The documents cited by Reuters contradict the record export figures published by the Mexican press and explain the deep energy crisis affecting the island.
14ymedio, Madrid, 20 November 2025 — The fuel deficit is affecting Cuba more than ever this year, when exports from its two regional benefactors are already down a third compared to the previous year. The collapse in oil shipments from Venezuela, which has been evident throughout the year, is now compounded by those from Mexico, whose deliveries between January and October 2025 fell by 73% compared with the same period last year. The collapse contrasts with data from the first half of the year, which showed a 2.8% increase in shipments, excluding derivatives.
Exports from state-owned Pemex to the island averaged 5,000 barrels a day (bpd) in the first ten months of the year, not very much compared to 18,800 in the same period in 2024, according to cargo dispatch data obtained by Reuters.
Figures from the British agency show that Mexico is reducing its cooperation with the island, spurred on by its own economic and productive limitations.
The figures from the British agency show that Mexico is reducing its cooperation with the island, spurred on by its own economic and productive limitations, after having become a new and important energy partner for the Havana regime in July 2023. That year, the country – then governed by Andrés Manuel López Obrador – sent an average of 16,000 barrels of oil and derivatives a day to the island (equivalent to some £250 million, that no one knows how it was paid for).
Throughout 2024, collaboration rose to 20,100 bpd, up 20% (although derivatives fell by 18%), with an estimated combined value of $600 million. To get the global comparison, we will have to wait until the end of the year, as after months without receiving anything from Pemex, the Ocean Mariner arrived on the island on Monday with some 70,000 barrels of diesel (valued at approximately £12-18 million).
The Reuters data also casts doubt on the figures provided by the organisation Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity (MCCI), which on 13 October published a report revealing extraordinarily high amounts. According to the document, the value of hydrocarbons sent by Mexico to Cuba between May and August 2025 exceeded $3 billion, delivered in 58 shipments.
“I understand that Mexico is not currently sending oil to Cuba,” Jorge Piñón, a researcher at the University of Texas at Austin, told this newspaper at the time, adding: “The MCCI has misinterpreted the Mexican Customs data and, in fact, Pemex has problems producing light crude oil (Istmo).”
So far this year, according to Reuters figures, the decline is 15% compared to 2024, when they had already fallen by 42% compared to 2023.
Added to this problem is Venezuela’s failure to comply with the 2000 agreements signed between Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez, under which Caracas would deliver PDVSA crude oil to Havana in exchange for resources in various sectors, ranging from doctors to intelligence agents. So far this year, according to Reuters’ figures, the drop is 15% compared to 2024, when they had already fallen 42% compared to 2023.
In the first ten months of 2025, Venezuela’s average export volume was 27,400 bpd, and the product that declined the most was fuel oil, which is necessary for power generation.
Reuters puts the total impact at 35%, taking into account both sources and all products – crude oil, liquefied petroleum gas, and residual and motor fuels. The figure fell from 69,400 bpd to 45,400. According to the agency, both Mexico and Venezuela have little surplus to sell to Cuba – despite what President Claudia Sheinbaum claimed last October, which was denied by sources at 14ymedio – which adds to Havana’s problems in paying cash. This has led to a cap on imports, the agency notes, although the payment mechanism to Gasolinas Bienestar, the front company created by Pemex for this type of opaque business, is still unknown.
Two further problems compound all these difficulties. On the one hand, the Olmeca crude oil that Pemex used to supply preferentially to Havana is now being sold – according to Reuters – to solvent customers. Meanwhile, production of the residual fuel oil from PDVSA that the island requires for its electricity generators has fallen, according to internal company documents. Finally, Cuba’s lack of fuel storage capacity – following the 2022 fire at the Matanzas Supertanker Base, where 17 people died – was the final nail in the coffin.
Cuba’s lack of fuel storage capacity – following the 2022 fire at the Matanzas Supertanker Base, where 17 people died – was the final nail in the coffin.
For its part, Russia has only sent two shipments to Cuba – similar to 2024 – one in February and another in September. On the most recent trip, the Akademik Gubkin brought 740,000 barrels of Ural crude oil (valued at about £48 million) to the island, while the first shipment of the year brought 790,000 barrels, valued at £55 million.
On Wednesday, the Cuban Electric Union estimated the deficit at 1,775 megawatts (MW) during peak hours. The system was only capable of generating 1,375 MW during peak demand hours, which exceeded 3,000 MW.
The energy production of the 31 new photovoltaic solar parks was 1,659 MWh, with a maximum power of 392 MW, but the lack of batteries prevents this energy from being stored for times when there is no sun, and breakdowns in five thermoelectric units, together with the two that are out of service for maintenance, makes the situation worse. However, the real problem lies in distributed generation, where 91 plants are out of service, resulting in a loss of 731 MW.
“I’m just reporting this so you’ll publish it. Callejón de los Perros, in Santa Marta, Matanzas, today at 8 a.m. we had been without power for 27 hours straight and counting, because it still hadn’t come back on. And not a word,” complained one on-line commenter.
Translated by GH
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