Juan Izquierdo – Page 4 – Translating Cuba

‘While Doing Military Service in La Cabana, Three Recruits Committed Suicide From the Statue of Christ’

The statue of Christ was inaugurated a week before Batista’s escape, on December 24, 1958. (Secret Nature/Facebook)

14ymedio, Juan Izquierdo, Havana, 9 November 2023 — Adrián González will never erase from his memory the suicide attempt in 1983 by one of his colleagues in the military service. Both were recruits in the military unit of La Cabaña, in Casablanca, on the other side of Havana Bay, when their friend climbed to the top of Christ, the colossal work of Jilma Madera, and jumped into the abyss shouting “I am Superman!” The fall was 20 meters (65 feet).

The young man survived, but was left one-armed and had to remain hospitalized for months. “He wanted to appear crazy and thus get out of the service,” says González, who today lives in New York, and whose memories of military unit 3074, located in La Cabaña, still keep him awake at night. “Until I left there, in 1986, there were at least three ’successful’ suicides. They all jumped off the Christ,” he tells 14ymedio.

At that time, he adds, the access to Christ, inaugurated a week before Batista’s escape, on December 24, 1958, was prohibited – “Fidel Castro did not like people going to pray there” – and he had it guarded, a single recruit, shotgun in hand. For many, the guard duty was a break from the continue reading

oppressive environment of the unit, but many ended up overthinking and descending into depression, he says.

Another young man stole a rifle from the arsenal and shot himself in the head. His desperation had reached a point of no return and he no longer cared about getting out, but rather about killing himself. “The officers told us then that he had problems with his father, but we all knew what had happened: the boy was never able to adapt to the service,” González says.

“I told them that I wanted to kill myself. They didn’t believe me. Then they tried to put me in prison for repeated absences, because I was from El Vedado and I ran away every night”

Unable to physically harm himself, González also starred in an episode of “madness” to try to leave the unit sooner. “They took me to the psychiatrist at the Naval Hospital after I faked severe depression. I told them that I wanted to take my life. They didn’t believe me. Then they tried to put me in prison for repeated absences, because I was from El Vedado and I ran away every night.”

He ended up being evaluated by a team of doctors in Mazorra – the gloomy asylum in Havana – and after the diagnosis “they recognized that I had depression, but it was not enough to discharge me. In the end I completed my service, I spent three years and three months in that unit, but at least I got out of prison,” he says. His assessment, four decades later, is similar to that of any Cuban who has been at the mercy of the Armed Forces: “I am miraculously alive.”

A recent study by the organization Archivo Cuba (Cuba Archive) described Cuban military service as “human trafficking with a lethal cost” that has cost the lives of at least 54 young people — that were able to be documented — since its establishment by Law No. 1,129, of 26 November 1963. Only the Island and North Korea force minors under 18 years of age to train in Armed Forces facilities, with a program with strong ideological overtones that underlines the need for blind obedience to the regime.

The causes of death recorded by the Cuba Archive are several: suicides, negligence by superior officers, medical neglect, imprudent orders – such as the young recruits who died at the Matanzas Supertanker Base — and disappearances and deaths in unclear conditions.

“My son said he would rather die under Ukrainian bombs than from hunger and sadness here”

In 2021, the number of young people in Cuba of military age – between 15 and 29 years old – was 1,033,123, according to official data. They are “a large captive reserve,” the report assessed, “submerged in poverty and hopelessness,” which is why they looked for any opportunity, including military means, to leave the country.

The clear – and most serious – example is the presence of young Cubans in the Russian Army, participating in the invasion of Ukraine. Their motivation, many admitted, was economic. With 26,000 euros a year, the salary promised to some of the Cuban mercenaries, they intended to help their families and later manage to take them to Russia.

The report, signed by María Werlau, documents how the presence of Cubans in the Russian ranks was known and consented to by the leadership of both countries, whose military and political rapprochement has been consolidated in the last year. Werlau highlights the case of the two young people from the Island who reported having been “deceived” and “mistreated.” According to a video released by several media, they had signed a contract that did not stipulate their direct presence on the front, and yet they had been forced to participate directly in the war.

“My son said he would rather die under Ukrainian bombs than from hunger and sadness here,” the mother of one of the recruits had revealed, according to the document.

“Medical care is scarce and food is very poor and people even go hungry, which affects minors who are still growing the most.”

The report also dedicates a section to the most traumatic antecedent of the struggle of young Cubans on foreign battle fronts: Angola. “According to official figures, Cuba’s participation involved 377,033 soldiers and 50,000 civilian collaborators,” for whom the African country paid up to $1,000 for each member, it points out.

For Werlau, the conditions of military service in Cuba could not be more deplorable. “Many of the recruits are sent to remote units far from their families,” she says. “Medical care is scarce and food is very poor and people even go hungry, which affects minors who are still growing the most.” In addition, young people are prohibited from leaving the country.

The “ordeal of sorrow” that military service entails leaves a psychological – and often physical – toll that lasts a lifetime. González knows this well, having met his friend again years after his “jump” from the Cristo. When González congratulated him for having “earned” his exit, the other showed him his hands, still broken from the impact: “Your luck was better,” he said, “I regret it. Look how I turned out.”

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‘A Complete Skeleton for a Religious Ritual Costs Between 10,000 and 12,000 Cuban Pesos’

“Monument to the Common Man”: human remains in the Cementario de Colón in Havana. (Radio Television Martí/Archive)

14ymedio, Nelson García/Juan Izquierdo, Havana, 5 November 2023 — The Cuban police only respect one religion: Palo Monte. The hermetic world of its rituals, its sorcerers and cauldrons, its fragmentary language – the kikongo – with which they pronounce incantions and curses, have made it since colonial times the most feared of the Island, according to its own followers. There is only one aspect of the Palo Mayombe, as it is also known, that agents do not let pass: the desecration of tombs to obtain ritual bones.

“The human bone is the center of the foundation,” Ta José, a 42-year-old habanero who has been practicing this cult from Central Africa for several decades, explains to 14ymedio. The foundation – also called garment or nganga, cauldron – is the most sacred object of the paleros. It consists of a container where pieces of wood, earth and endless objects are deposited that the palero [practitioner] should not reveal. It also contains human remains.

The importance of the foundation doubles if the bone belonged to someone prominent or a former member of the religion. Hence, to achieve it, a palero does not skimp on resources or think twice before entering a cemetery. As complicated as it is, “a way has always been sought to achieve it,” admits Ta José.

The most common way is to go to the cemetery and steal it. The other way is to find another palero that already has one

“The most common way is to go to the cemetery and steal it. The other way is to find another palero that already has one, because he went into the cemetery himself or bought it from the custodian,” he says. The business of buying and selling bones has caused the systematic dismissal of the cemetery’s custodians on the Island. The most well-known case of this year, last January, was that of the continuous desecration of the Matanzas cemetery, which provoked the intervention of the provincial Communist Party. continue reading

“Among us or with the help of friends we look for the key points,” describes the palero. “When someone needs, for example, a head (skull), he asks his contacts, even if they are from a different branch of palo monte, or he goes to the cemetery to ask the custodian. It’s always resolved. Of course, it’s quite expensive.”

“It depends on the type of work that is going to be done and what part of the body is going to be worked on,” he explains. “The smallest and cheapest piece you can get costs 1,000 pesos or its equivalent in dollars. A complete skeleton can cost between 10,000 and 12,000 pesos. The price may vary depending on the circumstances of the death, the illness that the deceased suffered. It also depends on the race: Chinese bones have more power for us and are sold at higher prices.”

The foundation – also called a garment or ‘nganga’, cauldron – is the most sacred object of the paleros. (14ymedio)

According to Ta José, there are people who are dedicated to going to the tombs and removing as many bones as they can. Then they find how to sell them on the black market, although no store of religious items – legal, such as self-employment – will announce it unless the person who asks can be trusted. “The police have always persecuted the desecrators,” he insists, but in general they “don’t mess” with the paleros.

Sometimes, of course, when they see someone wandering the streets “with a sack” late at night — as usually happens after a ceremony — the officers arrest the person and find that he is carrying a knife. The knives, he explains, are part of the foundation. When the person explains it to the police, they usually let him continue on his way.

There are families who provide the bones of their deceased, because they were practitioners and that motivates them to make the donation

“Bones are essential in palo monte,” emphasizes Ta José. For a palero, in the bones are “the foundations of power” and its material expression. If there is a spiritual foundation, which is “attended” with rum and tobacco smoke, the material cannot exist without the remains of some person. “There are families who provide the bones of their deceased, because they were practitioners and that motivates them to make the donation,” but it is not usual, he says.

All the “works” of the palero depend on the foundation, which Ta José synthesizes with an enumeration: “Consecrate, save, kill, solve problems and help the world.” According to the habanero, each cauldron is effective and achieves what its owner wants, sooner or later. “Some are stronger than others. It depends on the ceremony and the person’s knowledge,” he says, although he prefers not to say more: an important part of his religion is to keep secrets, which practitioners handle only after several initiations and tests. “I can’t say everything,” he admits.

Despite the difficulties and the mystery that has always surrounded palo monte, its impact on Cuban society has not stopped since religion arrived from Africa, he says. “There was always a certain discord between palo monte and santería, because each one wanted to be the strongest cult.” On the Island, studies say that santería is more widespread. However, Ta José insists, palo mayombe retains the reputation of being “the most effective, fastest and strongest.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The ‘Castle’ of the Cortinas in Havana, Converted Into a Military Zone and a Beggars’ Refuge

With a concrete structure and a design that imitates the fortresses of the Italian Renaissance, La Luisa has long passageways now filled with graffiti, garbage and weeds. (14ymedio)

14ymedio, Nelson García/Juan Izquierdo, Havana, October 23, 2023 — No one enters the ruins of the La Luisa farm, in the Havana municipality of Arroyo Naranjo, with good intentions. Where one of the most powerful families in Cuba once lived, now only beggars dare to sleep, surrounded by walls full of graffiti and vines. The sporadic visitors to the “castle” – the building retains its towers and walkways – are now criminals seeking temporary shelter to escape from the Police and young people who, according to the neighbors, come to “do evil things.”

La Luisa was one of the first properties confiscated by Fidel Castro after 1959. Its owner, the lawyer and politician José Manuel Cortina – who served as chancellor of the Republic on two occasions – was accused of being a “landowner” and died in exile in 1970.

The officials who occupied the “castle” after the triumph of the Revolution then received an order from Che Guevara: to install a metallurgy laboratory that ended up becoming the Research Center for the Mining and Metallurgical Industry (Cipimm). “That didn’t last long,” Jorge tells 14ymedio; he now works in the new offices of that institution, not far from La Luisa.

Without maintenance and after numerous instances of neglect, the old Cortina house ended up collapsing. (14ymedio)

Without maintenance and after numerous instances of neglect, the old Cortina house ended up collapsing. “One day, all the pipes were clogged, the drainage system failed and the bathrooms were unusable,” says Jorge. Shortly after, the “castle” was abandoned. continue reading

Over time, the Cortina lands – which bordered those of the family of former president Carlos Prío Socarrás – became a military zone. Now, the Army officers’ houses, as well as the new Cipimm – dedicated to studying the possibilities of gold and nickel exploitation in Cuba – are located where Republican politicians once built their summer estates.

“Many efforts were made, when the Historian of Havana Eusebio Leal was alive, for that Office to restore the ’castle’, but to no avail,” Jorge alleges. According to Leal’s architects, it was useless to repair La Luisa: no tourist was going to go to Arroyo Naranjo to see the building, no matter how interesting the construction.

No one else was interested in the farm, where several scenes from the Cuban-Spanish co-production The Nights of Constantinople were filmed, directed in 2001 by Orlando Rojas and featuring actors of the caliber of Francisco Rabal, Verónica Lynn, Rosita Fornés and María Isabel Díaz. However, the film failed to attract the authorities attention to the building.

Now, the Army officers’ houses, as well as the new Cipimm, are where Republican politicians once built their farms. (14ymedio)

A concrete structure with a design that imitates the fortresses of the Italian Renaissance, La Luisa has long passageways now filled with graffiti, garbage and weeds. Someone – probably a beggar or several, judging by the objects – blocked up several entrances to a room and now sleeps there, among the rubble.

Where there used to be a stately staircase to the second floor, now one made of boards is the only step to reach the upper floor. Balconies and windows, as well as several arches with mosaic work, still allow us to imagine the type of life that was led in La Luisa when the Cortinas occupied it.

Among the battlements, the central tower stands out from which – it is said – José Manuel Cortina watched over his property and the members of his family, as well as President Prío Socarrás. Trees and vines have broken through each floor, destroying not only the flooring but also the walls and beams.

Even so, the building is overwhelming and must have impressed those men in olive-green who, in the 60s – as a photo from the time attests – went to evict the Cortinas. Jorge knows it well, and continues to admire La Luisa under a demolished arch: “Even in these deplorable conditions, the ’castle’ is still a beauty.”

La Luisa was one of the first properties confiscated by Fidel Castro after 1959. (Ecured)

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With Blood and Bullet Holes, Che’s Last Shirt Casts Doubt on the Remains Buried in Santa Clara

The bullet holes in the fabric provide some clue as to the quantity and trajectory of the sixteen bullets that hit Guevara. (Raúl Torres Salmerón/Leticia Montagner García)

14ymedio, Juan Izquierdo, Havana, 9 October 2023 — In 2017, Dr. Moisés Abraham Baptista, who performed the autopsy of Che Guevara after his capture and execution, offered a challenge to Cuban authorities: using DNA evidence, verify that the remains found by the island’s forensic experts three decades ago in a grave in Vallegrande, Bolivia, and later reinterred in Santa Clara, are in fact those of the Argentine revolutionary.

As a basis for comparison, Baptista offered to provide Havana with the shirt Guevara wore when he was captured and that still has his blood and sweat on it, as well as several bullet holes. Baptista kept the garment at his house in Puebla, Mexico, where he moved after leaving Bolivia and where he lived until his death on March 2nd of this year at the age of eighty-three.

The Cuban government, of course, never responded to Baptista, who told his story to two Mexican journalists, Raúl Torres Salmerón and Leticia Montagner. The Bolivian doctor’s account as well as numerous documents, photographs and articles about the death of Guevara were collected by the authors for “I Did the Autopsy on Che Guevara.” 14ymedio was given access to the book, which remains unpublished seven years after Baptista made his claim.

It took Torres and Montagner years to convince Baptista to tell his story

It took Torres and Montagner years to convince Baptista to tell his story. A discreet man who was fully aware of the delicate political nature of the situation, he kept a low profile to avoid harassment by Cuban counterintelligence. After a team of forensic specialists announced the discovery of what they said were the remains of Guevara and several of his companions in 1997, the doctor decided to speak up.

He did it on Mexican television, saying he had remained silent out of concern for his own and his family’s safety. “People must know how the things I experienced happened. It’s no longer a secret,” he said. The shirt, preserved in excellent condition by Baptista, is a key element in his argument. It came into his possession in 1967, after the autopsy, while he was working as director at the Señor de Malta hospital in Vallegrande. continue reading

Torres and Montagner, who had access to the shirt, are thorough in their description. The garment, placed on a rack in Baptista’s residence in Puebla, smells like “blood, sweat and gunpowder,” they say. The fabric is khaki and has “two large tears, one six inches and the other three inches.” The bullet holes in the fabric provide some clue as to the quantity and trajectory of the sixteen bullets that hit Guevara and which of them, according to Baptista, killed him.

“The shirt still has some curly, light brown hairs on it, some of which can be seen on the collar,” the authors state. Photographs of Guevara in Bolivia confirm that these were the clothes he was wearing when he died. Baptista reported that the body, which was delivered to the hospital’s laundry room, had a lot of blood on the back. “When undressing him to wash the body, [I saw] a strange, large wound. This could have been from a bayonet or from a Garand M2 automatic carbine fired at very close range,” the doctor said.

Che Guevara, shortly before his death on October 9, 1967, with the shirt preserved by Dr. Abraham Baptista. (Arhivo)

In his 1967 reports, Baptista initially stated that Guevara suffered seven gunshot wounds but later revised the number to nine. On several subsequent occasions, he confessed that these figures had been “invented.”

Based on Baptista’s testimony, Torres and Montagner concluded, “When the first shots were fired, it is likely that he fell forward — that is, face down — and was still alive. They tried to finish him off with a machete, a bayonet or with a closed discharge from a machine gun while his back was turned up. He was still alive. They immediately turned him face up and he was killed by a shot to the heart. Judging from the trajectory of the bullet as indicated on his shirt, that was from top to bottom.”

After finishing the autopsy, Baptist severed the hands from the body as evidence that Guevera had been killed. He injected formaldehyde into the body to preserve it and, though he lacked the proper materials, made a death mask.

“I Did the Autopsy on Che Guevara” includes several appendices including Baptista’s medical reports, details about his departure from Bolivia, photographs of Guevara and his shirt, the doctor’s “political will and testament,” articles by the two authors — published in El País and Letras Libres — questioning whether it is Che’s remains which are buried in Santa Clara, and a short biography of Tamara Bunke, one of the guerrillas who accompanied Guevara on his expedition.

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The Other Side of Cuba: Luxury, Drugs, Expensive Alcohol for ‘Well-Off People’

Behind the bar, with dark glasses and a cocktail shaker in his hand, the bartender prepares everyone’s favorite drink. (14ymedio)

14ymedio, Nelson García/Juan Izquierdo, Havana, 8 October 2023 — The atmosphere is electrifying, and the music is very loud. Everyone knows him and wants to know – both in Havana and outside Cuba – the coordinates for the most exclusive bar in Cuba: Mío and Tuyo (Mine and Yours). Prostitution, drugs, the best alcohol and the best cigars – multiple rumors surround the administration of the premises. It is claimed that the owner, Elio Ahumada, is a close friend of Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, alias El Cangrejo (The Crab), Raúl Castro’s grandson and bodyguard. Allegedly armored by the regime, Ahumada has a slogan on social networks: “Speak comment, defame.” The gossip can only give publicity.

Located in Miramar, on 5B and 42nd streets of the municipality of Playa, the white fence of Mío y Tuyo, in addition to the security personnel who guard it, makes one thing clear: not just anybody can get in. It’s commonly said that only the “beautiful people” go there – with the intention of spending “the best nights in Havana” – but also the wealthiest, the one who dresses best and the one who has the most contacts, in addition to having transportation to return home in the early hours of the morning.

Behind the bar, with dark glasses and a cocktail shaker in his hand, the bartender prepares everyone’s favorite drink. Some are known, like a mojito, and some are far-fetched, like a social-climbing coyote. There are no limits, and the radiant bottles behind him attest to this: for whiskey, Johnnie Walker – blue label, one of the most expensive – Ballantine’s and Chivas Regal; for vodka, Grey Goose Magnum and Belvedere; for rum, wonders from one shore to another.

Those who prefer to smoke have a special patio and comfortable benches. There are also three exclusive VIP areas: to the left and right of the entrance door, and another at the back of the lounge. Many have gotten drunk at these tables, to which Ahumada’s Instagram attests, everyone from Rihanna to Gente de Zona, from Alexander Abreu to Isaac Delgado and continue reading

Paulo FG. Sandro Castro, Fidel Castro’s grandson, is also seen often. From time to time, security guards let in someone “poor”: it’s a strategy, some say, so that no one accuses its owner of practicing social apartheid.

Las jineteras del Tuyo y Mío cuentan con entrada libre y un “espacio” bien delimitado en el salón. (14ymedio) — The jineteras (hookers, or prostitutes) of Mío y Tuyo have free admission and a well-defined “space” in the lounge. (14ymedio)

What is the secret of Mío y Tuyo? What guarantees its continuous supply, its survival as a business, in the midst of a devastating economic crisis? Who protects Elio Ahumada? The “friend” in the dome who is most often pointed out is the famous grandson, who has been photographed more than once in the bar in the company of several young women. However, nothing – except the operation at full speed of the establishment – can show the link.

“Elio is a personal friend of El Cangrejo,” Omar, a former security employee of Mío y Tuyo, tells 14ymedio. “He earns his slice of money in exchange for sponsoring the place. He enjoys the open bar and all the free services provided, in addition to being able to organize private parties.” For Omar, the strategy is clear: “The Crab is the real owner; Elio is just a facade.”

Mary, a young woman who used to clean the bar, says that it’s a cover for the regime’s “dirty business.” “More than once I saw people using cocaine in the bathrooms,” she says. “When I told the management, they turned a deaf ear for a while. Shortly after, Elio himself told me that he would dispense with my services.”

To the alleged businesses of sale and consumption of drugs is added, according to observations in the bar and the comments of former employees, an orderly system of prostitution

To the alleged businesses of sale and consumption of drugs is added, according to observations in the bar and comments of former employees, an orderly system of prostitution. The young women entrench themselves in the VIP areas and wait for the arrival of potential customers: foreign businessmen, wealthy Cubans and members of the leadership who usually themselves show up with several women.

The jineteras (hookers, or prostitutes) of Mío y Tuyo have free admission and a well-defined “space” in the lounge. When they manage to “hook” a client – whom they monitor and select from the VIP platforms – they take him to the dance floor. Although they often go in groups – in case the client can pay for an orgy – there are also “independent” ones, who must then give a commission to the administrators.

The security guards preserve order among the “girls” of the bar and the “independents.” There can be no conflict in the facilities, and that’s why they are so scrupulous about who enters and who stays out. No one knows who may be behind the surveillance cameras. After all, another motto of Elio Ahumada, which seems like a private joke among friends, is that the luxurious bar is “more yours than mine.”

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Facing the Dragones Police Station Is a Nest of Thugs in the Ruins of Zulueta 505

The destruction of the Zulueta 505 building is slow but still dramatic. (14ymedio)

14ymedio, Nelson García/Juan Izquierdo, Havana, September 21, 2023 — Due to the magnitude of the damage and the lack of effort of the authorities to mitigate it, many buildings in Havana agree with Carpentier.* The “city of the columns” is barely left, with structures in ruin, paint chipped by moisture and vines invading arches and pillars.

Such is the case of the old Vía Blanca hotel, located at 505 Zulueta Street, between Monte and Dragones, whose decadence the passers-by compare with that of a “haunted mansion” near which no one dares to walk anymore. In the postcards of the 1950s, however, the building was described as a residential gem with “large and ventilated rooms.”

The destruction of the Zulueta 505 building is slow but still dramatic. The Government has been promising for years a repair of which, today, there is only one sign: the gigantic scaffolding that underpins the facade and on which climbing plants and rust have been growing for a long time.

The Government has been promising for years a repair of which, today, there is only one sign: the gigantic scaffolding that underpins the facade

In 2020, the nine families who lived in the building, several of them with children, were relocated under the pretext of restoring it. “Until that moment they lived at risk of being buried by a collapse,” recalls Rogelio, a 71-year-old retiree who lives in the neighboring building.

In conversation with this newspaper, Rogelio describes the long ordeal of the neighbors since, in 1995, they received the notification that they would be transferred to better houses in zone 11 of Alamar-Habana del Este. He pointed to the Office of the Historian, whose director, Eusebio Leal, began to earn the trust of Fidel Castro and to get streams of foreign capital, indispensable after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The building during the 1950s, when it was occupied by the Vía Blanca hotel, on an old postcard. (Facebook)

“It was all a lie,” concludes the old man, who is amused that the policemen of the well-known Dragones station – located in front of the building – have to dodge the scaffolding and constantly look up, in case some “loose” stone is about to fall, by chance, near them. continue reading

Not infrequently, Rogelio recalls, the neighbors tried to go to the police unit for the help of those same agents, who ignored them. On the other hand, the station does not lack paint or maintenance. In fact, the Ministry of the Interior is building a fence around the neoclassical building, with its windows covered by powerful bars, behind which the Capitol stands out.

“Nor do they like to park their cars nearby, in case a collapse occurs,” he notes, pointing to the row of police vehicles”

“Nor do they like to park their cars nearby, in case a collapse occurs,” he notes, pointing to the row of police vehicles.

Nature and the Government’s laziness are not the only things that have wreaked havoc on Zulueta 505. Drunks, beggars and other nocturnal “guests” resort to the arcades to “do their deeds,” according to Rogelio’s euphemism. What used to be “ghostly,” he adds, is now barely sordid: garbage and debris complete the picture.

Despite its proximity to the police station, the building has also served as a kind of sanctuary for all kinds of thugs. In the darkness on Zulueta Street, those who seize a wallet or a cell phone with a knife have the ideal shelter behind the arcades and the barrier of scaffolding. “No one is going to risk going in there to look for the thief,” Rogelio says.

Police station on Dragones Street, Central Havana. (14ymedio)

Xiomara, a 45-year-old housewife, has spent most of her life contemplating the desolation of the corner of Zulueta and Dragones. For her, the only “solution” is collapse, helped by rain or a windstorm. The authorities have proven to be useless, and the only measure they have taken is to place some scrawny yellow tape on the scaffolding. Only those who approach closely can read it: “Danger of total collapse.” Xiomara doesn’t need the warning. A few days ago, when she came back from the line for buying chicken, a fragment of the wall of Zulueta 505 almost struck her.

Several decades of broken promises have cured her of fear. Now she only expects a “foreign firm” to buy the land “with ruins and everything.” “If that happens, they will not return the building to the families who lost it,” says Xiomara. “They will most likely build another hotel.”

*Translator’s note: Alejo Carpentier, a Cuban writer, called Havana “the city of columns.”

Translated by Regina Anavy
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The Creative Cuisine of Cuban Grandmothers in the Face of General Scarcity

Cuban cuisine, opulent in other times, now functions with scarce food and improvised recipes. (14ymedio)

14ymedio, Juan Izquierdo, Havana, 29 August 2023 — The walls of Havana creak with the rain and Idalia’s breeze. While the radio predicts that everything is in order, jets of water slip between the tiles and drip, relentless, coating the walls. However, what most worries Aurelia, 61 years old and fond of cooking, is what she is going to eat at home while the storm lasts.

In her building in Centro Habana, several retirees like her tried to equip themselves — with very little luck — so they wouldn’t have to go outside in the rain. The result of the hunt is lean: a pound of ground chicken, a bottle of El Cocinero oil, and rice.

Neighbors trade small amounts of rice, flour or eggs to contribute to the completion of a whole meal

Pedro, one of Aurelia’s old friends, recalled that Cubadebate had a gastronomy section and that it might give them an idea to bite the bullet and invent a banquet. Sabor y Tradición, the column by gourmet cook Silvia Gómez Fariñas, has everyone taking offense against the “official Cuban recipe book”: sausage, guava jelly, beef burger, mango chutney, breaded chicken with peanuts, fried vegetables, etc., not to mention the wacky instructions for the hacked shark, the fish in green sauce and malarrabia.*

“We will have to make do with the creative cuisine of the revolutionary grandmothers,” Aurelia proposes ironically, among the insults of the others to the opulent menu of Cubadebate. Phone in hand, she starts calling other neighbors and “negotiating.” continue reading

Ernesto, who lives on the first floor, will lend her a few handfuls of powdered egg. “Let’s do the same deal as the other day,” Aurelia proposes, reminding him that, in exchange for the egg, he got some croquettes she had prepared. Using the same tactic, a call to her neighbor Sandra guarantees her a small bunch of chives and two or three spices.

The oil begins to get hot, Ernesto prepares a salad, someone else the rice, and Aurelia throws the picadillo into the pot

The kitchen counter begins to look less squalid, and Aurelia gets down to work. At the last minute, a packet of flour appears. “I sold the cigarettes from the bodega [the ration store] and got this a few days ago,” says Pedro. As if she were making an act of contrition, she confessed to her friends that she was saving the flour to make some sweets, but since the eggs are not available through the ration book, it’s better to use them and that’s it. “You only live once,” she concludes, while the downpour continues beating on the windows of the house.

The oil begins to get hot, Ernesto prepares a salad, someone else the rice, and Aurelia throws the picadillo into the pot. Disappointed, she notes the meat shrinking as it makes contact with the metal. Shortly after, already at the table, everyone devours Aurelia’s picadillo with white rice. “It won’t be Cubadebate’s hacked shark, but it is what it is,” she says.

The coffee – a bit watery – rounds off the meal. The weather begins to clear over Havana. Someone opens a window to let the fresh air in, but Aurelia asks that they close it: the neighborhood dump, located a few meters below her window, must be at its peak. She is right, whoever looks out the window will see a horde of flies swarming over the garbage. “With so much trash, it’s best not to talk too much,” she warns. “If you’re not careful, flies will get into your mouth.”

*Translator’s note: Malarrabia (insanity or bad case of hydrophobia) is a typical Cuban dessert made with several fruits and vegetables and syrup.

Translated by Norma Whiting
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In Addition to Being Expensive, Turkish ‘Patanas’ Are a Pollution Bomb in Cuba

Every day, the chimneys of the Suheyla Sultan spew toxins over the sky of Havana. (14ymedio)

14ymedio, Juan Izquierdo, Havana, 27 August 2023 — The formidable column of smoke that extends from the bay of Havana to the east is the most visible example of the environmental damage caused by the Turkish patanas, the floating power plants present on the Island since 2019. The chimneys of the Suheyla Sultan, generating 240 megawatts (MW) and connected to the Tallapiedra thermoelectric plant, throw considerable amounts of carbon monoxide (CO) and nitrogen oxide (NOx), two dangerous pollutants, into the atmosphere.

Despite the risk of toxicity, the authorities – who rent five of the same type from the company Karpowership for an estimated annual price of 31 million dollars – have installed the patanas in the ports of their two most populated cities, Santiago de Cuba and Havana, and in the Mariel Special Development Zone.

To gauge the damage in the absence of official reports, 14ymedio consulted the legal process faced by Karpowership in the Dominican Republic over two patanas in Pueblo Viejo de Azua, a protected coastal area. Despite the fact that the Dominican Ministry of the Environment granted the license to install two patanas (with a total of 180 MW, barely a third of the installed capacity in Cuba), the protests of activists, scientists, fishermen and inhabitants of the area remain red hot.

According to the government commission that approved the project, the patanas have chimneys that are 55 meters high and 1.8 meters in diameter, and emit into the atmosphere 100 milligrams of NOx per cubic meter and 290 of CO at a temperature of 45 ºC.

Given these values, Karpowership did not commit to anything, and the experts limited themselves to stating that “the emission of burning gases during the normal operation of the patanas is expected to have emissions of atmospheric pollutants such as CO and NOx. The emission levels of pollutants (carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxide) are expected to be below the maximum limits established” by the Dominican Environmental Technical Regulation. continue reading

However, the company had to pay a total of $5,275,000 to an “environmental adequacy” program that included a contingency plan, risk analysis, preventive measures against climate change and money for possible restorations.

Judging by the trace of hazy smoke that covers Havana, it is unlikely that Cuba, which, unlike the Dominican Republic, maintains total secrecy about the contract signed with the Turkish company, has taken similar measures to prevent these pollution levels. Another important difference between the two countries: while the Cuban population does not seem to worry about the cloud of pollution that covers Havana, protests continue in the Dominican Republic against the Karpowership patanas.

At the end of 2022, one of the plants, the Irem Sultan, had to temporarily leave the Dominican Republic after several riots led by residents in Azua, and it came to Havana. It could not return until the managers of Karpowership obtained the environmental license.

The formidable column of smoke extends from the bay of Havana to the east. (14ymedio)

Last May, after several statements by the Human Rights Commission of the Dominican Parliament, the Deputy Minister of Environmental Management, Indira de Jesús, had to present new arguments to justify the patanas, saying that they did not affect the protected area of Azua.

However, the newspaper Al Momento revealed that both power plants and support boats incur “permanent spills” of fuel, in addition to generating a coastal current that passes through the interior of the ships to cool their boilers, and that absorbs and burns, during suction, hundreds of fish and other species. The effect of this process is a remarkable warming of the water, which decreases its oxygen levels and damages the fauna of the coast.

Among the most affected animals has been the manatee, in danger of extinction; they feed on vegetation in mangroves located less than 100 meters from the patanas. The Academy of Sciences of the Dominican Republic also denounced the damage to the habitat of lobsters and crabs, which are very sensitive to water temperature.

The pollution is also affecting the inhabitants of the area, dependent on fishing, who have demanded a response from the authorities on multiple occasions for the findings of dead or poisoned fish on the coast.

In the Dominican Republic, “hope is placed in the justice system,” which can call to account the officials who authorized the installation of the patanas and the rulers who signed the permits, even though they are aware of the damage. However, in Cuba, where the courts respond to the regime and no expert has dared to denounce the environmental disaster caused by the patanas, the chimneys of the Suheyla Sultan will continue to throw toxins into the sky of Havana with impunity.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Cuba Has Spent More Than 100 Million Dollars on Turkish ‘Patanas’, a Secret Investment

14ymedio has verified that the Belgin Sultan and the Suheyla Sultan are in Havana. (14ymedio)

14ymedio, Juan Izquierdo, Havana, 23 August 2023 — One of the best kept secrets of the Cuban authorities is the cost of the Turkish patanas [floating power plants] that, since 2019, contribute to alleviating blackouts on the Island. Faced with the silence of those responsible, 14ymedio went to look for information in the Dominican Republic, which has contracted for two floating power plants (180 MW in total), for which it pays 40 million dollars for a duration of 42 months. If the same calculation is applied to Cuba, where there were seven patanas and now only five, with a capacity of 490 megawatts (MW), the cost would be 109 million dollars for the same period, or about 31 million a year.

However, both the Cuban authorities and the directors of the Turkish company have been anything but transparent about the agreements. Maritime tracking applications do not offer up-to-date information on the position of the patanas, and it has been necessary for 14ymedio to send its reporters to the ports to visually check their presence.

Karpowership’s most recent promotional video, published on August 17, boasts of its presence in multiple countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, including the Dominican Republic. Although Cuba does not appear on the map of the company’s partners in the region, the images show the most powerful patana hired by the Island – the Suheyla Sultan, 240 MW and connected to the Tallapiedra thermoelectric plant in Havana – but locates it in the Dominican port of Pueblo Viejo.

It is likely that this is due to the fact that Havana, unlike Santo Domingo, has not signed long-term contracts with Karpowership, only specific agreements. Another symptom of the instability of the Island’s patanas has been the intermittency of the supply of fuel oil for their operation.

In his report on Monday, the technical director of the Electric Union, Lázaro Guerra, assured that, after weeks of shortage, there was enough “fuel availability” now to start the patanas installed in Mariel, which were stopped by the oil deficit. The manager explained that other floating plants had suffered the same problem but guaranteed that the situation “has been improving.” continue reading

As 14ymedio was able to verify on Tuesday, the Belgin Sultan (15 MW) and the Suheyla Sultan (240 MW) are anchored in the port of Havana, while the Erin Sultan (130 MW) is connected to the Antonio Maceo thermoelectric plant on the Renté peninsula, at the entrance to the bay of Santiago de Cuba. The situation in Mariel could not be visually confirmed, since public access is restricted, but the images taken by Google Earth document the presence of two Turkish power plants, the Baris Bay (40 MW) and the Ela Sultan (65 MW).

Last July, during the sessions of the Parliament, the Minister of Energy and Mines, Vicente de la O Levy, reported that two patanas had left the Island after having “fulfilled their contracts,” which represented 170 MW less for the National Electricity System (SEN). The academic and specialist of the University of Texas, Jorge Piñón, points out that “the Turkish plants have been a lifeline for the SEN with a contribution of 2,591 GWh, 14.2% of the gross generation in 2022.”

The departure from circulation of both plants led to a controversy about a possible withdrawal of the Turkish ships, and the Cuban authorities are even more secretive about their management.

The minister then limited himself to insisting on the information he had offered to Parliament and said that six floating power plants were still operating on the Island. However, it is possible that he was counting the Karadeniz One, which is actually a tender, which returned to Havana on August 5 to replace a Turkish tugboat, the Gultekin Bey.

The power plants are part of an energy project called Powership Azua, authorized by the National Energy Commission. (EFE)

For their part, the Irem Sultan – which left Santiago de Cuba last April – and the Esra Sultan are in the Dominican Republic, whose government signed a contract with Karpowership last June to install them in a “definitive” way, after numerous discussions about the environmental damage they cause, in the coastal municipality of Pueblo Viejo de Azua, about 120 kilometers west of the capital, Santo Domingo.

The power plants are part of an energy project called Powership Azua, authorized by the National Energy Commission and managed by the Dominican subsidiary of Karpowership. Both run on fuel oil and have on board, according to government documents, “electric alternators, a substation, drinking water tanks, wastewater and sediments, liquid fuel storage tanks, offices and workshops.”

In addition, the project has a dock, a barge to store fuel and auxiliary facilities, which, added to the maintenance cost of the plant, total 42.8 million dollars. As for Cuba, floating power plants need similar conditions for optimal operation. Unlike the patanas in the Dominican Republic, the Cuban ones are directly connected to thermoelectric plants in Mariel, Havana and Santiago.

The patanas continue to be “the best deal” for Cuba in terms of energy, according to De la O Levy in February. The minister, who has referred on numerous occasions to floating power plants as a “great investment” that raises “concerns” in the population, has only gave a clear number: 17, the number of years that it will take Cuba to pay – through a monthly fee – a cost that the Government has not revealed.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Scarcity and Crime, Today’s ‘Moncada to Attack’ in Cuba, According to President Diaz-Canel

Díaz-Canel resorted to an old political trick and took advantage of the dawn light to begin his speech. (Cuba debate)

14ymedio, Juan Izquierdo, Havana, 26 July 2023 — Miguel Díaz-Canel’s speech at the Moncada barracks in Santiago de Cuba, delivered this Wednesday morning, focused on two points: lamenting the “physical disappearance of the historic generation” that stormed the barracks – although he had Raúl Castro and Ramiro Valdés in front of him – and the anguish of the Cuban rulers, who suffer firsthand from “another Moncada”: inflation and crime on the Island.

The event, which commemorates the 70th anniversary of the rebel attack on two important military enclaves in the former province of Oriente during the Fulgencio Batista dictatorship, began at five in the morning on July 26th. The Government spared no resources for the tribute, which began with a play of lights on the façade of the barracks recreating – with notable historical inaccuracy – the frontal shooting of the assailants until the building was symbolically collapsed.

Starting from the “ruins” of Moncada, the voice of Fidel Castro and various signs alluded to the “problems” of the Republic. When the show ended, which included congas and declamations, the first secretary of the Communist Party in Santiago de Cuba, José Ramón Monteagudo, noted that the city had complied with the request of Raúl Castro, who in one of his speeches had called for “beautification days” to make Santiago a “beautiful and hygienic” city.

Díaz-Canel resorted to an old political trick and took advantage of the dawn light to begin his speech. He mentioned the Christian apostle Santiago, patron saint of the city, who came to “dress as a mambí” during the independence wars, and the Virgin of Charity, in whose El Cobre sanctuary Antonio Maceo was baptized. continue reading

The Cuban Television cameras tried to offer a solemn profile of the president, who expressed himself with diction errors and voice breaks, as is usual in his public interventions.

“As long as we do not reach a decent degree of prosperity for Cubans, we will have a Moncada to assault,” he summarized, after alluding to the vicious circle that produced the increase in the price of basic necessities and the wave of crime that is sweeping the island.

As expected, Díaz-Canel blamed the problems in Cuba on the United States, which, in addition to the blockade, is determined to organize campaigns “to prevent foreign investment and foreign trade.” In addition, he accused Washington of leading “a pursuit of fuel supplies” to the island, through whose ports numerous oil tankers move, about which Havana does not offer the slightest information.

He spoke little about Fidel Castro, of whom he limited himself to saying that, while his brother was fighting in the Audiencia building, he “ordered the withdrawal.”

Raúl Castro did not go up to the rostrum or receive ovations. Together with a nonagenarian Ramiro Valdés, the soldier did not leave his seat until the end of the event. (ACN)

The rest of his speech was dedicated to Díaz-Canel allowing himself to be applauded by various groups of foreign visitors such as the Pastors for Peace – whose leader, Gail Walker, was present at the even t- the Puerto Rican independence group Juan Rius Rivera, the Caravan of Brazil and several “brigades” of young Belgians and Germans who traveled to the Island for the commemoration.

This time, Raúl Castro did not go up to the rostrum or receive ovations. Together with a nonagenarian Ramiro Valdés, the soldier did not leave his seat until the end of the act and the cameras captured an expressionless face, which in no way resembles that of the 22-year-old who was captured seven decades ago, after the failure of the assault .

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Giving Hotels and National Resources to Foreigners Will Not Pay Cuba’s Huge Debt

Ricardo Cabrisas, Deputy Prime Minister of Cuba, during the renegotiation of the debt with the Paris Club in 2020. (Cubadebate)

14ymedio, Juan Izquierdo, Havana, 15 July 2023 — The option of resolving Cuba’s external debt with the transfer of domestic resources to foreign companies, defended this Wednesday by the pro-government professor Juan Triana Cordoví, has been refuted by economist Pedro Monreal. Triana considers this option a way to refinance and “revitalize” socialism on the Island; for Monreal, it poses the risk of “being insufficient and undermining sovereignty.”

Triana, who teaches Economics at the University of Havana and writes a column in OnCuba, raises the need to renegotiate the Island’s debt and clean up the image of the country, which has become “one of the highest risks in the region” in terms of investment.

To do this, he suggests that, in a hypothetical negotiation, one could make use of the “assets” that in theory belong to the “people of Cuba,” although they are specifically managed by their “administrator”: the State. Triana refers, first of all, to hotels, which he prefers not to deliver completely to foreign companies but to turn them into owners of “part of the shares.”

He also alludes to the 2,417 state companies, of which – he calculates – only 12 (0.4% of the total) are really “strategic” and carry the weight of the national economy. Triana recommends that these companies that “decide the game” do not touch each other, partly because some of them are already shared with foreign entities: this is the case of the Canadian Sherritt International, whose debt to the Island is paid by the overexploitation of Cuban nickel and cobalt mines; Havana Club, managed together with the French Pernod Ricard; and Habanos, which is partly owned by Spain. continue reading

The negotiation would be done with the rest of the state companies, which could be saved from their financial mediocrity if they are shared with foreign investors, who would work, without intending to, to “save” socialism on the Island.

To these two elements, Triana adds idle lands and idle plots in cities, where there are already “several buildings built by capitalist real estate companies,” such as the Miramar Business Center. The formula of the exchange of assets, the professor acknowledges, could be questioned, but after all, he concludes, “it’s something that began more than thirty years ago when that first contract was signed with a foreign capitalist and in just a few months the first five-star hotel in Varadero was born.”

However, Triana does not place the key to taking the step in the will of the State, which conveniently blocks the economic movements of the country, but in “consensus” with the people, to whom he recommends “explaining” what is intended to be done.

Precisely from this erroneous argument – to assume that the Cuban people have some control over the management of the national economy – Monreal starts to refute Triana’s suggestion. In a series of Twitter threads, the economist explains not only why the massive exchange of assets to pay off the debt is impracticable, but also the serious political risk it entails for Cuba.

Affirming that the people own the state assets is, at the very least, a “controversial” budget when it comes to reasoning the possibility of an economic opening. “Power,” says Monreal, means the ability to “decide a difference” and have a specific “property.”

“It could be difficult to validate the exercise of the power of the people, specifically of the wage earners, within the framework of an economic package such as the ’arrangement’ that has ’compressed’ wages and that disproportionately puts the cost of the adjustment on the workers,” Monreal summarizes. “Explanations to the people are problematic when they are politically treated as a ’clay’ to mold and not as an active subject (citizens) with effective capacity to promote or stop public policy proposals.”

In addition, the Cuban people do not have “effective citizen spaces for criticism of the Government,” which makes it impossible for them to participate in decision-making.

The economic aspect of the problem is even more serious, and to analyze it, Monreal refers to the data that reflect the great “scale” of the Cuban foreign debt, whose “recent worsening” leaves very little room for action, even for the State.

The economist starts from a central and unquestionable argument: “Cuba’s accumulated external debt is today greater than the Gross Domestic Product,” and the hyper-devaluation of the Cuban peso in 2021, after the Ordering Task*, was the final blow to the country’s ability to assume reimbursement in the current situation.

The country had to disburse 1.606 billion dollars to pay for debt service in 2022, at the same time that it recorded a deficit of 1.629 billion in its current account, which reflects a total income (exports of goods and services) lower than expenses. These alarming data point to a “severe contraction of the resources” to confront the debt.

The increasing deterioration of the current account has an impact on the foreign exchange reserves that Cuba has, says Monreal. In addition – and although the official data offered by Havana are outdated – the current crisis precedes the coronavirus pandemic, one of the usual pretexts the regime uses to justify the impoverishment of the country, and it is related to a “sudden increase in short-term debt,” which complicated the conditions of payment to creditors.

That stagnation put Cuba between a rock and a hard place in front of international banks and their suppliers, including the Paris Club. The information published by this last body exposed the different renegotiations that the Havana regime has been forced to undertake with its creditors since 2020.

Looking for a payment solution based on the exchange of assets is dangerous economically, says Monreal, especially because, considering the scale of the problem, what Cuba can offer is “relatively small.” Therefore, he insists, the real balance of such a measure would be paid politically and would not free Cuba from its status as an “international pariah” for its economic discredit.

What is left for Cuba – which has already delivered, as Triana observes, its “crown jewels”: minerals, tobacco and rum – are health services, communications, the domestic market in dollars and its dominance over remittances from abroad. The Cuban State is limited, Monreal maintains, in negotiating these remaining assets, in part because it has always kept them under strict control.

The market remains in pesos, which would have to be “sweetened” to have some attraction for the foreign investor, through tax privileges. However, this process would be an obstacle, the economist considers, if you want to “privatize” state enterprises progressively, a process, Monreal says, that is characteristic of all the reform processes initiated by the communist parties in power, “with disparate results.”

The alternative could be, proposes Monreal, the agricultural sector: to promote private agricultural production to guarantee the supply of food in national currency and allow producers to carry out operations, even with large companies outside the Island.

This transfer of state agricultural assets to the national private sector – a system that Monreal calls “officially approved” – could be beneficial, if accompanied by other measures, to reduce the external debt. The result? A double benefit: to guarantee the food sovereignty that Cubans crave so much and, in short, to protect national sovereignty.

*The Ordering Task is a collection of measures that include eliminating the Cuban Convertible Peso (CUC), leaving the Cuban peso as the only national currency, raising prices, raising salaries (but not as much as prices), opening stores that take payment only in hard currency, which must be in the form of specially issued pre-paid debit cards, and a broad range of other measures targeted to different elements of the Cuban economy.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Authorizing the Controlled Slaughter of Livestock Was a ‘Mistake’ Cuban Officials Say

The aging Cuban farmers no longer know what to do with the thieves, who robbed 82,445 cattle and horses in 2022. (14ymedio)

14ymedio, Juan Izquierdo, Havana, 3 May 2023 — The livestock scenario in Cuba, marked by brutal robberies and police inaction, could not be more chaotic. Resolution 88 of the Ministry of Agriculture, which approved in 2022 a “procedure for the slaughter and consumption of beef for self-consumption” for authorized entities and producers, is now seen by officials as “erroneous” and somethng they regret, because instead of alleviating the situation, the level of crime has skyrocketed, according to Cubadebate.

The aging Cuban farmers no longer know what to do to face the thieves, who in 2022 robbed the huge figure of 82,445 cows and horses throughout the country, according to the official press. Few now go to the police, whose terrible investigative mechanisms are well known by the victims of this “common” problem.

“In the end nothing happens,” is the conclusion of the second part of a report on the theft and slaughter of cattle published this Wednesday by Cubadebate, with a third installment announced. Producers, officials and agents have offered the official media their thoughts on the subject, and no one dares to foresee a less bloodthirsty panorama: thieves are increasingly effective and violent, and in the countryside the early morning is filled with tension.

“Producers are very disappointed with this whole situation. It is very painful for them that a cow they have for milk is stolen to produce meat or to work,” says the director of livestock of the Ministry of Agriculture, Adrián Gutiérrez. Many no longer even know “where to [safely] put their animals to sleep.”

“They kill the cow, take it and nothing happens. There is also a safe market, which is not only fresh meat but the production of sausages,” says Gutiérrez. The farmers, for their part, know the score: what matters to criminals is to make easy money: “Did anyone think that with livestock it was going to be any different?” continue reading

In San Cristóbal, Artemisa province, the police managed to arrest a criminal who was up at dawn with two sacks full of meat. With complete peace of mind, he told the officers where the product had come from, on which farm he had killed the animal and what he intended to do with it.

However, when he arrived at the station, the man changed his entire statement. He said that had had found the sacks and that, naturally, with the hunger on the Island he did not hesitate to pick them up to feed his family. He spent three days in detention and left after paying bail. “It didn’t take long for them to find him again one morning, killing another cow,” Cubadebate says.

Releasing known criminals is an increasingly common practice in the rural areas of the Island. The “excessive request for evidence,” criticized by the official press, goes above common sense and the fact that thieves, in general, are repeat offenders. It is enough for a person to declare that “the bag of meat was found lying around” so that, sooner or later, the crime goes unpunished.

Osbel Benítez, a farmer from Manatí (Las Tunas) interviewed by the Cuban Observatory of Human Rights, reported that he had also suffered the consequences of police inaction. “They slaughtered three cows on January 12. I made the accusation and they haven’t done anything. The police do whatever they want,” he lamented, despite having provided all the evidence.

“It seems that it was a matter of patronage,” Benítez explained, alluding to the fact that several criminals are under the protection of the police.

Meanwhile, local meetings with the Ministry of Agriculture are increasingly frustrating. The authorities attribute the ease of committing crimes to the lack of control of the livestock herds. “It is the absolute responsibility of the owner,” say the managers, who wash their hands of the problem when the animal is not registered, despite the fines of 10,000 pesos and the confiscation that is imposed on those who violate the accounting of their livestock.

“If the livestock is counted, the person must report to the police when an event occurs,” they point out. But if the cow or horse is not listed in the state registry, it is not even worth the complaint. According to the newspaper, the animal does not exist, and neither does the crime.

For Yudith Almeida, the head of the National Livestock Registry, if a producer doesn’t have the “marker” — with which the animal’s skin is identified — or the ear tag, he is committing a serious “indiscipline,” and this exonerates the authorities from the damage.

The official lists the sanctions that can be applied to violators: 500 pesos and confiscation if there are no documents that prove the accounting of the animal in the registry; 10,000 pesos if the declaration of birth of major livestock is violated; 10,000 if a death is not declared; 10,000 for each missing cow or horse; 5,000 for each unauthorized process of sale or transfer; and 20,000 if the update of data for each animal is not already registered.

Given the legal complexity of explaining that he was the victim of a theft, “the farmer often prefers not to testify,” Almeida acknowledges.

Not even the official numbers can hide the situation: 82,445 cases of theft and slaughter of animals in 2022 — almost 2.5 times more than in 2021, when 33,690 were registered — of which 45,315 correspond to cattle and 37,130 to horses. The most affected provinces are Villa Clara (12,243 cases), then Holguín (9,825) and finally Matanzas (2,926).

Meanwhile, the government is promoting alternatives to relieve the deficit of meat and milk in the country, such as raising water buffalo. In Las Tunas, since 2013, a herd of 765 head has been supplied, but the farmers don’t accept these animals,” according to the president of the company in charge of breeding, Leonel Ávila.

Optimistic, Ávila says that buffalo ’have more advantages than cattle,” and he gives their reproductive capacity as an example. In addition, he points out that their milk production is progressing well, and “everything they eat is quickly converted into live weight.” But he acknowledges that these animals “require greater volumes of food.” However, the breeding of large-scale buffalo on the Island is, according to the farmer himself, on the plane of mere possibility.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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World Press Baffled by Cuban-Style Democracy

Cuba does not hold real elections but all the trappings — campaigns, rallies and propaganda — are there.

14ymedio, Juan Izquierdo, Havana, 24 March 2023 — Two days before elections for Cuba’s National Assembly, the world press is watching the lead-up to the vote with bafflement. The conclusion: no one really votes in Cuba but all the trappings — campaigns, rallies, and propaganda — are there to serve as staging for Cuban-style democracy.

Agence France-Presse (AFP) describes President Miguel Díaz-Canel’s appearances during the run-up as an “unusual political campaign,” especially in Santa Clara, the city that nominated him for national office and from which he has been re-elected “more than a dozen times.”

The French news agency describes Cuba as a “communist country unaccustomed to electoral campaigning” as exhibited by its current president, who is trying to contain growing voter apathy in a “dissatisfied society.” It also cites Cuban electoral law, which prohibits “all forms of individual electoral propaganda,” something none of the candidates – praised to a fever pitch by their local media outlets – have complied with.

The Associated Press (AP), an agency which generally takes a complacent attitude towards the regime, has adopted a more critical tone in its analysis of the electoral process. “The day’s result seems inevitable, though one closely-watched indicator will be how many voters abstain,” it says.

AP notes ironically that Cubans will elect 470 representatives from a list with the same number of candidates. “There are no indications that the current president, Miguel Díaz-Canel, will leave office and, for this reason, is expected to be re-elected,” it adds bluntly, underscoring the predictability of the result. continue reading

The Spanish news agency EFE describes the situation as “relevant and controversial,” indicating that what is really at stake is not the parliamentary election itself but the legitimacy of the system, which widespread absenteeism will call into question. “The fact that Cuba does not allow international observers to monitor these elections is, to say the least, troubling,” it finds.

“In the absence of public opinion polls, one group to follow is young voters, among whom disenchantment and political disaffection are widespread after years of severe economic crisis,” it says, noting that 13,000 Cubans over the age of sixteen will be going to the polls for the first time.

In a lengthy article, Al Jazeera recounts the history of the last six decades from the official point of view, highlighting the embargo against Cuba and extolling achievements in education and health. It avoids criticizing the system but it does address the potential issue of low turnout. “Voter absenteeism has become a feature of recent elections in Cuba. Participation in the November 2022 municipal elections, for example, fell below 70% for the first time, indicating a disconnect in a political system that depends on public support,” it explains.

Argentina’s digital newspaper Infobae refers to to a “decline in credibility” of both the regime and the electoral process. It believes social discontent, which has worsened since the protests of 2021 and 2022, will take its toll on the Cuban government’s international image. “The living conditions that underlie both the defiance and the mass exodus, probably along with low voter turnout as well, remain unchanged,” it says.

The Mexican digital news site Sin Embargo [Nevertheless] accuses the regime of perpetrating an “electoral simulation.” It notes that, at a minimum, a democracy should ensure certain conditions: “multiparty participation, competitive elections, freedom, accountability, rule of law.” It argues the absence of these reveals the iliberal and autocratic nature of the island’s system.

Meanwhile, government-controlled news outlets such as Prensa Latina and allied organizations such as Venezuela’s Telesur continually present this Sunday’s elections as “a show of support for the socialist social and political model.” Despite describing the technical aspects of the voting process, none of these outlets, nor Cuban officials themselves, explain the inconsistencies international analysts have pointed out, or the intense campaigns candidates have waged in recent weeks.

Parties, extended periods without blackouts, somewhat better stocked store shelves and an overwhelming call for a “united vote” — the pro-government slogan intended to discourage low turnout and encourage people to vote for the pre-selected candidates — are failing to alleviate the tension, felt both inside and outside the island, that already characterizes the run-up to these elections.

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‘In the Hospital, in Las Tunas Cuba, the Light Bulbs and Even the Window Panes Have Been Stolen”

Almost all the benches in Plaza Calé have lost their slats. (Newspaper 26)

14ymedio, Juan Izquierdo, Havana, 7 March 2023 — Based on the robberies and vandalism, the inhabitants of Las Tunas are “dismantling” the city’s public spaces. The list of “reprehensible” acts, as the official press called them this Monday, is extensive: garbage dumps, destruction of buildings, theft of furniture and corruption in state establishments.

The most alarming situation is going on at the provincial hospital, which, according to its directors, treats more than 7,000 patients daily. “The light bulbs, the screws for the window panes and the panes themselves have been stolen,” denounced Carlos Pérez Santiesteban, deputy clinical-surgical director of the center.

The people who accompany the patients take advantage of their stay in the hospital, according to the doctor, to get hold of what they find, from a piece of metal to the chair braces. To make matters worse, the doctor complains, “stretchers and wheelchairs are abused, mattresses are unprotected, food is eaten on the beds and liquids are spilled.”

Pérez, who describes the ability to control the situation as “difficult,” also regrets that people steal or destroy the installation’s switches, and that they intentionally dump waste in the corridors, bathrooms and gutters of the building. In addition, they habitually scratch the walls, smearing them with grease and damaging the paint. continue reading

According to the press, the “fury” of the people from Las Tunas has an explanation: they behave “as if they were bothered” by the good condition of public spaces. It is no longer a question of neglect, but of vandalizing what cannot be transported to homes, such as park benches or the walls of a building.

“In a bakery, for example, flour and oil are stolen and sold in the same neighborhood.” Nobody has scruples when it comes to “taking advantage” of public goods

Las Tunas, the report states, “has large bills” related to “collective property,” and attributes it to a “a training problem” to young people that later in life affects their adult behavior. However, it does not mention at any time the deficiencies and shortages – common throughout the country but exacerbated in the eastern provinces – that have triggered crime rates in Cuba, although they]se do not justify other behaviors such as dirtying and vandalizing hospital facilities.

There are people who even steal marble pieces “to make a grinder for spices and meat,” an astonished citizen of Las Tunas said. He was recently interviewed by the official press, which also publishes photographs of the “ragged sites” of the city. Almost all the benches at the Plaza Calé are missing their slats, while the metal railings of the Colón Street bridge –whose potholes are a danger to traffic– have been sawn off and stolen.

The fence of the Hermanos Ameijeiras Airport is in the same sorry state, whose wires and poles, already damaged by rust, have been cut and “recycled” in homes.

“Everyone here ‘struggles’, cautiously states one of the interviewees in the official report. “In a bakery, for example, flour and oil are stolen and sold in the same neighborhood.” No one has scruples when it comes to “taking advantage of” public goods, it doesn’t matter if they are food or construction materials –rebar, stones, bricks– that are already part of some structure. That notion, he admits, is even “accepted.”

Another problem is the city’s state of hygiene, to which the local newspaper has referred on other occasions. The amount of garbage in the streets, the puddles of urine in squares and parks, and the fact that almost all the garbage transportation of the waste depends on horse-drawn carts – for which Community Services pays little and late – increase the population’s discomfort.

The “latest fashion,” the newspaper claims, is breaking bottles and leaving the glass shards on the streets, which are already littered with excrement, paper and potholes. At the height of the problem, the text devotes several paragraphs to giving lessons in “socialist morality” and civility to the people of Las Tunas, whose attitude cannot be explained and who will end up, he insists, by leaving only “bits and pieces” of the city.

Translated by Norma Whiting
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The Building Next to Hotel Saratoga, Abandoned to its Fate

The residential building next door to the Saratoga continues to look like an empty dolls’ house. (14ymedio)

14ymedio, Juan Diego Rodríguez/Juan Izquierdo, Havana, 23 February 2023 — The members of the Cuban Parliament who are elected on 26 March will not be able to avoid the sight of the ruin of the Hotel Saratoga, right opposite the Capitolio Nacional building. Habaneros, however, are already well accustomed to seeing the state of the building, which exploded on 6 May 2022, killing 47 people, and which today evokes a sickly-looking house of cards.

The top floor is the only one which remains intact, like a grotesque reminder of what the Saratoga used to be, surrounded as it is today by sheets of red zinc. But the hotel is barely the centre of gravity of the collapse: its neighbouring residential building, which features in some of the most dramatic photos of the disaster, continues to look like an empty dolls’ house.

A comparison between the first photographs of the building, taken just after the explosion, and the scene which is presented to any pedestrian today, shows that the building has been systematically ransacked, not only by its former residents but by criminals and random passers-by. Where there used to be a mounted picture frame, a piece of furniture or a kitchen appliance, now there is only a stark bare wall. continue reading

Various parts of the structure which survived the explosion have been removed by the construction workers, or have collapsed under their own weight. Nevertheless, the aura is not one of a reconstruction site, rather one of just another building which has been abandoned to its own fate.

The people who lived at Prado 609, an annex of the hotel, were rehoused in the precarious Havana street of Vives, between Carmen and Figuras. It’s been a double tragedy for them: not only have they lost their homes but the new ones given to them by the government not only lack any charm but were constructed from cast concrete in one of the most “troubled” areas of the capital.

“They have no plans yet about what they’re going to do with the Saratoga. They’re not going to demolish it completely, only what’s necessary to stabilise the structure. The timetable is for 8 to 10 months”, a resident of the area told 14ymedio in December.

The company that the government commissioned for the work is Almest, a property developer linked to the Armed Forces, and a hitherto unknown French company, although evidence suggests that it’s the construction company Bouygues, which has worked on the construction of 22 luxury hotels on the island.

If one thing is clear it is that the fate of the Saratoga is bound up with that of the neighbouring buildings, among which there is also a baptist church. It would seem that the Cuban government has not yet decided on the move that will resolve the problem of one of the most central blocks of Havana.

Translated by Ricardo Recluso

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