August Rumors in Cuba: ‘Black Berets’ in Venezuela, President Díaz-Canel’s Broken Arm

A strange helicopter incident with the president’s grandchildren

Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel last week at the renewable energy fair / Presidency of Cuba

14ymedio biggerYucaByte/14ymedio, Havana, September 23, 2024 — What Havana orders is fulfilled in Caracas. In all the rumors collected in August by 14ymedio and YucaByte, the suspicion is repeated that the Cuban regime designed the strategy to keep Nicolás Maduro in power, manipulate the election results and dismantle the opposition. It is a logical deduction from the fact that both governments have given numerous indications of what is at stake in Venezuela and its growing interdependence.

The approach has been, above all, several users speculate, in the military and counterintelligence sphere. The massive presence of agents from the Island in the electoral process, their advice to the Venezuelan police and the sending of detachments of Cuban special troops – the so-called “black berets” – appear in a large part of the complaints on social networks, although both regimes have denied any type of interference. The Cuban Foreign Ministry insisted that it “maintained the normal and planned flow of movements of the members of Cuban cooperation in Venezuela.”

Several social media profiles of aeronautics fans detected alleged irregular flights between both capitals in planes of the state-owned Conviasa and Cubana de Aviación. They contained soldiers and diplomats from the Island, alleged many users. The truth is that Havana had already planted, months before the elections, numerous agents, such as the journalist Pedro Jorge Velázquez, known as El Necio, who now lives in Caracas.

Several social media profiles of aeronautics fans detected alleged irregular flights between both capitals in planes of the state-owned Conviasa and Cubana de Aviación

In addition, a photo published by Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla – and deleted shortly after – attested to the presence of agents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other entities of the Island in Caracas. Maduro himself was educated in Havana in 1987, as a student at Ñico López, the Communist Party School, a fact that many dusted off to show how long Venezuela has been in the sights of the Cuban regime.

Faced with the victory of the opposition – which Maduro did not recognize, unleashing a political crisis in the country – it was also a rumor that Havana considered Venezuela lost and that it had begun to withdraw its troops. Another hypothesis announced that Cuban troops were ready to act against the Venezuelan military if they decided to give their support to the continue reading

opposition and turn their backs on Chavismo. Finally, the rumors reached the extreme of saying that Cuba had one last trick up its sleeve: to capture Maduro and hand him over to the U.S. Department of Justice, which offers a reward of 15 million dollars for him.

On the other side of the Caribbean Sea, rumors continue to circulate about the corruption of leaders and their rush to leave the island to live out their “retirement” in the United States or Europe. Those who stay – say the rumors – have found a new source of corruption in the private enterprises. Through deals under the table, the inspectors take a slice of the profits of these businesses.

The families of the upper elite have also offered something to talk about this month, after the report of a forced landing in Holguín of a helicopter from the State-owned Gaviota was reported. According to rumors, two of Raúl Castro’s grandchildren were on board.

On the other hand, Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, known as El Cangrejo — The Crab — and also Castro’s grandson, is rumored to have assaulted Miguel Díaz-Canel  and dislocated his right arm. At least this was the explanation that many gave to the sling that the president has been wearing for several weeks and which he did not explain.

Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, known as El Cangrejo — The Crab — and also Castro’s grandson, is rumored to have assaulted Miguel Díaz-Canel and dislocated his right arm

A fired former high-ranking official, Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque, appeared in a photo that circulated for several days. Dismissed in 2009 along with then Vice President Carlos Lage, and absent from public life, Pérez Roque continues to pull strings within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to the rumor, and has contacts with important private entrepreneurs. The photo, however, showed him on foot and in humble clothes in a corner of Havana.

The terrible state of Public Health continues to be the subject of multiple rumors. This month there was talk of the sale in pharmacies of expired medicines, which are also used in hospitals. Some users report that many of these drugs were available in the warehouses at least since 2021, judging by the expiration dates.

Rumors about the burning of garbage dumps – a new sign of protest against the inaction of the Communal Services – are also recurrent; the acts of violence, such as the discovery of the mutilated body of a 20-year-old; and the beatings, silenced by the regime, that its agents give to members of their relatives and acquaintances. It was the case of the Havana judge Josué Mayo, of whom photos circulated with the information that he had assaulted his secretary. For few users it was a surprise that his own court acquitted him.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORKThe 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

In Cuba, Rumors of the Collapse of the Regime: Purge of Ramiro Valdés, Lis Cuesta Detained, Soldiers Ask for a Discharge

The atmosphere of desperation and paralysis of life generated by blackouts has been the subject of multiple complaints

It is affirmed that Raúl Castro ordered the confiscation of Valdés’ properties, his removal from the companies he supervised from office, and the strengthening of the authority of the current leadership / Cubadebate

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/YucaByte, Havana, 19 June 2024 — Blackouts set the pace of life in Cuba, heating up tempers and triggering protests of a different caliber in a summer that is just beginning. With an increasingly unstable country on their hands, the higher-ups observe how the historical leadership is crumbling. The death of the last generals – such as Raúl Castro [age 93] or Ramiro Valdés [age 92] – will mark, according to the rumors that collaborators with 14ymedio and YucaBite have collected in May, the beginning of a bloody dispute for power.

The signs pointing to warring factions within Castroism are already visible, say many users, who see in President Miguel Díaz-Canel’s trip to Moscow an attempt to win Vladimir Putin as a “godfather,” in the absence of Raúl. However, rumors indicate that the Kremlin is not getting along with the hand-picked Cuban president and there is talk of a cut in aid to Havana.

The key arguments are that Putin no longer trusts that Díaz-Canel is capable of maintaining control of the social tension on the Island, along with the old age of the historical leaders and, above all, the very high level of corruption of the current leaders, the majority appointed or ratified by the current president.

It was also suggested that not even a high-ranking official like Valdés is exempt from a possible purge. If last month there was speculation about his death – false information, as it turned out – it is now stated that Raul Castro ordered his properties to be confiscated, and the companies he supervised to be removed from his office, such as the military corporation Cimex, and the authority of the current leadership to be reinforced.

There were also comments that Díaz-Canel’s wife, Lis Cuesta, had also been detained in a police operation similar to the one that brought down the continue reading

former Minister of Economy, Alejandro Gil, whose current situation is also unknown. Cuesta – according to rumors – is accused of organizing much of the business corruption in Havana.

Elián González, the “child star” of Fidel Castro’s propaganda, took advantage of his position in the Cuban Parliament to defenestrate Susely Morfa, according to a rumor

A series of minor rumors, about the corruption and stampede toward the United States of local leaders, includes the information that Elián González – the “child star” of Fidel Castro’s propaganda – took advantage of his position in the Cuban Parliament to defenestrate Susely Morfa, former first secretary of the Communist Party in Matanzas. A video also circulated that allegedly showed a group of officials and politicians at a party. In the middle of the celebration someone gives a warning: “Don’t record it so they don’t upload it to Facebook.”

In May, all kinds of rumors circulated about the exodus of prosecutors, police and State Security agents heading to the United States. The “volcano route” and the US Humanitarian Parole program, which Cubans have been resorting to for years to escape the system that these agents represent, is now the route that the former repressors choose to abandon ship. Several social media sites – often of victims – offer photos and testimonies from the journey of those who either beat or led summary legal proceedings in Cuba, and now aspire to seek asylum in the United States or other countries.

This is the case of Francisco Hernández Tejeda, who supposedly served as second chief of a Rapid Response Brigade in Sancti Spíritus, and who is said to have left the Island for Brazil, where his wife already lived, having “deserted” from a mission as a doctor. Another rumor claims that thousands of members of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior have requested discharge, but that their superiors refuse to give it to them so that they will not leave the country.

The atmosphere of desperation and paralysis of life generated by the blackouts has been the subject of multiple rumors and complaints. Among them, several photos of children stand out who, according to the descriptions of the images, sleep outdoors because they cannot stand being inside their homes during power outages. Some of the photographs show how other people travel with their mosquito nets to protect themselves from mosquitoes in the streets.

Information about alleged acts of sabotage, in addition to protests, have not been long in coming

Information about alleged acts of sabotage, as well as protests, have not been long in coming. A forest fire in Minas, Camagüey, was attributed by several users to the Clandestinos organization or some other opposition group, as a protest against electrical shortages and instability.

It was also rumored in May that special troops, police officers and Army personnel in the municipality of Palmira, in Cienfuegos, are “barracked” waiting for a social outbreak due to the blackouts. The increase in surveillance in several areas of Havana is attributed to the arrival of summer. Two patrols and a bus with special troops travel through El Vedado from time to time, says a social media commenter.

And like the rest of the months, there are recurring rumors about el químico (the chemical), the trendy drug in Cuba. It, or one of its variants, has also been called el papelito. What does not stop circulating are rumors, often confirmed by the independent press, about the escalation of violence in the country. A decomposed corpse found in the Versalles area, in Santiago de Cuba; the murder of a minor in Bayamo and the stabbing of another in Contramaestre; and the multiple murders in which violent action by the Police is suspected are arguments – at least in the digital imagination of Cubans – that the Island is an increasingly insecure country.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORKThe 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

April Rumors: Raúl Castro’s ‘Chemical’ Grandson, Death of Ramiro Valdés, Dog Meat

According to a rumor, Rodríguez Castro was the owner of at least one part of a drug trafficking network in Matanzas

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/Yucabyte, Havana, 22 May 2024 — El químico (the chemical), the fashionable synthetic drug in Havana, slowly takes over the Cuban underworld. The possibility that Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, El Cangrejo (The Crab), grandson and bodyguard of Raúl Castro, is the man behind its manufacture and traffic – in increasingly vast networks – was one of the rumors that circulated in April and that the collaborators of 14ymedio and Yucabyte registered on the Island.

The consumption of el químico among young people has left deplorable scenes, documented in several recordings on social networks. In several of them, symptoms of paranoia, dislocation and violence are noticeable in drugged people. Some have tried to injure themselves. A rumor insists that more than 20 young people are under medical surveillance in Havana for their addiction and – according to a health official who did not identify himself – there are no supplies to treat them.

The authorities have recognized that el químico is increasingly circulating on the Island, although they have not given details about its composition and have accused emigrants of being the ones who contribute to the entry of drugs into the country. The silence has generated the suspicion that some member of the upper elite, such as Rodríguez Castro, pulls the strings of its distribution or takes advantage of his position to import it from some allied country of the Island, such as China or Russia.

Several users say that El Cangrejo was alarmed by a police operation that dismantled several distribution sources of the “el químico”

Several users say that El Cangrejo was alarmed by a police operation that dismantled several distribution centers of el químico in Jagüey Grande, Matanzas. According to a rumor, Rodríguez Castro was the owner of at least part of the network, whose merchandise was confiscated from two brothers who, allegedly, acted as his front men. continue reading

The erosion of the leadership of power on the Island and the tensions between the “historicos” and the new leaders has been another of the most frequent issues among the rumors of the week. Several users said in April that Ramiro Valdés was dying after suffering “convulsions and fainting” – although there was also talk of poisoning – during a political event. Valdés’s is one of the most “announced” deaths in recent months, even above that of Raúl Castro.

The latter did not lack a “death notice” in April, about which — a rumor alleged — Miguel Díaz-Canel received a call to leave a visit to San José de las Lajas, in Mayabeque, and “run” to Havana to plan Castro’s funeral. Despite his advanced age, the soldier has continued to appear on television, which appeases — at least for a few weeks — the rumors about his death.

One of the rumors that reached the most notoriety last month was the emigration of part of Prime Minister Manuel Marrero’s family

One of the rumors that reached the most notoriety last month was the emigration of the family of the Prime Minister, Manuel Marrero. His ex-wife, a user points out, lives in the United States, while his son resides in Spain and manages a small luxury hotel in Havana. In addition, several independent media reported the arrival of two of his nieces in the United States.

The situation of poverty and shortages hit rock bottom when it was revealed that a clandestine factory in the La Güinera neighborhood, in Havana, had produced and sold packages of picadillo, made of minced dog meat. The bag was sold for 50 pesos, packaged with the El Cocinerito brand, and was supposed to be distributed in several private and state stores. The authorities initially stated that the information was false, but a statement from the Ministry of Agriculture ended up confirming that “unscrupulous people” had carried out the “killing of dogs” in Mayabeque, whose meat was turned into the picadillo.

As every month, there are recurring rumors about crime, violence and insecurity on the streets of the Island. Most denounce the disappearance of minors, assaults with knives – such as the stabbing of a rapist – the discovery of human remains in public places and the execution, by the people themselves, of thieves captured in the middle of the act. For posterity remained, in April, a symbol of the boredom of Cubans for these situations: a woman who unsuccessfully denounced her husband for machista violence sewed her mouth shut after being ignored by the Police.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORKThe 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

A Flotilla from Miami on March 17, One of Many Rumors from Cuba

Between the 11J protests in 2021 and those of this March there are multiple points in common, as ’14ymedio’ and ‘Yucabyte’ confirmed

A group of protesters in Miami protesting on a boat after the July 11 protests

14ymedio/Yucabyte, Havana, 21 April 2024 — On March 17, the flood of rumors reached a fever pitch comparable to, though less intense, those of 11 July 2021 (which were quickly baptized ’11J’). Fed up with long blackouts and supply shortages, Cubans again took to the streets to protest the government’s management of the crisis. A few hours later, images of the demonstrations flooded social media.

The protests of 2021 and those of this March share several things in common, as 14ymedio and Yucabyte have found in their monthly audits. These include calls for the release of jailed protesters, anti-government graffiti and slogans, and the banging of pots and pans, which heralded the start of demonstrations. There were also rumors of a fleet of boats from Miami coming to the aid of the protesters as well as a counterattack by state media, which very quickly disseminated its version of events by all means possible.

Those who anticipated a harsh crackdown by the police were surprised to learn that repression was not widespread. Legal action against the protesters was taken later, after State Security – as it did after 11 July 2021 – analyzed video footage posted on social media. It quickly became apparent that the government would likely respond with more caution this time and would not issue a “combat order” like the one that an unsettled Miguel Díaz-Canel gave on 11 July 2021. continue reading

Those who anticipated a harsh crackdown by the police were surprised to learn that repression was not widespread

Though there were reports of plainclothes agents and truckloads of Black Wasp special forces circulating among the crowd, they never attacked the demonstrators, a fact that government television programs such as “Con Filo” and “Desde la Presidencia” — created ad hoc by Díaz-Canel to redirect the narrative about the demonstrations — boasted about.

Meanwhile, there were reports on social media, accompanied by unconvincing images, of monuments to Fidel Castro being burned in Cienfuegos and Mayabeque as well as of demonstrators allegedly throwing stones at movie theaters and state institutions. There were also photos of cardboard signs with slogans such as “Down with the dictatorship” in unidentified areas as well as trashcan fires in Havana.

Access to the internet, mobile phones and landlines were reported down in heavily militarized areas such as San Antonio de los Baños, the town where the 11 July protests originated. Several people posted on social media that there were more plainclothes police on the street than ordinary citizens.

Social media commenters in Bayamo reported telecommunication problems, slow connectivity and trucks ferrying brigades of special troops. Commenters in Camagüey province noted the presence of special police and State Security agents in parks and central locations in the city of Florida. Similarly, rumors were spreading that recruits in some military units from Mayabeque were being ordered to dress in civilian clothes in order to suppress protests.

Alongside the protests and closely related to them, speculation about other plots began cropping up on social media

Alongside the protests and closely related to them, speculation about other plots began to cropping up on social media. One of them was the purported killing of José Daniel Ferrer, an opposition figure currently imprisoned in Santiago de Cuba, one of the epicenters of the demonstrations. The rumor was fueled by similarities between Ferrer and Alexei Navalny, archenemy of Vladimir Putin’s regime, whose suspicious death in prison prompted comparisons with his Cuban counterpart.

Concern that Ferrer was at risk of becoming a Cuban Navalny was also the subject of statements and op-eds that circulated during the protests.

In what many saw as an imitation of Hugo Chávez’ long-running, unscripted TV talk show “Aló Presidente” (“Hello, Mr. President”), Díaz-Canel’s new program was a measure of just how concerned the government was not only about reality but also about the version being presented on social media. There was little doubt in the Cuban president’s mind about March 17. “These events were instigated by counterrevolutionary platforms and American politicians to generate a social upheaval on the island,” he said. In his view it was “virtual Cuba” that had gone through several days of protests, not “the real Cuba.”

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORKThe 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

December Rumors in Cuba: ‘Catfishing’, Police Brutality, Casinos, Corrupt Spies

For Etecsa, Cuba’s State communications monopoly, 2024 will be the year of “cybersecurity.” (Ministry of the Interior)

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/Yucabyte, Havana, 22 January 2024 — The recruitment of cyberclarias (catfishers)* – the digital infantry of the Cuban regime – a hypothetical legalization of protests and the increase in clandestine gaming have stood out among the rumors collected in December by associates of 14ymedio and Yucabyte. The discontent of Cubans has been expressed openly on social networks, and the regime is now paying attention.

With instructions from the Communist Party, a squad of Public Health leaders – alleges a rumor that circulated as a WhatsApp audio – held several meetings in medical schools and hospitals in Holguín and Ciego de Ávila. The agenda: to attract workers willing to “share revolutionary content” in their personal accounts in the face of the well-known “media war” that keeps the regime up at night.

Other rumors on the subject indicate that, in parallel, the Communist Party has reactivated hundreds of anonymous profiles and computer programs to flood the internet with hashtags favorable to the Government

Other rumors on the subject indicate that, in parallel, the Communist Party has reactivated hundreds of anonymous profiles and computer programs to flood the internet with hashtags favorable to the Government. Cyberclarias are also given training courses to better develop their work, along with “cyber defense” workshops. continue reading

For Etecsa, the State communications monopoly, 2024 will be the year of “cybersecurity.” Interviewed by the official press, its Business Director, Daniel Ramos, announced with great fanfare that the first class of engineers in Cybersecurity, a recent career taught at the University of Computer Sciences, is active. The educational center, which has always served as the regime’s headquarters for digital affairs, will lead a “fight against cybercrime” in the face of the alarming increase in incidents recorded by Etecsa, more than 2,600 last year.

Social disagreement will overflow the networks at some point, and it won’t take long to reach the streets, some rumors imply. The Government has planned for it, they add, and therefore is planning to legalize popular protests. Aware of Havana’s mode of operation, many commentators have warned that the origin of the rumor may be the Government itself, which tests public opinion and tries to “hunt” potential demonstrators.

Others say that the National Assembly had a “Demonstration and Meeting Law” on its schedule for 2022, which was never debated openly and was removed from the plan in 2023, without any explanation.

December, a “hot” month when it comes to violence and insecurity, brought abundant rumors about murders, disappearances and violent robberies. The images about police brutality were not far behind: agents beating individuals already immobilized, comments on arbitrary confiscations and harassment of pushcart sellers and farmers were just some of the incidents reported.

The end-of-year parties, users alleged, were nothing to celebrate: fairs understocked and with rotten food, inability to get food and inaction in the face of crime were the only things that the Government offered to Cubans, they criticized. The tension increased with the rumor, at the end of the year, that the ration book, indispensable for the poorest on the Island, was disappearing.

The Ministry of Internal Trade denied these rumors, but the so-called economic package – officially announced – promises a year of maximum austerity for Cubans, after a critical 2023.

The return to the public sphere of diplomat Manuel Rocha and former American analyst Ana Belén Montes, two former spies in the service of Havana, generated a series of rumors about Cuban intelligence services

The growing activity of the burles – informal and illegal casinos – is a symptom of the need of Cubans to obtain money quickly and at all costs. In many of these businesses, several users complain, it is common for children to get involved, “with money in hand” and alcohol, in the organization of the games.

The return to the public sphere of diplomat Manuel Rocha and former American analyst Ana Belén Montes, two former spies in the service of Havana, generated a series of rumors about the Cuban intelligence services. According to several users, the arrest of Montes in 2001 at the hands of the FBI and the disclosure of the links of Rocha, former deputy director of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, with the regime, testify to the state of corruption of Cuban espionage.

The Directorate of Intelligence of the Island has numerous flaws, and its negligence – they add – made it easier for the United States to access information to expose Rocha and Montes. When newspapers around the world made headlines with both former spies, Javier Milei, the President of Argentina, announced that Cuban and Venezuelan agents living in Argentina had instructions to instigate a protest.

A few days later, several rumors claimed that the Argentine authorities had captured an alleged Cuban spy: Alejandro Odriozola Diez, head of Intelligence of the Cuban Embassy in Buenos Aires.

*Translator’s note: ’Catfishing’ is pretending to be someone else online, stealing someone’s identity.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORKThe 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

November Rumors in Cuba: Diaz-Canel’s ‘Liquidation’, Healthcare Debacle, Crime Unleashed

The situation – all the rumors coincide – is worse than ever, especially in the health and security aspects of both the countryside and the city. (OnCuba)

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/Yucabyte, Havana, December 16, 2023 — Cuba is plummeting, and the first head to roll could be that of President Miguel Díaz-Canel. As he finishes without a single success to his credit, in what should have been his “better year” — he had promised it at the end of 2022 — the rumors collected in November by 14ymedio and Yucabyte foresee a conspiracy to “politically liquidate” the president after the death of his protector, Raúl Castro, which some see as imminent.

Díaz-Canel faces, say several Internet users, is becoming an imminent social outcast. The catalyst for his removal from office, they add, will be the power struggle that will follow the death of the last “historic” generals. The families that make up the leadership will change the rules of the game, and the current president, with no one to protect him, will have to cede the powers that the regime has offered him in favor of new candidates.

Although rumors do not indicate that this “transition” will be violent, they do expect a “large-scale repression” if Cubans take to the streets to demand a change, as happened during the protests of 11 July 2021. Since then, some say, the Government has had time to prepare “exits” to the crisis, which include Díaz-Canel as a scapegoat in the face of popular discontent. continue reading

If what is already known as “fraudulent change” does not work, they speculate, the authorities have drawn up a Plan B: the rapid response paramilitary brigades, composed of recruits from the eastern provinces who have been offered homes and work in Havana, in order to guarantee their loyalty to the regime.

The situation – all the rumors agree – is worse than ever, especially in the health and security aspects of both the countryside and the city. The contrast of conditions offered to national patients and the “luxury” services that the Island allegedly provides to foreign “guests” is one of the most talked-about situations in November.

The video of a woman giving birth on a sidewalk, supposedly in Cuba, was shared and soon went viral

The rumors that doctors require pregnant women to have a list of supplies before being admitted to the hospital, or that they are given identification bracelets and documents to give birth in their homes, are eloquent. The video of a woman giving birth on a sidewalk, supposedly in Cuba, was shared and soon went viral.

Meanwhile, the information that a senior official of the United Left Movement, from the Dominican Republic, had an operation on the Island aroused a barrage of criticism. Especially since the individual returned to his country praising the “excellent state” of the “well-equipped Cuban clinics.”

In the absence of reliable information about the drug business, rumors indicate that it is booming. After the recording of a young man convulsed allegedly by an overdose of fentanyl or a similar drug called a “chemical,” several rumors pointed to one of the people who “moves” it in the capital. This is an individual identified as Yasmani El Moncada, who, according to some commentators, works as a police informant. His link with the Ministry of the Interior has allowed this trafficker to survive numerous raids, some users say, as happened recently. El Moncada, arrested during an operation this month, was released two days later. Each gram of the “chemical,” they calculate, costs between 150 and 200 pesos.

Violence and insecurity in the streets of the country continue to grow and give rise to many rumors, which are fed even in the very profiles related to the Cuban police, despite their attempts to minimize the facts. The incidents reported mainly affect rural areas, where thieves campaign for their respect, while numerous robberies in state warehouses and assaults on motorcyclists to steal their vehicles are reported.

Each time, without being confirmed, more armed assaults and violent robberies are mentioned, which end, not infrequently, in the death of the victim. In addition, the rumors describe in great detail several “techniques” of scammers. One of the most “picturesque” is that of a child who pretends to be abandoned on the road. Whoever offers to takes him home will discover that the parents aren’t there but a gang ready to assault him is.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORKThe 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Rumors of October in Cuba: Suspicious Deaths, Medical Strike, Escape Plan for the Castros

The alleged death of a pregnant woman, while giving birth at home, shocked Cubans. The episode, of which no details were known, sparked a debate about the institutional situation of the island’s maternity wards. (Juventud Rebelde)

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/Yucabyte,  Havana , 22 “Why do memes harm the Revolution?” The question, written on the blackboard of a Cuban school, gives the measure of the regime’s suspicion towards the rumors that circulate on social networks, whose common factor is the deterioration of life on the Island and the upsurge in violence. 14ymedio and Yucabyte confirmed this in October, when numerous users questioned the celebration of a luxurious White Dinner, while complaints about drug use, deaths due to medical negligence and shortages proliferated.

The alleged death of a pregnant woman, while giving birth at home, shocked Cubans. The episode, of which no details were known, sparked a debate about the institutional situation of the island’s maternity hospitals, the precarious conditions in which pregnant women are maintained, and an alleged regulation that requires “allocating resources to patients with the greatest hope of life.”

In this sense, several users claimed to know of other cases in which the patient was left to die – “by order of the Ministry of Public Health” – to reuse or resell the supplies to the highest bidder. This crisis also has a correlation in pharmacies, which are short of supplies unless the interested party disburses the correct amount directly to the apothecary. In the informal market, on the other hand, state-made medicines – in addition to foreign ones – are available at outrageous prices. continue reading

A group of users has detected an increase in drug consumption and has transmitted images of people supposedly in crisis due to an overdose

A group of users has detected an increase in drug consumption and has transmitted images of people supposedly in crisis due to an overdose. This was the case of a young man who was recorded while convulsing, and although the cause of his attack is not clear, numerous commentators suggested that he had been intoxicated with fentanyl, although it was also attributed to cocaine or a synthetic drug that in Cuba is known simply as the “chemist.”

The fact that the Public Health crisis has gotten out of control has been the cause – according to various rumors and testimonies collected by the independent press – of hundreds of professionals choosing to abandon the sector. During the month, a call for a general strike by doctors and pharmacists circulated on several platforms, which in theory would be supported by the Free Cuban Medical Guild, an organization of exiled health workers.

The long blackouts and the stories of those who suffer them on the Island make up a very large group of rumors. Those who bear the brunt are the residents in the rural areas of the central and eastern provinces, who have denounced time and again that the “energy contingency” decreed by the Government is in no way temporary. Blackouts lasting between six and twelve hours are here to stay, say the less optimistic, and there is no “technical explanation” that justifies the power cuts. This month, several users described as “physical torture” the impossibility of cooking, turning on lights at night, or having means to scare away mosquitoes both in the fields and in the cities of the Island.

The crisis has reached such a climate of tension that numerous rumors speculate about an alleged “escape plan” for the Castros

The crisis has reached such a climate of tension that numerous rumors speculate about an alleged “escape plan” for the Castros and other families at the top of the regime. According to statements attributed to a former high-ranking military official, there is an airport in Cayo Largo del Sur with several helicopters and planes that will transport the family to Canada, whose Government will offer passports for their resettlement in Europe. They will travel on Sunwing airlines, says the rumor, which also alludes to other alternative plans to leave the country when the regime falls.

However, there do not seem to be any signs of emergency signs at the highest levels, quite the opposite. The celebration – with the consent and participation of the regime – of the White Dinner, an international event with logistical demands that Cuba, users insist, could not afford in the midst of the current crisis. The assumption that the event was managed by Miguel Díaz-Canel’s wife, Lis Cuesta, has made her the target of numerous criticisms.

Judging by the criticism of the expensive and extravagant life of Cuesta and other members of the ruling clans, often in a joking tone, the question on the blackboard in the primary classroom has an affirmative answer: memes do “harm” the regime, and a great deal.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORKThe 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

September Rumors in Cuba: Soldiers in Russia, Splurges for the G-77, Punishment for Small Private Businesses

Mercenaries, according to the alleged contracts with the Kremlin, are offered Russian nationality and an initial payment of $2,000. (Mario Vallejo/Facebook)

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/Yucabyte, Havana, 18 October 2023 — In a context of maximum international tension, the news that there were Cuban soldiers fighting in the service of Russia during the invasion of Ukraine generated countless rumors. Meanwhile, on the Island, the leaders did not give an official explanation, and soon – after the arrival in Havana of the leaders for the summit of the Group of 77 and the subsequent announcement of a new season of blackouts – the matter was forgotten. However, as 14ymedio and Yucabyte noted, users maintained the discussion on these issues throughout the month of September, and the debate remains red-hot.

Rumors about the participation of Cuban soldiers on the Russian side against Ukraine multiplied last month with the recording of two teenagers from the Island, allegedly recruited under deception to travel to Russia. Since then, a large amount of material on this subject – videos, photographs, direct transmissions and text messages – have occupied social networks.

Some activists claimed that dozens of Cubans were fighting in Ukraine as mercenaries

Some activists claimed that dozens of Cubans were fighting in Ukraine as mercenaries or as support personnel for Russian militias. According to several documents and alleged contracts signed by nationals of the Island, they were promised Russian nationality, a salary of up to $2,000 and benefits that, according to some complaints, “were never met.” continue reading

Other videos, allegedly recorded by the Ukrainian Army, showed the capture of Cuban prisoners, gagged and about to be transported in a truck. The Kiev military itself transmitted a message urging Cubans to return to their country and not support Vladimir Putin, since the Island had already made a “mistake” by allying with Russia.

When the regime offered its official version of the presence of Cubans at the front, users pointed out that it contradicted the statements of other propaganda media related to the Government, such as the pro-government troll Guerrero Cubano. Although it is not known how many Cubans are participating in the invasion, rumors have indicated that the figures range from 400 to 20,000 people.

The regime disengaged from the issue in the face of the imminence of the summit of the Group of 77 plus China, held in Havana on September 15 and 16. The event was an important logistical challenge for the Government, and many users pointed out that what was scarce in the Island’s stores – food, coffee, cigars and beverages – would be offered in abundance to visiting leaders and heads of state.

After the event, described by many as an unnecessary “waste” of resources, the blackouts of more than eight hours suddenly returned

After the event, described by many as an unnecessary “waste” of resources, the blackouts of more than eight hours – absent during the course of the summit – suddenly returned, according to netizens. The Government did not devote so much attention, users also added, to the recovery of Pinar del Río after the scourge of Hurricane Idalia. Building collapses, leaks and destroyed crops have remained in the same condition, they insisted.

A group of rumors speculates that, as a result of the rise of privately operated micro, medium and small enterprises (MSMEs), the Government is sending subtle messages for owners to respect their “limits.” Expropriations, warnings and news about the bankruptcy of several businesses would serve, according to users, to keep the MSMEs at bay that are not managed by owners related to the regime. Rumors also indicate that, allegedly, several senior officials of the regime – such as the former spy Gerardo Hernández – have begun to get directly involved with private businesses or that they plan to privatize state rapidos (gas stations) and other establishments.

Other rumors indicate that, for refusing to deposit the company’s money in cash in the bank, a MSME was expropriated in Havana. Allegedly, three vehicles from Trasval – the company in charge of transporting and supplying cash to stores, offices and banks — raided the premises and confiscated all the money they found. Meanwhile, the circulation of high-end cars continues to be attributed to business owners related to the leadership of the regime. This September, the networks were filled with photographs of a red Ferrari that allegedly cruised through the Havana municipality of Marianao.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORKThe 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

August Rumors: Banking Rules Killing Small Businesses plus Mariela Castro, a Porsche and Crooked Cops

El Biky, located at 412 Infanta Street, between San Lazaro and Concordia, is part of a high-end chain of restaurants. (14ymedio)

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/Yucabyte, Havana, September 22, 2023 — What’s driving the Cuban government to adopt new banking measures in the midst of a nationwide cash shortage? Which restaurants in Havana are being secretly managed by the children and grandchildren of senior Armed Forces’s officials? What event will get so out of control that the island’s frustrated inhabitants will take to the streets in a new wave a protests? 14ymedio and Yucabyte took a look at the rumors making the rounds on social media in August. While they do not answer these questions, they do attest to how some Cubans interpret the country’s current situation and how they visualize its future.

Most of the rumors about new monetary regulations announced in early March — what the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) is calling bancarización — center on the suspicion that the measures are not just about taming short-term inflation. There is fear that the real intention is to allow officials to keep closer tabs on small and medium-sized businesses (MSMEs). There is also the assumption that the reason these businesses are being required to pay their employees electronically is to stoke worker discontent and hinder their expansion.

There have also been rumors that several MSMEs have had to close due to the havoc caused by the new banking requirements. Several commenters claim that those that have managed to survive bancarización are now being monitored more closely than ever by the government.

The informal market has been severely impacted by the currency shortage which, according to rumors, has led to the emergence of a new service provider: the cash broker.

Cubans have spent the last several weeks in vain, lining up at ATMs. Dozens of commenters on social media complain the machines have no cash. One of them reported that this has led officials of several Havana boroughs such as Mariano to simply declare them out of service. continue reading

The informal market has been severely impacted by the currency shortage which, according to rumors, has led to the emergence of a new service provider — the cash broker — who makes money by charging a commission, generally 10% to 12% of the face value of peso banknotes. A statement by BCC vice-president Alberto Quiñones describing this activity as “illegal conduct” confirmed the existence of a market in which virtual money is exchanged for banknotes.

A few days later, official media outlets made an announcement that confirmed another widespread rumor, that the nation’s gasoline stations would no longer be accepting cash payments. This quickly led to other rumors such as the one that the electric utility company, Unión Eléctrica,  would start charging its customers electronically.

The level of discontent on the island over economic instability and inflation is so high that, according to some on social media, it is even impacting certain segments of the Communist Party, the Armed Forces and the Interior Ministry. Some senior government officials, especially those involved in the management of government-run MSMEs, are unhappy with the new banking regulations due to the obstacles they present for their businesses.

Comments have also been made on social media about connections between the children and grandchildren of senior government leaders and the sight of of high-end cars on the streets of Havana.

Another spate of rumors has focused on the network of restaurants, bars and companies that the descendants of Cuba’s “old guard” now control. Some of those posting on social medio point out that El Biky — a restaurant rumored to be owned by the former president’s daughter, Mariela Castro — seems to have no problem importing products that it later sells.

The most persuasive evidence, they say, is the wide menu selection and the fact that the names of the restaurant’s four partners remain unknown, as 14ymedio has reported. This newspaper also noted that El Biky opened a new location a few weeks ago at the José Martí International Airport.

Comments have also been made on social media about connections between the children and grandchildren of senior government leaders and the sight of of high-end cars on the streets of Havana. Several commenters have shared photos of a Porsche with a Texas license plate parked along Havana’s seaside boulevard, the Malecón.

In contrast to all the focus on luxury, other rumors about police refusing to confront the wave of crime plaguing the island are becoming ever more common on social media. Some commenters have pointed out that police officers themselves have formed a network to stop vehicles at checkpoints in Havana and confiscate, without any legal basis for doing so, food that citizens are trying to transport from one province to another.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORKThe 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Gunboat Intimidation, Rising Crime and Alleged Sabotage Fuel Cuba’s July Rumors

The presence of the Russian warship Perekop in the port of Havana, whose arrival coincided with the the anniversary of July 11 protests, was read as a warning signal. (Sputnik)

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/Yucabyte, Havana, 17 August 2023 — Heightened tensions during the second anniversary of the mass protests on July 11, 2021 (known in Cuba as 11J), a seemingly unstoppable rise in crime and alleged sabotage of state institutions were among the concerns fueling rumors that circulated throughout the country in July. On the other hand, efforts by various social network accounts linked to the regime to control the narrative and whitewash police actions during those protests also sharply increased.

On the eve of the 11J anniversary, several social media users reported a series of “preparations” by the government which included guard shifts at workplaces, the organization of rapid response brigades to deal with any incident that might occur, and surveillance and militarization of key public spaces such as parks and plazas.

In this context, it was not difficult to view the arrival of the Russian warship Perekop as one more attempt at intimidation. Even more surprising was the abrupt cancellation of two previously announced tours of the ship to which the public had been invited

Among the theories used to explain the cancellation was the fact that independent media had reported that the Perekop’s arrival happened to coincide with the anniversary of the June 11 protests. There was also speculation that the Russian crew were concerned about the possibility of Cubans spying on the ship. Neither Cuban nor Russian officials offered an official explanation however. continue reading

Poor internet service during the anniversary of the protests also got people talking. There was speculation the regime had found a formula to block VPN (virtual private network) apps that allow users to access webpages that are banned on the island. Reports of severed phone lines and connectivity problems as well as attacks — both virtual and physical — on activists, who were prevented from leaving their homes, were also confirmed.

Several social media accounts, especially on Facebook, have been reporting almost daily on crime in the country. The level of detail in these reports , as well as their defense of both Cuban counterintelligence and the police, has led many to conclude the Ministry of the Interior is behind them. These mostly anonymous accounts (with names such as Mauro Torres’ Page, Cuban Legionnaire, and The Faithful Cuban) as well as the  apparently collective or regional ones (Force of the People, Realities from Holguín), are frequently cited as sources by the official press.

This has not prevented numerous users from reporting acts of violence such as the assault in Havana’s Plaza of the Revolution district on an elderly parking lot attendant in which three electric motorcycles were stolen. It was also reported that a retired police officer, with backup from of a few residents, was the only person available to catch the thieves. The men had tried to rob a house in San Juan y Martínez, a town in Pinar del Rio province .

Tourists have not been immune to the crime wave affecting the island according to several rumors. A car with tourist license plates was allegedly stolen in Gibara, a town in Holguín province. Several social media users report the vehicle was ultimately returned and the thieves apprehended.

Havana’s Vibora Park neighborhood stands out as an area plagued by police inaction, where criminals are protected by certain high-ranking officers. According to rumor, assaults that occur in this area go unpunished and local residents usually do not rush to aid the victims.

One case that has gone viral involves the assault of a young man by four police officers. After beating him, the rumor alleges, they robbed him of his mobile phone, more than 50,000 pesos and a bottle of rum. Although the claim was accompanied by a video shot in front of Havana’s Dragones police station, with comments from an unidentified voice denouncing the aggression, there are no clear images confirming the alleged attack.

Rumors were also circulating this month that sabotage by unidentified opponents of the regime may have been the cause of several fires on the island. Since most of these incidents occurred in state buildings such as the Astilleros del Golfo in Granma, and the local radio station in Manzanillo, there has been speculation that they were set intentionally.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORKThe 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

June Rumors in Cuba: Thefts of Prostheses in Cemeteries, a Return to ‘Apartheid’ Hotels, and Russia

The theft of prostheses, especially hip prostheses, has been the alleged motive for several incidents of grave desecration on the island. (14ymedio)

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/Yucabyte, Havana, 22 July 2023 — Surgeons operating in the middle of a blackout, a supposed reissue of the apartheid policy against Cubans in the hotels of the North Keys, and the threat to transfer the inmates of the Island to the most feared prison in Russia, mark the flow of rumors collected in June by Yucabyte and 14ymedio. As in the rest of the year, the comments and images published on social networks take the pulse of reality and subliminally express the concerns of Cubans.

The Public Health crisis reached grotesque overtones in the reports of online posts, which shared multiple times the images of an operating room illuminated only by the flashlights of the doctors’ cell phones. Although the hospital or the nature of the intervention was not identified, the controversy over the effects of the energy crisis in cases of life and death did not wait.

Other rumors denounced that the Camilo Cienfuegos Clinical Surgical Hospital in Sancti Spíritus is part of a business that traffics blood bags – and other medical supplies – and that the healthcare workers demand payment of 5,000 pesos for each transfusion. Officially, the center affirms that it does not have blood reserves and the medical staff asks patients and relatives to arrange in advance the necessary quantities for the operations.

The theft of prostheses, especially hip replacements, has been the alleged motive for various incidents of grave desecration on the Island. Although the official press has admitted that criminals enter cemeteries to steal bones – usually for ritual purposes – and vandalize the graves, it is the first time that this type of crime has been linked to the sale of the prostheses of the deceased in the informal market. continue reading

Another important group of rumors captured during the month refers to the leak of an alleged letter about the “new policy for the sale” of reservations at the Angsana Cayo Santa María hotel. The document ordered that the sales be “closed to national clients,” alleging that it was not “discrimination” but “owners’ rules,” which seemed to indicate a return to the situation in force until 2008 when Cubans were prohibited from accessing hotel facilities. The rumor reached such a massive circulation that the Gaviota group, a subsidiary of the Cuban military conglomerate Gaesa, had to publish a statement to assure readers that a version of the hotel’s policy had been disseminated “with an editorial error.”

The suspicions about supposed secret agreements after Cuba’s rapprochement with Russia caused, once again, a flood of comments on the networks. It was said that the members of the Cuban Armed Forces carried out recruitment rounds in the basic secondary schools, so that the students choose to continue their studies in military schools.

Although these recruitments are carried out every year – on the eve of the end of the school year – this time the on-line posters raised suspicions about the possibility that the objective of the recruitment is to send young soldiers to the war in Ukraine.

Likewise, various rumors highlighted that Cubans facing serious criminal proceedings on the island may choose to participate as mercenaries on the battlefront, as an alternative to serving their sentence. In addition, the possible transfer to Russia of Cuban prisoners who are currently serving their sentences on the island was discussed. The objective: to lock them up, as additional punishment, in the IK-6 penal colony, the maximum security prison popularly known as Delfín Negro.

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORKThe 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

In Cuba, Rumors are the Counter-Narrative of the Official Version of Events

Many users disclosed not only the “traps” of the Government to attract voters or force them to go to the polls, but also the possible consequences of abstaining. (14ymedio)

14ymedio bigger14ymedio/Yucabyte, Havana, 19 April 2023 — Irregularities during the parliamentary elections, the drastic increase in crime and the precarious situation of prisons have dominated the flow of rumors about Cuba on social networks during the month of March. However, despite the fact that it is fragmentary data and not always verifiable, it forms a fabric of “underground” concerns that in the long run –as a recent report by 14ymedio and Yucabyte demonstrated– tends to become real information in Cuba.

The general tension during the elections for deputy candidates in Parliament had its correlation in the digital environment. Many users disclosed not only the “traps” of the Government to attract voters or force them to go to the polls, but also the supposed consequences of abstaining.

It was even stated that whoever attended the polling station after applying for a visa or parole at the US Embassy would automatically lose their right to access this service. The spread of this rumor was so alarming that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself claimed that it had contacted the US immigration authorities to deny the information.

Although no independent observers were allowed to verify the transparency of the voting, thousands of users left their impression on Twitter and Facebook. Many denounced what was jokingly called “Operation Tun-Tun”: the electoral authorities not only forced children to guard the ballot boxes, but sent them, house to house, to carry out reminders to guarantee broad participation. Despite this, users on the networks commented that many had avoided the polls. Others recounted that they had voted “a la cañona”, (by force) fraudulently representing several relatives, or that they had found their forged signature on the list of participants. continue reading

A clandestine group began to claim responsibility for several anti-government posters. These ‘graffiti’ contained offensive messages directed at the régime

In the heat of the elections, a clandestine group began to claim responsibility for several anti-government posters. These graffiti, reported by the independent press, contained offensive messages directed at the regime such as “Down with the dictatorship” and “No to the Communist Party”, signed by the organization identified as El Nuevo Directorio.

As for the second source of rumors, reports of robberies, assaults, rapes and adolescent gangs in the Cuban peripheries are already common on social networks. In the face of police inaction, reporting from digital profiles is one of the few alternatives in the hands of the population to make visible the wave of crime that is spreading through Cuba.

The ravages of a youth gang known as C39, which operates in Las Tunas, presumably under the command of an adult woman, has kept the country folks in check. The local Police, they say, are sitting idle and it is said that they even grant impunity to delinquents.

The agents did arrive on time, several users say, when two men tried to rape a male child in the city of Nuevitas, Camagüey. However, in this case too, the action of the local residents, who began to act on their own, was decisive in stopping the crime.

Platforms most used by users and format of the content collected. (14ymedio/Yucabyte)

Also unprotected, according to multiple reports, remain the residents of the capital’s Altahabana neighborhood, who suffer frequent assaults in their own homes. Under the guise of “messengers” who have come to deliver a package, they break into homes to rob residents, threatening them with bladed weapons.

Others are not so lucky and, after the encounter with the criminals, they end up getting murdered. This is what happened, says a user, to a rural resident from San Juan de los Yeras, in Villa Clara, who was stabbed after his horse was stolen.

Although it is rare that the official media or the Ministry of the Interior offer an official version of the facts, some institutions often expose various details. This was the case with the death of a baby abandoned by his mother, a student at the Villa Clara Sports Initiation School. It was the directors of the center who, in a brief Facebook statement and during a meeting where recorded conversations were leaked, commented on the seriousness of the event.

The most difficult rumors to verify are those that refer to the most hermetic environments monitored by the regime, such as prisons. The conditions in which the prisoners live had traditionally been one of the best kept secrets by the Government. However, the increase in the prison population in the Country, and the media attention that, since the protests of July 11, 2021, has focused on prisons, have helped to clarify how the inmates live.

The harassment and manipulation suffered by the relatives of political prisoners by jailers or State Security has also been exposed on social networks

A common prisoner, identified as Kevin, was allegedly beaten to death by his jailer, Yulieski Montero, at the Quivicán prison in Mayabeque. Those who shared the event charged that other inmates throughout the country have suffered mistreatment at the hands of the police officers who guard them, or by other prisoners, whom the guards incite to punish the “troublemakers”.

The harassment and manipulation suffered by the relatives of political prisoners by jailers or State Security agents when they go on regular visits has also been exposed on social networks. However, it is rare for the relatives of common prisoners to air events like these, for fear of reprisals and the consequences that the complaint could have for the inmates themselves.

This type of situation results in that, although a large part of the rumors collected become, in the long run, sources of verified information – or end up being denied – there is other information that cannot be verified. This “informal” flow of data runs parallel to the regime’s press and often becomes a counter-narrative of the official version of events.

However, there is also the case of rumors that remain static, without being able to be verified or denied, and that have become a constant in the collection. This is the case of the illness and death of Raúl Castro –and also of other leaders, such as Ramiro Valdés–, a rumor repeated throughout 2022 which has also been registered in the first months of 2023. Or of the reports about a “fraudulent transition” or “fraud change”, which describe a sort of conspiracy by the regime’s leadership to fake a transition to democracy from the seat of power itself, without compromising the interests of certain military clans historically linked to the Castros.
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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORKThe 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.