including the presence of Cuban personnel in torture centers such as El Helicoide, headquarters of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Sebin), in Caracas.

Several detainees in those centers reported that among the interrogators one could hear a “Cuban accent,” according to a report published in 2024 in El Confidencial. This participation would not be isolated but rather part of cooperation agreements signed between Havana and Caracas that, critics say, enabled the transfer of repressive techniques and the direct presence of Cuban police in planning and control roles within Venezuela’s security apparatus.

Organizations such as the Casla Institute have brought these complaints before international bodies, arguing that the involvement of Cuban officers in repression, arbitrary detentions, and torture at El Helicoide and other detention centers is not accidental but the result of decades of alliances between the two governments. According to these allegations, the repressive machinery designed on the Island helped systematize practices of state violence, including detention without due process, interrogations under torture, and forced disappearances, used to punish dissidents and opponents of the Venezuelan government.

Caracas has sent signals of symbolic and practical distancing from Havana

That framework began to crack after Maduro’s detention and the rise of Delcy Rodríguez as a central figure in the current government. Since then, Caracas has sent signals of symbolic and practical distancing from Havana. At recent official events, the presence of the Cuban flag—common for years at ceremonies and institutional events—has been reduced, and changes have occurred in posts held by officials of Cuban origin or closely linked to bilateral cooperation.

The constant presence of high-ranking officials from the Havana regime has also diminished. It used to be rare for a week to pass without Island newscasts airing the arrival of some Cuban leader in Caracas, where they were feted and received at the highest level. The red carpets and handshakes now seem more focused on envoys of Donald Trump than on Havana’s former allies.

One of the most commented gestures was the reshuffle at the Ministry of Tourism, where Leticia Gómez, a Cuban national, was replaced by one of Diosdado Cabello’s daughters—a decision interpreted as part of a process to reduce the weight of foreign presence. Local analysts note that these moves aim to send a message both to the Venezuelan population and to Washington at a time when the new political balance is still being negotiated.

On Venezuelan streets, the change is also felt. Yusniel, a Cuban sports trainer who has been in Caracas for more than two years and asked to use a fictitious name, says he has stepped up his precautions. “Being Cuban right now here isn’t something you can go around advertising,” he says. He reports hearing direct criticism after rumors circulating for years about Cubans’ participation in the security ring protecting Maduro were confirmed. “That has weighed heavily on how people see us,” he adds. “The label of interlopers is something they’re never going to take away from us.”

“They tell me Venezuela has come out of the tunnel and Cuba is coming behind”

At the same time, Yusniel says several Venezuelan friends have offered to help if he decides to stay in the country. “They tell me Venezuela has come out of the tunnel and Cuba is coming behind,” he recounts. The phrase sums up a sentiment repeated in private conversations: the idea that the collapse of the Chavista model could foreshadow similar transformations on the Island, and that staying in Venezuela might represent an opportunity compared with an eventual return to Cuba.

The impact of de-Cubanization is especially noticeable in the health system. For years, clinics and hospitals in working-class neighborhoods of Caracas and other cities operated largely with Cuban personnel. Since January, however, medical care has been notably reduced at several centers.

For Cuba, the pullback of its presence in Venezuela represents a tremendous economic blow. Medical and technical missions in the oil-rich country have for years been one of the government’s main sources of hard currency. An accelerated withdrawal or a significant reduction of this contingent would worsen the Island’s already precarious financial situation, marked by falling tourism, fuel shortages, and declining international support.

So far, neither Havana nor Caracas has officially announced the end of cooperation. The future of thousands of Cubans on mission will depend largely on how far the U.S. extends its influence over the new Venezuelan scenario and on whether Delcy Rodríguez’s government opts to maintain, renegotiate, or dismantle the agreements inherited from Chavismo. Meanwhile, Mariana and Yusniel wait for a decision that has yet to come and avoid public expressions that give away their origin, such as the very Cuban: “Chico, la cosa está mala” [Man, things are bad].

Translated by Regina Anavy

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