Reinaldo Escobar – Page 2 – Translating Cuba

The Relevance of a Dialogue Today in Cuba

The “change” will not be fraudulent because it will happen in the light at a negotiation table

Peace talks in 2016 between the Colombian Government and the FARC guerrillas in Havana / EFE

14ymedio, Reinaldo Escobar, Havana, 29November 2024 — In political terms an initiative can be convenient but inopportune, and vice versa. It must also be viable. The proposal for Cuba for a dialogue between the Government and the opposition fluctuates at these extremes.

Two answers, from opposite sides, are repeated in the face of the proposal for a dialogue:

“It is inadmissible that pro-democracy patriots sit down to talk with the dictators who decreed that ’the combat order be given’ to suppress the popular protests of July 11, 2021.”

“It is inadmissible that the revolutionaries who defend socialism and the sovereignty of the homeland against the aggressions of imperialism sit down to talk to their paid lackeys.”

These negatives have so many supporters on both sides that it is very difficult not to give up, even before developing arguments in favor of a dialogue.

Like swallows or the flu, from time to time these ideas return to the debate stage. Two colleagues from the independent press, Luis Cino and René Gómez Manzano, have recently addressed the issue. Also in an interview published in this newspaper with the Polish journalist and writer Adam Michnik, this controversial matter was raised from the perspective of a man who actively participated in a process of transition to democracy.

For Cino, who recognizes that it is unlikely that the dictatorship will want to sit down and talk with its opponents, “there are risks that, in the absence of other options, are worth running,” with the eventual gain that the regime recognizes the opposition.” He believes that “the dictatorship will see all its possibilities exhausted and face the imminence of a popular outbreak of incalculable magnitude, on top of the particularly hostile Trump continue reading

Administration, with Cuban-American Marco Rubio as Secretary of State.”

These new aspects show the imperative need for “the change” that has to go beyond cosmetic reforms

Cino warns that “the pro-democratic opposition must be clear about the direction, the goals to which it aspires. To do this, rather than with the regime, they must dialogue and agree, at least on their basic points and demands, with all the actors, both in Cuba and in exile.”

For his part, Gómez Manzano believes that Cino is in a hurry and that the moment of dialogue will be more propitious “when, in the ranks of the same single Party, those who are aware of an irrefutable truth become the majority: that the system is unfeasible and unsustainable”; however, at this moment “that essential aspect is not seen in Cuba, not even remotely!”

Manzano thinks it’s a good move to draw attention to “the need to negotiate with the regime, only not now with the one that declares itself to in ’continuity’. It is absolutely immobile and clings to power with an intensity that a limpet would envy.”

Five years ago I published in this newspaper an extensive, detailed (and somewhat pretentious) text on this matter where I warned that “to talk about dialogue, in the context of Cuba in the first decade of the 21st century, you have to steel yourself, replace all the fuses, secure the safety net and, if possible, pay life insurance in advance.”

The only thing that has changed since then is that the dominant historical generation has come closer to its extinction, and the living conditions of the population and the productive capacity of the country have plummeted even more. The demonstrations of 11 July 2021 also entered the equation, and in our neighbor’s house a government team is being installed that will not pull punches with the Cuban dictatorship.

These new aspects show the imperative need for “the change” to finally occur, which must go beyond the “changes” or cosmetic reforms that the regime could bring.

The change is not intended to be fraudulent because its birth will occur at a negotiation table. As we said yesterday, “the alternatives to dialogue are the overthrow of the dictatorship in a violent way (foreign invasion, popular uprising, coup d’état), with its inevitable consequence of death and ruin; the meek acceptance of waiting for the heirs of the heirs, in a remote future, to make some reforms; or, leave this Island forever.”

Mimicking Luis Cino’s arguments today, I think that if these continue being the alternatives, it’s worth running the risk of trying to have a dialogue.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Battered by Exodus and Crisis, Havana Takes Refuge “Behind the Wall” To Celebrate Its 505th Anniversary

The gala included a wide repertoire of ballads, boleros, romantic and traditional music, as well as songs in English, the language that makes officials nervous.

The show ’Behind the Wall’ was directed by baritone Ulises Aquino. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Reinaldo Escobar, Havana, 16 November 2024 – On Friday night, Havana had a respite from its long decline. In the Plaza de Armas, a few meters from the point where the city was founded 505 years ago, music forced a pause in the midst of the agitation and despair that permeates every wall of the Cuban capital. The show Detrás del Muro (Behind the Wall), directed by baritone Ulises Aquino, was one of the few public tributes that the Island’s most populated city has received this year.

Getting to the almost perfect square guarded by the Palacio de los Capitanes Generales and the Palacio del Segundo Cabo was quite a heroic act, given the transport collapse that paralyzed Havana’s streets. “I was able to come because I ordered a car on the La Nave app, it cost me 1,200 pesos from my house in Cerro to here and I’ll have to pay another 1,200 pesos to get back,” said an elderly woman waiting on the other side of the protective fence surrounding the chairs.

Some tourists looking on with curiosity hovered around the area, hoping to sneak into the free concert and take a few snapshots of the moment. The poor, homeless people, with a limping appearance and outstretched hands waiting for some banknotes, preferably in foreign currency, also did not miss an opportunity; nor did the living statues that put their hats on the ground while holding their breath and acting out the cold bronze of a sculpture; and the matrons dressed up as 19th century Havana commoners, with their headscarves and flowers in their hair.

The front rows were reserved for senior officials of the capital and other figures of the ruling party. / Facebook/Government of Havana

As daylight faded, the place became a magnet that also attracted nearby residents, increasingly absent in a historic center where museums abound and residents are missed. Some arrived with annoyed expression asking what was happening, without remembering that old Havana is blowing out the 505 candles of its existence this Saturday. Joining forces to remind them were the Symphony Orchestra of the Gran Teatro de La Habana, the Chorus of the Teatro Lírico, together with the orchestra and chorus of Opera de la Calle.

The words of Eusebio Leal — the Historian of Havana who died in 2020 — which resonated at the beginning of the show seemed more like an obituary than a text describing a living city. His voice made a tour of the intramuros town and the republican city, stopping at the proclamations, the awnings, the nightly concerts and the commerce in the streets, a vibrant image that continue reading

has nothing to do with the almost deserted avenues and the countless collapsed houses that characterize Villa de San Cristóbal today.

“I come every year when they do this show because I live nearby and it’s free. I also worked for many years with the Teatro Lírico and this reminds me of those good times,” says Ernesto, dressed for a solemn celebration. The old man, with his impeccable hat, long-sleeved guayabera buttoned up to the top and shiny cane, resembled one of those Havanans from the republican prints that hypnotize you when you look at them and make you sigh with nostalgia.

Ernesto finally got a seat and managed to sit in “the poor people’s area,” he said ironically. “But it sounds perfect because the audio, unlike other years, has been very good,” he said during a short break in the gala. “The stage should have been a little higher to see it well from here, but it’s a minor detail. I’m leaving happy, you can see that they’ve worked hard.”

The evening was led by the Symphony Orchestra of the Gran Teatro de La Habana, the Chorus of the Teatro Lírico, together with the orchestra and chorus of Opera de la Calle. / 14ymedio

The first rows of seats were reserved for high-ranking officials of the Cuban capital and other figures of the government, and members of the diplomatic corps of Spain and France were also expected. Guests of the artists who went up on stage also sat in that area, located in front of the façade of the Santa Isabel hotel, in a view from which part of El Templete, the founding auricle of the heart of Havana, could also be seen.

Seen wearing military uniforms were the president of the National Assembly, Esteban Lazo, the secretary of the Communist Party in Havana, Liván Izquierdo Alonso, and the governor of the city, Yanet Hernández Pérez. The olive green color of their attire, the stern look in their faces, and the initials “CDP” on their epaulettes, to warn that they are still mobilized by the Provincial Defense Council after the passage of Hurricane Rafael, seemed as incongruous as arriving at a trench in high heels or participating in a funeral in carnival clothes.

Dressed in civilian clothes were the Vice Prime Minister, Inés María Chapman, and the Vice President of the Republic, Salvador Valdés Mesa. But even their more informal attire did not help them fit in very well at an event where, unlike official events, political slogans, poetic verses intended to praise some leader and party slogans were conspicuous by their absence. Instead, the gala included a wide repertoire of ballads, boleros, romantic and traditional music, as well as songs in English, that language that makes officials and censors nervous.

The weight of the spectacle fell on the actress and singer Gretel Cazón, the tenor Humberto Bernal and Aquino himself.

The weight of the spectacle fell on the actress and singer Gretel Cazón, the tenor Humberto Bernal and Aquino himself, the latter being the mainstay of the gala and a true one-man band who was not discouraged. Minutes before the instruments began to play, the founder and director of Ópera de la Calle was still fighting against the obstacles of bureaucracy and was going from one side to the other trying to tie up the last organizational loose ends in the midst of a context where apathy and improvisation ran rampant.

There was also a hint of support at the end, when the performers were heard singing Silvio Rodríguez’s song Venga la esperanza (Welcome Hope), a song that sounded like an urgent call for hope and enthusiasm to return to the corners of Havana. “Hínchese la vela, rora el motor” (Swell the sail, roar the engine), was the demand in the town whose patron saint who carries a child on his shoulders to the other side of the river. A premonitory metaphor for the exodus and the coyotes that have come to define the city today.

However, it was the song dedicated to the Virgin of Charity of Cobre, patron saint of Cuba, that was the most emotional moment of the concert. The composition by maestro Ernesto Lecuona describes Cachita as a “sweet and dark mother, who showers you with your piety.” The end of the song mobilized enthusiasm by becoming a call “for freedom to shine radiantly in Cuba.” Repeated loudly, that word made hearts beat, provoked tears and turned the faces of the officials in the front row marble.

The attendees loudly applauded this slogan, which, repeated in the streets of Havana during the popular protests of 11 July 2021, cost so many protesters of that historic revolt years in prison. Just a few meters from the spot where the city was once born, on Friday night its residents set themselves a goal more difficult than fighting pirates, building a strong wall or turning this piece of land next to the bay into a dynamic port of the New World. Havana was revered by being reminded of exactly what it lacks most.

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Cuba: Resisting Is Not Winning, Changing Is Not Giving Up

Those in power in Cuba, in order to maintain their prerogatives, insist on the irrevocability of the system

As can be seen in the image accompanying this article, the trash has been collected and a disciplined citizen is preparing to leave his bag in some empty containers. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Reinaldo Escobar, Havana, 20 November 2024 — The chaotic accumulation of garbage in Havana is explained by the official propaganda media as the result of a combination of factors that include social indiscipline and the effects of the American blockade*. Those who exercise a discordant criterion reduce the cause of this disaster to the inability of the Government to fulfill a task which it is obliged to do.

If those in power in Cuba were to acknowledge their inability to resolve the problem, they might be forced to resign from their posts so that more capable people could take over.

Since they are not willing to give up everything they enjoy in order to stay in power and since they lack the ability to keep the country’s cities clean, they then appeal to that revolutionary principle, which has become a working method and is expressed in a willful idea left as an inheritance from Fidel Castro: “We are going to do it at whatever price is necessary.”

As can be seen in the image accompanying this text, the trash has been collected and a disciplined citizen is preparing to leave his bag in some empty containers.

Obviously, the application of this Fidelista legacy extends to almost all spheres.

As there were no suitable vehicles to handle the containers (because of the blockade) and as the rubbish was overflowing into the street (because of the undisciplined), dump trucks and different types of excavators were called in, which, with their voracious buckets, designed for rougher work, continue reading

collected the waste and deposited it in the trucks. A simple job with immediate results.

The price to pay was the demolition of the curb protecting the flowerbed and the sidewalk on Estancia Street, next to the parking lot of the Ministry of Agriculture. The destruction was not caused in one go, but rather by virtue of the repeated occasions in which this method was applied, gradually producing the current deterioration.

That is the banal fact, but what underlies it is the will to face a difficulty at whatever price is necessary. To resist as long as possible in order not to give up.

Obviously, the application of this legacy of Fidelism extends to almost all spheres. In order not to give up, it was decided to use national oil to fuel the thermoelectric plants, with the consequent damage to the boilers that have not been able to resist the corrosive effect of the sulfur.

In order not to give in to the stampede of qualified personnel in schools, it was decided to train ’emerging teachers’ in a hurry, with the consequence of a drop in the quality of academic results.

In order not to give in to the enemy in the area of Healthcare, surgeons learn to suture with threads other than those recommended and the shortage of medicines is being addressed with homeopathy.

The price to pay was the demolition of the curb protecting the flowerbed and the sidewalk on Estancia Street, next to the parking lot of the Ministry of Agriculture. / 14ymedio

It would be overwhelming to go on with the examples that could be brought to light. In the construction of low-cost housing, in agriculture with the absence of fertilizers, herbicides, machinery or irrigation, in industry that subjects its production plans to the schedule of blackouts, in science subject to impaired internet connectivity, even in the defense of the country, where the proclaimed military invulnerability is undermined because pilots cannot train, radars are not turned on to save fuel and it is almost offensive to the suffering civilian population to spend resources on maneuvers.

Hopefully we won’t have to pay the price that seems necessary.

*Translator’s note: There is, in fact, no US ‘blockade’ on Cuba, but this continues to be the term the Cuban government prefers to apply to the ongoing US embargo. During the Cuban Missile Crisis the US ordered a Naval blockade (which it called a ‘quarantine’) on Cuba in 1962, between 22 October and 20 November of that year. The blockade was lifted when Russia agreed to remove its nuclear missiles from the Island. The embargo had been imposed earlier in February of the same year, and although modified from time to time, it is still in force.

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By Increasing Housing Prices Fivefold, the Cuban State Is Repealing a Key Norm of Socialism

The fair rule that determined the price based on the buyer’s salary disappears

Many of the houses being sold today are the same ones that were acquired under the just rules of socialism. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Reinaldo Escobar, 13 November 2024 — The abandonment of the so-called fundamental laws of the socialist system in the Cuban model is something that has not been officially proclaimed, although it was slyly suggested in 1994 when the Special Period in Times of Peace was proclaimed, when it was necessary to appeal to the rules of the market “to save the conquests of the Revolution.”

The latest evidence that the publicized aspirations to establish real socialism on this Island are irrational and unviable is becoming clear after the publication in the Official Gazette of Resolution 313 of 2024, which will come into force on November 15.

The regulation issued by the Ministry of Finance establishes new minimum reference values for the liquidation and payment of taxes on personal income and on the transfer of property and inheritance, associated with acts of purchase and sale and donation of homes between natural persons.

These new reference values are five times higher than those established by this Ministry in March 2017 when it issued Resolution 112, which has now been repealed.

One of the reasons given in the document for carrying out this update is that it is necessary “given the current economic and social conditions.”

It is paradoxical that a government that requires private traders to reduce the price of their goods because it considers them excessive, then forces individuals to increase the price of the houses they sell fivefold with the sole purpose of increasing taxes.

Our lack of infrastructure and knowledge was balanced by belonging to a bloc where the weakest was worth as much as the strongest.

Let us go back to the time when there was still the illusion, or at least we were given the illusion, that “through a fair exchange between developed and underdeveloped nations” it was possible to achieve a socialist utopia. Our lack of infrastructure and knowledge was balanced by belonging to a bloc where the weakest was worth as much as the strongest.

We are talking about 1985. In May of that year the price I paid for the three-bedroom apartment that I still occupy was 4,200 pesos. Thus I stopped being a usufructuary who paid rent to become the owner who bought his home from a welfare state.

My salary was then 350 pesos per month and the cost of my house was calculated according to Law 65, in force since July 1985, based on the fact that I paid a monthly rent equivalent to 10% of my salary, or 35 pesos, and this figure was multiplied by 120 months, which in 20 years resulted in 4,200. If my salary had been the average for that year (188 pesos), then the price of my house would have been 2,280 pesos.

Almost 40 years have passed and the numbers must have obviously changed, but what was not supposed to change was the method for calculating housing prices, which was supposedly based on helping workers to buy a house.

If we do a reverse calculation with these elements, seeing that the reference price of my house, according to the aforementioned Resolution 313, is today 1,080,000, we can calculate that (if the same method of 1985 were maintained to calculate the prices of the houses) I would have paid for 20 years a monthly payment of 9,000 pesos, which is supposed to be 10% of a salary of 90,000. But it happens that the average salary in Cuba today is 4,648 Cuban pesos, which is 5% of this salary chimera of 90,000.

What kind of Cuban citizen were those who drafted this Resolution thinking of?

So one wonders: What kind of Cuban citizen were those who drafted this Resolution thinking of? Is the only reason for imposing an unattainable minimum price on housing mandatory to increase the amount collected through taxes?

The point is that the mere existence of “current economic and social conditions,” which the Resolution invokes to justify the new mandatory reference prices as a minimum for any purchase and sale transaction, are the denial of a deceased, though unburied, model.

I have no idea where the abandoned “socialist” formula of multiplying 10% of the salary by 120 months without including the real cost of producing a house came from; in the same way it is difficult to understand the reason why the State multiplies by five the “reference value” of a house that it neither built nor maintained.

This tedious play has been on stage for too long without any sign of renewal.

Many of the houses sold today are the same ones that were purchased under the just rules of socialism, but the most paradoxical thing is that the new officially established prices do not even come close to the very high prices imposed by abusive reality.

The illusion of a just method has vanished, as it is impractical and costly, but in the political theatre the bosses continue to play the role of providers of benefits who deserve meekness in gratitude.

This tedious play has been on stage for too long without any sign of renewal. Every day the make-up is falling off, the scenery is cracking, the script is boring and the actors are not convincing. The applause has died down for a some time now and the booing has already begun.

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More Than a Terminal Crisis, Cuba Suffers From Multi-Organ Fragility

What can a patient who suffers from all possible diseases die from?

Sancti Spíritus street in darkness. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Reinaldo Escobar, Desde Aquí, Havana, 22 October 2024 — No foreign power has invaded Cuba in October 2024; there has been no earthquake; no devastating hurricane has crossed the island; there is no civil war nor has an epidemic broken out. Parliament has not declared itself in rebellion, disapproving the laws sent to it by the Government for consideration, the military remains in its barracks, there have been no social explosions like those that occurred in July 2021, nor has there even been a disagreement in the ranks of the Communist Party. No forest fires, no plagues, no tornadoes, but nevertheless, the consensus is growing that the current situation is the unequivocal sign of a terminal crisis.

The “current situation” refers to the collapse of the National Electric System (SEN) which in less than 72 hours has left most of the population in a state of calamity accompanied by the uncertainty of not knowing, or even imagining, how and when solutions will appear.

The voices from within and outside the country demanding that the Government resign do so mostly from peaceful positions, basing their claim on the evident ineptitude of the leaders who remain in their positions for the simple reason that there is no legal way to remove them from their posts. continue reading

A poorly tightened nut on a thermoelectric plant can cause another similar collapse at any time.

Those in power in Cuba have no intention of standing down. In their absolute lack of self-criticism, they do not even review the past (i.e., Fidel Castro’s legacy) and instead the furthest they go is to acknowledge that they have not been capable of being worthy of that legacy. They blame all the ills on the United States government, which does not want to lift the embargo and persists in keeping Cuba on the list of countries that cooperate with terrorism or that do not fight it adequately.

Those who cross the red lines of denying legitimacy to the leaders of the single party, pointing out the unviability of the socialist system or denouncing the repressive actions of State Security run the risk of ending up in prison.

The collapse of the National Electrical System is a sign of the country’s fragility, and this fragility is nothing new. A poorly tightened nut on a thermoelectric plant can cause another similar collapse at any time. But it is not the only fragility. If Nicolás Maduro were forced to leave power in Venezuela, if something happens to Vladimir Putin in Russia, if the Chinese opt for another path, if President Lula slips in the bathtub again in Brazil, if the Paris Club does not want to forgive the debts again, if Cuba’s ousted Economy Minister Alejandro Gil escapes his detention and tells everything he knows…

Terminal crisis? More like multisystem or multiorgan fragility. What can a patient with every possible disease die of? You never know, maybe they get struck by lightning or hit by a train.

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The High Cost of Living in Cuba and Social Justice

These poor people, without a safe roof, without electricity or running water, find no other way to revolt than to make the bang on pots and pans in the middle of a blackout.

Protests with cacerolazos [banging on pots and pans] against the blackouts in Cuba. / Screen Capture

14ymedio, Reinaldo Escobar, Havana, 2 July 2024 –When in the 1970s, and even in the 1980s, communist ideologues explained to us that the high cost of living in capitalist countries was due to what they called the anarchy of production, they concluded that this would not occur under socialism because the fundamental means of production were social property (under the tutelage of the State, which in turn was under the tutelage of the Party) and that the planned economy of socialism would make the cyclical crises that overwhelmed the capitalists impossible.

No inflation, no stagflation, nothing of the sort. Everything would flow smoothly, which would allow compliance with the Fundamental Law of Socialism, which stated that “the point is to produce to satisfy the ever-increasing needs of the population and not, as in capitalism, to produce only for the purpose of making a profit.”

“It is about producing to satisfy the ever-increasing needs of the population and not, as in capitalism, where production is only for the purpose of making a profit.”

Don’t tell me any stories. I learned it by heart and, so that others could learn it, I even gave courses on the Political Economy of Socialism, sponsored by the Union of Cuban Journalists.

The dispute between Trotsky and Stalin, ignoring each other’s desire for prominence, was based, among other theoretical questions, on the discussion of whether or not it was possible to implement socialism in a single country. continue reading

A century later, those who consider themselves Cuban Stalinists maintain that it is possible to build a socialist utopia without the support of the bloc of the same name, which has now disappeared, and also ignoring the fact that the system that governs the world is capitalism and that the country that leads it, the United States of America, the official enemy of the nation, has no interest in contributing to the fulfillment of Cuba’s five-year plans, which are no longer even formulated.

No one can deny that life has become expensive in Cuba. It has become unaffordable, just as the foreign debt of developing countries was declared unaffordable at the end of the 1980s when Fidel Castro proposed a consensual disobedience to force debtors to forgive their debts.

No one can deny that life has become expensive in Cuba. It has become unaffordable, just as the foreign debt of developing countries was declared unaffordable.

If social justice fundamentalists were consistent with their discourse, they should be advocating disobedience that would entail the immediate confiscation of all MSMEs [small private businesses] and “non-state forms of production,” which are indirect causes of the social differences existing in the country. They do not dare to do so because they already know the results of the Revolutionary Offensive of 1968 and because, however fundamentalist they are or appear to be, they remain obedient.

The people, these poor people without a solid roof, without electricity or running water, find no other way to revolt than to bang their kettles in the middle of a blackout lasting more than 12 hours or to block a street or a highway with their rickety buckets to protest the lack of water. These people do not believe in fundamentalists.

To the fundamentalists this perhaps sounds and smells like a counterrevolution and they may even suspect that behind it all there is financing from imperialism because they do not see, because they do not want to see that this discontent coincides with that of the opposition.

Perhaps social justice is just a myth, a propaganda trick of the left to compete for power or to have a pretext to usurp it, but the high cost of living in Cuba is an undeniable fact after 65 years of a project disguised as social justice that should have made such high cost impossible.

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The Innocence of the Cuban Deputies

They have been unanimously raising their hands to approve everything the Government proposes for almost half a century.

Deputies, during a session / National Assembly

14ymedio, Reinaldo Escobar, Havana, 23 July 2024 — I should have entitled this commentary “the lack of guilt of the deputies,” so as not to confuse the meaning of innocence with “ignorance.” The deputies of the National Assembly of People’s Power (ANPP) are ridiculed by comparing them to a choir of trained seals that only knows how to applaud in exchange for crumbs. They have earned it, for almost half a century raising their hands unanimously to approve everything that the Government presents for their consideration.

The ministers go to the forum of Parliament to present their reports and proposals, knowing that the most daring will engender a discussion about some punctuation mark or propose a synonym more in line with the hidden intentions that the shrewd deputy guesses behind the big print of the law.

The fox that has been placed in the position of guardian of the hen house is not guilty, just as the ice that has been thrown into the oven to heat a broiler is not to blame. Ice and fox are innocent; the fault lies in the selection system and, ultimately, in those who designed the system.

Don’t ever believe that the issue has already been explained too many times. continue reading

To become a deputy in Cuba, not only do you have to travel a hazardous path, but you also have to meet a long list of requirements

To become a deputy in Cuba, you not only have to travel a hazardous path, but you also have to meet a long list of requirements that have nothing to do with the personal growth that everyone proposes.

The candidacy to occupy seats in Parliament is fed by two sources: half of the 471 seats will be filled with constituency delegates; the other, with “prominent personalities from politics, culture, science, sports and society.”

The first is a screening of the more than 15,000 constituency delegates throughout the country. That is, choosing 235 out of 15,000, which gives the Candidacy Commission a negligible margin of error. In the second source the margin is even smaller, because there is no recognized figure that indicates how many people are available for the selection.

It has already been repeated many times that the so-called “diversity” of this National Assembly is reduced to the factors of age, race, occupational profiles and a few brushstrokes of religion or gender, but it is enough to verify that more than 90% of the deputies belong to the Communist Party or to the Union of Young Communists to understand that a train will enter the tunnel under Havana Bay* before a dissident can walk through the doors of Parliament.

They didn’t get to those positions by presenting a program or trying to promote a proposal. They got there through their rigorously scrutinized biography

They didn’t get to those positions by presenting a program or trying to promote a proposal. Their biographies were rigorously scrutinized and verified by the organs of State Security. The docility of those chosen ones had nothing to do with their convictions, but rather with their obedience to the leader. That is the reason why Raúl Castro’s presence is essential, because it is enough to observe how he applauds or nods to know how to vote.

If one day the General is not there, or better, if one day he doesn’t exist and the miracle of a discussion happens, let’s say between Prime Minister Manuel Marrero and President Miguel Díaz-Canel, in which both hold divergent opinions on some essential or even banal issue, it is most likely that the abstentions will abound.

Because the real miracle will happen when they can debate two sides of an issue and two tendencies can emerge that could be considered radical, moderate, conservative or novel, or anything else that can be imagined.

If there is something missing in Cuba, it is the alternative paths outside the dictates of the Communist Party. In 65 years, we have left behind, with no possible return, shortcuts and avenues through which the nation could have advanced.

Right now, faced with the terrifying idea of a future that threatens us, we see a mass of obedient deputies unanimously approving the whim of continuing on the path to the precipice. Can you blame them for their blindness and cowardice? That is why they were placed in that position, that is where their innocence lies.

*Translator’s note: There are no tracks in the tunnel.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Lilo Vilaplana Talks About his Film ‘Plantadas’: “Doing Historical Justice Comforts Me”

The film can be seen in Cuba using the link sent through friends

Former political prisoner Alicia del Busto (left) during filming, with actresses Jennifer Rodríguez and Rachell Vallori, and Lilo Vilaplana / Courtesy / Alfredo de Armas

14ymedio, Reinaldo Escobar, Havana, 15 June 2024 — In a narrow, dirty and crowded cell, several prisoners support each other so as not to lose their sanity or their lives. The guards bring a beaten woman to the dungeon and the prisoners receive her with words of encouragement, despite the situation in which they find themselves. The scene, from the film Plantadas*, shows the importance of solidarity in the Cuban political prison system and delves into a portion of national history silenced by official discourse.

Lilo Vilaplana speaks with 14ymedio about his work, which is a shock against oblivion and a tribute to those women who warned, very early on, of the authoritarian drift of Fidel Castro’s regime.

14ymedio/Escobar: How difficult was it to process all the hours of interviews with former Cuban political prisoners and concentrate them into two hours of film?

Vilaplana: It was like putting together a puzzle so that the final product reflected the story told by each of them. Plantadas is not a documentary, nor a docudrama, but we start from real stories to create an entertaining plot that has three female characters, with their dramatic lines, representing the thousands of political prisoners in Cuba’s prisons since 1959 for disagreeing with a system that was implemented with blood, terror, betrayals and lies. The work we did with the writer Ángel Santiesteban was precisely to create those plots and subplots. Arranging the action based on the initial stories was a difficult challenge and required many hours of work.

14ymedio/Escobar: Did you encounter any reluctance on the part of the interviewees to tell their story?

Vilaplana: Some did not want to speak, because they did not want to open that wound. I understand them, there are painful stories, many were not able to have children, there were others whose children were told by the communists that their mothers were imprisoned because they did not want to be with them. There were scores of tortures, humiliations and difficulties caused by their imprisonments. continue reading

Some did not want to speak, because they did not want to open that wound. I understand them, there are painful stories, many were not able to have children

Currently, several of those who did not initially give us their stories, after watching the film, have begun to accompany us to activities to offer their testimony to the public. The first one to tell us her story was América Quesada, who was not able to see the finished film, because she died a few days before filming began. From the money that she had raised up to that point for the film, we gave her family the sum necessary for her cremation, because she was having financial difficulties.

14ymedio/Escobar: In the reconstruction of the locations, especially in the outdoor scenes and those inside the prisons, it seems that a contrast was sought between light and shadow, between clarity and gloom.

Vilaplana: Each space has a specific mood. It is something that we were very clear about from the beginning. The light, the sound, the camera shots, the art of each space was worked with very few resources, but with great accuracy and care. We were clear that there must be a marked difference in these environments.

14ymedio/Escobar: Among the protagonists are several faces of the Cuban women who have recently emigrated to the United States, who were indoctrinated while in Cuba to view political prisoners as mercenaries. Was it difficult for them to embody those prisoners?

Vilaplana: It was a very interesting mix of actresses and actors with experience and long exiles, and others who have been in the diaspora for some time. Among them were several newcomers who, until recently, had starred in films with the ICAIC [Cuban Art Institute and Cinematographic Industry]. It was very interesting, because they adapted.

Everyone knew the movie Plantados. They had seen it in Cuba and here, they met with many of those male prisoners and also with the female political prisoners. They asked them for advice, they asked them questions, and that way they learned the story firsthand, that is a luxury for any actor. They were able to understand the events that occurred in Cuba and regretted so many years of useless indoctrination.

14ymedio/Escobar: Every film project has that moment when it seems like it’s not going to go ahead. Did Plantadas have that too?

Vilaplana: No, Plantadas did not go through that process. Those involved in the project trusted that it would be done, we had the support of a few politicians, some businessmen, townspeople and exiles who contributed what they had so that the movie could be achieved. They also gave us food, offered a location and donated vintage objects, proposed to build whatever was necessary or positioned their vintage cars, depending on the project. Vilaplana Films made available production elements to the film, many costumes, set pieces, prop weapons and filming equipment for free, to lower costs and be able to finish the film with the little money raised. We didn’t have the budget of Plantados, but we already had the experience of that first film.

I anticipate that another film with Cuba’s prison’s theme is coming, because we are working on a new project

14ymedio/Escobar: Are you worried about being pigeonholed as the director who addresses the Cuban political prison?

Vilaplana: It doesn’t worry me, because my work refutes that statement. I have many different titles in my career. I have been a director of internationally successful drug trafficking series such as El Capo (I directed four periods), Perseguidos, La Mariposa and Dueños del Paraíso. As director, I have also participated in other international series such as Lynch, Mentes en Shock, Sin Retorno, Tiempo Finaland Zona Rosa. I have directed soap operas: La Dama de Troya, Por Amor, Un Sueño Llamado Salsa, The Past Doesn’t Forgive, You Will Love Me in the Rain, La Traicionera and Portraits… among many others. In addition, I have been the director of short films such as La Muerte del Gato, La Casa Vacía, Los Ponedores, to which were added series of docudramas in the style of Arrepentidos, Siguiendo el Rastro, Expediente, Unidad Investigativa and Leyendas del Exilio.

I anticipate that another film is coming with the theme of Cuban prisons, because we are working on a new project to tell what happened in the concentration camps that the communists called UMAP [Military Production Assistance Units]. We have won several awards with many of our productions.

14ymedio/Escobar: They say that making films is very similar to the work of a craftsman. Where do you start to shape a film?

Vilaplana: Creation has unsuspected paths and one process is never similar to the other. Sometimes you have the movie and other times the movie looks for you. Plantadas was a dream that Reinol Rodriguez and I had, together with my son, Camilo Vilaplana, as director. We made it come true, with a great production team, technicians, artists and an exile who has supported this process by appropriating a piece that deals with human rights abuse.

14ymedio/Escobar: Just a few days ago, activist Lázaro Yuri Valle Roca arrived in Miami. He was taken to the Havana airport, forcing his departure practically from prison. It seems that 60 years later, for opponents in Cuba the options remain the same: prison or exile. Doesn’t that discourage you?

Vilaplana: That is what the Castro Regime wants, to discourage the fight. But we will always be facing the dictatorship, with the hope that, one day, this nightmare will end. I will never be part of works that discourage struggle. Knowing that men like Lázaro Yuri Valle Roca, José Daniel Ferrer and so many female political prisoners do not give up, gives hope.

14ymedio/Escobar: What are you going to do with all those hours of interviews with political prisoners that were conducted to bring into line the Plantadas story? Is there a documentary coming?

Vilaplana: For now, the Plantados and Plantadas interviews will all be at the American Museum of the Cuban Diaspora. I want all those who want access to this treasure to have it. If with my films I manage to evoke these dark stages of the Castro dictatorship in Cuba so that it is never repeated again, and for that reason alone, it will have been worth making these historical films.

If with my films I manage to remember these dark stages of the Castro dictatorship in Cuba so that it is never repeated again, and for that reason alone, it will have been worth it.

14ymedio/Escobar: It is one thing to reach the Cuban public and another to reach viewers who are further removed from the Cuban reality. How has the film fared in festivals and platforms?

Vilaplana: Reaching the Cuban public is important, but reaching the world is a challenge. The movie Plantados, for example, always packs the theaters when it is shown. But it is absolutely curious how the Castro regime manages to have tokens and accomplices who try to prevent these issues from reaching festivals and platforms where they almost always claim that if it is a “politics issue” they are not interested.

“Politics” refers to when The Castro Regime is denounced. If it is a product financed by tyranny, they accept it and change the terms. I don’t understand how such a macabre system has so many accomplices. In any case, a lot of work has been done and we have won four awards at different festivals, in addition to being on the billboards of cinemas in Miami and many cities in the United States for 10 weeks. Plantadas has also been screened in Puerto Rico and in several countries such as Canada, Colombia, The Dominican Republic, The Bahamas and others. Now, thanks to the work of our VIP 2000 distributors, we are on the largest Spanish language streaming platform, and in the first week it placed among the four most viewed films, competing with the big productions from Hollywood and other strong countries in the market. Plantadas is available throughout Latin America and the US on the VIX platform and has already been dubbed into English. We are working with platforms in Europe to continue spreading this message.

14ymedio/Escobar: Within Cuba, watching Plantadas has become an act that practically has to be carried out in secret. What efforts have been made to reach the public in Cuba?

Vilaplana: The public in Cuba has its own link to see the film, and we have several friends who distribute it. I also send it to everyone who asks me for it. Sometimes groups get together and show it and discuss the film.

14ymedio/Escobar: The Yara Cinema, La Rampa, the Chaplin or the Payret? In which of these rooms do you think Plantadas will be screened for the first time in Havana?

Vilaplana: Plantadas is going to be screened in a free Cuba and will one day be studied in Cuban universities, just like Plantados, because history is the memory of the people and the political prisoners who have given years of their lives confined for their homeland to be free, democratic and prosperous must be remembered, as their sacrifice deserves. Carrying out historical justice comforts me and alleviates the pain of this family separation, of the many who’ve been shot, killed and murdered because of a system that should never have been installed in Cuba.

*Translator’s note: Plantadas [literally ‘planted’] refers to female political prisoners who resist, refusing to conform to the demands of their jailers. Brief history of plantados [male political prisoners who resist] here.

Translated by Norma Whiting

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What Didn’t Happen or Hasn’t Happened Yet in the Ten Years of ‘14ymedio’

As is known, the spontaneity of that feat, which was its great merit, was also its Achilles heel

The arrest of one of the protesters on July 11, 2021 in Havana / Marcos Évora

14ymedio, Reinaldo Escobar, Havana, 26 May 2024 — One way to evaluate the time that has passed is to inventory the achievements; another, to list the outstanding issues.

It is the responsibility of the press to point out faults, demand compliance with what was scheduled and also denounce the unfeasibility of what was promised.

These days, as our newspaper, 14ymedio, celebrates its first decade of existence, I have set myself the unpleasant task of relating everything that has not happened in Cuba yet. I’ve limited the list to ten, just to play with our birthday.

The salary that Cuba’s workers earn has failed to become the most important form of support for families.

The rationing system, instead of becoming a way to subsidize people, has extended its tentacles of control and limitations to other goods that were previously unrationed.

The salary that Cuba’s workers earn has failed to become the most important form of support for families

The mythical little glass of milk, promised in 2007, not only remains out of reach of consumers, but has become even further removed, along with other products previously considered accessible and popular.

The promise of guaranteeing decent housing for families continues to be a populist formula that is impossible to carry out under the current mode of production.

The criminalization of political dissent, far from decreasing, has been implemented in a penal code that criminalizes all dissent.

The Cuban State still has not ratified the human rights pacts signed by the country in 2008.

In all this time there has not been a single amnesty that benefits political prisoners.

Economic reforms remain timid and insufficient, and policies absent.

We Cubans are still obliged to return to the country before 24 continuous months have passed, under penalty of losing our resident status. Those who have transgressed this limitation still need a permit to enter the national territory. That elimination of the exit permit has been reintroduced selectively with travel bans on those who are arbitrarily “regulated” (the regime’s term for “forbidden to travel”). To make matters worse, a new arbitrariness has been introduced, which prevents the return of those who “behave badly” abroad even if they have not exceeded the 24-month limit.

Cubans are still obliged to return to the country before 24 continuous months have passed, under penalty of losing our status as residents

The new Agrarian Reform that grants land ownership is still pending. Both by omission of reforms and by reiteration of unnecessary and abusive control measures, Cuban agriculture has not taken a significant step, not even mentionable, in all these years towards the purpose of guaranteeing the food of its citizens.

Everything inventoried up to this point is the result of the deficiencies of those in power in Cuba and the defects inherent to the imposed system. If, by a miracle all these shortcomings disappeared, the dissatisfaction of citizens would remain the same because the essentials would still need to be changed.

It seems logical to warn that the people of Cuba are the ones who have a big pending issue. What happened on 11 July 2021 can be considered as an entrance test to the civic consciousness of recognizing oneself as the protagonist of history. As is known, the spontaneity of that feat, which was its great merit, was also its Achilles heel.

The independent press does not have it easy.

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Cuba: Gradual Process Versus Voluntarism, a Matter of Methodology

As the results of their proposals have been the same, perhaps it makes no sense to discuss how they carried them out.

Fidel and Raúl Castro during the last session of the 6th Congress of the Communist Party / Cubadebate

14ymedio, Reinaldo Escobar, Havana, 26 April 2024 — Any attempt to theorize about methodological issues in the way of governing is usually dismissed when the results are the same. That is one of the reasons why the differences in method to exercise power between Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl are barely mentioned.

If I had to define Fidel’s method, I would reduce it to a single sentence: “We will go forward no matter the cost.”

Raul’s contribution is evidenced in his attempt to achieve “a sustainable (and prosperous) socialism” and his insistence on advancing “sin prisa, pero sin pausa” — without haste, but without pause.

Four years ago Raúl met with a large group of leaders from all political and governmental levels, and he warned them that waste and improvisation had to be eliminated and that they had to “have their feet and ears glued to the ground.”

When in April 2018 Miguel Díaz-Canel assumed the position of president of the Council of State by appointment, Raúl Castro assured that this was part of a process of “gradual and orderly transfer.”

While it can be said that everything that happened in Cuba from 1959 to 2006 (especially the disasters) was the result of Fidel Castro’s indisputable voluntarism (everyone makes his own to-do list), it can also be said that the poor result of the reforms promoted by Raúl Castro from 2008 to the present is largely due to the slowness and lack of depth of their application.

As the results have been the same (I have my own list), it makes no sense to discuss the methodology.

But I make this observation:

If Fidel Castro had applied the nationalization of foreign companies in a gradual and orderly way, and his Revolutionary Offensive of 1968 would not have been decreed with the stroke of a pen but with his feet and ears on the ground…

If Raúl Castro, a chainsaw ready for action, had put an end to the inefficient socialist state enterprise and put the country’s economy into private hands, opening the doors to foreign investment…

The methdology wouldn’t have mattered.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Who Will Be Named President of the Republic of Cuba in 2028?

The outcome of any of the scenarios presented here is subject to Raul Castro’s ability to make decisions in April 2028, two months before his ninety-seventh birthday.

14ymedio, Reinaldo Escobar, Havana, 15 April 2024 — The most depressing arguments against the possible scenarios presented here actually taking place can be summed up in two popular expressions in plain and simple language: “You know that these people do whatever they want” and “anything can happen here at any time.”

Putting aside these truisms, another (though unlikely) scenario which would be one in which Miguel Díaz-Canel successfully completes a second term as president. In this instance, we must try to address what academics refer to as “the scientific problem” as expressed in the next question: Who will be appointed president of the Republic of Cuba in April 2028?

With four years to go, it seems premature to make predictions. However, this is the time when movement — or rather big shifts — could happen, leading to “the great designation” that will come as a no surprise to anyone.

In any presumably democratic country where presidential elections are held, speculation about the possible winner is based on how seemingly willing the electorate is to choose one candidate over several 0thers. To win the voters’ approval, politicians must campaign for office through the media and at public events. They offer campaign promises and eventually prevail over their opponents.

That simply does not happen in Cuba. Nominating commissions made up of organizations claiming to represent civil society but which are controlled by the Communist Party are the ones who nominate candidates for executive office. In the ten times that the National Assembly of People’s Power has met, not a single candidate has ever been rejected at the polls. It is the members of the newly chosen assembly who vote to approve the candidate proposed by the presidential nominating commission as President of the Republic.

The joke that bests reflects this situation would be one that asks, “What do polling results show?”

Current electoral law mandates that, to be president, a candidate must be a member of the National Assembly, no older than sixty at the start of his or her first term in office and no younger than thirty-five. Each continue reading

term is to last five years and no one may serve for more than two terms. These strictures are enshrined in the Cuban constitution.

Since the president is inevitably the Communist Party first secretary, it is obvious that the designee must be a party member as well as an official who already holds positions in the party and government, though that is not stipulated anywhere in writing.

Miguel Díaz-Canel’s second term in office ends in April 2028 so it is relatively easy to figure out who would meet the the age requirements by that date in order to be eligible. The data is publicly available. One need only type “Parlamento cubano” into the Google search engine and add a name.

The figures below are current as of April 15, 2024.

Of the 471 names currently on the roster of National Assembly members (this includes those who have died, resigned or been fired), only 348 would meet the presidential age requirements in 2028. To be more precise, of the current members, ninety-three would be over sixty years of age and thirty would still be under thirty-five by that date.

Members of the the eleventh National Assembly will be take office shortly before the next president is chosen. One can assume, however, that it is unlikely that a “new arrival” — a junior legislator — would be elected to high office. Therefore, any analysis or speculation about who the most likely candidates for president might be will have to be done based on the current list of Assembly members.

Of the 348 members who will meet the age requirement, one belongs to the Politburo and three to the Secretariat. Nine hold the post of first secretary of a provincial wing of the Communist Party. One is a deputy prime minister and another is a government minister. Fourteen are members of the Council of State, though four of them hold none of the other positions previously mentioned.

Keeping in mind that some of them hold more than one of the positions mentioned here, we are talking about twenty-seven potential presidents.

Of those twenty-seven, the ones who seem to have the best chances are these six members of the Communist Party Central Committee:

Gladys Martínez Verdecia (1970), who is also a member of the Politburo and first secretary of the Communist Party in Artemisa province.
Joel Queipo Ruiz (1971), member of the Secretariat and head of its Economic and Productivity Department.
Jorge Luis Broche Lorenzo (1970), member of the Secretariat and head of the Department of Social Services
Félix Duarte Ortega Martínez (1974), member of the Secretariat and president of the National Association of Small Farmers.
Beatriz Johnson Urrutia (1969), first secretary of the Communist Party in Santiago de Cuba province and member of the Council of State.
Jorge Luis Perdomo Di-Leila (1970), deputy prime minister.

Assembly member Susely Morfa (1982) could join the list if she does well in her new job.

The next four years could see promotions and dismissals that require significant revisions to this list. But the most radical reform, the one that could upend everything, would be a decision to change the age requirement.

With all that being said, let’s take closer look at the first two depressing realities mentioned at the beginning of this piece.

Article 228 of the Cuban constitution stipulates that,”when the reform refers to… the powers or the term of office of the President of the Republic… ratification is also required by a vote in favor by the majority of electors in a referendum called for such purposes.”

There is no obligation to put any changes to the age requirement to a referendum since only “the powers” and “the term of office” are explicitly mentioned, not the requirements. Therefore, it is older people, the ones already ensconced in powerful positions, who might entertain presidential ambitions. They might be tempted to promote this seemingly minor but decisive modification but they would have to propose it in the next four years, which is why it pays to be attentive.

Let’s say they propose raising the maximum age for a first-term president to seventy. That would still rule out the old guard, all in their eighties or nineties, but the pack of wolves highest up in the food chain would presumably still be in the running.

Of the thirteen apostles of continuity, these six members of the Politburo are first in line:

Roberto Morales Ojeda (1967), who is also the Central Committee’s secretary of organization and deputy prime minister.
Manuel Marrero Cruz (1963), who now serves as prime minister.
Lázaro Alberto Álvarez Casas (1963), major general and Minister of the Interior.
Ulises Guillarte de Nacimiento (1964), who is a member of the Council of State due to his position as secretary general of the Workers’ Central Union of Cuba.
Teresa María Amarelle Boué (1963), who is a member of the Council of State due to her position as the secretary general of the Federation of Cuban Woman.
Marta Ayala Ávila (1966), who is a National Hero of Labor.

Though several rungs down on the pecking order, these seven members of the Central Committee are worth keeping an eye on:

Inés María Chapman Wugh (1965), deputy prime minister.
Gerardo Hernández Nordelo (1965), national coordinator for the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, member of the Council of State and Hero of the Republic of Cuba.
Jorge Luís Tapia Fonseca (1963), deputy prime minister.
Liván Izquierdo (1967), member of the Central Committee and Communist Party first secretary in Havana province.
Rogelio Polanco Fuentes (1966), member of the Communist Party Secretariat and chief of its Ideology Department.
Homero Acosta Álvarez (1964), Secretary of the National Assembly and of its Council of State.
José Ángel Portal Miranda (1967), Minister of Public Health.

Assembly member Luis Antonio Torres Iríbar (1965) could join the list if he does well in his next job.

If the National Assembly agrees to do away with the age limit, we could see the return of Machado Ventura or the rise of Elián González.

The outcome of any of the scenarios mentioned above is subject to Raul Castro still being able to make decisions in April 2028, two months before his ninety-seventh birthday. If he is unable to express his will as he did in 2018 with Miguel Díaz-Canel, one can assume that the process of appointing the next president could be more rules-based and subject to consensus.

But, as everyone knows, these people can do whatever they and anything can happen at any moment.

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Alejandro Gil Will Not Be the Only One To Fall

It is not very credible that such a hierarchical corruption plot can be carried out without others noticing or knowing it.

14ymedio, Havana, Reinaldo Escobar, 8 March 2024 — An unusual “official note” made public the depth of the fall of Alejandro Gil Fernández, Cuba’s now ousted Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Planning. Readers of the the Communist Party press already know that this headline discloses the most important information, but this note was not signed by a ministry or a state entity, but by the leader of the Government and the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC).

Miguel Díaz-Canel had congratulated Gil a month earlier on his 60th birthday and in another tweet, where the president was delicate with defenestrated ministers, including Gil, when he told them: “They gave their energies in very hard years for the country. They will have tasks to continue doing for Cuba.”

The March 7 note is obscure and imprecise. It does not reveal who was in charge of the “rigorous investigation” that determined the “serious mistakes” made by Gil in the performance of his duties. Later it adds that, given “the level of verification of the facts, and at the proposal of the Attorney General’s Office,” the Political Bureau and the Council of State approved that the Ministry of the Interior initiate “the corresponding actions for the clarification of these behaviors.” By the way, the mistakes made in the exercise of a position are not conduct or crimes.

Here you have to ask yourself not only who carried out the rigorous investigation but who approved it. Rumors point to a namesake of Alejandro, who, it seems, has the power to investigate without waiting for permission.

Although they are different cases, today the same questions that surrounded the so-called Case number 1 of 1989 are reopened.

The lack of precision becomes more evident when one tries to identify the nature of the facts with the mention of three generalities taken from a moral code: “corruption, pretense and insensitivity.” They are mentioned as part of the ethics of the Revolution that “has never allowed, nor will ever allow them.” The president (Díaz-Canel) lacked “revolutionary firmness” by limiting himself to these insinuations. continue reading

What is most heard right now in the streets of Cuba are questions, and the most frequent refer to whether other heads will roll below and even above the level of the accused former minister. It is not very credible that such a hierarchical corruption plot can be carried out without others noticing or knowing it.

Although they are different cases, today the same questions return as those that surrounded the so-called Case number 1 of 1989*, which began on June 14 with an informative note from Granma and ended on July 13 with the execution of the main characters involved.

If, under the accusation of breaking the stained glass window of a commercial establishment in the middle of a citizen protest, several people have been sentenced to prison terms of 12 or 15 years, what will be the request of the Prosecutor’s Office for Alejandro Gil and his accomplices? Will there be a public trial? Who is going to sign the next “official note”?

*Translator’s note: A reference to General Arnaldo Ochoa, who was found guilty of drug smuggling among other crimes and was executed by firing squad.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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“Requesting Voter Certification Is Not Playing Into the Hands of the Cuban Dictatorship”

Manuel Cuesta Morúa talks to 14ymedio’s Reinaldo Escobar about Parliament’s rejection of an amnesty law for political prisoners

14ymedio, Manual Cuesta Morúa/Reinaldo Escobar, Havana, 21 February 2024 — The Cuban Parliament recently rejected a request to process an amnesty law promoted by dozens of relatives of political prisoners. From that request, which the National Assembly classified as “inadmissible,” a broad debate was generated about the relevance or not of appealing to the Cuban regime’s own laws to promote change on the Island.

Manuel Cuesta Morúa talks about this with this newspaper. The opinion of this veteran dissident, based on the Island, addresses several of those aspects that we share with our readers.

Reinaldo Escobar/14ymedio: To legitimize or not to legitimize? Can you live under an authoritarian regime and refuse to accept all its official regulations and protocols?

Manuel Cuesta Morúa: It might seem cynical to say that the process of legitimizing dictatorships begins with the acceptance of the institutions that manage our existential or social condition. The misnamed “supply book” [ration book], the identity card and the passport are among those institutions through which the dictatorship regulates, controls and limits us, but which we accept. And not because we want to, but for two reasons: dictatorships are possible only if they institutionalize all social life. They are also obliged to incorporate language and certain democratic tools.

The misnamed “supply book” [ration book], the identity card and the passport are among those institutions through which the dictatorship regulates us.

RE/14ymedio. Why do they have that obligation?

MCM. Otherwise they have a serious problem of both internal and external legitimation. They have to appear to themselves and to others. For this reason, the legal and constitutional spaces that are left to the population so that they can become citizens are only conditions, almost inevitable obligations that dictatorships impose on themselves in order to be able to cross with a certain impunity the field and the game of appearances.

RE/14ymedio. So is it like a game of mirrors?

MCM. Exactly. They are not conditions that they impose on us, but rather institutional realities that they have no choice but to assume if they want to be accepted in some way. The dictatorship imposes some things on us by law, such as Article 5 of the Constitution, and others, the majority, outside continue reading

or manipulating the law.

RE/14ymedio. An example of some of those conditions within the law?

MCM. The requirement to have a voter certification to file a petition before the National Assembly, which may be similar to any other citizen authentication requirement in any genuine democracy. However, in the case of Cuba, this is an excessive barrier. However, it can be skipped if we impose on ourselves the exercise of strong citizenship.

RE/14ymedio. So do you recommend requesting voter certification?

MCM. Yes, I believe that applying for it is a step in our becoming civic citizens. We would not be playing into the hands of the dictatorship, which is not interested in appearance becoming reality, but in ourselves. They don’t even disseminate these legal paths.

RE/14ymedio. Do you think that the regime itself hides the existence of these channels?

MCM. Exactly. Does the Government speak on any radio or television program about laws such as 131, which includes the possibilities of civic responsibility? Do they systematically print the Constitution to distribute it — not sell it — in workplaces or schools?

RE/14ymedio. But wouldn’t using those paths be “playing into the hands” of the regime?

MCM. Judging by the responses to the Varela Project or the proposal for independent candidates in the elections for local People’s Power delegates, the Government did not believe, not even remotely, that it would play into its hands. The test of authenticity of civic alternatives lies in their ability to legitimize themselves, both within their own rules and within the conventional rules of society and the State. The real problem with dictatorships is that they always feel constrained when it comes to the rules of the game.

RE/14ymedio. You are among the promoters of a project that recommends using these paths. At what point is that project right now?

MCM. The process began in 2022 with the help of the Council for Democratic Transition in Cuba and the D Frente platform. Julio Ferrer, an independent lawyer, warned us that in March 2020 Law 131 had come into force, which regulates how signatures must be collected for any citizen initiative. A person has to start by going to the National Electoral Council to request certification of their voter status.

As cumbersome as it may seem and be, this is a step forward compared to the time of the Varela Project, when, once the first 11,000 signatures were delivered, the Government demanded the requirement that each signature had to be authenticated before a notary.

Before each incursion of ours, they raised the fence of the requirements to make our civic exercise more difficult.

RE/14ymedio. And have these certifications been achieved?

MCM. Obtaining them has been an odyssey. We start by going to the Municipal Electoral Councils. In some, after consulting with their superiors, they accepted our request and signed a copy as acknowledgment of receipt, others did not. It was all very irregular and that is why we went to the National Electoral Council, first to Ferrer to insist and finally obtain the first voter certification delivered in Cuba. Later, I investigated why the rest of the requests made in different provinces had not been processed.

RE/14ymedio. What did they answer?

MCM. A legal advisor told us that the processing had to be done in each Provincial Electoral Council. That’s what we set out to do, only to find out that it wasn’t at that level either. Before each of our incursions, they raised the hurdle of requirements to make civic exercise more difficult for us. So far, eight voters have received their certification among a dozen applications.

RE/14ymedio. Between criticism from your own side and bureaucratic obstacles from the other, the result seems quite uncertain?

MCM. Our determination is to continue jumping hurdles. From law to law, and from below, that is still the best path.

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Cuba: The New Minority

Meeting of the Council of Ministers chaired by Miguel Díaz-Canel in 2022. (Studies Revolution)

14ymedio, Reinaldo Escobar, Havana, 17 February 2024 — If it were possible to conduct a national survey without the participants being afraid to answer truthfully and with the guarantee that the results will not be manipulated, I dare to say that when asked, “Are you satisfied with the management of those who govern?”, we would see that the vast majority would mark the “no” box. If the question were more precise and investigated the popular will to carry out a profound change in the system, the same majority would mark the “yes” box.

I refuse to believe that all the people I talk to, those with who agree with me, in a bus, a taxi, a line or the privacy of their homes are lying when they show their disagreement with the rulers or when they project a new way of living in Cuba. In any case, if they were to lie, it would be to say that everything is fine and that socialism is the solution, but they would do it out of fear.

I have known many who believed in the project that was intended to build communism in Cuba and who today no longer believe in it, but I don’t know anyone who, having really been against it, have been convinced that the proposals of the only party allowed are the desired future for the country. There are many imposters among those who applaud, but the only ones who pretend are the State Security agents infiltrated into the opposition. continue reading

In any case, if they were to lie, it would be to say that everything is fine and that socialism is the solution, but they would do it out of fear

Communist Party militancy represents less than 9% of the Cuban population, but its presence in Parliament, in the Council of State and in the Council of Ministers exceeds 98%. These abysmal differences between a minority that rules and a majority that must obey are cemented in Cuba on apparent political differences, far from the entrenched divergences between Sunnis and Shiites that fractured Iraq or the ethnic conflicts between Tutsi and Hutu that ended with a genocide in Rwanda. Camagüey will never be separatist like Chechnya; the devotees of the Ocha Rule (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)* will not promote a massacre of Catholics; the war between blacks and whites that occurred in 1912** will not be repeated.

When those who occupy the seats in the spheres of power are a minority, they can only maintain their prevalence through force, expressed in the intimidating presence of repressive institutions, the political control of the judicial spheres and a network of collaborators dedicated to betraying and participating in acts of repudiation.

This structure can be corroded from below or from above.

Loyalty to historical nonagenarians is still the best currency to stay afloat

Here below you can see that, although many people continue to pay their fee as members of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), they only do it to keep appearances before a presumed “verification” to ascend at work, but no one is on night guard anymore, and the private businesses that pay better salaries than the State do not do verifications. The aspiration to emigrate, which entails the requirement to demonstrate a credible fear, far exceeds the ambition to be head of something in a State entity. The presidency of the CDR does not determine who is going to install a landline phone and, in short, with cell phones the communication issue is resolved.

“Up there” is where you can best see the masquerade dance. Loyalty to historical nonagenarians is still the best currency to stay afloat. But that minority that mostly occupies the positions in the chamber of power is composed of human beings who, no matter how cynical and opportunistic they are, realize that their commitment to those who rule is in contradiction to their responsibility to those they supposedly represent.

They are in the minority, and the majority realize it.

Translator’s notes:
*Resolution 46/182 and other resolutions affirm that UN humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence from political motivations.
**The “Little Race War” in 1912 was a series of protests and uprisings in Cuba, in which the Cuban armed forces put down a rebellion by black Cubans in the eastern part of the country

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Older Generation Demonstrates Its Ineptitude in Dealing with the Devastating Crisis Cuba is Experiencing

As is common knowledge, major decisions cannot be made in Cuba before consultations with and approval from the trio of nonagenarians who hold the reins of power. (Cubaenvivo.net)

14ymedio, Reinaldo Escobar, February 2, 2023 — The economic measures that were widely dubbed “el paquetazo“* — the package — were unpopular but necessary. Even from a coldly economic perspective, however, they seemed to be too little too late.

The recent dismissal of the economics minister, Alejandro Gil, indicates that the decision to postpone increases in the price of fuel and public transportation is not due solely to an alleged virus or because Cimex’ computer networks got hacked, as has been reported, but to a change in policy to the detriment of the package’s promoter.

As is common knowledge, major decisions cannot be made in Cuba before consultations with and approval from a trio of nonagenarians — Raúl Castro, Ramiro Valdés y José Ramón Machado — who hold the reins of power. Once they have signed off, then the politburo weighs in, followed by the Communist Party Central Committee and lastly the complacent legislature, at which point the Council of Ministers is only too happy to give its approval.

What could the triumvirate’s motivation be? This is almost impossible to know. They are driven by factors both biological and ideological, and by family commitments, about which we can only speculate. Where Gil ultimately ends up in the Cuban political hierarchy now that he is no longer economics minister is still unknown. This raises the question of whether he was fired or has “failed up” as those whose job performance is lacking yet who still manage to climb the ladder of power are jokingly described. continue reading

The nonagenarians may have calculated that, if the package’s measures took effect right now, the resulting social upheaval could occur before their ultimate biological hour of reckoning arrived

Perhaps Gil was too cautious and Cuba’s khaki-clad leaders needed a figure who could convey greater speed and toughness in implementing the measures. Or perhaps his name became too quickly associated in the public’s mind with an acceleration of economic reforms and this set off alarm bells in the older generation, whose hands still steer the ship of state.

Maybe this is just one round in a complex boxing match. This time, the almost hundred-year-old guardians of orthodoxy have won, ejecting a technocrat from the ring. He has been knocked out an apparatchik, but that does not rule out future fights. What has become clear is that the Cuban leadership no longer seems as rock solid as it once was. It cracks under pressure and sends the public an unfortunate message: uncertainty.

If this was a fight between anxious traditionalists and bureaucrats worried about economic asphyxiation — officials who were looking for small ways to preserve the system but ventilate it financially — the traditionalists have won. Gil’s departure may be celebrated, but it could be the worst news for Cuba’s short-term future. They used him as a scapegoat but that does not stop inflation, nor does it revalue the peso much less improve what is served on Cuban dining tables.

But if the obdurate traditionalists have won this round, we must know why.

The nonagenarians may have calculated that, if the package’s measures took effect right now, the resulting social upheaval could occur before their ultimate biological hour of reckoning arrived. Prolonging the agony of the country and its people in exchange for not having to pay in life for the consequences of a disaster for which they are completely responsible illustrates the depth of their selfishness.

Perhaps the settling of scores is not over. As the popular saying goes, “the goat that breaks the drum pays with its skin.” Especially if he is a scapegoat.

*Translator’s note: “Paquetazo” is basically ‘package’, but the ending ‘azo’, signifying a blow, adds a certain heft to it. (See “Maleconazo“) See also from Spanishtogo.app: “Paquetazo, a term used predominantly in Latin America, refers to a package of economic reforms implemented by the government that often includes a series of austerity measures. Over time, it has become a popular term among citizens to express discontent with these policies.”

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