In addition to the rates of 24 pesos to the dollar for state-owned enterprises and 120 for tourism, the Government creates a floating rate with the aim of capturing foreign currency from the informal market
The Cuban economy awoke this December 18th to a long-announced development, carefully wrapped in the language of “graduality”: the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) launched a third official exchange rate, a floating one, which began at 410 pesos per dollar and joins the existing rates of 24 pesos to the dollar for state-owned enterprises and 120 for tourism. The government presents the measure as the beginning of a transformation of the exchange market aimed at “organizing” the economy and moving toward future monetary unification. In practice, the country is entering an even more complex stage of exchange rate segmentation, amidst the worst economic crisis in recent decades
The president of the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC), Juana Lilia Delgado Portal, defended the decision in a special appearance broadcast on state television and reported by Cubadebate. She explained that the coexistence of multiple exchange rates has generated distortions, encouraged informality, and hindered banking and tax traceability. Recognizing a third segment, she admitted, responds to an objective reality that can no longer be ignored: the enormous gap between official rates and the real value of the dollar in an informal market that currently hovers around 440 pesos.
The new system divides the foreign exchange market into three segments. The first, at 1×24, will remain reserved for centralized state allocations for goods and services considered essential, such as fuel, medicine, electricity, public transportation, and basic necessities. The second, at 1×120, will be maintained for certain entities with the capacity to generate foreign currency, particularly in the tourism sector. The third, which is new, introduces a floating rate that will be published daily by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) and will apply to individuals and non-state management entities.
The government insists that this is not improvisation, but a “responsible” strategy. An immediate unification, it argues, would cause a sharp devaluation of the peso, with even more severe inflationary effects than those currently being experienced and a further loss of purchasing power for wages. International experience, authorities reiterate, supports transitional schemes with multiple segments in economies with accumulated imbalances.
Pedro Carbonell assured that the new floating rate will be based on “real transactions” and not on speculative expectations as, according to him, occurs in the informal market.
However, recent Cuban experience gives cause for skepticism. Since the failed Economic Reorganization Task [or as commonly known the Tarea Ordenamiento (“Ordering Task“)], launched in January 2021 with similar promises of rationality and stability, the Cuban peso has done nothing but lose value, while inflation has skyrocketed and real wages have plummeted. Four years later, the country has not only failed to achieve a currency that would “organize” the economy, but has also deepened partial dollarization and normalized an informal market that now sets the real price benchmarks.
The Director of Macroeconomic Policy at the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC), Ian Pedro Carbonell, asserted that the new floating exchange rate will be based on “real transactions” and not on speculative expectations, as he claims occurs in the informal market. The stated objective is to channel foreign currency flows through the financial system, provide a legal and transparent framework for buying and selling foreign currency, and reduce the risks currently faced by households and businesses.
On paper, the benefits seem clear. Exporters and foreign exchange earners will be able to sell part of their income at a more favorable rate than the one currently used in their accounting, obtaining more pesos to pay salaries, invest, and cover internal expenses. Non-state management entities will, for the first time, have legal access to purchasing foreign currency through their bank accounts, with a limit equivalent to 50% of their average gross income from the last quarter. And the public will be able to sell their dollars and euros at banks and Cadeca (exchange bureaus) at an “attractive” rate, without resorting to the informal market.
But the very design of the scheme reveals its limitations. The floating market will only sell the foreign currency it manages to buy. It will lack the backing of state reserves or a financial buffer to guarantee stability. In a country with a chronically insufficient supply of foreign currency, exports at historic lows, and tourism in freefall, the central question is not how will the rate be set, but how many dollars will actually be available.
On the same day as the official announcement, the independent media outlet El Toque reported that its website had been blocked on the island following a cyberattack.
The government admits that the informal market will not disappear immediately. In fact, the gap between the new rate and the street price will be the true measure of its effectiveness. If the floating rate falls far below the real value of the dollar, the incentive to operate outside the system will persist. If it gets too close, inflationary pressures will be inevitable.
Adding to this scenario is a revealing political context. On the same day as the official announcement, the independent media outlet El Toque reported that its website had been blocked on the island following a cyberattack. For weeks, official media and government officials have accused this project of “economic terrorism” for publishing the informal exchange rate. The government seems to be fighting the symptom—the inconvenient reference point—while being forced to acknowledge the disease: a national currency that lacks credibility.
The Central Bank of Cuba’s (BCC) strategy also includes a promise to stabilize and strengthen accounts in freely convertible currency (MLC), a dollar-based virtual currency that the state itself introduced and then effectively devalued. Restoring its functionality in businesses is now presented as part of the new exchange system, although for many Cubans, the MLC remains a stark reminder of inequality and exclusion.
Authorities speak of transparency and continuous information in the coming days. But recent history weighs heavily. Without profound structural reforms, without a real increase in production and exports, and without confidence in the rules of the game, no exchange rate—fixed or floating—can be sustained. The new exchange rate architecture attempts to bring order to a fractured system, but it does not solve the underlying problem: a Cuban peso that remains adrift in an exhausted economy.
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