Translating Cuba – Page 5 – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

A Man Dies While Attempting To Steal Dielectric Oil in Santiago De Cuba

Two brothers were extracting the product when a transformer exploded, causing the death of one and severe burns to the other

Transformers where the incident took place, in Songo La Maya, Santiago de Cuba. / Santiago de Cuba Electric Company

14ymedio, Havana, April 11, 2026 – A man died and another was seriously injured on Friday night in Santiago de Cuba while attempting to steal dielectric oil* from a bank of transformers in the locality of Alta Esperanza, in the municipality of Songo La Maya.

According to the official publication of the provincial Electric Company, at the moment when the two brothers were attempting to carry out the theft, a fault in a transformer caused an explosion that directly affected those involved, instantly killing one of them and severely burning the other.

The statement emphasizes that this type of crime against the National Electric System (SEN) is punished under Law No. 151/2022, Article 125, of the Penal Code, which constitutes “sabotage” as it is an “attack against the infrastructure that sustains daily life and the country’s economic development.”

The risky theft of dielectric oil is not new in Cuba, and its recurrence demonstrates the level of desperation the population has reached in the context of needs and shortages resulting from the current crisis on the Island.

The risky theft of dielectric oil is not new in Cuba, and its recurrence demonstrates the level of desperation the population has reached

In addition to being dangerous to the physical integrity of the perpetrators, as seen in this and other cases, the crime is defined and severely punished by law. Penalties can range from four to twenty years in prison and even reach life imprisonment if there are aggravating circumstances. In some cases reported by 14ymedio, perpetrators have received sentences of up to 15 years in prison. continue reading

Dielectric oil serves an essential function of insulation and cooling, crucial for extending the lifespan and efficient operation of electrical transformers. In a situation of scarcity of all kinds of supplies in the country, this substance has become a valuable commodity, stolen from power poles to end up lubricating motors of household appliances, among other uses.

The explosion of the transformers caused a power outage in the municipalities of Songo La Maya and Segundo Frente, following the fall of a 33 kV line that supplied the area. The Electric Company warned that the extraction of dielectric oil can cause breakdowns, explosions, and blackouts as occurred in this case, in addition to generating a shortage of this essential resource for the system, with direct effects on supply to the population.

The state entity reported hours later that the perpetrators were brothers, and that authorities managed to recover 70 liters of the stolen oil 100 meters from the scene of the incident.

*Dielectric transformer oil is a specialized insulating fluid used in power transformers to provide electrical insulation and cooling.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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A Pair of Oxen and a Cart, the Latest Innovations in Cuba’s Military Strategy

What must they be thinking in Washington and Moscow about the bovine logistics introduced by Havana in the “war of all the people”?

Following the same logic, the Strait of Hormuz could be closed with a pair of barracudas. / Screenshot

14ymedio,Yunior García Aguilera, Madrid, April 11, 2026 – Social media of the regime have once again delivered one of those scenes conceived halfway between parody, mockery, and Cuban-style ridicule. In the videos of defense preparations circulating this Saturday, several half-malnourished uniformed men deploy around a rural house, crouch down, take positions, and simulate a military operation with the seriousness of someone who believes they are participating in the prelude to the Normandy landings. Except that in the middle of the scene, a camouflaged cart bursts in, pulled by a pair of oxen, as if it were a secret, decisive, and impregnable weapon.

In some Pentagon office, one imagines U.S. generals watching the videos in silence, first with confusion, then rewinding them to make sure they are not looking at a meme, and finally wondering whether it is a military exercise or a Gaesa agricultural fair. Perhaps one of them has concluded that there is no need to deploy drones, satellites, or precision missiles against an adversary that still seems to fight its battles in the Middle Ages.

On the other side, it is also easy to imagine the discomfort of Havana’s allies. In Moscow, perhaps someone has looked away to avoid admitting that, after sending weapons, oil, and political support, the great showcase of Cuban “resistance” ends up making such blunders. Even in Tehran, perhaps some strategist has thought that, following the same logic, the Strait of Hormuz could be closed with a pair of barracudas, three sharks, and a boat covered with dry grass. continue reading

It’s one thing is to improvise in a ruined country and quite another to turn precariousness into military doctrine

While the world discusses autonomous drones, electronic jamming systems, highly precise guided missiles, and wars fought thousands of miles away through screens, satellites, and sensors, in Cuba the defensive epic seems to continue relying on bovine logistics. The ox, slow and completely alien to the rhetoric of the “imperial enemy,” thus enters the cast of the “war of all the people.”

There will be no shortage of those who say it is ingenuity, adaptation to shortages, or a display of “creative resistance.” But it’s one thing to improvise in a ruined country and quite another to turn precariousness into military doctrine and, on top of that, to showcase it. In the images, soldiers run around, smear their faces with mud, cover themselves with grass and bushes, as if thermal weapons, night vision, and satellite surveillance had not yet been discovered.

What is laughable, however, stops being amusing when the context is observed. Since January, after the capture of Nicolás Maduro and the cutoff of Venezuelan oil shipments, the Cuban regime has intensified its military maneuvers and the staging of defense exercises. In parallel, the energy crisis has worsened to extremes that affect daily life, the electrical grid, and essential services.

That is where the oxen from Villa Clara come into the scene, not as a tactical innovation, but as a prop resource to disguise waste

The Russian tanker Anatoly Kolodkin arrived with about 730,000 barrels of crude, a limited amount whose real dilemma is not its volume but what the authorities will decide to spend it on. That aid will not last long if it ends up squandered on absurd war drills. While operations in hospitals are suspended, supplies are scarce, and the healthcare system operates at the limit due to blackouts and lack of fuel, the State continues to find thousands of liters, week after week, to move tanks, helicopters, and heavy equipment, as has been seen in previous maneuvers.

Now propagandists seem to have understood that it is no longer effective to denounce to the world that there is no fuel for pediatric services but there is for weekly military deployments. The narrative of permanent victimization runs into the evidence of a power that, when it comes to shielding itself, always finds reserves, diesel, mobilization, and staging. Perhaps that is where the oxen from Villa Clara come in, not as a tactical innovation, but as a prop resource to disguise waste.

In a collapsed country, wasting fuel on useless exercises to reassure a nervous leadership does not convey strength. It conveys fear. And also disconnection. The distance between power and the needs of the people is measured today in hours of blackouts, canceled bus routes, lost harvests, and exhausted hospitals. But also, it seems, it can be measured in the length of a cart pulled by oxen and presented as if it were a strategic resource.

The scene provokes laughter, yes. But then it leaves something worse: the certainty that, while the country sinks, those in power continue playing at war with the fuel they deny the population. And so, among dry grass, mud camouflage, and the weary pace of military cattle, the Revolution ends up demonstrating that it no longer knows how to run a country and barely manages to herd its own decline.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Russia ‘Is Working on an Energy Supply Plan’ That Includes Sending Another Oil Tanker to Cuba

An envoy from Moscow gives no details about this cooperation and limits himself to noting that it involves restarting the Antillana de Acero plant, paralyzed by the lack of electricity

Antillana de Acero, halted since 2020, continues without stable operations due to the energy crisis and decades of deterioration. / Granma

14ymedio, Havana, April 11, 2026 – Speaking Friday, the Russian Deputy Minister of Industry Roman Chekushov said, “We discussed with our Cuban partners that Russian companies would have access to the management of industrial enterprises in the Republic [of Cuba].” Chekushov is in Havana as part of a delegation led by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov.

Last Thursday, Chekushov had stated to the same outlet that both parties have agreed on “an energy supply plan” as a basis for reactivating production at the Cuban metallurgical plant.

“We will try to launch rolled steel production once the small remaining outstanding debt is settled, which will increase the turnover of metallurgical product sales and allow further development of that business with those funds,” the Russian official noted.

Chekushov stressed that Cuba’s current economic priority is the restoration of normal electricity supply. “All industrial projects are linked to this,” he said.

“We discussed with our Cuban partners that Russian companies would have access to the management of industrial enterprises in the Republic”

The most important project within this bilateral cooperation is the modernization of the Antillana de Acero José Martí metallurgical plant, whose rehabilitation was agreed upon in 2015 by both governments. According to the Russian official, the contract is 93% completed in terms of value, which he described as “practically the end.”

The completion of the project would allow an annual production of around 160,000 tons of rolled steel, in a context where Cuba’s heavy industry has operated for years with serious energy and investment continue reading

limitations.

He also noted that in the case of the assembly of Russian vehicles in Cuba, suspended last month as a result of the energy crisis just one year after its launch, is expected to resume once the energy supply is normalized.

The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, at a press conference following his meeting with Cuban president Miguel Díaz-Canel last Thursday, stated: “Ensuring the Island’s energy security is a priority. It is premature to talk about next steps. It is widely known that we are not limited to the supply of the batch of oil that has already arrived on the tanker Anatoly Kolodkin.”

A second tanker loaded with 251,000 barrels of diesel and coming from the Baltic port of Vysotsk is heading toward the Caribbean, probably to Cuba

Following the arrival in Cuba on March 30 of the Russian oil tanker Anatoly Kolodkin, with 100,000 tons of oil, a second shipment appears to already be en route to the Caribbean.

However, Ryabkov did not confirm the departure of the second Russian tanker promised a few days earlier by Energy Minister Sergei Tsiviliov, who boasted of having “broken the energy blockade” imposed by Washington.

According to maritime tracking agencies, the tanker Universal, loaded with 320,000 barrels of fuel and coming from the Baltic port of Vysotsk, has just crossed the English Channel and is heading toward the Caribbean, with an arrival date of April 23, probably to Cuba, although it keeps its final destination secret, as do all Russian ships sanctioned by the United States and Europe.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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A Cuban Man and Others Deported by the U.S. to Eswatini Will Have the Right to a Lawyer

Roberto Mosquera del Peral, who had served a sentence for homicide in Miami, was sent to that African country last summer

In October 2025, the Cuban’s lawyer said her client had begun a hunger strike to protest his detention. / DHS

EFE / 14ymedio, Nairobi / Madrid, April 11, 2026 – The Supreme Court of Eswatini, the former Swaziland, ruled in favor of four of the migrants deported by the United States to that small African kingdom and recognized their right to meet with a lawyer, after spending nine months without in-person access to legal assistance. Among them is the Cuban Roberto Mosquera del Peral, sent to the country last summer as part of the new policy of expulsions to third states promoted by the Trump administration.

The court’s decision confirms an earlier ruling by a lower court, which had been challenged by the Eswatini government. The case refers to the first group of deportees that Washington sent to Eswatini in July 2025: initially there were five men, although one of them was later repatriated.

The judicial resolution does not end the case nor immediately improve the underlying situation of the deportees, but it does represent a defeat for the Eswatini executive, which had argued that those men did not have the right to a defense because, formally, they were not detained nor had they been charged with any crime in the country. It also claimed that they did not wish to meet with the local lawyer Sibusiso Nhlabatsi, who acts on behalf of the attorneys representing them from the United States and who until now had only been able to speak with them by phone.

Amnesty International (AI) welcomed the ruling, although it warned that the main problem remains unchanged. “The Supreme Court’s ruling represents an important step in defending the right to access a lawyer for people who have been illegally transferred by the U.S. to Eswatini,” said Vongai Chikwanda, regional deputy director of the organization for East and Southern Africa.

“No one should be transferred to a country in violation of international law guarantees, only to then be secretly detained without a clear legal process”

The NGO, however, stressed that access to a lawyer does not correct the most serious violations reported for months. According to AI, these transfers are part of an abusive practice that leaves deportees trapped in continue reading

countries with which they have no connection, without a clear judicial process, and without guarantees against a new expulsion.

“No one should be transferred to a country in violation of international law guarantees, only to then be secretly detained without a clear legal process, without access to lawyers, and without protection against a subsequent illegal expulsion,” the organization insisted.

The case of Mosquera del Peral illustrates this policy. The Cuban man had served a sentence for homicide in Miami and was one of the individuals sent by Washington to Eswatini after his country of origin, like others, refused to accept him. He traveled with nationals from Vietnam, Jamaica, Laos, and Yemen. Over the months, the number of deportees transferred to that African kingdom grew to at least fifteen people, although two of them have already been returned to their countries, Jamaica and Cambodia.

Last October, Mosquera’s lawyer, Alma David, reported that the Cuban had been held for more than three months without charges in the maximum-security prison of Matsapha, in Eswatini. The attorney said at the time that her client had begun a hunger strike to protest his detention and warned that his life was in danger, while demanding that he be allowed access to a lawyer in that African country.

Washington agreed to pay 5.1 million dollars to the Eswatini government, as acknowledged by the kingdom’s authorities

According to complaints filed in court and by human rights organizations, the deportees have remained detained without charges and in isolation in the maximum-security prison of Matsapha, near Mbabane, the capital of Eswatini. The local government denies that these are illegal detentions, but that has been precisely one of the central issues in the litigation.

As early as last February, Eswatini’s judiciary rejected an appeal that sought to halt the deportation of third-country nationals from the United States. That lawsuit had been filed in August, shortly after the U.S. Department of Homeland Security confirmed the transfer of the first five foreigners to the African country.

The agreement was not free. Washington agreed to pay 5.1 million dollars to the Eswatini government, as the kingdom’s authorities acknowledged. That figure further fueled criticism from activists and legal experts, who see in these agreements an externalization of the U.S. migration system: those expelled leave American territory but do not necessarily return to their countries of origin, instead being sent to third states willing to receive them in exchange for financial compensation.

Nine months after their arrival at a maximum-security prison in a foreign country, they remain in a situation of legal limbo

Since returning to the White House in January 2025, Trump has hardened his migration policy and promoted rapid expulsions with the support of several countries. In addition to Eswatini, Washington has reached similar agreements with El Salvador, Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda, South Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Humanitarian organizations believe these agreements expose hundreds of people to a chain of abuses: arbitrary detention, mistreatment, isolation, and the risk of being sent to places where they may face persecution, torture, or degrading treatment. For this reason, they have called on several African governments to refuse to become destinations for migrants expelled from the United States.

In the case of Eswatini, the Supreme Court’s ruling opens a legal window for the deportees but does not clarify how long they will remain detained or what their final destination will be. Nor does it resolve the underlying issue: whether a country can accept people expelled from another state and keep them detained for months, without charges, without transparency, and without explaining what will happen to them.

For Mosquera del Peral and the other men, the ruling means at least a possibility of defense that had until now been denied to them. But nine months after their arrival at a maximum-security prison in a foreign country, they remain in a situation of legal limbo, turned into pawns of a migration policy that has moved the problem far from the U.S. border.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Eight Basic Problems of Cuban President Díaz-Canel

His illusion of power, with the symbolic capacity of all representation, is a serious problem for the new consensus that needs to be built.

Miguel Díaz-Canel, in a 2024 photo. / Cubadebate

14ymedio, Manuel Cuesta Morúa, Havana, April 10, 2026 / Faced with a country in crisis in its three fundamental dimensions—infrastructure, nation, and model of state—Miguel Díaz-Canel should step aside. He should not insist on presiding over Cuba. His delusion of power, with the symbolic capacity of all representation, is a serious problem for the new consensus that needs to be built. His withdrawal, moreover, would salvage something of what we might call his legacy.

Here are eight reasons why the current president should resign:

1. He has the legitimacy of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) to be its general secretary, but not that of 99% of the people to be the president.

2. Because the PCC is a selective party, in which the people do not elect its leaders, it lacks the popular legitimacy to designate, from within its ranks, who will lead the country. Its membership comprises less than 1% of the active population, those with the right to vote.

3. He only has the legitimacy of those who, in his district, voted for him as a candidate for the National Assembly, without competing against any other candidate. It is worth noting that he, like many others, was nominated directly by the Nominations Commission, which has the power to directly nominate 50% of the candidates to serve in an Assembly where there is no competition for each of its 416 seats. We must keep in mind that ratification is achieved through a vote for one candidate per seat.

He lacks the popular support that, in seven years, could have generated a certain legitimacy of function if he had possessed the intellectual competence.

4. Nor did he even compete within the National Assembly with other candidates, so he only had one ratification vote, after the triple designation on the part of Raúl Castro, the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) and the Candidacy Commission, the latter composed of mass organizations, now empty, which, within the electoral system are above the popular will.

5. He does not have the popular support that in seven years could have generated some legitimacy of functions if he had had the intellectual competence and the competencies of the mandate granted to solve the problems of the people.

6. He lacks—crucial in a regime that rewards personality—the empathetic legitimacy that comes from popular sympathy. The thing is that the guy can’t solve problems, but at least he’s likeable. But—worse still—his lack of sympathy doesn’t end in indifference, but in antipathy. I don’t recall a public figure as detested in Cuba as Díaz-Canel. And this is a serious problem for governing a country, because it obstructs communication between the government and the people.

7. He is not a factor of critical power factor, because he lacks the capacity and competence to determine the main lines in the most fundamental political and diplomatic relations for Cuba, those that have to do with the United States.

8. Finally: he is not an ideologue or an intellectual, a popularizer of any political doctrine, nor a particularly gifted communicator, which would give him respectability at least within a certain segment of the elite.

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Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov Denounces the United States’ “’Obsession’ With Expelling Russia From the ‘Western Hemisphere’

Moscow reiterates its “100% solidarity with Cuba” and its intention to remain in the region

Díaz-Canel conveyed to Sergei Ryabkov a hug for Putin. / Cubadebate

14ymedio, Madrid, April 10, 2026 – Nine days after the Anatoly Kolodkin docked at the port of Matanzas with 730,000 barrels of crude oil, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, entered the Palace of the Revolution ready to receive praise from Miguel Díaz-Canel. “There is value in countries like the Russian Federation in not allowing themselves to be subjected to imperial policies,” said the Cuban leader.

The meeting also comes after Moscow announced the shipment of a second tanker to the Island, although it has not provided details about it. “Russia is not going to abandon the Western Hemisphere, no matter what they say in Washington, which is obsessed with the idea of expelling Russia, as well as China, from this region,” he said.

“At the present time, Russia is one hundred percent in solidarity with Cuba; despite the complexity the country is going through, we are by your side,” Ryabkov told the Cuban leader.

Díaz-Canel thanked the deputy foreign minister for his support and stated that “it is proof that Cuba is not alone.” According to the Cuban leader, the shipment of crude oil to the Island “supports a concept that we are defending, which is that we have every right to receive oil and that other countries have every right to export oil to Cuba.” continue reading

“It supports a concept that we are defending, which is that we have every right to receive oil and that other countries have every right to export oil to Cuba”

The decision to send the tanker Anatoly Kolodkin to the Island seemed like an impossible mission at the time it became known. After the order signed by President Trump at the end of January imposing tariffs on countries that sent oil to the Island, none were willing to take the risk, even though both Russia and Mexico stated several times that they were seeking solutions. The decision by the Supreme Court, which declared the mechanisms by which Washington intended to apply those tariffs illegal, seemed to open a window, but no one made a move knowing there were other possible penalties.

Another possibility opened with the announcement by the United States of suspending sanctions on Russian crude for one month to ease energy problems resulting from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The Sea Horse, flying the flag of Hong Kong (China) but loaded with Russian oil, began heading discreetly toward the Island but changed course almost at the same time that the White House added an amendment stating that Iran, North Korea, and Cuba were excluded from that relief.

However, the Anatoly Kolodkin continued its route without opposition from the United States. “They have to survive! (…) I have no problem,” Trump himself said when asked about that ship. “I said, if a country wants to send oil to Cuba right now, I have no problem with it. Whether it’s Russia or not,” he added. Subsequently, the White House clarified that it was a humanitarian decision and that it would be reviewed case by case, making the future of that second shipment announced on April 1 by Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsiviliov unpredictable.

Ryabkov spoke yesterday of the “special nature” of relations between Havana and Moscow and described as “very productive” the meeting of political consultations between the foreign ministries of both nations held that day, which he considered “very useful in carefully evaluating different issues.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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March Rumors Fantasized About Russian Oil and the Fall of Díaz-Canel

La ‘bola’ — the rumor — about free internet access through Starlink revealed that more and more Cubans and small private businesses are obtaining this expensive and illegal system

The Russian tanker Anatoly Kolodkin at the dock of the Supertanker Base in Matanzas / Facebook/Oliver Zamora Oria

14ymedio, Havana, April 10, 2026 – March once again showed that in Cuba, rumors are not mere gossip but a way of surviving informationally in a country where official silence takes up too much space. In the absence of data, institutional opacity, and the habit of announcing everything after it has already happened, people fill the gaps with conjectures. Rumors circulate by word of mouth, jump from a WhatsApp chat to a Telegram group, and become the soundtrack of daily life. This month, amid blackouts, lines, and geopolitical shocks, rumor-mongering reached an intensity rarely seen.

The undisputed protagonist of March was the Russian oil tanker Anatoly Kolodkin. Since it set sail from Primorsk at the beginning of the month, every mile it advanced toward the Caribbean fueled new speculation. In Havana neighborhoods, its position was discussed as if it were a hurricane during cyclone season. Some claimed that Washington would prevent its arrival, in compliance with the executive order signed by President Trump at the end of January, which imposes tariffs on countries that supply fuel to the Cuban regime. Others, more dramatic, spoke of a possible military confrontation between the United States and Russia in waters near the Island. Ultimately, the tanker docked in Matanzas without issue.

Others, more dramatic, spoke of a possible military confrontation between the United States and Russia in waters near the Island

Another rumor that gained traction in March was the supposed political decline of Miguel Díaz-Canel. Since the leader himself publicly confirmed negotiations between Washington and Havana, an open secret already reported by international media and the independent press, many began to see him as a leader on his way out. The question is not whether he will fall, but when and how. Will he leave the country on a discreet plane? Will he be removed by the Castro clan to make way for a figure more acceptable to Washington?

Recent statements by Sandro Castro, grandson of Fidel Castro, claiming that Díaz-Canel “is not doing a good job,” were interpreted as a sign that the president has become a fuse ready to be burned. In political circles and in bread lines, his fate seems sealed long before any official announcement. continue reading

Militarization also occupied a prominent place in the month’s rumor mill. Drivers traveling at dawn along interior highways reported convoys of trucks loaded with soldiers and equipment. In Havana, military exercises and explosions associated with defensive maneuvers caused concern among residents. Helicopters flying over urban areas, practice gunfire, and unusual movements in military facilities reinforced the sense that something is being prepared behind the scenes. In a country accustomed to secrets, any loud noise becomes a coded message.

Amid so much speculation, one of the most frustrating rumors for Cubans was the one claiming that access to the Starlink internet system had been opened on the Island. For several days, social media filled with messages promising fast and stable connection just by activating a mobile phone. The illusion did not last long. To use the service, a reception kit is still required, an expensive piece of equipment pursued by the General Customs Office of the Republic, along with a monthly subscription unaffordable for most people on this Island. The promise of free internet once again turned out to be a technological mirage.

The promise of free internet once again turned out to be a technological mirage

Statements by Donald Trump, in which he said he hoped to “take” Cuba soon, also unleashed a wave of conjecture. Some imagined discreet negotiations that would lead to an orderly political transition. Others spoke of more violent scenarios, from a military intervention to an internal collapse of the regime.

The social outbreak in Morón, Ciego de Ávila, was another focus of speculation. After the burning of items at the municipal headquarters of the Communist Party and the subsequent internet blackout in the locality, versions began to circulate about mass arrests and a strong military presence in the area. There was talk of young people being pursued in their homes and of fear spreading throughout the community. The lack of official information and restrictions on connectivity fueled distrust, reminding many of what happened during the Island-wide protests of 11 July 2021.

Precisely, problems with internet connectivity have become a constant rumor. Every digital blackout generates suspicions of deliberate censorship. Many Cubans believe that interruptions are not only due to technical failures or the energy crisis but also to the intention of preventing citizens from organizing and sharing information in real time. In a country where social media has become a public square, disconnecting the signal is equivalent to closing the street.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The IACHR Demands Explanations From the Cuban Regime Over the Imprisonment of the Minor Jonathan Muir Burgos

The organization gives the Cuban State five days to report on the situation of the teenager imprisoned for participating in the Morón protests, accused of the crime of sabotage

Jonathan Muir is being held in a maximum-security prison under conditions not officially clarified.

14ymedio, Havana, April 10, 2026 – The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) sent an official request to the Cuban Government demanding urgent information about the situation of Jonathan Muir Burgos, the 16-year-old who remains deprived of liberty after participating in the protests last March 13 in Morón, Ciego de Ávila.

The request, addressed Thursday to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, gives a period of five days for the State to respond about the conditions of Jonathan Muir’s detention, his state of health, and the measures adopted to guarantee his integrity.

The IACHR clarifies that this request does not yet imply a decision on the granting of such measures but underscores the urgency of verifying the teenager’s situation. The request has been made following a petition for precautionary measures submitted by the organization Cuba Decide (Defensa CD).

“The case of Jonathan has ceased to be an isolated complaint and has come under formal international observation,” Juan Carlos Vargas, executive director of Cuba Decide, told Martí Noticias. “The regime now has to respond within a very short timeframe. What is happening with a minor who is imprisoned, held incommunicado, and at risk?” he added.

“The regime now has to respond within a very short timeframe. What is happening with a minor who is imprisoned, held incommunicado, and at risk?”

The teenager’s family is denouncing what they consider a pattern of torture. Initially, the calls Jonathan was allowed to make from prison took place at 1:00 a.m. Both the time and his cries describing his situation and his pleas – “Please, get me out of here” – were unbearable for his parents. But since Thursday, April 9, those calls have stopped completely. Furthermore, the first scheduled visit was canceled, which has heightened the family’s concern. continue reading

In its request, the IACHR asks the Cuban authorities for clarification on three key aspects: the official position regarding the request for international protection; a detailed report on the conditions of detention, including access to medical care since Jonathan suffers from skin conditions and is not receiving treatment for them in prison, according to his relatives; and a risk assessment detailing whether the competent authorities have analyzed the danger the minor faces and what measures have been adopted to guarantee his safety.

Jonathan David Muir Burgos was charged with the crime of sabotage, an accusation that could cost him at least seven years in prison. The authorities ordered his transfer to Canaleta prison, a facility that in February was the scene of a riot violently repressed by regime forces after a young man committed suicide following complaints about the prison’s poor food.

While the dictatorship responds or not, Jonathan remains inside a maximum-security prison. Time is running against him

The teenager is one of the cases of several minors detained in Cuba in the context of the anti-government protests that have taken place since last March 6, following the deterioration of the already serious energy situation. Jonathan Muir is being held in a maximum-security prison under conditions not officially clarified. Relatives and civil organizations have reported psychological pressure against the young man and mistreatment in the conditions of his confinement.

“While the dictatorship responds or not, Jonathan remains inside a maximum-security prison. Time is running against him,” Vargas warned Martí Noticias. “This request is not just another procedure; it is an urgent tool to prevent the situation from escalating into something irreparable.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Díaz-Canel Disliked the NBC News Question About “His Willingness to Resign to Save Cuba”

The president asserts that only the Cuban people can remove him from the Presidency if they believe he is “incapable” or not “up to their standards”

Díaz-Canel during the NBC News interview, which will air in full on Sunday / Screenshot

14ymedio, Madrid, April 10, 2026 – “Resigning is not part of our vocabulary,” Miguel Díaz-Canel told Kristen Welker, host of NBC News’ Meet the Press, in a preview of an interview that will be broadcast in full next Sunday. The last time a Cuban leader was interviewed by this U.S. television network was in 1959, when Fidel Castro appeared on that very same program.

The clip begins with a moment of high tension between the president and the interviewer. “Would you be willing to resign in order to save Cuba, the Cuban people?” Welker asks. Díaz-Canel, dismissing the critical questions, spends more than a minute pushing back against the journalist, insisting on whether she asks that type of question to other presidents, whether she is doing so on behalf of the State Department, and whether she would ask it to Donald Trump, apparently ignoring the strained relationship between the U.S. president and NBC. Welker, unfazed, clarifies what everyone knows: “I ask very tough questions to the president.”

With that settled, Díaz-Canel addresses the issue. “In Cuba, the people who hold leadership and government responsibilities are not chosen by the Government of the United States, nor are they appointed by the Government of the United States. We are a sovereign, free state. We have self-determination, we have independence, and we do not submit to any dictate of the Government of the United States,” he argues.

“We are a sovereign, free state. We have self-determination, we have independence, and we do not submit to any dictate of the Government of the United States,” he argues

The president then defends his humble origins and reaffirms Cuba’s electoral system. “Any one of us, in order to hold a responsibility, must be elected at the grassroots level in an electoral district by thousands of Cubans and then the Cubans who represent those others in the National Assembly of People’s Power elect those positions through indirect voting, as happens in other countries around the world,” he repeats.

He does not clarify, however, that it is impossible to be elected if continue reading

one does not belong to the Communist Party or one of the organizations endorsed by the regime. On the contrary, he defends the single-party system. “When we assume a responsibility, we do not do so out of personal ambition, nor corporate ambition, nor even for a party position, because our party is not electoral. We do it by a mandate of the people, and in the concept of revolutionaries, surrender is not an option.”

Díaz-Canel, despite being fully aware that he is not a popular leader — unlike his more charismatic predecessors — asserts that the population can show him the door. “If the Cuban people believe that I am incapable, that I am not up to their standards, that I do not represent them, they are the ones who must decide whether I should be in leadership or holding the position of president or not,” said the man who governs a country where criticizing him personally constitutes a crime of “propaganda against the constitutional order,” punishable by long prison sentences.

The president continues by saying that policy in Cuba is decided by collective bodies and that under no circumstances can the United States demand anything of him, especially given what he describes as decades of “hostile” policy toward the Island. “They do not even have the moral authority to say they are concerned about the situation of the Cuban people and that the Cuban Government is the one that has led Cuba to this situation when they bear all that responsibility,” he continues, urging Washington to take a critical look at itself and see “how much their policies have cost the Cuban people in suffering and limitations, and how much they have deprived the American people of a normal relationship with Cuba.”

Díaz-Canel has maintained, as in all his recent appearances, that the regime is willing to engage in dialogue, as long as it is not conditioned on changes to the system. “We would not demand changes to the American system, about which we have endless doubts and endless criticisms,” he argues, and he calls for talks to focus on what can unite both countries. “Once again, I repeat, to avoid confrontation and to have a future for both peoples of benefit, of relationship, of friendship, and also of solidarity,” he concludes.

The excerpt of the interview was broadcast alongside a message the president sent to the II International Conference on Unilateral Coercive Measures, held in Geneva, in which he again denounces the “strangulation” that the United States imposes on the island. “Cuba is the victim of a prolonged collective punishment that seeks to bring its people to their knees through hunger, disease, and severe shortages of basic supplies,” he said in a video.

“Cuba is the victim of a prolonged collective punishment that seeks to bring its people to their knees through hunger, disease, and severe shortages of basic supplies”

The president reviewed some of the consequences he attributes to the worsening energy situation following Trump’s oil blockade. Among them, he cited the suspension of surgeries for more than 96,000 people (including 11,000 minors), 19,000 patients who are undergoing oncology or hemodialysis treatments being at risk, shortages of gas and water, and industrial production at minimal levels. “What right does the world’s leading economic power have to commit such an abuse against a small country?” Díaz-Canel asked, describing the situation as a return to “barbarism and servitude.”

“It is impossible to quantify the physical and psychological exhaustion, the daily shortages, the postponement of dreams, and the media war that is inflicted, out of sheer malice, on a noble, resilient, and supportive people like ours,” he argued, also taking a few minutes to thank those who have chosen to stand by Cuba, such as Mexico and Russia, coinciding with the announcement that a new oil tanker from that country will arrive on the Island, although Moscow has not indicated a date.

Translated by Regina Anavy
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After Nearly Two Months Imprisoned Without Evidence, the Cuban Regime Releases a Man Accused of Graffiti Against President Díaz-Canel

Moisés Legrá Díaz was held in conditions of overcrowding and malnutrition despite a police expert report that exonerated him

Moisés Legrá Díaz’s mother denounced the poor conditions in which he was being held. / Social media

14ymedio, Havana, April 9, 2026 – Moisés Legrá Díaz was released by the regime on April 7, after spending nearly two months deprived of liberty under pretrial detention as a precautionary measure, accused of the crime of “propaganda against the constitutional order.”

The arrest had taken place on February 13 in Havana, after the young man responded to a summons from State Security in Villa Marista, following the appearance of graffiti in the municipality of Arroyo Naranjo with the phrase “Patria y Vida” and insults against President Miguel Díaz-Canel. From the political police operations center, he was transferred to Combinado del Este, a maximum-security prison.

According to Javier Larrondo, president of the NGO Prisoners Defenders, speaking to 14ymedio, the precautionary measure was lifted after handwriting analysis could not prove that the posters matched his writing. Therefore, he clarified, Legrá Díaz’s release is not part of the 51 political prisoners the regime promised to release after the agreement reached with the Vatican last March. Nor is it part of the 2,010 prisoners that the Cuban government announced it would release starting this April, who so far are all common prisoners.

Legrá Díaz, a father of three with no criminal record, was released as innocent. However, he had been held since his arrest in conditions of overcrowding and malnutrition, according to complaints by his mother and civil organizations. During the weeks he remained in pretrial detention, activists and relatives warned about the deterioration of his health. continue reading

During the weeks he remained in pretrial detention, activists and relatives warned about the deterioration of his health

One of these independent organizations was Cubalex, which denounced that, although Legrá had undergone handwriting analysis to determine whether he authored the posters, with a negative result, he remained detained.

Legrá Díaz’s return to his home, where his family was waiting for him, was confirmed by a call from his mother to Martí Noticias: “Since around two in the afternoon Moisés is now here at home with the children,” who, she describes, “cried and hugged their father.”

The criminal offense of “propaganda against the constitutional order,” incorporated into the 2022 Penal Code, penalizes any expression of criticism that the State considers “incitement against the social order or the socialist State,” without clearly defining which acts constitute the crime, making it a legal instrument to persecute dissent.

The case exposes the abusive use of pretrial detention as a preventive punishment, as well as the use of ambiguous criminal charges to target freedom of expression

Cubalex points out that the case of Legrá Díaz, a family man with no criminal record or activist background, exposes the abusive use of pretrial detention as a preventive punishment, as well as the use of ambiguous criminal charges to persecute freedom of expression.

The same offense has been applied, with prosecutors requesting up to nine years in prison for posters or street graffiti, as in other recent cases reported by 14ymedio, but also for social media posts or direct criticism of the government, among which the example of the conviction and imprisonment of the young creators of the digital collective El4tico stands out.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Imports of Chicken From the U.S., the Main Source of Protein for Cubans, Have Fallen by Nearly 50%

Food sales are declining overall, while car deliveries are holding steady, and, for the first time, small private businesses are authorized to purchase fuel

Frozen chicken has been the most imported food product into the country since 2012 / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, April 9, 2026 – The crisis in Cuba is also being reflected in the drop, since the beginning of this year, in food imports from the United States. Chicken, the product most purchased by both the State and small private businesses since records have been kept, plummeted this February both in tonnage and value compared to the previous month.

A total of 13,121 tons were purchased for 15.87 million dollars, a drop of 19.6% in quantity and 21% in value compared to January. Moreover, compared with the month of December, when around 23,000 tons arrived, the situation is much worse. Regarding the year-on-year decline, in February 2025 Cuba imported 25,474 tons for 32.46 million, which means that the availability of the Island’s main source of animal protein has been reduced by nearly half in one year.

The data comes from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and reflects limitations in the purchasing capacity not only of the State, but also of private actors. Long blackouts, which prevent the maintenance of the cold chain, and distribution difficulties from ports, as a result of the oil restrictions imposed by the U.S. on the Island at the end of January, are worsening the already diminished purchasing options for the population.

The data comes from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and reflects limitations in the purchasing capacity not only of the State, but also of private actors

The figures are consistent with those also published this Wednesday by the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, which revealed a 36.6% drop in imports of food and agricultural products, including frozen chicken, compared to February 2025. In the second month continue reading

of the year, the Island paid 30,187,420 dollars for food, down from 47,636,633 dollars last year, although slightly above what was reported in February 2024, at 27,204,788 dollars.

In the first two months of the year, the value reached 65,831,522 dollars, also below the 93,168,816 dollars recorded in the same period of 2025, equivalent to a year-on-year contraction of 29.3%.

The report shows that frozen chicken continues to be, since 2012, the most demanded product by Cuban importers and accounts for nearly half of total food purchases in February. Next on the list is rice, with 1,926,996 dollars. It is followed by sweetened milk and cream, frozen pork, juice mixes, roasted coffee, and bone-in pork cuts.

In total, the 10 main products purchased in February amounted to 22,140,544 dollars, which represents 73.3% of the total exported by the United States to the Island under the framework authorized by exemptions to the embargo, which mainly allow the import of food, health products, and automobiles, always paid in cash and in advance.

The figures continue to show that the much-discussed food sovereignty remains far from being achieved. During the first nine months of 2025, Cuba imported 355 million dollars in agricultural products from the United States, 15% more than recorded in the same period of 2024, according to figures from that country’s Department of Agriculture. At that time, one of the products that increased the most was pork. Between January and September last year, the Island purchased 33.6 million dollars of that product from its northern neighbor, more than double the same period in 2024, when it spent 16.3 million dollars.

This month’s report also notes that, once the Trump Administration added fuels to the list of products authorized for export to private actors in Cuba, there were purchases totaling 2,573,594 dollars.

This month’s report also notes that, once the Trump Administration added fuels to the list of products authorized for export to private actors in Cuba, there were purchases totaling 2,573,594 dollars

In that regard, growth in exports of cars from the United States is also reported, with a total amount of 16,238,357 dollars in the first two months of this year. The cumulative value since 2022, when the first license to import vehicles to the Island was issued, exceeds 416 million dollars. Of this figure, more than 243 million correspond to electric and gasoline vehicles, both new and used, as well as bicycles, trucks, motorcycles, and mopeds, in addition to parts and components. The year with the highest spending on these products was 2025, closing at 149,413,031 dollars.

The spending figures presented in the report only include the price of products exported from the United States, without including transportation or other associated charges.

In February, Cuba also ranked 51st among 215 U.S. agricultural export markets. In 2004 it reached position 25 in annual data and 29 in 2008, before falling to 49 in 2024 and 2025.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuba: Acopio Loses Its Monopoly, but the State Retains Partial Control Over the Sale of Agricultural Products

The Government reserves the most profitable sectors, such as tobacco and honey, and maintains control over exports

The obligation ends for farmers to have no choice but to rely on the State company Acopio, with its endless debts and non-payments. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Madrid, April 9, 2026 – The commercialization of agricultural production will no longer be a monopoly of the Cuban State company Acopio, as it has been for 40 years. According to the regulation published this Thursday in the Official Gazette, producers will have more freedom to sell directly in the national market, although the State reserves the most profitable sectors and maintains control over exports.

The main novelty is, without a doubt, the recognition of small and medium-sized enterprises (mipymes [MSMEs in English]), cooperatives, self-employed workers, and individual producers as possible intermediaries. Thus, Decree 143/2025 and Resolution 16/2026 establish that any economic actor may manage markets, lease State premises, and sell both wholesale and retail goods.

Acopio is now just one more entity, although with considerably greater infrastructure than any private company in the country. As such, it must be able to fulfill contractual obligations regardless of whether it has financial resources or not. If it encounters logistical or financial problems, it is required, like all others, to inform the producers with whom it had contracts, who are then free to market their products with other natural or legal persons. According to this principle, the obligation ends for farmers who have no choice but to turn to the State company, with its endless debts and non-payments.

Producers are now authorized to make direct sales to the national balance, tourism, or mini-industries

Producers are now authorized to make direct sales to the National Balance, tourism, foreign-currency border sales, the national food processing industry, and mini-industries. However, exports continue reading

have several particularities. Although the producer can choose the product and where to sell it, commercialization must be carried out through intermediaries approved for that purpose, presumably due to their specialization.

In addition, there are a number of products that are outside this freedom of sale, as they are considered strategic sectors for the country. The list currently includes tobacco, charcoal, honey, cocoa, and coffee, although under the category “others,” the door remains open to include any that may be considered in the future.

The regulation includes a significant change in contracting committees, an entity that already existed but now, especially with the inclusion of private actors, represents the decentralization of the commercialization system.

These territorial groups will consist of a president, the Governor (at the provincial level) or the Mayor (at the municipal level), and permanent members who are representatives of the Agriculture Delegation, State and private companies, cooperatives, producers, and guests who are representatives of the Bank, Finance and Prices, the National Association of Small Farmers, and the sector’s labor union.

Their role is now decisive, compared to before when it was more deliberative without final decision-making power. They are now responsible for setting prices for non-centralized products, using local costs and market behavior as references. Their functions also include determining production priorities, social consumption and State markets, preparing balances and future estimates, as well as resolving conflicts. According to the latter, if a buyer of a product reports that they do not have funds to purchase what was agreed upon, these committees will determine its new destination “without this implying increased costs for producers or exempting the contract violator from responsibility.”

The new regulation includes some economic control mechanisms, including full banking of operations and the use of the Information System for Agricultural Planning (SIPA)*

Another important body is the public procurement committees, responsible for supplying entities of social consumption such as hospitals, nursing homes, and schools. These committees, which must be established in each center, are chaired by the head of the institution and include an odd-numbered team of its own staff responsible for managing each purchase.

The biggest change is the end of State allocation and the establishment of bidding and competition mechanisms. Each hospital, school, or other entity must issue a call in which any economic actor, whether a State company, cooperative, small business, or individual producer, can submit an offer on equal terms. The committee must evaluate proposals and select the supplier based on the best balance of quality, price, and delivery timing, issuing a formal decision that results in a legal contract and is subject to oversight, theoretically to prevent cases of corruption or favoritism.

The new regulation includes some economic control mechanisms, including the full banking of operations and the use of the SIPA information system to register contracts and transactions, a potential issue due to the distrust citizens feel toward the political and economic system.

*An IT tool adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Pot-Banging Protests Erupted in Broad Daylight During Wednesday’s Demonstrations in Havana

“At this rate, five Cubans with pots and pans could very well open the Strait of Hormuz.”

Neighbors protesting with pot-banging on a rooftop in Havana, this Wednesday.

14ymedio, Havana, April 9, 2026 — Protests against the prolonged power outages, involving banging pots and pans, are no longer confined to nighttime. This Wednesday, the pot-banging protests took place again in several neighborhoods of the capital, with the difference that some of them occurred in broad daylight.

A resident of Santos Suárez, in the Diez de Octubre municipality, recounts on Facebook with a touch of humor: “Five blocks from here, around 3:00 pm, following the number 1 concert in B-flat for pot and pan, performed by the neighbors in that area, the police arrived and immediately the lights came back on!” As has happened on other occasions, the authorities have responded to the pot-banging protests by restoring electricity, always temporarily.

“Did the fuel appear only for that little bit of neighborhood?” the same woman asks, adding ironically, “At this rate, five Cubans with pots and pans could very well open the Strait of Hormuz.”

Videos circulating on social media show residents banging pots and pans during the day in that neighborhood, but also in Central Havana and others, where blackouts have lasted up to 30 hours.

We want food, we want light, we want water

Other testimonies gathered by Martí Noticias confirm the pot-banging protests that could indeed be heard in various neighborhoods of Diez de Octubre in the afternoon, accompanied by slogans such as: “We want food, we want electricity, we want water.” The same news outlet quotes a resident as saying: “We’ve been without electricity for a day and a half. It’s madness, we can’t sleep.”

During the night, similar demonstrations were also reported in other parts of the capital. In the Bahia neighborhood, videos circulating online show that, in addition to the banging of pots and pans, church bells were ringing as a form of protest against continue reading

the more than 24-hour power outage.

In the Zamora neighborhood of the Marianao municipality, after three consecutive days of power outages lasting more than 12 hours, residents also banged pots and pans in protest. According to published accounts, electricity was restored almost 20 minutes after the protest began.

Repressive forces were deployed, including trucks with black berets, plainclothes police officers, and around five patrol cars.

On Tuesday night, pot-banging protests were also reported in Guantánamo, in the Caribe and Norte neighborhoods. The intensity of the protest prompted a police presence, which the independent legal organization Cubalex warned of as a “risk of repression, arbitrary arrests, and other human rights violations,” following arrests reported in the context of daily demonstrations that began on March 6.

“Repressive forces were deployed, including trucks with black berets, plainclothes police officers and around five patrol cars,” Cubalex reports in its publication, accompanied by videos documenting the demonstration and the police presence.

According to a report by Martí Noticias, authorities restored electricity to quell the protest. But the service only lasted for an hour. Then the blackout resumed, accompanied by an internet outage that lasted until the following morning.

The pot-banging protest in Guantánamo took place about five blocks from the provincial headquarters of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). The PCC’s first secretary in the province and officials from the Ministry of the Interior were present. This deployment reflects fears that the protests could take on a political dimension.

Although no arrests were reported during these latest protests, it has been noted that arrests often occur days later.

The demonstrations, sparked by shortages of basic services, have taken on a political character, with slogans blaming the state administration for the crisis. Several have featured chants of “Freedom!” and “Down with communism!” along with insults directed at Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel.

Although no arrests were reported during these latest protests, it has been noted that arrests often occur days later, as happened after the March 13 demonstrations in Morón, with more than 16 people subsequently arrested, including minors, such as the case of teenager Jonathan David Muir.

The lack of electricity makes it impossible to pump water, preserve food, and sleep in the spring heat on the island. Mosquitoes and the weather exacerbate the discomfort, making it increasingly difficult to lead a basic daily life amidst the energy crisis.

The National Electric System (SEN) has been severely affected recently by the breakdown this Monday of the Antonio Guiteras thermoelectric plant – the largest generating plant in the country – and the failure that caused the disconnection of unit 1 of the Che Guevara plant, in Villa Clara, already restored by this time.

The National Electric System (SEN) continues to fail to meet basic demand due to the accumulated wear and tear on its plants and a lack of maintenance.

Today’s report from the Cuban Electric Union (UNE) indicates that Unit 2 of the Felton thermoelectric plant is offline due to a breakdown, while Unit 5 at Mariel, Units 5 and 6 at Renté, and Unit 5 at Nuevitas remain out of service for maintenance. This results in a projected deficit of 1,775 MW during today’s peak hours, compared to a national demand of 3,020 MW.

Despite the recent arrival of the Anatoly Kolodkin tanker to the island with 100,000 tons of Russian crude oil, the National Electric System (SEN) still cannot meet basic demand due to the accumulated wear and tear on its plants and a lack of maintenance. The fuel shortage, exacerbated by the sanctions and tariffs imposed on Cuba by the United States, further worsens the country’s energy crisis.

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Mike Hammer Expresses Washington’s Support for the Imprisoned Members of El4tico in Cuba

“We will continue to insist that freedom of expression be respected and that all those unjustly detained be released,” Hammer said.

Mike Hammer has gained prominence on the island since Trump’s return to the White House / X @USEmbCuba

14ymedio, Havana, April 8, 2026 — Mike Hammer head of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Havana, expressed his concern over the February arrest of Ernesto Medina, known as Tico, and Kamil Zayas, members of the El4tico project, for publishing content critical of the government. In a video posted Wednesday on the social media account of the U.S. Embassy in Havana, the diplomat is shown on a video call with Doris Santiesteban, Medina’s wife, telling her that the activists and their families have “Washington’s support.”

During the conversation, Santiesteban points out that all legal actions taken on behalf of the detainees have failed. “Every legal recourse we’ve pursued has been rejected. Changes to pretrial detention, a complaints, they’ve all been denied,” she states in response to Hammer’s direct question.

Regarding the physical condition of her husband and Zayas, the woman replied: “Well, they are thin, they are skinny.”

Then, the head of mission, who since his appointment has been constantly traveling throughout the island and visiting activists, independent journalists , and ordinary Cubans in their own homes, points out that “on behalf of the United States Embassy in Washington, we are very concerned about them. We will continue to insist that they should be released, like all political prisoners. They have done nothing wrong.” continue reading

“We will continue to insist that they should be released, like all political prisoners. They have done nothing wrong.”

Before ending the conversation, Hammer wishes Santiesteban “strength and courage,” and adds that at the diplomatic headquarters “we are always thinking of Tico and Kamil.”

“I also thank you and the United States embassy for the support and solidarity,” Santiesteban later said.

The diplomatic mission accompanied the 53-second video with the message: “We will continue to insist that freedom of expression and thought be respected and that all those unjustly detained be released.”

Ernesto Medina and Kamil Zayas were detained on February 6 in an operation in Holguín that resembled a raid against armed and dangerous criminals, including a search of their home and the confiscation of work equipment such as a cell phone, laptop, camera, tripod, router, and other devices. The harassment they endured at the hands of the repressive forces was recorded and shared by the journalists themselves in their online stories.

Nearly a week later, the Holguín Provincial Prosecutor’s Office justified its decision to open a criminal case against the platform’s creators. They were accused of “propaganda against the constitutional order” and “incitement to commit crimes” through publications that incited the population and members of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior to change the constitutional order and “they defamed state institutions.”

It accused them of “propaganda against the constitutional order” and “incitement to commit crimes” through publications

The call between Hammer and Santiesteban took place two days after artist and political prisoner Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara ended an eight-day hunger strike in Guanajay prison, Artemisa, as confirmed by his Facebook page.

The hunger strike was a direct response to the death threats he received from agents of the Department 21 of State Security during an inspection at the prison on March 28, and the regime’s refusal to release him early despite legal efforts by Cubalex, an independent, non-profit organization dedicated to defending and promoting human rights in Cuba

Days before undertaking it, he had begun a 12-hour daily fast, which he planned to end on March 31. However, when that date arrived, he upped the ante.

Cuban artist Anamely Ramos, who announced the new hunger strike at the time, pointed out that Otero Alcántara’s decision was based, in addition to the recent death threat, on the fact that “he already suspects that they will want to extend his sentence beyond the five years, which end completely in July.”

“He already suspects that they will want to extend his sentence beyond the five years, which end entirely in July.”

On Wednesday, Human Rights Watch (HRW) condemned the Cuban government’s announced release of 2,010 people, noting that it excludes political prisoners. In a statement, the NGO said that, “while the announcement raised hopes among many families of political prisoners, neither Human Rights Watch nor other civil society groups, including Prisoners Defenders and Justice 11J, have identified any political prisoners among those released.”

He emphasized that Havana would exclude, among others, people convicted of “crimes against authority,” which can include “contempt,” “propaganda,” and “assault,” “which the government has used for decades to persecute and arbitrarily prosecute opponents.”

In this regard, HRW indicated that more than 700 political prisoners remain behind bars in Cuba, “and hundreds more suffer house arrest and other restrictions.”

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The Prohibited Photo

Rather than cleaning the corner of Factor and Conill, Cuban authorities prefer to prevent anyone from taking pictures of it.

From the balconies of our building, the view is complete: an unintentional monument to neglect, an altar where the homeland coexists with the abandoned. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Yoani Sánchez, Generation Y, Havana, April8,2026 — Employees of the state-run warehouse on Factor y Conill Street in Nuevo Vedado have been orientado [instructed] to cover the fence around the corner with sacks. The order aims to prevent neighbors from taking photographs of the immense mountain of garbage that grows there every week, with the bust of José Martí in the background and the Cuban flag in the gardens of the warehouse, products destined for the rationed market are stored, as a backdrop. However, clearly visible from the heights of my building is the triptych formed by the Apostle, the solitary star, and the garbage.

The scene has something of farce and unintentional comedy about it. While the sacks have been hung with diligence, as if it were a national security operation, flies continue to come and go without asking permission, and the smell of decay rises through the windows with a punctuality that public transportation could only dream of. The garbage, undisciplined and stubborn, doesn’t care about directions or makeshift curtains.

Sackcloths hiding the statue of Martí at the corner of Factor and Conill streets in Nuevo Vedado. / 14ymedio

One would think the problem is the pile of waste, but apparently not. The real enemy is the photograph. The image circulating on WhatsApp, leaking onto social media, and contradicting the official narrative seems to be the biggest concern for officials and bureaucrats.

From the balconies of our building, the view is complete: the sculpture of a head, reached by a path of stones that no one uses, the blue stripes with their red triangle and, a few meters away, a string of torn bags, damp cardboard, and plastic scraps spilling onto the sidewalk. An unintentional monument to neglect. An altar where patriotism coexists with abandonment. continue reading

Appearances are so important to this regime that it is willing to spend time, energy, and resources covering up an image and obscuring a shot, rather than using those same resources to clean the city and prevent the diseases that spread from these open-air dumps. In the end, it is not about eliminating the garbage, but about hiding it. Like so many other things in this country.

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