The removal of the age limit for the presidency is a sign that a similar profile is being sought to ensure continuity.

14ymedio, Ramón Martínez, Orlando (Florida), 21July 2025 — Castro’s latest move to eliminate the 60-year age limit for accessing the office of President of the Republic, as provided for in the Constitution approved in 2019, was a predictable gesture.
The justifications given for approving this “constitutional amendment” are trivial, because what lies beneath is the need to appoint a person to that position for the next 10-year term who will guarantee the continuity of the regime and who will more or less follow the current ruler’s line, which, although disastrous across the board, has been successful in the one area where they cannot afford to make mistakes: continuing to hold the reins of power. The analysis should have focused then on the possibility that finding someone under 60 to fill that position would not be an easy task.
Miguel Díaz-Canel, who has governed the country since April 19, 2018, when he was appointed President of the Council of State and, also, President of the Council of Ministers, succeeding Raúl Castro, began serving as President of the Republic with effective date of the new Constitution on October 10, 2019.
The president shall serve a five year term and may be re-elected only once.
As stipulated in the Constitution, the president shall serve a five-year term and may be reelected only once. Thus, Díaz-Canel, who was reelected by the National Assembly of People’s Power in April 2023, must step down from office in the same month of 2028.
Apparently, as we can see, the next president of the Republic of Cuba will be Roberto Morales Ojeda (born Cienfuegos, June 15, 1967). He would turn 61 in 2028, when Díaz-Canel is due to leave (although if he is appointed to office in April, as is assumed, he would not yet have turned 61). But “the regime’s strategists,” — that group of shadowy thinkers who guide the Cuban ship with a firm hand toward no port — do not want to make months-long mistakes, so they have eliminated the 60-year-old requirement.
But why would Morales Ojeda be the successor? Who is this individual? Let’s have a look.
Morales Ojeda has been a member of its Central Committee since 2006 and of the Political Bureau since 2016.
After graduating in medicine in 1991, Morales Ojeda briefly worked in epidemiology before moving on to health administration (he served as municipal health director of Rodas and Cienfuegos, respectively) before beginning his rising career as a professional cadre of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). He has been a member of its Central Committee since 2006 and of its Political Bureau since 2016. He has served as First Secretary of the provincial party in Cienfuegos, a member of the Central Committee Secretariat, Deputy Minister and Minister of Public Health, and Deputy Prime Minister. In 2021, he was selected as Organizational Secretary of the PCC Central Committee.
But beyond his career and official positions, he has recently emerged as a media figure and has been very close to the current president-designate in most of the activities in which the latter participates. He is acts as a second-in-command, quietly following his boss, as if to “continue gaining experience.” And although he draws from a dry source, like everything that emanates from the mind and actions of the current president — “hand-picked” (as the popular slang goes) — his learning would be useful to fulfill the role of “firefighter” once the current president retires.
This individual, in his interventions and speeches, does not display, as expected, any differentiating nuance that separates him from the norm of continuity. He is an obedient, dull, and uncharismatic person, like the current president, so he would be his ideal replacement.
The ‘nomenclatura’ would be better off keeping Marrero in his current position.
But the regime’s strategists shouldn’t put all their eggs in one basket and rely solely on Morales Ojeda. The possibility of appointing Manuel Marrero, the current prime minister and also a member of the political bureau, who would be 65 in 2028, could also be a valid reason for eliminating the 60-year limit. However, the nomenclatura would be better served by keeping Marrero in his current position, as he could continue to be “elected” indefinitely. Although the term of office is also five years, as it is for the president, there is no limit to the number of times a person in that position can serve.
Thus, Morales and Marrero will be able to continue destroying the country with a heavy hand. A domino effect is almost a foregone conclusion.
It is not realistic to think that the elimination of this clumsy constitutional bureaucratic obstacle of 60 years was to give consideration to a “historical,” which conceptually are those characters linked to the regime since before its triumph or since the beginning of its establishment in 1959. Of the few that are still active, names like First Vice President Salvador Valdés (80), or the president of the National Assembly of People’s Power Esteban Lazo (81) — both also members of the political bureau of the PCC — would be unthinkable because they do not have the slightest capacity to overcome the adversities that the head of state in Cuba has to deal with.
One of the requirements to be elected president is to be a deputy of the National Assembly
As for José Ramón Machado Ventura and Ramiro Valdés, age could be a deterrent, since in 2028 the former would turn 98 in October, and the latter 96 in April.
Nor would it seem logical to appoint, when 2028 arrives, leaders who are little or not at all known, as might be the case with some other members of the political bureau who must be there to fill a quota and who, when the time comes, would be of a suitable age to serve as president.
At a slightly lower level, there is an exquisite pool of men and women, many of them rising stars, who are members of the Central Committee, but who should not yet be considered “presidential candidates.” Furthermore, one of the requirements to be elected president is to be a deputy. The age range of this large group is marked, ranging from young people in their 30s to elderly people over 80.
And although in this group there are some names that have had some relevance and appear more frequently than others in the public eye, it is no less true that it would be very surprising if any of them received the blessing of Raúl Castro, who would be 97 years old in 2028 (June 3, 1931).
There has already been a lot of Castro-military in power with Fidel (almost 50 years in power) and Raúl (10 years)
Nor would it be advisable to promote any of the military to the supposed top position of the Cuban State, especially the members of a general staff who are not yet advanced in age. For example, the names of the division generals of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and member of the central committee, Raúl Villar (60), head of the Central Army, Eugenio Ravilero (60), head of the Eastern Army or Ernest Feijoo, head of the Western Army, and coincidentally also 60 years old, are key pieces in the maintenance of the framework of power and would only be 64 years old when the next president is appointed, therefore, it is better that they continue to be very useful in the positions they hold. They have a whole life ahead of them.
Much less to think about Lázaro Alvarez (62), a member of the political bureau, recently promoted to Army Corps General, who has been the Minister of the Interior since 2020 and is the person most responsible for maintaining internal order (a term that in real words means having the efficient repressive machinery of the dictatorship well oiled).
So there was already too much Castro-military power with Fidel (almost 50 years in power) and Raúl (10 years), to continue putting military personnel in charge, although in truth the transmutation from civilian to military in communist Cuba is only mediated by the change from a guayabera to an olive green uniform.
Of the heirs of the Cuban royal family, the one who has done the most to flirt with power is Alejandro Castro Espín.
Finally, among the heirs to the Cuban royal family (read: children or grandchildren of Fidel and Raúl), the one who has done the most to flirt with power is Alejandro Castro Espín (59), although he does not meet the requirement of being a deputy. The only son of Raúl Castro and Vilma Espín, he is a brigadier general in the Ministry of the Interior and works for the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Directorate of this shadowy ministry. He is possibly one of the members of the so-called “power behind the scenes,” as it is speculated exists on the island.
Castroism, which claims to be eternal, continues to renew itself, taking steps to guarantee its continuity. It was stupid to stipulate that a 60-year-old human being cannot aspire to the office of president of a republic, when at that age, one is supposed to reach adequate political maturity and possess the still optimal physical and intellectual performance if the person remains healthy. Hence, the dictatorial planners have rectified their position in time.
____________
COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.
