Miguel Alejandro Hayes – Translating Cuba

Despair in Cuba’s Gas Lines After Five Months Without Supply

In Guanabacoa, propane had not been sold for five months / 14ymedio

14ymedio, José Lassa and Mercedes García, Havana / Sancti Spíritus, 2 June 2025 — The arrival of liquefied gas (propane) in the Cuban capital has brought anything but tranquility. It had been three months since many customers could get it, but they were not even concerned: the sale was for those who had been unable to buy since December; that is, for five months.

“There are huge lines, people are almost beating each other up, it’s hell,” said a resident from Boyeros on Sunday. “I got February 14; who knows when it’s my turn, because they are now selling it for December. I have a neighbor who had to leave the line because she says it was infernal. A real fight must have happened.”

In Guanabacoa, the despair was total. The managers were trying to organize a line in front of a population that was desperate for the 199 tanks they had to sell, making it clear that most would leave empty-handed. There, at the point of sale of Fuente and Obispo, chaos was the word that defined the situation.

The organizers read the names of the people who could come and buy and tried to coordinate so that no one would sneak in. The day was marked by discomfort, arguments, screams and an overwhelming heat from which some protected themselves with umbrellas while others tried to shelter from the sun by gluing themselves to nearby buildings.

The Cuban Petroleum Union (Cupet) had announced the start of the sale of propane in the western provinces for this Saturday, through all channels on social networks and the official press. Cupet stated that the process would begin on May 31 and would be carried out daily in an organized manner, delivering a single cylinder per customer to those who couldn’t buy in February.

But organization has been impossible in Havana, although almost half the population (more than 280,000 households) receive gas service through pipelines. These customers are supplied by natural gas coming from the continue reading

plants in Puerto Escondido, Varadero and Boca de Jaruco, all part of Energas, a joint venture managed by Canada’s Sherritt International and Cuba’s state-owned Cupet.

It was unfortunate that on the very same day that the chaotic sale of propane began, the plant at Boca de Jaruco went out of service due to a breakdown in one of the Energas outlet lines, disrupting the flow of the other two. This affected generation and “increased the impact,” according to the Ministry of Energy and Mines in a message on social networks calling for calm and assuring that four turbines had already been recovered.

Protests over the disorganization have multiplied in all the municipalities of the capital. Those who paid 10 pesos on Ticket to secure a digital place in line complain that it isn’t applied. They demand that priority be given to those who have not bought since 2024, something that is not always true, or they claim that corruption among organizers is taking place.

“I call on the managers to organize lines at the points of sale and not leave it in the hands of corrupt coleros* [people paid by others to wait in line for them] and delegates. I hope the police and the army will support me,” shouted one customer.

The sale is limited, for the moment, to one tank of propane / 14ymedio

The situation contrasts with the tranquility in Sancti Spíritus, where calm reigns thanks to a good functioning of the Ticket application. “There have been no lines or fighting, because it is organized by Facebook and other networks,” says a resident of the capital city, where the sale also began on December 31 for the physically disabled, vulnerable and those who had not received it since December. On Sunday, it was reserved for those who paid 10 pesos for the virtual line. “Here everyone knows when it’s their turn. I should get it next week because I have number 33 on Ticket.”

Of the 150 days in the year that they had the propane, on 117 there was none on the island, according to the minister of Energy and Mines, Vicente de la O Levy, last Thursday on Miguel Díaz-Canel’s podcast “From the Presidency.” They both admitted that it happened when the ship carrying the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) that is being sold now has arrived but had not been unloaded, because there was no money to pay for it. They stated that the conditions for doing so in advance and the banking problems arising from the US embargo also complicate the operation.

These same problems, they said, are being repeated with a second ship that was “hired and paid,” which makes it foreseeable that the gas shortage will be repeated, with repercussions for the population.

In addition, as Díaz-Canel and De la O Levy notes, the lack of LPG influences the electricity demand, which increases by 200 or 250 megawatts the daily power required. But this is not the only problem. Many people are likely to buy the gas ‘on the left’ (the informal market), either from outsiders or by underestimating the serious consequences that can occur; or they are forced to cook with fire, even having to sacrifice their furniture if they cannot afford the high price of coal.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Private-Sector Retail Sales Lead to the Decline of Cuba’s Digital Currency

Cuba’s ’Freely Convertible Currency’ (MLC) Is Becoming Less Effective as a Tool for Extracting Hard Currency Remittances.

The MLC is a digital version of the convertible peso (CUC), issued by the Banco Metropolitano, Banco de Crédito y Comercio, and Banco Popular de Ahorro / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Miguel Alejandro Hayes, Miami, May 18, 2024 — After being suspended for several months, Western Union’s remittance service to Cuba resumed on May 9. The operation basically remains the same. Cubans living overseas will make deposits in U.S. dollars which recipients in Cuba will receive as “freely convertible currency” (MLC) via an ATM card.

It is worth remembering that the MLC is, in essence, a digital version of the now defunct convertible peso (CUC). It is the local currency into which three banks — Banco Metropolitano, Banco de Crédito y Comercio, and Banco Popular de Ahorro — convert remittance transfers.

That seems like good news but is it really? And for whom?

The MLC is essentially a mining operation masquerading as monetary policy, a way to insure that remittance transfers end up in state-owned banks. The more remittances Cubans living overseas send through Western Union, the more hard currency there will be in accounts at the aforementioned Cuban banks.

At the same time, earnings for the military-run business conglomerate GAESA are growing thanks to Fincimex, its financial investment and remittance company. Channeling foreign currencies through state banks is not conducive to secrecy, something on which GAESA relies to run its operations. Remittances could just as well move through the military’s continue reading

own banks such as the International Financial Bank (BFI) or directly through foreign banks. Fincimex has successfully promoted its own bank cards, which are not linked to state banks, as a way to tap into the remittance market. It has also announced alternatives to Western Union, specifically Tocopay and Vidaipay, as a means of sending dollars to Cuba. So the resumption of Western Union’s operations is not exactly great news for GAESA.

At the same time, the MLC subjects Cubans to economic kidnapping. This fake currency is only useful for purchasing goods sold through the network of military-owned hard currency stores, which are losing ground to SMEs,* privately owned shops and independent vendors.

On the other hand, if consumers have cash in the form of dollars, they can buy things directly from the private sector, exchange it at banks for MLC, or exchange it for Cuban pesos on the informal market.

This marked difference in practicality between the dollar and the MLC is reflected in the almost 100-peso difference in their respective exchange rates. To put it another way, the difference in value between 100 dollars and 100 MLC is almost equivalent to the price of three cartons of eggs [at 36 eggs per carton].

This suggests that, for those lucky enough to be getting remittances, it is currently much more advantageous to get them in the form of dollars rather than in MLC. So, though legal channels exist for transmitting remittances in MLC, there are more incentives to send dollars instead.

Similarly, if a segment of the Cuban diaspora — either through ignorance or for some other reason — starts remitting more MLC in the future, the supply of this currency on the informal market will grow. Then, due to the law of supply and demand, the MLC will depreciate, which will once again discourage its use because senders and receivers alike will prefer remittances to be in dollars, which have more value on the open market.

Going forward, it is highly unlikely that there will be a natural increase in the supply of consumer goods that someone can purchase with MLC

Going forward, it is highly unlikely that there will be a natural increase in the supply of consumer goods that someone can purchase with MLC. Its fate is tied to other factors.

The MLC is the most fictitious currency Cuba has ever had. It only exists and only has value because GAESA forces people to use it in order to buy things. The demand for it is artificial, its usefulness is limited. Why else would anyone want MLC other than to buy a specific random product at a GAESA store?

That is why the fate of the MLC as a currency depends on economic policy as it pertains to the supply of goods being sold for MLC. The more goods in quality and quantity that can be purchased with this currency, the more demand there will be for it.

On the other hand, the military and the government are facing a situation in which they have less ability to generate foreign reserves due to declining revenue, high costs and heavy debt burden. Therefore, all indications are that earnings from MLC stores will continue to decline, and with them the demand for their corresponding currency. Even so, the military has no other choice than to continue exploiting this tool and trying unsuccessfully to get the Cuban exile community to send more remittances.

The only question is how long the MLC will stick around. Cubans no longer need it to survive because SMEs offer a wider range of products, which consumers can purchase with pesos at the prevailing open-market exchange rate. The MLC will remain out there, following the pace of the economy, for as long as they decide to stick with it. More specifically, until they find another tool to extract hard currency. They are already experimenting with several.

*Translator’s note: English-language acronym for “small and medium-sized enterprise.”

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Why Are Cuba’s Provincial Governors Being Fired?

Though replacing provincial leaders is something that happens fairly regularly, the sheer number of party cadres who have been removed from office recently suggests that top military officials are concerned about something.

Susely Morfa, a diehard supporter of the regime, was removed as first-secretary of the Communist Party in Matanzas province in March / Radio Rebelde

14ymedio, Miguel Alejandro Hayes, Miami, May 2, 2024 — Something is going on up there. Over a dozen senior officials have been removed from office so far this year. Prominent on the list are party officials and governors in Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Matanzas, Holguín, Las Tunas and Cienfuegos.

The reason could be an issue common to each case that was of concern to the military leadership running the country. And considering that this elite group is motivated by money as well as the power to make even more money, one can surmise what interests the officials who were sacked may have been hindering.

The most important economic change that occurred in Cuba recently was the legalization of small businesses. Though these can be either private or state-owned, it is the former that predominate.

This change in the domestic economy has reduced economic centralization. Since they were legalized in 2021, small and medium-sized private businesses (MSMEs) have contracted with state agencies to purchase materials and resources, lease real estate, deliver goods and provide services. These formal business alliances come under the heading of Local Development Projects (PDLs). All of this is happening in a cooperative fashion, as public-private partnerships in which the “public” consists, to a large degree, of provincial governments and party officials. continue reading

MSMEs have gained greater economic importance and now play a larger strategic role in local life

Wealth creation, business financing and even foreign reserve earnings have been enhanced by the monetary flow between the private and public sectors. And it has happened without them necessarily having to rely on the country’s top leadership, much less on the military business community. As a result, MSMEs have gained greater economic importance and now play a larger strategic role in local life

That is why the creation of these new businesses, operating in conjunction with local power brokers, has led to a decentralization of decision-making authority in terms of state resources, creating new centers of power at the local level. In other words, economic decentralization.

The leaders of these new provincial fiefdoms are not about to change the system, however. And the cases of corruption that have come to light — the ones in Havana stand out due to the large number of them — are not an issue in and of themselves for a regime that promotes such practices as a means of individual survival.

The problem for the military elite is that the system only makes sense if they alone are in charge and do not feel threatened. Just because the private sector might be made up of trusted people, of people under their control, does not mean they will be allowed to get rich faster than the military business community itself. Party cadres will still be party cadres but they must not be allowed to become too important.

When it comes to power in Cuba, the thinking is that any form of decentralization is evil because it suggests a shift in the power dynamic, a relinquishing of decision-making to others, of allowing them to act unhindered by the establishment. And authoritarians always see self-autonomy as a threat.

That is why these actions by local officials suggest the beginnings of an economic counter-reformation. And though it is not an exact correlation, it so happens that the officials who were dismissed were from provinces where private-sector MSMEs and PDLs have had the greatest impact.

Unlike previous counter-reformations and purges that were purportedly aimed at rooting out corruption, this time the nation’s top leaders cannot afford to destroy the thing that is threatening them

In spite of everything, the private sector operates efficiently and effectively. In the domestic economy, it serves as a source of goods and services for consumers and provides something of a stimulus to the declining quality of life on the island.

Instead, the military can set limits on private MSMEs using the powers of the state. It can control them so that they do not shift the center of gravity yet take advantage of their results. To do this, they need the most trusted local officials, the ones who keep a low profile and do not have too many projects of their own. Officials with their own ambitions always pose a danger. That is why they are removed if they have to be removed.

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