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Putin Admits He Spoke with the US About Cuba Amid the Spectre of a Venezuela-Style Operation

The Russian president recalled that the Island is “a friendly country” for Moscow and that bilateral ties continue

“I would prefer not to comment further,” he added, before referring to the Russian tanker that arrived in Cuba in March with some 100,000 tonnes of crude oil. / EFE

14ymedio/Agencies, Madrid, 4 June 2026 / Russian President Vladimir Putin admitted on Thursday that Moscow has maintained contacts with Washington over Cuba, amid speculation about a possible US operation against the Island. The leader offered no details, but made clear that the matter had been discussed with the Donald Trump administration.

“Answering your question directly… You asked whether we had had contacts with the US administration on the Cuban question. Yes, there were,” Putin said during a meeting with senior executives of international news agencies on the sidelines of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, as reported by the Russian agency Interfax.

The Kremlin chief declined to go further. “I would prefer not to comment further,” he added, before referring to the Anatoly Kolodkin, the US-sanctioned Russian tanker that arrived in Cuba in March with some 100,000 tonnes of crude oil. “Cuba is a friendly country for us. Our relations have traditionally developed over decades. The US administration knows this. Our contacts with Cuba continue,” he said.

“The issue of US pressure on Cuba is present in our contacts with the Americans,” said Ryabkov on 1 June

The EFE agency placed those words in the context of a question about a possible military operation in Cuba similar to the one carried out by the US in Venezuela on 3 January. According to the wire, Putin admitted to having spoken with the American side about continue reading

that scenario, though his public response was limited to confirming the contacts and avoiding any specifics about their content.

The Russian president’s statement comes just days after his Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, declared that Washington’s pressure on Havana was present in conversations between Moscow and the US. “The issue of US pressure on Cuba is present in our contacts with the Americans,” Ryabkov said on 1 June.

The episode shows that Cuba has once again come to occupy a sensitive position on the board between Washington and Moscow. At the end of January, the White House declared that the actions of the Cuban government constituted an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to US national security and foreign policy. The document accused Havana of collaborating with Russia, China, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah, as well as harbouring foreign military and intelligence capabilities.

What most closely connects the Cuban case to a possible “Venezuela-style” operation is the charge against Raul Castro for his responsibility in the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue light aircraft in 1996

Since then, Washington has tightened sanctions, including pressure on fuel supplies to the Island. The effect has already been felt at sea. The Universal, another sanctioned tanker that was travelling to Cuba, interrupted its route from mid-April and remained adrift in the middle of the Atlantic, carrying nearly 270,000 barrels of diesel, according to maritime tracking data cited by Bloomberg. Its case reflects the caution of vessels linked to the Island’s energy supply, in contrast to the Anatoly Kolodkin, which did manage to offload Russian crude in March, with US permission.

The tension has also moved into the military, intelligence, and legal spheres. On 14 May, CIA Director John Ratcliffe travelled to Havana for an unusual meeting with senior Cuban officials. Two weeks later, on 29 May, another unusual meeting took place, this time between the head of US Southern Command, General Francis Donovan, and senior Cuban commanders at the perimeter of the Guantanamo Naval Base.

What most closely connects the Cuban case to a possible “Venezuela-style” operation is the charge against Raul Castro for his responsibility in the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue light aircraft in 1996. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office for the Southern District of Florida officially considers him a fugitive, after he failed to appear before the court despite the active arrest warrant.

Translated by GH.

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Cuba’s Central Bank’s Decision Is Brought Forward to Thursday: Visa and Mastercard Can No Longer Be Used in Cuba

Customers who went shopping at the Vima store today were unable to make purchases and were very upset.

At Carlos III Plaza, signs are still displayed on the doors stating that Visa and Mastercard are accepted, but that is no longer possible. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, Juan Diego Rodríguez, June 4, 2026 / Although the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) announced on Wednesday that Visa and Mastercard cards could no longer be used starting June 6, stores stopped accepting them today. Fincimex announced it yesterday in a late-afternoon social media post, but the vast majority of people only found out today when they arrived at the stores.

At Vima—a partnership between the Spanish food company and Cimex—an employee said that Saturday is “when the bank withdraws,” referring to the foreign institution that authorities have never identified by name. However, Fincimex must carry out its periodic reconciliation with the foreign bank and, for that reason, “they closed operations yesterday at two in the afternoon.” In fact, he added, “when we try, the card comes up invalid; it’s not that we don’t want to accept it, it’s that we can’t.”

The explanation matches the brief statement issued by the financial arm of the military conglomerate Gaesa, which reported that, “in order to avoid possible additional economic impacts,” operations were halted at 2:00 p.m. on Tuesday. It continued: “Normally, transactions using these cards through POS terminals require 72 hours for settlement from abroad, so financial operations carried out today would complete their processing after the termination date of the agreements signed with the foreign bank and would represent financial losses for Cuba.”

“When we try, the card comes up invalid; it’s not that we don’t want to accept it, it’s that we can’t”

In this way, the statement concluded, “due to the illegitimate actions of the U.S. Government, a commercial operation that for 32 years allowed Visa and Mastercard cards to operate in Cuba according to international standards has been interrupted.”

The explanations, given without advance notice, have been of little comfort. Customers who had gone to shop at Vima today, relying on the deadline announced by the BCC, were visibly upset. “Then why do they say it starts on Saturday if you already can’t use them today?” protested one woman, pulling at her hair and wringing her hands. continue reading

At Carlos III Plaza, staff are giving the same explanation, although, unlike Vima, signs are still displayed on the doors stating that Visa and Mastercard can be used.

According to the brief BCC statement released yesterday, the reason international cards were being withdrawn from the Island was that the “foreign bank that processes transactions carried out in Cuba using Visa and Mastercard cards” ended its relationship with Fincimex on Tuesday.

That “interruption,” the statement continued, was “directly” related to the executive order issued by U.S. President Donald Trump on May 1, which opened the door to new sanctions against officials, institutions, and companies linked to the regime and which the Central Bank describes as “part of its strategy of suffocation against the people of Cuba.”

Entrance to Vima, on Infanta Street in Central Havana, now without the notice about those international cards. / 14ymedio

“The foreign bank announced that, beginning June 6, the date on which the Empire’s measure comes into force, it becomes unlawful and impossible to continue carrying out the agreements with the Cuban entity,” the notice stated, without mentioning whether Visa and Mastercard themselves had taken any action. It did indicate that the “100% national” prepaid cards Clásica and Tropical, as well as Russia’s Mir card and China’s UnionPay, could continue to be used, along with cash.

The BCC statement attempted to project normalcy at the end, but the list of alternatives confirmed the scale of the problem, since replacing those cards with the permitted options is far from equivalent. Visa and Mastercard are the most widely used payment instruments among European, Latin American, and Canadian travelers. Mir has limited reach and operates in the context of international sanctions against Moscow, while UnionPay has a broader global presence but is not part of the payment habits of most Western tourists visiting Cuba.

For many foreign residents, international cards provided direct access to these stores without depending on the informal currency market. A significant percentage of ordinary Cubans who shop in dollar stores also do so with cards obtained abroad by relatives.

The decision by this mysterious “foreign bank” adds to the actions of numerous companies that have been leaving the Island in recent weeks or ending contracts with the Business Administration Group (Gaesa), which has been specifically sanctioned by the United States. This Wednesday, the Spanish hotel company Meliá Hotels International confirmed its withdrawal from 15 of the 34 hotels it manages on the Island, those owned by Gaesa. Earlier, Iberostar stopped operating and marketing 12 hotels, and Blue Diamond Resorts announced the complete cessation of its operations in Cuba.

Meanwhile, Sherritt International, one of the largest foreign investors in Cuba, suspended in May its direct participation in its joint ventures on the Island and announced the repatriation of its personnel after Washington sanctioned Moa Nickel S.A., the company it shares with the state-owned Compañía General de Níquel. The multinational later paused its plan to dissolve its Cuban operations while reporting that it is negotiating with a former Trump adviser for the purchase of a majority of its shares.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Visa and Mastercard Payments Will No Longer Be Accepted in Cuba Starting Saturday

The BBC says the intermediary “foreign bank” has severed its relationship with Fincimex for fear of US sanctions

A sign outside a state-run dollar store indicates that Visa and Mastercard, among other cards, are accepted. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 3, 2026 / The Central Bank of Cuba has announced that, starting Saturday, Visa and Mastercard payments will no longer be accepted on the island. According to a brief statement broadcast by state-run radio host Lázaro Manuel Alonso, the bank explained that the reason is that the “foreign bank processing transactions in Cuba using Visa and Mastercard”—whose name was not disclosed—informed on June 2nd that it is severing its relationship with Fincimex, the financial arm of Cimex, part of the Cuban military conglomerate Gaesa.

This “interruption,” the statement continues, is “directly” related to the executive order issued by US President Donald Trump on May 1, which opened the door to new sanctions against officials, agencies and companies of the regime and which the Central Bank calls “part of its strategy of suffocating the people of Cuba.”

“The foreign bank announced that as of June 6, the date the Empire’s measure takes effect, it becomes illegal and impossible to continue executing agreements with the Cuban entity,” states the notification, which does not mention whether Visa and Mastercard have taken action. It does indicate that the “100% Cuban” Clásica and Tropical prepaid cards, as well as the Russian Mir and the Chinese UnionPay, can still be used, in addition to cash. The Central Bank of Cuba’s statement attempts to project an image of normalcy at the end, but the list of alternatives confirms the scale continue reading

of the problem, because replacing these cards with the permitted ones is far from equivalent.

Visa and Mastercard are the most widely used payment methods among European, Latin American, and Canadian travelers.

The decision by this mysterious “foreign bank” adds to the growing list of companies leaving the island in recent weeks or terminating their contracts with the Business Administration Group (GAESA), which is specifically sanctioned by the US. Just this Wednesday, the Spanish hotel chain Meliá confirmed its withdrawal from 15 of its 34 hotels on the island, all owned by GAESA. Previously, Iberostar ceased operating and marketing 12 hotels, and Blue Diamond Resorts announced the complete cessation of its operations in Cuba.

Canadian mining company Sherritt International, one of the largest foreign investors in Cuba, suspended its direct participation in its joint ventures on the island in May and announced the repatriation of its staff after Washington sanctioned Moa Nickel SA, the company it co-owns with the Cuban state-owned Compañía General de Níquel. The multinational, however, later halted plans to dissolve its Cuban businesses, while also announcing negotiations with a former Trump advisor to purchase a majority stake in the company.

Visa and Mastercard are the most widely used payment methods among European, Latin American, and Canadian travelers. Mir has a limited reach and operates within the context of international sanctions against Moscow, while UnionPay has a greater global presence but is not part of the payment habits of most tourists traveling to Cuba from the West.

The measure may also put pressure on the price of the dollar in the informal market.

The Central Bank’s announcement could provoke an immediate reaction among foreign correspondents, diplomats, aid workers, and employees of foreign entities in Cuba—one of the groups that most frequently uses international credit cards to shop in hard currency stores. With the suspension of operations starting June 6, an increase in purchases is expected in the preceding days, especially for food, toiletries, and other scarce goods. For many foreign residents, the international credit card was a direct route to these stores without relying on the informal currency market.

The measure could also put pressure on the dollar’s price in the informal market. In recent months, paying with foreign cards has become increasingly difficult due to blackouts, connection failures, and disruptions in banking systems. Some customers will have to resort to domestic prepaid cards, such as Clásica or Tropical, or to cash in foreign currency. The latter becomes the most practical option for many businesses because it can be accepted even during power outages, increasing the demand for physical dollars in an already strained market.

The decision is a devastating blow, not so much for tourism, which is practically at a standstill, but for dollar stores. A significant percentage of shoppers use prepaid cards issued by relatives abroad—the so-called stored-value cards where the amount to be spent is loaded.

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Thousands of Doses of Medication Found Alongside a Drug Cache at the Headquarters of the Cuban-Galician Haydee Santamaria Association

Those close to those detained in the police operation say the medications were a donation for Cuba

Thousands of doses of more than 150 different medications were found by the Spanish Civil Guard and National Police in a house in Vilaboa. / Video capture

14ymedio, Havana, 4 June 2026 / Thousands of doses of more than 150 different medications were found by the Spanish Civil Guard and National Police in a house in Vilaboa, in Galicia, registered as the headquarters of the Cuban-Galician Association Haydee Santamaria. The blister packs include drugs such as Rivotril, Lexatin, and Lyrica – benzodiazepines used to treat anxiety – and alongside them were found more than five kilograms of cocaine, around five hundred packs of contraband cigarettes, hashish, more than 30,000 euros in cash, and several weapons, among them six shotguns.

According to local press reports, the association, founded in 2014, has had no activity since 2020, but its Cuban-born president is one of the nine people detained in the police operation, three of whom are already in custody. Those close to the woman argued that the medications had been found because they were donations for Cuba. However, investigators believe they were in fact being sold through an illegal network, and that the association’s president is the ringleader of the network, in which her son and another accomplice were also involved.

The association, founded in 2014, has had no activity since 2020, but its president is one of the nine people detained in the police operation

An official explained that as part of the investigations in Vilaboa, “a person was detected who was distributing narcotic substances in continue reading

significant quantities” and who was operating in complicity with others in the municipality of Sanxenxo. As evidence gathering progressed, “it was possible to detect and identify the presence of two organised and highly active cells, belonging to a single criminal group, engaged in the sale and distribution of cocaine, hashish, and tobacco”, which also operated in the Pontevedra municipality.

Data from the investigations also indicate that the collective – which bears the name of a heroine of the Revolution – was established with the aim of bringing together Cubans living in Galicia, and had a significant presence in Vigo, where it came to concentrate 444 of the 2,518 people from the island living in the region.

On the island, 14ymedio has documented the sale on the black market of Alprazolam in the streets of Tulipan, in Nuevo Vedado; under the arcades of Carlos III and Reina, in Centro Habana; and at the Esquina de Tejas, in Cerro. The drug is hawked alongside loose cigarettes, sweets, lighters, and packets of adulterated coffee.

Translated by GH

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Spanish Company Meliá Abandons the Management of 15 of Its 34 Hotels in Cuba

The decision was communicated to Gaesa on May 26, according to a company statement.

The measure comes due to “a combination of unforeseen circumstances beyond the control or management capacity of Ilha Bela,” the statement said.

14ymedio, Madrid, June 3, 2026 / Meliá is leaving 15 of the 34 hotels it manages in Cuba, as confirmed this Wednesday through its Portuguese subsidiary, Ilha Bela. The decision has been communicated to the National Securities Market Commission (CNMV) – the Spanish regulator that oversees the transparency of business activity – and although the hotel owner was informed on May 26 – the military conglomerate Grupo de Administración Empresarial SA (GAESA) – made it public this Wednesday, June 3rd.

With Meliá’s decision, four international hotel chains have now withdrawn, either partially or completely, from Cuba in the last four days: the first was the Canadian company Blue Diamond, followed by the Spanish company Iberostar and the Asian company Aston. In total, some 60 luxury hotels (4 and 5 stars) will no longer be managed by foreign companies.

The measure is taken “from a deep sense of corporate responsibility, and responds to and is a consequence of a combination of unforeseen circumstances beyond the management or action capacity of Ilha Bela,” the statement said, referring to the sanctions announced in the executive order signed by Donald Trump on May 1 and which will be applicable from this Friday, June 5.

The affected hotels are Gran Hotel Bristol Habana Vieja, Innside Catedral Habana, Meliá Buena Vista, Meliá continue reading

Cayo Santa María, Meliá Jardines del Rey, Meliá Las Dunas, Meliá Península Varadero, Paradisus Los Cayos, Paradisus Princesa Mar, Paradisus Río de Oro, Paradisus Varadero, Sol Caribe Beach, Sol Cayo Santa María, Sol Río de Luna y Mares and Sol Varadero Beach.

The chain maintains that the impact is “limited,” since almost all of these hotels were already closed due to the collapse of tourism, caused by the energy crisis and the suspension of international flights

The chain maintains that the impact is “limited,” since almost all of these hotels were already closed due to the collapse of tourism, caused by the energy crisis and the suspension of international flights. In any case, Ilha Bela says it is “activating and implementing specific plans to carry out an orderly disaffiliation of these hotels.”

The statement adds that protocols are being implemented to inform Meliá’s suppliers and customers. Ilha Bela, based in Madeira, is the subsidiary through which the Mallorcan company operated its hotels in Cuba under the Meliá, Paradisus, Sol, and Innside brands.

For the moment, Meliá has not provided any further details beyond the statement. The last statements made by Gabriel Escarrer, CEO of the Spanish hotel chain, were on May 20, a few days before communicating the decision to Gaesa. The businessman, who was attending a tourism event in a Mallorcan town, admitted that the situation on the island was “difficult” and “unsustainable” and that he considered the scenario very uncertain. “I think that today few people know what is going to happen with Cuba,” he responded regarding expectations.

Regarding his business, he remained cautious. “We are consolidating and placing the few remaining customers in the same hotels,” he said. It is now known that the company will keep 19 establishments open, three of them in Havana – Meliá Cohiba, Meliá Habana, and Sevilla Habana – two in Cienfuegos – the Meliá San Carlos, for which it received a claim under the Helms-Burton Act, and La Unión – and one in Sancti Spíritus – the Meliá Trinidad Península.

In addition, it will retain control of the following resorts: Meliá Internacional Varadero, Meliá Las Américas, Meliá Varadero, Meliá Marina Varadero, Sol Palmeras, and Mystique Casa Perla by Royalton; Meliá Cayo Coco, Sol Cayo Coco, and Meliá Cayo Guillermo; and Meliá Santiago de Cuba, Sol Turquesa Beach (Holguín), and Paradisus Los Cactus.

Also present at the meeting was the president of the Balearic Islands government, Marga Prohens (Popular Party), who stated that Balearic companies like Meliá are “examples of excellence, job creation, and opportunities in countries like Cuba.” She added that her government would stand by these companies “in the face of any attack on their freedom” that might occur “anywhere in the world,” alluding to the threat of sanctions.

This Wednesday, shortly after the information came to light, the regional government’s Tourism Minister, Jaume Bauzà, spoke out, expressing his concern about the situation and conveying the regional administration’s willingness to “help in any way possible”.

“I haven’t been able to speak with the Mallorcan companies that are there, but I reiterate that we will look out for them. It’s a commercial matter, but if we can help in any way, we will,” he said.

Although it is a business matter, he insisted, the non-autonomous government views the situation these Mallorcan companies are facing with “concern” and hopes “that it can be resolved as quickly as possible” for both them and the Cubans. “Maximum cooperation, recognition, and willingness to help in any way we can,” he concluded.

However, for now, the situation does not appear likely to escalate politically. This Wednesday, elDiario.es published a report on the pressure exerted by the Donald Trump administration on foreign companies, for which it consulted sources within the Spanish Foreign Ministry. “The government, through the Foreign Ministry, is following with great attention and enormous concern the extraterritorial impact of the unilateral measures taken by the US against Cuba, which affect the interests of Spanish companies and exacerbate the humanitarian crisis facing the Cuban population,” they declared.

Meanwhile, a spokesperson for the European Commission said that there is “aware that some EU companies have been considering ceasing or reducing their economic activities in Cuba in recent days. We are closely monitoring the situation. We expect all parties to ensure a level playing field for EU companies.”

“We are closely monitoring the situation. We hope that all parties involved will ensure a level playing field for EU companies.”

This Monday, another Balearic hotel chain, Iberostar, confirmed its withdrawal from six of the 12 hotels it managed in Cuba, all owned by Gaesa. The company will continue, for the time being, to operate those hotels belonging to Cubanacán and Gran Caribe. The Balearic newspaper Última Hora reviewed the situation of other companies in the archipelago, such as Blau, which manages three hotels in Cuba that are currently closed—two in Varadero and one in Havana—none of which are Gaviota properties. Valentin Hoteles, with three Gaesa-owned establishments—in Havana, Cayo Cruz, and Cayo Santa María—has not yet commented.

Although not explicitly mentioned, the Mallorcan family-owned Roc chain is also in the same predicament. It manages five hotels in Cuba, of which only one—Roc Casa del Mar—belongs to Gaesa, while of the other four, three belong to Gran Caribe and one to Cubanacán. Finally, Barceló has no signed agreement with Gaviota, and its two hotels—Barceló Solymar and Occidental Arenas Blancas—belong to Gran Caribe.

“We have to wait and count to 21,” Mallorcan hoteliers told Última Hora . According to the newspaper, despite the catastrophic years for tourism on the island, business owners maintain “their commitment to continue operating in the country and preserve their leading position, especially those seeking to recoup investments made to reposition their establishments.”

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Marco Rubio Proposes the Czech or Polish Model for a Transition in Cuba

“There are people within the Government’s technocratic sphere who could play some role in this, but we do not have names,” the Secretary of State said.

Marco Rubio, during an appearance before the U.S. Senate / X @SecRubio

14ymedio, Madrid, June 4, 2026 – Cuba once again took center stage on the second day of Marco Rubio’s appearance before a U.S. House of Representatives committee, where the Secretary of State affirmed on Wednesday that there are people within the regime with whom a transition can be negotiated.

“There are people within the Government’s technocratic sphere who could play some role in this. But if you ask me whether there is an individual we would trust and who would support us in leading this transition from beginning to end, I cannot give you that name right now,” Rubio said.

Although he refrained from giving any indication of who that person might be, he did suggest that it would not be someone from the highest ranks. “That becomes a little more difficult the higher up the ranks you go, because of the ideological inclination some of them have,” he added.

“That becomes a little more difficult the higher up the ranks you go, because of the ideological inclination some of them have”

The head of U.S. diplomacy was responding to questions from Cuban-American congresswoman María Elvira Salazar, who pressed him on whether the Venezuela model could be replicated in Cuba, referring to the idea of finding a figure from within the regime, akin to Delcy Rodríguez, to help bring about change. Rubio acknowledged that continue reading

the situation on the Island is of particular interest to him and stressed that his goal was to avoid chaos.

“Clearly, there are individuals within the power structure who understand that what they have is not sustainable and that it must be rebuilt. But they have no power. And if they do have it, they do not know how to do it,” he insisted.

Rubio again criticized the Government by referring to the military conglomerate Gaesa, saying that he would not “allow them to benefit from the game they have been playing, in which they steal money from the Cuban people for the benefit of that conglomerate at the expense of the people of Cuba.” He nevertheless emphasized a negotiated path.

“I think we want to look at models like the Czech Republic or Poland, how they made the transition. And one of the things they did was preserve some institutions in their society to provide stability and longevity to the project,” he explained. His remarks continued the message he delivered the previous day when, while discussing the Island’s precarious situation and its affinity with states supposedly hostile to the United States, such as China and Russia, he argued that change required a new system, inseparable from new leadership.

“They need serious systemic reform,” he said before asking and answering whether the country could take care of itself. “I think the answer is yes, they can, but I do not believe this system is capable of reforming itself unless new people take control or a new mindset is imposed,” he emphasized.

“We have spoken with them, we have offered them what I believe needs to happen for their economy to recover,” he said, without providing further details.

In recent months, the international press has cited as part of the negotiations Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, the grandson of the former president and who is known as El Cangrejo [The Crab], reportedly having spoken directly with Rubio. Another name mentioned has been Alejandro Castro Espín.

Venezuela also came up during the hearing when Rubio was asked about possible elections in the South American country, precisely five months after the capture of Nicolás Maduro.

“We would like to see them as soon as possible, but remember that only five months have passed: not five years, not 50 months,” he said regarding elections in Venezuela.

“We would like to see them as soon as possible, but remember that only five months have passed: not five years, not 50 months. Five months is not a long time for a country that has gone through what that country has gone through, but clearly we need a new electoral commission,” he declared.

Salazar, speaking after the hearing, suggested that elections in Venezuela could be held in 2027, although she said that 2028 would also be acceptable if that ensured the proper conditions for legitimate elections.

“I am betting on elections being held in 2027, but if it is in 2028, that is fine. These are processes that need to be properly established so that the results are good,” she maintained.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Raúl Castro’s Most Bitter Birthday

The man who a decade ago shook hands with the US president at diplomatic ceremonies is today an old man cornered by the justice system of that same country and reviled in Washington

A few meters from the Faculty of Dentistry, a newly erected billboard interrupts the urban landscape: “Raúl is Raúl.” / 14ymedio/Capture

I walk by the corner of Carlos III and Rancho Boyeros Avenue in Havana. A few meters from the Faculty of Dentistry, a newly erected billboard interrupts the urban landscape. It doesn’t announce a campaign against Washington, nor a partisan rally, nor even any of those slogans that have survived the passage of time like old furniture that no one dares to take out of the house. It simply says: “Raúl is Raúl.”

The phrase, that purports to be a celebration of Raúl Castro’s 95th birthday on June 3rd, has a strange effect. Four stars, a dark green background, and the insignia of an Army general convert the sign into something much more like a death notice than a tribute. The message doesn’t convey vitality, but rather evokes farewell. As if those who ordered its placement knew that the end of an era was approaching.

It is difficult to look at that billboard and not think about the distance that separates the man who turns 95 today from the figure who for decades held the second most powerful position in Cuba. For much of his public life, Raúl Castro existed in the shadow of his brother Fidel. From the years of the insurrection to the consolidation of authoritarian power, his role was that of an indispensable companion, a disciplined executor, and the guarantor of the military and repressive machinery.

While Fidel Castro favored improvisation, interminable speeches, and epic campaigns, Raúl cultivated an image of a pragmatic administrator.

It was Fidel Castro who drew him into the revolutionary adventure and placed him in all the key positions of the system. But it was also Fidel who condemned him to a subordinate political existence. For half a century, Raúl was the eternal number two.

However, those who knew him well always insisted that there were important differences between the two brothers. While Fidel Castro favored improvisation, endless speeches, and epic campaigns, Raúl cultivated an image of a pragmatic administrator. While one seemed obsessed with history, the other was focused on the mechanisms of power. While one spoke to the masses, the other preferred continue reading

to control the internal workings of the military and party apparatus.

That reputation for pragmatism fueled many national and international expectations when he officially assumed the presidency in 2008, following Fidel Castro’s illness. Within and outside Cuba an optimistic narrative was established. There was talk of reforms, of modernization, and of a possible economic opening. Even of a gradual political liberalization.

Some absurd prohibitions disappeared. Cubans could stay in hotels previously reserved for foreigners, buy cell phones, buy and sell their homes and cars, and access certain consumer spaces that had been off-limits for years. Later came immigration reform and the limited expansion of self-employment.

But the illusion did not last long.

The country that spent decades asking for change received more of the same. It asked for reforms and got stagnation. It dreamed of a future and was saddled with more permanence.

The transformations never touched the core of the system: the political monopoly of the Communist Party, the lack of civil liberties, and military control over strategic sectors of the economy. What many imagined as a transition ended up resembling more of a cosmetic operation designed to preserve the existing order and make the international community believe that Cuba was embarking on a path toward openness.

The moment that best symbolized those hopes was probably Barack Obama’s visit to Havana in March 2016. Images of Raúl Castro alongside the US president traveled the world. For a few hours, it seemed possible to imagine a different future for the island. A less isolated country. Less trapped by its own ideological ghosts.

Ten years later, that scene seems to belong to another life.

Today, Obama’s former interlocutor is surrounded by a completely different context. He was recently indicted in the United States on several charges, including murder, in relation to the 1996 downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes, an incident that left four dead and profoundly strained relations between Havana and Washington.

The paradox is brutal. The man who a decade ago shook hands with the US president at diplomatic ceremonies is today an elderly man cornered by the justice system of that same country and vilified in Washington.

Nor does the political legacy he leaves behind help. Among his most unfortunate decisions was choosing Miguel Díaz-Canel as his successor. He not only appointed him, but also imposed upon him a motto that later became official doctrine: “Continuity.”

For a society exhausted by hardship, mass emigration, and economic deterioration, that slogan sounded more like a threat than a promise. The country, that had been demanding change for decades, received more of the same. It asked for reforms and got stagnation. It dreamed of a future and was saddled with more permanence. The Island-wide protests of 11 July 2021, ultimately revealed the depth of that rift between Raúl Castro’s regime and the population.

Today, as rumors multiply about his health and his disconnection from reality, it is impossible to know how much Raúl Castro knows about what’s happening beyond the walls that protect him. Perhaps he still receives daily reports, or perhaps he’s increasingly detached from the daily lives of Cubans. Perhaps he isn’t even fully informed about the legal proceedings against him in the United States.

This June, Castro turns 95 at one of the worst moments of his public career. Isolated, internationally criticized, and with a country in ruins. The only thing that seems to remain today is an old man facing the judgment of history, a tribunal far more implacable than any he has known in his lifetime.

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Raúl Castro, the Enforcer ‘Time Magazine’ Saw Born Alongside the Revolution

In January 1959, while half the world was still celebrating Batista’s downfall, Fidel’s younger brother was already appearing in the international press as an architect of terror.

The image contradicts the later narrative that sought to portray him as a pragmatic administrator, less charismatic but more rational than Fidel. / Adelante

14ymedio, Havana, June 3, 2026 — “Quarrelsome and envious” was how a Jesuit priest described the younger brother who accompanied Fidel Castro at a Catholic school in Santiago de Cuba. Time Magazine recorded it in a report published on January 26, 1959, barely three weeks after Fidel Castro’s triumphant entry into Havana.

The article, titled The Vengeful Visionary, was not yet a retrospective reading of Castroism, but rather a snapshot taken in the heat of the moment. The text portrayed, with remarkable clarity, the birth of the Revolution, its euphoric crowds, and at the same time the machinery of death that was beginning to operate in the name of revolutionary justice.

Although the explicit protagonist of the cover story was Fidel Castro, Time’s text offers an early key to understanding Raúl. He appears there less as his older brother’s shadow than as the executor of a policy already defined by revenge and by the normalization of exemplary punishment. The magazine described the first executions as the moment when the victors, who had promised democracy, justice, and honest government, “clung to the arrogant instruments of dictatorship.”

While Fidel estimated that fewer than 450 men would be executed, his younger brother boasted that “a thousand might die”

The harshest passage is the one devoted to Santiago de Cuba. According to Time, the revolutionary tribunals operated with rebels serving simultaneously as prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. Sentences were handed down in summary proceedings and carried out just as quickly. In Santiago, the magazine added, “the show was under the personal command of Raúl, Fidel’s 28-year-old brother, a slant-eyed man who had already executed 30 ‘informers’ during two years of guerrilla warfare.”

The publication portrays him with a coldness that remains striking today. The context was that of mass executions, with priests continue reading

available to hear the condemned men’s final confessions before they faced the firing squad. While Fidel estimated that fewer than 450 men would be executed, his younger brother boasted that “a thousand might die.”

The scene at Santiago’s firing range reads like a preview of the country that was to come. A trench twelve meters long, three meters wide, and three meters deep; prisoners transferred before dawn from Boniato prison; confessions heard by six priests; condemned men with their hands tied; and bodies falling into the pit. One rebel murmured: “Let it end quickly. I have pain in my soul.” By noon, according to the account, 70 prisoners had died.

In that architecture of terror, Raúl Castro does not appear as an improviser, but as an enforcer. Fidel justified the repression with fiery speeches and appeals to the suffering of Batista’s victims. Raúl, by contrast, embodied the administrative side of violence: organizing, commanding, carrying out, and sustaining the mechanism. That difference would define much of his later career within the regime. Fidel needed to present violence as exceptional justice. Raúl seemed comfortable with violence as a method of power.

“Let it end quickly. I have pain in my soul”

Time’s account does not absolve Batista. It describes with stark detail the corruption, torture, and police sadism of his regime. But that is precisely what makes the reading more disturbing. The magazine acknowledges the previous horrors and yet warns that the new government was nullifying the Constitution, holding summary trials, and turning revenge into a public spectacle. The dilemma was not whether Batista had been brutal, but whether the Revolution was prepared to establish the rule of law or a new dictatorship of terror.

Raúl Castro is placed firmly on that second path. Before becoming Minister of the Armed Forces, before formally inheriting power, before becoming the face of Castroist continuity, he was already there: in Santiago, beside the mass graves, in command of the rifles. The image contradicts the later narrative that sought to portray him as a pragmatic administrator, less charismatic but more rational than Fidel.

What Time saw in 1959 was something else: the birth of a political culture in which obedience was imposed at gunpoint and the law could be suspended “in the name of the people.” Raúl Castro was not merely an observer of that drift. He was one of its first visible enforcers, and the magazine portrayed him even then as a man who took pleasure in pulling the trigger and filling graves with corpses.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Dollar Reaches a Record 600 Cuban Pesos on the Informal Currency Market

Those who receive remittances are celebrating the rise, but prices have also increased significantly, and people on the street are noticing.

The official exchange rate stands this Wednesday at 524 pesos per dollar. “Nobody sells to the State,” says Roberto. “It’s like stealing from yourself.” / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 3, 2026 — The day Laritza had been waiting for has arrived. For weeks, this retired Havana resident has been holding on to the 100 dollars she received from relatives abroad, waiting for the informal exchange rate to reach the magic number of 600 pesos per dollar. “Although they never give you the exact amount listed, the best will change at 5 or 10 pesos below,” she admits with satisfaction.

Exactly one month ago, the U.S. currency was trading at 535 CUP, but the acceleration has been surprising even for a currency that has spent years trapped in a spiral of devaluation. “The situation for the Cuban Government is worsening, and no understanding with the United States that could bring improvement is in sight. The main indicators of the Cuban economy continue in free fall, and their impact is reflected in the depreciation of the Cuban peso over the last five years,” stated the May bulletin of the Observatory of Currencies and Finance (OMFi), directed by Pavel Vidal.

That analysis was released in mid-May, when the dollar was trading at 540 pesos, according to El Toque’s informal exchange rate. On June 2, the currency jumped eight points and reached 600.

The more they earn, the more everything around them becomes more expensive. “And there are also the hard-currency stores, where shopping becomes more expensive too”

“For those of us who receive remittances, it benefits us in a certain way, although food, toiletries, and everything else go up in price. So in the end, it makes no difference,” says Roberto, a reseller in Havana who echoes not only the fears of the poorest Cubans continue reading

but also the concerns of people like himself who do business. The more they earn, the more everything around them becomes more expensive. “And there are also the hard-currency stores, where shopping becomes more expensive too,” he adds.

Prices have risen significantly, and people are noticing. “The imported garlic bulbs that I bought a few weeks ago for 50 pesos are now 150. Cristal beer already costs 400 pesos in the neighborhood’s private markets, and all imported products are going up,” María told this newspaper.

In December 2025, the Government launched a floating exchange rate in an attempt to compete with the informal market rate, which had become the real benchmark among the population. After years of open warfare with El Toque for publishing an exchange rate far higher than the State’s, the official buying and selling price was set at 410 pesos per dollar—in addition to the other existing rates of 24 for state enterprises, and 120 for entities capable of generating foreign currency. Besides being an attempt to recapture the lost foreign-exchange market, the regime was also trying to contain inflation, which continues to climb, although less dramatically than in 2023 and 2024, not because of economic improvement, but because of generalized poverty.

The official exchange rate stands this Wednesday at 524 pesos per dollar. “Nobody sells to the State,” Roberto insists. “It’s like stealing from yourself,” he says mischievously. María agrees. “The other day I overheard an argument about that between a neighbor and a cousin who had just arrived from Europe and made the mistake of exchanging a few hundred dollars at the Havana airport when he landed. ‘Boy, you don’t do that, you lost out every way possible,’ the one who lives here in our building told him,” she recalls. “Any vendor at the farmers’ market will give you more pesos for that amount of dollars. Here people will come looking for you, carry your bags, and even shine your shoes if it means you’ll sell them your dollars,” she adds.

Private business owners sometimes use that trick to justify only a tiny portion of all the dollars they handle

Although it is not always easy. “You have to go to several places looking for someone who will pay a better price. Some small and medium-sized businesses want to take them 30 or 40 pesos below the El Toque rate, so you go from one business to another until you find a better deal,” Roberto explains.

“There’s a self-employed businessman here who buys dollars and always posts ‘five pesos below El Toque‘, so it’s still above the State’s rate. Serious guy, money neatly bundled in groups of 1,000 pesos, and a trusted clientele. No lines, and you don’t even have to show your ID card. So who would go to the State with that other offer?” the reseller argues.

For Laritza, some people do, but they are the minority. “The naïve, the newly arrived, or people who need a record of the transaction. Private business owners sometimes use that trick to justify only a tiny portion of all the dollars they handle. That way they have a receipt to show inspectors to justify purchases of certain goods in dollar stores,” she says.

The retiree, who resells to a “mule” who brings merchandise from Panama, speaks about the mixed blessings of these increases in the value of foreign currency. “She’s always chasing us around asking whether we have a Cabezón (the 100-dollar bill with Benjamin Franklin’s face on it). She’s told us she has had to raise the prices of all the products in her little shop because, with the current dollar exchange rate, the merchandise she brings in has become more expensive. As an added advantage—and we don’t know how she does it—she always pays in cash and with large bills, but other informal currency traders are having a very hard time obtaining enough cash to give their customers,” she notes.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Exodus of Hotel Chains From Cuba Continues, With the Departure of the Asian Company Aston

Archipelago Internacional breaks its relationship with Gaesa, following in the footsteps of Spain’s Iberostar and Canada’s Blue Diamond.

The Grand Aston Havana hotel was controversial from its inception, built by Gaesa during a time of deep economic crisis in the country. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 2, 2026 / Archipelago International, Southeast Asia’s largest privately owned hotel management group, followed in the footsteps of Spain’s Iberostar and Canada’s Blue Diamond this week by ending its management of hotels linked to Gaviota, the chain controlled by the Business Administration Group SA (Gaesa), the conglomerate of the Armed Forces in Cuba.

The decision comes just days before the deadline, June 5, set by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), to end the operations of foreign companies linked to Gaesa, under threat of sanctions.

Archipelago’s hotels in Cuba, operating under the Aston brand—the Grand Aston Havana, Grand Aston Varadero, Grand Aston Cayo Paredón, Grand Aston Cayo Las Brujas, and Aston Costa Verde—are now in a situation similar to that of the properties abandoned by Iberostar and Blue Diamond. They may remain open, but would be managed by Gaviota, which, given the OFAC sanctions, will find it difficult to partner with a new foreign operator. 14ymedio confirmed this during a visit today to the Grand Aston in Havana, which remains open—albeit empty—under Gaviota’s management.

The Grand Aston Havana’s cafeteria was empty of customers on Tuesday. Hotel employees confirmed that the establishment has been taken over by Gaviota’s management.

Archipelago’s departure affects recently built, opulent hotels like the Grand Aston La Habana, controversial since its opening, given that Gaesa constructed it amidst a deep economic crisis that directly impacted the population. The Grand Aston, like the Iberostar Selection Habana—located in the controversial Torre K and now closed due to the crisis—was developed in the post-pandemic period. While shortages were growing and urban decay was evident in many areas of Havana, the Cuban state prioritized the construction continue reading

of large hotel facilities for international tourism.

The Grand Aston was controversial from its opening, given that Gaesa had built it at the same time as a deep economic crisis was developing that was affecting the population.

Before Archipelago’s withdrawal, announced yesterday, the Grand Aston was already suffering from the decline in tourism on the island. According to employee testimonies to 14ymedio, business had recently become so low that, in some cases, employees were told “not to come to work, there were no tourists.”

Meliá, for now, has not announced changes to its plans for Cuba. Half of its hotels are closed due to the consequences of the energy crisis, exacerbated by US sanctions and the oil embargo. Of Meliá’s 34 hotels in Cuba, at least 15 are co-managed by Gaviota : many of the large resorts on the keys and some of the newer hotels in Varadero.

In Havana, the majority of hotels operated by the Balearic company remain linked to the state-owned groups Cubanacán or Gran Caribe. This is the case with the Meliá Cohiba, the Meliá Habana, and the Hotel Sevilla, among others.

Meliá manages 14,053 rooms on the island, representing approximately 14% of its global portfolio. A withdrawal from Cuba would impact its stock price, which had risen 40% this year.

It is still unclear how the sanctions will affect Meliá’s presence in Cuba, or what the company’s strategy will be to disassociate itself from Gaesa if necessary.

The hotel chain’s president and CEO, Gabriel Escarrer, acknowledged last month that the situation in Cuba is “difficult” and “unsustainable,” and that the chain is continuing its strategy of consolidating the few tourists who visit the island into fewer hotels. “I think that today few people know what’s going to happen with Cuba,” he said at the time when asked about Meliá’s future in Cuba.

Escarrer—son of Escarrer Juliá, founder of the hotel chain and a close associate of Fidel Castro—was already sanctioned by OFAC in February 2020. At that time, the businessman, visiting Cuba to attend the Tourism Fair, claimed to be indifferent to the sanctions and said his intention was to remain on the island for at least another three decades. “We will not tremble in the face of any external pressures we may experience,” he insisted.

Last February, when Washington’s sanctions against Gaesa had not yet intensified, Escarrer had declared: “It is not our intention to withdraw [from Cuba] in any way and we feel very comfortable with the leadership position.”

The decision by the Asian airline Aston was revealed by the Dominican media outlet aerocoa.com, close to the deadline imposed by the U.S. State Department under Executive Order 14404, signed by President Donald Trump on May 1st. This order mandated sanctions against “those responsible for repression in Cuba and threats to U.S. national security and foreign policy.” A few days later, the decree began to take effect with specific sanctions against GAESA, its president, Ania Guillermina Lastres, and Moa Nickel SA.

Although Cubanacán is on OFAC’s SDN list and is sanctioned by the agency, it does not belong to the Gaesa conglomerate, which the State Department directly targeted.

This Monday, the Spanish company Iberostar announced its disassociation from Gaviota , leaving under its management in Cuba only those hotels that were owned by Cubanacán or Gran Caribe. Last Saturday, Blue Diamond announced that it would cease its operations and the use of its brands in Cuba “with immediate effect.”

Although Cubanacán is on the OFAC SDN list and is sanctioned by the agency, it does not belong to the Gaesa conglomerate, which the State Department directly targeted on May 7.

The sanctions, however, could also be extended to the state entities Cubanacán, Gran Caribe and Islazul if so determined by the State Department and OFAC, given that Executive Order 14400 considers as a criterion of linkage with the Government of Cuba the “ownership, control or direct management of the entities.”

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A Child Prisoner Is Beaten and Threatened With Solitary Confinement for Protesting in Morón, Cuba

Christian de Jesús Crespo Álvarez, 16, is being held in Canaleta prison and his family does not receive direct information about his health status

14ymedio, Madrid, May 30, 2026 / Christian de Jesús Crespo Álvarez even had the food his family had brought to prison for him taken away. When the 16-year-old complained about the disappearance of his belongings at the Canaleta prison in Ciego de Ávila, he was beaten. Afterward, according to Cubalex, he was threatened with being sent to solitary confinement. Since then, his family has been unable to find out anything about his condition.

Christian is one of the minors detained after the March 13 protest in Morón, a demonstration sparked by blackouts, shortages, and mounting frustration in a city that ultimately became the scene of yet another repressive operation. His case joins those of other teenagers in Cuba who are treated as highly dangerous criminals for their opposition to the government.

According to the alert published by Cubalex, the young man was transferred from Canaleta prison to the Provincial Instruction Unit for further questioning. He remained there for approximately four days. Upon returning to the prison, he discovered that his belongings were missing, and his complaint ended in violence.

According to the alert published by Cubalex, the young man was transferred from Canaleta prison to the Provincial Instruction Unit

In his last communication with his family, the teenager said he wasn’t feeling well, that he was very down, and that his urine was dark in color, a symptom that raised alarms among his relatives.

The family later learned, indirectly, that Christian had been taken to the prison infirmary. However, they received no information about a diagnosis, treatment, or medical progress. They have also had no direct contact with him since the call in which the boy alerted them to his physical and psychological continue reading

deterioration.

Cubalex maintains that Christian has suffered mistreatment at the hands of both other inmates and prison officials. The situation is especially serious because he is a teenager being held in conditions that the organization considers extremely vulnerable and lacking legal protection.

The minor is accused of sabotage, although, according to Cubalex, no formal charges have yet been filed. The accusation places the case in a highly serious legal context, despite the fact that the events originated during a social protest. The organization also reported that State Security continues to conduct forensic analysis based on videos posted on social media and recordings made by Communist Party officials during the demonstration.

The minor is accused of sabotage, although, according to Cubalex, there is no formal request from the prosecutor so far.

The pressure isn’t limited to Christian. Cubalex claims that the minors detained after the Morón protest are being subjected to constant interrogations to force them to confess to receiving payments for demonstrating and to record or sign statements of remorse. The organization alleges that the intention is to construct a political narrative that portrays a citizen protest as a foreign-funded operation.

At least four teenagers were identified by Cubalex among those detained for the events of March 13: Jonathan David Muir Burgos, 16; Christian de Jesús Crespo Álvarez, also 16; Kevin Samuel Echeverría Rodríguez and Yohasnel Estrada Rodríguez, both 17. All were caught in a penal machinery that the regime usually activates after protests: first the arrests, then incommunicado detention, later the exemplary accusations.

The case of Jonathan Muir had already raised concerns among international organizations. He, too, was accused of sabotage and sent to Canaleta prison. His family denounced the conditions of his confinement and the psychological impact of prison on a minor. Now, the complaint against Christian reinforces the suspicion that these are not isolated cases, but rather a practice aimed at intimidating other young people who might join future protests.

Cubalex demanded the immediate release of Christian and the other minors detained for exercising their rights. “Protest is not a crime,” the organization reiterated, also calling for an end to the isolation, violence, arbitrary punishments, and coercive interrogations of adolescents.

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José Daniel Ferrer: The Voice of Cuba That Travels Through Europe

From Madrid to Stockholm: Cuba’s freedom knocks on the doors of the old continent

Ferrer carries with him a truth that the Cuban dictatorship has tried to hide for more than six decades. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Jorge Luis León, Houston, May 31, 2026 / There are moments in history when a single voice manages to express the feelings of millions. Not because it speaks louder than others, but because it speaks with the authority that comes from sacrifice, consistency, and perseverance. Today, that Cuban voice resonating across Europe is that of José Daniel Ferrer.

From Madrid to Stockholm, from parliaments to civil institutions, from political meetings to human rights forums, Ferrer carries with him a truth that the Cuban dictatorship has tried to hide for more than six decades: the tragedy of a nation deprived of freedom and the unyielding yearning of a people who wish to live with dignity.

The importance of this European tour transcends the agenda of meetings and diplomatic protocols. It is a task of enormous historical significance. Each encounter represents an opportunity to show the Cuban reality without propaganda filters; each intervention constitutes a denunciation of the repression; each contact strengthens the international ties that will be necessary for the democratic reconstruction of the nation.

Ferrer is building bridges with political leaders, democratic organizations, human rights institutions, and influential sectors of European society.

Europe listens because it recognizes the legitimacy that arises from resistance. José Daniel Ferrer doesn’t arrive backed by speeches crafted in comfortable offices or by advertising campaigns. He arrives backed by years of imprisonment, constant persecution, beatings, humiliations, and a will that never bowed to fear.

That trajectory transforms his words into something more than political opinions. They are testimonies of a struggle sustained for decades. They are living proof that in Cuba there are men and women who have confronted absolute power without renouncing their principles.

This trip also has a strategic dimension that should not be underestimated. Free nations understand the importance of preparing for the future. Ferrer is building bridges with political leaders, democratic organizations, human rights institutions, and influential sectors of European society. These are contacts that can play a significant role when the time comes for national transformation.

There is also a message of unity that runs through each of these days.

The future Cuba will need friends, cooperation, investment, institutional support, and international recognition. No democratic transition can be built in isolation. History shows that major changes are usually accompanied by intense diplomatic efforts and a broad network of international solidarity.

Therefore, this tour of Europe is not simply a political trip. It is part of the preparation for a new era. It is Cuba’s presence in arenas where, for too long, the regime’s official version has prevailed.

There is also a message of unity that runs through each of these days. Ferrer doesn’t speak solely on behalf of one organization or a specific sector. He speaks for political prisoners, for families separated by exile, for young people who dream of a better future, for those who suffer poverty, for those who have lost hope, and for those who continue to resist within the island.

This is no time for opportunistic leaders or fleeting prophets.

The voice that is heard in Europe today is that of a Cuba that refuses to surrender.

This is no time for false hopes or improvisation. This is no time for opportunistic leaders or fleeting prophets. This is a time for serious work, historical responsibility, and national unity.

As José Daniel Ferrer travels across Europe, the cause of Cuban freedom advances one step further. Every door that opens, every alliance that strengthens, and every awareness that awakens brings us a little closer to the day when Cuba will once again occupy its rightful place among the democratic nations of the world.

Tyranny can control newspapers, courts, and prisons. It can sow fear and build walls. But it cannot indefinitely halt the march of history.

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The Cuban Regime Presents Gaesa as the Entity That Has Made It Possible to Save the Revolution

In a statement defending the corporation, Havana denies accusations of “opacity” and claims it has always reported its activities “to the Party, the State, and the Government.”

Image of a Cimex office, part of Gaesa, in Holguín. / Granma

14ymedio, Madrid, June 2, 2026 — The Cuban Government has issued an institutional statement, published by the official press, defending the military conglomerate Gaesa, which has come under intense pressure from Washington over the past month. In the text, the regime argues that the group has provided “countless” services to the nation by generating foreign currency that was later used to “confront the economic war” waged by the United States.

In describing the company’s role, the Government focuses on investments made by the Business Administration Group (Gaesa) in the public sector, while overlooking one of the main reasons many Cubans resent the conglomerate: the high percentage of resources it devoted to hotel construction even as the tourism business was in clear decline. “Its objective has always been to bring together companies capable of generating foreign currency and resources that the State requires to maintain and develop social achievements and contribute to the advancement of sectors and branches of national life,” the statement argues.

To support its case, the statement cites the construction of more than 10,000 homes throughout the country

To support its case, the statement cites the construction of more than 10,000 homes throughout the country despite a housing deficit exceeding 600,000 units, the creation of a children’s pioneer camp and vacation programs, and “the way the Cuban economy was sustained during the pandemic years,” without specifying exactly what that means.

The foreign currency collected by Gaesa has also been used, the statement continues, to invest in the severely deteriorated continue reading

Lidio Ramón Pérez thermoelectric plant in Felton, Holguín; major hydraulic projects such as the East-West and North-South water transfer systems; as well as polyclinics, family doctor offices, and schools.

The statement attempts to strongly counter accusations of opacity surrounding the company, though it falls short by merely asserting that its activities have been “systematically reported to the leadership of the Party, the State, and the Government” and have been subject to maximum oversight and auditing by authorities. However, Gaesa does not even publish a basic annual activity or financial report, as would be expected from a company seeking to rebut allegations of “opacity” or “secrecy,” both terms explicitly mentioned in the text.

The statement suggests that information is withheld in order to avoid what the regime has often described as persecution. “Thousands of men and women, over the last 30 years, have been discreet guardians of the country’s resources and deserve recognition. Although their work has not been told often enough, it speaks for itself and rises above the state-sponsored slander orchestrated from Washington,” the text adds.

The defense of the military conglomerate occupies the second half of the statement, while the opening paragraphs appear aimed more directly at Miami than Washington. The White House is not spared criticism, however, being accused of “acting with deliberate intent” to destroy the Revolution, including its historical and current leaders, and thereby confuse both domestic and international public opinion. But the true architects of this strategy, the statement claims, are “ideologues of the Cuban-American far right, who pride themselves on being creative and unpredictable.”

But the true architects of this strategy, the statement claims, are “ideologues of the Cuban-American far right, who pride themselves on being creative and unpredictable

The statement says that the May 1 executive order, which opens the door to sanctions against foreign companies cooperating with Gaesa, “constitutes the most intense, disproportionate, and dangerous escalation in the recent history of relations” between the two countries, because it seeks to “isolate the country diplomatically, commercially, financially, and energetically; undermine the nation’s sustainability; condition dialogue; and evaluate options for military aggression.”

Since the announcement of the measure, several international companies have severed ties with the military corporation in sectors ranging from logistics to tourism. This comes in addition to earlier actions, such as pressure to end Cuba’s international medical missions and restrictions on oil shipments, under which only two fuel tankers have arrived in Cuba so far this year: one from Mexico in early January and another from Russia in March, after the new order had already been issued.

“The GAE”—as the statement refers to the company, omitting the final initials corresponding to “Corporation” (Sociedad Anónima)—“is not the product of secrecy, nor of elites, much less a vehicle for the enrichment of a few,” the document states. In recent weeks, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has estimated Gaesa’s reserves at $18 billion, based on financial information published by the Miami Herald in August 2025. However, The Economist argued last March that the military conglomerate is on the verge of bankruptcy precisely because of its excessive investments in tourism. “Before the United States tightened restrictions, Gaesa barely had one billion dollars in reserves,” the publication said.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Costa Rica Announces a Regularization Program for Thousands of Cuban Asylum Applicants

Nicaraguans, Venezuelans, and Colombians are also included in the measure, which aims to ease pressure on an overwhelmed system.

The regularization program opens the door for hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers whose applications are either pending or have been denied. / Jesuit Migrant Service

14ymedio, Madrid, June 2, 2026 — Costa Rica announced on Monday the creation of an extraordinary regularization program for Cuban, Nicaraguan, Venezuelan, and Colombian asylum seekers whose applications are still pending or have been rejected.

“They may apply for the special temporary category for Nicaraguan, Venezuelan, Cuban, and Colombian nationals whose applications for refugee status recognition are pending resolution or have been denied,” states Article 1 of the resolution approving the measure, which was confirmed by Costa Rica’s General Directorate of Migration and Immigration (DGME) to the local press.

The official information refers to the “challenges and possible delays in the refugee status determination system” and notes that there is a “large number of people” from those nationalities with asylum cases awaiting resolution. This has led authorities to consider a regulation of this kind necessary in order to provide a “mechanism aimed at the protection and legal stay” of these individuals.

The greatest advantage of the resolution is that it will allow beneficiaries to work legally and thereby contribute to the formal economy, as specified in Article 2.

The greatest advantage of the resolution is that it will allow beneficiaries to work legally and thereby contribute to the formal economy, as specified in Article 2. “The beneficiary of this special category will have unrestricted authorization to engage in any paid employment activity, whether self-employed or working for an employer.”

The measure may benefit people who have continue reading

been living in the country illegally for many years, since it applies to those who applied for asylum between June 1, 2014, and May 7, 2026. The DGME will verify on its own that the application was filed and that applicants do not hold any other valid immigration status or have any regularization process other than an asylum claim.

The category will authorize residence in Costa Rica for a period of two years, renewable indefinitely for additional periods of the same length. “However, before the document is renewed, the foreign national’s migration movements will be verified in accordance with Article 36 of the General Migration and Immigration Law,” the resolution states.

Beneficiaries of the measure will be able to enter and leave Costa Rica subject to the usual controls. However, if irregular travel movements are detected, the individual must provide documents and evidence explaining “the reasons why such movement does not appear in the records. If the reasons are not justified, renewal will not be authorized.”

The DGME also warned that this status may be revoked if it is determined that the person poses a threat to public security or fails to meet the requirements for renewal. It will also be lost if the individual has been convicted of a crime within the previous ten years.

Estimates by the Costa Rican press place the number of Cubans residing in the country at between 10,000 and 15,000

The resolution also establishes that anyone who fails to renew the document within three months after its expiration will automatically lose the immigration benefit without further proceedings.

Costa Rica has traditionally served as a transit country for Cubans traveling from South America to the United States. However, thousands have settled in the country, one of the most politically and economically stable in the region, with high levels of security and quality of life. Estimates by the Costa Rican press suggest that between 10,000 and 15,000 Cubans currently reside there.

The DGME reports approximately 7,300 pending asylum applications from Cubans, making them the second- or third-largest nationality group seeking asylum, behind Nicaraguans—whose pending applications numbered around 190,000 in the summer of 2025—and, at times, Venezuelans.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Iberostar Follows Blue Diamond’s Lead and Leaves Gaesa Hotels

The Spanish hotel chain remains active in Cuba through six properties belonging to Cubanacán and Gran Caribe.

The Grand Packard in Havana is one of the Gaviota hotels from which Iberostar is withdrawing. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 1, 2026 — On Monday, the Spanish hotel company Iberostar severed its ties with Gaviota, the hotel chain controlled by the Business Administration Group S.A. (Gaesa), and stopped managing the twelve hotels associated with that entity. The company will maintain its presence in Cuba through properties whose state-owned partners belong to other tourism groups not linked to the military conglomerate, including Cubanacán and Gran Caribe.

The decision became public shortly before the deadline imposed by the U.S. Department of State under Executive Order 14404, signed by President Donald Trump on May 1, 2026, which called for sanctions against “those responsible for repression in Cuba and threats to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” A few days later, the decree began taking concrete form through specific sanctions against Gaesa, its president Ania Guillermina Lastres, and Moa Nickel S.A.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) set June 5, 2026, as the deadline for companies to terminate their operations or risk exposure to sanctions.

“As of June 1, 2026, these establishments will no longer be managed, marketed, or promoted under the Iberostar brand”

On Monday, 14ymedio confirmed that several hotels previously managed by Iberostar and owned by Gaesa remain open, but are now under the direct administration of Gaviota, as occurred with the withdrawal of Blue Diamond Resorts last Saturday.

Staff at the Grand Packard Hotel explained: “If you try to book an Iberostar hotel in Havana through travel agencies, what will come up is Parque Central, which is still managed by that company. To book with us, you have to do it directly here or through Gaviota.” By contrast, representatives at the Parque Central Hotel—owned by Cubanacán—confirmed to 14ymedio that “Iberostar executives are working here today without any problem, and the company remains at this hotel.”

Iberostar continues operating the Selection Parque Central, a Cubanacán property. / 14ymedio

Iberostar’s withdrawal was announced through the Argentine tour operator Sudameria. In the company’s statement, it explained that, “as part of a process of adaptation to the international regulatory environment” and in order to preserve its standards of quality, compliance, and management, Iberostar Cuba Hotels & Resorts “will cease operating and continue reading

marketing a group of hotels in Cuba as of June 1, 2026.”

The company stated that the measure ends any commercial, operational, or branding relationship between Iberostar Cuba Hotels & Resorts and the establishments included in the decision.

Among the 12 hotels from which Iberostar is withdrawing and whose ownership is linked to Gaesa are the Hotel Grand Packard on Prado Avenue; the Iberostar Selection Habana, located in the controversial Torre K [K Tower] and currently closed due to the crisis; the Iberostar Selection Ensenachos in Cayo Santa María; the Iberostar Origin Bella Vista Varadero; and the Iberostar Selection Esmeralda, among others.

“As of June 1, 2026, these establishments will no longer be managed, marketed, or promoted under the Iberostar brand,” according to the statement. They will now be managed directly by Gaviota.

Although Cubanacán appears on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list and is sanctioned by the agency, it is not part of the Gaesa conglomerate, which the United States directly sanctioned on May 7

Through the Iberostar Cuba website, only hotels without links to Gaesa can currently be booked, including the Hotel Inglaterra and Iberostar Selection Parque Central, both Cubanacán properties in Havana, as well as the Iberostar Origin Daiquiri in Cayo Guillermo and the Iberostar Origin Taínos in Varadero, both owned by Gran Caribe.

Although Cubanacán appears on OFAC’s SDN list and is sanctioned by the agency, it is not part of the Gaesa conglomerate, which the U.S. State Department directly sanctioned on May 7.

The sanctions could nevertheless be extended to state-owned entities such as Cubanacán, Gran Caribe, and Islazul if the State Department and OFAC determine that they meet the criteria outlined in Orden Ejecutiva 14400, which includes “ownership, control, or direct management by the Government of Cuba.”

Iberostar is following the path taken by the Canadian hotel company Blue Diamond Resorts, one of the main foreign operators in Cuba’s tourism sector over the past decade, which ended its operations on the Island “with immediate effect” last Saturday.

The hotel chain Meliá, which operates between 32 and 35 properties in Cuba, also faces the possibility of sanctions and is under increasing pressure to define its position before the deadline established by the U.S. Department of State.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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