Category: Elias Amor Bravo

There is everything in these measures. For example, according to MFF resolution 204/2022, natural persons who receive non-commercial air, sea, postal and courier shipments in the national territory are exempt from the payment of customs tax for the first 30 dollars of the value or its equivalent weight, on up to three kilograms of the shipment, in the value/weight ratio, established by Customs. With 30 dollars, little can be taken away. Seeing the packages that arrive at Cuban airports, three kilograms seem like little.

Therefore, the rule says that natural persons who receive items in excess of 30 dollars and up to a value of 200 dollars, will have a tariff rate of 30%, adding that the calculation of the customs tax to be paid is carried out by applying, to the import value, the established tariff rate, and its result is converted into Cuban pesos, according to the current exchange rate. At the official rate, of course, of 1×24.

For its part, Customs resolution 175/2022 develops the rules for non-commercial imports made by natural persons, “taking into account that these are carried out occasionally for their personal, family or household use, through luggage, shipments, household goods or other authorized charges.” Actually, that occasional use is quite questionable, since these imports are the ones that then make up the mercantile mass of goods and products that are traded informally in the country, but this is the least interesting thing to the regime.

The rule states that “items and products to be imported by natural persons will be admitted as long as they correspond to a non-commercial import; the quantities to be imported are declared transparently and varied; that their import does not exceed the limit of what is established as appropriate; and that the nature and functions of an article or the repetition of the imports made do not show the nature or commercial purpose of its import.”

Everything is so open and subjective that in this way you can bring practically everything into the country. Otherwise, as is always the case in these cases, it is up to Customs to decide whether the import is carried out on a commercial basis and to apply the sanction provided for in customs regulations.

The resolution establishes, under these conditions, that “when the customs authority determines that there is a commercial nature due to the repeated non-commercial imports, it notifies the infringer of the sanctioning decision and the period in which, from that act, his right to import is limited.” Now we will see who pays, and how much. The possibility of sanction is there, but in these cases, and in many others, the law is made, the trap is set.

The aforementioned resolution also establishes that when an item or product is not defined in the reference values, the referential price available, including that of sale in domestic commerce and in other origins, is taken as a basis, in accordance with the provisions of current legislation. Once again, it is Customs that is authorized to apply the value-weight alternative method for all those items that, due to their characteristics and value, can be valued by that method, as legislated.

To household appliances, computer and communications equipment and other durable items are applied, as a method of valuation, the Customs declaration, the purchase invoice or the reference value, without prejudice to applying the provisions of specific provision or what is requested by the person, in which case the acceptance of weighing it or not is evaluated.

On the other hand, Customs Resolution 176/2022 uses the value-weight alternative method for the determination of the Customs value of items that are classified as miscellaneous and others where, due to their characteristics, it is applicable, items that are imported non-commercially by natural persons through shipments, applying the equivalence of one kilogram equal to ten US dollars.

For the determination of the value of shipments through this alternative, values that are based on automated dispatch, in which the weight of the miscellaneous of the shipment is obtained, are taken into account. The items contained in the shipment for which the value-weight method is not applied are individually valued and considered within the established import limit.

The annexes to the resolution include specifications on the rules for non-commercial imports of natural persons, aspects to be taken into account in the classification of other items or products that are not considered miscellaneous and the list of reference values for non-commercial imports that are made by any means.

Finally, a list of reference values is published for non-commercial imports made by natural persons by any means, products that are not distributed by “legal” trade and that go through the vicissitudes of these Castro rules. Photographic products whose valuation is less than 50 USD: the value-weight alternative applies. Non-durable household and hardware items: up to five items of each type that are classified as hardware, provided that their value does not exceed 50 USD; and for those that exceed that value up to three are admitted. Paints, varnishes, pigments and thinners, provided that the total sum of the contents of their containers does not exceed 20 liters. Household appliances: provided that they are varied, accepting up to two items of the same type, provided that the sum of their values does not exceed the limit established for the importation of luggage. Computer and telecommunications equipment: up to three items related to telecommunications and network devices, including accessories or peripherals of computer equipment.

Cell phones or smartphones: up to five units.

Musical instruments: up to three items, in all cases in accordance with the import limit. Furniture: up to five items of each type that are classified as home furniture, as long as their value does not exceed 50 USD.

Motor vehicles, their parts, parts and accessories: it allows the importation as luggage of up to two items of the so-called electric mopeds of up to two seats or one by means of shipments. Bicycles, electric and pedal-assisted bicycles, electric skateboards or the like: up to two items.

Nothing is left to improvisation. A package of resolutions like this was already being drafted and in the process of being launched long before Minister Gil announced it in the National Assembly. The regime is aware of its failure and that it is in a terminal phase in which multiple anomalies that are impossible to solve with the communist economic model accumulate. The question is, will we see more in this torrid summer?

Translated by Regina Anavy

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And just like colored clay, Granma announces with great fanfare that the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (CIGB) already has the Cuban vaccine candidate against the Omicron variant of SARS-COV-2 ready. Now it seems that it’s so, although you have a certain feeling of déjà vu when reading this news for the umpteenth time.

And as usually happens in these cases, the information was given by the member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party and the General Director of the CIGB, Dr. Martha Ayala Ávila, during a technical meeting with the highest authorities of the BioCubaFarma Business Group. The party is always behind this kind of thing, even with the production of clay.

Apparently, it was also said that they will continue with preclinical and toxicological evaluations in animal models and then move on to the clinical trials phase, in conjunction with the Center for the State Control of Medicines, Equipment and Medical Devices (CECMED) and the Ministry of Public Health (MINSAP). In other words, in a few months we will have the vaccine ready again. As you can see, Dr. Ayala doesn’t answer to a board of directors, usually little given to this news of fireworks, but the regime is only interested in certain facts.

The world offered a master lesson in 2020 when the COVID pandemic broke out, and large drug manufacturers worldwide began a race to identify vaccines to curb the disease. And they did it, each country at its own pace and according to its needs. There was even plenty of international cooperation to fight COVID-19. The Cuban communist regime made its own decision to advance its vaccination candidates, and here we are. The new vaccine candidate is based on the RBD sequence; that is, the receptor binding domain of human cells, through which this type of coronavirus penetrates, which has already had extensive development and practical application in the millions of people vaccinated with the second and third doses.

In Cuba, immunogenicity is now being evaluated in animal models, to check if the vaccine has the ability to induce a high immunogenicity. From there to being in a position to address the development of this vaccine candidate and then decide when to use it in the population is a stretch, probably a long one. It was said that the CIGB has the capacity to produce this vaccine candidate in its plants, to link with AICA Laboratories and carry out clinical studies in coordination with MINSAP, always with the approval of the Cuban regulatory authority, which may mean that the regime is studying the possibility of marketing the vaccine abroad through more exports. To do this, it will need some type of WHO approval that, it should be remembered, still hasn’t happened for the first vaccines given to the population in Cuba.

That they get to it right now and that Granma turns it into a great announcement is smoke in the wind, and has a lot to do, like children’s clay, with that feeling of a terminal phase that the regime uses to counteract this warm and torrid summer for millions of Cubans. The distance of the population from the leaders is opening up more and more, and this type of news does nothing but increase the gap. There is little to celebrate for Raúl Castro to gain time, and in his 91 years he won’t have to see the collapse of the mammoth built by his brother and him. The end is near, even if it’s built out of clay. Granma doesn’t know what to say anymore.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

But Malmierca knows how to catch attention and that is why, after recognizing that the management of his department leaves much to be desired (at the end of last year, 285 businesses had been approved in Cuba since 2014, 49 located in the Mariel Special Development Zone and 29 reinvestments), he announced that “about seven foreign investment projects linked to forms of non-state management are being studied, and the relevance of approving businesses in domestic trade is being analyzed.”

The deputies of the Assembly, who at that time were sleeping peacefully, felt a small convulsion. Some even used their mobile phones to say that Malmierca was thinking of authorizing foreign investment in the private sector. People couldn’t believe it.

So when the minister changed the subject and began to talk about the virtues of the unique digital window and the measures to attract foreign capital at the municipal level, everyone’s interest was in that mention of the possible entry of foreign investment into private businesses — something that, until now, had been banned. Everyone wanted more information, but the deputies of the Assembly rarely bother the top leaders of the regime, so it would be best to wait.

Little by little, the State newspaper Granma’s headline summary of the news — “There are possibilities of attracting more foreign capital” — began to run from mobile to mobile. Yes, but how would that idea be translated into reality, in view of the experience since 2014? It seemed evident that Malmierca was proposing an update of the policy for attracting foreign investment in Cuba and its flexibility in favor of more profits, as well as the actions being taken to encourage and improve this mechanism, but was there really a will to open foreign capital to the private sector?

Malmierca had said that the reforms that were going to be introduced would in no case mean that “the socialist character of our government would be violated,” but someone saw that the portfolio of opportunities for foreign investment had included, among other options, small projects and 60 others that emerged from the territories. They were no longer the great millionaire pharaonic projects that used to frighten foreign investors for the mobilization of required financial resources.

But so far, nothing more. The natural date would be the 38th Havana International Fair (Fihav-2022) to be held in November. Apparently someone said that there were preparations being made “for exceptional projects, and the strategic axes of the National Economic and Social Development Plan until 2030 will be taken into account.”

And reading the news, someone said they had mentioned it. Granma reported “the minister pointed out that another flexibility of the policy is the possibility that the more than 4,000 forms of non-state management can work with foreign investment, in accordance with the provisions of the law.” That’s it. This is the key to authorizing the entry of international capital into the private sector, but it’s advisable to read it in detail and to not be in a hurry.

“Working with foreign investment” is not well known and is not the same as receiving foreign capital and offering a stake in it, by the way, which at no time is mentioned. These are very different things, and until the proposal is outlined, you have to understand the first version: “work with foreign investment.” And that’s not nothing.

Then there are the dangers that aren’t obvious. If Malmierca wants there to be foreign investment in the retail sector, the first thing that has to be achieved, and this seems almost impossible in the Cuban economy, is that there are products to be sold and bought and also purchasing power to do so, and it doesn’t seem that these two parameters are currently in the reality of trade and the retail trade circulation of the Cuban economy.

Little by little, people calmed down. No one should expect any change in the foreign investment policy because the communist regime’s nature is to have absolute control of the economy and to prevent the accumulation [of profit] and the prosperity of private businesses. There will be no foreign investment in the private sector, at least with the 2019 communist constitution in force. The alarms stopped going off. It’s very difficult to get out of the vicious circle of the Cuban economy.
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Note from 14ymedio: This article is reprinted with the permission of the author. I was originally published in Cubaeconomía.

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Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Leaders should be aware of this data and be careful when disqualifying and attacking their northern neighbor because they can affect demand preferences. Despite the “embargo/blockade,” tourists from the United States to Cuba outperform those from any European country.

Meanwhile, tourists from the markets of the old continent, despite the rise of traditional powers such as Spain, France or Italy, don’t show special interest in coming to Cuba, or they register growth much below the average, which, in the specific case of the Russians, confirms that the measures of the international community are taking effect.  Only 37,654 Russian tourists arrived in Cuba in the first half of the year.

Third, because other competitive destinations in the Caribbean have been launched so far this year, leaving Cuba far behind in the process of recovering tourism after the pandemic. This is the case of the Dominican Republic, which in the first five months of this year received a spectacular figure of 2,396,864 tourists out of a total of 3,000,000 passengers.

The results of this Caribbean destination once again leave Cuba far behind, almost 71% below, which shows considerable difficulty in growing tourism. Other destinations such as Cancun or Costa Rica also show positive data, which may indicate that Cuba’s tourism policy is not adequate and that it should be reviewed.

Fourth, because the results of this first quarter move the economy away from the objectives of the plan for 2022. And we can’t forget the almost sick relevance that Cuban communists attach to their plan for the economy, which is usually rarely fulfilled. If the results of these six months were doubled, tourism in Cuba at the end of the year would not exceed 1.3 million visitors, a figure that is far removed from the communist regime’s goal of 2.5 million, almost by half.

No. Tourism is not going well in Cuba in 2022. Growth is insufficient to overcome the crisis and has nothing to do with what is happening in other countries in the area that have been able to mobilize their market. The worst thing is that the Cuban private sector, linked to tourism, loses growth opportunities and remains stagnant, waiting for the situation to improve. And now there is inflation.

The inflation of the CPI, for example, of the “Restaurants and Hotels” component directly related to tourism, has confirmed the growing loss of competitiveness of the sector. The prices of this component until May increased by 24.61% year-on-year, two tenths less than the average of 26%. Rising inflation reduces the attractiveness of Cuban tourism and reduces demand. It’s a serious problem that the authorities don’t know how to solve.

The authorities have invested too much in the construction of hotels, and now when it comes time to occupy them, they find that other destinations in the area are more competitive in price because they have been able to tackle inflation with effective measures. Suddenly, in addition, they see that the euro and the dollar are on parity, and any possible attraction of European tourists is dismantled. The Cuban communist leaders have no idea how an economy is run, but they won’t accept this, and their obsession with intervening, planning and controlling economic activity has led to disaster. Likewise, for purposes of manipulation, it’s not good to give figures that are fake. Cuban tourism is a good example of this.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

As a result of the fire, which caused damage to the unit’s turbine, there was a leak in one of the boiler tubes through which national crude was circulating. Once again, national oil and its disastrous sulfur composition are blamed. So even when the boiler was turned off, the high temperatures inside ended up causing the fire. And as a result of all this, the necessary synchronization with the National Electrical System (SEN) couldn’t be carried out, which meant a loss of production.

Like playing with fire. On this occasion, the regime forced the general director of the thermoelectric plant, in an exceptional situation, to make a statement to the Cuban television news, to explain that workers of the plant and forces of the fire brigade put out the flames in just 45 minutes, highlighting that there were no injuries or deaths.

Viewers were overwhelmed by the appearance of the director on national television. They don’t usually descend to these levels of the hierarchy, and it seems that the regime opted for the saying “each stick holds its candle.” Cubans learned on the news that because of the fire, which occurred at 2 p.m., Block 2 of Felton had damages described as “considerable and not easy to eradicate,” in a clear acceptance that power outages will continue. The photo report in the state press gave a good account of the disaster caused by the flames.

So, as a preventive measure, after the fire that paralyzed Unit 1, which provided stability of around 250 megawatts to the SEN, was put out, production resumed in order to synchronize the power at night. Nothing was said about this alleged return to normality.

Cubans, a year after the July 11 demonstrations, are fed up with so much talk and the technical, anodyne explanations about the origin of the blackouts, and increasingly confused about when the lights will come on, because there is more time of darkness than light. They know that blackouts appear and reach some areas while in others they don’t.

For example, in the most confrontational neighborhoods, where the regime detects a higher level of social unrest in the population, electricity is maintained, while it disappears in the interior areas of the country and where there are medium-sized populations. This is intended to lessen the feeling of anger at the regime, which these blackouts keep alive in large sectors of the population. Blackouts have continued, a year later, with even greater incidence. There is no solution to this problem in the Cuban communist regime.

The blackouts will continue. *Translator’s note: Tarea ordenamiento = the [so-called] ‘Ordering Task’ is a collection of measures that include eliminating the Cuban Convertible Peso (CUC), leaving the Cuban peso as the only national currency, raising prices, raising salaries (but not as much as prices), opening stores that take payment only in hard currency which must be in the form of specially issued pre-paid debit cards, and a broad range of other measures targeted to different elements of the Cuban economy. 

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Therefore, the two unknowns of who will be the substitute for these very relevant functions raise, at least for the time being, a scenario of crisis and uncertainty about the political model of the Regime. It’s even possible that Raúl Castro, who is responsible for this decision and who, at an advanced age, may be thinking that life disappears around him at great speed, will ignore these issues. The position that until now was concentrated in a single person could even be divided, and this would also be a challenge for the Regime, accustomed to dealing with a single element for the two tasks.

Apparently, at the time these lines are written, it seems that one of the unknowns has already been resolved, with the alleged appointment of Raúl’s son as the head of GAESA, which implies that the family has blatantly showed Cubans, even more than with López-Calleja, who rules the economy and the country. A false move? Or could it be that there is no one else in the Regime to occupy these decisive positions of great economic and political influence?

As the State newspaper Granma says in the eulogy that has been dedicated to the deceased, “he was a man of high commitment and loyalty to the Cuban revolution” with “great ability to make decisions and take on challenges.” Finding someone with these characteristics is a priority because if they don’t get it right, the bases that support the Regime can falter.

López-Calleja had all the economic power, and if he didn’t want more, it was for his own reasons. In recent years, from the Economic Political Commission in 2006, and later from 2011 in the Government Commission for Attention to the Mariel Special Development Zone, he made a good part of the decisions that have been a brake and an obstacle to the development of the private sector, which in this blog is called the “internal embargo” of the Cuban economy, much more harmful and detrimental than the external one.

Granma concludes his eulogy by saying that “his contributions to the defense of the Homeland and the development of the national economy, together with his attitude in the fulfillment of each of the missions assigned throughout his exemplary life, made him worthy of various decorations and recognitions granted by the Council of State of the Republic of Cuba.” This confirms that closeness to the core of power that acted as an element of pressure and fear in the face of his potential rivals. No one dared to oppose him.

But the official communist newspaper is wrong. It’s not true that López-Calleja’s legacy highlights that “model of business system that serves as an example to the country, for having demonstrated its efficiency.” In reality, the management of political monopolies says very little about who is in charge. It’s an easy task, which, on the other hand, usually has the impact of who has been at the forefront for so long. His substitute, whether Raúl’s son or someone else, will find it difficult. The sale of GAESA to the private sector will always be a possibility if things don’t go as expected, but then, will the sale of the means of production pass to the Cuban people as the constitution says? I doubt it.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

But that position is suicidal, even in the Castro regime, where 62 years don’t seem like a long period of time.  So changes in the economic direction of the country may be closer than ever, as happened once to Murillo when the “ordering task*” guidelines were a real disaster for the economy.

Queipo has entered strongly into this scenario of the economy’s terminal crisis and has declared with a solemn tone “that it is necessary to unify key areas of political-economic assurance to the new economic actors and territorial organisms of the State, and the elevation of the economic culture of the population.” These populist and Party messages mean nothing.

However, he has placed himself opposite Gil, who only talks continually about “fulfilling the plan.” Queipo’s agenda is broader, but it doesn’t go to the core of the problem, which is the economic and social model, and it entertains itself by betting on the “chains” that are considered necessary to increase production and reduce inflation. This shows the same naive interpretation of the fight against price increases, in absolute accord with Gil and his team.

In a populist attempt to reach new entrepreneurs, Queipo proposed the mapping of the Cuban Business Guide to all territorial levels, “so that economic actors from the same locality are recognized and linked,” and asked that the Third Conference multiply its meetings at the local level. By the way, the Business Guide is the result of the joint work of the National Association of Economists and Accountants of Cuba, the Yellow Pages of the Telecommunications Enterprise of Cuba S.A. and the private company SME Dofleini S.R.L.

At the same closing ceremony, Malmierca said the same thing as always “that the socialist state enterprise is at the center of the effort to reactivate the national economy and will continue to strengthen with the linking of the country’s new economic actors.” Not even he believes it. Speculation goes through everything. He knows that he has been amortized for a long time and is wasting chips in a game in which he has little to win.

Reading between the lines of the information in the state press, it seems evident that Díaz Canel is not going through the best political moment of his career and that, once again, he is looking for support in the empty shell that is the Communist Party. When will they understand that the only support they can have is that of the Cuban people in their call for free, democratic and multi-party elections, and then go home?

*Translator’s note: Tarea ordenamiento = the [so-called] ‘Ordering Task’ is a collection of measures that include eliminating the Cuban Convertible Peso (CUC), leaving the Cuban peso as the only national currency, raising prices, raising salaries (but not as much as prices), opening stores that take payment only in hard currency which must be in the form of specially issued pre-paid debit cards, and a broad range of other measures targeted to different elements of the Cuban economy. 

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

Now Díaz-Canel wants consumers to use electricity at other times, outside the “peaks,” to mitigate demand. According to him, thermoelectric plants have the capacity to generate what the country needs when there are no peaks, and they do so with national fuel, a product that is also available to work for stability. The solution seems clear.

The problem is that the thermoelectric units of the Felton and Guiteras plants don’t function continuously because they’re obsolete and require investments and maintenance that weren’t carried out at the time, and now they fail continuously and unexpectedly. In the absence of such a supply, the “peak” reappears at any time of day and after a blackout because there is no other source of electricity. No one in 62 years has really thought about how to improve the energy supply in Cuba, by resorting to renewables, for example.

And at this point, Díaz-Canel’s explanations went in other directions, such as the signing of agreements to establish three new power plants and the possible future growth with a fourth plant. However, this isn’t an investment that can be made in the short term, and solutions such as mobile power plants won’t solve the problem either.

He even referred to the boiler deposits that are created by the national fuel, which, if not taken care of, could cause the loss of generation capacity. Even distributed electricity generators that consume large amounts of diesel aren’t the solution to the problems of crude oil supply.

Recognizing the seriousness of the problem, what can be done? You can’t stand idly by.

The proposed solutions are also enough to keep you up at night.

It is intended to use tourism revenues to finance investments. But, of course, the tourists who arrive are still few, and the income is small, so this route is impractical. Before the solution was to build hotel rooms, it seems. The same happens with the revenue in MLC [freely convertible currency] stores, which, despite the commercial margins of 200% and 300%, is barely enough to replace products. Hence, the shortages that we see in these stores. The money raised from tourism and MLC shops has barely helped to buy fuel and allocate resources to maintenance and repairs. The beans have been counted.

The other solution is to fix first what gives more generation capacity to the electrical system, which has led to the prioritizing of the Felton and the Guiteras, with all the difficulties derived from the obsolescence of these plants.

And then Díaz-Canel proposed energy savings, transferring the problem to individual and collective responsibility. It’s the same populist argument as always, as if three million of the four million homes were to turn off a 20W bulb that may be unnecessarily lit, that would instantly represent a power of 60 MW, the same as a generation block of Renté or one of October 10. It’s incredible that such efforts are requested from the victims of the blackouts.

After Díaz-Canel, Liván Arronte, Minister of Energy and Mines, spoke. He referred to what he called “the cyclical situations that have occurred in the electrical system, causing the worsening of the situation in recent days.”

And he returned again to the incidents of Unit 2 of Felton, which is nothing more than an accumulation of nonsense derived, as already mentioned, from the lack of investment and attention in recent years. He likewise referred to the Guiteras thermoelectric plant, which is equally affected by the same maintenance problems.

The minister went so far as to say that the 200 MW of reserve of the electricity system, often due to instability and problems, are not reached, which at any time causes blackouts. But he said nothing about what to do to overcome these problems.

What Arronte did talk about is the burning of national crude oil in thermoelectric plants, which although it gives sovereignty from the energy point of view because it’s our fuel, its high sulfur content causes the dreaded fouling and corrosion in the boilers, which has to be compensated for with systematic maintenance, like cleaning and replacement of parts and aggregates.

That is, using national crude means that we have to do more maintenance, but it’s the available fuel, and in the face of the high prices of the international market, it’s the country’s solution to be able to guarantee electricity generation. In other words, there will be more blackouts.

Arronte did not miss an opportunity to remember that the electrical problem has a lot to do with the blockade, not only for the acquisition of fuels, but also for the resources needed to repair the units, requiring the purchase of parts through second countries.

Omar Ramírez Mendoza, the Deputy Director of the Electrical Union, participated after Arronte and advanced much more technical issues that were interrupted by Díaz Canel.

Ramírez was very clear. Maintenance is done, but not always with the depth it takes because there is no time available to meet demand and avoid blackouts. The other reason is that the teams that need the resources to intervene don’t have them available, so using them runs the risk of increasing the damage, or resulting in a greater need for intervention than expected.

At this point, Díaz-Canel recognized that there is a state of discomfort in the population that he described as “logical, and that had two dimensions: one on a personal and collective level in the population, who suffer directly from blackouts, and the other is that the economy is affected, which has to do with guaranteeing services and goods to people.”

And, in this regard, he pointed out that “states of opinion express discomfort, but also understanding, so it is necessary to highlight the way in which the people, living in a rigorous, demanding situation of limitations, have been able to understand for the most part that this is not the fault of a government that doesn’t occupy itself or a weakness in the work of the institutions, but has to do with the aspects addressed.” In this regard, Díaz-Canel is wrong, because most Cubans know who is responsibile for the blackouts. What they don’t understand is that they continue to occur, despite the fact that, as Díaz-Canel says, “a lot of work is being done to solve the problem.”

After briefly referring to the difference between real power and the available power of the plants, he spoke of an accident that occurred at the Máximo Gómez plant in Mariel, which caused Unit 6 to now need (and this is being addressed) the import of components needed to bring it to 100 MW, while Unit 7, which produces 90 MW, was completely lost.

Then came explanations for accidents and similar events at the CTE Otto Parellada, Tallapiedra, and Ernesto Guevara power plants in Mayabeque, the CTE Antonio Guiteras and the Felton in Holguín, and the Renté in Santiago de Cuba. Speaking of the plants in service and those that are paralyzed, and the planned entry into operation of the plants, Díaz-Canel threw out even more confusion and, of course, if he wanted to give peace of mind to the people who watched the program, forget about it. The live connection during the program with the authorities of different thermoelectric plants in the country did very little to give that peace of mind to the people. There was only some positive news about the Nuevitas thermoelectric power plant that apparently is overcoming its problems.

At this point, Mario Pedroso, Director General of the Company of Generators and Electrical Services, referred to the actions that are being taken with the diesel groups to make up the deficit of thermoelectrical generation with distributed generation.

Geysel is an electric generator maintenance and operation company that has representation in all the provinces of the country, and whose fundamental task is aimed at working on the peaks, to evacuate contingency in the system or to guarantee amendment during a natural disaster. To do this, they have 943 generator sets of different technologies and an installed power of 1,334 MW. In these cases, breakdowns due to lack of maintenance accumulate and increase their frequency due to common use.

Of the 943 electric generators, there are only 579 MW available and 348 MW of the 1,334 potential ones. The availability of diesel will be compromised in the coming months if the forecasts of the world economy are met, and that may be even worse for this energy option. They recognize it themselves. There are difficulties with the supply of diesel fuel, and in many cases the fuel needed for power generation hasn’t been delivered in a timely manner, which has strained the country’s fuel distribution system. In other words, the possibility of a quiet summer is increasingly in the air.

Later, Pedro Sánchez Torres, Director of the Oil-Fuel Electric Generator Maintenance Company, announced that they have some 950 MW installed as part of Cuba’s base generation in 489 machines in 33 power plants, located throughout the country.

In this case, he explained that the company is going through a complex situation today with respect to spare parts that in recent years they haven’t been able to acquire, not only because of the financing, but also because of the complexities in access to the factory where they can be supplied, since they have been forced to use third-party suppliers. This has meant 506 MW in breakdowns, more than 200 MW that they haven’t been able to recover and 163 MW in maintenance that they haven’t been able to recover. Nor should there be favorable expectations.

In the end, Ramiro Valdéz, who had been listening to the entire program in silence, but with obvious blushing, said something like “we need to work in function of living from the electric-energy point of view in a balance with the budget of each household” and closed. The historic generation has less and less confidence in the heirs, and they realize that it’s over.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The supply of intermediate goods must be solved, not only because of their prices in MLC, but also because many economic actors face problems of scarcity, especially with imports, which prevents them from meeting their commitments to customers. Private actors are asking the state to authorize importation independently of the state, but the regime doesn’t want to lose the business that allows it to withdraw foreign currency for the state coffers.

The Minister of Internal Trade, Betsy Díaz, pledged to eliminate the obstacles that have an impact on the performance of new economic actors and their contribution to the nation’s economy, but she knows that, for ideological reasons, she will not be able to do so. And that is why they use the global crisis as justification and especially the current situation with certain basic consumer products that also affect Cuba. These are false justifications, because the minister knows that Cuban private entrepreneurs, in agreement with their compatriots in the United States, could solve these problems if they could establish agreements and businesses freely, which the regime does not allow.

For the regime, the solution is to invent greater preparation of the municipalities with regards to new economic actors, adequate legal advice, as well as in the knowledge that state companies have the power to carry out certain activities, which could be used to take advantage of eliminating some obstacles. It’s just more of the same, now seasoned with the role of municipalities. They have no remedy. Things will get much worse.

And, in addition, not satisfied with making things increasingly difficult and obstructing any private wealth creation project, now the regime wants Cuban private entrepreneurs to develop policies on social responsibility.

No one is going to question that this is not important, but can anyone in their right mind think that the Cuban private business sector in its current condition of precariousness and weakness can dedicate itself to these policies? In other words, does the communist regime perform any social responsibility with its state enterprises? Let them give just one example.

As if the prohibitions on the exercise of certain activities or the obstacles and complications in developing free foreign trade activities were not enough, it occurred to someone in the regime that it is necessary to create policies related to social responsibility for all economic actors. How can it be understood that there are fundamental sectors and activities in which the regime has not authorized a single MSME or CNA, such as financial and insurance activity? The lack of chains, even innovation, something so hackneyed by Díaz-Canel in his famous doctoral thesis, escape, at least for the time being, from the private projects of MSMEs or CNAs.

They conclude that what needs to be done is to create an “institute of new actors,” envisaged in the law. More bureaucracy.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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For example, the lack of presidents and economic managers has been detected among the “pending issues,” which, according to Granma, “translates into incomplete boards of directors, poor planning, poor financial status and lack of areas of collective use.” In other words, agricultural cooperatives don’t produce due to corporate and organizational problems. Is this really credible, is it really the cause of unproductivity?

Let’s continue with the “unfinished business” relationship. Granma cites, nothing more and nothing less, than “the need to implement a communication and education system that contributes to the promotion of the values and principles of cooperativism in Cuban society, through the national, provincial and municipal media, and education centers at all levels of education.” Well, that sounds good, but can it really be accepted that this is necessary to increase production in the furrow? Do the principles and values of cooperativism serve to produce more cassava and malanga to feed people? The truth is, I don’t know.

In addition, considered essential for the authorities, is “the completion of an awareness process with presidents, boards of directors and assemblies of cooperative members; and the consultation process on competencies.” To this end, 2,200 leaders of 550 cooperatives are being investigated as a baseline. Wouldn’t it be better if, instead of so much awareness, they were left alone to produce and dedicate themselves to harvesting crops instead of so many surveys and questions?

And to close the list of “pending issues,” the authorities highlighted the importance of the “procurement process, statistical control, the creation of a contract proforma (SIPA) for the procurement process in 2023, as well as the inclusion in the new Decree-Law of the cooperative method on what is related to the election of leaders.” Bureaucracy, hierarchy, control and communist interference in the lives of these organizations that, by their nature, should be free.

The leaders didn’t mention a single word from the regime about property rights, free choice and decision-making by the cooperatives about production and pricing or, for example, how to achieve continuous supplies of products and tools that can be bought with the national money [Cuban pesos].

Nor did they mention the need to ensure the existence of a competitive and flexible distribution market, capable of meeting the needs of urban consumption, much less talk about the necessary flexibility and autonomy of current cooperatives so that they can decide on all kinds of issues, including their structure and legal future, partnership with other entities, the entry of foreign capital or the free contracting of the market.

It’s not surprising that Cuban agricultural cooperatives don’t produce food and function so badly. They’re an obvious example of the regime’s internal blockade of everything that represents independent private economic activity.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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He also spoke of “advancing production processes, better land use and boosting the diversification of agricultural products,” but this is impossible if the producers don’t own the land they cultivate. No one aspires to leave their mark on something that will never be theirs. Working for the communist state came to an end. Production and planting can only be increased and done in the most efficient way possible with private land-ownership rights, markets for the purchase and sale of plots and land, and private management of the agricultural sector. The land should belong to those who really work it. There is no other way; even the Vietnamese did it, and it was a wonder for them.

And then he talked nonsense at that moment, about “protein plants to increase the obtaining of animal feed, the production of feed with our own resources, or the development of mini-industries to take advantage as much as possible of agricultural production.” These are also things that don’t serve to solve the problem of tomorrow’s lunch.

The same is true of the use of bioproducts, even when the possible decrease in intermediaries between producers and agricultural markets is cited, and the speeding up of marketing in this area. No farmer supports the ideas that are included in the “63 measures.”

Díaz-Canel knows that there is no point in publishing a Law on Food Sovereignty and Food and Nutrition Security or the 63 measures, if the crops aren’t harvested and the population can go to the points of sale. Something so simple and so easy to achieve in Cuba becomes, thanks to the communist economic model, a thankless task.

Hence, in the face of such a difficulty, which could be solved with the aforementioned recipe of freedom, private property rights, market and profitability, principles that must be restored in the Cuban countryside and in the economy as a whole, Cuban communists start rehearsing other collectivist experiments to see what comes out. Díaz-Canel is irresponsible, getting into these types of stories that lead nowhere. I am referring to the 19 “productive poles” that have been created throughout the country.

According to Granma, these poles are made up of 86 basic business units, 54 basic cooperative production units, 45 agricultural production cooperatives and 190 credit and service cooperatives, with an arable land area of 151,829 hectares.

Can these poles really solve the problem of tomorrow’s lunch? They are clear about it. The estimated production at the end of 2021 reaches a total of 706,200 tons of agricultural items,, only a quarter of the planned production. Honestly, such a bureaucratic and organizational effort to achieve only that percentage of agricultural production is unjustified. If private tenants obtained from the communist regime the same amount as these collectivist-inspired poles, they would surely produce much more than that quarter, and they would also do so more efficiently.

But the communist regime is more interested in poles and municipalities, in the commitment to transfer to the local representatives the responsibilities that the central government is unable to achieve because it has failed again and again. The local authorities are not in favor. This strategy that can even be counterproductive, but it offers an idea of how lost they are for not giving up failed ideological principles.

Especially worrying was Díaz-Canel’s message to the attendees: “We are called upon to train and mobilize government structures from the municipal level so that they are in a position to lead this production process with popular participation in the local stages and, in addition, to promote an intense process that reaches all local producers, both state, cooperative and private, the state enterprise and even the last farm, the agroindustrial productive pole, each local development project, favoring agroecology as a necessary alternative for agricultural production in the current circumstances.” What does this sound like?

In the midst of all this, Díaz-Canel called for “increasing exports, achieving the linkage of all producers through a state company, or in other cases of cooperatives and new economic actors also closely linked to production.” Not a single reference was made to the values of freedom, private property rights, market and profitability in the Cuban countryside. As if he were talking about another country, at another time. You have the feeling that every day that passes he is further away from the reality in which he lives, and it is not known if it is his fault or the court of party and regime sycophants that surround him. The same as Fidel Castro.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The communists, in the face of the evident failure of their “63 measures” and any initiative that has its origin in the social communist model that governs Cuban agriculture in the last six decades, can think of nothing more than to “distract” producers, instead of letting them work freely, decide how much to produce, in what dimensions of plot and at what prices.

The regime’s interference in agriculture is the origin of all the evils of a sector that aspires to have the freedom to decide. Agrarian reform was a disaster; INRA’s (National Institute for Agricultural Reform) replacing the old ministry was another. A lot of time has passed since then, but the evils of Cuban agriculture remain the same: statism, bureaucracy, interference, control and repression.

It is not with “substitution of good practices” that more and better can be produced. The communist invention of the so-called “productive poles” dedicated to the production of various crops, will not work either, since it implies exercising a coercive force on producers, based on bureaucratic and political decisions, which have little or nothing to do with the socio-productive reality of Cuban agriculture.

A good example of this deficient creation of the so-called “poles” was offered by Granma stating that this formula, despite the full support of the regime, including these “substitutions of good practices,” has only produced 706,200 tons, barely 26% of the total production achieved in the year. A minutiae. And in the first quarter of this year, when non-compliance by Minister Gil was reported, the productive poles have not improved their contribution, with only 232,485 tons, which represents 25.3% of total production, one point less.

Then the National Director of Marketing of the Ministry of Agriculture spoke about marketing policy to point out what everyone knows, “that it is once again a difficult task, especially because of the scenario that Cuba is currently experiencing.” The solution is at their fingertips, and if they don’t implement it, it’s because they don’t want to: suppress ACOPIO (Cuba’s State Procurement and Distribution Agency) forever and leave absolute freedom to the marketing of producers with competitive private distributors. That’s a good practice.

In reality, and although this plenary served to vindicate, for the umpteenth time, the 63 measures of agricultural production, the truth is that no more production has been achieved, and there are the official results of ONEI (National Office of Statistics and Information) and the statements of Minister Gil, and they have not served to improve marketing either. Cuban communists still do not understand that what is not produced cannot be distributed, and that before the pitcher, you have to have the cow to produce milk. The achievements in terms of new products, new points of sale and new economic actors that offer products in other varieties have been carried away by the wind, in a 2021 lost forever, and a 2022 that is not going any better.

And in the face of the failure of the “63 measures”, the leaders insist that it’s necessary to continue “advancing in the dissemination of this policy, in which its importance and advantages, especially for the producers, are understood.” The author of this blog has consulted several Cuban agricultural producers who insist that the problem isn’t in knowing the measures, but in their futility, which simply don’t address what is really needed, so they turn their backs on them.

The meeting also discussed agricultural prices, an issue of the utmost importance, which according to the CPI prepared by ONEI on a monthly basis, are the fastest growing of the different components of the index, with their negative influence on the population. The evidence indicates that the current inflationary process that the Cuban economy is experiencing, which will get worse in the coming months, is originating from and also influencing the prices of raw materials and food.

And that either the authorities face this problem with effective and practical solutions, or the probability of a food crisis in Cuba seems very high. Wasting time relying on a possible solution to the problem on the part of state-owned companies doesn’t make sense, in view of past experience. The productive poles don’t either. The regime has no solutions within the communist social model to deal with the agricultural crisis, a situation that, similarly, led the Vietnamese to apply the Doi Moi (1986 Vietnam economic reforms). Why not in Cuba?

With this type of substitution of “good practices” and support for statism, the communist regime is on its way to a situation of serious structural crisis in the agricultural sector that no one wants, but which is on the doorstep. For a long time, the Cuban guajiro has known what the good practices are in his sector, and although he cannot claim them freely for fear of repression, it’s very clear: freedom, private property rights and a free market. The rest is wasting time.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.

The minister missed a golden opportunity to assume responsibility and speak clearly about why there is a lack of food in Cuba. Surely he knows why and also that getting lost in talking about a process indicator does nothing more than bore an audience that doesn’t give a damn that there is a reorganization of the ministry or that the role of the municipalities is strengthened, passing employees from one place to the other, as well as Raúl Castro’s old idea of producing in pots, parks and gardens.

At one point in his speech, the minister alluded to the restructuring of companies, which have reduced their workforce by 39%, especially the OSDEs*, which, out of an average of 180 contracted workers, now have fewer than 70. To avoid panic, he said that it’s not a matter of leaving people unemployed, but of “relocating them” and cited the example of “comrades who were heads of UEB** who today are heads of an irrigation-machine labor collective.” In other words, UEBs don’t help much, if budget tables can be dispensed with.

The minister said that “we need to look for more people dedicated to production.” it seems that he doesn’t have enough, that almost 20% of the employed population in Cuba is in the agricultural sector, and he wants more people producing with the result of lower productivity. On the other hand, he talked about “inflated structures” so we don’t really know what to expect.

He also talked about increasing foreign investment, recognizing that not enough progress has been made in agriculture. In fact, it has been on the margins of the projects, due to the legal structure of property rights that has to change.

He referred to the agricultural development bank, which in his opinion “has been very well received by producers,” but in reality has a marginal existence, since only 1.8 billion pesos were granted last year “mainly to producers linked to pig production, cattle ranching, and the cultivation of rice, bananas, cassava and guava” without significant increases in production, as revealed by ONEI*** data.

Other beneficiary products such as tomatoes, soybeans, pigs and livestock, in addition to rice, beans, corn, potatoes, bananas, cassava and sweet potatoes, also did not experience any improvements, with the exception of tomatoes. The 18,282 credits approved do not reach 10% of tenants and independent producers, and the 5 billion pesos are a drop in the bucket for the real needs of the sector. The farmers have turned their backs on the “dynamizing measures” of agricultural production. They have done the right thing.

Then, after talking about the need for more labor in agriculture, the minister said that “there is a lot of land to be exploited,” and in this case, once again, the direct responsibility is his. In reality, if “idle or poorly exploited land remains in Cuba, a problem to be solved in order to raise production,” the regime has to recognize that collective ownership of land is a strategic error and that it should be transformed into private property, as the Chinese and the Vietnamese did.

If the minister wants “our people to feel that making the land produce is part of their life project,” what has to be done is to give the land to those who work it, but with all the consequences, so that its use can be increased, reduced, sold, rented, or freely decided without ideological or partisan slogans, only with the criteria of efficiency and profitability.

The minister doesn’t seem to bet on this. For him, it’s more important to take care of labor groups as part of the land delivery process. He cited the more than 1,500 labor groups, with almost 15,000 workers, who could benefit from the approved measures, but acknowledged “that they’re not received everywhere in the same way (…) We find problems with the bosses, because they don’t change their methods. That doesn’t create a sense of belonging in the workers, and we need efficient management there as well.”

With regard to the delivery of land, the minister was critical and pointed out the delays in meeting the deadlines and resistance of the administrations to deliver idle land. The picture is bleak: premature requests that have to be resolved through political management, many more in process and the people going hungry.

The minister spoke of “working more intentionally with producers, approaching them and offering land to them.” But he stressed in this regard that “we don’t want to concentrate the ownership of the land in usufruct [a form of leasing], but in the management of that land.” And it was justified by the delivery of land for livestock, because of more than 7,000 hectares of land delivered, due to the lack of imported feed, no increases in production have been achieved.

In livestock production, milk and meat, the minister spoke of the recovery of more than 1,000 typical dairy farms, as well as the efficiency of the more than 150,000 producers, the 27,000 ranchers with 10 or more cows that “are key in our plans and we are visiting them” to give them land. Apparently it doesn’t work; they want to give them up to 555 acres of land but the average is around 165. No one wants to contribute their work and effort to something that will never be theirs. Let’s see when they learn. The minister acknowledged that there is a decrease in the livestock mass and said that “we have just over 3.5 million head of cattle, but only 40% of our cows give birth. Although we are complying with the milk plan, this is an area where more can also be done.”

In organic farming, the minister pointed out that the cultivated areas have grown but are insufficient. For example, bananas need 70,000 more acres, while malanga needs another 27,000 and cassava needs more than 125,000. The disturbing question is who decides which areas are organically cultivated, how and why?

He also pointed out that in the cultivation of food and vegetables, “more could be done” and cited as an example the autonomy of municipalities to agree on prices as a stimulus to production, while helping not to raise costs excessively, in his plans is to recover urban agriculture.

At another point he said that in Cuba there are 4,494 cooperatives and more than 400,000 producers and noted that “in the Political Bureau, 17 solutions for cooperatives were approved, and work is currently being done on a new legal norm that gives them more independence.” The organizational form is in crisis.

Regarding the training of cadres, with which he was dissatisfied, he pointed out that work is being done on skills and on the projection of the cadre and insisted that “we have to continue to improve work with young people.”

He reserved another part to talk about the role of scientists and science, which in his opinion has allowed progress in innovation-based management having achieved “247 innovations, 33 topics and 117 indications from the president.” In this regard, he said that “dissatisfaction persists. We must look for mechanisms that allow what has been achieved in one producer to spread more quickly to others.”

In summary, the minister defended the implementation of the 63 agricultural measures by justifying their positive impact, but didn’t offer a single indicator of improvement results. The recent publication of ONEI still gave figures very close to the negative balance of the agricultural sector in 2021. Therefore, following the lines of Minister Gil, the head of agriculture joined the official speech that “progress is being made, although we can’t feel pleased. We are totally dissatisfied.”

The question is, what gradual progress should be achieved to be satisfied with something that obviously doesn’t work? Because at this rate, either a new model for the Cuban agricultural sector is identified, or the food crisis anticipated by analysts and experts is closer than ever.

And it may be true that the solution is not to import consumables, as the minister said, but to find a way to produce them here, but perhaps others should look for and implement solutions. Cubans can’t be fooled any longer. Don’t take them for fools. Their daily meal is not secure. Things are getting worse and worse.

Translator’s notes:
*Organizaciones Superiores de Dirección Empresarial [Higher Organizations of Business Management]
**Unidad Empresarial de Base [Basic Business Unit]
***Oficina National de Estadisticas e Información [National Office of Statistics and Information]

Translated by Regina Anavy

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COLLABORATE WITH OUR WORK: The 14ymedio team is committed to practicing serious journalism that reflects Cuba’s reality in all its depth. Thank you for joining us on this long journey. We invite you to continue supporting us by becoming a member of 14ymedio now. Together we can continue transforming journalism in Cuba.