Translating Cuba – English Translations of Cubans Writing From the Island

Havana Chronicles: “We Used to Complain About the ‘CUC’, But Now We Miss It”

Packed onto an electric tricycle through the streets of Havana, the passengers reminisce about better times.

In a city where every opportunity to get around shouldn’t be missed. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Yoani Sánchez, Havana, June 5, 2026 / After waiting for ages, I manage to catch an electric tricycle on Carlos III Street. There are already five passengers, so I’m the last to get on, and my leg doesn’t fit. The only option is to leave it dangling to get anywhere in a city where every opportunity to get around shouldn’t be missed. So I travel to Fraternity Park with my thigh, calf, and foot hanging off the vehicle. I feel lucky to finally reach my destination.

Across from me, a woman with a worried expression says she can’t take it anymore. “I moved to the Isle of Youth more than 20 years ago, when it seemed like things were finally going to take off,” she reminisces, though we’re all caught up in our own dramas. Me, for example, took my first shower in three days at two in the morning this Thursday. I no longer know if it’s day or night, and sleeping at least five hours straight seems like a painful pipe dream.

“I made a little money buying good fish on the Isle of Youth for 18 pesos a pound and selling it here in Havana for two CUCs [Cuban convertible pesos],” the talkative passenger explains. The mere mention of those chavitos sets off a wave of nostalgia in the entire vehicle. “We used to complain about that currency, but now we miss it,” remarks a man sitting next to me. The times of the dual currency system looms as a new period of nostalgia, much like the 1980s once did. A decade some remember as one of abundance, but which I recall as one of strict surveillance and absolutely Orwellian. continue reading

I no longer know if it’s day or night, and sleeping at least five hours continuously seems like a painful chimera.

“With the little money I made selling fish, I bought a house in Nueva Gerona, even though I’m from here, from Cerro,” the woman adds. “Now my little house is locked up there because there’s no way to leave the island; it’s like being in a double prison.” The tricycle advances. A Lada behind us accelerates, and the driver lets it pass, but not before shouting, “Are you in a hurry?” Haste is a bad advisor in a city at a standstill. Even looking at your watch is considered bad form in a country where time is worthless.

I get off in front of the Aldama Palace. The entire area is boarded up, and sections of the roof on the upper floor of the once-imposing building have collapsed. A toothless man offers me a handful of hibiscus flowers in exchange for some money to buy food for his “little granddaughter.” I take out an Antonio Maceo, as the 50-peso bill is known, and exchange it for the bouquet of fragile petals. There was a time when I used to walk around Havana eating these flowers. It was a mixture of hunger and experimentation. I know the best part. There’s a fleshy area just below the pistil that you can chew with gusto; it has a flavor reminiscent of almond, but much milder. If the authorities at the Ministry of Domestic Trade find out, they’ll ration the hibiscus flowers too.

I jump off the tricycle, my leg completely numb. I limp like an undignified old lady crossing Fraternity Park as frail as I am. I run a few errands nearby, but almost everywhere I go, I find closed doors and a power outage. “No country can function like this,” mutters an old man as he passes me. “No country, no services, no people,” I add, amidst a yawn that reminds me I’ve been up for nine hours after barely three hours of sleep.

Returning home. There’s a green minibus at the taxi stand for the route along Rancho Boyeros Avenue to Santiago de las Vegas. In the back, a refurbished area for passengers, there are two low benches facing each other, each meant to fit ten passengers. It iss not the time to be overweight. Anyone who gets on the vehicle with a few extra pounds is looked at suspiciously. Where that man displays a broader frame, that young woman must be squeezed against the next passenger. Size matters, and so do pounds.

When we are about to depart, a woman appears carrying a framed picture, one meter wide by one and a half meters high. It’s one of those cheap prints, mounted on flimsy wooden boards, with a photo of a quinceañera. She asks us to make room for her to put the image on board, which ends up dividing the bathyscaphe in half lengthwise. The airflow between the windows on either side is cut off, the passengers are separated by the flimsy structure, and the rickety vessel starts moving.

Así viajo, hasta el parque de la fraternidad, con el muslo, la pantorrilla y el pie colgado del vehículo. Me siento afortunada de llegar a mi destino. / 14ymedio

I look at the flowing blue dress of the quinceañera in the portrait. It’s accompanied by a smaller painting of her in a swimsuit, smiling in profile at the camera. There are still people celebrating birthdays, baptisms, and weddings amidst the disaster we’re living through, I tell myself. The woman asks for help covering the large painting with a sheet and explains, “They were asking for 8,000 pesos to Mazorra, and I can’t afford that.” Once aboard the bathyscaphe, like any other traveler, she paid 1,000 pesos and treated us all to a surreal scene.

I arrive at Boyeros and Tulipán. I get down carefully so as not to spoil the image of the quinceañera that everyone inside the car is protecting, as if to safeguard this innocence that the harshness of reality will shatter. I get out, pay the driver. I turn right. I reach into my purse and find the withered hibiscus. The Ministry of Transportation’s generator is already whirring, a sign that there’s no electricity at my house. I take a bite of the bunch of flowers and head towards my own hill, towards the steep mountain that awaits me.

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Previous Havana Chronicles:

The Roar of Despair of a Cuban Woman Returning to Her Country After Many Years

The Tulipán Market Closed: “They’ve Given the Order To Go to the March for Raúl”

Along Carlos III Street and towards Ethiopia

Sleeping Is Also a Privilege in Havana

A Desperate Plea in the Middle of the Dark Havana Night: ‘Light!’

The Refuse of Disenchantment

Under a Picture-Postcard Blue Sky, the Country is Crumbling

Fatigue Barely Allows One to Enjoy the ‘Lights On’ in Havana

Dollars, the Classic Card, and a Havana Without Tourists

A Journey Through the Lost Names of Havana

The Shipwreck of a Ship Called “Cuba”

Havana Seen From ‘The Control Tower’

In Havana, the Only Ones Who Move Are the Mosquitoes

Reina, the Stately Street Where Garbage is Sold

Searching for Light Through the Deserted Streets of Havana

The Death Throes of ‘Granma’, the Mouthpiece of a Regime Cornered by Crisis

The Anxiety of the Disconnected Cuban

One Mella, Three Mellas, Life in Cuba Is Measured in Thousands of Pesos

It Is Forbidden To Leave Home in Cuba Today Because It Is a “Counter-Revolutionary Day”

Vedado, the Heart of Havana’s Nightlife, Is Now Converted Into a Desert

Havana, in Critical Condition

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The OCDH Asks the European Union To Create an International Fund for Victims of Communism

The NGO states that the mechanism it proposes “could compensate victims with the resources embezzled and plundered from the Cuban people by the Havana regime”

“”Assets stolen from Cubans should be used to compensate Cubans,” says the OCDH. / 14ymedio

14ymedio/EFE, Havana, June 5, 2026 – The Cuban Observatory for Human Rights (OCDH) formally urged the authorities of the European Union (EU) to participate in the creation of an “International Compensation Fund for the Victims of Crimes Against Humanity of the Cuban Communist Regime,” according to a statement issued this Thursday.

The OCDH delivered its petition to the Madrid office of the representations of the European Commission and the European Parliament in Spain, according to the statement.

The NGO states that the mechanism it proposes “could compensate victims with the resources embezzled and plundered from the Cuban people by the Havana regime,” because “assets stolen from Cubans should be used to compensate Cubans.”

The petition is addressed to the principal European authorities, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

“The Havana regime confiscated the people’s property and concentrated the assets in what is now known as Gaesa”

“It is wealth extracted from the sweat of Cubans,” denounced OCDH Executive Director Alejandro González Raga, explaining that “the Havana regime confiscated the people’s property and concentrated the assets in continue reading

what is now known as Gaesa [Business Administration Group S.A.], an opaque military structure.”

According to the statement, the United States Department of State “estimates the illicit assets of that conglomerate deposited in foreign accounts at up to 20 billion dollars.”

The petition comes after the U.S. Executive Order of May 1, which provides for sanctions against individuals and companies that maintain business relations with the Cuban state, and the sanctioning, one week later, of Gaesa.

“Every dollar frozen from Gaesa is a dollar available to compensate victims,” the OCDH states.

The Observatory emphasizes the need for action by the EU, since, in its view, it has the necessary legal mechanisms to carry out the requested action, and urges its participation as a founding organization in the Compensation Fund with an initial contribution and technical assistance.

“Europe was conceived as a community of values, not only of interests; the time has come to prove it,” González Raga concluded.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Confirmation of the 28-Year Sentence Against Álvaro Uribe’s Brother for Creating a Paramilitary Group

The former president respects and adheres to the decision of the Supreme Court but reaffirms his argument that Santiago Uribe is innocent

The Court believes that rancher Santiago Uribe created and financed the paramilitary group The Twelve Apostles. / Justice for Colombia

14ymedio/ EFE, Bogota, June 5, 2026 – The Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice confirmed this Thursday the sentence of 28 years and three months in prison against rancher Santiago Uribe, the brother of former Colombian president Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010). for creating and financing the paramilitary group The Twelve Apostles.

“Dr. Jaime Granados (the Uribe family’s attorney) informs me that the newspaper information tells him that the Supreme Court confirms the conviction against my brother Santiago, a devastating issue for my family,” expressed the former president in a message published on X.

The Court confirmed that Santiago Uribe committed the crimes of conspiracy and homicide, both aggravated, by participating in the formation of The Twelve Apostles, a paramilitary group that was born in the municipality of Yarumal, department of Antioquia (northwest), and was also involved in the 1994 murder of Camilo Barrientos.

The Full Chamber confirmed “the judgment delivered on November 25, 2025 by the Superior Court of Antioquia, whereby it convicted Santiago Uribe Vélez as a co-perpetrator criminally responsible for aggravated felony conspiracy and aggravated homicide, as a combination of crimes against humanity,” a decision against which “no appeal is possible.” continue reading

Uribe’s defense was led by attorney Jaime Granados, who is also the lawyer for the former president in his judicial cases. He said on several occasions that there were false witnesses and even media manipulation in the trial.

“Judicial decisions must be respected and complied with. However, through the legal mechanisms enshrined in the legal system, we will continue to defend the innocence of Santiago, because the 16 years of knowledge of this case allow us to warn that he is being unjustly condemned,” Granados stated.

Allí added that he and his team will study “the full content of the decision and the votes,” after which they will announce “more details.”

Former President Uribe, meanwhile, has been denounced for his alleged links with the paramilitaries in his years as governor of Antioquia

Former President Uribe, meanwhile, has been denounced for his alleged ties with the paramilitaries in his years as governor of Antioquia (1995-1997), including one that indirectly links him to the massacre at El Aro, in which 17 farmers were killed in October 1997.

Commenting on the events, Colombian president Gustavo Petro assured that Colombia must “free itself from the paramilitary governance left in the northern region of Antioquia” by the group of The Twelve Apostles.

“I want to turn that page and ensure the creation of a national agreement so that this era does not repeat itself. Differences between Colombians are not resolved by weeding out the other, but by building a safe and permanent path of coexistence. The methods of Santiago Uribe Vélez must not be repeated again in Colombia,” added Petro.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Cuban Regime Promises to “Resist the Imperial Onslaught” Following New Sanctions

Bruno Rodriguez describes the inclusion of Diaz-Canel among those affected by US financial restrictions as “vile”

Manuel Anido Cuesta alongside his mother, Lis Cuesta, and Diaz-Canel – all now sanctioned by the US – during a visit to the Vatican in 2023. / . / EFE

14ymedio, 5 June 2026 / It is less than a month since Miguel Diaz-Canel once again declared that the sanctions imposed by the US do not affect him because he holds no accounts or assets in the United States, so his reaction to Washington’s latest salvo came as no surprise. The president avoided personalising the issue and considered that the “illegitimate addition” of new names to the lists of those affected is “designed to reinforce the blockade measures and the scenario of conflict between Cuba and the United States.”

“The US president is making new threatening statements against Cuba and the Treasury Department has added new names of Cuban leaders, organisations and companies to an illegitimate sanctions list,” Diaz-Canel denounced on X. In his view, this attitude stems from a “political blindness” that “adds to the coercive measures applied in recent weeks (…), designed to harm the Cuban people” — a reference to the executive order signed by Donald Trump on 1 May that opens the door to sanctioning foreign companies that cooperate with Cuban state entities.

“The aggressiveness and perversity of the Yankee government will collide with our determination to face the worst scenarios and resist the imperial onslaught,” Diaz-Canel added.

“The aggressiveness and perversity of the Yankee government will collide with our determination to face the worst scenarios and resist the imperial onslaught”

His brief message followed a statement by Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, who did allow himself to personalise the matter. “The vile inclusion of President Miguel Diaz-Canel, part of his family, as well as Cuban institutions, civil society organisations and companies on an illegitimate and unilateral list by the US government is the latest continue reading

demonstration of the American interventionist plan to present Cuba as a threat to United States national security,” he wrote on his X account.

In the same vein as the president, he devoted the second part of his post to a message of resistance. “Every US action aimed at constructing a scenario of conflict between the two countries is destined to fail. Every threat against Cuba’s independence and sovereignty will be met with greater unity and determination from our people,” he argued.

In addition to Diaz-Canel, the United States Treasury Department imposedfinancial sanctions this Thursday on the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples, the mining company La Victoria and the travel agency Amistur.

The measures extend to the president’s wife, Lis Cuesta, his stepson Manuel Anido Cuesta, Colonel Alejandro Castro Espin, son of former president Raul Castro, and the latter’s son, Raul Alejandro Castro Calis. Spared — and this is no minor detail — was Raul Guillermo Rodriguez Castro, known as El Cangrejo, grandson of the elderly general and informal interlocutor with Marco Rubio himself in negotiations with the US that continue in spite of everything.

Diaz-Canel addressed this matter in an interview published today by elDiario.es, which sent its US correspondent to spend a few days in Havana and to whom the most newsworthy material in the piece is owed. The journalist, who explains in the introduction that the meeting with the president took place on Wednesday afternoon, asked him: “You were talking about the last round of sanctions, the one on 1 May. This very morning it happened to me at the hotel – I went to pay for something at the cafeteria and my credit card was declined.”

The Central Bank of Cuba had announced that day that Visa and Mastercard cards would not be usable from 6 June onwards, although hours later Fincimex warned that it had halted operations at 2 p.m. that same day and this newspaper confirmed on Thursday that shops were already refusing them. The journalist’s words make clear that the effect was immediate.

“You were talking about the last round of sanctions, the one on 1 May. This very morning it happened to me at the hotel – I went to pay for something at the cafeteria and my credit card was declined.”

Little that is new emerges from the rest of the lengthy conversation in which Diaz-Canel insists on how the sanctions imposed during Donald Trump’s first administration – maintained under Joe Biden and intensified in this second Republican term – have contributed to the worsening of the Cuban economy and, by extension, of its industry and services.

While acknowledging mistakes, the president insists that Cuba has held out under extreme conditions by drawing on science and innovation, claims that steps towards economic openness have been taken, and calls for the regime’s incompetence to be demonstrated by lifting sanctions. “If we are so incompetent, why blockade me? Why not let me collapse on my own? Because they have no interest in Cuba improving. That is a lie. They want to take possession of Cuba,” he added.

The two most noteworthy remarks come when Diaz-Canel is asked what will happen if there is a social uprising like that of 11 July 2021: “We have our programmes for each of those scenarios, to navigate them,” he says enigmatically, though he goes on to speak of little more than neighbourhood and recreational programmes to keep young people occupied. He also responds on the subject of talks with the US, which the journalist raises precisely when Diaz-Canel is insisting on his rhetoric of whole-people war and resistance.

“We could have a civilised dialogue of the kind the United States has with other countries it also regards as adversaries, regardless of ideological differences. Moreover, we could have trade relations, cultural, academic, sporting and scientific exchanges… There could be tourism on both sides without restriction,” he notes – but the condition remains the same: the system is not up for negotiation.

On the other side of the strait, Donald Trump – who had been absent from public life for a week – was again asked about Cuba. “The country is starving, it has no energy, no oil, no money, nothing,” he said, before declaring: “We are going to treat Cuba well and we have very good plans.” The president also maintained that his popularity among Cuban Americans is extremely high – 95% of them voted for him, he said – and that his expectations include their return to the island. “They are incredible people, energetic, entrepreneurial. Some of the wealthiest people in Miami are Cuban. I am going to take good care of them and I am going to allow them to return to their homeland,” he said.

Either way, the president again made any concrete steps conditional on what happens in the Middle East. “I like to do one thing at a time, and first we will deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran. And as soon as that is done, on the way back we will make a brief stop…” he said, before alluding to those good plans.

Translated by GH

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Hotel Companies Face Lawsuits from Cuba for Breaking Contracts Amid US Threats

Banco Sabadell will maintain its Havana office, as it only provides services to Spanish companies
Diaz-Canel invites Cubans abroad to take over management of the hotels

Banco Sabadell in Havana carries out only support activities for Spanish companies and does not consider itself affected.

14ymedio, Madrid, 5 June 2026 / With the break between the Spanish hotel companies and Gaviota now complete, experts are now considering whether legal problems will come from Havana. The possibility is plausible enough that the newspaper El Pais ran a headline this Friday reading Melia and Iberostar Face Lawsuits in Cuba for Abandoning Hotel Management, in a piece in which a lawyer sets out this angle – one that had already been raised previously.

Ignacio Aparicio, executive partner at Andersen and director of Cuban Desk, warns that Cuba has two options. “The first is the partners’ agreement. Hotels in Cuba are generally managed through joint ventures in which the Cuban state – through various entities – and the operator both participate. Faced with the unilateral withdrawal of the latter, Cuba could argue that it finds no legal or contractual basis for rescinding the contract, and will seek to resolve the dispute before third parties. A common mechanism for this is arbitration before the Cuba Chamber of Commerce, or before arbitration institutions abroad, a route Cuba rarely opts for,” he explains.

The expert believes the Cuban regime will argue that the threat of sanctions does not compel the breaking of contracts, since such sanctions have existed for decades, and he maintains that it is standard for contracts to contain a clause stating that regulatory changes in third countries do not constitute “force majeure enabling their rescission.”

“They will have to argue that they are leaving their contract for a strictly economic reason and not solely because of US sanctions”

Aparicio advises Spanish companies to focus their defence on demonstrating that, faced with “extraordinary and unforeseeable supervening circumstances,” there has been such a serious disruption to the balance of obligations under the contract as to make performance impossible. “They will have to argue that they are leaving their contract for a strictly economic reason and not solely because of US sanctions, since the absence of electricity supply, food, and air connectivity have been supervening circumstances that have left them without a business, frustrating the purpose continue reading

of the partnership,” he explains.

The newspaper notes that this was precisely the approach taken by Blue Diamond, which in its statement on leaving the island cited a “combination of causes” – such as the suspension of flights – rather than “actions taken by the United States Government.” However, both Melia and Iberostar still retain a considerable number of hotels each – 19 in the case of the former and 6 in the case of the latter – which makes invoking that argument somewhat more complex in their case.

The possibility of Cuban authorities suing what have been and continue to be their partners is, in any event, debatable. In an interview given by Miguel Diaz-Canel to the Spanish online outlet elDiario.es, the president strikes an almost affectionate tone towards the companies. “They have been investing in Cuba for a long time, they have worked hand in hand with our tourism entities, they are business people for whom we have great respect, and they are leaving against their will,” he remarked.

Diaz-Canel alludes to a mutual exchange and learning process that has lasted years and trained thousands of professionals, though he now opens the door to a change of hands in favour of Cuban entrepreneurs abroad. “I am certain that many will return to Cuba to continue the business, but it will not be easy given the stubbornness with which the US Administration has sought to hold back the development of Cuban tourism, knowing that it is a source of income,” he says – making no mention of the fact that many exiles have expressed their intention to invest if there is a political, economic, and above all legal change on the island.

The institution, quite relaxed, told the Catalan press that its activities have no connection whatsoever with Cuban state entities and that there is no intention of leaving

Meanwhile, in Spain companies continue to sort out their positions. One of the most closely watched was also Banco Sabadell, given that the executive order of 1 May explicitly targeted the financial sector. The institution, quite relaxed, told the Catalan press that its activities have no connection whatsoever with Cuban state entities and that there is no intention of leaving.

“Banco Sabadell has always complied with applicable legislation and international sanctions requirements, and will continue to do so,” it stated to ON Economia. Its Havana office has the sole function of supporting Spanish companies present on the island; it carries out no retail banking activity and takes no deposits from individual customers.

The institution has operated in Cuba through Financiera Iberoamericana, a company 50% owned jointly with the state-owned Banco Internacional de Comercio, which does not appear on the sanctions list. Even so, the bank says it will remain alert, as it must, to adapting should circumstances change. The group’s financial exposure in Cuba is minimal, as its 2025 accounts show. Its business on the island contributed barely 4.2 million euros.

The new situation has made no dent in the performance of the major Spanish corporations present on the island. On Thursday, Melia Hotels International closed the trading session up, having already gained 41.51% in the last quarter alone. Moreover, although its Cuba revenues were negligible in 2025 – at 12.7 million euros – that figure represents barely 0.6% of what the Balearic giant brings in overall.

Translated by GH.

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Putin Admits He Spoke with the US About Cuba Amid the Spectre of a Venezuela-Style Operation

The Russian president recalled that the Island is “a friendly country” for Moscow and that bilateral ties continue

“I would prefer not to comment further,” he added, before referring to the Russian tanker that arrived in Cuba in March with some 100,000 tonnes of crude oil. / EFE

14ymedio/Agencies, Madrid, 4 June 2026 / Russian President Vladimir Putin admitted on Thursday that Moscow has maintained contacts with Washington over Cuba, amid speculation about a possible US operation against the Island. The leader offered no details, but made clear that the matter had been discussed with the Donald Trump administration.

“Answering your question directly… You asked whether we had had contacts with the US administration on the Cuban question. Yes, there were,” Putin said during a meeting with senior executives of international news agencies on the sidelines of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, as reported by the Russian agency Interfax.

The Kremlin chief declined to go further. “I would prefer not to comment further,” he added, before referring to the Anatoly Kolodkin, the US-sanctioned Russian tanker that arrived in Cuba in March with some 100,000 tonnes of crude oil. “Cuba is a friendly country for us. Our relations have traditionally developed over decades. The US administration knows this. Our contacts with Cuba continue,” he said.

“The issue of US pressure on Cuba is present in our contacts with the Americans,” said Ryabkov on 1 June

The EFE agency placed those words in the context of a question about a possible military operation in Cuba similar to the one carried out by the US in Venezuela on 3 January. According to the wire, Putin admitted to having spoken with the American side about continue reading

that scenario, though his public response was limited to confirming the contacts and avoiding any specifics about their content.

The Russian president’s statement comes just days after his Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, declared that Washington’s pressure on Havana was present in conversations between Moscow and the US. “The issue of US pressure on Cuba is present in our contacts with the Americans,” Ryabkov said on 1 June.

The episode shows that Cuba has once again come to occupy a sensitive position on the board between Washington and Moscow. At the end of January, the White House declared that the actions of the Cuban government constituted an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to US national security and foreign policy. The document accused Havana of collaborating with Russia, China, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah, as well as harbouring foreign military and intelligence capabilities.

What most closely connects the Cuban case to a possible “Venezuela-style” operation is the charge against Raul Castro for his responsibility in the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue light aircraft in 1996

Since then, Washington has tightened sanctions, including pressure on fuel supplies to the Island. The effect has already been felt at sea. The Universal, another sanctioned tanker that was travelling to Cuba, interrupted its route from mid-April and remained adrift in the middle of the Atlantic, carrying nearly 270,000 barrels of diesel, according to maritime tracking data cited by Bloomberg. Its case reflects the caution of vessels linked to the Island’s energy supply, in contrast to the Anatoly Kolodkin, which did manage to offload Russian crude in March, with US permission.

The tension has also moved into the military, intelligence, and legal spheres. On 14 May, CIA Director John Ratcliffe travelled to Havana for an unusual meeting with senior Cuban officials. Two weeks later, on 29 May, another unusual meeting took place, this time between the head of US Southern Command, General Francis Donovan, and senior Cuban commanders at the perimeter of the Guantanamo Naval Base.

What most closely connects the Cuban case to a possible “Venezuela-style” operation is the charge against Raul Castro for his responsibility in the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue light aircraft in 1996. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office for the Southern District of Florida officially considers him a fugitive, after he failed to appear before the court despite the active arrest warrant.

Translated by GH.

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Cuba’s Central Bank’s Decision Is Brought Forward to Thursday: Visa and Mastercard Can No Longer Be Used in Cuba

Customers who went shopping at the Vima store today were unable to make purchases and were very upset.

At Carlos III Plaza, signs are still displayed on the doors stating that Visa and Mastercard are accepted, but that is no longer possible. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, Juan Diego Rodríguez, June 4, 2026 / Although the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC) announced on Wednesday that Visa and Mastercard cards could no longer be used starting June 6, stores stopped accepting them today. Fincimex announced it yesterday in a late-afternoon social media post, but the vast majority of people only found out today when they arrived at the stores.

At Vima—a partnership between the Spanish food company and Cimex—an employee said that Saturday is “when the bank withdraws,” referring to the foreign institution that authorities have never identified by name. However, Fincimex must carry out its periodic reconciliation with the foreign bank and, for that reason, “they closed operations yesterday at two in the afternoon.” In fact, he added, “when we try, the card comes up invalid; it’s not that we don’t want to accept it, it’s that we can’t.”

The explanation matches the brief statement issued by the financial arm of the military conglomerate Gaesa, which reported that, “in order to avoid possible additional economic impacts,” operations were halted at 2:00 p.m. on Tuesday. It continued: “Normally, transactions using these cards through POS terminals require 72 hours for settlement from abroad, so financial operations carried out today would complete their processing after the termination date of the agreements signed with the foreign bank and would represent financial losses for Cuba.”

“When we try, the card comes up invalid; it’s not that we don’t want to accept it, it’s that we can’t”

In this way, the statement concluded, “due to the illegitimate actions of the U.S. Government, a commercial operation that for 32 years allowed Visa and Mastercard cards to operate in Cuba according to international standards has been interrupted.”

The explanations, given without advance notice, have been of little comfort. Customers who had gone to shop at Vima today, relying on the deadline announced by the BCC, were visibly upset. “Then why do they say it starts on Saturday if you already can’t use them today?” protested one woman, pulling at her hair and wringing her hands. continue reading

At Carlos III Plaza, staff are giving the same explanation, although, unlike Vima, signs are still displayed on the doors stating that Visa and Mastercard can be used.

According to the brief BCC statement released yesterday, the reason international cards were being withdrawn from the Island was that the “foreign bank that processes transactions carried out in Cuba using Visa and Mastercard cards” ended its relationship with Fincimex on Tuesday.

That “interruption,” the statement continued, was “directly” related to the executive order issued by U.S. President Donald Trump on May 1, which opened the door to new sanctions against officials, institutions, and companies linked to the regime and which the Central Bank describes as “part of its strategy of suffocation against the people of Cuba.”

Entrance to Vima, on Infanta Street in Central Havana, now without the notice about those international cards. / 14ymedio

“The foreign bank announced that, beginning June 6, the date on which the Empire’s measure comes into force, it becomes unlawful and impossible to continue carrying out the agreements with the Cuban entity,” the notice stated, without mentioning whether Visa and Mastercard themselves had taken any action. It did indicate that the “100% national” prepaid cards Clásica and Tropical, as well as Russia’s Mir card and China’s UnionPay, could continue to be used, along with cash.

The BCC statement attempted to project normalcy at the end, but the list of alternatives confirmed the scale of the problem, since replacing those cards with the permitted options is far from equivalent. Visa and Mastercard are the most widely used payment instruments among European, Latin American, and Canadian travelers. Mir has limited reach and operates in the context of international sanctions against Moscow, while UnionPay has a broader global presence but is not part of the payment habits of most Western tourists visiting Cuba.

For many foreign residents, international cards provided direct access to these stores without depending on the informal currency market. A significant percentage of ordinary Cubans who shop in dollar stores also do so with cards obtained abroad by relatives.

The decision by this mysterious “foreign bank” adds to the actions of numerous companies that have been leaving the Island in recent weeks or ending contracts with the Business Administration Group (Gaesa), which has been specifically sanctioned by the United States. This Wednesday, the Spanish hotel company Meliá Hotels International confirmed its withdrawal from 15 of the 34 hotels it manages on the Island, those owned by Gaesa. Earlier, Iberostar stopped operating and marketing 12 hotels, and Blue Diamond Resorts announced the complete cessation of its operations in Cuba.

Meanwhile, Sherritt International, one of the largest foreign investors in Cuba, suspended in May its direct participation in its joint ventures on the Island and announced the repatriation of its personnel after Washington sanctioned Moa Nickel S.A., the company it shares with the state-owned Compañía General de Níquel. The multinational later paused its plan to dissolve its Cuban operations while reporting that it is negotiating with a former Trump adviser for the purchase of a majority of its shares.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Visa and Mastercard Payments Will No Longer Be Accepted in Cuba Starting Saturday

The BBC says the intermediary “foreign bank” has severed its relationship with Fincimex for fear of US sanctions

A sign outside a state-run dollar store indicates that Visa and Mastercard, among other cards, are accepted. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 3, 2026 / The Central Bank of Cuba has announced that, starting Saturday, Visa and Mastercard payments will no longer be accepted on the island. According to a brief statement broadcast by state-run radio host Lázaro Manuel Alonso, the bank explained that the reason is that the “foreign bank processing transactions in Cuba using Visa and Mastercard”—whose name was not disclosed—informed on June 2nd that it is severing its relationship with Fincimex, the financial arm of Cimex, part of the Cuban military conglomerate Gaesa.

This “interruption,” the statement continues, is “directly” related to the executive order issued by US President Donald Trump on May 1, which opened the door to new sanctions against officials, agencies and companies of the regime and which the Central Bank calls “part of its strategy of suffocating the people of Cuba.”

“The foreign bank announced that as of June 6, the date the Empire’s measure takes effect, it becomes illegal and impossible to continue executing agreements with the Cuban entity,” states the notification, which does not mention whether Visa and Mastercard have taken action. It does indicate that the “100% Cuban” Clásica and Tropical prepaid cards, as well as the Russian Mir and the Chinese UnionPay, can still be used, in addition to cash. The Central Bank of Cuba’s statement attempts to project an image of normalcy at the end, but the list of alternatives confirms the scale continue reading

of the problem, because replacing these cards with the permitted ones is far from equivalent.

Visa and Mastercard are the most widely used payment methods among European, Latin American, and Canadian travelers.

The decision by this mysterious “foreign bank” adds to the growing list of companies leaving the island in recent weeks or terminating their contracts with the Business Administration Group (GAESA), which is specifically sanctioned by the US. Just this Wednesday, the Spanish hotel chain Meliá confirmed its withdrawal from 15 of its 34 hotels on the island, all owned by GAESA. Previously, Iberostar ceased operating and marketing 12 hotels, and Blue Diamond Resorts announced the complete cessation of its operations in Cuba.

Canadian mining company Sherritt International, one of the largest foreign investors in Cuba, suspended its direct participation in its joint ventures on the island in May and announced the repatriation of its staff after Washington sanctioned Moa Nickel SA, the company it co-owns with the Cuban state-owned Compañía General de Níquel. The multinational, however, later halted plans to dissolve its Cuban businesses, while also announcing negotiations with a former Trump advisor to purchase a majority stake in the company.

Visa and Mastercard are the most widely used payment methods among European, Latin American, and Canadian travelers. Mir has a limited reach and operates within the context of international sanctions against Moscow, while UnionPay has a greater global presence but is not part of the payment habits of most tourists traveling to Cuba from the West.

The measure may also put pressure on the price of the dollar in the informal market.

The Central Bank’s announcement could provoke an immediate reaction among foreign correspondents, diplomats, aid workers, and employees of foreign entities in Cuba—one of the groups that most frequently uses international credit cards to shop in hard currency stores. With the suspension of operations starting June 6, an increase in purchases is expected in the preceding days, especially for food, toiletries, and other scarce goods. For many foreign residents, the international credit card was a direct route to these stores without relying on the informal currency market.

The measure could also put pressure on the dollar’s price in the informal market. In recent months, paying with foreign cards has become increasingly difficult due to blackouts, connection failures, and disruptions in banking systems. Some customers will have to resort to domestic prepaid cards, such as Clásica or Tropical, or to cash in foreign currency. The latter becomes the most practical option for many businesses because it can be accepted even during power outages, increasing the demand for physical dollars in an already strained market.

The decision is a devastating blow, not so much for tourism, which is practically at a standstill, but for dollar stores. A significant percentage of shoppers use prepaid cards issued by relatives abroad—the so-called stored-value cards where the amount to be spent is loaded.

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Thousands of Doses of Medication Found Alongside a Drug Cache at the Headquarters of the Cuban-Galician Haydee Santamaria Association

Those close to those detained in the police operation say the medications were a donation for Cuba

Thousands of doses of more than 150 different medications were found by the Spanish Civil Guard and National Police in a house in Vilaboa. / Video capture

14ymedio, Havana, 4 June 2026 / Thousands of doses of more than 150 different medications were found by the Spanish Civil Guard and National Police in a house in Vilaboa, in Galicia, registered as the headquarters of the Cuban-Galician Association Haydee Santamaria. The blister packs include drugs such as Rivotril, Lexatin, and Lyrica – benzodiazepines used to treat anxiety – and alongside them were found more than five kilograms of cocaine, around five hundred packs of contraband cigarettes, hashish, more than 30,000 euros in cash, and several weapons, among them six shotguns.

According to local press reports, the association, founded in 2014, has had no activity since 2020, but its Cuban-born president is one of the nine people detained in the police operation, three of whom are already in custody. Those close to the woman argued that the medications had been found because they were donations for Cuba. However, investigators believe they were in fact being sold through an illegal network, and that the association’s president is the ringleader of the network, in which her son and another accomplice were also involved.

The association, founded in 2014, has had no activity since 2020, but its president is one of the nine people detained in the police operation

An official explained that as part of the investigations in Vilaboa, “a person was detected who was distributing narcotic substances in continue reading

significant quantities” and who was operating in complicity with others in the municipality of Sanxenxo. As evidence gathering progressed, “it was possible to detect and identify the presence of two organised and highly active cells, belonging to a single criminal group, engaged in the sale and distribution of cocaine, hashish, and tobacco”, which also operated in the Pontevedra municipality.

Data from the investigations also indicate that the collective – which bears the name of a heroine of the Revolution – was established with the aim of bringing together Cubans living in Galicia, and had a significant presence in Vigo, where it came to concentrate 444 of the 2,518 people from the island living in the region.

On the island, 14ymedio has documented the sale on the black market of Alprazolam in the streets of Tulipan, in Nuevo Vedado; under the arcades of Carlos III and Reina, in Centro Habana; and at the Esquina de Tejas, in Cerro. The drug is hawked alongside loose cigarettes, sweets, lighters, and packets of adulterated coffee.

Translated by GH

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Spanish Company Meliá Abandons the Management of 15 of Its 34 Hotels in Cuba

The decision was communicated to Gaesa on May 26, according to a company statement.

The measure comes due to “a combination of unforeseen circumstances beyond the control or management capacity of Ilha Bela,” the statement said.

14ymedio, Madrid, June 3, 2026 / Meliá is leaving 15 of the 34 hotels it manages in Cuba, as confirmed this Wednesday through its Portuguese subsidiary, Ilha Bela. The decision has been communicated to the National Securities Market Commission (CNMV) – the Spanish regulator that oversees the transparency of business activity – and although the hotel owner was informed on May 26 – the military conglomerate Grupo de Administración Empresarial SA (GAESA) – made it public this Wednesday, June 3rd.

With Meliá’s decision, four international hotel chains have now withdrawn, either partially or completely, from Cuba in the last four days: the first was the Canadian company Blue Diamond, followed by the Spanish company Iberostar and the Asian company Aston. In total, some 60 luxury hotels (4 and 5 stars) will no longer be managed by foreign companies.

The measure is taken “from a deep sense of corporate responsibility, and responds to and is a consequence of a combination of unforeseen circumstances beyond the management or action capacity of Ilha Bela,” the statement said, referring to the sanctions announced in the executive order signed by Donald Trump on May 1 and which will be applicable from this Friday, June 5.

The affected hotels are Gran Hotel Bristol Habana Vieja, Innside Catedral Habana, Meliá Buena Vista, Meliá continue reading

Cayo Santa María, Meliá Jardines del Rey, Meliá Las Dunas, Meliá Península Varadero, Paradisus Los Cayos, Paradisus Princesa Mar, Paradisus Río de Oro, Paradisus Varadero, Sol Caribe Beach, Sol Cayo Santa María, Sol Río de Luna y Mares and Sol Varadero Beach.

The chain maintains that the impact is “limited,” since almost all of these hotels were already closed due to the collapse of tourism, caused by the energy crisis and the suspension of international flights

The chain maintains that the impact is “limited,” since almost all of these hotels were already closed due to the collapse of tourism, caused by the energy crisis and the suspension of international flights. In any case, Ilha Bela says it is “activating and implementing specific plans to carry out an orderly disaffiliation of these hotels.”

The statement adds that protocols are being implemented to inform Meliá’s suppliers and customers. Ilha Bela, based in Madeira, is the subsidiary through which the Mallorcan company operated its hotels in Cuba under the Meliá, Paradisus, Sol, and Innside brands.

For the moment, Meliá has not provided any further details beyond the statement. The last statements made by Gabriel Escarrer, CEO of the Spanish hotel chain, were on May 20, a few days before communicating the decision to Gaesa. The businessman, who was attending a tourism event in a Mallorcan town, admitted that the situation on the island was “difficult” and “unsustainable” and that he considered the scenario very uncertain. “I think that today few people know what is going to happen with Cuba,” he responded regarding expectations.

Regarding his business, he remained cautious. “We are consolidating and placing the few remaining customers in the same hotels,” he said. It is now known that the company will keep 19 establishments open, three of them in Havana – Meliá Cohiba, Meliá Habana, and Sevilla Habana – two in Cienfuegos – the Meliá San Carlos, for which it received a claim under the Helms-Burton Act, and La Unión – and one in Sancti Spíritus – the Meliá Trinidad Península.

In addition, it will retain control of the following resorts: Meliá Internacional Varadero, Meliá Las Américas, Meliá Varadero, Meliá Marina Varadero, Sol Palmeras, and Mystique Casa Perla by Royalton; Meliá Cayo Coco, Sol Cayo Coco, and Meliá Cayo Guillermo; and Meliá Santiago de Cuba, Sol Turquesa Beach (Holguín), and Paradisus Los Cactus.

Also present at the meeting was the president of the Balearic Islands government, Marga Prohens (Popular Party), who stated that Balearic companies like Meliá are “examples of excellence, job creation, and opportunities in countries like Cuba.” She added that her government would stand by these companies “in the face of any attack on their freedom” that might occur “anywhere in the world,” alluding to the threat of sanctions.

This Wednesday, shortly after the information came to light, the regional government’s Tourism Minister, Jaume Bauzà, spoke out, expressing his concern about the situation and conveying the regional administration’s willingness to “help in any way possible”.

“I haven’t been able to speak with the Mallorcan companies that are there, but I reiterate that we will look out for them. It’s a commercial matter, but if we can help in any way, we will,” he said.

Although it is a business matter, he insisted, the non-autonomous government views the situation these Mallorcan companies are facing with “concern” and hopes “that it can be resolved as quickly as possible” for both them and the Cubans. “Maximum cooperation, recognition, and willingness to help in any way we can,” he concluded.

However, for now, the situation does not appear likely to escalate politically. This Wednesday, elDiario.es published a report on the pressure exerted by the Donald Trump administration on foreign companies, for which it consulted sources within the Spanish Foreign Ministry. “The government, through the Foreign Ministry, is following with great attention and enormous concern the extraterritorial impact of the unilateral measures taken by the US against Cuba, which affect the interests of Spanish companies and exacerbate the humanitarian crisis facing the Cuban population,” they declared.

Meanwhile, a spokesperson for the European Commission said that there is “aware that some EU companies have been considering ceasing or reducing their economic activities in Cuba in recent days. We are closely monitoring the situation. We expect all parties to ensure a level playing field for EU companies.”

“We are closely monitoring the situation. We hope that all parties involved will ensure a level playing field for EU companies.”

This Monday, another Balearic hotel chain, Iberostar, confirmed its withdrawal from six of the 12 hotels it managed in Cuba, all owned by Gaesa. The company will continue, for the time being, to operate those hotels belonging to Cubanacán and Gran Caribe. The Balearic newspaper Última Hora reviewed the situation of other companies in the archipelago, such as Blau, which manages three hotels in Cuba that are currently closed—two in Varadero and one in Havana—none of which are Gaviota properties. Valentin Hoteles, with three Gaesa-owned establishments—in Havana, Cayo Cruz, and Cayo Santa María—has not yet commented.

Although not explicitly mentioned, the Mallorcan family-owned Roc chain is also in the same predicament. It manages five hotels in Cuba, of which only one—Roc Casa del Mar—belongs to Gaesa, while of the other four, three belong to Gran Caribe and one to Cubanacán. Finally, Barceló has no signed agreement with Gaviota, and its two hotels—Barceló Solymar and Occidental Arenas Blancas—belong to Gran Caribe.

“We have to wait and count to 21,” Mallorcan hoteliers told Última Hora . According to the newspaper, despite the catastrophic years for tourism on the island, business owners maintain “their commitment to continue operating in the country and preserve their leading position, especially those seeking to recoup investments made to reposition their establishments.”

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Marco Rubio Proposes the Czech or Polish Model for a Transition in Cuba

“There are people within the Government’s technocratic sphere who could play some role in this, but we do not have names,” the Secretary of State said.

Marco Rubio, during an appearance before the U.S. Senate / X @SecRubio

14ymedio, Madrid, June 4, 2026 – Cuba once again took center stage on the second day of Marco Rubio’s appearance before a U.S. House of Representatives committee, where the Secretary of State affirmed on Wednesday that there are people within the regime with whom a transition can be negotiated.

“There are people within the Government’s technocratic sphere who could play some role in this. But if you ask me whether there is an individual we would trust and who would support us in leading this transition from beginning to end, I cannot give you that name right now,” Rubio said.

Although he refrained from giving any indication of who that person might be, he did suggest that it would not be someone from the highest ranks. “That becomes a little more difficult the higher up the ranks you go, because of the ideological inclination some of them have,” he added.

“That becomes a little more difficult the higher up the ranks you go, because of the ideological inclination some of them have”

The head of U.S. diplomacy was responding to questions from Cuban-American congresswoman María Elvira Salazar, who pressed him on whether the Venezuela model could be replicated in Cuba, referring to the idea of finding a figure from within the regime, akin to Delcy Rodríguez, to help bring about change. Rubio acknowledged that continue reading

the situation on the Island is of particular interest to him and stressed that his goal was to avoid chaos.

“Clearly, there are individuals within the power structure who understand that what they have is not sustainable and that it must be rebuilt. But they have no power. And if they do have it, they do not know how to do it,” he insisted.

Rubio again criticized the Government by referring to the military conglomerate Gaesa, saying that he would not “allow them to benefit from the game they have been playing, in which they steal money from the Cuban people for the benefit of that conglomerate at the expense of the people of Cuba.” He nevertheless emphasized a negotiated path.

“I think we want to look at models like the Czech Republic or Poland, how they made the transition. And one of the things they did was preserve some institutions in their society to provide stability and longevity to the project,” he explained. His remarks continued the message he delivered the previous day when, while discussing the Island’s precarious situation and its affinity with states supposedly hostile to the United States, such as China and Russia, he argued that change required a new system, inseparable from new leadership.

“They need serious systemic reform,” he said before asking and answering whether the country could take care of itself. “I think the answer is yes, they can, but I do not believe this system is capable of reforming itself unless new people take control or a new mindset is imposed,” he emphasized.

“We have spoken with them, we have offered them what I believe needs to happen for their economy to recover,” he said, without providing further details.

In recent months, the international press has cited as part of the negotiations Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, the grandson of the former president and who is known as El Cangrejo [The Crab], reportedly having spoken directly with Rubio. Another name mentioned has been Alejandro Castro Espín.

Venezuela also came up during the hearing when Rubio was asked about possible elections in the South American country, precisely five months after the capture of Nicolás Maduro.

“We would like to see them as soon as possible, but remember that only five months have passed: not five years, not 50 months,” he said regarding elections in Venezuela.

“We would like to see them as soon as possible, but remember that only five months have passed: not five years, not 50 months. Five months is not a long time for a country that has gone through what that country has gone through, but clearly we need a new electoral commission,” he declared.

Salazar, speaking after the hearing, suggested that elections in Venezuela could be held in 2027, although she said that 2028 would also be acceptable if that ensured the proper conditions for legitimate elections.

“I am betting on elections being held in 2027, but if it is in 2028, that is fine. These are processes that need to be properly established so that the results are good,” she maintained.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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Raúl Castro’s Most Bitter Birthday

The man who a decade ago shook hands with the US president at diplomatic ceremonies is today an old man cornered by the justice system of that same country and reviled in Washington

A few meters from the Faculty of Dentistry, a newly erected billboard interrupts the urban landscape: “Raúl is Raúl.” / 14ymedio/Capture

I walk by the corner of Carlos III and Rancho Boyeros Avenue in Havana. A few meters from the Faculty of Dentistry, a newly erected billboard interrupts the urban landscape. It doesn’t announce a campaign against Washington, nor a partisan rally, nor even any of those slogans that have survived the passage of time like old furniture that no one dares to take out of the house. It simply says: “Raúl is Raúl.”

The phrase, that purports to be a celebration of Raúl Castro’s 95th birthday on June 3rd, has a strange effect. Four stars, a dark green background, and the insignia of an Army general convert the sign into something much more like a death notice than a tribute. The message doesn’t convey vitality, but rather evokes farewell. As if those who ordered its placement knew that the end of an era was approaching.

It is difficult to look at that billboard and not think about the distance that separates the man who turns 95 today from the figure who for decades held the second most powerful position in Cuba. For much of his public life, Raúl Castro existed in the shadow of his brother Fidel. From the years of the insurrection to the consolidation of authoritarian power, his role was that of an indispensable companion, a disciplined executor, and the guarantor of the military and repressive machinery.

While Fidel Castro favored improvisation, interminable speeches, and epic campaigns, Raúl cultivated an image of a pragmatic administrator.

It was Fidel Castro who drew him into the revolutionary adventure and placed him in all the key positions of the system. But it was also Fidel who condemned him to a subordinate political existence. For half a century, Raúl was the eternal number two.

However, those who knew him well always insisted that there were important differences between the two brothers. While Fidel Castro favored improvisation, endless speeches, and epic campaigns, Raúl cultivated an image of a pragmatic administrator. While one seemed obsessed with history, the other was focused on the mechanisms of power. While one spoke to the masses, the other preferred continue reading

to control the internal workings of the military and party apparatus.

That reputation for pragmatism fueled many national and international expectations when he officially assumed the presidency in 2008, following Fidel Castro’s illness. Within and outside Cuba an optimistic narrative was established. There was talk of reforms, of modernization, and of a possible economic opening. Even of a gradual political liberalization.

Some absurd prohibitions disappeared. Cubans could stay in hotels previously reserved for foreigners, buy cell phones, buy and sell their homes and cars, and access certain consumer spaces that had been off-limits for years. Later came immigration reform and the limited expansion of self-employment.

But the illusion did not last long.

The country that spent decades asking for change received more of the same. It asked for reforms and got stagnation. It dreamed of a future and was saddled with more permanence.

The transformations never touched the core of the system: the political monopoly of the Communist Party, the lack of civil liberties, and military control over strategic sectors of the economy. What many imagined as a transition ended up resembling more of a cosmetic operation designed to preserve the existing order and make the international community believe that Cuba was embarking on a path toward openness.

The moment that best symbolized those hopes was probably Barack Obama’s visit to Havana in March 2016. Images of Raúl Castro alongside the US president traveled the world. For a few hours, it seemed possible to imagine a different future for the island. A less isolated country. Less trapped by its own ideological ghosts.

Ten years later, that scene seems to belong to another life.

Today, Obama’s former interlocutor is surrounded by a completely different context. He was recently indicted in the United States on several charges, including murder, in relation to the 1996 downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes, an incident that left four dead and profoundly strained relations between Havana and Washington.

The paradox is brutal. The man who a decade ago shook hands with the US president at diplomatic ceremonies is today an elderly man cornered by the justice system of that same country and vilified in Washington.

Nor does the political legacy he leaves behind help. Among his most unfortunate decisions was choosing Miguel Díaz-Canel as his successor. He not only appointed him, but also imposed upon him a motto that later became official doctrine: “Continuity.”

For a society exhausted by hardship, mass emigration, and economic deterioration, that slogan sounded more like a threat than a promise. The country, that had been demanding change for decades, received more of the same. It asked for reforms and got stagnation. It dreamed of a future and was saddled with more permanence. The Island-wide protests of 11 July 2021, ultimately revealed the depth of that rift between Raúl Castro’s regime and the population.

Today, as rumors multiply about his health and his disconnection from reality, it is impossible to know how much Raúl Castro knows about what’s happening beyond the walls that protect him. Perhaps he still receives daily reports, or perhaps he’s increasingly detached from the daily lives of Cubans. Perhaps he isn’t even fully informed about the legal proceedings against him in the United States.

This June, Castro turns 95 at one of the worst moments of his public career. Isolated, internationally criticized, and with a country in ruins. The only thing that seems to remain today is an old man facing the judgment of history, a tribunal far more implacable than any he has known in his lifetime.

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Raúl Castro, the Enforcer ‘Time Magazine’ Saw Born Alongside the Revolution

In January 1959, while half the world was still celebrating Batista’s downfall, Fidel’s younger brother was already appearing in the international press as an architect of terror.

The image contradicts the later narrative that sought to portray him as a pragmatic administrator, less charismatic but more rational than Fidel. / Adelante

14ymedio, Havana, June 3, 2026 — “Quarrelsome and envious” was how a Jesuit priest described the younger brother who accompanied Fidel Castro at a Catholic school in Santiago de Cuba. Time Magazine recorded it in a report published on January 26, 1959, barely three weeks after Fidel Castro’s triumphant entry into Havana.

The article, titled The Vengeful Visionary, was not yet a retrospective reading of Castroism, but rather a snapshot taken in the heat of the moment. The text portrayed, with remarkable clarity, the birth of the Revolution, its euphoric crowds, and at the same time the machinery of death that was beginning to operate in the name of revolutionary justice.

Although the explicit protagonist of the cover story was Fidel Castro, Time’s text offers an early key to understanding Raúl. He appears there less as his older brother’s shadow than as the executor of a policy already defined by revenge and by the normalization of exemplary punishment. The magazine described the first executions as the moment when the victors, who had promised democracy, justice, and honest government, “clung to the arrogant instruments of dictatorship.”

While Fidel estimated that fewer than 450 men would be executed, his younger brother boasted that “a thousand might die”

The harshest passage is the one devoted to Santiago de Cuba. According to Time, the revolutionary tribunals operated with rebels serving simultaneously as prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. Sentences were handed down in summary proceedings and carried out just as quickly. In Santiago, the magazine added, “the show was under the personal command of Raúl, Fidel’s 28-year-old brother, a slant-eyed man who had already executed 30 ‘informers’ during two years of guerrilla warfare.”

The publication portrays him with a coldness that remains striking today. The context was that of mass executions, with priests continue reading

available to hear the condemned men’s final confessions before they faced the firing squad. While Fidel estimated that fewer than 450 men would be executed, his younger brother boasted that “a thousand might die.”

The scene at Santiago’s firing range reads like a preview of the country that was to come. A trench twelve meters long, three meters wide, and three meters deep; prisoners transferred before dawn from Boniato prison; confessions heard by six priests; condemned men with their hands tied; and bodies falling into the pit. One rebel murmured: “Let it end quickly. I have pain in my soul.” By noon, according to the account, 70 prisoners had died.

In that architecture of terror, Raúl Castro does not appear as an improviser, but as an enforcer. Fidel justified the repression with fiery speeches and appeals to the suffering of Batista’s victims. Raúl, by contrast, embodied the administrative side of violence: organizing, commanding, carrying out, and sustaining the mechanism. That difference would define much of his later career within the regime. Fidel needed to present violence as exceptional justice. Raúl seemed comfortable with violence as a method of power.

“Let it end quickly. I have pain in my soul”

Time’s account does not absolve Batista. It describes with stark detail the corruption, torture, and police sadism of his regime. But that is precisely what makes the reading more disturbing. The magazine acknowledges the previous horrors and yet warns that the new government was nullifying the Constitution, holding summary trials, and turning revenge into a public spectacle. The dilemma was not whether Batista had been brutal, but whether the Revolution was prepared to establish the rule of law or a new dictatorship of terror.

Raúl Castro is placed firmly on that second path. Before becoming Minister of the Armed Forces, before formally inheriting power, before becoming the face of Castroist continuity, he was already there: in Santiago, beside the mass graves, in command of the rifles. The image contradicts the later narrative that sought to portray him as a pragmatic administrator, less charismatic but more rational than Fidel.

What Time saw in 1959 was something else: the birth of a political culture in which obedience was imposed at gunpoint and the law could be suspended “in the name of the people.” Raúl Castro was not merely an observer of that drift. He was one of its first visible enforcers, and the magazine portrayed him even then as a man who took pleasure in pulling the trigger and filling graves with corpses.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Dollar Reaches a Record 600 Cuban Pesos on the Informal Currency Market

Those who receive remittances are celebrating the rise, but prices have also increased significantly, and people on the street are noticing.

The official exchange rate stands this Wednesday at 524 pesos per dollar. “Nobody sells to the State,” says Roberto. “It’s like stealing from yourself.” / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 3, 2026 — The day Laritza had been waiting for has arrived. For weeks, this retired Havana resident has been holding on to the 100 dollars she received from relatives abroad, waiting for the informal exchange rate to reach the magic number of 600 pesos per dollar. “Although they never give you the exact amount listed, the best will change at 5 or 10 pesos below,” she admits with satisfaction.

Exactly one month ago, the U.S. currency was trading at 535 CUP, but the acceleration has been surprising even for a currency that has spent years trapped in a spiral of devaluation. “The situation for the Cuban Government is worsening, and no understanding with the United States that could bring improvement is in sight. The main indicators of the Cuban economy continue in free fall, and their impact is reflected in the depreciation of the Cuban peso over the last five years,” stated the May bulletin of the Observatory of Currencies and Finance (OMFi), directed by Pavel Vidal.

That analysis was released in mid-May, when the dollar was trading at 540 pesos, according to El Toque’s informal exchange rate. On June 2, the currency jumped eight points and reached 600.

The more they earn, the more everything around them becomes more expensive. “And there are also the hard-currency stores, where shopping becomes more expensive too”

“For those of us who receive remittances, it benefits us in a certain way, although food, toiletries, and everything else go up in price. So in the end, it makes no difference,” says Roberto, a reseller in Havana who echoes not only the fears of the poorest Cubans continue reading

but also the concerns of people like himself who do business. The more they earn, the more everything around them becomes more expensive. “And there are also the hard-currency stores, where shopping becomes more expensive too,” he adds.

Prices have risen significantly, and people are noticing. “The imported garlic bulbs that I bought a few weeks ago for 50 pesos are now 150. Cristal beer already costs 400 pesos in the neighborhood’s private markets, and all imported products are going up,” María told this newspaper.

In December 2025, the Government launched a floating exchange rate in an attempt to compete with the informal market rate, which had become the real benchmark among the population. After years of open warfare with El Toque for publishing an exchange rate far higher than the State’s, the official buying and selling price was set at 410 pesos per dollar—in addition to the other existing rates of 24 for state enterprises, and 120 for entities capable of generating foreign currency. Besides being an attempt to recapture the lost foreign-exchange market, the regime was also trying to contain inflation, which continues to climb, although less dramatically than in 2023 and 2024, not because of economic improvement, but because of generalized poverty.

The official exchange rate stands this Wednesday at 524 pesos per dollar. “Nobody sells to the State,” Roberto insists. “It’s like stealing from yourself,” he says mischievously. María agrees. “The other day I overheard an argument about that between a neighbor and a cousin who had just arrived from Europe and made the mistake of exchanging a few hundred dollars at the Havana airport when he landed. ‘Boy, you don’t do that, you lost out every way possible,’ the one who lives here in our building told him,” she recalls. “Any vendor at the farmers’ market will give you more pesos for that amount of dollars. Here people will come looking for you, carry your bags, and even shine your shoes if it means you’ll sell them your dollars,” she adds.

Private business owners sometimes use that trick to justify only a tiny portion of all the dollars they handle

Although it is not always easy. “You have to go to several places looking for someone who will pay a better price. Some small and medium-sized businesses want to take them 30 or 40 pesos below the El Toque rate, so you go from one business to another until you find a better deal,” Roberto explains.

“There’s a self-employed businessman here who buys dollars and always posts ‘five pesos below El Toque‘, so it’s still above the State’s rate. Serious guy, money neatly bundled in groups of 1,000 pesos, and a trusted clientele. No lines, and you don’t even have to show your ID card. So who would go to the State with that other offer?” the reseller argues.

For Laritza, some people do, but they are the minority. “The naïve, the newly arrived, or people who need a record of the transaction. Private business owners sometimes use that trick to justify only a tiny portion of all the dollars they handle. That way they have a receipt to show inspectors to justify purchases of certain goods in dollar stores,” she says.

The retiree, who resells to a “mule” who brings merchandise from Panama, speaks about the mixed blessings of these increases in the value of foreign currency. “She’s always chasing us around asking whether we have a Cabezón (the 100-dollar bill with Benjamin Franklin’s face on it). She’s told us she has had to raise the prices of all the products in her little shop because, with the current dollar exchange rate, the merchandise she brings in has become more expensive. As an added advantage—and we don’t know how she does it—she always pays in cash and with large bills, but other informal currency traders are having a very hard time obtaining enough cash to give their customers,” she notes.

Translated by Regina Anavy

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The Exodus of Hotel Chains From Cuba Continues, With the Departure of the Asian Company Aston

Archipelago Internacional breaks its relationship with Gaesa, following in the footsteps of Spain’s Iberostar and Canada’s Blue Diamond.

The Grand Aston Havana hotel was controversial from its inception, built by Gaesa during a time of deep economic crisis in the country. / 14ymedio

14ymedio, Havana, June 2, 2026 / Archipelago International, Southeast Asia’s largest privately owned hotel management group, followed in the footsteps of Spain’s Iberostar and Canada’s Blue Diamond this week by ending its management of hotels linked to Gaviota, the chain controlled by the Business Administration Group SA (Gaesa), the conglomerate of the Armed Forces in Cuba.

The decision comes just days before the deadline, June 5, set by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), to end the operations of foreign companies linked to Gaesa, under threat of sanctions.

Archipelago’s hotels in Cuba, operating under the Aston brand—the Grand Aston Havana, Grand Aston Varadero, Grand Aston Cayo Paredón, Grand Aston Cayo Las Brujas, and Aston Costa Verde—are now in a situation similar to that of the properties abandoned by Iberostar and Blue Diamond. They may remain open, but would be managed by Gaviota, which, given the OFAC sanctions, will find it difficult to partner with a new foreign operator. 14ymedio confirmed this during a visit today to the Grand Aston in Havana, which remains open—albeit empty—under Gaviota’s management.

The Grand Aston Havana’s cafeteria was empty of customers on Tuesday. Hotel employees confirmed that the establishment has been taken over by Gaviota’s management.

Archipelago’s departure affects recently built, opulent hotels like the Grand Aston La Habana, controversial since its opening, given that Gaesa constructed it amidst a deep economic crisis that directly impacted the population. The Grand Aston, like the Iberostar Selection Habana—located in the controversial Torre K and now closed due to the crisis—was developed in the post-pandemic period. While shortages were growing and urban decay was evident in many areas of Havana, the Cuban state prioritized the construction continue reading

of large hotel facilities for international tourism.

The Grand Aston was controversial from its opening, given that Gaesa had built it at the same time as a deep economic crisis was developing that was affecting the population.

Before Archipelago’s withdrawal, announced yesterday, the Grand Aston was already suffering from the decline in tourism on the island. According to employee testimonies to 14ymedio, business had recently become so low that, in some cases, employees were told “not to come to work, there were no tourists.”

Meliá, for now, has not announced changes to its plans for Cuba. Half of its hotels are closed due to the consequences of the energy crisis, exacerbated by US sanctions and the oil embargo. Of Meliá’s 34 hotels in Cuba, at least 15 are co-managed by Gaviota : many of the large resorts on the keys and some of the newer hotels in Varadero.

In Havana, the majority of hotels operated by the Balearic company remain linked to the state-owned groups Cubanacán or Gran Caribe. This is the case with the Meliá Cohiba, the Meliá Habana, and the Hotel Sevilla, among others.

Meliá manages 14,053 rooms on the island, representing approximately 14% of its global portfolio. A withdrawal from Cuba would impact its stock price, which had risen 40% this year.

It is still unclear how the sanctions will affect Meliá’s presence in Cuba, or what the company’s strategy will be to disassociate itself from Gaesa if necessary.

The hotel chain’s president and CEO, Gabriel Escarrer, acknowledged last month that the situation in Cuba is “difficult” and “unsustainable,” and that the chain is continuing its strategy of consolidating the few tourists who visit the island into fewer hotels. “I think that today few people know what’s going to happen with Cuba,” he said at the time when asked about Meliá’s future in Cuba.

Escarrer—son of Escarrer Juliá, founder of the hotel chain and a close associate of Fidel Castro—was already sanctioned by OFAC in February 2020. At that time, the businessman, visiting Cuba to attend the Tourism Fair, claimed to be indifferent to the sanctions and said his intention was to remain on the island for at least another three decades. “We will not tremble in the face of any external pressures we may experience,” he insisted.

Last February, when Washington’s sanctions against Gaesa had not yet intensified, Escarrer had declared: “It is not our intention to withdraw [from Cuba] in any way and we feel very comfortable with the leadership position.”

The decision by the Asian airline Aston was revealed by the Dominican media outlet aerocoa.com, close to the deadline imposed by the U.S. State Department under Executive Order 14404, signed by President Donald Trump on May 1st. This order mandated sanctions against “those responsible for repression in Cuba and threats to U.S. national security and foreign policy.” A few days later, the decree began to take effect with specific sanctions against GAESA, its president, Ania Guillermina Lastres, and Moa Nickel SA.

Although Cubanacán is on OFAC’s SDN list and is sanctioned by the agency, it does not belong to the Gaesa conglomerate, which the State Department directly targeted.

This Monday, the Spanish company Iberostar announced its disassociation from Gaviota , leaving under its management in Cuba only those hotels that were owned by Cubanacán or Gran Caribe. Last Saturday, Blue Diamond announced that it would cease its operations and the use of its brands in Cuba “with immediate effect.”

Although Cubanacán is on the OFAC SDN list and is sanctioned by the agency, it does not belong to the Gaesa conglomerate, which the State Department directly targeted on May 7.

The sanctions, however, could also be extended to the state entities Cubanacán, Gran Caribe and Islazul if so determined by the State Department and OFAC, given that Executive Order 14400 considers as a criterion of linkage with the Government of Cuba the “ownership, control or direct management of the entities.”

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