Havana remains silent on how many aid workers are still in the South American country, while Caracas dismantles part of the alliance that sustained the Cuban regime.
14ymedio, Madrid, May 8, 2026 / The capture of Nicolás Maduro by US forces has plunged Cuba into one of its worst strategic nightmares. Venezuela no longer subsidizes oil for the island, it does not automatically obey Havana, and has a new government willing to review the cooperation mechanisms that for more than two decades allowed the Cuban regime to compensate for its declining production with Venezuelan aid.
The main blow is, above all, energy. For years, Venezuela was the island’s primary oil supplier, even when shipments no longer reached the levels agreed upon by Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro in 2000. In 2025, Cuba received—according to some agencies—between 11,000 and 16,000 barrels of Venezuelan crude oil per day, although others raise the estimate to 27,000 barrels per day. In some months, the flow was much higher.
This dependence explains the unease that has taken hold in Havana since January, when the new Venezuelan government began to sever ties with the Plaza de la Revolución. Cuban researcher Pável Alemán, quoted by EFE, acknowledges that “it is difficult to pinpoint the exact state of the bilateral relationship,” although he warns of a “gradual cooling” following the decisions made by Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodríguez.
The interruption of Venezuelan oil is not happening to an economy in a position to withstand it
According to Alemán, the new Venezuelan government “is gradually dismantling a group of social programs that had been approved long before,” in addition to complying with “the US request to stop exporting oil to Cuba” and approving “much more profound” changes, including the reform of the Hydrocarbons Law. “This has a negative impact on Cuban society and, logically, on bilateral relations,” he told the Spanish news agency.
The interruption of Venezuelan oil supplies is not happening to an economy in a position to withstand it. Cuba imports a significant portion of its fuel, its aging thermoelectric plants are operating at near capacity, and the regime has received only one shipment of Russian oil—delivered by a single tanker on March 30—since the last Mexican shipment arrived on January 9. In recent years, imports have been insufficient to prevent blackouts, restrictions on transportation, and an industrial crisis that extends from nickel production to agriculture.
But oil was only one part of the pact with Caracas. The other was the Cuban presence in Venezuela. Doctors, trainers, political advisors, intelligence officers, and military specialists were deeply embedded in key Chavista institutions. The alliance was sold for years as a cooperative effort, but in practice it functioned as an exchange of fuel for professional services and political control.
Relations are “totally paralyzed” and awaiting developments in both Caracas and Havana.
Professor Efraín Vázquez Vera, also quoted by EFE, believes that relations are “totally paralyzed” and awaiting developments in both Caracas and Havana. In his view, Venezuela is no longer a “factor” in Cuban politics, and Maduro’s arrest serves more as a warning: “a latent threat or possibility of what could happen in Cuba.”
Havana, for the moment, is avoiding public confrontation. In the last four months, communications between the two governments have decreased significantly, as have gestures of support and personal contacts.
Silence also surrounds the situation of the Cubans who remain in Venezuela. After Maduro’s capture, 14ymedio documented the repatriation flights on Cubana de Aviación’s Ilyushin IL-96, as well as testimonies from doctors quartered in Venezuela awaiting their return to the island. However, the government has never reported how many aid workers were evacuated, how many remain in Venezuelan territory, or what has happened to the remaining personnel involved in security operations.
There is “a bit of resentment on the part of Cubans,” because some on the Island believe that the operation against Maduro had “internal” Venezuelan support and that, therefore, the Island’s military was “sacrificed.”
Vázquez Vera believes he senses “a bit of resentment on the part of Cubans,” because some on the island believe that the operation against Maduro had “internal” Venezuelan support and that, therefore, the Cuban military personnel who were part of his protection detail were “sacrificed.” Although, officially, the Cuban regime has not issued any criticism.
Alemán avoids using the term “treason,” but acknowledges the moral impact of the incident. It was, he told EFE, “the first time in decades that Cubans had fallen in a conflict on the soil of another country.” At least 32 members of the Cuban Armed Forces died during the U.S. operation on January 3 at Fort Tiuna, where officers specializing in counterintelligence, psychological warfare, and crowd control were stationed.
Alemán maintains that any attempt to replicate a Venezuelan-style operation on the island would clash with Cuban nationalism, which he says is more unifying than ideology itself. “Here, it won’t be easy for them to find someone to negotiate with behind the backs of Cuban society and launch a government replacement project,” he told EFE. The problem for the Cuban regime is that the Venezuelan crisis has already had its effects without a single Delta Force soldier ever setting foot in Havana.
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