Cuba: Mosquitoes, Garbage, and Chikungunya Are Rampant in the Military Neighborhood of San José De Las Lajas

The municipality of Mayabeque is experiencing one of its worst hygiene crises in decades

In the streets—if you can even call these shreds of torn-up asphalt streets—the garbage forms mountains that seem to have taken root. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, San José de las Lajas (Mayabeque),  Julio César Contreras, November 22, 2025 — At five in the afternoon, when a reddish light falls on the crumbling buildings of the Military Housing Complex in San José de las Lajas (Mayabeque), the same ritual occurs: doors close, windows are boarded up with cardboard, and neighbours hurry inside before the swarm of mosquitoes takes over the neighbourhood. There’s no need to look at the clock. The buzzing announces it.

In the streets—if you can even call these shreds of torn-up asphalt streets—trash forms mountains that seem to have taken root. Plastic bags, used diapers, food scraps, pieces of wood, and even broken furniture accumulate for days and weeks. A dog rummages through the garbage as if searching for an improbable treasure, while a neighbour rides by on a bicycle, dodging green puddles where the stagnant water reeks of feces and neglect.

San José de las Lajas is experiencing one of its worst sanitation crises in decades, but in the Military Housing Complex—an aging complex with inadequate infrastructure—the situation has reached unbearable levels. According to the official press in Mayabeque province, the province is seeing an increase in cases of fever associated with chikungunya and dengue, which has prompted “intensive fumigation efforts” in several municipalities. But these “efforts” have not reached their area, according to residents.

“The press says they’re using bazookas all over the city, but they haven’t come to my building.”

Orlando, a mechanical engineer and father of two, speaks to 14ymedio with a weariness evident in his eyes. “The press says they’re using bazookas [mosquito sprayers] all over the city, but they haven’t come to my building. Everyone in my house got it: first the boys, then my wife, and finally me. This virus finished us off.” continue reading

The neighbourhood, built decades ago by small groups of low-ranking officers, has changed drastically. “There’s hardly anyone left from those days,” says Orlando. “The military left, and now the civilians who remain get a garbage truck from the municipal services every three or four months. They come, empty a container—if it hasn’t been stolen—and leave. The rest of the garbage is left lying on the ground. Nobody picks up anything.”

The images tell the whole story: an improvised garbage dump stretching for meters, an overflowing container, and buildings whose facades have long since lost their color. On the ground, water forms puddles that resemble breeding grounds for the Aedes aegypti mosquito. The breeding grounds, say the residents, aren’t just outside. “Rotten pipes, cisterns without lids, rooftop tanks full of filth… that’s where they breed,” explains Orlando.

The disease is advancing like a shadow. “At least five buildings are sick. In mine, almost all of them,” the engineer estimates. “It’s a fence you can’t escape.”

The elderly woman claims that the delegate of People’s Power “is just a figurehead.”

Lucía, a retired woman who lives alone, displays a mixture of annoyance and resignation. She has called the local Communist Party headquarters, the government, and the municipal and provincial Public Health departments. “The answer is always the same: they’ll fumigate when the fuel arrives. I’ve been hearing that since August.” Finally, sick and exhausted, she opted for a paid solution: hiring a fumigator herself.

“I found him on Revolico, 600 pesos per visit. He came two days in a row with the bazooka. He told me himself that first he had to fumigate two blocks that were his responsibility near the East Polyclinic, and then he could come here. You can see how we are. I spent 1,200 pesos out of the 3,200 in my checkbook.”

The elderly woman asserts that the representative of the People’s Power “is just a figurehead.” She says it without anger, with the voice of someone exhausted from waiting for official solutions that never come.

Meanwhile, life in the Military Housing Complex is a succession of fevers, joint pain, vomiting, and sleepless nights. Every day, news breaks of someone else who has fallen ill. Outside, the children no longer play. The adults walk as best they can, their steps almost robotic due to the joint pain caused by chikungunya, their eyes fixed on the ground.

“The country that boasts of its medical prowess can’t even handle a mosquito.”

Authorities, for their part, report on television a decrease in cases and “greater vector control.” In practice, the epidemic remains out of control. Cuba’s Ministry of Public Health reported this Friday that 6,597 new cases of fever were registered the previous day, in addition to confirming 847 cases of dengue and 753 of chikungunya in a single day. Meanwhile, Durán explained, in his daily television address, that chikungunya, the main illness affecting the country, has now reached a total of 31,513 cases, including both confirmed and suspected cases.

“You feel embarrassed for them,” says Lucía. “A country that boasts of its medical prowess can’t even handle a mosquito.”

In the distance, a woman hangs a sheet out onto the balcony to dry. The wind carries a sour smell from the garbage. A truck drives by without stopping. The dog starts rummaging through the trash again. The neighbourhood settles into its routine of survival.

In the Military District, the only thing that moves with constant frequency is disease.

Translated by GH

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Cristina Fernández De Kirchner Sees Her Argentine Empire Crumble After the Seizure of 20 Properties

The decision also affects her children, who had inherited assets, deposits, and shares

Of the seized properties, 19 were registered in the names of her children, Máximo and Florencia, in addition to one property registered in Cristina’s own name. / Wikimedia

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/EFE, Havana, November 21, 2025 — Argentine Justice ordered the almost total confiscation of the emblematic assets of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her children, Máximo and Florencia, to cover approximately 685 billion Argentine pesos derived from the final conviction for fraudulent administration and steering of public works contracts in the province of Santa Cruz.

The Federal Oral Court No. 2 has ordered the seizure of approximately 20 properties, primarily located in Río Gallegos and El Calafate (Patagonia, southern Argentina), which will now be under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for administration and subsequent public auction. The former president, sentenced in 2025 to six years in prison and permanently barred from holding public office in the Vialidad case, now faces the financial dismantling of her family’s inheritance.

The hardest blow falls on Máximo and Florencia, her children. Many of the properties now subject to seizure were already in their names, thanks to a meticulous schedule of donations and transfers made between 2006 and 2016. In that last year, Cristina transferred 50% of 26 properties to them, in addition to bank deposits and shares. That move, presented at the time as a “family” asset restructuring, is now being interpreted by the courts as part of the same criminal scheme.

All those convicted must use their assets to cover the full amount of the damages, even if those assets are held by family members or third parties, according to a mechanism known as “joint and several confiscation.” This legal mechanism allows for the seizure of the 19 properties registered in the names of Máximo and Florencia, as well as a property in Cristina’s own name, lots in El Calafate, and assets linked to the hotel business. continue reading

Visits to the Peronist leader are restricted to only twice a week, a maximum of two hours, and no more than three people per shift.

While the Supreme Court prepares to act as administrator and auctioneer of the assets that for years represented the economic power of Kirchnerism, Cristina Fernández’s daily life has been spent under house arrest since June of this year. The same Federal Oral Court 2 that signed the seizure order has just restricted visits to the Peronist leader to only twice a week, for a maximum of two hours, and with no more than three people per visit. The decision comes after a meeting with nine economists that exceeded the limits of her legal status.

The new rules do not affect her immediate family, assistants, lawyers, or healthcare personnel, but they do limit Cristina’s ability to continue operating politically from her home, which she herself renamed San José 1111 on social media. On X, the former president attributed the decision to the “media circus” and defended the meeting with economists as part of a project for “productive and federal growth for the 21st century.”

Behind the fall of the Kirchner economic empire lies a geography that extends beyond Argentina, as a significant part of the family’s recent history unfolded in Havana. Florencia Kirchner traveled to Cuba in February 2019 to participate in a screenwriting course, already a key figure in the corruption cases involving her family. Just as she was due to return to Buenos Aires, Cuban doctors forbade her from flying, diagnosing her with post-traumatic stress disorder and mild lymphedema in her legs, in addition to other health problems. Cristina herself blamed the “fierce persecution” by the justice system for her daughter’s “physical deterioration.”

Between March 2019 and March 2020, Fernández traveled to the island at least ten times to visit her daughter.

From March 14, 2019, Havana became the former president’s second political and emotional home. Between March 2019 and March 2020, she traveled to the island at least ten times to visit Florencia. Some trips were to spend the end-of-year holidays, others to welcome 2020 with her daughter, and still others combined family and political engagements, such as the presentation of her book, Sinceramente, at the Havana Book Fair in February 2020.

Meanwhile, the Argentine Justice system imposed conditions: Florencia had to appear every 15 days at the Argentine Embassy in Cuba to report on her state of health and any changes of address, a form of minimal control over a key figure in the corruption cases involving the family.

From Cuba, Cristina fostered a narrative in which the Island was presented as a medical and political refuge from an Argentine Justice system supposedly aligned with “the hegemonic media.”

The thread that connects Río Gallegos, El Calafate, and Havana is that of a power that believed it could shield itself with properties, legal privileges, and international connections, and that is now discovering that the courts can also seize deeds, accounts, and hotels. Kirchnerism insists on speaking of “persecution.” The judicial reality, however, shows the end of an impunity that, for years, traveled first class between Buenos Aires and Havana. So far, Cuban state media have avoided mentioning the seizures.

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Cuban Prime Minister Manuel Marrero “Is Behind” the Trial of Gil Fernández for Alleged Collaboration With the CIA

The sister of the former Minister of Economy describes a plot devised by the prime minister and the military sector of the Cuban regime to protect their economic interests

The prime minister of Cuba, Manuel Marrero Cruz, and Alejandro Gil Fernández, then Minister of Economy, in a 2023 photo. / Granma

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, November 22, 2025 — María Victoria Gil, the sister of Alejandro Gil who was tried last week behind closed doors for espionage, has said that the country for which the former minister is accused of spying is the United States, specifically the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and suggests that the case against her brother was instigated by Prime Minister Manuel Marrero. In an interview with Miami-based Cuban journalist Mario J. Pentón, she said that her source, whom she cannot name, “is very reliable” and that the information “is corroborated.”

“What I am going to say is what my brother has really not been able to say,” said the former state television host and attorney. About her revelations Pentón says: “Supposedly the CIA gave him the Ordering Task to destroy Cuba; you know where this thread leads.” And Vicky Gil adds: “They always blame the United States for all the failures of a failed system that is corrupt to the core and that has been able to totally and absolutely destroy an entire country.”

Gil’s sister reiterated that the former Minister of Economy “categorically denies all facts related to the espionage” and that, as confirmed by a source close to the case, the defense made by lawyer Abel Solá López was “brilliant.” This same informant told 14ymedio that they expect the next trial of Gil, for more than a dozen crimes such as embezzlement, tax evasion, influence peddling and money laundering, and in which other senior officials of the regime are involved, will take place next Wednesday.

This same informant told 14ymedio this Saturday that they expect the next trial of Gil, for more than a dozen crimes, will take place next Wednesday

“In a country where the entire leadership is corrupt, how are you going to try an official for corruption, money laundering, influence peddling? You would have to try all of them,” observed Vicky Gil in the interview with continue reading

Pentón. So, she continued, they have to put on a “strong case,” which, brought by State Security, as happens in cases of espionage, “may be a total lie, but how do you prove it?”

The former presenter of De la Gran Escena on Cuban Television believes that “the least guilty of all that is happening with my brother is President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez,” because he was unaware, she claims, of the case being set up against Gil, who was his right-hand man. And she mentions, in this regard, the information about the prime minister that her source shared: on February 1, 2024, Marrero called Gil and told him that “his work as Minister of Economy and Planning has not yielded the expected results, that his work was poor, and, therefore, the next day he would be dismissed and must begin to hand over all the documentation relating to the ministry.”

The following day, continues Vicky, it was reported that her brother had been dismissed. “What is Miguel Díaz-Canel doing? Congratulate my brother for the good work,” she says about the tweet that the president posted on X on February 6, Gil’s birthday. On the other hand, according to her, the now-dismissed minister agreed to go to Marrero’s office for the delivery of the portfolio. “When my brother arrived there with all the documentation, he found that along with Manuel Marrero Cruz there were two officers from Cuban State Security,” who informed him that “he was under investigation.”

From that moment on, they took him and his wife, Gina María González García, “to one of those famous houses that the Ministry of the Interior has that are wonderful, that I know, that are in Nuevo Vedado, in Miramar…” “How do you know of them, Vicky?” asks Pentón. “I know two in Nuevo Vedado, because I was an agent for a short time, and I didn’t do well because I chickened out,” she confesses, specifying that she was picked to monitor the trafficking of artwork on the Island.

Gil instead went straight to the high security prison of Guanajay, in Artemisa, where his family has been able to visit him for “15 minutes every 15 days”

In any event, Gil and his wife stayed in that house for four months, during which time nothing was known of them publicly. It was then, imagines Vicky, that a criminal investigation was ordered. Her brother was prosecuted, and her sister-in-law was acquitted and returned to their home in Miramar, one of the most affluent neighborhoods of the capital. Gil instead went straight to the high security prison of Guanajay, in Artemisa, where his family has been able to visit him for “15 minutes every 15 days,” says the former presenter.

To Pentón’s question about whether the prime minister is the one behind her brother’s arrest, María Victoria Gil reaffirms: “Yes, Marrero is the person in front and behind this whole trial against Alejandro Gil,” which she considers “a racket.” As for the crimes of corruption that are attributed to the former head of Economy, she adds, “Marrero has committed five times more.”

The confrontation between Gil — who comes from the civilian world — and Marrero — a colonel — evidences a possible operation mounted by the military-controlled Group of Business Administration (Gaesa), which would thus hold the former minister responsible for having affected its business and contributing to the widespread collapse of the economy with the Ordering Task*, the process of monetary and exchange unification that began on January 1, 2021.

For Vicky, it may come from somewhere else: “Perhaps my brother wanted to put a stop to Marrero’s shameful waste and disloyalty.” Without giving more details, she adds, “We know how corrupt that world is. What more proof of the corruption do you need, and how little does the Cuban government care about the people of Cuba that when you put them all together, they can’t even close one button on their guayaberas?”

*Translator’s note: The “Ordering Task” [Tarea Ordenamiento] was a collection of measures that include eliminating the Cuban Convertible Peso (CUC), leaving the Cuban peso as the only national currency, raising prices, raising salaries (but not as much as prices), opening stores that take payment only in hard currency which must be in the form of specially issued pre-paid debit cards, and a broad range of other measures targeted to different elements of the Cuban economy. 

Translated by Regina Anavy

Havana Is No Longer Spared From Eight-Hour Power Cuts

“From 6:00 pm onwards, the most central area of Regla seems like a pitch black hole.”

“Perhaps a few lights here and there, from a café with plants, but the rest of us have to go out onto the pavement.” / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Darío Hernández, Havana, 22 November 2025 — “Chico, here in the neighbourhood we’re used to darkness at this time of day,” says Rodolfo, a 64-year-old man sitting at the door of his house on Martí Street, the main avenue in Regla. “By 6:00 pm, the most central area looks like a pitch black hole. Maybe there’s a light here and there, from a café with a generator, but the rest of us have to go out onto the pavement with chairs or sit on the walls and wait for the power to come back on.”

Yaima has already become accustomed to power cuts disrupting the schedule. “You more or less go by what the company says,” she says, although lately they have been lasting up to 20 or 30 minutes longer than announced. “I’m used to it now, but this week, as has happened on other occasions, the schedules have been completely off.”

Havana residents are the least affected by the Electric Union, while the rest of Cubans protest, but the energy crisis is already hitting so hard that no one is spared. “With the utmost calm, they send the message that certain blocks have had to be affected due to a generation deficit, and they ruin your plans,” he protests. On Wednesday, my children went to bed with a piece of bread because at 10 p.m., when the power came back on, they weren’t going to eat.”

Power cuts during the early hours of the morning last more than three to four hours.  / 14ymedio

On that day, several units at the Felton, Santa Cruz del Norte, Renté and Cienfuegos thermoelectric power stations were out of service or undergoing maintenance, and 91 distributed generation plants were out of service due continue reading

to a lack of fuel. The drop in supply from the main partners, Mexico and Venezuela, is – so far this year – 35% compared to 2024, a year in which there had also been a sharp cut in oil imports. The scale of this crisis has reached an unsustainable point and has simultaneously affected the six “blackout blocks” several times. Power cuts during the early hours of the morning are more than 3 or 4 hours.

The endless explanations from the authorities about the state of the national energy system and how it will be fixed – announcements that have been made for at least five years, during which time it has only gotten worse – fill minutes on TV’s Round Tables and prime-time news programmes that will not reach those who might be interested. “Here, for more than a week, it has not been possible to watch television from approximately four to eight or nine o’clock. This is bloody awful. Oh, and that’s not to mention the water, which arrives here every other day at that time. When the power comes on, all that’s left is a trickle of water,” Rodolfo continues in a very alarming complaint given the current health context on the island.

“Imagine, with these blackouts I can only work three or four hours a day” / 14ymedio

To make matters worse, the telephone and internet signals are lost when the power is cut. “On other occasions, the power went out here and there was no connection, but you could go out onto the roof and more or less access WhatsApp or Facebook during the four hours of the power cut,” says Yaima, whose work as a sales manager for a micro-SME [small business] is also affected. “Now it goes out, and the next second you lose the signal completely. You can’t call your mother, you can’t entertain yourself or, worse, as in my case, you can’t work. I get paid on commission, per customer I serve. Imagine, with these power cuts I can only work three or four hours a day,” she complains.

To top it off, the telephone signal and internet are lost with the blackouts. “There were times when the power went out and there was no connection, but you could go to the roof and more or less get on WhatsApp or Facebook during the four hours of blackout,” says Yaima, whose work as sales manager for a small group of people is also affected. “Now the power goes out, and the next second you lose the signal completely. You can’t call your mother, you can’t entertain yourself, or worse, as is my case, you can’t work. I charge a commission for each customer, and imagine, with these blackouts I can only work three or four hours a day,” she laments.

The winter chill is also absent from the island this year, and after a few days of milder temperatures at the beginning of the month, the heat is keeping demand for fans and air conditioning high. This Friday, authorities estimate that 3,200 megawatts will be needed during peak hours, but the system can only generate 1,494, much less than half. Meanwhile, the authorities will continue to be embroiled in their war against El Toque and in the new “programme to correct distortions and boost the economy”, which will be discussed today at a round table that neither Rodolfo nor hundreds of thousands of Cubans will be able to see.

Translated by GH

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Cuba: There Are 19 Minors in “Critical Condition” and 44 Adults in Serious Condition Due to Chikungunya

Dr. Durán returns to his daily television program to report on the arbovirus epidemic.

Durán García acknowledged that this arbovirus – present in 14 provinces – is currently the main health problem. / Escambray

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, November 19, 2021 — A total of 63 patients are in intensive care units in Cuba due to chikungunya, including 19 minors in critical condition. This information comes from Dr. Francisco Durán, Director of Epidemiology at the Ministry of Public Health, who reported on Wednesday on what the government continues to call a “complex epidemiological situation” during the state television program Buenos Días.

The official’s report reveals the severity of the health crisis the country is experiencing, especially regarding chikungunya. He noted that 3,103 suspected cases of the disease were reported this Tuesday, “a high number for a single day.” He added that there are currently 2,216 diagnosed patients, of whom 126 are hospitalized.

Durán García acknowledged that this arbovirus – present in 14 provinces – is currently the main health problem, due to the number of infections and the severity of the symptoms, “which are extremely painful.” continue reading

This Tuesday, he noted, 3,103 suspected cases of this illness were reported, “a high number for a single day.”

This Tuesday, a report from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) indicated that Cuba registered an average of 700 new daily cases of this outbreak in October, the vast majority in Havana and Matanzas.

Regarding dengue fever, the specialist said that only 344 new cases were reported, although he did not provide total figures. In his appearance on Canal Caribe, where he will have a segment starting this Wednesday to report on the “fight against these arboviruses,” as he did previously for the COVID-19 pandemic, he also spoke about oropouche, and assured viewers that no new patients have been detected since September.

Furthermore, on Tuesday alone, 1,706 patients with “nonspecific febrile syndrome” were reported in the country, and it was noted that 3,226 people received medical attention, 16% of whom are hospitalized. Regarding the total number of cases, it was confirmed that 47,125 patients are currently hospitalized with one of these viruses.

The national director of Epidemiology acknowledged that the infection figures for both illnesses reported by the authorities “do not always correspond to reality,” because many sick people do not go to medical services and, therefore, are not officially registered.

He also reported that the Aedes aegypti mosquito infestation remains at 0.70%, a figure he described as “high,” as it implies “significant transmission possibilities.” Despite fumigation and larvicide application campaigns, the official himself admitted that the actions “remain insufficient.” He explained that, in many cases, the brigades lack sufficient personnel or that the equipment used to carry out these tasks is either unusable or “broken.”

In response, he accused the authorities of not carrying out these campaigns in places like Sancti Spíritus, Matanzas, Pinar del Río and Artemisa, especially since “these provinces have a high transmission rate.”

On the other hand, he denied the presence of the West Nile virus in the country, assuring that the Institute of Tropical Medicine “has not diagnosed any cases” after carrying out hundreds of tests, although he conceded that other arboviruses are circulating on the Island.

“Arboviruses. Which ones? We can’t know because there’s no reagent.”

The official, however, did not report on the number of deaths in the country from any of these illnesses. The last officially reported figure was three, a month ago. However, both the high activity at funeral services, reported by this newspaper , and numerous social media posts contradict this.

A Facebook post from Tuesday, for example, tells the story of a 24-year-old teacher who died without a clear diagnosis but who, “like many, her only ailment for three months and a little more was ‘some arbovirus’.”

Regarding the lack of diagnosis, the user asks in the message: “Arboviruses. Which ones? We can’t know because there’s no reagent. How to treat them? With whatever you can manage and plenty of fluids, which doctors say are good for everything. Of course, if you’re getting water, the fact that it’s colored doesn’t mean it’s not potable, according to the authorities.”

The complaint was also directed at the institutions, given their lack of answers. “We don’t know; no institution in our country is designed to answer the people’s questions. Their function seems to be to justify every action,” he said, also pointing the finger at doctors for not reporting the lack of supplies and for “their lack of precise knowledge about what has been ailing the people for some months now. We don’t know; perhaps no one wants to take responsibility.”

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“Fight for My Freedom” Is the Cry of Yosvany Rosell, After 30 Days on a Hunger Strike

The Cuban political prisoner faces dehydration and possible kidney failure

Yosvany Rosell / Facebook

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Mexico, November 21, 2025 — The health of Cuban political prisoner Yosvany Rosell García Caso continues to deteriorate after almost a month of hunger strike. The activist, who was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his participation in the Island-wide protests of 11 July 2021 [’11J’], was rushed to the Hospital Clínico Quirúrgico of Holguín. According to his wife, Mailin Sánchez, she was able to visit him yesterday and attend a medical consultation in which the doctors expressed their concern about possible irreversible dehydration and kidney failure.

Despite his physical deterioration, which is palpable in both his weight loss and the deterioration of his voice, Rosell remains firm in his position. “Do not ask me to stop my strike, I ask you to fight for my freedom,” was the message he sent, reaffirming that his refusal to receive treatment constitutes an act of radical protest against the unjust treatment he claims to have suffered in prison.

“Don’t ask me to stop my strike, I ask you to fight for my freedom.”

His family has been making an urgent appeal to international agencies for immediate action. They consider that the case is evidence of serious violations, both because of the prison conditions in which he has remained and because of the lack of humanitarian response to his protest.

Rosell began the strike on October 23, demanding a definitive change in his confinement regime. He alleges that prisoners considered to be opponents are subjected to constant pressure, prolonged isolation and practices which he describes as abusive. His family says that this is the seventh time continue reading

the activist has been on a hunger strike, despite being hypertensive and suffering from heart disease, which increases the risks.

The family insists that every day counts and that international intervention could prevent a fatal outcome. Meanwhile, human rights organizations watch the evolution of the activist with alarm. They fear that the continuation of his hunger strike could have irreversible consequences. In the midst of this situation, his wife expressed on social media that Yosvany received religious assistance this Friday.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Meliá Blames “Social Network Campaigns” for the Poor Results of Tourism in Cuba

Other hotels suffer more than the Spanish, and the country’s revenues fall another 12%, with an occupancy rate of only 18.9% of the available rooms

Year after year, occupancy data deteriorate with no end in sight. / 14ymedio/Archive

14ymedio bigger

14ymedio, Madrid, November 21, 2025 — “In Cuba, there are signs of recovery despite the persistence of discouraging social network campaigns.” The phrase is not from the Minister of Tourism or any Cuban hierarchy: it appears in the quarterly results report that the Balearic hotel Meliá is obliged to make public as a company listed on the Spanish stock exchange. The company is proud of having recovered a derisory 0.7% occupancy between June and September, which is not little in the panorama of the Island, which so far this year has not managed to fill even one-fifth of the rooms available.

On Thursday, the National Bureau of Statistics and Information (ONEI) published its balance sheet for the first nine months of the year. There are few reasons to be satisfied, with an occupancy rate — in international tourism — of just 18.9%. Income also fell by 12%, from 94,320,614,700 pesos in the same period of 2024 to 82,885,5516,000 this year. 

Although the exchange rate applied by the government to the sector is unknown, the Cuban economist Pedro Monreal has concluded that everything indicates that it is 120, so the amount represents about $690.7 million, compared to the $786 million that accumulated last year at this point. This is gross revenue, from which expenses must be deducted, not disclosed but very high, because Cuba has to import everything from food to towels for the hotels, all owned by the State. continue reading

The amount is about $690.7 million, compared to the $786 million that it accumulated last year at this point

No indicator is saved, since there was also a drop in travelers, now known from the monthly reports, by 20.5% up to September, including  the number of nights they decide to spend on the Island: a drop of 20%. If up to a year ago foreigners had more than 10 million nights in Cuba, now there are two million fewer overnight stays. In summary, the four main indicators outlined by ONEI show a substantial decline of the sector.

From the Meliá data it is clear that its hotels get the best share, since the occupancy in its facilities was 40.2%, but all that shines is not gold. The hotel has had to continue to lower rates — 76.2 euros is now its average price, 8.7% less — and, therefore, its performance per room (Revpar) fell by 6.9%, reaching 30 euros. The hotel states in its report that the current Black Friday with its offers and the bet of the tour operators — facing the drop in direct reservations — will end up returning Cuba to its place.

The document takes stock and makes it clear that its bet on Cuba continues against all odds: “US restrictions and the complex energy situation remain the main challenges. However, the creation of a supply chain of our own has improved sourcing, allowing us to gain market share and strengthen our position in the market,” it says in relation to its company Mesol, from which this newspaper has tried to gather information without obtaining any response. In addition, air capacity has increased using the charter mode, especially from key source markets such as Canada.”

The return of the Canadians had been anticipated by Juan Carlos García Granda, minister of the branch, in some tourist areas, but this has not been supported by the current data. After a season of persistent falls, the Canadians return persistently to the Island, being one of the few nationalities that grows in the month of September, when 12.7% more travelers arrived from that country. 

However, we will have to wait for the development of the last quarter to know whether it is a mirage, since in global terms, Canadians still represent 20% less than in the first nine months of last year. 

Canadians return to the Island persistently, being one of the few nationalities that grows in the month of September, when 12.7% more travelers arrived from that country

Few nationalities have grown in this period, and some of those that do are with a low number of visitors. Among them are Argentina (7.3%), Colombia (11.2%), Turkey (9%) and Peru, (27%) but with only 10,382 tourists.

On the other hand, among those that fall — some of them plummet — are some of the main groups: Cubans abroad (20.7%), US (19.6%), Spain (27.1%) and Germany (43.5%). United Kingdom, where the drop is 56.8% -the largest of all countries listed — does not even count as a powerful nationality, bringing in only 10,175 tourists.

Also among Cuba’s partner countries there are notable collapses, especially — and although it has already strengthened — the Russians, who were the great hope of the year (it was expected to attract 200,000, but they didn’t come in 2024) and reached only 88,879, which is 37.2% less than in the same period of the previous year. The large resources and political efforts made to increase this group have proved fruitless, another failure in the bulky account of García Granda. 

Mexico, with 10% less, and Venezuela, with a 20% reduction, have not helped in this sector either. The new hope seems to be China, with whom a strategy similar to that of Russia is being deployed and which is only just beginning to bear very poor fruit. Although the coveted tourists of this nation grew by 4%, their total represents nothing for Havana: only 17,810 Chinese. Many, probably, are the ones who come to trade and monitor their investments. 

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Almost 50,000 Cubans Are Bedridden With Arbovirus Infections, and the Number of Critical Cases Continues To Rise

Dr Francisco Durán admitted on Cuban Television that this is a “fairly high figure” that “reflects the complexity of the disease”

Health clinic closed in Cárdenas, Matanzas, the epicentre of the epidemic. / EFE/Ernesto Mastrascusa

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, 21 November 2025 — In just one day, from Wednesday to Thursday, the number of patients in intensive care units due to chikungunya rose by 21 in Cuba. In total, there are now 81 cases, of which 61 are in serious condition and 20 are in critical condition. Of these, 48 are minors. In the same 24 hours, 4,708 patients with “non-specific fever syndrome” were also registered, which is how they enter the system, said Dr Francisco Durán García, director of epidemiology at the Ministry of Public Health, in a programme launched two days ago on Cuban television to report on the serious health situation facing the island.

The Cuban Ministry of Public Health reported on Friday that 6,597 new cases of patients with feverish symptoms were registered the previous day, in addition to confirming 847 cases of dengue and 753 cases of chikungunya in a single day. For his part, Durán explained in his television appearance today that chikungunya, the main disease affecting the country, now has a cumulative total of 31,513 cases, including confirmed and suspected cases.

On Thursday, the official released the total figures for the first time, which were very worrying. Currently, there are 47,125 patients bedridden with arbovirus, most of them in their own homes, he said. This is, he said, a “fairly high figure” that “reflects the continue reading

complexity of the disease”.

On Wednesday, Durán said, 620 new suspected cases were reported. “In just one day,” he emphasised. “You see how bad it is”. This, he went on, “without taking into account a significant number of patients who do not go to see the doctor.” There are 2,216 patients in hospital with this arbovirus.

This Wednesday, 107 cases of dengue fever were diagnosed in different provinces, bringing the total to 2,098.

As for dengue fever, the situation continues to get worse. On Wednesday, 107 cases of dengue fever were diagnosed in different provinces, bringing the total to 2,098. Regarding this disease, Durán said that “although it does not cause symptoms as severe as chikungunya – I say severe because of the discomfort it causes in people – it is very risky because it tends to become complicated at a certain point, and if the person does not have something as simple as hydration, they can die.”

Dr. Durán emphasised that people should see a doctor if they have a “persistent fever” or appear “dehydrated”. “In that case, you really need to do that quickly,” he warned.

He also spoke at length about the continuing “high infestation of the Aedes aegypti mosquito”, which is linked to “the rain that has fallen and is still falling” and “the piles of rubbish around here”. He warned: “While fumigation is important, sanitation is also important”.

Also on Thursday, what he did not talk about was people dying. On social media, however, they are increasingly reported. A few days ago, Cuban writer José Félix León, who lives in Barcelona, Spain, reported the death of a cousin in the Pinar del Río hospital due to COVID-19. “The ICU at that hospital is not big enough for the number of patients there, but those in power insist that there is no COVID in Pinar del Río,” he said. “Cuba is in a situation unlike anything it has ever experienced in its recent history. The diseases transmitted by the Aedes aegypti mosquito are killing and incapacitating people, and the government of El Fatso is not declaring a state of emergency.”

“How long are they going to keep denying reality?” says a driver from Holguín who for weeks has been transporting relatives of those who died from a virus. At the Mayabe cemetery, he says, “they confiscated a young woman’s phone for taking pictures showing the number of burials and coffins that came in a single day.” State Security was guarding the cemetery.

The document, published just three days ago, confirms that the first outbreak of this arbovirus occurred last July in Perico (Matanzas)

As this newspaper has confirmed, simple visits to funeral homes and cemeteries demonstrate that activity there is higher these days. So much so, that, at least in Havana, they are using vehicles from the telecommunications company Etecsa as hearses.

The space Dr. Durán now occupies—similar to what he had during the COVID-19 pandemic five years ago—reveals the extent of the regime’s concern, which ignored the situation for months. The Ministry of Health ‘s brand-new “management and research protocol for patients with chikungunya” reveals the degree to which this concern is exposed.

The document, published just three days ago, confirms that the first outbreak of this arbovirus occurred last July in Perico (Matanzas), and from there it spread throughout the island. In September, when infections from an unidentified virus had multiplied, local health authorities simply reprimanded the alarmed population. “There is no mysterious disease in Cárdenas,” declared Andrés Lamas Acevedo, director of the Matanzas Provincial Center for Hygiene and Epidemiology, at the time.

The epidemiological alert in that territory was of little use : the arbovirus had already escaped.

The protocol provides detailed information on the symptoms, stages of the disease, and risks for children, pregnant women, and those with other conditions, including co-infection with dengue or COVID-19. It also recommends medications to relieve fever and pain, such as paracetamol or metamizole, and, if these are ineffective, opioids, while avoiding aspirin and steroids.

“While chikungunya has a low mortality rate and is therefore generally considered non-fatal, deaths frequently occur in cases with comorbidities or with rarer but more severe symptoms of the disease,” the text warns. “Death is primarily due to pre-existing health problems or severe clinical manifestations in the elderly, infants, or immunocompromised patients.”

In the final pages of the protocol, the use of “natural and traditional medicine” is recommended. These, they indicate, “based on an integrative model of care, can be combined with the rest of the preventive measures and conventional treatment” and include herbal medicine, homeopathy, acupuncture or “related techniques” and ozone therapy, all of which lack any scientific basis.

Added to this is the sudden start in the production of natural repellent made with extracts of neem and caña santa [lemongrass], as reported by Venceremos, by the Medilip Oral Liquids Pharmaceutical Laboratory Company in Guantánamo, even though this type of mosquito repellent is not effective against the persistent Aedes aegypti.

The lack of medicine, on the other hand, means that Cubans don’t need this “encouragement” from the government to seek alternative remedies . Also in Holguín, a vendor recounts that, faced with the spread of chikungunya and the resulting limitations in movement and fatigue, “people are resorting to energy drinks to stay afloat.” The result, this small business owner assures, is that sales of these “anti-zombie products” have skyrocketed.

Meanwhile, Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently issued a travel alert for the island, following a similar one issued two months ago by the U.S. State Department, due to the “worsening health situation resulting from the spread of arboviruses.” The anticipated decline in tourism, coupled with recent economic measures against foreign companies , whose accounts have been frozen, threatens to create an apocalyptic situation in Cuba.

Translated by GH
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Ciego De Ávila, Cuba, Suffers Power Cuts Lasting up to 24 Hours at a Time

Priority circuits, such as the hospital and the dairy plant, are also affected.

Cargo Dispatch Office of the Ciego de Ávila Electric Company. / Invasor
14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, 21 November 2025– The electricity situation is critical, and only solar parks provide a “daytime respite.” With these words, without sugar coating it, and right from the headline, Invasor paints the picture in Ciego de Ávila this Friday. According to Lester Arencibia Bacallao, director of the Provincial Load Office of the Electricity Company, the territory is suffering from “maximum blackouts”, i.e. power cuts that last up to 24 hours a day.

For this reason, they are prioritising the circuits that supply power to “essential services”, such as the Provincial Hospital and the Dairy Plant. However, even these are not immune to power cuts: three and a half hours of blackout for every three and a half hours with power.

Arencibia responded to a “frequent concern among the population” – “Why are these circuits so extensive and not segmented to free up energy for more areas?” – without providing much clarification. “These circuits have been physically like this for many years. This is how they have been configured,” he explained to the provincial newspaper (which comments in a final note that the text was generated by artificial intelligence based on information provided by the official).

Making changes “requires very costly investments, such as laying 33-kilovolt lines and installing substations, resources that are not available in the current economic situation.”

Making changes, Arencibia explained, “requires very costly investments, such as laying 33-kilovolt (kV) lines and installing substations, resources that are not available in the current economic situation.”

As for the “non-priority” circuits, the aim is to ensure that power cuts do not exceed 12 consecutive hours, but the official acknowledged that with the current deficit “this is impossible”. He explained: “Sometimes, the circuits even exceed 12 to 14 hours. They have even reached 19 and 20 consecutive hours without power.” continue reading

He also addressed the extent to which solar parks alleviate the situation. Although he said that photovoltaic generation is “the main palliative” – in Ciego de Ávila there are three 21.4 MW solar parks and four smaller ones, with a total capacity of more than 76 MW – he pointed out that this type of energy “is intermittent”.

The greatest contribution they can make, between 10:30 and 14:30, is also fragile, simply caused by a cloud. “This volatile nature, coupled with the lack of storage systems, prevents this energy from being available in a stable manner and for the critical night-time peak hours,” says Invasor. Arencibia adds: “During the day, solar parks save many tonnes of fuel… and if we do the maths and didn’t have any of those parks, the situation would be much worse.”

Although the interview focused on the province of Ciego de Ávila, the official went on to draw conclusions about the rest of the country: until the “structural problems of national thermal power generation” are resolved, the situation “will continue to be complex”.

One of the damaged facilities was the Hermanos Díaz Oil Refining Company, which is responsible for fuel supplies throughout the east.

On the subject of energy, if there is any news in the official press, it refers to the effects of Hurricane Melissa, which almost a month later are still being felt in eastern Cuba. One of the damaged facilities was the Hermanos Díaz Oil Refining Company in Santiago de Cuba, which is responsible for fuel supplies from Las Tunas to Guantánamo. “Diesel, fuel for electricity generation, kerosene for mountainous areas, lubricants and other derivatives depend on its stable operation,” Juan Jesús Alfonso López, director of Refining at Cupet, told Sierra Maestra.

At the refinery, the newspaper reports, “work is continuing around the clock to restore the plant to full operation.” Hurricane-force winds – reaching speeds of up to 200 kilometres an hour – caused “severe damage to internal electrical networks, thermal insulation, sea containment barriers and other systems critical to the refining process.”

This Thursday, President Miguel Díaz-Canel, once again dressed in olive green, visited areas in the provinces of Santiago de Cuba and Granma, the hardest hit by the cyclone. He noted that 96.43% of electricity service has been restored. “There are still 9,000 customers in remote areas, which we are working on,” he said.

Meanwhile, the daily deficit is returning to its pre-hurricane levels, once again approaching 2,000 MW. On Wednesday, the Cuban Electric Union recorded a shortfall of 1,964 MW during peak demand hours in the late afternoon and evening. For the following day, 1,494 MW were expected to be available for a demand of 3,200 MW, meaning that the deficit would be 1,706 MW, although the actual impact was expected to be 1,776 MW.

Six thermoelectric power plants (CTE) are out of service due to breakdowns or maintenance: one in Felton, three in CTE Renté, another in Santa Cruz and one more in Cienfuegos, as well as the gas plant in Puerto Escondido, Varadero.

Translated by GH.

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The Regime Admits Its Defeat in Its Struggle With Cuban Freemasonry

He withdraws his support for his pawn, former Grandmaster Filema Duarte, and accepts the election of his successor, José Manuel Valdés.

Valdés’s candidacy was presented under the slogan “United we are stronger.” / Facebook / José Manuel Valdés Menéndez-Cuesta

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, November 20, 2025 — After nearly two years of open crisis in the Grand Lodge of Cuba, the regime has decided to try to extinguish the flames. The Ministry of Justice declared the general elections of October 25th “legitimate,” in which Havana Freemason José Manuel Valdés Menéndez-Cuesta was elected as the new Grand Master. With this decision, the country’s authorities officially withdraw their support for Mayker Filema Duarte, who clung to the position against the will of the majority.

The decision comes via Resolution 7, signed by the Director of Associations at the Ministry of Justice, Miriam García Mariño, and represents a sharp reversal of the government’s stance since May, when the Masonic High Chamber removed Filema from office, yet the ministry refused to acknowledge the change. Now, without state backing, Filema is definitively out of the picture, after months of presenting himself as the legitimate Grand Master thanks solely to the endorsement of government authorities.

In July, Justice Minister Óscar Manuel Silvera asserted on national television that the Masonic crisis was an “internal matter” and labeled accusations of state interference as “false” and “malicious.” However, Law 54 on Associations itself grants the Ministry a “leading” role over the internal affairs of organizations like the Grand Lodge of Cuba (GLC) and empowers it to approve or reject the resolutions of its Higher Chamber. In practice, no Masonic election is valid until the Ministry of Justice ratifies it. This key to “legality” has been used by the regime to prop up unpopular Grand Masters and, now, to try to extinguish the fire it itself helped to ignite.

For months, Filema refused to call elections, suspended crucial sessions, and tried to extend his term beyond its established deadline. On July 6, around 200 Freemasons staged a sit-in at the GLC headquarters to prevent him from remaining in office, in one of the most unusual displays of civil defiance Havana has seen in recent years. continue reading

The Ministry of Justice admits that Filema’s attitude “disregarded the will of the majority” and sought to “irresponsibly and indefinitely” delay the institutional functioning of the Grand Lodge

The security apparatus responded with summonses, threats, and surveillance. Several leaders of the revolt were interrogated, and some, such as Acting Grand Master Juan Alberto Kessel Linares and Sovereign Grand Commander José Ramón Viñas Alonso, ended up facing criminal charges for alleged “currency trafficking,” measures that the membership itself interpreted as punishment for not being “submissive.”

In the resolution that now recognizes the new leadership, the Ministry admits that Filema’s attitude “disregarded the will of the majority” and sought to “irresponsibly and indefinitely” delay the institutional functioning of the Grand Lodge.

Some Freemasons, interviewed anonymously by the independent media Cubanet, went even further, describing the Filema period as a veritable “dictatorship,” made possible only by state support. “We lived under a dictatorship, Filema’s dictatorship,” one of them summarized. Another interviewee believed that the regime’s interference “will continue,” but “not so blatantly,” and warned that these nearly two years of struggle with the government “shook the foundations of the Order” and forced the government to “put out the fire” in the face of the strength shown by the membership.

In this context, José Manuel Valdés Menéndez-Cuesta, a member of the Federico Valdés lodge in the Havana municipality of Cotorro, rose to Masonic power. With more than 25 years of experience within Cuban Freemasonry, Valdés was elected on October 25th at the National Masonic Building, following an election in which the Higher Chamber managed to overcome Filema’s delaying tactics.

With Resolution 7, the Government is trying to close the most scandalous chapter of its fight with Freemasonry.

The scale of the embezzlement Valdés inherited goes far beyond the $19,000 stolen from the Llansó National Masonic Asylum, the theft of which triggered the current crisis. According to internal documents cited by the Grand Lodge itself, then-Grand Master Mario Urquía Carreño and his treasurer Airam Cervera were not only responsible for that cash, but also allegedly manipulated bank statements and falsified invoices to misappropriate another 2.1 million Cuban pesos, in addition to recording $2,700 as “losses.”

The supposed “restitution” of the money has also failed to restore confidence. At the end of August, Urquía and Cervera sent one million pesos as the first payment. Weeks later, a second deposit of four million pesos was announced, also in Cervera’s name, bringing the total to five million pesos deposited into the Grand Lodge’s account. Meanwhile, the whereabouts of the dollars from the Asylum remain unclear, and the leadership itself admits that the repayments only cover part of the shortfall created in Masonic finances.

Valdés’s candidacy was presented under the slogan “United we are stronger,” a motto that encapsulates the aspiration to close ranks after the internal fracture. Some members of the Fraternity describe him as an “honest” and “decent” man, capable—at least in theory—of rebuilding internal order, restoring the institution’s independence, and “getting rid of the traitors and infiltrators” that the crisis exposed.

With Resolution 7, the government attempts to close the most scandalous chapter of its conflict with Freemasonry. But the gesture does not erase either the previous interventionism or the legal framework that made it possible. The ministry urges Valdés and his team to “achieve unity, institutionalization, and the proper development of the transition process” in accordance with Masonic legislation, while reserving the final say on any relevant decision.

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Belgium Closes Its Embassy in Havana and the Regime Expresses “Surprise and Disappointment”

The decision has a strong symbolic impact at a time when official ties with Europe have cooled and the regime’s international reputation has deteriorated

Belgian Embassy in Cuba. / cuba.diplomatie.belgium.be

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, November 20, 2025 — The Government of Belgium reported the closure of its embassy in Havana, and the Cuban regime has responded by expressing “surprise and disappointment.” The announcement, made on November 18 by the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is part of a restructuring of its diplomatic network which includes the closure of eight missions and the opening of five new ones.

According to the official Belgian statement, the change is due to a “strategic redistribution” of resources and does not constitute a break in its relations with Cuba, since consular services will be taken over by other regional missions and special envoys.

For its part, the Cuban embassy in Belgium stated that the measure “does not affect the historical ties that unite both peoples,” emphasizing the more than 120 years of bilateral relations, which, according to the text, have included scientific, cultural, academic and economic exchanges.

The measure “does not affect the historical ties that unite both peoples”

The Belgian embassy maintained that the decision was based on a technical and strategic analysis. Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot explained that the review was the first in more than a decade and that the government is pursuing a more “broad, resilient and future-oriented” diplomacy. continue reading

For Cuba, the decision also has a strong symbolic impact at a time when official ties with Europe have cooled and the regime’s international reputation has deteriorated, especially after the recent closure of Ukraine’s diplomatic headquarters on the island and allegations of the recruitment of Cubans to participate in the Russian invasion of that country.

In the short term, Cuban and Belgian citizens will have to face changes in consular procedures. The services provided by the Belgian embassy in Havana — visas, citizen registration and consular assistance — must now be provided from other countries, such as Panama.

But the impact does not end there. In Cuba, the Belgian embassy was also an interlocutor between official institutions and the European Union in various cooperation projects. The closure can slow down cultural initiatives and academic collaboration.

The Belgian embassy held that the decision was based on a technical and strategic analysis

In its statement, the Cuban embassy in Brussels requested “that the measure not damage the links between institutions, entrepreneurs and ‘the many friendships established between both peoples.” It warned that the closure “contradicts” Belgium’s speech on Latin America and the Caribbean and expressed its hope that the decision will not result in “a de facto break.”

Although the Belgian authorities claim that bilateral diplomacy will continue through other channels, the move comes at a time of growing tensions between Havana and the West. For Havana, it represents a new challenge in its strategy to strengthen European alliances that counterbalance its isolation with Latin America and Russia.

The Cuban embassy concluded its statement stating that it maintains “the will to preserve existing links,” even in a scenario of “difficult understanding” for citizens who expect consular services and cultural cooperation that may be affected by the Belgian decision.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Mexican Press Exposes Record Oil Shipments to Cuba Worth $850 Million

Despite everything, the population continues to suffer from endless power cuts.

The oil tanker Ocean Mariner is scheduled to arrive in Cuba this Sunday from Mexico. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, 16 August 2025 (delayed translation) — The Mexican press woke up on Saturday to inflammatory headlines questioning the management of Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex). Between 29 May and 27 June 2025, the company carried out 39 export operations aboard 20 ships bound for Cuba, including 10.2 million barrels of crude oil and 132.5 million litres of refined products (jet fuel, diesel and petrol). And yet Cubans continue to suffer endless blackouts: this Saturday, the Unión Eléctrica forecasts a deficit of 1,675 megawatts during peak hours.

These products, valued at $850 million, were shipped through Gasolinas Bienestar S.A., the Pemex subsidiary created, among other “solidarity” objectives, to export fuel to the island. These deliveries even included jet fuel, which Havana was all but begging for, last December when flights had to be cancelled for several hours at the capital’s airport.

Mexico has even replaced Venezuela in terms of the amount of fuel sent to the island. In June, Caracas sent just 8,000 barrels per day (bpd), instead of the monthly average of 50,000 bpd in previous years, although in July it increased its exports to 31,000 bpd. In contrast, Mexico delivered 333,000 bpd of crude oil alone to Cuba in June, in addition to fuel.

The amount is almost equal to the value of the oil that Pemex sent to Cuba over more than a year, between July 2023 and September 2024: nearly $1 billion. Deliveries have continued since last June, with the Ocean Mariner, continue reading

scheduled to arrive in Cienfuegos tomorrow, 17 August, and the Sandino, which is currently loading crude oil in the Mexican port of Pajaritos-Coatzacoalcos, in the state of Veracruz, where it arrived on 28 June.

Of the total shipments in 2025, 19 departed from Coatzacoalcos and one from Tampico, in Tamaulipas, with 6.8 million litres of diesel. The importing company was Coreydan S.A., a Cuban state-owned company about which little is known, but which in 2023 imported hydrocarbons from Gasolinas Bienestar worth $60 million between July and another unknown date, according to Bloomberg. According to the Mexican press, the state-owned company shares its headquarters in Havana with Unión Cuba-Petróleo (Cupet), at 552 Amistad Street, in Centro Habana. 14ymedio was able to verify on site that no neighbour in the building had heard of Coreydan.

Of the shipments from May to June this year, all but one are registered as having been imported by Coreydan, with the exception of one dated 19 June, in which 8 million litres of regular petrol were shipped on behalf of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Cupet and Coreydan, the state-owned company that imports Mexican oil, share headquarters at 552 Amistad Street in Havana. / 14ymedio

Other vessels involved in transporting crude oil between Mexico and the island include the Ocean Mariner, which arrived in Havana in July with 13,000 tonnes (approximately 91,000 barrels) of fuel from the Ciudad Madero refinery, after having made at least two previous trips during the year. The tanker is scheduled to arrive at the port of Cienfuegos on Sunday.

In previous years, according to Mexican media reports, there have also been frequent trips by the Bicentenario, owned by Pemex Logística, which made four visits to Havana and one to Matanzas in 2023. In addition, Cuban vessels such as the Delsa (eight trips), the Esperanza (six trips) and the Vilma (17 trips) made trips between 2023 and 2024, all from the Coatzacoalcos-Pajaritos terminal.

In a report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2024, Pemex had already acknowledged that, since July 2023, its subsidiary Gasolinas Bienestar S.A. had been purchasing crude oil and petroleum products from its own companies for export to Cuba. In that same report, the company stated that it had exported products worth $400 million between July and December 2023 and another $600 million in 2024.

As for 2025, in the first quarter, Mexico sent 19,600 barrels of oil per day (bpd) to the island, worth more than $166 million, according to Gasolinas Bienestar S.A.’s own reports. In the absence of data for April and May, it is already a fact that Claudia Sheinbaum’s government has delivered more than $1 billion in oil and derivatives to its Cuban ally.

However, this million-dollar support has not been free for Mexico. On 25 February, the association Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity (MCCI) revealed that Pemex has become even more indebted as a result of these shipments, which were subsidised at least until the last years of Manuel Andrés López Obrador’s term in office (2018-2024). It is currently unknown whether Havana pays anything for these deliveries, whether it is a barter in exchange for services (although Cuba already receives a very high payment for its health missions) or whether it is a donation from Mexico.

Pemex has become even more indebted as a result of these shipments, which were subsidised at least until the final years of Manuel Andrés López Obrador’s term in office.

Last July, the Mexican Employers’ Confederation (Coparmex) warned that Pemex’s accumulated debt to its suppliers, mostly SMEs, threatens thousands of businesses across the country, especially in key regions of the energy sector. 

According to a statement from the organisation, which represents more than 36,000 companies responsible for 30% of the national gross domestic product (GDP), although Pemex reduced its debt to suppliers by 20% at the end of the first quarter of the year – placing it at around $20.2 billion – the amount remains “unsustainable”.

Mexico is also unable to export such large quantities of crude oil, local media criticised on Saturday. With headlines such as “Pemex prioritises Cuba over Mexico in petrol shortage”; “Petrol shortages… and Cuba benefits from Pemex”; and “While Mexico suffers petrol shortages, Pemex sends million-dollar shipments to Cuba”, the press reported that petrol supply problems have been reported in Mexico City, the State of Mexico, Nuevo León and Chiapas.

14ymedio note: The data provided by the Mcci is the result of an erroneous interpretation of Mexican Customs statistics.

Translated by GH

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Cuba Received 35% Less Oil and Oil Products From Mexico and Venezuela Between January and October

The documents cited by Reuters contradict the record export figures published by the Mexican press and explain the deep energy crisis affecting the island.

Vilma is one of the tankers Cuba sends to Mexico in search of oil / Tomasz Nadolnik-Marinetraffic

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Madrid, 20 November 2025 — The fuel deficit is affecting Cuba more than ever this year, when exports from its two regional benefactors are already down a third compared to the previous year. The collapse in oil shipments from Venezuela, which has been evident throughout the year, is now compounded by those from Mexico, whose deliveries between January and October 2025 fell by 73% compared with the same period last year. The collapse contrasts with data from the first half of the year, which showed a 2.8% increase in shipments, excluding derivatives.

Exports from state-owned Pemex to the island averaged 5,000 barrels a day (bpd) in the first ten months of the year, not very much compared to 18,800 in the same period in 2024, according to cargo dispatch data obtained by Reuters.

Figures from the British agency show that Mexico is reducing its cooperation with the island, spurred on by its own economic and productive limitations.

The figures from the British agency show that Mexico is reducing its cooperation with the island, spurred on by its own economic and productive limitations, after having become a new and important energy partner for the Havana regime in July 2023. That year, the country – then governed continue reading

by Andrés Manuel López Obrador – sent an average of 16,000 barrels of oil and derivatives a day to the island (equivalent to some £250 million, that no one knows how it was paid for).

Throughout 2024, collaboration rose to 20,100 bpd, up 20% (although derivatives fell by 18%), with an estimated combined value of $600 million. To get the global comparison, we will have to wait until the end of the year, as after months without receiving anything from Pemex, the Ocean Mariner arrived on the island on Monday with some 70,000 barrels of diesel (valued at approximately £12-18 million).

The Reuters data also casts doubt on the figures provided by the organisation Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity (MCCI), which on 13 October published a report revealing extraordinarily high amounts. According to the document, the value of hydrocarbons sent by Mexico to Cuba between May and August 2025 exceeded $3 billion, delivered in 58 shipments.

“I understand that Mexico is not currently sending oil to Cuba,” Jorge Piñón, a researcher at the University of Texas at Austin, told this newspaper at the time, adding: “The MCCI has misinterpreted the Mexican Customs data and, in fact, Pemex has problems producing light crude oil (Istmo).”

So far this year, according to Reuters figures, the decline is 15% compared to 2024, when they had already fallen by 42% compared to 2023.

Added to this problem is Venezuela’s failure to comply with the 2000 agreements signed between Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez, under which Caracas would deliver PDVSA crude oil to Havana in exchange for resources in various sectors, ranging from doctors to intelligence agents. So far this year, according to Reuters’ figures, the drop is 15% compared to 2024, when they had already fallen 42% compared to 2023.

In the first ten months of 2025, Venezuela’s average export volume was 27,400 bpd, and the product that declined the most was fuel oil, which is necessary for power generation.

Reuters puts the total impact at 35%, taking into account both sources and all products – crude oil, liquefied petroleum gas, and residual and motor fuels. The figure fell from 69,400 bpd to 45,400. According to the agency, both Mexico and Venezuela have little surplus to sell to Cuba – despite what President Claudia Sheinbaum claimed last October, which was denied by sources at 14ymedio – which adds to Havana’s problems in paying cash. This has led to a cap on imports, the agency notes, although the payment mechanism to Gasolinas Bienestar, the front company created by Pemex for this type of opaque business, is still unknown.

Two further problems compound all these difficulties. On the one hand, the Olmeca crude oil that Pemex used to supply preferentially to Havana is now being sold – according to Reuters – to solvent customers. Meanwhile, production of the residual fuel oil from PDVSA that the island requires for its electricity generators has fallen, according to internal company documents. Finally, Cuba’s lack of fuel storage capacity – following the 2022 fire at the Matanzas Supertanker Base, where 17 people died – was the final nail in the coffin.

Cuba’s lack of fuel storage capacity – following the 2022 fire at the Matanzas Supertanker Base, where 17 people died – was the final nail in the coffin.

For its part, Russia has only sent two shipments to Cuba – similar to 2024 – one in February and another in September. On the most recent trip, the Akademik Gubkin brought 740,000 barrels of Ural crude oil (valued at about £48 million) to the island, while the first shipment of the year brought 790,000 barrels, valued at £55 million.

On Wednesday, the Cuban Electric Union estimated the deficit at 1,775 megawatts (MW) during peak hours. The system was only capable of generating 1,375 MW during peak demand hours, which exceeded 3,000 MW.

The energy production of the 31 new photovoltaic solar parks was 1,659 MWh, with a maximum power of 392 MW, but the lack of batteries prevents this energy from being stored for times when there is no sun, and breakdowns in five thermoelectric units, together with the two that are out of service for maintenance, makes the situation worse. However, the real problem lies in distributed generation, where 91 plants are out of service, resulting in a loss of 731 MW.

“I’m just reporting this so you’ll publish it. Callejón de los Perros, in Santa Marta, Matanzas, today at 8 a.m. we had been without power for 27 hours straight and counting, because it still hadn’t come back on. And not a word,” complained one on-line commenter.

Translated by GH

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Cuba Is Freezing the Bank Accounts of All Foreign Companies

There is growing suspicion that the regime has appropriated these funds to pay for its imports

Line at a branch of the Banco Metropolitano in Luyanó, Havana. / 14ymedio

14ymedio bigger14ymedio / EFE, Havana, November 20, 2025 — The Cuban regime is communicating to foreign companies that they will not be able to extract or transfer abroad the currencies they currently have deposited in Cuban banks. This was confirmed to EFE by “multiple business and diplomatic sources.”

Foreign companies are also being offered the possibility of opening a new type of bank account, called “real,” which must be fed with “foreign currency.” These may be used for foreign transfers and cash withdrawals.

However, some foreign companies indicated to EFE that there are also problems in these “real” accounts with extracting currency in cash and repatriating money.

In an article published this Thursday, EFE says that the measure implies a recognition of the inexplicit “corral” that the country has been suffering for months, and generalizes the model that the Cuban authorities tested in the first half of this year with a handful of foreign companies, information also reported by the Spanish agency last April. continue reading

Although the regime formally restricted this kind of operation in early 2025, in practice it had already been controlling its partners’ finances for a long time

In fact, this newspaper had access last July to a letter from Agri VMA, a Vietnamese company with facilities in Mariel. The regime officially restricted this kind of operation in early 2025, but in practice it had already been controlling its partners’ finances for a long time, allowing them to make transfers only under express authorization.

In a desperate request for authorization, dated May 28, 2024, Agri VMA addressed three Cuban ministers to explain the imperative need to access their frozen funds in an account of the International Financial Bank — owned by the Cuban state — to send $300,000 to their headquarters in Vietnam. The company claimed to need these funds to “buy raw materials and ensure a perfect continuation of our services.”

It was not possible to know whether the transfer was finally authorized, but last year Havana became much more careful with its Asian ally, its second trading partner on that continent after China and its first in investment on the island. Agri VMA itself has not stopped appearing in the headlines for its “successful” rice project and last January became the first foreign company to which the Cuban state ceded land to exploit.

What is most suspect is whether the regime has been using these currencies to pay for its imports, in a context of absolute illiquidity in the banking system. Cuba has 334 businesses with foreign direct investment, of which 56 have 100% foreign capital, according to data from the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

According to what EFE published today, the plan is part of the mechanism for management, control and allocation of foreign exchange provided by the Government Program to Correct Distortions and Revive the Economy, the recently published plan of anti-crisis measures, which does not contain details.

According to the same EFE sources, the Cuban Foreign Ministry met this Wednesday with the diplomatic corps to communicate “a similar mechanism to alleviate the financial difficulties suffered by the representations of other nations,” although without having to open a “real” account. Thus, it was explained to them that a cut-off date for their accounts would be announced shortly. Foreign currency received from then on could theoretically be withdrawn and transferred abroad. The availability of previous funds is not guaranteed, they added.

The measure also takes place months after it was unexpectedly announced that all foreign entities must start paying rent in dollars

These announcements, which highlight the banking, economic and financial crisis that Cuba is suffering, take place at a time when many foreign companies are experiencing serious difficulties. These are aggravated by the distortions in the exchange rate, since legal entities must operate at 24 pesos per dollar when the street exchange of the greenback is around 450.

The measure is also taking place months after all foreign entities were unexpectedly told that they must start paying rent in dollars for the buildings they rent from Cuban real estate companies and for the salaries of their employees (which are paid through a Cuban agency that collects a commission).

Neither the Cuban government nor the Central Bank of Cuba, which is organically dependent on the executive, has publicly reported on these measures or explained the reasons. Experts and observers believe that the authorities have resorted previously to using the currencies in these accounts to be able to make payments abroad.

Also, several years ago, the debts of the Cuban State to more than 250 Spanish companies raised the sector’s complaints and forced the government of Pedro Sánchez to intervene. In a visit to Havana on the occasion of the opening of the Tourism Fair, dedicated in 2018 to Spain, the then Minister for Industry, Trade and Tourism, Reyes Maroto, asked the regime for a payment plan for its debt with Spanish entrepreneurs, as well as a reduction of bureaucratic obstacles so that they could do business on the Island.

In return, he offered Spain’s support for investment in Cuba, such as support lines for the internationalization of MSMEs* and, especially, an equivalent fund created with the $400 million debt that Spain forgave in 2015.

*Translator’s note: Literally, “Micro, Small, Medium Enterprises.” The expectation is that it is also privately managed, but in Cuba this may include owners/managers who are connected to the government.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

A 28-Year-Old Mother Is the Fourth Victim of Gender-Based Violence in November in Cuba

Diosdeisis Sandoval Damas was attacked and then dragged into the street, where an elderly neighbour tried to help her.

Diosdeisis Sandoval Damas vivía en el popular barrio de La Güinera, en Arroyo Naranjo. / Facebook

14ymedio bigger14ymedio, Havana, 19 November 2025 — Diosdeisis Sandoval Damas, 28, is the latest victim of femicide reported by the independent platforms Alas Tensas and Yo Sí Te Creo en Cuba. The woman, a resident of La Güinera, in the Havana municipality of Arroyo Naranjo, was allegedly murdered by her ex-partner on 13 November.

According to witnesses, the woman was attacked by the man, who then dragged her into the street, where an elderly neighbour tried to help her. The attacker stabbed her fatally in the groin, and when the man tried to intervene, the attacker started throwing stones to stop him. The victim had a young daughter.

According to 14ymedio’s tally, this case is the 37th femicide in Cuba so far this year and the fourth in November. Before this incident, the newspaper had reported on the murder of Liena de la Caridad Reinoso Ramos, a 23-year-old nurse stabbed by her ex-partner in Pinar del Río on 6 November.

The assailant allegedly stabbed her fatally in the groin, and when the man tried to intervene, the attacker started throwing stones to stop him.

Independent organisations that keep these records compile and verify femicides based on community reports, social media complaints and testimonies from family members, due to the lack of detailed official data.

With less than a month and a half left until the end of the year, 14ymedio’s records show 15 fewer femicides than at the end of 2024, when 52 were documented. However, it it is still impossible to know the true extent of gender-based violence in Cuba: many cases are never reported on social continue reading

media, and the government only releases data related to certain legal proceedings.

Last year, the authorities held 76 trials for gender-based crimes, but the dates on which the murders took place are unknown. In the trials held in 2023, 110 victims were recorded.

The Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of the Interior, the Supreme Court and other institutions announced this year that they would create a computerised administrative registry to collect data on femicides, but shortly afterwards confirmed that it would not be made public.

Translated by GH

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.