A former Obama advisor, Ricardo Zúñiga, believes that frustration with Havana’s intransigence will “probably” lead the US to a military operation.
14ymedio, Havana, June 25, 2026 / For the Cuban leadership, relinquishing power doesn’t mean losing an election or giving up certain privileges, but rather risking everything. This is how Ricardo Zúñiga, one of the main negotiators of the thaw promoted by Barack Obama, interprets the regime’s resistance to undertaking reforms and reaching an agreement with the United States.
The members of the small ruling group see things this way: “Either they stay in power or they’re likely to be annihilated.” They’re not going to risk losing everything, “but they also don’t have any internal solutions to improve the country’s situation,” the former diplomat stated in an interview with journalist Gloria Ordaz, broadcast Wednesday on Telemundo 51.
Zúñiga, who served as Obama’s senior advisor for the Western Hemisphere, paints a grim picture if the economic pressure exerted by the Trump administration does not lead to concessions from Havana. In his view, American frustration could ultimately trigger military action against the island.
The former official presented this possibility as a personal assessment, not as information about a plan already approved by Washington. He also questioned whether an air operation—since he ruled out a ground invasion—could bring about a political transition, especially because the Cuban system does not depend exclusively on a single leader nor does it exhibit the internal divisions seen in other regimes.
They are not going to risk losing everything, “but they also don’t have internal solutions to improve the country’s situation.”
The former advisor believes Trump already has sufficient leverage after tightening sanctions against military companies and the Castro family’s associates. “The Trump administration already has the lever. They already have the means to persuade,” he noted. In his opinion, the next step should be to use that power to achieve concrete changes, instead of continuing to punish an already severely damaged economy.
Zúñiga has firsthand knowledge of the Castro regime’s negotiating style. During the secret contacts that led to the announcement of the restoration of diplomatic relations in December 2014, his main interlocutor was Alejandro Castro Espín, son of Raúl Castro and a high-ranking official in the Ministry of the Interior, now sanctioned by Washington.
“He was a very orthodox person, with an education from Fidel Castro’s government and with a worldview that we never shared and that we were never going to share,” he recalled.
Despite these differences, the two delegations were able to make progress because they were acting under the direct instructions of Obama and Raúl Castro and had clearly defined operational objectives. Those talks led to the reopening of embassies and a broad rapprochement process that Havana failed to use to undertake profound economic or political reforms.
“We are talking about a moment where the situation in Cuba is considerably worse than in 2016,” Zúñiga warned. “They already made the wrong decisions after the opening initiated by President Obama. Now they have to improve conditions for the population with measures they previously resisted and which today are probably not even sufficient.”
Zúñiga’s diagnosis, however, questions both the effectiveness of a military intervention and the possibility of repeating the ‘thaw’ negotiation model.
Regarding Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, alias ” El Cangrejo” (The Crab), Zúñiga asserts that his appearances in spaces linked to the talks should not be interpreted as proof that he is Raúl Castro’s political heir. “He doesn’t rule Cuba,” stated the former advisor, for whom real power is divided among “a consortium” made up of leaders of the Armed Forces—including the military conglomerate GAESA—the Ministry of the Interior, the Communist Party, and “some important bureaucrats in the economic sector.” Therefore, he rules out the possibility of any eventual agreement being negotiated with a single interlocutor.
Referring to Josefina Vidal—Cuba’s Deputy Foreign Minister and one of the main negotiators of the thaw in relations —Zúñiga presents her as a “very capable” official deeply identified with the regime’s official position. He describes her as a firm and experienced negotiator who knows the United States well and can navigate complex conversations effectively, although he emphasizes that “she represents a viewpoint that is no longer appropriate for Cuba.”
Zúñiga’s assessment, however, questions both the effectiveness of a military intervention and the possibility of repeating the negotiation model of the thaw. Unlike then, Washington now faces an exhausted Cuban economy, an entrenched political leadership, and a power structure that perceives any opening as an existential threat. Nor does he believe that the current leadership of the regime is capable of implementing successful reforms.
“I fear there will be frustration in the talks and they may decide to attack (…), but that wouldn’t bring about a change in the situation. I think it’s likely that’s how it will end, although I don’t think that would be the end; it will be much slower, because Cuba is not Venezuela.”
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