Translating Cuba

The Ocean Mariner initially headed toward Dominican waters. However, on February 10 it changed course toward Cuba.

The following day, a U.S. Coast Guard vessel, the Stone, approached the tanker to ask where it was headed. The response was that it was bound for the Dominican Republic, despite being far off course, according to a U.S. official. Given the suspicious maneuver, the Coast Guard sailed alongside the tanker for nearly two days and escorted it to Dominican waters, where it remained for several days without unloading the fuel.

After the vessel’s interception, Trafigura appeared in the transaction network. The company holds a 49% stake in Empresa Minera del Caribe SA (Emincar), together with Cuba’s state-owned Geominera (51%), and operates the copper mines of Matahambre in Pinar del Río. The firm officially purchased the cargo after the Ocean Mariner incident with the Coast Guard. However, Trafigura did not buy directly from Monarch, the original buyer of the shipment, but from a third company whose name no one has disclosed.

El Tiempo reports that the original seller and buyer argued that their responsibility “for the cargo ended once the ship set sail, under the terms of the contract in the Free On Board (FOB) modality.” Additionally, they have not so far received any request from authorities. They also insist that the operation followed legal export procedures and that information about a possible diversion attempt to Cuba “is not official but based on press reports.”

“The destination of the product listed in the shipping documents corresponds to Río Haina, Dominican Republic. Since the operation was carried out under FOB terms, once the product was loaded and dispatched from the port of Palermo, the availability, control, and management of the cargo rests with the buyer,” said Iván Lombana, legal representative of ISM, the original seller. He also emphasized that the company does not receive operational updates on routes once ownership (of the fuel) and risk are transferred to the buyer.

Spokespersons for Trafigura interviewed by the Colombian outlet denied any connection to a shipment to the Island.

Spokespersons for Trafigura interviewed by the Colombian outlet denied any connection to a shipment to the Island. They stated that they agreed to purchase the Colombian-origin fuel oil transported on the Ocean Mariner for delivery in the Bahamas. “Trafigura had no prior involvement with this cargo or voyage and did not charter the vessel. As one of the world’s largest traders of oil and petroleum products, we are regularly contacted by counterparties seeking buyers for uncommitted cargoes,” they said, though they declined to reveal from whom they purchased it.

This Sunday at 1:24 a.m., Colombian President Gustavo Petro, through X, without mentioning the fuel sale process or the attempted breach of Washington’s oil embargo, stated: “I do not agree with blockading a country; what is needed is more freedom, not more chains.”

In the post, in which he spoke about Cuban music and Silvio Rodríguez, he added that “there is no crime in the free transport of oil in the Caribbean, but it is preferable that the Caribbean’s energy be provided by the sun that rises almost every day.” He also said that the United States “must change its policy toward Cuba” and called for “unleashing the solar energy program across the entire Island. In Latin America we can support this by manufacturing solar panels. Colombia can provide its silica sands and copper. We already produce panels for export if necessary.”

Meanwhile, in an interview with the Spanish newspaper ABC, Mike Hammer, chargé d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, confirmed that the aim is to send fuel to “support the Cuban people without it being exploited by the regime and used to sustain itself, which is what they have done for 67 years.” The official added that they would seek to replicate the model used for food and medicine shipments after Hurricane Melissa, in which donations were channeled through the Catholic Church and Caritas Cuba, “because we want to ensure that any assistance to those affected actually reaches them.”

Translated by Regina Anavy 

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The exact reasons for the pullback remain the subject of conflicting accounts. A source close to the Venezuelan ruling party said the departures respond directly to orders from Rodríguez under U.S. pressure. Other sources, however, could not confirm whether this is a decision by Caracas, a voluntary move by the Cubans, or an instruction coming from Havana.

Washington has placed the Cuba–Venezuela relationship at the center of its regional strategy. Following the U.S. military operation of January 3—during which, according to the Cuban government, 32 Cuban citizens linked to security tasks were killed—President Donald Trump vowed to cut the ties between the two countries at their root.

“Cuba survived for many years thanks to Venezuela’s oil and money… but not anymore!” Trump wrote on January 11 on his Truth Social network, making clear the line of economic and political pressure.

Official media in Cuba avoid discussing the changes that have occurred in Venezuela following Maduro’s capture

For decades, the exchange was mutually beneficial: Havana sent thousands of doctors, sports trainers, and intelligence advisers, while Caracas supplied subsidized oil that was vital to the Cuban economy. That arrangement began to erode with Venezuela’s crisis, but it now faces its greatest challenge.

Since mid-December, Washington has blocked shipments of Venezuelan crude to Cuba, a move that has worsened the Island’s already severe energy crisis. This has been compounded by the executive order of January 29, in which the Trump administration threatens to impose tariffs on countries that export crude to Cuba.

A White House official cited by Reuters also said that the United States maintains a “very good relationship” with Venezuela’s new leadership and believes Rodríguez’s interests “align” with Washington’s objectives.

Despite signs of operational distancing, both governments have publicly insisted on the continuity of the alliance. On January 8, Rodríguez herself appeared in Caracas alongside Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez during an event commemorating the victims of the U.S. attack. Days later, the Venezuelan leader spoke by phone with President Miguel Díaz-Canel to reaffirm, according to the official version, the bilateral “brotherhood.”

The pullback reflects more of a tactical adjustment than a strategic rupture

In Havana, the rhetoric has also remained largely unchanged, although official media avoid addressing the changes that have taken place in Venezuela since Maduro’s capture. On the ground, however, the picture is more nuanced. A source close to the Cuban government acknowledged that while some soldiers wounded during the U.S. operation have returned to the Island, others remain active in Venezuela. The source also noted that a considerable number of doctors continue providing services.

Analysts consulted by Reuters agree that the pullback represents more of a tactical adjustment than a strategic break. Frank Mora, former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States, believes Rodríguez is acting cautiously. According to his assessment, she is trying to keep the Cubans “at arm’s length” until she consolidates her grip on power, without completely breaking with Havana.

Along the same lines, academic John Polga-Hecimovich stresses that the footprint of Cuban intelligence remains deeply embedded in Venezuela’s security structures. Although advisers failed to prevent Maduro’s downfall, their previous work, especially in counterintelligence, contributed decisively to the stability of Chavismo for years.

For now, the partial withdrawal raises more questions than answers. While return flights continue to multiply, U.S. sources warn that covert Cuban agents are likely to remain in Venezuela monitoring the evolution of the political landscape. What does seem clear is that the de-Cubanization of Venezuela is deepening, and the Havana–Caracas axis is going through its most fragile moment.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The opponent specified that Ana María Mari Machado could assume leadership functions

However, he emphasized that he prefers a negotiated solution. “I have always defended the idea that we Cubans achieve freedom and democracy through our own efforts.” But “if the regime leaves no other option, what is needed is action,” Ferrer said. He arrived in Miami last October as a political refugee following an agreement between the governments of Cuba, the United States, and the Vatican.

The opposition leader asserted that for the first time in decades several factors are converging that point to a possible transition, beginning with the Cuban people, who, he said, are now protesting more openly and without fear, no longer in secret or only before trusted individuals and journalists.

“I would start with a Cuban people that is increasingly discontented and rebellious, increasingly less afraid,” he insisted. He added that there is an “awakening of youth,” such as the digital project El4tico, which “has received incredible solidarity from young people inside Cuba, never seen before.”

To that he adds the blow to Venezuela, with which “the Cuban regime lost an ally,” and the current U.S. government policy of “maximum pressure against the tyranny,” including the threat of tariffs on those who assist it.

“The regime’s allies are distancing themselves because they know that bad company does not suit them, and there are also threats of possible tariffs for those who help the Castro-communist regime, at least with fuel,” he said.

“The regime’s allies are distancing themselves because they know that bad company does not suit them”

“For many years it has been said ‘the time is now,’ but never have so many factors converged for us to affirm that this year the Castro-communist regime will not survive. Yes, now we are very close,” emphasized the founder of the Patriotic Union of Cuba.

Regarding the next step Trump should take, he said it is to “continue applying pressure,” enforcing “tariffs on whoever sends oil to the regime so that repression can continue operating and fuel does not run out for the vehicles of the repressive forces.”

The opposition leader said the regime is currently sustaining itself with fuel reserves stored “in the mountains of Oriente, where they continue extracting it from a very long and deep cave, with many fuel depots.”

As for Mexico’s president, Claudia Sheinbaum, the opposition leader said that “the oil she wants to send to the Cuban regime is not for ambulances; it is for the vehicles of high-ranking leaders and, first and foremost, for the repressive forces.”

He added that “if Sheinbaum truly supports the Cuban people and is in solidarity with them, she should only send aid consisting of food, medicine, and essential goods such as hygiene products, directly to the people through the Church or any other actor.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

“To be clear (…) amnesty is forgiveness for certain types of crimes,” Rodríguez said during the parliamentary session, adding that “one does not forgive someone who has not committed an offense” established in the law.

“Let no one think that we are endorsing impunity here. No, it is a pardon being decided by Venezuela’s political leadership, at the request of the acting president,” the lawmaker explained.

Likewise, the head of Parliament told a group of journalists in Miraflores that the amnesty could lay the groundwork for looking toward the future and embarking on a new path of peace in Venezuela.

The amnesty also comes amid the “new political moment” announced by Rodríguez after the capture of Nicolás Maduro by the United States, which also called for the release of political prisoners. The acting president also requested the closure of the feared El Helicoide prison, accused by opponents of being a torture center.

Lawmakers approved granting amnesty for acts or “offenses committed” during different episodes of political crisis between 2002 and 2025, such as the coup against the late president Hugo Chávez in April 2002, the oil strike at the end of that year and the beginning of 2003, and the anti-government protests in 2013, 2017, and 2024.

However, the acting president asked Parliament, the Coexistence and Peace program that promotes political dialogue, and the judicial reform commission to evaluate cases not covered by the approved law in order to “heal wounds, restore democratic coexistence,” and advance justice.

Article 9 of the new legislation excludes from amnesty crimes involving serious human rights violations, crimes against humanity, intentional homicide, very serious bodily injury, drug trafficking, as well as offenses established in the anti-corruption law.

It also excludes individuals who are or may be prosecuted or convicted for “promoting, instigating, requesting, invoking, favoring, facilitating, financing, or participating in armed or forceful actions against the people, sovereignty, and territorial integrity” of Venezuela by “States, corporations, or foreign persons.”

It also excludes individuals who are or may be prosecuted or convicted for “promoting, instigating, requesting, invoking, favoring, facilitating, financing, or participating in armed or forceful actions against the people, sovereignty, and territorial integrity”

Article 11 states that a court with jurisdiction over the alleged offense will verify the application of the amnesty and declare the nullity of all ongoing proceedings or review final sentences for annulment within a period “not exceeding 15 consecutive days.”

The legislation also provides that individuals benefiting from this law who commit crimes after its entry into force will be prosecuted normally under existing laws.

Several human rights NGOs and Venezuelan opposition figures expressed reservations on social media following the law’s approval. Among them, Provea’s general coordinator, Oscar Murillo, said the measure does not align “with the spirit of peace and reconciliation that such a norm should have.”

The president of the NGO Foro Penal, Alfredo Romero, wrote on X that the law should be received with optimism but it is also restrictive and leaves out “many cases.”

The NGO Justicia, Encuentro y Perdón stated that the approved text is “revictimizing, exclusionary, and in no way guarantees the full release of all political prisoners.”

Likewise, the opposition party Primero Justicia said the law is “insufficient and biased.” However, one of the first high-profile releases was that of one of its leaders, Juan Pablo Guanipa, a collaborator of the opposition leader and 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Maria Corina Machado.

“I want to confirm that I am now fully free,” Guanipa said on social media. The former lawmaker argued that the law passed in Parliament “is not an amnesty at all,” but a document intended to “blackmail many innocent Venezuelans” and exclude people who remain imprisoned.

“Torture centers in Venezuela remain open, and hundreds of Venezuelans are still in exile. The laws used to repress remain in force, and dozens of officers from our National Armed Forces remain imprisoned”

“Torture centers in Venezuela remain open, and hundreds of Venezuelans are still in exile. The laws used to repress remain in force, and dozens of officers from our National Armed Forces remain imprisoned for speaking out against the plundering of our homeland,” he said.

In that regard, he called for focusing efforts and working tirelessly until Venezuela “is once again free and prosperous,” alongside Machado and the opposition leader in exile, Edmundo González Urrutia.

Guanipa reiterated his demand that all political prisoners be released “immediately” and that all exiles return. “I agree with reconciliation among Venezuelans but only with the truth upfront. A reconciliation based on lies is like a giant with feet of clay: it collapses at the first sign of trouble,” he said.

For his part, opposition lawmaker Stalin González, a member of the law’s oversight commission, believes the amnesty is a “tool to rebuild justice,” although “it is not perfect.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

But they can’t say in the morning, “I’m ready to pick up passengers” if they do not have fuel or certainty that they will soon obtain it. No one in Havana right now can have that certainty

“We were doing well, we were growing and pushing out some competitors, but right now we’re considering shutting down operations,” the manager admits. “Just paying the operators’ salaries, license fees, and other costs takes a lot of money, and we don’t have enough drivers on the road to recover it.” Although they have added electric tricycles and even motorcycles to their fleet, “we can’t make up for what we’ve lost because we used to do many long trips, take people to the airport, and get lots of requests at dawn. We can’t guarantee any of that anymore.”

La Navecita’s case mirrors that of the vast majority of small businesses on the Island. According to a report signed by Oniel Díaz Castellanos and published by the consulting firm Auge, the oil shortage affects more than 96% of Cuban small and medium-sized private enterprises [SMEs or mipymes in Spanish]. “When blackouts in Cuba reach 20 hours a day and fuel on the black market exceeds six dollars per liter, thousands of Cuban entrepreneurs ask the same question: Can my business survive this energy crisis?”

Using data from the National Office of Statistics and Information (Onei), the consultant maps the 9,236 private enterprises registered in the country as of 2024, explaining where they are concentrated and which may be most harmed by this unprecedented crisis that is worse than even the darkest moments of the Special Period. He notes that 43% of the private business sector is concentrated in Havana, meaning “what happens in the capital — blackouts, fuel availability, import measures — will determine the fate of nearly 4,000 companies.”

Díaz Castellanos classifies firms into three levels of dependency — critical, high, and moderate — based on their activity and how much they can survive without fuel. The first group cannot survive at all, such as a textile workshop “that cannot turn on its machines,” or a restaurant “that loses all its inventory if refrigeration fails.” The second group can operate without electricity but at significantly reduced capacity, such as a store selling non-perishable goods that can function “only in daylight” and cannot sell fresh products. The third group can survive despite disruptions. This could include, for example, a consultant who can work with a laptop and small devices, as long as there is an opportunity to charge them at some point.

The list leads to a “forceful” conclusion: “96.4% of Cuban private small and medium-sized enterprises (8,904 companies) face an impact ranging from severe to catastrophic due to the fuel shortage.”

The consultant recalls that the First Business Climate Study for Cuban SMEs, conducted by Auge last December, already showed that the energy crisis “was a central concern.” Although managers “trusted their internal capacity,” they “distrusted the environment.” In effect, in that report, 76% of surveyed entrepreneurs said they felt optimistic or very optimistic about 2026, while 60% predicted that the national economy would be somewhat or much worse this year.

In effect, in that report, 76% of surveyed entrepreneurs said they felt optimistic or very optimistic about 2026, while 60% predicted that the national economy would be somewhat or much worse this year.

“While a significant portion of companies acknowledge having improved or maintained their situation in 2025 thanks to their own efforts, most foresee a decidedly pessimistic national outlook for 2026,” Díaz Castellanos writes. “The energy crisis has confirmed that pessimism: no matter how much individual effort is made, if the energy system collapses, the business collapses with it.”

The consultant does not mention the factors that have worsened the energy crisis or propose possible solutions, but announces that this article will be the first of several. Future installments, he says, will address specific impacts in each sector, who can actually access direct fuel imports, and “practical recommendations for entrepreneurs trying to keep their businesses afloat in this scenario.”

Hugo, a small shopkeeper in Havana, sees only one solution: “put everything on hold until the worst passes.” His business, a food and beverage shop near Ayestarán Street and 20 de Mayo in the Cerro municipality, had imported beer as its star product, which “had managed to maintain a low price compared to other stores in this neighborhood.” He sold it for between 230 and 260 pesos but can no longer sustain that price.

“A supplier brought me that beer directly from the port of Mariel, from a Chinese company located there.” With few intermediaries and quick transport, Hugo was able to keep prices lower than the 300 or 350 pesos typically charged for imported beer in his area. “For months I was earning quite a bit because everyone knew I had the cheapest beer and it was always cold,” he recalls.

The rest of the food he sells in his small shop cannot make up for the lost beer revenue. “I promised my wife that in March I will liquidate everything if the partner who picks up the goods in Mariel can’t stabilize fuel supplies.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Experience has shown, Monreal argues, that the Trump Administration seeks to force situations in order to impose conditions

The economist believes that compensation for expropriated properties through agreements in tourism, agriculture, or energy could be a starting point. There could also be other opportunities for U.S. companies in any sector, including agricultural imports, medicines and other essential goods, as well as tourism and remittance services, which are already authorized but restricted.

This approach would clash with the intentions of part of the exile community, which has welcomed initiatives by Miami-Dade’s new tax collector. Dariel Fernández has spent nearly a year highlighting alleged cases of fraud in the use of federal licenses to trade with Cuba. In his view, and that of other Florida politicians, those cases would justify eliminating such authorizations altogether, a point he reiterated Monday at a press conference at the Port of Miami.

Florida Republican congressman Carlos Giménez insisted that those permits, intended to benefit private enterprise, could end up being used fraudulently and are therefore better eradicated.

But the Trump Administration, Monreal argues, could move in the opposite direction and “ease current economic restrictions, including a reinterpretation of cash in advance that would facilitate exports from the U.S.” Although he stresses this is a hypothesis, he says it “seems likely.”

This view is shared by John S. Kavulich, president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, who published a column Wednesday in Café Fuerte entitled “The Trump Administration Is Opening the Diplomatic Door to Cuba.” In it, the economist outlines what he sees as three steps within the U.S. government: “First step in the negotiation, change the Cuban economy. Second, invite U.S. companies. Third, for now, the type of government does not matter; it just needs to function like China and Vietnam.”

Kavulich argues that Washington will not demand political changes from the regime, but rather economic, commercial, and financial management

Kavulich argues that Washington will not demand political changes from the regime, but rather economic, commercial, and financial management. As evidence, he points out that China and Vietnam are led by Communist parties but still provide opportunities for U.S. companies. “Regardless of whether a country has an authoritarian, democratic, dictatorial, military, monarchical, oligarchic, parliamentary, participatory, presidential, theocratic, totalitarian, or any other system of government, President Trump focuses on the opportunities that exist for U.S. companies: exporting, importing, and providing services,” he says.

If there were any doubt that Trump would not intervene in Asia, outside his sphere of influence under the renewed “Donroe” doctrine, something similar has already occurred in Venezuela, where Nicolás Maduro’s authority was replaced by elevating his vice president in exchange for concessions benefiting U.S. companies. Kavulich believes that Miguel Díaz-Canel is a subordinate figure who lacks even the symbolic capital Maduro possesses.

“For some members of the Trump-Vance Administration, the Díaz-Canel Government is not the key problem,” the economist emphasizes. He points instead to economic regulations, arguing that reform would be an opportunity for the regime, as it would gain not only Washington’s acceptance but also that of China, Russia, and the European Union, whose investors have been deterred by Havana’s administrative rigidity.

“In May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration authorized direct investment and financing for a private company located in Cuba, owned by a Cuban citizen. Almost four years later, the Cuban Government has not issued the necessary guidelines and regulations,” he notes as an example. “The company, based in Havana, must submit a page to its financial institution, operated by the Government of Cuba, similar to a ‘Know Your Customer’ form, officially authorizing direct investment and financing.”

The economist, knowledgeable about business between the two countries and supportive of expanding it, adds that the Trump organization, headquartered in New York, “had interest in tourism-related opportunities in Cuba,” and believes this could be the key to renewed collaboration between the two countries.

It is unclear whether a shift limited solely to economic matters would be easily accepted in Florida, but the precedent of Venezuela suggests that anything is possible. Marco Rubio hinted as much to Bloomberg last Saturday: “Forget, set aside for a moment the fact that there is no freedom of speech, no democracy, no respect for human rights. The fundamental problem in Cuba is that it has no economy, and the people in charge of that country, who control that country, do not know how to improve the daily lives of their people.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

“She is the apple of her grandfather’s eye, she served as his bodyguard and has allies running the massive military-business conglomerate known as Gaesa”

“She is the apple of her grandfather’s eye, she served as his bodyguard and has allies running the massive military-business conglomerate known as Gaesa,” one of the sources said.

Rodríguez Castro is the son of the late Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja, who served as executive president of the group and as a member of parliament until his death in the summer of 2022 from a heart attack. Castro’s powerful son-in-law had been viewed up to that point as one of the possible replacements for Díaz-Canel, who has never enjoyed widespread popularity.

The conversations between Rubio and Castro are described by Axios sources as “surprisingly” friendly. “There are no political diatribes about the past. It’s about the future,” one source said, adding that despite the age difference — Castro is 41 — they share considerable cultural common ground.

“Raulito could have come straight out of Hialeah. It could be a conversation between regular guys on the streets of Miami,” the source added.

According to Axios, Rubio and his team
see Castro’s grandson and his circle as representatives of a younger, more business-minded generation of Cubans, for whom revolutionary communism has failed and who see value in a rapprochement with the United States. The Secretary of State, for his part, considers Díaz-Canel a party apparatchik incapable of negotiating meaningful change.

The report adds that, although everything remains speculative, a possible agreement could exempt members of the Castro family, including the former president, from exile, though such a decision would be difficult because of the impact it could have on Miami’s Cuban community.

The report adds that, although everything remains speculative, a possible agreement could exempt members of the Castro family, including the former president

On Monday, Donald Trump insisted that talks are underway between the Cuban regime and his administration, led by Rubio, although Havana has systematically denied them. The chargé d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Cuba, Mike Hammer, even suggested in an interview that Díaz-Canel might not be aware of the dialogue, but his government reiterates that such claims are malicious insinuations aimed at sowing division.

“We are talking to Cuba right now. Marco Rubio is talking to Cuba right now, and they should absolutely reach a deal, because it is truly a humanitarian threat,” Trump said aboard the presidential plane.

Rubio, for his part, said Saturday in an interview with Bloomberg that “the fundamental problem” of the Island is that “it doesn’t have an economy” and that its leaders “don’t know how to improve the daily lives of their population without giving up power in the sectors they control.”

“It’s important for the people of Cuba to have more freedom, not only political freedom but also economic freedom. I truly think that their willingness (the Cuban government’s) to begin opening up in that respect is a potential path forward.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

______________________

COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Despite criticizing the sanctions announced by the United States, Mexico has acknowledged that it has “for the time being” halted fuel shipments to the Island

She also emphasized that cooperation includes citizen-led initiatives in addition to government efforts. “Not only is the Government supporting the people of Cuba, but there are already many civic initiatives. Mexico has always been supportive, and this will be no exception,” she insisted.

The president framed these actions within Mexico’s constitutional principles of foreign policy, such as “the self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.”